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Journal of Politics
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democracy and good governance; personal perspectives and reflections, and other
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Journal of Politics and Democratization
Volume 2-1 (April 2017)
Of Uprisings and Regressions:
The Strange Fruit of Egypt’s Arab Spring
Paul J. Carnegie
Associate Professor
Director of Governance in the School of Governance,
Development, and International Affairs
University of the South Pacific
Abstract: The events that swept Egypt six years ago gripped us all and they also raised high expectations
of substantive political change. Yet, it may have been better to exercise reservation about Egypt’s postuprising direction. As we have witnessed, there are no guarantees during a transition phase of regime
change. The following article investigates why and how Egypt’s “Arab Spring” turned out the way it did.
It argues that the current outcome, while disappointing to normative aspirations, was not wholly
unexpected. The product of a polity in the capricious embrace of reactionary forces and past legacies.
Key words: Arab Spring, democratization, Egypt, post-authoritarian politics, transition dynamics.
Biography: Associate Professor Paul J. Carnegie is Director of Governance in the School of Governance,
Development and International Affairs at the University of the South Pacific. He has research
specializations in comparative post-authoritarian politics, human security, and localized responses to
militant extremism with a focus on Indonesia and Southeast Asia as well as the MENA and Asia Pacific.
He has published widely in his fields including the monograph The Road from Authoritarianism to
Democratization in Indonesia (Palgrave Macmillan) and a recent co-edited volume on Human
Insecurities in Southeast Asia (Springer). He also has related output in leading international journals
including Pacific Affairs, the Middle East Quarterly, Journal of Terrorism Research and Australian Journal
of International Affairs. Paul has extensive applied research experience and networks having lived and
worked previously in Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Egypt, and the United Arab Emirates.
“All men recognize the right of revolution; that is, the right to refuse allegiance to, and to resist,
the government, when its tyranny or its inefficiency are great and unendurable.”
Henry David Thoreau 1849
Introduction
Let us be honest, the challenges of Egypt’s transition were never anything other than
considerable and multiple. We all too readily assumed that the toppling of the long-standing
authoritarian ruler, Hosni Mubarak, was an inextricable turn towards democracy. This was a false
assumption. It may be one thing to remove a despot but quite another to establish and sustain
substantive democratic change over time without stagnation or reversal (Carnegie, 2010).
As our experience of democratization phenomena over the last 30-40 years tells us, countries do
not emerge from upheaval overnight. The less than optimal outcome we are witnessing in Egypt since
the uprisings rests largely on the fact that during a transition period a country is not suddenly a tabula
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rasa—merely capable of projecting the most feasible solutions. Past developmental patterns,
underlying societal conventions, and reactionary forces can all constrain the possibility of political
change. In fact, distinct trade-offs and ambiguous outcomes emerge primarily because any form of
democratic re-arrangement vis-à-vis political power involves compromise with an authoritarian past
(Bermeo, 1990; Collier & Collier, 1991; Geddes, 1999; Munck, 1994; O’Donnell, 1996; Whitehead, 2002).
In other words, political transitions are a complicated and contingent affair. This “politics of transition”
is as liable to stall or retreat into a semi-authoritarian condition as it is to progress into a more
democratic outcome (Ottaway, 2003). The process is rarely, if ever, ideal (Carnegie, 2008).
Indeed, in recent years, numerous scholars have drawn attention to the emergence of what are
more commonly referred to as “hybrid regimes” (Casper, 1995; Diamond, 2002; McFaul, 2002; Ottaway,
2003; Schedler, 2003, 2006; Zakaria, 1997). They exist on a spectrum somewhere between democracy
and authoritarianism. Neither one thing nor the other. Outwardly, they may display some of the formal
procedural features of “democracy” but they “play” by considerably different “rules” (Carnegie 2009,
pp. 398-399). Often times, the perceived self-interests or those of “reserved domains” end up playing
significant roles in shaping events and outcomes (Carnegie, 2012, pp. 71-79). In fact, a variety of
electoral authoritarianism is quite possibly the most common form of political regime in the developing
world.
The following article maps key stages in the politics of Egypt’s post-Mubarak transition, to gauge
how and why its “Arab Spring” turned out the way it did. It argues that substantive political change
failed to emerge primarily because the forces and legacies of Egypt’s authoritarian past weighed too
heavy in the process. They drained the momentum and ability of the popular uprising to take hold and
institute meaningful reform.
Translating Frustrations into Reform?
While events in Tunisia acted as a catalytic stimulus that set in train cathartic outpouring of
societal frustration in Egypt, the problems that underpinned the popular uprising were more deepseated. The protests may have focused attention on a dynastic family who had blatantly pursued
massive personal gain for themselves and their associated cronies but what we also witnessed was a
simultaneous convergence of multiple social, economic, and political vectors bringing things into sharp
relief. If we look at the conditions in Egypt, there were some pretty clear clues to the simmering anger
and frustration. We all know that there was and are massive inequalities in wealth distribution. Despite
substantial wealth generation that narrow self-serving politico-business-military elites enjoyed, some of
which trickled down to the middle classes, economic stagnation was and is rife. Millions struggle below
the poverty line in Egypt (25-26 percent of a population of 83.5 million) with a literacy of about 66
percent and an annual GDP per capita of little more than $2,270 (The Guardian, 2015). Combine this
with rising prices of basic foodstuffs and high unemployment among a disenfranchised, marginalized,
and frustrated youthful population wired together as never before and you have an extremely volatile
mix. The constant and ongoing repression of dissent by the Internal Security Services in the run up to
the “rigged” 2010 parliamentary elections and the unrest generated by an intra-regime power struggle
over who would succeed an aging and ailing Mubarak were the final ingredients (The Guardian, 2011).
The failures of a corrupt, repressive, and ossified autocratic regime were about to come home to roost.
One of the most fascinating aspects of the Egyptian uprising was its crosscutting nature,
traversing race, gender, religion, and social status. The speed with which “horizontal bonds of
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solidarity” formed between mostly student-led activist groups and the wider populaces was surprising
and facilitated logistically at least by social media technology and Friday Prayers. Taking inspiration from
the Kefaya (Enough) and April 6th movements, the latter originating in 2008 as an expression of
solidarity with striking workers in Al-Mahala. Interestingly, the April 6th movement had itself been in
contact with a Serbian group called Otpor, the student-led movement that helped bring down Slobodan
Milosevic in 2000. The synthesis of this exchange obviously provided helpful tactical and strategic input
in terms of setting up camp in the Capital, speaking truth to the regime and remaining resolute in the
face of reprisals.
Social media also provided a distributed networked platform to publicize geographically
dislocated events (Beaumont, 2011). The ability to send and receive information instantaneously about
unfolding events via the use of mobile phones facilitated in the formation of important bonds of
solidarity among disparate grouping. Phone cameras became the “eyes and ears” of the uprising
(Preston, 2011). The Mubarak regime worked tirelessly to try and obstruct mainstream news media’s
access to certain events. They targeted access to phone lines and internet access all in an attempt to
control the message getting out. But they could not curtail the use of social media with tech-savvy
activists rerouting access through outside servers. It provided a logistical tool to keep the flow of
information and conversation going. For instance, Facebook provided a platform to plan
demonstrations via its “event” feature. Listing the time, location, and purpose of the demonstrations
gave previously disconnected groups of people, who wanted to join in, their chance. Media technology
not only enabled the protestors to share their experiences with each other but also the rest of the world
in real time. The momentum it generated in 18 days was sufficient to force Mubarak from office.
Having said this, translating this popular social momentum for greater political freedoms,
representation, effective rule of law, and better living conditions (that brought down Mubarak) into
some form of representative capacity was always going to be an uphill task for Egyptians. What the
Egyptian people were faced with was finding ways to strike a different “social contract.” Uprising forces
may have been large but they were weak in terms of capacity, experience, and resources, desiccated by
decades of repression and co-optation of political parties (CIHRS, 2009; Ebied, 1989; Stacher, 2004). It
was a populace systematically depoliticized vis à vis the state. Egyptian friends of mine used to call the
political landscape a “millpond” and “open prison” where Mubarak’s police-state had “removed the
hope of their even being hope.” Trying to establish political organizational structures capable of gaining
relevant representation was no easy task. Real politics had languished in a catatonic state choked by
intimidation and fear. Out with the banned Muslim Brotherhood, there was little if any organized
institutions autonomous of the state. They had to be re-built and pushed hard for concessions and
compromise if a progressive agenda was going to influence substantive reform. There was much at
stake but time was short.
In a transition period, political actors are in contestation not just to satisfy their immediate
interests but also to define rules and procedures whose configuration will likely determine winners and
losers in the future. What became clear was that the mainly progressive forces that fuelled the uprising
especially in Tahrir Square did not have sufficient time, experience, or resources to capacity build
against powerful and organized reactionary actors (Carter Center, 2012). The organizational “deepstate” supporting structures of the military establishment and the Mubarak regime’s National
Democratic Party (NDP) in Egypt did not simply crumble and actually remained largely intact (CIHRS,
2011). There was strong residual presence constraining potential democratic reform and conditioning
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the character of contestation between elites and oppositional forces. The following sections give more
detail to this prognosis.
Free and Fair Elections?
Despite concerted efforts to organize free and fair elections, they took place in circumstances of
flux and instability. There was really little point in assuming that elections in isolation would simply
channel contests among political rivals and accord public legitimacy. There also had to be correspondent
reform of state institutions, policymaking procedures and attendant recovery of civil liberties and
political rights, in particular, enhanced freedom of expression, access to alternative information, and
expansion of associational autonomy. This was in short supply. In many instances, press restrictions
remained in place, harassment of democracy advocates and civil society groups continued, and the
ranks of political detainees swelled, all of which indicated a less than reform-friendly climate (CIHRS,
2016).
The organizational structures of the old regime had not just vanished. There was strong residual
presence with “old” actors contesting for power and a return to the political arena in different ways.
The National Democratic Party (NDP) may have been discredited and fragmented in the immediate
aftermath of Mubarak’s downfall, but its underlying institutional organization and the interests it
represented remained very much intact. NDP acolytes and cronies of the Mubarak regime still stalked
the corridors of power. Egyptians scornfully called them “fuloul” (a remnant).
Then in June 2012 came the lamentable decision by the judges of the Constitutional Court,
appointed under Mubarak, to disband the newly elected Islamist-dominated parliament and allow exprime-minster under Mubarak, Ahmed Shafiq, to run for the presidency. Even with the electoral success
of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and the inauguration of Mohamed Morsi
as the new president on 30th June 2012, the Constitutional Court’s decision essentially green lighted
General Tantawi and the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF) to make an audacious power
grab. Many Egyptians are well aware of how practiced the SCAF is at presenting an illusion of change for
the wider populace, the international community, and associated media while nothing really changes.
After the ouster of elected President Mohamed Morsi and his Freedom and Justice party (FJP) in
a coup d’état in July 2013, the SCAF essentially manufactured a “Hobson’s choice”’ for the next
presidential election with their “man,” the former Defense Minister, General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi
standing against Hamdeen Sabahi of Egyptian Popular Current after interim president Adly Mansour
declined to run. Sisi was duly elected with 97 percent of the vote at the end of May 2014 (BBC, 2014).
He was able to capitalize on a wave of popular fear over disintegration and chaos and he promised
stability. In reality, General el-Sisi’s accession to power heralded a swift and brutal crackdown against
supporters of Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood as well as protestors and leading dissenting voices of
the “Arab Spring.”
Consequently, Egypt went without a Parliament for two years until the High Elections
Committee (HEC) announced the composition of the 2015 parliamentary elections. There were 596
seats with 448 elected under an individual voting system, 120 elected from the party lists, and 28
appointed by el-Sisi. The seven electoral lists were from the Egyptian Front, Forsan Misr (The Knights of
Egypt), The Independent Current, Fi Hob Misr (For the Love of Egypt), Nedaa Misr (The Call of Egypt), the
Nour Party, and al-Sahwa al-Wataneya (The National Awakening) (IFES, 2015). Although the Salafi Nour
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Party contested nearly 60 percent of the seats, its popularity was dented by its support for Morsi’s
ouster. Significantly, with the leading party from the previous elections, the Muslim Brotherhood’s
Freedom and Justice Party, now banned and with large numbers of its leading members languishing in
jail, the stage was clear for some “old” actors to contest for power and return to the political arena in a
different guise. Many former National Democratic Party (NDP) acolytes staged their return and ran as
independent candidates. Moreover, the Egyptian Front is dominated by figures from al-Haraka alWataneya (The National Movement) founded by the aforementioned Ahmed Shafiq, Mubarak’s former
prime minster. Former NDP denizen Ahmed al-Fadali also heads up the Independent Current. The
elections did little more than shore up el-Sisi’s authority (The Guardian, 2015). Forcibly removing
political opponents outside legitimate general elections and reinstituting emergency laws was no sign of
democratic progress. One of the measures of democratic consolidation is the peaceful transfers of
power from incumbent to opposition through free and fair elections alongside greater civilian control
over the military.
The Military Returning to the Barracks?
Dismantling the most repressive structures of Mubarak’s authoritarian regime and trying to
reduce excessive military involvement in the political-economy of Egypt was always going to be difficult.
Although the military presented itself as a guardian of the nation and provisional protector of the
protestors during the uprising, its calculations ran deeper. The military establishment essentially
abandoned Mubarak as they saw him as a liability to their interests. With protests spreading
countrywide and Mubarak’s grip on power loosening in the face this popular pressure, the only way to
avert further crisis was to remove him from the heart of the body politic. After the fall of Mubarak,
there was little to persuade the military establishment to “return to the barracks.” They never really let
their grip on power go and they remained largely beyond the influence of the protests. There was very
limited time and only a small window of opportunity for protesters and activists to actually push for
concessions and step by step reforms that would have allowed for a gradual phasing out of military
embeddedness in Egypt’s body politic. The protesters may have broken through a fear barrier of threats
both psychological and physical but improved civilian rule over the military failed to materialize. In
reality, Morsi’s attempt to remove to members of the senior leadership of the SCAF early in his
presidency was a fatal miscalculation for himself and the country. An imminent reactionary backlash
was there for all to see.
The swift denunciation and military-led ousting of the elected Morsi government indicated that
the SCAF never really relinquished the political power it had granted itself under the 17 June 2012
addendum to the Constitutional Declaration. The addendum gave the SCAF the legislative powers of the
recently dissolved People’s Assembly and key powers previously held by the Egyptian military. It also
formalized the SCAF as a governing institution within the constitutional framework. Although
circuitously elected president, el-Sisi and his administration are essentially the same group of Egyptian
generals that formed the backbone of the Mubarak regime. In fact, the Egyptian military is still
Washington’s favored institution for holding onto Egypt and maintaining a regional status quo conducive
to its interests and that of local and global capital. There has been little change in the form of
government. The el-Sisi military junta represents little more than the continuation of Mubarak’s socalled civilian administration.
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Transitional Justice?
After the events of the Tahrir Square, distrust in institutions such as the judiciary and police
enforcement were open wounds in need of healing. If substantive change had really been a serious
consideration, political elites would have moved quickly to reign in the arbitrary power and nefarious
practices of the internal security services, or Mukhabarat but they did little. While public demand was
strong, leaders of emerging oppositions tried to negotiate and seize the opportunity provided by the
uprising to push hard for concessions from a disoriented regime but were kept at arms-length. Out with
the efforts of civil society groups and activists, serious considerations about transitional justice and what
form that might take and the steps needed to achieve it were in short supply—too many skeletons in
the cupboards. One way forward could have been a good airing but the SCAF were busy ensuring its
impunity and that no retrospective prosecutions would eventuate for the armed forces (CIHRS, 2013).
The SCAF and established political elites displayed little appetite for initiatives such as the establishment
of some form of truth and reconciliation commission as seen in places like South Africa or East Timor.
Despite some superficial judicial proceedings and the show trial of “Mubarak and Sons,” key issues of
who would be brought to justice for past crimes, and how far back into the past that justice process
would reach were never truly resolved. The mortar needed to rebuild respect for the rule of law and
combat endemic corruption, cronyism, and nepotism failed to arrive.
Constitutional Reform?
In the decades prior to the uprising, the Mubarak regime was skilled in using the Constitution to
its advantage especially by renewing the state of emergency powers that had been continuous force
since the assassination of President Anwar Sadat in 1981. Although Mubarak repeatedly vowed to
amend the Emergency Law (no. 162 of 1958) to end the permanent state of emergency, it never
eventuated primarily because it allowed him to maintain his grip on power (Kausch, 2009).
Under the state of emergency, state security agencies had sweeping powers of arrest, detention
and special trial, habeas corpus and constitutional rights were suspended, and censorship was
effectively legalized. With the mirage of a constitutional mandate, Mubarak implemented several laws
that allowed the regime to regulate the freedoms of political parties by limiting their financial resources
activities and functions. Moreover, the regime controlled the registration process of newly established
parties. It also employed constitutional means to exert control over the media and access to it.
Although the constitution guaranteed media freedom in Egypt, Mubarak’s regime still exerted major
control over it through the Emergency Law and Press Law (no. 20 of 1936). This allowed the Minister of
Interior Affairs to prevent “subversive” publications and broadcasts while detaining journalist deemed
the same (Ibrahim, Lachant, & Nahas, 2003). As such, the regime exerted a draconian control over the
media and forms of civil and political organization under the pretext of maintaining public order (CIHRS,
2009).
After Mubarak’s ouster, the constitutionally mandated enactment of Emergency Law (no. 162 of
1958) reached its expiry date at midnight on 31 May 2012 and with it Egypt’s state of emergency. Yet, a
mere two weeks later, on 13 June 2012, the Justice Ministry issued a decree effectively reimposing de
facto martial law by extending the arrest, detention, and military trial powers of security forces. In
December 2012, after two rounds of polling, the electoral approval for a new Constitution was a mere
63 percent on a 30 percent turnout (BBC, 2012). While the 2012 Constitution did introduce changes to
Mubarak’s 2007 Constitution, both its formation and content were contentious. Many members of the
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Constituent Assembly withdrew during the process after then President Morsi issued a decree giving
himself wide-ranging powers. The Cairo Administrative Court even referred the legality of the
Constituent Assembly to the Supreme Constitutional Court.
After the coup d’état to remove Morsi in 2013, the Supreme Constitutional Court suspended the
2012 Constitution. On 14 August 2013, interim president Adly Mansour reinstated a temporary state of
emergency and curfew following deadly clashes between security forces and supporters of deposed
President Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood. This remained in place until a revised constitution in
2014 achieved an electoral approval of approximately 98 percent on a 38.5 percent turnout (BBC,
2014a). The latter does provide some limitations on the imposition of emergency regulations in
comparison to the previous two constitutions. Nonetheless, the draconian and repressive Emergency
Law (no. 162 of 1958) remains the applicable juridical instrument in such instances. As el-Sisi was
declaring to CNN in 2015 that “Egypt enjoys unprecedented freedom of expression”, thousands
languished in detention without trial and the country was ranked second worst for the incarceration of
journalists with at least 23 behind bars (CPJ, 2015). Dictatorship and tyranny by another name is still
dictatorship and tyranny. What is important is what something is and not what it is called.
There were also limited constitutional reforms of overly centralized political power structures
and insufficient limitations on the power of the executive. Steps toward more effective representation
and diminishing power asymmetries by constitutionally de-coupling the corrupt and corrupting nexus
between politics, business, and the military could have laid foundations for future democratic legitimacy
and an effective check to facilitate peaceful civilian transfers of power.
Radical Islamist Ascendancy?
A major concern for future political developments in Egypt was the spectre of radical Islamist
ascendancy. Previously and although banned, the Muslim Brotherhood had been able to organize
around and prosper off the deficiencies of Mubarak’s regime. It stepped in where the regime had so
abjectly failed including the provision of education, health, and sanitation for the poorest in society. As
such, it had built up a country-wide organizational structure and solid popular support base. Yet,
despite the electoral success of Islamist parties in the first post-Mubarak elections, the tenor of the
uprisings suggested that the majority of people were against the institution, a form of Islamist
theocracy. The electoral success of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) and the
inauguration of Mohamed Morsi as the new president in June 2012 was short lived. Popular discontent
and protests began to grow over the increasingly autocratic and inept style of Morsi’s presidency and
the FJP’s air of Islamist theocracy. This was a situation the SCAF was effective at leveraging with a
fearful electorate to their advantage. They were able to (re)present a narrative that Mubarak and the
military establishment had long spun about themselves in Egypt—that their strongarm is the lone
bulwark and protector against a fanatical Islamist takeover. Unfortunately, the irony of liberal-secularist
groupings’ annoyance and critical disdain of Morsi’s style of leadership and the failures of his party’s rule
is that it led them into taking a disastrous shortcut. Their tacit support of military action to undermine
Muslim Brotherhood supremacy in Egypt was a Faustian pact that ushered in the return of a ruler with
an iron fist. It became a perverse form of exchange whereby the military unconditionally retained its
reserved economic domains, privileged status, and authority. It also seems that the international
community was willing to recognize a regime that prioritized western interests and stability above the
democratic and participatory desires of its inhabitants.
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Conclusion
As mentioned, varieties of electoral authoritarianism are quite possibly the most common form
of political regime in the developing world today. While there was no denying the significance of Egypt’s
uprising, an unfettered triumphalism was premature. It was an entrance into uncertainty characterized
by opportunity but also fraught with considerable danger. This article foregrounded some of the key
reasons why and how the process stalled and retreated back into an “authoritarian condition.” It
showed that the forces and interests of Egypt’s past weighed heavy in its post-uprising political
landscape. The popular momentum of the uprising failed to translate into effective political reform, a
situation that broadly conforms to a less than appetizing insight from the democratization literature. To
wit, short-lived and turbulent events may remove a despot but they are less likely to deliver wideranging and substantive change. The real work and the real difficulties start after the downfalls.
Unfortunately, there was no simple remedy, the perceived self-interests of “reserved domains ‘ ended
up playing significant roles in shaping outcomes. Egypt’s “Arab Spring” yielded some strange fruit,
indeed.
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Constructing the “Abkhazian Issue” in the
Georgian Press, 2002-2010
Khatuna Maisashvili
Associate Professor
Ivane Javakhishvili Tbilisi State University
Faculty of Social and Political Sciences
Department of Journalism and Mass Communications
Tbilisi, Georgia
Abstract: Drawing on the fieldwork among the Georgian newspapers, in the period of 2002-2010, this
article shows how the Georgian media has mediated “The Abkhazian Issue” in a relatively “cool” conflict
context. In this case, mediation of the sequels and circumstances of the long-lasting ethno-political
conflict coincides with mediation of nationhood and national identity in the era of declining and
fragmenting a nation-state. The research aims to identify the construct “Abkhazian Issue” in the media
of the parent state, Georgia, to highlight its latent variables and to identify the correlation between the
components of this construct and vast social and political discourse in Georgia. The article is based on
several research techniques: intensive (in-depth) interviews with eight respondents, content analysis
(framing analysis approach) of 1,752 units from Georgian media, with further implication by factor
analysis and the experimental designed panel discussion with 12 participants. In result, the key factor of
mediation has been identified as a weakness, in general, of both of the parties of the conflict, and
especially as a weakness of the breakaway region, Abkhazia, in nation-building, and in its insufficient
capabilities to maintain even quasi-independent status. The weakness of Georgia is considered as a
result of short-sighted policy, as well as of wasted opportunities for the reintegration and reconciliation
with Abkhazia.
Key Words: conflicts, nationalism, media.
Introduction
New Spaces on the Map of Globalized World of Nations—Mediating a Breakaway Region
Since the end of the World War II and the Cold War, the world has continued to watch how
secessionist groups try to establish new states after breaking away from the modern states. Experts
discuss and argue about whether these postmodernist “New Middle Ages” are the results of
globalization or a trend designed to impede globalization. In this context, the term “New Middle Ages”
may not be metaphorical at all. Indeed, there are similarities with the maps from the Middle Ages and
today, given the claims of so-called breakaway regions regarding borders and dividing lines. Roberts
(1985) wrote that the mediaeval maps represented the world unobsessed with the boundaries, that
general areas were indicated for kingdoms and empires without the compulsion to represent the precise
place where one kingdom ended and another started. As Mann (1988) points out, in Mediaeval Europe
no single power controlled a clear-cut territory or the people within it. Today’s map of the world of
nations is full of such blurring lines between states, parent states and breakaway regions, even in the
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case of Abkhazia where it is certainly unclear who is the real policy maker in this breakaway region, and
whose authority legally spreads over the territory of Abkhazia.
It is important to touch on two concepts from the very start, those of the breakaway regions
proper and their media image. The case of interest here, the Georgian-Abkhazian conflict, and its media
reflections, is part of the post-Soviet history.
In the final years of the Soviet Union (1991-1992), a trend became evident that the states
(republics) and political institutions, declining in their powers, were no longer able to impose a uniform
sense of identity. As Breuilly (as cited Billig, 1995, p. 133) noted, the USSR embodied Russian hegemony
over the other 14 legally constituted republics, with over hundred “nationalities” also legally recognized.
Billig (1995) also noted that, “Just as the republics have moved for national independence, so some of
the “nationalities” now move against newly independent republics” (p. 133). So, the former Soviet
republics have been threatened by the very sub-national processes which their own birth permitted.
Billig (1995) characterized this process through the formula, “Having come into existence through
processes of national fragmentation, they are liable to be threatened by the imaging of other identities,
claiming their own even smaller homeland space” (p. 133).
As a result of these very processes, Abkhazia de-facto broke away from the rest of Georgia.
Since September 1993, when, on September 27, the fall of Sokhumi marked the end of the GeorgianAbkhazian conflict, Abkhazia, as a political entity, has been referred to by various terms—de-facto,
unrecognized, occupied—depending on certain political circumstances. The last internationally
recognized name of Abkhazia belongs to the Soviet era. It was named Autonomous Soviet Socialist
Republic of Abkhazia within the state borders of the Georgian Soviet Socialist Republic. Norwegian
researcher, Pal Kolsto (2006), points out that, “Like the former Soviet republics that today are
independent states, most current quasi-states in post-Soviet Eurasia were also formerly federal units of
the Soviet Union, but on a lower level” (p. 726). Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the
international community enforced certain restrictions to limit the national self-identification of entities
with different statuses. According to the Georgian Legislation, the latest applicable status of Abkhazia is
“occupied territory.”
Zygmunt Bauman (1993) argues that the nations being created in the contemporary
postmodern world differ so much from the nations created by nationalism in the edge of modernity,
that the term nation should not be properly applied. Specifically, he states that, “Exit the nation-state,
enter the tribe” (p. 141). The new so-called nations lack “viability,” because national viability has been
undermined in the present world; they are too small to be sovereign, and, in any case, state sovereignty
is disappearing (Bauman, 1992b, p. 675). “The rhetoric implies that France and the United States, having
been established in the heyday of nationhood, were (and perhaps, still are) “real” nations. But Slovenia
and Byelorus are arrivistes, seeking entrance after all the tickets to genuine nationhood have been sold”
(Bauman, 1992b, p. 675).
But the modern world no longer perceives breakaway regions as something uncommon or
incidental. Kolsto (2006) emphasizes,
Since the end of the Cold War, there has clearly been a higher than average incidence of
such entities in the former Soviet Union and in former Yugoslavia; that is, in two
recently disintegrated multinational communist federations. In the former Soviet
republic of Moldova, we find the Dniester Moldovan Republic (DMR); and in Azerbaijan,
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the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR). Georgia has the dubious distinction of being the
home of two quasi-states—Abkhazia and South Ossetia“ (p. 726).
This process continues - two years ago, Crimea joined the ranks of the breakaway regions emerging in
the territory of the former Soviet republics. The trend of fragmenting nation states is growing stronger
in Europe as well.
As noted above the second key concept is related to media representation of a breakaway
region. In our case, the perspective on Abkhazia and the “Abkhazian Issue” is Georgia-centric. The
vision is produced by and for Georgians. It is broadly accepted that the concept of a nation-state still
remains an important analytical unit, even in the times of media globalization (Flew & Waisbord, 2015).
As many scholars point out, the mass media is regarded as a crucial instrument by which diverse
conflicts within and among nations and nation-states are “mediatized,” “performed,” “enacted,” or
“narrated” (Matar & Harb, 2013). Thanks to Benedict Anderson (1983) and Michael Billig (1995), the
role of the media in the forging of a given nation’s symbolic discourse is defined in the late 20th century
as the architect of imaginary unity and the reminder of national identity.
When studying the media presentation of statehood, researchers juxtapose two aspects of the
media-nationhood nexus—ontological and epistemological. Roosvall and Salovaara-Moring (2010) point
out that [… relevance of nationhood in media…] “ontologically it offers a sense of territorial stability and
security while epistemologically it can supply a sense of familiarity and order in the global landscape” (p.
9). Even in that case when one state is split and national community loses its territorial base (as it
happened in case of Georgia, when separation of Abkhazia was perceived by the majorities of Georgians
as “a loss of Georgian land”), the media help community “to retain its … sentiment and “we feeling”
(Oommen, p. 191).
The numerous recent global interdisciplinary research lead to a generalized conclusion that the
emergence of any breakaway or de-facto entity and its media representation is subject to a general
pattern made up of several characteristics. Examination of relevant literature (mainly Georgian sources,
including Pax Georgiana (Khatuna Maisashvili. Tbilisi: 2015), “Independence of Abkhazia – Premodern or
Postmodern Project of Identity” (Khatuna Maisashvili, Paper for International Scientific Conference
“Space and Society”, June 2016, Tbilisi)) shows that these characteristics are quite broad, namely:
•
Dynamics of relations between parent states and breakaway regions at different stages of a
conflict; preconditions and prospects of the breakaway regions building and maintaining
statehood.
•
Nation-affirming rhetoric in the discourse of political leaders from both sides—when political
leaders craft their public rhetoric and communication policies with the aim to create, control,
and distribute the mediated messages as a political resource.
•
Process of creation of different forms of psychological identifications with a nation, particularly
in the international relations.
•
Strong and weak points of both parent states and breakaway regions when it comes to creating
effective mechanisms to manage conflicts and their consequences.
•
Level of engagement of outside actors in conflicts in light of the military component.
•
Engagement of supranational, global, and international organizations in the process.
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•
National components of breakaway regions; the economic development of breakaway regions.
•
Attempts to discern the trajectory of the fate of breakaway regions, whether return and
reintegration into the parent state or absorption into an outside master.
The Relevance and Objectives of the Study
The conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia, and the mediation of this conflict, has covered
several stages. Naturally, the media representations of hot and relatively milder stages differ in many
ways, such as different perception of danger, space and identity. Equally different is the effect of
perception of each message by the audience who question whether the message is simply new
knowledge or a signal to action.
According to the Georgian and international scholars, the initial stage in the Georgian-Abkhazian
conflict covered the period from July 1988 through August 14, 1992. It was a stage when the desire of
Abkhazian political establishment and nationalist organizations to separate from Georgia was
proclaimed. The second stage covers the war itself, the hottest period in the conflict, with its effects
and consequences, from August 14, 1992 through September 27, 1993. The next stage covers six years
from 1993 to 1999 when Georgian authorities instilled a sense of anticipation of “Abkhazia’s rapid and
honorable” return. From 1999 to 2002, both the relations between the parties to the conflict and the
mediation of these relations ended up in stagnation.
The period selected for this study, from 2002 to 2010, is unique in several dimensions:
1) Its dynamics leading from fragmented relations between the parties to full termination as a
result of Abkhazia’s occupation by Russia.
2) Changing political rhetoric where, in 2003-2004, politicians whose names were tied to the
initiation of the war left the political arena, and politicians upholding new visions took over in
both Georgia and Abkhazia.
3) Both the effect and quality of outside interference (for example, the actions of Russia,
Abkhazia’s “outside master”, from soft russification policy to military aggression.
4) The format of relations changed: direct meetings between the parties were interrupted by the
occupation.
The research question to be undertaken in this study, therefore is, What is the substantial
meaning of the coverage of the “Abkhazian issue” in the Georgian media? What variables constitute it,
and what defines the composition of this issue?
Methods
The study employs a combined method, a mix of quantitative and qualitative analyses, to
answer the following question with maximal precision: What components comprise the structure of the
“Abkhazian Issue” in Georgian political, social, and cultural discourse?
1) The main findings of the study, which involve political, social, and cultural (including media)
contexts and describe the specifics of the period chosen (2002-2010), are based on intensive
interviews with experts, including academicians and policy researchers specializing in the
Abkhazian issue, in addition to reporters and editors of media publications. The interviews were
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held from July 2011 to March 2012. The intensive interviews involved eight interviewees. Since
the interviewees were top quality professionals, our questions were designed to extract from
them descriptions of facts or trends, recollections/reconstruction, and assessment. In
particular, the questions involved:
a) Perceptions of the “Abkhazian Issue” in different communications streams: i) results of
surveys, ii) political platforms and political rhetoric, and iii) the media.
b) Perception of the “Abkhazian issue” at different stages of the conflict.
c) Identification of specific timeframes in the period under study and characterization of each
stage.
d) Deictic centers for decision-making on the “Abkhazian issue.”
2) Content analysis (framing analysis approach) was used to study 1,752 stories of different genres
published by the most widely-circulated and trusted publications, Resonance, daily, and the
Kviris Palitra weekly, which are two independent Georgian newspapers, and in the agenda of
which the “Abkhazian Issue” is highly ranked in comparison with other Georgian media. The
unit of analysis is defined as any article from the total under study that involves:
a) Relations between representatives of Georgian and Abkhazian elites at any given level or
format of negotiations.
b) Initiatives by the Georgian Government and the de-facto authorities of Abkhazia, also by civil
society organizations, involving the other party.
c) Existing or potential conflict resolution resources.
d) The image of Abkhazia and the Abkhazians.
e) Humanitarian problems triggered by the conflict.
f) Correlation between the identities of the Georgians and the Abkhazians (national identity,
social identity, cultural/religious identity).
g) The state of ethnic Georgians in Abkhazia.
h) The roles and functions of outside actors in the dynamics of the conflict.
The further stage involved processing of the results of frame analysis by using the statistical
procedure of factor analysis.
Findings
A. Effect of Presence. Perception of the “Abkhazian Issue” in Political, Social and Cultural
Discourse. The implications of intensive interviews.
Public Opinion, Political Discourse, and Media Discourse
The results of the intensive interviews reveal that the interviewees remember how the
“Abkhazian Issue” was positioned in both public opinion surveys and political and media discourses. In
particular, the issue of territorial integrity (formulated in this manner precisely) in the period under
discussion was invariably among the top three issues of national importance, according to public opinion
surveys conducted in Georgia annually by the U.S. National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the
International Republican Institute (IRI).
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According to the experts, however, unlike other high-priority, urgent issues under the survey,
the topic of the restoration of territorial integrity was not automatically reflected in the election
campaign rhetoric of politicians. For example, the experts believe that, despite its top positions in
surveys in 2003, the UNM’s (United National Movement, the political party that came to power as a
result of the Rose Revolution in 2003) election campaign rhetoric did not prioritize the “Abkhazian issue”
at all. Moreover, it was probably viewed by Saakashvili and his team as a problem related directly to
Shevardnadze, which would be solved after the toppling of Shevardnadze. From 2003 to 2010, the
“Abkhazian issue” in political discourse underwent a tremendous transformation. In parallel with, or in
place of, “the restoration of territorial integrity” political rhetoric employed substitute terms, such as
reintegration, reclamation of Abkhazia, conflict resolution, and reconciliation with the Abkhazians, and,
since 2008, de-occupation.
As for the media, the interviewees believe that, since the 1990s, the Georgian media defines its
role as a reminder of national identity, including that of Abkhazia because it is an integral part of the
internal national space. According to the interviewees, any given fact or event related to the “Abkhazian
Issue” invariably meets value criteria, several at once, of information in every way. The receiving
audience required from the press a frequency of presentations of the “Abkhazian issue” (a high
frequency of media coverage is a characteristic of the representation of domestic environment), a
higher scope covered by information (the higher the scope and dramatism of an event, the better it
meets the reader’s expectations), also ethnocentricity, that is, identification with the Georgian users of
information, and continuity (even when the scope diminished, continuity an frequency compensated for
the loss).
Characterization of Timeframes
During the interviews, interviewees were asked to recall, identify, and characterize, based on
their professional experience, timeframes with clear, reasonable, and specific features. In other words,
they were asked to compose different types of timeframes.
The generalization of this part of the interviewees revealed the following:
1) 2002-2003: In the final two years of Eduard Shevardnadze’s rule, the center of conflict
management in public politics clearly relocated from Tbilisi and Sokhumi. Both Tbilisi and
Sokhumi delegated different policy aspects to various domestic or foreign actors. In particular,
the process of negotiations was entrusted in its entirety to international organizations. The
inert format of peacemaking forces no longer guaranteed the conflict’s maintenance at level
zero. Finding “the key” to Abkhazia was a task assigned to Aslan Abashidze, the leader of the
Adjara region. In 2002-2003, Tamaz Nadareishvili (the head of the legitimate Abkhazian
Government) and the leaders of Georgian guerilla fighters seemed to make up the only
motivated force able to reclaim Abkhazia. Russia as a political actor replaced Abkhazian
authorities. In 2002, a threat of Russian aggression became evident, replaced in 2003 with the
so-called Loshchinin Russification doctrine. Russians took over the Abkhazian property. The
chaotic political processes in Abkhazia proceeded against the background of extremely difficult
social and economic conditions and crime on the rise.
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2) 2003-August 2004 marked the beginning of Saakashvili’s rule, the resonating political victory of
this new political leader in Adjara, and Aslan Abashidze, a leader of regional importance, fleeing
Adjara. Saakashvili’s government promoted a belief in the successful import of a scenario,
similar to the Adjara scenario, in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, also implementing “humanitarian
intervention” in so-called South Ossetia. The anticipated return of the breakaway regions
proved a total failure.
3) August 2004-May 2006 saw quite an intensive peacemaking process, with integration initiatives
raised by the Georgian and Abkhazian sides. It was a field of miscommunication, with messages
failing to match because these initiatives had no feedback. Saakashvili’s government constantly
reminded the Abkhazians, as well as Georgia’s citizens, that there was an alternative scenario
involving use of force.
4) May 2006-August 2008: the parties rejected, or neglected, initiatives regarding each other.
Authorities pursued an active PR campaign promoting Kodori as Georgia’s outpost. Open
military rhetoric abounded, followed by the August 2008 war and the subsequent occupation of
Abkhazia by Russia. From 2005 to 2008, the Georgian media disseminated information about
Sergey Baghapshi’s (Abkhazia’s de-facto president) attempts to settle in Abkhazia ethnic
Abkhazians, descendants of the mujahedeen fighters, from Turkey, and the families of
volunteers from the North Caucasus, who enjoyed general ethnic solidarity with the Abkhazians.
5) August 2008-2010 marked the beginning of a “dead era” when direct communication between
the Abkhazians and the Georgians died. The efforts of the Georgian Government focused
directly on the diplomatic front in order to prevent Abkhazia’s international recognition as an
independent state.
6) Deictic centers: The interviewed experts value the locations of media stories and the locations
from which they were reported, because they believe that it had an impact on the nature of
mediatization and the perception of messages. There are several deictic centers: Tbilisi (the
center of Georgian politics); Sokhumi (the center of Abkhazian politics); Abkhazian territories,
except Gali (mediatized, for the most part, according to Abkhazian and Russian sources; Gali
(conveyed based directly on narratives of eyewitnesses, that is, first sources. Information and
news broadcasts from Gali portray local Georgians as hostages of location, as persons abused
and stripped of their rights on ethnic grounds, venues of negotiations, Georgia’s regions with
different statuses, and ongoing processes in which may have an impact on Abkhazia.
B. The mediatized components of the “Abkhazian issue. Outcomes of framing analysis, factor
analysis and experimental designed focus-group.
A content analysis was conducted at the initial stage of the study. Media content compression
of 1,752 samples reflecting the “Abkhazian issue” was split into thematic frameworks/schemata used by
the Georgian media for the media representation of the Abkhazian issue, namely:
1) Tense and/or uncontrollable criminal situation in Abkhazia.
2) Hard economic conditions in Abkhazia.
3) Hazelnut harvest season resembles hunting season.
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4) Level of crime in Abkhazia peaks during tourist season.
5) Georgian authorities do not know how, or simply cannot, carry out effective policy in relation to
Abkhazia.
6) Georgia’s government policy and actions in relation to Russian peacekeepers are inconsistent.
7) International organization are ineffective in Georgia-Abkhazia conflict resolution.
8) Guerilla fighters are the only force motivated enough to reclaim Abkhazia.
9) The stance of Abkhazia’s legitimate authorities is that enforcement (war) is the only way to
reclaim Abkhazia.
10) North Caucasian solidarity has an immense and dangerous impact on Abkhazia-Georgia
relations.
11) Abkhazia is yet another “regional” issue facing Georgia’s authorities, similar to the problem of
Aslan Abashidze’s Adjarian separatism.
12) Political parties and experts view offering the Abkhazians appealing investment opportunities as
a way to establish a dialogue with Abkhazia and Abkhazians.
13) International trade and infrastructural projects offer a real opportunity to integrate Abkhazia
into Georgia.
14) The Abkhazian issue becomes relevant in Georgian politics only during electoral campaigns
15) Abkhazia’s de facto government is Russia’s proxy.
16) Russia’s Abkhazian policy seeks to conquer Abkhazia, not to promote its independence.
17) Russian investments are not investments as such, but an outright robbery, appropriation of
public assets.
18) Georgia-Abkhazia conflict stems from an ethnic identity conflict.
19) Status is the key issue in Georgia-Abkhazia relations.
20) Abkhazians would rather opt for a confederation, not a federation.
21) Abkhazian authorities are concerned about Abkhazia’s ethnic diversity.
22) Abkhazian authorities are seeking another “external partner.”
23) Members of the Abkhazian community do not enjoy equal civil rights.
24) Sergey Bagapsh, “President of Gali Georgians and Gagra Armenians.”
25) The Rose Revolution may be exported to Abkhazia.
26) The Rose Revolution cannot be exported to Abkhazia.
27) The Kodori Gorge, as a PR promotion strategy for Upped Abkhazia, is a hoax, not a constructive
political decision.
28) Granting the status of Upper Abkhazia to the Kodori Gorge is a step toward reclaiming Abkhazia.
29) Georgia’s authorities are taking imprudent steps and blocking informal Georgia-Abkhazia
dialogue.
30) Abkhazia is just one big Russian military base.
31) Gali is alienated by both Georgians and Abkhazians.
32) Diplomacy is the only domain where the Georgian side can fight to prevent recognition of
Abkhazia as an independent state.
33) The end of the August 2008 war is a dead-end in Georgia-Abkhazia relations.
34) Abkhazia’s legitimate government plans a campaign to recruit ethnic Abkhazians.
35) Occupation changes the situation drastically.
The schemata show that these 35 frameworks describe the forms of relations between Georgia and
Abkhazia, as well as their determinant variations.
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Next, 12 political experts were selected and employed as participants of panel discussionwhere
they were asked to use the frameworks above to answer the following question: How dependent on
Georgia’s political developments are the facts/events reflected in the schemata? Answers were
expected to be given on a scale 1 to 5 standing for:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
Not dependent at all
Dependent insignificantly
Somewhat dependent
Dependent significantly
Totally dependent
In addition, factor analysis was used to identify whether or not it was possible logically to link
the frameworks/schemata to the factors that would explain the typology of Georgia-Abkhazia relations.
The average scale was calculated by mode.
1)
2)
3)
4)
5)
6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
11)
12)
13)
14)
15)
16)
17)
18)
19)
20)
21)
22)
23)
24)
Tense and/or uncontrollable criminal situation in Abkhazia -1
Hard economic conditions in Abkhazia – 1
Hazelnut harvest season resembles hunting season – 2
Level of crime in Abkhazia peaks during tourist season – 1
Georgian authorities do not know how, or cannot, carry out effective policy in relation to
Abkhazia – 5
Georgia’s government policy and actions in relation to Russian peacekeepers are inconsistent –
4
International organization are ineffective in Georgia-Abkhazia conflict resolution – 3
Guerilla fighters are the only force motivated enough to reclaim Abkhazia – 4
The stance of Abkhazia’s legitimate authorities is that enforcement (war) is the only way to
reclaim Abkhazia – 5
North Caucasian solidarity has an immense and dangerous impact on Abkhazia-Georgia relations
–1
Abkhazia is yet another “regional” issue facing Georgia’s authorities, similar to the problem of
Aslan Abashidze’s Adjarian separatism – 5
Political parties and experts view offering the Abkhazians appealing investment opportunities as
a way to establish dialogue with Abkhazia and Abkhazians – 5
International trade and infrastructural projects offer a real opportunity to integrate Abkhazia
into Georgia – 4
The Abkhazian issue becomes relevant in Georgian politics only during electoral campaigns – 5
Abkhazia’s de facto government is Russia’s proxy – 1
Russia’s Abkhazian policy seeks to conquer Abkhazia, no to promote its independence – 2
Russian investments are not investments as such, but an outright robbery, appropriation of
public assets – 1
Georgia-Abkhazia conflict stems from an ethnic identity conflict – 4
Status is the key issue in Georgia-Abkhazia relations – 4
Abkhazians would rather opt for a confederation, not a federation – 4
Abkhazian authorities are concerned about Abkhazia’s ethnic diversity – 2
Abkhazian authorities are seeking another “external partner” – 1
Members of Abkhazian community do not enjoy equal civil rights – 1
Sergey Bagapsh, “President of Gali Georgians and Gagra Armenians” – 1
Maisashvili, K. Constructing the Abkhazian Issue
In the Georgian Press, 2002-2010
© Journal of Politics and Democratization
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Volume 2-1 (April 2017)
25) The Rose Revolution may be exported to Abkhazia – 2
26) The Rose Revolution cannot be exported to Abkhazia – 3
27) The Kodori Gorge, as a PR promotion strategy for Upped Abkhazia, is a hoax, not a constructive
political decision – 5
28) Granting the status of Upper Abkhazia to the Kodori Gorge is step toward reclaiming Abkhazia –
5
29) Georgia’s authorities are taking imprudent steps and blocking informal Georgia-Abkhazia
dialogue – 5
30) Abkhazia is just one big Russian military base – 2
31) Gali is alienated by both Georgians and Abkhazians – 4
32) Diplomacy is the only domain where the Georgian side can fight to prevent Abkhazia’s
recognition – 5
33) The end of the August 2008 war is a dead-end in Georgia-Abkhazia relations – 2
34) Abkhazia’s legitimate government plans a campaign to recruit ethnic Abkhazians – 5
35) Occupation changes the situation drastically – 2
Discussion
As is clear, the results of the research were represented by the scaled data. The respondents
used a summated rating approach, or Likert scale, to agree or disagree with the framed statements.
That permitted conducting the factor analysis. Framed data were grouped as the certain factors for
identifying the dimensions of evaluation. The process of factor analysis included three stages:
extraction, rotation, and interpretation.
Stage 1: Extraction, or identification of the Number of Factors
For identifying the number of
factors, a decision was made to use a
scree plot. This approach implies
usage of two criteria. In one case,
factors were extracted with an
eigenvalue more than 1 on the scree
plot, and in another case, the
number of factors was counted down
above the point where the scree plot
creates the angle. Thus, in this case,
both approaches point out 10 factors
extracted. Figure 1 depicts extraction
1, the reduction of factors.
Maisashvili, K. Constructing the Abkhazian Issue
In the Georgian Press, 2002-2010
© Journal of Politics and Democratization
21
Journal of Politics and Democratization
Volume 2-1 (April 2017)
Stage 2: Rotation
After establishing the number of factors, based on the theoretical background of the study, it
was necessary to identify whether the factors should be in correlation and what should be the degree of
correlation. While in case of the data, factors may not correlate with each other, thus, orthogonal
resolution Varimax was chosen.
Prior to detailed analysis of the table of correlation, it became obvious that the correlation was
almost equal—the table does not reveal a particularly high correlation among the certain judgements,
so we have no need to remove some of the statements. In analysis of variances, the data of the first
three factors were used, since it covered most of the variations; namely, in this case, it explained 92% of
the variances.
The rotation matrix (Table 1) shows the distribution of the statements into 10 groups of factors,
namely:
1. Factor 1 includes statements N11, N12, N13 and N15. The degree of correlation among the
factors is high.
2. Factor 2 includes statements N9, N14, N23 and N34. Inside the factor, statement N 34 has the
lowest correlation rate.
3. Factor 3 includes statements N5, N10, N14, N28. Statement N 10 has the lowest correlation rate
inside the factor.
4. Factor 4 includes statements N2, N3, N26, N27 and N35. Inside the factor, statement N35 has
the lowest rate of correlation.
5. Factor 5 includes statements N7, N19, N31 and N33, inside which statement N31 has the lowest
correlation rate.
6. Factor 6 includes statements N25, N26, N29 and N32, where statement N32 has the weakest
correlation.
7. Factor 7includes statements N17, 18 and N21, where statement N18 has the weakest
correlation.
8. Factor 8 includes statements N1, N4, N6, N8, inside which statements 4 and 6 have weaker
correlation.
9. Factor 9 includes statements N20 and N22.
10. Factor 10 includes statement N30.
Table 1
Rotated Component Matrix*
Factor
1
A12
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
-.908
-.185
-.117
-.259
-.168
-.118
.908
.185
.117
.259
.168
.118
A13
.908
.185
.117
.259
.168
.118
A11
-.887
.272
A15
.169
Maisashvili, K. Constructing the Abkhazian Issue
In the Georgian Press, 2002-2010
© Journal of Politics and Democratization
-.105
.112
.121
.226
22
Journal of Politics and Democratization
A23
-.954
A9
.877
.223
-.108
.689
.440
.229
-.559
.107
.247
.946
A24
-.405
-.733
A28
-.161
.677
A14
A34
A5
A10
A3
A2
-.332
A35
.179
-.156
.221
.248
-.114
.145
.491
.259
.472
-.577
-.540
.470
.651
.182
.290
-.130
.266
.650
-.110
.269
.184
.149
.160
.604
-.123
.159
.294
-.280
.507
-.399
.368
.100
.873
.302
.107
-.812
.142
.273
-.159
.259
-.407
.318
.727
A7
-.277
.318
-.405
-.113
.499
A25
-.223
-.255
-.331
-.142
A29
.135
-.105
-.187
.116
.142
-.162
.276
-.170
-.204
A18
.532
-.210
-.137
-.250
A1
.284
-.129
A21
A17
A8
A4
-.167
.177
-.161
-.441
-.333
-.326
.229
.442
.130
.135
.210
-.209
.134
.351
.610
.596
.276
-.319
-.133
-.444
.174
.147
.220
-.127
.163
.128
.434
.393
-.908
.139
.245
-.778
.377
.128
.157
.510
.180
.224
.124
.167
.445
.659
A32
.272
-.164
.107
A19
A26
.529
.476
-.130
A33
.384
-.283
-.933
A31
.183
.109
.185
A27
A16
Volume 2-1 (April 2017)
.418
.635
.151
.954
-.390
.236
.664
.126
-.564
-.140
.434
-.175
-.113
.769
.168
.429
-.144
.181
-.246
-.403
-.289
-.193
-.162
.227
.167
-.435
-.758
.294
-.555
-.215
.251
-.126
-.249
.575
Maisashvili, K. Constructing the Abkhazian Issue
In the Georgian Press, 2002-2010
© Journal of Politics and Democratization
23
Journal of Politics and Democratization
A6
-.282
.474
-.447
-.172
.324
.127
-.222
.165
-.175
.465
-.284
.252
.238
.226
.134
-.112
.126
A20
A22
A30
Volume 2-1 (April 2017)
.204
-.501
.113
-.193
.928
.308
-.165
.263
-.620
.922
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.
Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization.
*Rotation converged in 25 iterations.
Stage 3: Interpretation
The analysis makes it evident what kinds of latent variables relate with the identified factors and
how they are determined by political will and actions by the side of the Georgian authorities, how much
they depend on the strength or weakness of Georgia as a parent-state. However, the results of analysis
demand the further implication and interpretation as far as each factor seeks for the certain political
formulation and signification, determined by the political conjuncture. The order of signification is
organized owing more or less subjective to the judgement of the researcher, despite the factors are
identified with quantitative logics and procedure.
As is evident, the statements forming Factor 1, are connected with the paradigm strengthweakness (the parent-state and the break-away region). The statements construct the thread as
follows: (1) Georgia is strong, and Abkhazia is weak; (2) Georgia possesses all the opportunities to
convince the Abkhazians that to be part of Georgia is economically and politically attractive for them; (3)
Georgia has been becoming attractive owing to the potential of regional infrastructure projects; (4) the
regional projects are considered as a chance of development for Abkhazia, because Abkhazia has no
resources for economic development, for promotion of its own initiatives for development at least the
quasi-state. Factor 1 is thus named, “The potential possibilities of Georgia for returning Abkhazia”.
Factor 2, based on the values of its constituent propositions, can be named as "Dispersed
strategy in relations to Abkhazia within the political spectrum of Georgia." Under a dispersed strategy it
combines as well the position of legitimate government of Abkhazia (displaced) that is adjusted for
ultimate results, so the position of the Saakashvili government, configured for PR and propaganda, as
the eventual, inconsistent approach of the Georgian political parties to find a resolution for the
“Abkhazian problem,” which is actualized only in the pre-electoral context. This factor indicates the
unawareness by the Georgian authorities about owning those levers of influence on Abkhazia, which
was represented in the Factor 1. Conceptually, creation of such a strategy depends entirely on the
policy of the government of Georgia, although its execution depends only partially.
Factor 3 combines the judgments that can be called ”Disregarding collateral risks by the parentstate." These judgments relate to the risks, the total management of which goes beyond the
competences and capacities of the Georgian authorities, but, nevertheless, their incorporation into
strategy would have prevented certain complications of the Abkhaz-Georgian relations. This primarily
concerns the factor of North Caucasian, Adyghe solidarity. Factor 3 represents the continuation of the
Factor 2, since in this case we observe the process in which the Georgian side seeking for maximum
results does not take into account the "complexity" and "package nature" of relations with Abkhazians.
The order of political priorites devoids a political and rational logics.
Maisashvili, K. Constructing the Abkhazian Issue
In the Georgian Press, 2002-2010
© Journal of Politics and Democratization
24
Journal of Politics and Democratization
Volume 2-1 (April 2017)
Factor 4 represents the unity of judgments, in which Abkhazia is represented as a "disaster
area," as a place of chaos and crime. Such a representation creates for the recipient the expectation
that "poor, weary from the excesses" Abkhazia will be back to Georgia. This factor can be called "The
weaker Abkhazia, the more chances for reintegration with Georgia." Included in Factor 4, judgments
portray a picture, for which the Georgian government is not responsible, but it is the result of the war, it
is the choice of the Abkhazian people for which they are paying. It is not surprising that journalists,
portraying an image of the "disaster area" often use symbolic codes, creating a contrast between the
"old, prosperous, Georgian Abkhazia" and the present Abkhazia, which remained without Georgia and
became mired in poverty and chaos.
Factor 5 and Factor 6 can be combined under one signification unit "Formative problem in the
relations between Abkhazia and Georgia." Problems related to the format, do not mean only the
formalities in the process of negotiations, as judgments, included in the Factors 5 and 6 affect the
meaningful dimensions of relations, such as actors of the negotiation process, subject of the talks,
context of negotiations, etc. These factors indirectly relate to the role of international and
supranational organizations that, along with the authorities of Georgia, were unable to find the
adequate formats to the real issues.
Judgments forming Factor 7 relate to the national identity contradictions between, on the one
hand, Georgia and Abkhazia, and, on the other hand, between Russia and Abkhazia. These specifically
include the nature of Russian expansion in Abkhazia, predatory patronage over Abkhazia, which causes
protest among the Abkhaz; ethnic and value conflict between Georgia and Abkhazia; and the Abkhaz
authorities’ concern the ethnic diversity of the region. How much this factor depends on the policy of
the Georgian government is not clear; the answer is ambiguous as the Georgian-Abkhazian relations are
based on other categories of identity. The factor can be named “Challenging Identity”.
Factor 8 coincides in some dimensions with the Factor 4 and may be called "Weak Abkhazia"
(but without perspective to return to Georgia).
Factor 9 has a clear meaning and can be called "Quest for status outside of Georgia" or "Status
with a minimal dependence on Georgia."
Factor 10, including only one statement “Abkhazia is a big Russian Military Base,” refers to the
occupied status of Abkhazia, or “Dead end of relations.”
Conclusion
The findings of the analysis conducted should answer the following question: Are the strong or
weak points of Georgia and Abkhazia one-dimensional phenomena, or do they turn into weak or strong
points in particular contexts?
A combination of factors show that both sides, in their media representation of the “Abkhazian
Issue,” materialize in particular combinations. For example, Georgia appears as a party with
supranational organizations as a facilitator strengthening Georgia’s positions, while Abkhazia appears as
a party with Russia, with its different functions, as a peacemaker, promoting and recognizing the
independence of Abkhazia’s statehood, and ultimately as an occupant.
Maisashvili, K. Constructing the Abkhazian Issue
In the Georgian Press, 2002-2010
© Journal of Politics and Democratization
25
Journal of Politics and Democratization
Volume 2-1 (April 2017)
Georgia’s weak points lie in missed opportunities and a fragmented vision of regulating the
Abkhazian problem. From a formal point of view, no fragmentation may be detected, and only one goal
may be discerned on the surface; that of Abkhazia’s incorporation into Georgia—Georgia must reclaim
Abkhazia! However, the problem is in the diversity of meaning of this very “reclamation” and “living
together,” depending on how these terms are perceived. Is it about going into war and conquering
Abkhazia by force? Restoration of territorial integrity? Reintegration? Confidence building among
Abkhazians toward Georgians? To share with Abkhazians, who choose Georgian citizenship, the benefits
accessible to Georgians? This very immaturity of a conceptual vision has turned into Georgia’s weak
point because it goes without saying that each of the processes listed above drastically differ
methodologically, in terms of mechanisms of operation. This fragmented vision has intensified formatrelated problems for the parties to the conflict (read facilitators as well).
The Georgian media of 2002-2010 blindly followed political discourse, which is preconditioned
and nourished by the media fearing that they perhaps involuntarily break the stereotypes imbedded in
Georgia’s collective consciousness. Some of these stereotypes include the hierarchy “Georgia as a
dominant, and Abkhazia as a subject,” perceptions about negotiations as a negative, futile practice,
perceptions about Abkhazia as a “weak” and “isolated” tribal unity, and others.
The weaknesses of the sides, especially the Abkhazian party, as the key factor pertaining to the
“Abkhazian issue”, may be examined in two dimensions, political and psychological. Politically, the
media offer a fragmented picture of the situation in Abkhazia, which may be easily generalized;
Abkhazia, separated from Georgia, has been unable to enjoy its (albeit unrecognized) sovereignty
because declared state independence and an obligation of unity (as a nation) alone have proved
insufficient to shape a modern state. The history of such quasi-independence, which spans almost 20
years, has confirmed that neither Abkhazia nor South Ossetia has been able to forge its population into
“a nation” (in modern political sense) because it cannot guarantee the population’s political or economic
rights, territorial mobility, freedom of movement, and equal rights. Further, Abkhazia is boxed in by
tribal nationalism, unable to break through the vicious cycle of clan loyalty. Georgia’s weakness in the
same dimension points to the decay of political visions and institutions in Georgia that have been
traditionally used to view the relations between Georgia and Abkhazia. Psychologically, the Georgian
media gleefully emphasize the weakness of the Abkhazians, their total ineffectiveness without outside
protection; the weaknesses of the Georgian side, as portrayed by the media, instill shame in the
audience at first and then wrath triggered by the unaccomplished national mission.
The vision of the “Abkhazian issue” is Georgian-centric. In other words, it relies on the media
content created by Georgian reporters for Georgian audiences, which means that this study is limited,
and that a study employing the same method, but assessing different media engaged in the issue, is
most likely to deliver different results.
Maisashvili, K. Constructing the Abkhazian Issue
In the Georgian Press, 2002-2010
© Journal of Politics and Democratization
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Journal of Politics and Democratization
Volume 2-1 (April 2017)
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Maisashvili, K. Constructing the Abkhazian Issue
In the Georgian Press, 2002-2010
© Journal of Politics and Democratization
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Journal of Politics and Democratization
Volume 2-1 (April 2017)
Disputed Elections and the Role of the Court in Emerging
Democracies in Africa: The Nigerian Example
J. Tochukwu Omenma 1
Postdoctoral Fellow,
Department of Politics and International Relations,
University of Johannesburg
and
Institute of African Studies,
University of Nigeria, Nsukka
[email protected]
Okechukwu O. Ibeanu2
Institute of Developmental Studies,
University of Nigeria,
Enugu Campus
Ike E. Onyishi3
Department of Psychology,
University of Nigeria, Nsukka
Abstract: The paper deals with a set of substantively important questions for Africa’s ongoing
democratization. In a narrow sense, what role are courts playing in the process of intervening in electoral
dispute, as it is related to fraud, official misconducts, and violence? More broadly, how is the
involvement of courts in those disputes influencing the broader democratization process? After
examining relevant data from Nigeria’s elections since 1999, data indicate that out of hundreds of
disputed gubernatorial election results, only 6.3% success were recorded in court. The paper arrived at
two conclusions: first, courts in Nigeria are failing to adequately address electoral disputes because the
legal burden of proof required of petitioners is too demanding to be effective. Second, the inaction of
courts enable incumbents to consistently retain power, thereby negating the principle of consolidation of
democracy. Thus, the court is failing to play a role in promoting democratic consolidation. Reasonably
valid quantitative measures exist for each of the factors. Data sources consisted of governmental
documents, data from international election observers and other research.
Keywords: Election quality, election petitions, courts intervention, alternation of executive power.
1
Dr. Omenma is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Department of Politics, University of Johannesburg and
and Research Fellow, Institute African Studies, University of Nigeria, Nsukka.
2
Professor O. Ibeanu is a Professor of Political Science and Research Professor, Institute of Development
Studies, University of Nigeria, Enugu Campus
3
Dr. Ike E. Onyishi, is a Senior Lecturer Department of Psychology, University of Nigeria, Nsukka.
Omenma, J. T., Ibeanu, O. O., and Onyishi, I. E.
Disputed Elections and the Role of the Court in Emerging
Democracies in Africa: The Nigerian Example
© Journal of Politics and Democratization
28
Journal of Politics and Democratization
Volume 2-1 (April 2017)
Introduction
In recent years, the courts have been increasingly involved in resolving electoral disputes in
many countries across the globe. This is part of the direct involvement of the courts in electoral process
and shaping political contests. The facts are, “the members of the court are integral elements of the
larger political setting” (Hirschl, 2006, p. 721); the competitive nature of presidential elections (Brooks
2014, p. 3) or the development of politics of rights and; the continuing spread of democratization across
the world (But, n.d). Despite court visibility, the failure rate of election dispute remains high and its
effect on body polity is contested.
Extant literature has offered several explanations. First is the constitutional power of the court,
which places on the courts all the powers and sanctions of a court of law and makes the courts arbiter in
all disputes (Hirschl, 2006; Bork, 2002). Ely (1980) refers to court’s power of arbiter as a means to
ensure that elected representatives are not “choking off the channels of political change to ensure that
they will stay in and the out will stay out” (Ely, 1980 cited in Gloppen, 2004, p. 4). Second, court
involvement is an essential element of the entire electoral cycle. The courts “ensure that each action,
procedure and decision related to the electoral process is in line with the law” (International IDEA, 2010,
p. 1). Von Doepp (2009) supports this by stating that vibrant and autonomous judiciaries are central
means to democracy, and “represent key ingredients for democratic consolidation (p. 1).” Third, is the
competitive nature of most presidential elections. In a presidential democracy, the president wields
substantial powers, and the influence that comes with the office makes it very attractive. The
consequence is that election rigging becomes commonplace in most presidential democracies. Under
this condition, candidates or parties disadvantaged by the process usually approach courts for electoral
justice.
The puzzle is to understand how the courts have performed along these three explanatory
variables. Given that, post-electoral challenges are almost never successful in changing election results
(Hernández-Huerta, 2015). More importantly, when most involvements of the courts in the electoral
process lead to unprecedented constitutional crisis, such as in America (Hirschl, 2006) or “further
undermine democracy as is the case in Nigeria” (Omenma, 2015, p. 12). Despite these reservations,
there are strong belief that the judiciary “cannot be a passive on-looker” in the democratic process
(Muhammad, 2012, p. 41); that courts’ “interventions in the electoral processes...have gone a long way
to deepen our democratic system…” (Azinge, 2012, p. vi); and the courts have been “…the great
guarantor of our new democracy” (This Day, 30 October 2007). These two dimensions of thought call
for further scrutiny, because the intervention of the courts in the electoral process appears to have
produced mixed results.
This study is guided by two research questions: (1) does the quality of elections account for the
increased court intervention in disputed elections? and (2) has the increased interventions of the courts
in disputed elections impacted on regular alternation of executive power? The objectives are to
determine the extent to which election quality accounts for increased court interventions in disputed
elections; and to assess the effect of increased court interventions in disputed elections on alternation
of executive power. The paper begins by conceptualizing the various theoretical arguments and debates
surrounding courts interventions, election quality, and democratic consolidation. Subsequent sections
formed our methodological approach, data presentation, analysis, and result of our findings.
Omenma, J. T., Ibeanu, O. O., and Onyishi, I. E.
Disputed Elections and the Role of the Court in Emerging
Democracies in Africa: The Nigerian Example
© Journal of Politics and Democratization
29
Journal of Politics and Democratization
Volume 2-1 (April 2017)
Review of Related Literature
Judicial Interventionism
Judicial intervention in the management of election petitions and other related political matters
has greatly expanded in the last one decade (Rares, 2011; Gloppen, 2004; Ugochukwu, 2009). In fact,
courts have been involved in wide range of issues that boarder on national and international political
importance. Rares (2011, p. 1) notes that the “Judicial system is a public resource that must be
managed so as to ensure that the right of the public to have access to a court to resolve their disputes is
not empty rhetoric.” Ellett (2008) argues that in Africa “the new leaders of the continent … are
systematically obstructing the liberalization of the political system in an effort to remain in power as
long as possible…” thereby “choking off the channels of political change….” which is necessary for
development (Ely, 1980 cited in Gloppen, 2004, p. 4). The consideration, therefore, is not only on the
constitutional role of the courts to resolve electoral disputes, but how the court confines itself to “the
application of legal principles” (Okoye, 2009, p. 128) without empty rhetoric.
Interest-group theorists claim that the court is there to enforce the “deals” of the dominant
interest group of the government (Posner, 1975), thereby legitimizing government policy rather than
challenging it (Dahl, 1957; Shapiro, 1999; Gillman, 2002). Ginsburg (2003) affirms that the court is an
“insurance policy” inserted by the makers of the constitution to protect the dominant elites of the
society. Stephenson (2003) observes that “When one party or ruling clique dominates the political
system, we expect either a judiciary with preferences almost identical to the ruling party or no real
independent judiciary at all (p. 59).
Unlike the interest-group scholars, Mahoney (1990), and Canon (1982) turned to Schlesinger’s
original use of “Judicial activism” to explain judicial interventionism. Judicial activism, Smith (2002)
argues, “serves principally as the utmost judicial put-down, a polemical, way of expressing strong
opposition to a judicial decision or approach to judging” (p. 1057). Mahoney (1990) states that “Judicial
activism exists where the judges modified the law from what was previously stated to be the existing
law which often leads to substituting their own decisions from that of the elected representatives of the
people” (Mahoney, 1990 cited in Imam, et al., 2011 p. 52). Judicial activism comes in three dimensions.
First, the willingness of the judges to depart from the previous decisions; second, departure from the
original or ordinary meaning of the constitutional context; and third, the numbers of judicial decisions
that struck down legislations (Tushnet, 2007).
It is in this sense that we conceptualize judicial interventionism as the significant involvement of
the courts in interpreting electoral matters/petitions outside its reference, such that it usurps the rights
of the electorate. It is also, along this line that Rares’ (2011) phrase of “empty rhetoric” is important,
which agrees with Hernández-Huerta (2015) that “post-election challenges are never successful in
changing election results” (p. 4). Why has this been so, given the fundamental role of the judiciary in the
electoral process?
Election Quality and Election Fraud
Omenma, J. T., Ibeanu, O. O., and Onyishi, I. E.
Disputed Elections and the Role of the Court in Emerging
Democracies in Africa: The Nigerian Example
© Journal of Politics and Democratization
30
Journal of Politics and Democratization
Volume 2-1 (April 2017)
The concept of election quality has been approached from several dimensions. First are
scholars that use positive expressions to define election quality, such as free and fair elections (Elklit &
Svensson, 1997; Anglin, 1998; Lindberg, 2006a), clean elections (Munck, 2009), and democratic elections
(O’Donnell, 2001; Munck, 2009) or election quality (Elklit & Reynolds 2005a; Hartlyn et al., 2008; Kelley
& Kiril, 2010). Negative expression describes it as “any purposeful action taken to tamper with electoral
activities and election-related materials in order to affect the results of an election, which may interfere
with or thwart the will of the voters (Lopez-Pintor, 2010, p. 9). This expression denotes flawed elections
(Pastor, 1999), electoral malpractice or misconduct (Birch, 2008; Donno, 2010), electoral manipulation
(Schedler, 2002a), or electoral fraud, electoral corruption, or election rigging (Lehoucq, 2003; LopezPintor, 2010; Simpser 2005; Calingaert, 2006). The problem with these word expressions is that what
constitutes election quality is generated by participants with different interests, expectations, and
standards across elections (Kelley, 2012). There is certainly a measurement problem of election quality
from phraseological perspective.
Second, is the quality-based approach, which defines quality of elections from a universal
standard, often based on democratic theory and/or international law and norms (van Ham, 2012; Elklit
& Reynold, 2005b). The international election observation mission evaluates elections in many
countries, based on the international standards, identifying elections that conform to or contradict
international standards. Some scholars question the standards used by election observers to evaluate
elections (Geisler, 1993; Anglin; 1998; Carothers, 1997), because how the citizens/stakeholders perceive
quality election in a country may be different from the international standard of democratic elections.
Third, is the process-based approach of election quality (van Ham, 2012). This involves
examination of overall judgments of election quality based on more specific indicators of irregularities
before, during, and after election-day. Process-based approach highlights on the pros and cons of preelection, election-day, and post-election activities. Process-based is not a one-off event, but rather a
comprehensive evaluation of all the stages of election.
Finally, Lindberg (2006) and Dahl (1971) provide a broader concept of quality of elections based
on participation, competition and legitimacy. These interrelated variables measure the degree of
citizenship participation, level of competitiveness, and degree in which elections confer legitimacy on
the leaders. From the relevant literature reviewed, there is the need to examine courts role in the whole
debate of election quality.
Democratic Consolidation
There are different views and interpretations of democratic consolidation, particularly, when
the process ends. There are four reference points—avoiding the breakdown of democracy,
institutionalizing democracy, quality of democracy, and “two-turn-over test” of power.
Scheduler (1997) and O’Donnell (1992) associate democratic consolidation with a democratic
government that avoids all possible factors that lead to a breakdown or eliminating all risks that will
likely result to democratic breakdown. By this definition, democratic consolidation suggests “survival,”
“stability,” “sustainability,” or “persistence” of democratic principles. This notion is also linked to
Omenma, J. T., Ibeanu, O. O., and Onyishi, I. E.
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“democratic survival” or avoiding relapse to non-democracy. How do we measure survival? There is
usually a measurement problem if we subscribe to this definition.
Another group of scholars focus on “institutions” building (Schmitter, 1988; Linz, 1990; Schedler,
1997; Przeworski, 1991). In essence, any democratic set-up, where election has been accepted and seen
as the only means of changing government, democracy is likely to be “consolidated.” Linz (1990)
describes it as a state of affairs when “democracy must be seen as the only game in town” (p. 156). The
key phrase is when election is the only game in town. Even though election is an important variable in
defining democracy, holding regular elections is not enough; the content of such elections is very
important. Conceptualizing democratic consolidation from the prism of the only game in town is a
reductionist approach, because there is no reference to quality of election, key to democratic
consolidation.
There are scholars who approximate democratic consolidation to “deepening of democracy”,
“high-quality democracy” or “quality of democracy” (Schedler, 1996; Linz & Stepan, 1996; Diamond &
Morlino, 2004; Roberts, 2009; Munck, 2012). The idea of “high-quality democracy” or “quality of
democracy” is borrowed from the minimalist concept of democracy. This is the most attractive concept
of democratic consolidation, according to Dahl (1989), who states that elections devoid of fraud and
violence increases political legitimacy. The analytical problem is that the quality of democracy is actually
the very concept of liberal democracy, thereby assuming that the image of democratic consolidation is
only that of advanced democracies (Schedler, 1997).
Finally, is Huntington’s (1991) alternation of executive power through constitutional means. By
this, democracy encourages regular change in the partisan character of the executive branch of
government. Huntington states that,
Democracy may be viewed as consolidated if the party or group that takes
power in the initial election at the time of the transition, loses a subsequent
election, and turns over power to those election winners, and if those election
winners then peacefully turn over power to winners of a later election (pp. 26667).
Przeworski (1991) sustains this notion by affirming that a system in which parties lose elections
is an important indicator of consolidation. Along the same vein, Freedom House (2010) defines
consolidation in terms of “regular elections conducted in conditions of ballot secrecy and reasonable
ballot security, and in the absence of massive voter fraud that subverts the public will… A country
cannot be listed as an electoral democracy if a single party or movement enjoys consistent and
overwhelming dominance over national elections (p. 4).
Emphases are on regular elections, free and fair elections, two-turn-over test of power, loss of
elections” or the failure of “a single party” to consistently win elections. Alternations in power provide
invaluable criteria for measuring consolidation. The statistical weight for regular alternation is a useful
indicator of democratic consolidation, particularly in emerging democratic nations. Most African nations
regularly hold periodic elections, but the character of such elections is in doubt. Democracy does not
consolidate when regular elections take place or when democratically elected authorities assume
Omenma, J. T., Ibeanu, O. O., and Onyishi, I. E.
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power. It is a condition that permits regular change of government. Perhaps, the challenge to
democratic consolidation is to identify those conditions or platforms that produce regular alternation of
executive power.
Theoretical Framework and Research Design
Theoretical Framework
This study interrogates two conceptual questions. First, why is court intervention in disputed
elections increasing? Secondly, does increased court intervention in disputed election lead to
consolidation of democracy? In answering these questions, our conceptual framework is informed by
the Marxian theory of the capitalist state, particularly its distinction between the forms of state in the
center and in the periphery of the global capitalist system (Poulantzas, 1973, 1980; Ake, 1981; Nnoli,
1986; Ibeanu, 2009).
In capitalist societies, people are, first and foremost commodity bearers, approximated in their
labor power. As commodity bearers, members of a capitalist society exist as separate, self-interested,
formally free, and aggressively competitive individuals. Market forces regulate this competition and
everybody is equally subject to these seemingly neutral forces of demand and supply (Ake, 1981).
Market forces activate both the market economy and market democracy, namely, thoroughgoing
commoditization arising from the separation of the producer from the means of production and the
separation of the individual from the primordial community (Ake, 1981). Ibeanu (2009) argues that
elections and rule of law constitute the market democracy as against economic forces of demand and
supply. Ibeanu (2009) states that, while the market finds political expression in elections, market forces
are incarnated politically in the rule of law. This explains why the laws of these market societies
generally provide for the freedom of individuals to vote and be voted for, the equality of votes and
freedom to choose between political platforms.
Market-type settings permeate the whole capitalist society, not only at the economic level of
structures, but also at the political and ideological. In the same way, money is the standard of exchange
in the market, so also is the ballot (votes) with respect to the political/electoral market. In a nutshell,
the economic role of money in the market place (market economy) is replicated in the ballot system at
the political level (market democracy). In the same way that money is an indirect value, so also is the
ballot an indirect value. Like economic value (profit) which is realized indirectly by appropriating
surpluses expressed in money, political value is also realized by indirectly appropriating political offices
through the impersonality, choice, formal equality, and self-interestedness expressed in the ballot.
The forms of capitalist state in the center are represented by the respect for the rules guiding
elections, particularly as contained in the constitution and electoral law, expresses the collective
subjugation of all—candidates, electors and regulatory bodies—to the rule of law. Consequently, the
regulatory regime, like the forces of demand and supply, are seemingly disassociated from the interest
of one political party/candidate or another and all are equally liable to the rules of the game. This is
necessary to maintain public confidence in elections through a high valorisation of votes (ballots). Thus,
a ballot is much more than a mere piece of paper; it embodies complex social relations.
Omenma, J. T., Ibeanu, O. O., and Onyishi, I. E.
Disputed Elections and the Role of the Court in Emerging
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By contrast, capitalist societies in the periphery, such as in Africa, show notable differences from
the acceptable situation in developed capitalist countries. In the periphery, social existence is still ruled
by pre-capitalist norms such as communalism, particularism, affectivity, ascription, and patriarchy (Ake,
1981). In the face of these norms, the requisite regime for proper regulation of market life remains
immature and the forces of demand and supply are not robust; indeed, they barely operate.
Consequently, peripheral capitalism is prone to primitive accumulation. This refers to the
preponderance of force/violence over market ideology in regulating relations and behaviour, and the
automaticity of market relations is still far-fetched.
Concomitantly, at the political level, especially regarding elections, peripheral capitalist
countries show all the features consistent with their economic base. This is principally noticeable in the
style in which elections are rigged, which is known as the Primitive Accumulation of Votes (PAV). That is
to say that politicians acquire votes through the use of both objective and structural violence, and
disregard of the rule of law. For those who engage in primitive accumulation of votes, it is justified in
the name of communal interests such as clans and ethnic groups, though in fact it is self-seeking
(Ibeanu, 2009). Furthermore, electoral regulatory regimes—the Constitution, electoral law, electoral
commission, and the judiciary—remain weak, captured by sectional and special interests. All of these
sustain the belief that a legitimate way of securing political office is to steal the people’s mandate.
Drawing from the foregoing general theory, our more specific conceptual scheme shows that
there are two dependent variables linking the electoral interventionism of the judiciary in Africa,
namely, quality of elections and turnover of executive power. These explanatory variables reinforce
each other. Our first proposition is that increasing election fraud is consistent with declining quality of
election, which in turn is an indicator of high rate of disputed elections in courts.
Second, given the context where money politics is dominant, courts are likely to be targets of
“political investors response” to the market forces. This means that electoral justice becomes subject to
being auctioned. The import of this is that outcomes of election adjudicatory processes are largely
produced in response to very narrow but powerful interests. That is, results which are in
contradistinction with the votes cast. In the process, the judiciary becomes politicized and used to
reinforce electoral fraud or often act to protect specific sectional/party interests, thereby limiting the
opportunity of electoral justice.
In summary, our central empirical inferences, which we shall elaborate and test through our
hypotheses, is that despite the frequent interventions of the judiciary in electoral matters, there are no
significant improvements in quality of election and democratic consolidation. In addition, it has in many
cases undermined the EMB and the quality of elections and has not significantly led to two-turn
transitions of executive power from one political party to another.
Hypotheses
Based on the foregoing theoretical insights, we hypothesize as follows: (1) if election fraud
becomes widespread, it tends to reduce the quality of elections, thereby increasing the likelihood of
election disputes in courts; and (2) increasing court interventions in disputed elections tends to lower
the prospects of alternation of executive power among parties.
Omenma, J. T., Ibeanu, O. O., and Onyishi, I. E.
Disputed Elections and the Role of the Court in Emerging
Democracies in Africa: The Nigerian Example
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Research Design
This paper focuses on examining the influence of the courts on politics—elections and
democratic consolidation. The study adopted the survey design. Data on the conduct of elections were
sourced from reports of international election observers, legal charges and court rulings, while data on
courts adjudicatory processes were collected from law reports, court proceedings, and academic
journals. We developed a single independent variable—court interventions in the disputed elections
and two dependent variables, namely, (1) quality of elections, and (2) alternation of executive power.
Data sources consisted of governmental documents, data from non-governmental organizations
such as European Election, Observation Mission (EU EOM), and other research. For the quality of
elections, we relied on EU EOM data, which provided us with election-day incidence in Nigeria for 2003,
2007 and 2011. We categorized election-day incidence into four datasets:
1.
2.
3.
4.
INEC ad hoc staff violations/errors;
State/party official interference;
Election violence; and
Multiple/underage voting.
Each of the categories has specific and verifiable indicators (examples) used as a measurement
of quality of election. The data sourced were for the gubernatorial and presidential elections in Nigeria.
For the alternation of power, data of election results were obtained from the database of Independent
National Electoral Commission (INEC) of Nigeria. Data were analyzed using simple descriptive statistics
of percentage and graphs. One-way ANOVA was used to determine the scale of election fraud, whether
the percentage is the same across the fraud types from 2003 to 2011 and to determine the fraud type
with the highest percentage of occurrence since 2003. To test our second hypothesis, which is lowering
prospects of alternation of executive power, we constructed a component bar chart. Each bar indicates
numbers of alternation of power in the 36 states of the federations in Nigeria, 1999–2011. For the
qualitative data, logical arguments, inferences, and content analysis were used to process such data.
Data Presentation
H1: If election fraud becomes widespread, it tends to reduce the quality of elections, thereby
increasing the likelihood of election disputes in courts.
Election Fraud and Disputed Elections in Court
There are four basic types of election frauds identified, namely, INEC ad hoc staff
violations/errors; state/party official interference; election violence; and multiple/underage voting.
Election fraud comes in varying degrees to include vote-buying, violence, falsification/inflation of results,
ballot stuffing, and other rigging methods that thwart the intentions of the electorates (Bratton, 2008;
Brusco, Nazareno, & Stokes 2004; Calingaert, 2006; Fischer, 2002). Fraud becomes widespread when
there are significant violations of election process that shape election results (Lehoucq, 2003) and
substantially violate relevant sections of electoral law (International IDEA; EU EOM 2003).
Omenma, J. T., Ibeanu, O. O., and Onyishi, I. E.
Disputed Elections and the Role of the Court in Emerging
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Using the dataset of European Union Election Observation Mission for the three consecutive
election years, 2003, 2007 and 2011, we compute and measure the presence and the degree of election
frauds in Nigeria. The dataset were the EU EOM reports of the presidential and gubernatorial elections
incidence as represented in Tables 1, 2 and 3. There are 36 states including the Federal Capital Territory
(FCT) Abuja that make-up the Federal Republic of Nigeria, which was used to measure the degree and
widespread of election fraud.
Table 1:
2003 Election—Incidence and Types of Election-day Frauds/Irregularities
Types of Fraud
Number of Examples
States
INEC ad hoc staff
12
• Improper ink finger checks
violations/errors
• Marking of the fingers not properly done
• No name ticked on voter list while voting had started
• Cases of violation of secrecy
• Early closure of voting
• Absence of EC.8.A forms in most PUs
• Changes in election results
State/party official
12
• Ballot stuffing by party agents
interference
• Party agents aiding falsification of figures
• Inducement of voters by money
• Use of state security agencies to guide stolen ballot
boxes
• Collation done in undesignated areas
Election violence
15
• Ballot snatching by party thugs
• Crowding of PUs and collation centers by agents of
incumbent party
• Stealing/disappearance of sensitive election materials
• Shooting of guns/fighting to scare away voters
• Road blocks by party supporters
Multiple/underage voting
14
• All presidential ballots cast, while gubernatorial
ballots were in distribution
• Similar thumbprints on the ballot papers
• Election results showed 95% to 100% voter turnouts
• Large difference between the votes cast for the
presidential and gubernatorial races
• Stuffing of ballot box with ballot papers
• Some election results in excess of registered voters
Total
➢ 23 cases of electoral violations
Source: EU EOM 2003, pp.32-37. Note: INEC ad hoc staff per polling unit ranged in size between 2 and 4, and they
were usually recruited by state governors, Local Government Chairmen or party executives at the wards (see
Donald Duke Guardian newspaper interview, July 18, 2010, pp. 72-73).
Omenma, J. T., Ibeanu, O. O., and Onyishi, I. E.
Disputed Elections and the Role of the Court in Emerging
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© Journal of Politics and Democratization
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Volume 2-1 (April 2017)
On average, Table 1 shows that election frauds occurred in one third of the 36 states of the
federation. Fraud indicators numbered 23, ranging from major incidence (voting without reference to
the register, early closure of voting hours, absence of EC. 8. A. forms, changing election results and
ballot stuffing) to minor incidence (improper ink finger check and collation of result in undesignated
areas). Among the four fraud types, the INEC violation has the highest frequency of incidence of fraud.
INEC violations and State/Party officials’ interference were identified as major factors in election frauds
incidence at 2003 election.
On the widespread nature of the fraud, INEC violations were reported in 12 states (33.33%);
state/party official interference occurred in 12 States (33.33%); election violence was experienced in 15
states (41.66%); while multiple/underage voting were identified in 14 states (38.88%). On the whole,
these fraud incidences show significant election fraud in the majority of the 36 states of the Federation.
This supports the description of European Union Election observers’ report that the entire election of
2003 was “a sham and marred by serious irregularities and frauds” (EU EOM, 2003). The incidences of
fraud do not add-up to the principles of fair, free, and inclusive elections as enunciated by scholars
(Dahl, 1971; Alemika & Omotosho, 2008).
Table 2:
2007 Election—Incidence and Types of Election-day Fraud/Irregularities
Types of Fraud
Number of Examples
States
INEC ad hoc staff
23 + FCT
• Materials arrived very late
violations/errors
• Bunches of ballot stamped before
• No voting took place yet result recorded in many PUs
• Lack of proper voters register
• No reference to voters register while accreditation of
voters
• Cases of violation of secrecy
• Abandonment of proper procedures
• Ward results arriving very late
• Ballot box disappearance and figures used
• Incorrect collation process and declaring of such
results
• Cases of missing of result sheets in many PUs
• Party agents were denied copies of the PU results
• Collation without reference to PU result sheets
State/party official
25
• Party agent helping voters to cast their votes
interference
• Party agents aiding falsification of figures
• Inducement of voters/INEC ad hoc staff with money
• Use of state security agencies to guide stolen ballot
boxes
• Collation done in undesignated areas (LG HQs)
• Party agents and police taking part in counting
• Buying of voter’s card
Omenma, J. T., Ibeanu, O. O., and Onyishi, I. E.
Disputed Elections and the Role of the Court in Emerging
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Election violence
Volume 2-1 (April 2017)
24
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Multiple/underage voting
Total
22 + FCT
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
➢
Government officials thumb printing of ballot papers
Chaos at PUs
Thugs checking voters ID instead of PU staff
Hijacking of ballot boxes by party thugs
Shooting in the PU, voters scared away
Stealing/disappearance of sensitive election
materials;
Police shooting of guns to chase thugs away
Invasion of PU by thugs
Harassments/abduction of INEC ad hoc staff by party
agents/thugs
Burning bombing of INEC offices
Massive and widespread ballot stuffing
Unauthorized changing of results
Voting without accreditation
Similar thumbprints on the ballot papers
Election results show 95% to 100% voter turnouts
Large difference between the votes cast for the
winners and the losers
Stuffing of ballot box with ballot papers
Some election results in excess of registered voters
38 cases of electoral violations
Source: EU EOM, 2007, pp. 49-103.
There are two distinct readings of Table 2. First is that incidence of election frauds (major and
minor) increased substantially from the previous 2003 election; second, is that fraud increased across
the states. On the average, 23.2 states were reported to have recorded a significant increase in the four
types of fraud. On the widespread nature of the fraud, INEC violations were reported in 24 states
(66.67%); state/party official interference occurred in 25 states (69.44%); incidents of election violence
were experienced in 24 states (66.67%); while instances of multiple/underage voting were identified in
23 states (63.89%). The highest re-occurring incidence of violation (13) was caused by the INEC ad hoc
staff. This includes arrival of election materials very late; pre-stamping of bunches of ballot paper
before arrival at polling units; lack of proper voters register; no reference to voters register while
accreditation of voters; incorrect collation process; and declaring of wrong results, among others.
Table 3:
2011 Election—Incidence and Types of Election-day Fraud/Irregularities
Types of Fraud
Number of Examples
States
INEC ad hoc staff
24
• In 47% of PUs the secrecy of vote was not respected
violations/errors
• Missing of PU staff and materials, such as result
sheets and ballot papers
• Omitted or incorrect application of ink
Omenma, J. T., Ibeanu, O. O., and Onyishi, I. E.
Disputed Elections and the Role of the Court in Emerging
Democracies in Africa: The Nigerian Example
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State/party official
interference
20
Election violence
15
Multiple/underage voting
14
Total
• Used ballots did not equal the number of valid, spoilt
and rejected ballots in many PUs
• Voting without voters registering or holding voters’
cards in many PUs
• Accreditation of underage voters
• Accreditation and voting at the same time in many
PUs
• Important safeguard against multiple voting were
not followed consistently
• 70% arithmetic errors in ward collation centers
• 87% in LGA collation centres and 70% at the state
collation centers
• Voting without accreditation
• Interference of party agents with the accreditation
/voting process
• Party agents interfering in voting procedures in many
PUs
• Inducement of voters with money
• Use of state security agencies to guide stolen ballot
boxes
• Disorder in about 18% of the ward collation
centers
• Crowding of PUs and collation centers by agents of
incumbent party
• Stealing/disappearance of sensitive election materials
• A few cases of ballot snatching
• Voting without accreditation
• About 12% of underage voting
• Stuffing of ballot box with ballot papers
➢ 21 cases of electoral violations
Source: EU EOM, 2011, pp. 47-48.
Table 3 shows 21 instances of fraud and irregularities. Violations/errors arising from the INEC’s
ad hoc staff retained the highest number (10) of fraud/irregularities among other fraud types. The table
equally shows an increase in interference on election-day activities in 20 states by the incumbent party.
This accounts for 76.92% state/party official interference across the 26 States. Cases of political
violence were reported in 15 states (57.69%) of the Federation. Gubernatorial election was organized in
26 states instead of 36 states of the Federation due to the staggering of elections. The percentage
representation indicates that fraud remains widespread and sustained.
The data on Tables 1, 2, and 3 are summarized in Table 4. Table 4 indicates the percentage of
fraud per election year and the trend of fraud, whether it is increasing or decreasing.
Omenma, J. T., Ibeanu, O. O., and Onyishi, I. E.
Disputed Elections and the Role of the Court in Emerging
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Table 4
Summary of Election Fraud from 2003 - 2011
2003
No. of
Percentage
Fraud Type
States
of Fraud in
36 States
INEC ad hoc staff
12
33.33%
violations/errors
State/party official
12
33.33%
interference
Election violence
15
41.67
Multiple/underage voting
14
38.89
No. of
States
24
2007
Percentage
of fraud in
36 states
66.67
2011
No. of Percentage
States of Fraud in
26 States
24
92.31
25
69.44
20
76.92
24
66.67
15
57.69
23
63.89
14
53.85
Table 4 indicates that one-third of the 36 states significantly involved in election frauds for the
2003 elections. As expected, the percentage of fraud across the four fraud types was high in 2003,
where election violence was highest (41.6%) and INEC ad hoc staff violations/errors and state/party
official interference was 33.33% each. In the 2007 elections, the percentage of fraud increased in the 36
states across the fraud types. It was a double digit increase in the 2007 election. State/party official
interference has the highest at 69.44%, indicating strong influences of the incumbent party in the
conduct of elections. The subsequent election of 2011 shows an equally substantive increase in all the
fraud types in 26 states where elections were organized. INEC ad hoc staff violations/errors were
92.31% and State/party official interference were 76.92%. They occurred in 24 states and 20 states,
respectively, indicating that these fraud types were widespread in Nigeria.
Using one-way ANOVA test statistics at 0.05% alpha level of significance in SPSS version 16, we
conducted descriptive statistics test to know the percentage of each fraud type across the fraud types
and the growth trends. The mean values for the four types of fraud show INEC ad hoc staff at 64.10;
state/party official interference at 59.89; election violence at 55.34; and multiple/underage voting at
52.14 (see Table 5, Appendix I). The mean and standard deviation value of INEC violations are 64.10 and
29.57, respectively, showing that, although there are significant differences over the election years, the
mean value of INEC violation is very high.
Figure 1 shows the trend of election fraud for the three election periods. The overall results of
the mean values appear very robust, as all variables remain significantly high and sustainable. The whole
test is summarized in a bar chart as shown in Figure 1.
Omenma, J. T., Ibeanu, O. O., and Onyishi, I. E.
Disputed Elections and the Role of the Court in Emerging
Democracies in Africa: The Nigerian Example
© Journal of Politics and Democratization
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Volume 2-1 (April 2017)
100
90
80
70
60
2003 Election
50
2007 Election
40
2011 Election
30
20
10
0
INECad
ad hoc staff
state/party official
Election Violence
Multiple/undergae
INEC
staff State/party
official Election
violence Multiple/underage
violations/errors
interference
voting
violations/errors
interference
voting
Figure 1: Trend Growth of Election Fraud, 2003-2011
Figure 1 shows a steady increase in all the four types of fraud over each election year. The
results clearly speak in favor of increase rather than gradual decrease. INEC violations of electoral law
were 33.33% in 2003 election, increasing to 66.67% in 2007, and finally to 92.31% in the 2011 election.
The same increase is reflected in other fraud types such as state/party official interference, election
violence, and multiple/underage voting. This also refutes Lindberg’s (2006) finding that election quality
tends to increase after three or more rounds of election, but rather supports Bratton’s (2004) assertion
that election quality tends to decline after the first round of election in Africa. The consistency in fraud
data, over a period of four rounds of elections, is supportive of the part of our hypothesis that fraud is
common and sustainable in most presidential elections in Africa. What the analysis indicates is that
whether collectively or independently, the fraud types are substantial violations of laws and regulations
of elections and on the account of each fraud, party or candidate can petition the court for election
justice.
H2: Increasing court interventions in disputed elections tends to lower the prospects of alternation of
executive power among parties.
Disputed Elections and Nature of Alternation of Executive Power
There are several conditions that may lead to disputed elections in the courts. First is where the
electoral management body is manifestly weak, lacks operational autonomy and easily compromised in
the process of discharging its responsibility (Kawanaka & Asaba, 2011; López-Pintor, 2000; van Aaken,
2009). Second, is when election outcome is marred by widespread and systematic irregularities, frauds,
Omenma, J. T., Ibeanu, O. O., and Onyishi, I. E.
Disputed Elections and the Role of the Court in Emerging
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© Journal of Politics and Democratization
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and manipulations. Losing parties or candidates may resort to legal actions or mobilize against stolen
mandate in order to publicize fraud (Hernandez-Huerta, 2015).
Election data in Nigeria show that election violations recorded against INEC has the highest
mean score of 64.10 while the second highest mean score of 59.89 is the fraud type of state/party
official interference. Table 4 shows that the percentage of election fraud in Nigeria from 2003 to 2011 is
different, but each fraud type is substantial, with a rate above 52% on average. This agrees with the
literature that weak EMB may likely lead to widespread of election fraud in presidential democracies,
which in turn may results to legal actions (Hernandez-Huerta, 2015).
Table 6 is a computation of disputed elections for four election cycles in Nigeria. There is a total
of 1,497 election constituencies (COREC, 2013) and for the three election years, 2003, 2007 and 2011, a
total of 2,596 post-election cases were contested in various Election Petition Tribunals across the
Federation, including the FCT. There were no available statistics on the number of post-election
petitions after the 1999 general elections.
Table 6
Summary of Post-Elections Litigations filed in 2003, 2007 and 2011
Years
No. of Constituencies
No. of Litigations
1999
1,497
N/A*
2003
1,497
574
2007
1,496**
1291
2011
1,487***
731
Total
2596
Sources: Electoral Reform Committee, 2008, p. 123; INEC Report on the 2011General Elections, p. 38; INEC
Committee on the Review of Judgments on Election cases (COREC), 2013, p. 93.
* Not Available (N/A); ** Governorship election was not conducted in Anambra State at the 14 April 2007;
*** Governorship elections were not conducted in 10 states at the April 26, 2011.
Figure 2 equally demonstrates successive increments in the numbers of disputed elections in
each election year. In the 2003 general elections, 574 petitions were filed at the various election
tribunals in the Federation including the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). It increased to 1,291 in 2007
and reduced 731 in 2011. Although the number of the petitions reduced after 2011, against 1,291 of the
2007 elections, the disputed election petitions for the 2011 election was substantially higher than the
574 cases recorded in 2003 general elections. Statistically, disputed election petitions increase at each
successive election cycle. The drop for the 2011 elections was not below the 574 received after the
2003 elections.
Utilizing data on the number of petitions received at the Election Tribunal we measure the
success rate at which disputed presidential and gubernatorial elections were reversed by the courts.
Omenma, J. T., Ibeanu, O. O., and Onyishi, I. E.
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Table 7 presents the number of election petitions received and decided by the Gubernatorial and
Legislative Election Tribunal in the 36 states of the Federation for the election cycles of 2007 and 2011.
The table equally indicates the success rate of the petitioners to their claim of massive election
irregularities for the election years of 2003, 2007, and 2011.
Figure 2: Litigation Trend Since 1999
Table 7
Success Rate of Gubernatorial Elections Petitions, 1999, 2003, 2007, and 2011
Years
No. of states
No. of Litigations
Success rate
Percent
1999
36
NA
0.0
0.0
2003
36
N/A
1
2007
35*
107
9
8.4
2011
26**
53
0.0
0.0
Total
133
160
10
6.3
Source: INEC Committee on the Review of Judgements on Election cases, 2013, p. 93-94.
* There was no governorship election in Anambra State based on the Supreme Court ruling that the tenure of
Governor Peter Obi will end in March 2010, and not April 2007.
** Elections were not held in 10 states- Adamawa, Anambra, Bayelsa, C/River, Edo, Ekiti, Kogi, Ondo, Osun, Sokoto.
Omenma, J. T., Ibeanu, O. O., and Onyishi, I. E.
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For the 1999 elections, no record indicates the number of petitions received by the Tribunals for
the 36 states, and the success rate for the election year was nil. For the 2003 gubernatorial elections,
only one state gubernatorial election petition succeeded. This was in Anambra State where the Court of
Appeal nullified Dr. Chris Ngige’s election under the People’s Democratic Party. In 2007, a total of 107
petitions challenged the gubernatorial election results in 35 States. Out of the 107 petitions, nine
petitions were successful at the courts.
For the 2011 elections, a total of 53 elections petitions were filed at the various Election Petition
Tribunals in 26 States where gubernatorial elections were conducted. In contrast, the success rate at
Gubernatorial Elections Tribunals was nil (Table 7). Failure for the tribunal to reverse gubernatorial
elections after the 2011 elections was not based on improvement on the quality of elections (see Table
3), but due to Section 134(2) of the Electoral Act of Nigeria, 2010 (as amended) which provides that, “An
election tribunal shall deliver its judgment in writing within 180 days from the date of the filing of the
petition.” Most petitions that challenged gubernatorial elections in the 2011 were struck out due to
time limitations of election tribunals placed by the 1999 Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria (as
amended).
The success rate of post-election petitions for the gubernatorial election is 10 out of the 160
petitions entertained by the courts. This represents a 6.3% success rate at Gubernatorial and Legislative
Election Tribunals for the 36 States and for the four cycles of elections. On the contrary, the mortality
rate (failure) of petitions over the periods of study shows 93.7%.
The impact of court interventions in disputed gubernatorial elections is also presented in the
component chart Figure 3. The pattern of alternation of executive power is broken into three
categories—non-alternation, partial alternation, and wholesale alternation. Alternation is a shift from
one regime to another, particularly a shift of executive power of the state, from one political party to
another, either at a regular or irregular interval. Of the 36 states that participated in the gubernatorial
elections in 1999, 2003, 2007 and 2011 elections, 18 states have not experienced alternation of
executive power. This means that the political parties that won the transitional elections of 1999 in
each of the 18 states, have not lost the gubernatorial elections for the four cycles of election. Indeed,
the same party continues to win the gubernatorial elections since 1999, with sufficient margin to form
one-party cabinets. This points to the dominant character of incumbent political party in the democratic
process in Nigeria, thereby rendering opposition parties relatively insignificant in these states.
As depicted in Figure 3, the States described as partial alternation have not completed the three
components of the bar chart with a single-color shade. Data indicate that partial alternation of
executive power had occurred in 17 states. On this point, the partial alternation begins the sequence of
democratic consolidation as described by Huntington (1991). However, the party that took over
executive power from the transitional party has perpetuated the party in government. Complete
alternation of power has been achieved only in one state, Ekiti State. Ekiti State demonstrates more
open structures of political competition. The state has the most open election competition, with regular
alternation of executive power, since 1999. Following Huntington’s (1991) notion of consolidation of
democracy, Ekiti State has the greater prospects of consolidating democracy in Nigeria. This signifies
that elections have been relatively free, fair, and credible; that incumbent factors and state interference
Omenma, J. T., Ibeanu, O. O., and Onyishi, I. E.
Disputed Elections and the Role of the Court in Emerging
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in election-day activities are minimal; and that there are increasing popular participation of the
electorates and less disenfranchisement of the electorate.
Figure 3: Pattern of Alternation of Executive of Power at 36 States Government, 1999-2011
Table 7 shows that courts interventions in disputed elections have resulted to 10 gubernatorial
elections reversal after four cycles of elections in Nigeria. Among these states, alternation could not
occur in five states because the incumbent party won the re-run elections and retained power in the
states. Alternation only occurred in five states as a result of court nullification of the election results.
The Presidential elections for the four cycles of elections have witnessed neither partial nor complete
alternation of the government in Nigeria. The party that won the first transitional elections in 1999 still
dominates for the last fourteen years of democracy in Nigeria. Even though each presidential election
results have been disputed in court, none has been reversed.
Discussion
Why Courts Fail in Changing Election Results
The question is why has the court consistently failed to successfully change executive
(presidential and gubernatorial) election results, even where there is sufficient evidence showing
massive election fraud and even when there are increasing numbers of disputed elections. Since the
end of the World War II, courts have determined the outcome of about 50 countries’ presidential
Omenma, J. T., Ibeanu, O. O., and Onyishi, I. E.
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elections, yet none has been reversed (Hirschl, 2008; Whittington, Kelemen, & Caldeira, 2008). Not
even in Mexico, the Philippines, or Nigeria with the highest frequency of disputed elections, had
presidential election results been annulled by the judiciary. It is only in Panama, that court successfully
annulled the presidential election in 1989 (Hernández-Huerta, 2015).
There are four interrelated explanations why the courts consistently fail to upturn presidential
elections in Africa. First, is the legal burden of proof of evidence placed substantially on the
petitioner(s). The burden of proof of evidence simply requires the petitioner to provide concrete
materials of evidence to show cases of multiple/underage voting, falsification of results, ballot stuffing,
and non-accreditation of voters, among others. The material evidence required include essential
election data like voters registered, used and unused ballot papers, result sheets, and other materials
which are at the custody of EMB. Data on election fraud (Table 5) shows that the mean and standard
deviation value of INEC violations/errors of elections are 64.1 and 29.57 respectively, in Nigeria. The
mean value of INEC violations/errors is very high, suggesting substantial non-compliance to election
standards and law. Given this distortions by EMBs, the Commissions in African countries are
consistently unwilling to release election materials for forensic studies and court use. When access to
election materials is denied, the standard of proof would be incredibly difficult to be discharged by the
petitioners. All these sustain the belief that a legitimate way of securing political office is to steal
people’s mandate, while the Courts validate the fraud. This is consistent with our theoretical expression
that EMBs are weak and lack independence which leads to deep-seated suspicion of EMB competency
and professionalism in the conduct of election, especially in the context of incessant court injunctions.
This also agrees with the report of Election Reform Committee (ERC, 2008), Nigeria, which reproached
the Electoral Commission for frustrating “several election petitions due to failure to provide evidence,
thereby jeopardizing the petitions of litigants” (p. 148).
Second, is the legal clause of “non-compliance with the provisions of law” and that “did not
affect substantially the result of the election” which has been incorporated in most electoral laws in
African like Nigeria, Kenya, Uganda, Ghana among others countries. Section 139 (1) of the Electoral Act,
2010 (as amended) in Nigeria provides that an election shall not be liable to be invalidated by reason of
non-compliance with the provisions of this Act if it appears to the Election Tribunal or Court that the
election was conducted substantially in accordance with the principles of this Act and that the noncompliance did not affect substantially the result of the election.
This section is subject to prevarications, misinterpretations, and, often at times, misuse. Before
an election is invalidated, both conditions of “non-compliance with the provisions of law” and “affect
substantially the result of the election” must exist together. It is not enough to establish evidence of
fraud, but such evidence must “affect substantially the result of the election” to warrant invalidation or
annulment by the court. What constitutes “non-compliance” that “did not affect substantially the result
of the election” remains the prerogative of the judge. How the court interprets and applies this section
in election matters has been appalling, particularly when the judiciary is known to be very weak and
overtly dependent on the executive arm of government, as it exists in many African countries.
The cases of Awolowo v. Shagari (1979) and Buhari v. Obasanjo (2003) elucidate how the courts
interpret the clause in Nigeria and elsewhere in Africa. Section 34(1) (c) (ii) of the 1979 Constitution of
Nigeria required the winner of a presidential election to score at least one quarter of the votes cast in
Omenma, J. T., Ibeanu, O. O., and Onyishi, I. E.
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two-thirds of the 19 states of Nigeria. Alhaji Shehu Shagari, a presidential candidate met this
constitutional requirement in 12 states instead of a minimum of 13 states. The Supreme Court admitted
that “the evidence established this non-compliance in only one state,” but ruled that the shortfall of one
state has “not affected substantially the result of the election.” Also, the Supreme Court in Buhari v.
Obasanjo (2003) admitted evidence of election frauds to include “massive fraud,” “violence,” “inflation
of election results,” INEC’s refusal to tender before the tribunal the certified true copies of the
Presidential polls, among others. Despite this, the court ruled that the extent of these frauds was not
sufficient to cancel the entire poll.
This clause of “non-compliance with the provisions of law” and that “did not affect substantially
the result of the election” is a giant jurisprudential step backwards. Even more puzzling, is whether the
standard actually used by the Supreme Court to decide the cases relied on that Section, or were there
other informal rules unknown to the public, which are frequently used by the court to decide postelection petitions. Politicians regularly cash in on these legal gaps to perpetuate electoral frauds
because what the winner needs to do is to produce evidence that the election was held in accordance
with the law. The simple way to do so is to produce the result of the election. The mere fact of
providing “the result of the election,” even if it is from the moon, makes the election result valid which
does not approximate to free and fair principles of elections. The court will simply rule that, even
though there were cases of election fraud, but such fraud does not substantially affect the result of the
election. The clause simply supports the literature that the court is an insurance policy to protect the
dominant class in the society (Ginsburg, 2003; Shapiro, 1999; Gillman, 2002).
Third, is the syndrome of “Big Man politics,” “money politics,” or “politicization of the Judiciary”
in Africa (Joseph, 1991, Lewis, 2008; Kramer, 2004; Kew & Lewis, 2010). This syndrome appears to be
the main determinant of electoral justice system in Africa. Our data (Table 5) on election fraud in
Nigeria identified four fraud types--(1) INEC ad hoc staff violations/errors; (2) state/party official
interference; (3) election violence; and (4) multiple/underage voting. Statistical analysis of the incidence
of fraud types in elections in Nigeria shows on average 57.87 mean values. What the average mean
values indicates is that whether collectively or on a single basis, the fraud types are substantial violation
of election standards, laws and regulations, and on the account of each mean value of the fraud types,
unbiased courts should nullify election results.
Given the context where money politics is dominant, there is always a wide gap between the
evidence of election frauds and court verdicts. The gap is not necessarily due to incompetence of
petitioners’ legal teams, but the courts have become targets of “political investors” while electoral
justice becomes auctionable. The human factor is involved, which borders on corruption. In Nigeria,
four out of five members of Akwa Ibom State Governorship and Legislative Houses Election Tribunal
were found guilty of financial inducement from State Governor, Victor Attah and subsequently upheld
the Governor’s 2003 election (Ugochukwu, 2004; 2011; The Guardian, August 22, 2004, p. 19;
Fawehinmi, 2007). Also in 2003, Justice Okwuchukwu Opene and Justice David Adeniji of the Appeal
Court received bribes of 15 million naira (US $100,000) and 12 million naira (US $80,000), respectively,
and delivered controversial judgments on disputed election petitions (Ugochukwu, 2011; Fawehinmi,
2007).
Omenma, J. T., Ibeanu, O. O., and Onyishi, I. E.
Disputed Elections and the Role of the Court in Emerging
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The outcomes of election adjudicatory processes are largely produced in response to very
narrow but powerful interests. Legal technicalities such as refusal of the Judge to admit some sensitive
exhibit thereby excluding substantial evidence or even when a sensitive exhibit is admitted, such
evidence is ignored in the course of judgment. Other examples include situations when Judges or court
staff manipulate court dates to favor one particular party; judges grant long adjournments, or frivolous
ex parte orders or injunctions for a price in order to buy time. Still other technicalities include delays in
constitution of or total refusal to constitute election tribunals, or disbandment of election tribunal due
to deliver judgment, that is, results which are in contradistinction with the votes cast. This supports
Puddington’s (2010) description of judiciary in Africa as “…weak, unable to act independently or apply
the law equally to all members of society” (p. 3). Also, Olujimi (2013), a former Attorney General of the
Federation in Nigeria, affirms that “The ruling party believes that once a matter is before the court, it
must go their way and once you have a judge who is not working in their favor, they descend on him
with fury.”
Judges in Nigeria have earned promotion after delivering “political” rulings. Chief Awolowo
criticized the appointment of Justice Atanda Williams as the Chief Justice of Nigeria before his appeal to
the Supreme Court was heard (Ebenezer, 2014). Justice George Oguntade was elevated to the Supreme
Court after delivering the “required judgment” on the 2003 presidential election, while Justice James
Ogebe, the Chairman of the tribunal that determined the 2007 presidential election petition, was
appointed to the Supreme Court in 2007 by the President, just days before the judgment of the tribunal
he chaired was due to deliver its judgment (Ugochukwu, 2011). Uncompromising judges are either
suspended to pave way for the required ruling or their promotion stagnated for refusing to deliver a
political judgment. Justice Isa Ayo Salami, President of Court of Appeal of Nigeria, was suspended
because he refused to do the biding of the executive.
Fourth, direct influence of politics on the outcome of disputed election is supported by
comparing the margin of victory of vote in the few states where courts upturned election results and
those states’ courts upheld election results. Findings of regression analysis based on victory margin of
votes between the winner and the first runner-up reveal that the value of the victory margin, 0.305079,
is not statistically significantly different from zero at 5% level of significance. This, by implication, means
that there is no significant difference between the states in Nigeria where there were successful
judiciary adjudications and those states where we had no successful judiciary adjudication (Omenma
2015). To buttress the above finding, another ANOVA regression analysis was conducted to see the
impact of the judiciary intervention in the 2007-2011 gubernatorial elections in the various states of the
Federation. The result of the analysis shows that the resulting t-statistic value of 1.253 is not statistically
significantly different from zero at 5% level of significant, confirming that judiciary intervention has no
impact on the quality of elections in Nigeria. Simply put, evidence of election fraud, upon which various
courts relied to nullify gubernatorial elections in ten states, also existed in other states where courts did
not nullify the elections in Nigeria.
The nullification of Dr. Chris Ngige, a gubernatorial candidate of Anambra State in 2003, and
Professor Osereheimen Osunbor a gubernatorial candidate of Edo State in 2007 were due to the
influence of political godfathers who want to teach them lessons by using the judiciary to oust them
from office (The Guardian, March 2008, p. 8; Vanguard, June 08, 2015, p. 1). This does not suggest that
the elections which produced Governor Ngige and Governor Osunbor were free and fair, but that intraOmenma, J. T., Ibeanu, O. O., and Onyishi, I. E.
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party conflicts between the patron-client interests resulted in the use of the incumbency power at the
central government by the patron to remove the governors.
Although there have been regular elections in Africa since the 1990s, most elections were not
free and fair, and the electoral justice system has had limited impact or effect on the quality of election.
Huntington (1991) argues that in any democratic country, where there are “sustained failure of the
major opposition political party to win office necessarily raises questions concerning the degree of
competition permitted by the system (p. 8).” Democratic consolidation is not only a function of having
frequent or regular conduct of elections, but also of the credibility of elections. A credible election is
that which must have been conducted substantially in accordance with the principles of the electoral act
and do not contradict the freely expressed will of the electorates. The essence of the court’s
intervention has always been to promote democratic culture, strengthen the confidence of the people
in the democratic process, and promote constitutionalism and due process in the political system. But
data on elections have not shown significant improvement on the conduct of free and fair elections,
neither do the countries experience regular alternation of executive powers notwithstanding over two
thousand election petitions in three election years.
Available statistics of the outcome of disputed elections in Nigeria, just like in most African
countries, show that courts have not significantly addressed the issue of electoral fraud. The number of
elections invalidated by courts is quite insignificant while presidential elections have not been
invalidated by courts in spite of admission of election frauds and irregularities. This increases the
propensity for sustained electoral fraud, reinforcing the theoretical approach that the courts enforce the
electoral deal of the dominant interest groups (Ake, 198; Ramseyer, 1994; Ibeanu, 2009) . It strongly
indicates that partisan politics plays an important role in electoral justice system in Africa, both in the
process of admitting of valuable evidence and evaluating complaints.
Conclusion
Judicial interventionism means courts operating outside its references. In election matters, it
means deliberate exclusion or ignoring strong evidence in the course of admitting evidence and
judgments in disputed elections. The electoral justice is regularly produced in response to very narrow
but powerful interest. It thereby sustains the belief that election fraud is the only legitimate means to
gain power. Given this, the court cannot be the natural actor driving democratic consolidation
processes. The study reveals that the high mortality rate in disputed elections in Africa is primarily due
to several factors. First is the weak autonomy of EMBs that make up the Commission’s agent of election
frauds. Second is the legal burden of proof of evidence placed disproportionately on the petitioner and
the twin clause of “non-compliance” that did not “affect substantially the result of the election.” Third is
the dominance of incumbency factor. Finally, is the declining quality of elections thereby limiting the
prospects of alternation executive of power.
Omenma, J. T., Ibeanu, O. O., and Onyishi, I. E.
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Appendix I:
Table 5
Descriptive Statistics Summary for the Test
Type of Fraud
N
Mean
Std.
Deviation
Std. Error
95% Confidence
Interval for Mean
Lower
Upper
Bound
Bound
Minimum
Maximum
INEC ad hoc staff
violations/errors
3
64.1033
29.57365
17.07436
-9.3617
137.5684
33.33
92.31
Interference
3
59.8967
23.30941
13.45769
1.9929
117.8004
33.33
76.92
Election violence
3
55.3433
12.66413
7.31164
23.8839
86.8028
41.67
66.67
Multiple/underage
voting
3
52.1433
12.48778
7.20982
21.1220
83.1647
38.89
63.69
Total
12
57.8717
18.37718
5.30504
46.1954
69.5480
33.33
92.31
Omenma, J. T., Ibeanu, O. O., and Onyishi, I. E.
Disputed Elections and the Role of the Court in Emerging
Democracies in Africa: The Nigerian Example
© Journal of Politics and Democratization
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Journal of Politics and Democratization
Volume 1-1 (April 2016)
Troubling Universalized Human Rights: The Complexities
of Identity and Intersectionality
Malia Lee Womack
Ph.D. Candidate
Ohio State University
https://wgss.osu.edu/people/womack.48
[email protected]
Abstract: One hundred ninety-three countries are members to the United Nations. A core function of
the intergovernmental organization is to produce human rights treaties. The multilateral agreements
define humanity and its needs through a universalizing approach that deduces subjectivity/individuality
and homogenizes humans into shared identities. Some of the conventions are intended to protect all
humans and others are designed to protect group rights. Each multilateral agreement produces a
narrative about what it means to be human or a member of a particular human group. However, the
universalized identity defined in each treaty is incomprehensive and fragmented. Universalization
divides human needs along rigid lines. This approach creates an understanding of victimhood that
assumes people experience human rights violations in the same way. Attention to intersectionality is
majorly lacking in the homogenizing approach; a more complex understanding of identity is necessary.
This manuscript argues for increased attention in human rights to intersectionality and its complexness,
in order to address the intricate needs of diverse humans (especially those who are most subjugated).
This paper also argues for a restructuring of the human rights system to allow oppressed groups agency
to define their needs, design their rights, and oversee implementation of the provisions. Moving forward
theories of rights practices must explore what types of legal frameworks and institutions are best
equipped to meet the needs of all humans. Is it better to use a universal framework or a plurality of
frameworks? Can universalism be redesigned to comprehensively address intersectionality and the
complexities of identity, and if so, how should this design be constructed? What design will provide
subjugated groups agency to define their needs and be core overseers of their rights? Human rights are
not static and profound attention to intersectionality and complex personhoods can assure rights protect
people who are otherwise marginalized.
Key words: human rights; universalism; intersectionality; complexities of identities; group rights
One hundred ninety-three countries are members to the United Nations (UN). A core function
of the intergovernmental organization is to produce human rights treaties. The multilateral agreements
define humanity and its needs through a universalizing approach that deduces subjectivity/individuality
and homogenizes humans into shared identities. Some of the conventions are intended to protect all
humans and others are designed to protect group rights. Each multilateral agreement produces a
narrative about what it means to be human or a member of a particular human group. However, the
universalized identity defined in each treaty is incomprehensive and fragmented. Universalization
divides human needs “along rigid substantive lines” (Bond, 2003, p. 72). This approach creates an
understanding of victimhood that assumes people experience human rights violations in the same way
(Bond, 2003). Attention to intersectionality is majorly lacking in the homogenizing approach; a more
complex understanding of identity is necessary. Although human rights practitioners increasingly
support universalizing rights, critiques about the lack of attention to intersectionality is also emerging in
Womack, M. L. Troubling Universalized Human Rights:
The Complexities of Identities and Intersectionality
© Journal of Politics and Democratization
56
Journal of Politics and Democratization
Volume 1-1 (April 2016)
the UN system (Simmons, 2011; Yuval-Davis, 2006).
The 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform for Action, which was produced because of the
Fourth World Conference on Women, is a groundbreaking document that prompted discussions of
intersectionality in human rights (Yuval-Davis, 2006). The declaration discusses how women experience
oppression differently depending on their varied identity traits. In 2000, the monitoring body for the
UN’s core anti-racism treaty, The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD), also highlighted the importance of designing human rights from an intersectional
perspective. The expert committee submitted General Recommendation Twenty-that advises countries
to take a gendered approach when implementing the racial equality multilateral agreement (YuvalDavis, 2006). Later that year in Zagreb, Croatia, the United Nations Division for the Advancement of
Women, the United Nations Development Fund for Women, and the Office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights held a meeting that produced the Gender and Racial Discrimination Report (UN
Women). The report informs that an intersectional approach to human rights is necessary, yet the
document is not clear on how this approach should be modeled (Yuval-Davis, 2006). Furthermore,
similar to General Recommendation Twenty-Five, the report predominantly only recognizes race and
gender as what constitutes a person’s intersectional identity (Division for the Advancement of Women,
2000). The pages below argue for increased attention in human rights to intersectionality and its
complexness, in order to address the intricate needs of diverse humans (especially those who are most
subjugated). This paper also argues for a restructuring of the human rights system to allow oppressed
groups agency to define their needs, design their rights, and oversee implementation of the provisions.
Power Frameworks and the Intricacies of Identity
Group identities are commonly determined as static and biologically based but they are, in fact,
historically and socially constructed. Such group rubrics are formed, constituted, and reconstituted due
to human interaction and state behavior; as cultural and political practices evolve so do definitions of
group identities (Benhabib, 2011). Group rubrics are shaped by institutions, organizations, legislation,
government agencies, and family and community behavior (Yuval-Davis, 2006). The rubrics are also
predominantly constructed by “the exploiters’ side of the international [and domestic] division of labor”
(Spivak, 1988, p. 75). The most privileged in society have the greatest ability to shape how group
identities are defined and maintained. The most empowered will is the “collective, political will of the
proletariat” (Buck-Morss, 1991, p. 290). Human rights are formed by hegemonic systems which deem
some people (perhaps unconsciously) so inferior that they are not deserving of rights protections
(Simmons, 2011).
Law is not applied evenly or universally. Rights protect specific individuals and leave others
unprotected or underprotected. Law serves a hegemonic system of dominance and control (Simmons,
2011). In human rights, what appears to provide subjugated groups agency can be a mechanism for
marginalizing and dominating these groups. The construction, interpretation, and implementation of
human rights treaties is conducted by people from privileged backgrounds who are generally well
educated, live in urban areas, and are from privileged classes and positionalities in their communities.
Theorists about universalism most often emerge from nations that are and have been oppressors or
from privileged classes in poorer nations (Nussbaum, 2000). Therefore, universalizing philosophy is
another form of domination and colonialism (Nussbaum, 2000). Privileged groups possess agency to
define the needs of less privileged beings. In fact, many populations in the latter group do not even
know what human rights treaties their nation has ratified. The dominating “us” acts as a voyeur
Womack, M. L. Troubling Universalized Human Rights:
The Complexities of Identities and Intersectionality
© Journal of Politics and Democratization
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Journal of Politics and Democratization
Volume 1-1 (April 2016)
concerned with “them” who are subject to an egoist, objectifying, pitying gaze (Lather, 1997). Since
human rights are designed by elite actors and concentrate on universal needs, they abstract the
concrete experiences of the most subjugated “others” whose identities are least recognized in the
human rights hierarchy (Simmons, 2006).
While systems of power oppress identity groups there are also variations in experiences among
such groups. For example, a female identity is not as knowable and unified as it is often perceived to be
and cannot be easily defined due to there being profound differences among those who are
appropriated (or strive to be recognized) under this category (Fuss, 1989). Similarly, a Black identity
cannot be simplistically defined due to profound variations within this group rubric. There have been a
range of scholastic attempts to define Black womanhood, however much of these attempts are
problematic. A range of academic discourse about Black womanhood determines that people under this
identity rubric face a “triple oppression” due to being women, Black, and impoverished (Yuval-Davis,
2006). This produces a narrow understanding of women who are Black that does not address the reality
that first, while it is common for these women to be impoverished, not all women in this identity group
are poor. Second, this narrow “triple oppression” understanding trivializes other experiences of people
in the group rubric, for example in relation to their sexuality, gender performance, age, disability status,
religion, nationality, ethnicity, immigration status, and geo-political location (Yuval-Davis, 2006).
Just as women who are Black have complex identities, all humans have complex subjectivities.
People experience their identity in subjective manners including when they encounter discrimination
and/or exploitation. There is a multidimensionality in identities; “categories of identity do not merely
intersect; they mutually constitute one another. The meaning of race [is] influenced by the meaning of
gender, and vice versa” (Cooper, 2008, p. 682). Similarly, every other identity trait a person possesses
impacts all traits that constitute their personhood. “It is not so much that we possess ‘contingent
identities’ but that identity itself is contingent” (Fuss, 1989, p. 104).
Moreover, people define their identities in a variety of ways which differs depending on when
and for what reason their identity is being articulated. These definitions are shaped by factors including,
but not limited to, their current state and environment, as well as how they experience their
intersectionality, family, religion, communities, locality, nation, and a globalized society. “Self-ascribed
identity is often multifaceted and fluid, and rarely is it completely voluntary, being constrained by
societal norms and various power structures” (Simmons, 2011, p. 161). People are ever evolving beings
and are impacted by their surroundings.
Even though all people are uniquely complex with intersectional ever evolving identities and
individualized lived experiences, there are also concrete trends in identity groups’ socio-economic
positionality and experiences. For example, the majority of people who are Black tend to be of lower
socioeconomic status and women tend to be more impoverished than men (Yuval-Davis, 2006). Thus,
despite the issues that arise when doing so, politicizing identities around narrow markers such as race or
gender (or both) is useful in order to mobilize against oppression of certain groups. Discrimination and
human rights abuses people endure is determined by their intersectional identities as well as identity
hierarchies in a spectrum of power frameworks in the local, domestic, and global spheres (Bond, 2003).
The manner in which diverse humans’ moral dignity is protected and basic human needs are met is
based on historical, socio-economic, legislative, and political structures of oppression, subjugation, and
privileging certain group identities while exploiting others.
Womack, M. L. Troubling Universalized Human Rights:
The Complexities of Identities and Intersectionality
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Journal of Politics and Democratization
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Strategic Essentialism
Oppressed groups mobilize around narrow identity markers they share with other beings in
order to combat subjugation of their shared identity trait. These activists strategically essentialize an
element of their identity through a cultural lens to empower themselves against systems of oppression.
For example, activists of color commonly essentialize their race through a cultural (not biological) lens to
combat historical, social, and political adverse practices that generate and maintain racial inequality.
This strategy is utilized to influence adverse cultural ideologies and practices. “Strategic essentialism in
this sense entails that members of groups, while being highly differentiated internally, may engage in an
essentializing and to some extent a standardizing of their public image, thus advancing their group
identity in a simplified, collectivized way to achieve certain objectives” (Eide, 2010, p. 76).
Strategic essentialism, when utilized to advance the political goals of a group identity, can
improve people’s lived experiences. However, there are also limits to the strategy. The approach is
used in human rights to mobilize around oppression of group identities, yet over-homogenization of
collective identities invisiblizes the oppositions and competitions within such identities (Benhabib,
2011). Mobilizing around basic group rubrics has proven to privilege the needs of some groups over
others under the rubrics. For example, organizing around a racial marker usually prioritizes the needs of
men under the marker unless it is qualified as female. When strategic essentialism is used, there is a
constant risk of “playing into the hands of those whose essentialism is more powerful than their own”
(Eide, 2010, p. 76). Subjugated people also have an internalized hegemonic understanding of their
subjecthoods/needs due to them constantly being appropriated by oppressors. Narrow identity
markers marginalize particular people under the group rubric in question and delegitimize their needs
which form due to their intersectional and less privileged identities. “Individuals do not experience
neatly compartmentalized types of discrimination… rather, individuals experience the complex interplay
of multiple systems of oppression operating simultaneously in the world” (Bond, 2003, p. 76). It is
problematic when one part of a person’s identity is recognized while other parts are not (Fuss, 1989).
This leads to a hierarchy of identities within one human subject which does not recognize the complexity
of their experiences due to their intersectional identity (Fuss, 1989). Therefore, identity groups
“deemed worthy of legal recognition remains a contentious matter in all debates on group rights, and
has consequences for which collective rights groups are deemed entitled” (Benhabib, 2011, p. 51).
Nevertheless, strategic essentialism has been a source of empowerment to mobilize against adverse
state and cultural behavior and the institutionalization of prejudices such as racism and sexism.
Essentializing identities in relation to their historical and socio-political constructs has generated
meaningful political effects despite the issues with this approach (Fuss, 1989).
Redesigning Human Rights to Address the Needs of Intersectional Beings
As explored above, (1) identity groups are historically, politically, and culturally constructed; (2)
people within identity groups are diverse and have complex intersectional identities; (3) people exist
within systems of power that oppress them in ways that intersect with other people’s experiences; (4)
strategically essentializing group rubrics is a source to mobilize against oppression but also prioritizes
the needs of the most privileged beings in the group rubric in question.
What does this all mean for human rights? Universalizing human or a group identity cannot
adequately reflect the needs of diverse beings who experience discrimination and rights violations in
unique manners due to their intersectional personhoods and subjectivities (Bond, 2003). Human rights
Womack, M. L. Troubling Universalized Human Rights:
The Complexities of Identities and Intersectionality
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Journal of Politics and Democratization
Volume 1-1 (April 2016)
treaties are a site of failure. “The current theoretical foundations, organization structure, and practices
of the United Nations… does not permit a nuanced human rights analysis that [accounts] for multiple
forms of human rights abuses occurring simultaneously” (Bond, 2003, p. 74). Metaphorically speaking,
the United Nations is a culture industry that perpetually cheats its consumers (global citizens) of what it
promises (to protect their human dignity) (Adorno & Horkheimer, 2016). The UN does not fulfill its
promises because they are void of a comprehensive definition of humanity. Universalizing identity
invisiblizes the complex nature of human suffering and produces a narrow understanding of human
need that is ineffective in protecting diverse populations. The approach as it is currently operationalized
assures the human rights system is one of oppression and domination in which some groups’ desires
and needs are recognized while those of others are not or are marginalized. The system “impedes the
development of autonomous, independent individuals who judge and decide consciously for
themselves… [such development is] the precondition for a democratic society” (Adorno, 1975, p. 17).
Democracy requires that all people see themselves as law creators as well as those who obey laws;
democracy must circulate throughout all areas of society (Benhabib, 2011).
There is hope. Just as identity groups are continuously redefined due to state practices and
cultural behavior, human rights treaties are also not static. The treaties are alive because they are in
constant evolution due to them being repeatedly reinterpreted; they exist as complex dialogues in the
international and domestic spheres (Benhabib, 2011). Human rights evolve due to political and
institutional practices based on negotiation, communication, and justification (Benhabib, 2011).
However, increased attention to intersectionality is crucial. It is vital to reinterpret the governing
policies to better address the needs of diverse populations. This paper advocates for the reconstruction
and restructuring of the human rights system so that it prioritizes intersectional needs, the diverse
nature of human identity, and desires for particular kinds of rights by people who are most in need of
them.
People must object to adverse universalizing utopian ideals that are hegemonic, imperialist, and
anti-democratic. It is necessary to revise the human rights hierarchy so that subjugated intersectional
beings’ have the agency to define their needs rather than having their needs defined by the privileged
actors that currently dominate the construction, interpretation, and implementation of the conventions
(Simmons, 2011). Paternalism must be avoided in order to refrain from informing people what rights
they most need when, in fact, oppressed groups are most capable of determining their needs
(Nussbaum, 2000). In the current framework, the most subjugated beings are instructed about their
humanity rather than having the agency to define their humanity and their rights. Universalism, as it is
practiced, marginalizes diverse world views and the complex history of discourses and contestation
among people (Benhabib, 2011). The human rights system should utilize valuable diverse perspectives
among oppressed groups about their basic needs. Subjugated beings must define their fundamental
rights (Simmons, 2011). They should also be core participants in overseeing the implementation of the
provisions rather than the current hierarchal system operated by privileged actors.
Theorists have only recently begun to examine whether the human rights movement can
“accommodate a complex, nuanced understanding of human rights violations” (Bond, 2002, p. 73).
Moving forward, theories of rights practices must explore what types of legal frameworks and
institutions are best equipped to meet the needs of all humans (Benhabib, 2011). Is it better to use a
universal framework or a “plurality of different though related frameworks” (Nussbaum, 2000, p. 40)?
Can universalism be redesigned to comprehensively address intersectionality and the complexities of
identity, and if so, how should this design be constructed? What design will provide subjugated groups
Womack, M. L. Troubling Universalized Human Rights:
The Complexities of Identities and Intersectionality
© Journal of Politics and Democratization
60
Journal of Politics and Democratization
Volume 1-1 (April 2016)
agency to define their needs and be core overseers of their rights? Human rights are not static and
profound attention to intersectionality and complex personhoods can assure rights protect people who
are otherwise marginalized.
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