Policy Paper
The European Union Global Strategy: How Best to Adapt
to New Challenges?
By Helga Kalm with Anna Bulakh, Jüri Luik, Piret Pernik, Henrik Praks
March 2016
ISSN 2228-2068
I Context
The writing of the new European Union Global Strategy comes at a difficult
time. The world has become more and more volatile and there are crises on
Europe’s eastern, southeastern and southern flanks. Although the conflicts in
the south and the east are very different in nature, they both highlight the need
for the EU to strengthen its foreign and security policy to better respond to a
hybrid blend of challenges, which involve military and non-military,
conventional and unconventional methods and tactics. The Global Strategy has
the difficult task of setting the EU’s interests and objectives in respect of global
security as well as the means to achieve them in the medium and long term.
The geopolitical situation of the various member states means that the threats
are perceived differently, and coming up with a common strategy risks watering
down the threat assessments. There are marked and fundamental differences
in both strategic goals and capabilities of hostile actors and partners in the east
and in the south. The Global Strategy therefore needs to allow for tailor-made
approaches that look at countries and their aims individually, without ever
compromising the core values of the EU.
Until recently, the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) focused
exclusively on crisis management outside EU borders. However, the security
landscape has changed and possible threat scenarios can arise on our borders
and even within our countries. France’s invocation of Article 42.7 of the Lisbon
Treaty showed that member states can and will turn to the EU in case of nontraditional threats to their security. Member states need to increase their
defence capabilities on both the national and the European level. In tackling
non-traditional threats, one needs to consider that these emanate not only
from terrorist networks, organised crime and other non-state actors, but also
from hostile states.
In the east, Russia constantly tests European solidarity by exploiting
vulnerabilities, coercing and pressuring member states through a variety of
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The European Union Global Strategy and Estonia: How to Survive in a Difficult Neighbourhood?
measures from nuclear threats to information warfare. Russian strategy
traditionally consists of a combination of conventional, irregular and nonmilitary means. Russia sees the world as divided into spheres of influence,
causing various problems between it and the EU. It also uses hybrid tactics
extensively against EU’s Eastern Partners to influence their policies and
undermine their freedom of choice.
Due to the size of its territory, the potential of its population and its immense
economic capabilities Russia could, in principle, play a key role in increasing
stability and security in Europe. It remains a cooperation partner in various
areas of joint interest, in particular the fight against terrorism, the
implementation of non-proliferation policies and the reduction of cross-border
crime. However, a meaningful partnership on any level—let alone a strategic
one—should remain on hold until Russia is ready to fulfil its commitments
under UN and OSCE principles, especially with regard to respecting the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of other states.
In the south, the threat presently stems from failed and dysfunctional states
and non-state actors like Daesh. The sudden and massive flow into the EU of
people fleeing civil war and economic hardship at home has already had a
substantial impact on the domestic politics of most European countries.
Although migration flows are unlikely to stop in the near future, the EU still
lacks proper data about how they will develop, and mechanisms that would
allow them to prepare accordingly. The crises on Europe’s southern and
southeastern borders emphasise the weakness of EU border controls and
asylum policies, as well as the failure of the Dublin Regulations. Internal and
external security threats can no longer be viewed as separate concerns and
there is a dangerous lack of information sharing between member states that
puts the EU at risk of terrorist attacks.
II Policy Recommendations
Surrounding countries
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The Global Strategy should send a clear and unambiguous signal to
Russia as well as other countries in the region that the EU is a serious
player without any idealistic fantasies or unrealistic expectations and
that it does not accept the concept of a world order based on spheres
of influence. While in relations with Russia one should support a dualtrack strategy1 of deterrence and engagement, this should be based on
honest dialogue, rather than on keeping Russia happy with unjustified
concessions. The present confrontation with Russia is rooted in
president Putin’s interest in reviving the policy of spheres of influence.
The Global Strategy should send a clear message to Europe at large that
it will never accept such an approach.
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See, for example, https://www.opendemocracy.net/od-russia/nathalie-tocci/eu-russiarelations-towards-pro-active-agenda (last accessed 4 February 2016)
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The European Union Global Strategy and Estonia: How to Survive in a Difficult Neighbourhood?
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The Global Strategy must not compromise on EU core values, including
respect for human rights and international law. We need a tailor-made
approach to different neighbours, but the core values must remain the
same in relations with everyone, including Eastern Partnership and
Southern Neighbourhood countries as well as the Russian Federation.
Russia has tried to raise the temperature in its relations with the EU by
casting present tensions as a battle of values, where the West
somehow imposes “its” value system on Russia. President Putin likes to
emphasise that the Russian people themselves, not outsiders, have the
right to choose their way of life. The EU must focus on democratic
values and principles, in particular emphasising the importance of free
elections, freedom of the media and freedom to demonstrate. We have
to protect our values openly and unapologetically. The human rights
dialogue should be a crucial part of our relationship with Russia, just as
it is with other countries. The EU must remain careful not to succumb
to Putinist logic, and instead protect its values as universal.
The Global Strategy must be clear that further integration of Eastern
Partnership countries into the EU is beneficial to all and does not in
any way reduce the role Russia plays in Europe. The EU remains
committed to the principle of the freedom of choice of sovereign
countries in their relationship with the EU.
The Global Strategy should include economic tools as part of the EU’s
foreign-policy mechanisms. The sanctions imposed on Russia after its
annexation of Crimea sent the right signal. The EU should not be afraid
to use sanctions in the future.
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Surrounding countries
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The Global Strategy should focus on developing tools for timely
reaction to crises on its borders. Control of the external borders of the
Schengen Area is not exclusively the responsibility of the individual
member states located on its land and sea borders, but should also
involve other nations. The proposal in late 2015 for a European Border
and Coast Guard is the first step in this direction, but more needs to be
done. A more orderly and coordinated process at Europe’s borders
would benefit people seeking asylum and allow for better screening and
vetting, thereby benefitting the national security of member states.
- The Global Strategy should push EU countries towards adopting a
more equitable sharing of responsibility for asylum seekers and
implementing common EU standards on reception conditions and
asylum procedures. The EU refugee relocation scheme must be more
efficient than the smugglers at getting people to where they have a right
to go. The answer should be forward-looking and offer long-term
solutions.
In order to prevent a domino effect, the Global Strategy should outline
flexible aid policies directed at those countries in the EU’s neighbourhood
that are suffering due to large migration flows and related economic
hardship. Countries that have to provide a lot of aid themselves need to be able
to receive both humanitarian and development aid to maintain them as pillars
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The European Union Global Strategy and Estonia: How to Survive in a Difficult Neighbourhood?
of stability. Although Lebanon and Jordan are currently the ones suffering the
most, flexible aid policies should become a mechanism that can be easily
transferred to other regions as well.
The Global Strategy should promote a tailor-made approach in bilateral
partnerships with neighbours. Responding differently to the specific needs and
realities of partner countries allows member states to build their partnerships
more effectively. Bilateral partnerships should be sufficiently flexible to allow
for individual approaches to partner countries, i.e. to move quicker with those
countries that are ready for it.
The EU must invest more in its soft-power tools and promote its image in a
more positive and result-oriented manner in order to build civil society’s
resilience towards outside actors. Russia has effectively used societal
cleavages, particularly minority issues, to the benefit of its foreign policy in the
Eastern Partnership region as well as in some EU member states. Active support
of and engagement with civil society will help to build social resilience against
external influencing policies. Civil society is a unique tool for keeping
governments in the neighbourhood accountable.
The Global Strategy should not completely rule out the prospect of
membership indefinitely. Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova all declared their
commitment and aspiration for eventual EU membership at the Riga Summit in
May 2015, and there is no reason for the EU not to put the theoretical prospect
on the table. A dialogue on prospective membership should not be a topic for
political speculation among member states, but rather a matter of recognition
of the successful implementation of reforms.
Hybrid threats
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The Global Strategy must remain realistic in what it aims to achieve.
Instead of flirting with illusionary ideas of a European Army or Defence
Union, the EU needs to focus on two areas: (1) the development of
European defence capabilities and (2) linking and better coordinating
external and internal policies and instruments.
o The development of defence capabilities necessitates both
cooperation and coordination, including in the form of pooling
and sharing resources, but also increased defence spending. An
agreement along the lines of NATO’s 2014 Wales Summit pledge
to work towards spending 2% of GDP on defence—which would
contain political guidance and a commitment to increase
defence budgets—would be an important step in this regard.
o The Global Strategy should address, as part of the CSDP, the
response mechanism to the invocation of the EU Solidarity
Clause by a Member State that suffers an attack. At present,
CSDP does not deal with threats against the EU on its own
territory. The first step should be to address member states’
security concerns within the CSDP framework and to provide
support for developing capabilities to handle those concerns.
The response will then depend on the nature of the initial event,
e.g. whether it is a cyber incident or a terrorist attack, but there
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The European Union Global Strategy and Estonia: How to Survive in a Difficult Neighbourhood?
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should be a clear understanding of what type of support should
be provided and from whom.
The increasing military aggressiveness of Russia means that ensuring
effective deterrence should remain central. This can only be done by
continued transatlantic defence commitments institutionalised through
NATO.
While countering hybrid warfare is first and foremost the
responsibility of each individual member state, the EU should assist
them in strengthening resilience and, in the event of a hybrid attack,
support the Member State in defending against it. The Global Strategy
should propose specific measures for assisting member states in
building resilience and reducing vulnerabilities in fields like border
control and counterterrorism, cyber defence and the protection of
critical infrastructure.
The EU needs to counter hostile hybrid activities from the start, to be
aware and to anticipate them. The Global Strategy would do well to
rethink its various policy areas through the lens of security and hybrid
threats. A coherent response requires combining CSDP responses with
those in other areas, such as justice and police, border security, energy,
cyber and counterterrorism.
The Global Strategy should incorporate an EU-level plan for dealing
with strategic communications and the information domain as part of
hybrid warfare. Although it is difficult to develop a common strategic
narrative with 28 member states, there is a need to take public
diplomacy initiatives as not all member states are always affected
equally. For example, Russia’s aggressive intelligence activities in
Europe are aimed not only at gathering sensitive information, but also
at influencing, dividing and destabilising target countries. This does not
mean that the EU should engage in counter-propaganda tactics, but it is
necessary to find a compelling way of telling the truth. Reliable
information is a powerful weapon.
In order to improve the EU’s overall resilience, shared situational
awareness is needed among EU agencies, across member states, and
with NATO. The EU should develop a common approach to compiling
and maintaining up-to-date (almost real-time) shared situational
awareness, building upon information exchanges between the public
and private sectors and with NATO. Developing mechanisms at the
strategic level for speedy and flexible decision-making, and rehearsing
them in exercises, is needed to respond effectively to threats.
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Cyber security
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In the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the EU’s
goal should be to contribute globally to safeguarding its core values
online: the freedom of expression, human rights, the rule of law, a free
and open internet, and a safe digital domain. Better cooperation
between law-enforcement and national computer-response teams
(CERTs) is needed to combat cybercrime and the use of the Internet by
terrorists.
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The European Union Global Strategy and Estonia: How to Survive in a Difficult Neighbourhood?
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To foster global cyber-security cooperation, inter alia through its cyber
diplomacy policies, the EU should acquire a more prominent role, and
prioritise and focus its capacity-building initiatives in third countries.
It should develop further its key strategic partnerships and relationships
with key international organisations, as well as contribute to
international discussions on the definition of norms and principles of
responsible state behaviour in cyberspace. The EU must support the
development of cyber norms and confidence-building measures.
Cyber security must become a mainstream part of all policies, linked
to other external action instruments (capacity-building, development
aid, strategic partnerships, protection of freedom and human rights
online). Internally, member states should achieve baseline cyber
resilience and reinforce cooperation among themselves and at the EU
level.
Cyber security must be integrated into the EU’s military and civilian
missions and the Global Strategy should outline priorities and means
for doing so. The EU should strengthen its role in facilitating the
development of collective cyber-defence capability, as well as pooling
and sharing. In the area of CSDP, ICT systems and critical infrastructure
on which EU civilian and military missions depend need to be better
protected, and interoperability among member states and with NATO
must be strengthened. There is a need to improve information sharing,
align threat assessments, and improve capabilities for incident
detection and response. A unified cyber-defence concept for CSDP
military operations and civilian missions, which is presently being
developed in Brussels, should also take into account cyber threats
against member states within EU territory.
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