Evira Research Reports 5/2011
Possible routes of entry into the country
for African swine fever – Risk profile
Evira Research Reports 5/2011
Possible routes of entry into the country
for African swine fever – Risk profile
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
Project group
Research Department, Risk Assessment Research Unit
Jonna Oravainen
Tapani Lyytikäinen
Leena Sahlström
Niina Tammiranta until 31.12.2010
Special Thanks to
Anna-Kaisa Airaksinen, Evira
Aslak Ermala, Finnish Game and Fisheries Research Institute
Ari Heiskanen, Riistankasvattajat ry.
Outi Hälli, University of Helsinki
Tiina Juselius, Evira
Leena Kankaanpää, Evira
Erkki Kiukas, Game Management District of Kyme
Pia Lahin, Farmers’ Pension Institute
Arja Lahtinen, Evira
Heli Lampela, Finnish National Board of Customs
Sanna Nikunen, National health classification register
Tiina Nokireki, Evira
Petri Nummi, University of Helsinki
Heidi Oksman, Etelä-Karjalan Jätehuolto Oy
Juhani Terhivuo, Finnish Museum of Natural History
Jaana Vuolle, Evira
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
Description
Publisher
Finnish Food Safety Authority Evira
Title
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever
– Risk profile
Authors
Jonna Oravainen, Leena Sahlström, Tapani Lyytikäinen
Abstract
The African swine fever is a viral disease that spreads easily to
domestic pigs and wild boar and has considerable socioeconomic
consequences as well. Statutory measures are required to combat
African swine fever. In the acute phase of the disease pigs can show
symptoms including high fever, haemorrhages in the skin, anorexia,
blood in stool and possibly diarrhea. Mortality rates can reach almost
100 per cent, and death appears within 7-10 days from infection.
The disease is not spread to humans.
The disease occurs as well as in domestic pigs as in wild boar in the
largest part of sub-Saharan Africa and in Sardinia. Since 2007 the
disease has occurred in the Caucasus region and in 2011 near the
border of Finland: the Leningrad region and the Kola Peninsula.
In the risk profile different routes and chains of events which could
lead to the African swine fever entering Finland for the first time are
identified and described. The most obvious ones are: people who
have travelled in the infected area, infected meat or meat products,
with domestic pigs and sperm, contaminated transport vehicles,
catering waste from international transport and infected wild boars
crossing the border to Finland.
The key measures to protect the Finnish swine industry from the
African swine fever are high biosecurity of farms and effective and
aimed information on the risks of the disease.
Publication date
September 2011
Keywords
African swine fever, pigs, wild boar, vector, ASF virus, import route
Name and number
of publication
Evira Research Reports 5/2011
Pages
62
Language
Finnish
Confidentiality
Public
Publisher
Finnish Food Safety Authority Evira
Layout
Finnish Food Safety Authority Evira, In-house Services
ISSN 1797-2981
ISBN 978-952-225-094-0
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
Kuvailulehti
Julkaisija
Elintarviketurvallisuusvirasto Evira
Julkaisun nimi
Afrikkalaisen sikaruton mahdollisia maahantuloreittejä
- riskiprofiili
Tekijät
Jonna Oravainen, Leena Sahlström, Tapani Lyytikäinen
Tiivistelmä
Afrikkalainen sikarutto on lakisääteisesti vastustettava helposti leviävä sikojen ja villisikojen virustauti, jolla on myös vakavia sosioekonomisia vaikutuksia. Akuutissa tautimuodossa eläimillä esiintyy
syömättömyyttä, korkeaa kuumetta, verenpurkaumia iholla, veristä ulostetta sekä mahdollisesti ripulia. Kuolleisuus on lähes 100 %
ja tauti johtaa kuolemaan 7-10 vrk tartunnan jälkeen. Tauti ei tartu
ihmisiin.
Tautia esiintyy sekä kesy- että villisioissa suurimmassa osassa Saharan eteläpuolista Afrikkaa ja Sardiniassa. Vuodesta 2007 lähtien tautia on esiintynyt Kaukasuksen alueella ja vuonna 2011 lähellä Suomen rajaa: Leningradin alueella ja Kuolan niemimaalla.
Tässä riskiprofiilissa kartoitetaan reitit ja tapahtumasarjat, jotka voivat johtaa siihen, että afrikkalainen sikarutto tulee Suomeen ensimmäisen kerran. Näistä oleellisimmat ovat: maahantulo infektioalueella matkustaneiden ihmisten mukana, infektoituneen lihan tai
lihatuotteen mukana, elävien kesysikojen ja sperman mukana, kontaminoituneiden eläinkuljetusajoneuvojen mukana, kansainvälisen
liikenteen ruokajätteen mukana ja Suomeen vaeltavan infektoituneen villisian mukana.
Tilatason tautisuojaus sekä tehokas ja kohdennettu tiedottaminen
taudin vaaroista ovat avainasemassa, kun halutaan suojata Suomen
sikaelinkeinoa afrikkalaiselta sikarutolta.
Julkaisuaika
Syyskuu 2011
Asiasanat
Afrikkalainen sikarutto, sika, villisika, vektori, ASF-virus, maahantulo
Julkaisusarjan
nimi ja numero
Eviran tutkimuksia 5/2011
Sivuja
62
Kieli
Suomi
Luottamuksellisuus
Julkinen
Julkaisun
kustantaja
Elintarviketurvallisuusvirasto Evira
Taitto
Elintarviketurvallisuusvirasto Evira, virastopalveluyksikkö
ISSN 1797-2981
ISBN 978-952-225-094-0
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
Beskrivning
Utgivare
Livsmedelssäkerhetsverket Evira
Publikationens titel
Möjliga smittvägar för afrikansk svinpest in i landet – en riskprofil
Författare
Jonna Oravainen, Leena Sahlström, Tapani Lyytikäinen
Resumé
Afrikansk svinpest är en virussjukdom som bör bekämpas genom
lag. Sjukdomen förekommer hos svin och vildsvin, den överförs
lätt och har även betydande socioekonomiska följder. I det akuta
stadiet förekommer aptitlöshet, hög feber, hematomer på
huden, blod i avföringen samt eventuellt diarré hos djuren. Dödligheten är nästan 100 procent och sjukdomen leder till döden 7-10
dygn efter smittan. Sjukdomen smittar inte människor.
Sjukdomen förekommer både hos tama svin och vildsvin i största
delen av Afrika söder om Sahara och på Sardinien. Från och med
2007 har sjukdomen förekommit i Kaukasusregionen och år 2011
nära gränsen till Finland: kring Leningrad och på Kolahalvön.
I den här riskprofilen utreds rutter och händelseförlopp som kan
leda till att den afrikanska svinpesten för första gången påträffas i
Finland. De mest väsentliga är: människor som reser in i landet från
resor i infektionsområdet, infekterat kött eller köttprodukter, levande
tama svin och sperma, kontaminerade djurtransportfordon,
matavfall från internationell trafik och infekterade vildsvin som
strövar över gränsen till Finland.
De viktigaste medlen för att skydda den finska svinindustrin från
den afrikanska svinpesten är att skydda gårdar mot sjukdomen samt
en effektiv och riktad information om sjukdomens faror.
Utgivningsdatum
September 2011
Referensord
Afrikansk svinpest, svin, vildsvin, vektor, ASF-virus, import rutt
Publikationsseriens
namn och nummer
Eviras undersökningar 5/2011
Antal sidor
62
Språk
Finska
Konfidentialitet
Offentlig handling
Förläggare
Livsmedelssäkerhetsverket Evira
Layout
Livsmedelssäkerhetsverket Evira, Enhet för ämbetsverkstjänster
ISSN 1797-2981
ISBN 978-952-225-094-0
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
Table of Contents
Abbreviations ...................................................................................................8
Definitions ....................................................................................................... 9
Summary........................................................................................................ 11
Preface............................................................................................................ 13
Assignment and limitation............................................................................. 14
African swine fever as a disease..................................................................... 15
The Agent........................................................................................................... 15
Symptoms........................................................................................................... 15
Diagnostics......................................................................................................... 16
Prevalence.......................................................................................................... 17
The situation in Finland..................................................................................... 19
Spreading............................................................................................................ 19
Management and control.................................................................................. 21
Target population........................................................................................... 22
Domestic pigs in Finland.................................................................................... 22
Wild boars (Sus scrofa) in Finland..................................................................... 23
Routes of entry into the country for ASF......................................................... 28
Principal routes of entry into the country..................................................... 30
There is a risk of introduction into the country, but risk management
measures are effective.................................................................................... 40
The risk of introduction into the country is real but possibilities for
risk management are small............................................................................ 42
Examples of existing risk management measures.......................................... 44
Legislation and related control.......................................................................... 44
Guidelines........................................................................................................... 44
Information......................................................................................................... 45
Information on other projects and reports..................................................... 46
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
Main information gaps................................................................................... 47
Consequences................................................................................................. 48
Economic consequences of introducing African swine fever into
the country......................................................................................................... 48
Discussion....................................................................................................... 50
Conclusions..................................................................................................... 52
References...................................................................................................... 53
Legislation.......................................................................................................... 57
Annex 1 Information on other ASF-related projects and surveys whose results
are interesting from Finland’s point of view.................................................... 59
The EFSA report (EFSA 2010a)........................................................................... 59
The ASFRISK project............................................................................................ 61
Risk assessment related to meat smuggling in Great Britain......................... 61
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
Abbreviations
AHAW
ASF
CITES
8
EELA
EFSA
ETT
EU
Evira
Mela
MAF
MTT
OIE
PDNS
PMWS
PRRS
PVO
RKTL
Sikava
The Panel on Animal Health and Welfare
African Swine Fever
The Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild
Fauna and Flora
National Veterinary and Food Institute, Finland
European Food Safety Authority
Finnish Association for Animal Disease Prevention
European Union
Finnish Food Safety Authority
The Farmers´ Social Insurance Institution
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
Agrifood Research Finland
World Organisation for Animal Health
Porcine dermatitis and nephropathy syndrome
Postweaning multisystemic wasting syndrome
Porcine reproductive and respiratory disease
Provincial Veterinary Officer
Finnish Game and Fisheries Research Institute
National Health Classification Register
TIKE
Traces
Information Centre of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
Trade Control and Expert System
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
Definitions
Acute
Sudden
Antigen
A substance that when introduced into the body stimulates the production of an
antibody.
Endemic
A continuously prevalent disease, particular to a region
Fomite
Mechanical transmitter of the disease agent, for example care equipments for
animals.
Immunoblotting
Proteins are allowed to adhere to membrane from gel electrophoresis and are analyzed
using labelled antibodies.
Inactivate
Become ineffective
Infective
Animal or vector infected by a virus and where the virus has already reproduced or
replicated.
Infected
Animal or vector infected by a virus
Incubation period
Time from the moment of infection to clinical symptoms
Catering waste from means of transport operating internationally
Catering waste from means of transport operating internationally refers to all
catering waste from aircraft, ships and trains on international routes which originate
from meals and food preparation for passengers and crew, as well as all other waste
that has been in contact with such foodstuffs and leftover food. This sort of waste
must be disposed of, either by burying at an approved landfill site or by incineration
in an approved incineration plant. Category 1 catering waste on a landfill site or a
combustion plant must be dealt with without delay (burying or burning).
9
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
Chronic
Lasting, incessant, persisting
Mortality
Percentage of dead animals of all animals (infected farm)
Peracute
Very acute
Reservoir
Where the disease survives
Risk profile
Operation prior to possible risk assessment, referring to depiction of a defined problem
field concerning animal disease for risk management. Simultaneously the most
important information gaps are investigated. In the process, existing data on a risk
and its devolvement, health effects and means of control, including known economic
losses are combined.
Serotype
Subspecies of bacteria or virus determined by antibodies.
Subacute
Less than acute
Sylvatic cycle
Part of the natural transmission cycle of a pathogen which is spent by cycling
between the wild animals and the vector.
Trophy
Part of animal as hunter’s memory, usually the antlers, skin (pelt), head, skull or
teeth.
Antibody
Antibodies, that is, immunoglobulins are glycoproteins in the immune system by
means of which the body identifies foreign organisms and parts of them. Each antibody identifies a specific antigen.
Vector
A vector can be an insect or an animal that spreads a disease from one animal to
another without falling ill itself. A vector can spread a disease for example when
sucking blood from a sick animal or by carrying microbes that causes the disease in
its digestive tract or in its fur. In this research report the vector refers to a tick in the
genus Ornithodoros.
Viremic
Animal with virus particles in its blood
Virulence
The ability of any agent of infection to produce disease
10
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
Summary
Statutory measures are required to
combat African swine fever. The African
swine fever is a viral disease that spreads
easily to domestic pigs and wild boar
and has considerable socioeconomic
consequences as well. Clinically and
pathologically the African swine fever
is very similar to the classical swine
fever. A laboratory diagnosis is necessary
to separate these two diseases from
each other. There is no vaccine against
the African swine fever.
In Finland the target population is
domestic pigs, farmed and natural wild
boar. The report characterizes these on
the basis of authority record data and
expert evaluations. It is noteworthy that
by number, both wild boar farming and
natural wild boars are concentrated to
Eastern Finland, but both can be found
in almost all parts of Finland, except
from the most northern parts.
The disease is endemic and occurs as
well as in domestic pigs as in wild boar
in the largest part of sub-Saharan Africa
and in Sardinia. Since 2007 the disease
has occurred in the Caucasus region in
Georgia and in its neighbouring countries
Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia. Recently
the disease occurred near the border to
Finland, in the Leningrad region and in
Murmansk on the Kola Peninsula.
In the risk profile different routes and
chains of events which could introduce
African swine fever into Finland for the
first time are identified and described.
There are many different routes of entry.
The major routes of entry into the country
towards which risk management measures are possible to direct are: introduction with people who have travelled in
an infected area, infected meat or meat
products, domestic pigs and semen,
contaminated livestock transport vehicles. The frequency of these events
and other details in connection to them
are described in this risk profile to the
extent information is available.
ASF is also noticed to spread via catering
waste from means of transport operating
internationally. In Finland this waste,
is according to our knowledge, appropriately compiled and disposed of,
and is not likely to be eaten by domestic
pigs or wild boars. Feeding catering
waste to pigs is forbidden in Finland.
An infected wild boar can wander to
Finland across the border. The present
wild boar population in Karelia in Russia
is that scarce that it delays the disease
from advancing to the Finnish side with
wild boars. Notwithstanding, the route
is good to keep in mind, especially if
the wild boar population grows stronger
and consequently starts to spread to the
Finnish side.
It is possible to control the risk of introduction into the country by means of
legislation, guidelines and provisions.
Information can have an effect on the
11
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
risk. Legislation limits the spreading of
the disease, for example by decisions
on protection. In addition to the ban
on import of pig and pig meet products
from Russia into the EU, protection
regulations lay down that livestock
transport vehicles transporting pigs to
Russia must be cleansed and disinfected
after unloading and before entering the
EU area. A verification of this has to be
presented to the customs authority.
The Association for Animal Disease
Prevention (ETT) has laid down guidelines
for visits abroad and especially for
animal disease risks on foreign livestock
farms. ETT warns especially about the
risk of viral and easily spreading animal
diseases entering one country from
another as easily as via clothing, shoes
and animal products. Furthermore Evira
presents information and guidelines for
souvenirs of animal origin intended for
personal use. The customs aim at giving
information at border crossing points by
means of posters and brochures on
import restrictions.
The most important information gaps
defined in the survey are: The prevalence
and role of the tick in the genus Ornithodoros in the EU area, the wild boar’s
role as a disease reservoir and spreader
and potential contacts due to the traffic
between Finnish pig farms and risk areas.
An example of the latter is the number
and destinations of Finns’ wild boar
hunting trips and of these the proportion
of pig farm workers and owners, the
number of pig farm workers frequently
travelling to ASF-countries, the amount
of meat and meat products smuggled
and illegally imported from ASF risk
areas and movements of empty livestock transport vehicles across the border.
The introduction of African swine fever
into Finland would have a strong impact
on Finnish pig farming, causing considerable economic losses for the whole
industry. The outburst of the disease
causes direct and indirect losses. The
12
extent of the losses and their variation
is dependent on both the number of
infected pig farms and factors that are
indirectly dependent on the number of
infected farms. In a survey published
by MTT and EELA in 2005, the economic
impact of an outbreak of the classical
swine fever in at least five farms would
cause losses of 13.6 million Euros.
Some ASF risk assessments have been
made in the EU in recent years. The
report by EFSA - AHAW panel assessed
the possibility of ASF becoming endemic
in the Caucasus and Russian outbreak
regions and the risk of ASF spreading
into the EU area and becoming endemic
in the EU, if the disease makes its way
here. The risk of the disease maintaining endemic in the area was assessed
to be moderate, but the risk of the
disease spreading inside the regions
is high. The risk of the disease spreading into the EU area was estimated to
be moderate and most likely to happen
through catering waste. In Great Britain
the risk of ASF spread was estimated in
connection to smuggling and that the
smuggled and infected meat enters the
country with personal luggage.
The ASF entry into the country pose a
significant threat and in the risk profile
several potential routes are detected.
The infection of the wild boar population is a veritable threat, but transmission from wild boar to domestic pigs is
unlikely. Meat or meat products brought
into the country by private persons is a
possible route of entry. Regarding
import or live pigs and semen related
guidelines and provisions must be complied with. The European Commission’s
decision on cleansing and disinfecting
livestock transport vehicles returning
from Russia to the EU area is an important means of risk management. Biosecurity on farms and information on the
transmission of African swine fever to
risk groups (e.g. foreign and in ASF
areas travelling piggery workers) are
key points when managing the risk.
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
Preface
The African swine fever is one of
the most threatening diseases to pig
farming in the world. The threat is
based on high mortality rates due to the
disease and significant impacts on the
operations of the swine industry (i.e.
restrictions concerning animal traffic,
costs due to preventive measures and
complications in international trade. The
disease is endemic and occurs as well as
in domestic pigs as in wild boar in the
largest part of sub-Saharan Africa and in
Sardinia (EFSA 2010a).
Since 2007 the disease has been
detected in the Caucasus region. In
November 2009 African swine fever was
detected in the Leningrad administrative
district near St Petersburg (FAO 2009).
Furthermore the African swine fever
virus was detected in pig carcasses
found in the Lomonosov municipal area
in the Leningrad administrative district
at the end of 2010. Rosselkhoznadzor,
the Federal Service for Veterinary
and Phytosanitary of Russia reported
16.3.2011 about a new outburst of the
disease in the same region.
8.4.2011 Russia reported about new
outbursts in Murmansk on the Kola
Peninsula and in the delta of the Vaga
River in Arkhangelsk. The distance to
the Finnish border from the infected
region in St Petersburg is ca 150 km and
from Murmansk ca 250 km. (OIE 2011).
African swine fever has so far not been
detected in Finland. As the disease
occurs in regions near the EU, it constitutes
a continuous threat for the member
states (ASFRISK 2011, Roberts & Hartley
2011).
13
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
Assignment and limitation
This risk profile defines and depicts
different chains of events that could
result in the African swine fever in the
Finnish pig population. Here the pig
population includes domestic pigs,
farmed and natural wild boar. In this risk
profile the extent of the risks caused by
potential chains of events is not
estimated. In the risk profile information is produced for risk management.
The risk profile was ordered by the
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.
Possible routes of entry explored in the
survey
with people
with infected pigs and semen
with pork meat, wild boar meat or
products made of this meat
with contaminated empty livestock
transport vehicles
with contaminated appliances, objects and equipment (fomites)
14
with contaminated catering waste
from means of transport operating
internationally
with infected natural wild boars
When the disease has crossed the border, certain chains of events must occur
for the disease to get into contact with
Finnish wild boar or pig. These events
are described in this risk profile as well.
The following events are excluded from
the risk profile
the spread of the disease in the
country
transmission by the Ornithodoros
tick
mini-pigs
information about farms and animal
traffic is not specifically compiled for
the profile
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
African swine fever as a disease
African swine fever is a very easily communicable disease. Even the European
wild boar is susceptible to the ASF
virus. The African swine fever has serious
sosioeconomic consequences on the
industry and on trade with pigs and pig
products. (EFSA 2010a).
4-13 and in temperatures under 60 °C.
In faeces the virus survives in room temperature for 11 days and in pig blood at
4 °C for 18 months. (Kleiboeker 2002).
Infected blood inactivates in 30 minutes
in a temperature of 60 °C (Farez &
Morley 1997).
Clinically and pathologically the African
swine fever is very similar to the classical swine fever. A laboratory diagnosis is
necessary to separate these two diseases from each other. (Kleiboeker 2002).
Even if the serotypes of different viruses
cannot be defined, the virulence of ASF
virus strains varies when assessed by
to clinical symptoms. Subsequently the
disease can occur in the acute, subacute and chronic form. (EFSA 2010a).
In all forms of the disease the occurrence
is high as the virus is easily contagious
and occurs abundantly in infected animals. The sub-acute form of the disease
is typical in Sardinia. (Kleiboeker 2002).
According to the EFSA-report, the virus
in the Caucasus and in Russia is especially virulent and the virulence persists
since the first outbreak of the disease in
Caucasus in 2007. The virulence can be
seen as high mortality rates etc. In other
regions the virulence has subsided in a
certain time enabling part of the pigs to
fall ill in the chronic form of the disease and becoming carriers of the disease. (EFSA 2010a).
African swine fever is not communicable to humans.
The Agent
The causative agent of African swine
fever is the Asifivirus, a member of the
Asfarviridae family. The Asifivirus is a
DNA virus. The ASF virus is very resistant
and can survive for months or years in
frost or refrigerator temperature (EFSA
2010a). The virus survived 6 years in a
dark environment of 5 °C (Farez & Morley
1997). The ASF virus is destroyed in
normal cooking temperature, but
unheated or inappropriately heated
catering waste and pork products
prepared by salting and smoking
constitute a considerable risk for spreading the disease. The virus lives more
than 300 days in ham prepared by salting or drying (e.g. Parma ham). Furthermore, the ASF-virus lasts well in pH
Symptoms
The African swine fever can occur in the
peracute, acute, sub-acute or chronic
form. The disease form depends on the
virus strain, exposure form and dosage.
15
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
The incubation period is 5 to 15 days.
(Kleiboeker 2002).
In the peracute form, the pig can die
without preceding symptoms. In the
acute form of the disease pigs can show
symptoms including high fever,
haemorrhages in the skin (especially on
ears and flank), anorexia, blood in stool
and possibly diarrhoea. The haemorrhages in the skin can cause necrosis before
death. Mortality rates are very high
(almost 100%), and the disease can cause
death within 7 to 10 days from infection.
(Kleiboeker 2002).
The sub-acute form of the disease is
typical in Sardinia. The symptoms are
similar to those in the acute form, but
milder. Pregnant sows give birth and
might die suddenly. At first the pigs
suffer from fever, but the fever drops
within 3 to 5 days. A decrease in thrombocytes and leukocytes appears temporarily and possibly mild diarrhoea.
Mortality depends on age, the rate in
young pigs is 70 to 80% and for older
less than 20%. (Kleiboeker, 2002).
Typical symptoms for the chronic form
of ASF are symptoms in the respiratory
tract and skin injuries resulting in necrosis.
Pregnant sows can give birth even if
mortality rates are low as a whole.
(Kleiboeker 2002).
Diagnoses that separate the acute form
of the disease are among others, classical
swine fever, erysipeloid, PRRS, coumarin
poisoning, salt poisoning, purpura
haemorrhages symptoms, PMWS, PDNS,
salmonella or pasteurella-contagion
and any intestine or respiratory disease
with fever against which antibiotics
have no effect (Kleiboeker 2002,
Commission Decision 2003/422/EC).
Diagnostics
Pathologic findings that can be observed
in pigs with acute African swine fever
16
are haemorrhages in spleen, lymph
nodes, kidneys and heart. The spleen
can be darkened and enlarged three
times the normal size. There can be
fluid swellings around the kidneys and
blood-tinged fluid in the heart sac. Also
meningeal and choroid plexus haemorrhage can be observed. (Kleiboeker
2002).
In the sub-acute form of the disease,
the symptoms are similar to those in the
acute form, but less grave. The spleen
can be one and a half times the normal
size. The lymph nodes are enlarged but
have only small haemorrhages, equally
to the kidneys. (Kleiboeker 2002). Typical findings for chronic ASF are observed in the respiratory tract, for example
pleurisy, pleural adhesions, pneumonia
and lymphoid tissue hyperplasia.
Pericarditis and skin injuries resulting in
necrosis are common (Kleiboeker 2002).
The European Commission Decision (EC)
No 422/2003 on approving an African
swine fever diagnostic manual describes diagnostic and sampling methods
and evaluation criterion of laboratory
results to confirm ASF. Confirmation
must be based on the detection of
clinical signs and post-mortem lesions of
disease, the detection of the virus,
antigen or genome in samples of
pig tissues, organs, blood or excreta, the demonstration of a specific antibody response in blood samples.
Samples of tonsils, lymphnodes, spleen
and lung tissues are best applicable for
confirming the ASF virus, its antigen or
genome from dead or slaughtered pigs.
If the carcass is spoilt the recommended sample is a whole long bone or
breastbone for marrow sample. Concerning pigs with fever or showing other
symptoms, blood samples must be
taken containing coagulation inhibitors,
or whole blood without coagulation
inhibitors according to official authority
guidelines (2003/422/EC).
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
For detecting the disease agent in a
sample OIE Terrestrial Manual designate
the following procedures. Hemadsorbtion test (HAD), fluorescent antibody test
(FAT) and polymerase chain reaction
(PCR). For detecting ASF antibodies the
following serological tests can be used:
enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay
(Elisa), indirect fluorescent antibody
(IFA) test, counterimmunoelectrophoresis (CIE).
The selection of tests is dependent on the
disease situation and the laboratory’s
available methods (OIE 2008) Evira uses
PCR for detection of genome and Elisa
for detection of antibodies. Evira recommends sending of tonsil, lymph node,
spleen, kidney and lung samples. In
addition whole blood without coagulation inhibitors samples are taken. Evira
has not the ability to isolate the virus.
When necessary, samples are sent to
a reference laboratory in Spain. (Nokireki 2011).
Prevalence
The disease was characterized for the
first time in Kenya in 1928. The second
incidence was reported in Angola in
1932. In Kenya and in South Africa the
incidences were noticed to relate to the
interaction between warthog and
domestic pig and as a means to resist
the disease, the two species were
separated from each-other. In Europe the
disease was reported in Portugal in 1957
and again in 1960. Presumably the
disease came from Angola. The disease
could not be controlled and it spread to
France, Italy, Malta, Belgium and the
Netherlands. The Iberian Peninsula was
not declared free from the disease until
1995. In Sardinia the disease became
endemic. (Penrith and Vosloo 2009).
In 1971 ASF spread to a new continent
and was reported in Cuba where it was
eradicated with difficulty. The disease
spread from the Iberian Peninsula to the
Dominican Republic 1978, Haiti in 1979
and a second outburst was reported in
Cuba in 1980. The disease was eradicated in all these countries. (Penrith and
Vosloo 2009).
Nowadays the African swine fever
occurs commonly in Africa. The largest
part of the sub-Saharan countries has
reported cases of ASF (Costard et al.
2009). Outside Africa, in Europe infections have occurred in Sardinia and since
2007 the disease has occurred in the
Caucasus region in Georgia and in its
neighbouring countries Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia and also on Mauritius. In October 2009 African swine fever
was detected on a farm in the Leningrad
administrative district area near St
Petersburg. The cause was suspected
to be a contaminated meat product or
contaminated meat. The area is located
2 000 km north of the outbreak area in
Caucasus (FAO 2009).
Furthermore the African swine fever
virus was confirmed in 30 swine carcasses found in a waste treatment plant in
the Lomonosov municipal in the Leningrad administrative district on the last
day of 2010. The carcasses were found
30 km from St Petersburg and less than
100 km from the Estonian border (Defra
2011) and about 150 km from the
Finnish border. There was suspicion that
the pigs were infected through catering
waste from the military academy that
the pigs had been fed with. On March
16, 2011 Rosselkhoznadzor, the Federal
Service for Veterinary and Phytosanitary
reported about a new outburst of the
disease in the same region (Figure 1).
It seems that the infection is so far not
under control in the Leningrad administrative district.
On 8 April, 2011 Russia reported to OIE
about cases of the disease in Murmansk
on the Kola Peninsula and in the delta
of the Vaga River in Arkhangelsk
(Figure 2). On the home page of Rosselkhoznadzor there is information about
the farm related to the case in Arkhangelsk where the pigs had been fed with
17
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
catering waste from the military unit
and a day-care centre (Rosselkhoznadzor 2011). According to an OIE report on
a pig farm in Arkhangelsk and in
Murmansk, 20 pigs of 21 on both farms
died of African swine fever. The confirmed virus in the area seems to be very
virulent. The distance from Murmansk
to Finland is only about 250 km. There
is also regular air traffic between Rovaniemi and Murmansk and further to
Arkhangelsk (Embassy of Finland, Moscow 2011).
Both the acute and peracute form of the
disease has occurred in Russia. What
contributes to the spread of the disease
is the approval of feeding catering waste
to pigs, the traditional procedure in
Russia and that wild boars are in contact with the domestic pig population.
The fact that a national serological
surveillance programme has not been
established makes the combating of the
disease difficult. Only a few antibody
detections have been done so far.
(Sánchez-Vizcaíno 2011).
Figure 1. The disease case in the Lomonosov municipal in the Leningrad administrative district
on 16 March, 2011. Source: OIE-WAHID, http://web.oie.int/wahis/public.php?page=single_
report&pop=1&reportid=10395. 16.5.2011.
18
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
Figure 2. The disease case in Murmansk (26/3/2011, above) and Arkhangelsk
(3/4/2011, below) Source OIE-WAHID, http://web.oie.int/wahis/public.php?page=single_
report&pop=1&reportid=10465. 16.5.2011.
The situation in Finland
Spreading
Evira analyses African swine fever antibodies and virus in blood samples from
pigs only in suspected cases. In 2010
single animals from four different farms
were studied. Two of these were farmedraised wild boar. Furthermore co-operation has started with Kyme Game
Management District. Four samples
have been asked for from that district.
Nine were received in 2010. (Nokireki
2010). All samples have so far been
negative, thus African swine fever has
never been detected in Finland.
In Europe the disease usually transmits through the nostril cavern and
the mouth when animals are in direct
or indirect contact with infected pigs or
through feed contaminated by the virus.
However, on areas where the tick of the
genus Ornithodoros lives, the transmission of these vectors is significant concerning maintenance and spreading of
the virus. ASF can even spread by indirect contact with contaminated material
or by way of biting insects transporting
mechanically the ASF virus. The disease
19
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
might also spread through the semen
of infected hogs. (Commission Decision
2003/422/EC).
A key role concerning the spread of the
disease from one country or continent
to another is the transport of infected
pigs and pork meat products and feeding pigs with catering waste. It is
estimated that if all feeding of catering
waste to pigs was stopped everywhere,
one of the most significant transmission
routes could be eliminated (Hess 1981).
The role of wild boar regarding the epidemiology of the disease is well described as regards warthogs (Phacochoerus
africanus) in East and South Africa, but
in other respects there is little information about African and other wild porcine species. A horizontal and vertical
spreading is not possible for the warthogs; subsequently the survival of the
virus is dependent of the sylvatic cycle
which includes the soft tick of the genus Ornithodoros. Young warthogs are
infected by the O. moubata-tick bite
and become viremic. Hence new ticks
are infected when feeding on a young
warthog. In areas where ticks occur, up
to 80 percent of the warthogs are found
to be infected (Costard et al. 2009).
The bushpig (Potamochoerus larvatus)
lives in sub-Saharan Africa and on
Madagascar, but their role in relation to
the ASF epidemiology is uncertain. They
show no clinical symptoms of the ASF
infection and seem to need a bigger
dose of the virus than domestic pigs in
order to get infected. In the outburst
area in Malawi bushpigs were suspected
to be a reservoir of the disease. Another possible infected wild animal reservoir is the giant forest hog (Hylochoerus
meinertzhageni). (Costard et al. 2009).
Wild boars (Sus scrofa) are susceptible
to the ASF virus and they have similar
symptoms and a mortality rate as
domestic pigs. Disease cases in wild
boar have been reported on the Iberian
20
Peninsula, Sardinia and Caucasus and
elsewhere in Russia (EFSA 2010a).
According to the report of EFSA it is known
that all ticks of the genus Ornithodoros
can be infected with the ASF virus and
accordingly possible disease vectors.
The significance of these ticks is considerable concerning local maintenance
of the disease, but they have no impact
on the geographical spreading of the
disease. Ticks of the above-mentioned
genus have never been found in wild
boar. It is suggested that the reason for
this is that wild boar do not rest in sheltered burrows, but on ground. (EFSA
2010b).
The report of EFSA states that there is
considerable lack of information on the
role of the wild boar and the tick in
maintaining the ASF virus and concerning infection of domestic pigs. On the
Iberian Peninsula the Ornithodoros erraticus was pointed out as a vector of the
ASF virus in connection to infection of
domestic pigs. There is, however, very
little information on the prevalence of
this vector and other potential vectors
in the EU area. There is also no certainty whether or not wild boar can be a
reservoir of the disease or whether or
not they are infected merely in regions
where there is an outbreak of the disease in domestic pigs. (EFSA 2010b).
The Finnish Museum of Natural History
points out that they do not have any
information on the tick of the genus
Ornithodoros occurring in Finland. In
the museum’s foreign collection there
is one specimen of the genus, but no
detailed information. In addition to
birds, bats are possible spreaders. Mites
have been found in bats, but the Museum
of Natural History has no information on
findings of the above-mentioned tick in
bats. It is hard to assess the occurrence
of the tick of the genus Ornithodoros in
Finland. If the life cycle includes development phases outside the host, these
can be eliminated due to winter. (Terhivuo 2011).
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
Management and control
The African swine fever is an easily
spreading animal disease and statutory
measures are required for combating the disease in Finland. If there is
suspicion of African swine fever, veterinary officials must hinder the spread of
the disease to other animals and make
an effective eradication of the infection
possible. When the infection is confirmed, EVIRA will order the pigs on the
farm to be slaughtered and disposed
without delay. The provincial veterinary officer (PVO), in cooperation with
EVIRA decides about the slaughter and
disposal methods. All waste and material possibly contaminated with the
virus, for example bedding, feed and
manure are disposed of according to the
instructions of the PVO. The meat and
by-products of the pigs ordered to be
slaughtered are traced and if necessary
destroyed. When the pigs are disposed
of, the vehicles used for transport and
buildings where pigs were kept, as well
as the environment round the buildings and all appliances are disinfected.
(MAFa 6/EEO/2003).
After confirming African swine faver a
biosecurity zone is established round
the infected farm (with a radius of at
least three kilometres) and a control
zone (with a radius of at least ten
kilometres). Transportation of animals
in the zone is limited as well as products and consignments that are connected with the risk of spreading the
disease. Also visits to the farm within
the zone can be restricted. The places
where the pigs are kept within the biosecurity and control zones are analyzed
in case of swine fever. Contact holdings
of infected farms are traced and the
activities of animals on traced farms are
restricted. Before the final results of the
analyses, it is possible that pigs have to
be disposed of on such farms that run
a high risk of infection. According to
the analyses and if necessary, measures
and restrictions are also directed to
places for keeping pigs to which the
infection might have spread. There is no
vaccine against the African swine fever.
(MAFa 6/EEO/2003).
21
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
Target population
Domestic pigs in Finland
concerning normal production of pork
meat products is relatively small.
There were 2 300–2 400 pig farms in
Finland in 2009. The number depends
on how a pig farm is defined and the
time of the data etc. The majority of the
pig farms were located in the region of
Vaasa Office of the Regional State
Administrative Agency for Western and
Inland Finland and in the region of Turku
Office of the Regional State Administrative Agency for South-western
Finland (66.8%) (Table1). In the region of the Regional State Administrative
Agency for Eastern Finland there are few
pig farms (7.2%) and its significance
The distribution of basic types of pig
farms (farrowing, finishing and farrowing-to-finishing farms) was even in
Finland and neither the farrowing nor
the finishing farms are clustered in any
part of the country. Out of the pig farms
31.5% were farrowing farms, 38.0% finishing farms and the rest were classified as farrowing-to-finishing farms
where at least a considerable part of
the farm’s own piglets are raised until
slaughter.
Table 1. Number of pig farms, sows and finishers for meat production in the operations areas of
respective Regional State Administrative Agency.
22
Regional State Administrative
Agency
Offfice
Southern Finland
Helsinki
Pig farms
Sows
Finishing pigs
69 (2,9%)
3 700
27 000
Hämeenlinna
173 (7,2%)
9 300
64 000
Kouvola
105 (4,4%)
4 200
28 000
Western and Inland
Jyväskylä
70 (2,9%)
2 500
12 000
Finland
Tampere
111 (4,6%)
6 600
27 000
Vaasa
759 (31,7%)
49 200
288 000
Southwestern Finland
Turku
841 (35,1%)
60 400
333 000
Eastern Finland
Joensuu
42 (1,8%)
1 300
9 000
Kuopio
74 (3,1%)
4 400
23 000
Mikkeli
56 (2,3%)
2 100
11 000
Northern Finland
Oulu
87 (3,6%)
5 700
34 000
Lapland
Rovaniemi
6 (0,3%)
<100
1 000
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
According to compiled data from slaughterhouses ca 200 pig farms were part of
different network production systems
(sow pools, multi-site systems, intermediate farms etc.).
Six percent of the farms offered the pigs
the possibility to stay outdoors at least
part of the year (unpublished data). The
data is based on a questionnaire that
the risk assessment unit at Evira carried
out in 2007. The questionnaire was
related to the assessment of the necessity of emergency vaccination in
connection to risk of the spreading of
the foot-and-mouth disease (Lyytikäinen et al. 2011). On Sikava’s special
level farms (Finnish SPF) it is prohibited
to keep the animals outdoors due to the
risk of transmission of faeces-related
diseases. There are 73 approved special
level farms in Finland. (Nikunen 2011).
Organic pork production requires outdoor access for pigs according to the
following guidelines; Pigs must have
access to an outdoor pen at least from
May to October. The outdoor enclosure
must allow them to perform rooting
exploratory behaviour. Solid ground
solutions in the outdoor pen are allowed, provided that rooting material
is arranged, for example turf. (Evira
2009b). Organic production was carried
out by nine pig farms in Finland in 2009,
and the total number of pigs on these
farms was a little more than 2 600. The
farms are located in South and West
Finland, only one organic pig farm is
located in Eastern Finland. In 2004 there
were still 17 organic pig farms so the
number of farms has significantly
dropped during the last years. The
number of animals, however, has
remained about the same, meanwhile
the number of farms has decreased
(2 554 pigs in 2004). (Evira 2011d).
These being the case, pigs have little
access to outdoor activity; hence direct
interaction between domestic pigs and
wild boars is limited.
Wild boars (Sus scrofa) in
Finland
Natural wild boar
There is no exact data on the size of
the wild boar population in Finland. A
rough estimation suggests hundreds of
wild boars, however, no more than five
hundred, according to the expert at the
Finnish Game and Fisheries Research
Institute (Ermala 2010). The wild boar
population has never been monitored
in Finland and at present there are no
plans to do so either (Ermala 2010).
Wild boars occur in Finland mainly in
South-eastern Finland, especially in
Kymenlaakso, Etelä-Savo and PohjoisKarjala. The wild boar population is
densest near the Russian border.
(Ermala 2010). The most likely spreading direction from South-eastern
Finland is Southern Finland, areas
beneficial for animals, especially regarding agriculture. Northern Finland with
less cultivated land is not so attractive
for the wild boar. (Nummi 2010). The
population in Russian Karelia was
estimated to 850-900 wild boars
in 2010 (Danilov etc. 2010). On the
Russian side of Karelia the density of
wild boar is not so high that the animals
are forced to migrate. It is a question of
natural movements of the eastern
species (Ermala 2010).
Wild boars have quite a stable territory.
One year old individuals are ejected
from the herd to look for a place of their
own. There can be overlapping in the
territories of different herds. At least
the herds can amicably agree upon the
same feeding grounds. (Ermala 2010).
The wild boars thrive near water
systems and find their way to them.
They can swim in the sea to nearby
islands, providing the circumstances are
good, but hardly from Estonia to Finland
(Ermala 2010). In winter the wild boar
23
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
is not believed to move across the ice,
more probably it walks by land. The wild
boar takes apparently the route along
the isthmus from Russia to Finland. A
snow cover higher than 40 cm complicates the movements of the wild boar,
but in other respects the snow does
not hinder them from moving around.
Neither the cold is assumed to have an
impact on the life of the wild boar, due
to their thick fur (Ermala 2010, Nummi
2010). The frozen ground might, however, make searching for food difficult.
The wild boar is estimated to have
several feeding grounds near the east
border in the Game Management
District of Kyme. Wild boars near the
frontier often stay on the Russian side
during day time and move to the
Finnish side to feed at dusk. They can
shift several kilometres and even more.
In the Game Management District of
Kyme the largest wild boar herd
consists of 10 to 20 animals, sometimes
even many more. (Kiukas 2010). During
the last ten years there have been
attempts to increase the number of wild
boars by means of feeding. Earlier wild
boars were not separately fed, but they
visited other feeding grounds. Nowadays separate feeding places are
arranged for the wild boars. For example
in Kitee a herd of forty wild boars are
fed. (Ermala 2010).
The wild boar usually reproduces once
a year (Hälli & Heinonen 2009). Even if
the wild boar can reproduce effectively,
it is still rare in number. Many hunters
wish for the population to grow. Damages
caused by wild boar are not considered
so significant that the size of the population ought to be limited (Ermala 2010).
Probably less than a hundred wild boars
are annually hunted in Finland. It is
difficult to estimate the exact number as
the hunters are not obligated to notify
their catches (Ermala 2010).
Normal procedure entails that the body
and edible internal organs are not
24
consumed before they are tested for
Trichinella. Intestines are not used.
(Kiukas 2010).
Natural game meat inspection is
carried out either in a game handling establishment or a slaughterhouse
approved as a game handling establishment, or in butcheries or so called
butcher’s sheds. The meat inspection is
always carried out by the official veterinarian. It is agreed that natural game
meat that has been inspected in slaughterhouses, butcheries or game handling
establishments can also be delivered to
other EU member states. If the natural
game meat is inspected in a butcher’s
shed it is only approved for the home
market (Evira 2010b).
Wild boar meat is at least tested for
Trichinella. For Trichinella tests meat
samples are taken in connection to the
meat inspection. The samples are sent
to be analyzed in a laboratory authorized
by Evira (Evira 2010b).
Food legislation requirements do not
apply to meat that hunters use in their
own household. Game meat preserves,
sausages and other products intended
for the hunters’ own use can be produced of inspected or non-inspected
game meat, performed elsewhere than
in a meat production establishment.
Authorized meat handling establishments are allowed to manufacture meat
products only from inspected meat.
(Evira 2010e).
Farmed wild boar
The project VILLISIKA (WILD BOAR)
2007–2009 at the Faculty of Veterinary
Medicine at the University of Helsinki
investigated in 2007 the actively
operating wild boar farmers which at
that time were 64 (Hälli 2011). Farming
wild boar is an operation subject to
declaration and in March 2011 the
Regional State Administrative Agencies
had registered 111 wild boar farms in
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
the Elite data system (Figure 3). This
number also includes such farms that
have quitted farming wild boar but have
not informed the authorities about it
(Table 2 and Figure 4).
There are two associations for wild boar
farmers in Finland. Riistankasvattajat ry.
is an active association for game breeding entrepreneurs. The association has
also other members than wild boar farmers. On the web-site of Riistankasvattajat ry. 24 farmers are listed. Some of
the wild boar breeders (14 farms)
belong to Suomen Villisiankasvattajien
Yhdistys ry. In Northern Karelia where
intensive wild boar farming is concentrated, the farming area is about 100
hectares and the total number of wild
boars two thousand (Heiskanen 2010).
© 2011 MML, Karttakeskus
Figure 3. Wild boar farms with known location registered in the
Elite data system (82 farms, 74% of farms). Location of other
farms is not registered in the official register. 4/4/2011.
25
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
Regional State Administrative
Agencies
Rovaniemi
Head offices
Branch offices
Oulu
Decisions on whether staff work in
other locations are made by Regional
state administrative agency.
Vaasa
Kuopio
Jyväskylä
Tampere
Mikkeli
Hämeenlinna
Kouvola
Turku
Helsinki
Figure 4. The Regional State Administrative Agencies and their offices.
Source: Ministry of Finance
26
Joensuu
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
Table 2. The distribution of all wild boar farms and number of wild boars registered in the Elite
data system per Regional State Agency.
Regional State Administrative Agency
Percentage of animals
Percentage of farms
Regional State Administrative Agency for
Southwesten Finland
5
7
Regional State Administrative Agency for
Lapland
9
9
Regional State Administrative Agency for
Northern Finland
14
23
Regional State Administrative Agency for
Western and Inland Finland
16
16
Regional State Administrative Agency for
Southern Finland
18
23a
Regional State Administrative Agency for
Eastern Finland
38
22
a
42 percent of the farms in the Regional State Administrative Agency for Southern Finland are
situated in the region of Kouvola office i.e. in the most eastern part of the region.
Wild boar farming has taken into use a
two-stage breeding system. There are
two pig production farms in Northern
Karelia. (Heiskanen 2010). The aim on
the sow herd farm is to rear only breeding sows and piglets. Wild boar sows
give birth to 3 to 5 piglets once a year.
The piglets are relocated to the finisher
farm in late summer or early spring. The
farmed wild boars in Eastern Finland are
descendants of free-living wild boars
captured in nature. To our knowledge
wild boars are not imported to Finland
from any other country than Sweden
and Estonia. The swine register is notified of all transfers of wild boar, but in
the register wild boars are not separated from domestic pigs.
A wild boar can reach an age of 30 years,
but on farms in Finland the oldest
animals have reached an age of 15
years (Hälli & Heinonen 2009).
Prior to wild boar slaughter and bleeding the veterinarian carries out an
ante-mortem inspection. The slaughtering process is concluded within three
hours in the slaughterhouse and from
there the meat is delivered to whole
saling. In Northern Karelia three slaughterhouses take wild boars. In the fall of
2010 these slaughterhouses expected to
receive 500 animals to be slaughtered,
that is ca 28 000 kilograms. (Heiskanen
2010).
Wild boars that have escaped from farms
can wander nearby, but usually they
return home when they are hungry.
Wild boars seldom escape and if they
do so, they usually find their way back
the same day. Wild boars do not seem
to try to escape, but can leave if, for
example, the gate is left open by mistake.
In the surroundings round the farm
daily inspections are done. That way
attempted escapes, obtrusions into the
farm and animals wandering near the
farm are discovered. If a wild boar tries
to escape it most likely tries to dig itself
under the fence. (Heiskanen 2010).
Settlements are probably rather insignificant, neither enticing nor deterrent to
the wild boar. It is possible that sows
during mating time on farms can attract
wild boar hogs, as it is possible to find a
mating partner by means of scents even
from far away. Wild boar herds from
Russia avoid farms, strange animals do
not attract them and the welcome especially during sows’ mating time would
not be a warm one.
27
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
Routes of entry into the country
for ASF
The African swine fever can enter the
country through import of infected pigs
or semen. The disease can even enter
through an empty livestock transport if
it is inadequately cleansed and disinfected. Wild boars can wander to
Finland or live boars can be imported to
farms in Finland. The disease can enter
the country through a person’s clothes
or by the introduction of personal
consignments of products of infected
meat or meat products. Also different
contaminated appliances (e.g. hunting
gear), objects and equipments can bring
the disease into the country through
people and livestock transport vehicles.
Furthermore catering waste from means
28
of transport operating internationally is
a potential risk (Figure 5).
When the disease has crossed the
border, certain chains of events must
occur for the disease to get into contact
with Finnish wild boars or pigs. In addition a direct transmission from the wild
boar population to the domestic pig
population requires a wild boar population which id dense enough and outdoor
activities for domestic pigs. It is possible
that disease spreads through a vector,
but if domestic pigs are tightly held
indoors and biosecurity is adequate,
there is a lower risk of disease transmission.
Infected pig or
semen in Finland
BORDER
Import
Infected wild boar in
Finland
Migration
Infected wild boar
Susceptible pig,
wild boar or
farmed wild boar
BORDER
Introduction into the
country
Person carrying the
virus in his or her
equipment or clothes
Figure 5. Detected routes for the African swine fever to enter into Finland.
Contaminated
livestock transport
vehicle in Finland
BORDER
Transport
Livestock transport
vehicle contaminated
by the virus
Infected pig or semen
Escaped infected
farmed wild boar
Contaminated
objects and
equipments having
been in contact with
the virus
Infected catering
waste for pig or
wild boar feed/
infection through
vector
Infected catering
waste from
international
transport (planes or
ships)
Is not disposed of
as category 1
waste
Disposal as
category 1 waste
BORDER
Infected wild boar
meat/pig meat
BORDER
Legal or illegal commercial
import or introduction for
personal use
Meat of infected pig
or wild boar
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
29
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
Principal routes of entry into
the country
Tourism
ASF can be introduced into the country
through people’s clothes, shoes, gear or
souvenirs made from animal products.
For this to happen a person, while staying abroad, has to be in contact with an
infected pig, wild boar, pig meat or wild
boar meat for example in relation to a
visit to animal farms or by participating
in wild boar hunting. People can bring
the disease into the country through
souvenirs made from animal products
that have been in contact with an
infected pig or its body fluids.
Finns travel a lot. In 2009 15-74-yearolds Finns made totally 5.6 million leisure
trips abroad. To Russia 125 000 trips
including overnight stays were made
and to Africa 109 000 trips, of the latter
half were made to Egypt. Finns made
totally 182 000 leisure trips to Russia in
2009. Every fifth leisure trip including
an overnight stay was made to Estonia,
that is 718 000 trips. Including day trips
and cruises, the number of trips to
Estonia totalled 1.6 million. (Statistics
Finland 2010a).
Of business trips including overnight
stays in the destination country, 45
percent of the (390 000) trips were
made to the neighbouring regions.
Most business trips were by far made
to Sweden, totally 167 000 trips. On
second place came Germany and Estonia, to both countries 95 000 business
trips were made. To Asia, the American continent and Africa about 100 000
business trips were made. To Russia
52 000 business and conference trips
were made in 2009. (Statistics Finland
2010b).
The Russians were the absolutely biggest foreign tourist group in
Finland in February 2011. In February 2011 nearly 32 000 Russians were
registered in a tourist accommodati30
on, which constitute 22 percent of the
total number of foreign tourists. The
Russians’ overnight stays dropped 2.4
percent from February last year. (Statistics Finland 2010b).
As the African swine fever has never
been detected in Egypt according to OIE,
Finns travelled in countries where ASFinfection potentially occurs, more than
300 000 times in 2009. As other African states have not been specified in
the statistics, it is assumed and simplified that trips to all other countries
except Egypt are trips to areas of potential ASF infection.
Wild boar hunting trips have become
more common. Many Finnish and
foreign travel organizers arrange wild
boar hunting trips mostly to Estonia and
Sweden, but also to Poland, Germany,
Slovakia, Hungary and Russia. At least
one travel operator organizes wild boar
trips to Africa. There is, however, no
information available on how many
wild boar hunting trips are made.
Travels of persons working in swine
production in Finland
The most significant group of people
concerning the introduction of the
disease into the country is people
having to do with pigs in ASF infected
areas and also with pigs in Finland
(Figure 6). For this reason people working in Finnish pig farms and regularly
visiting infection areas (workers in pig
farms and pig farm owners) are the
most noteworthy group in relation to
the disease. Pig farm workers visiting
Russia cause a potential risk for the ASF
to enter into country through infected
food products as souvenirs.
Agriculture in Finland employs directly about 90 000 people of which
80 000 are entrepreneurs or their family
members. Measured by number of
persons, grain farms are the biggest
employer in the agriculture industry,
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
secondly farms concentrated on
dairy cattle and horticulture (Employment and Economic Development Office
2008). In Finland there are probably not
more than 10 000 pig farm workers and
pig farm entrepreneurs (pig farms about
2 400). The labour force (15–74 yearolds) totalled some 2.6 million in
November 2009 (Statistics Finland
2010c); hence the pig farm workers
constitute at the most 0.4 percent of
the labour force. If this fraction of the
population travels as much as the rest
to Russia and Africa, an assessment of
the number of trips that people working
with pigs made to ASF infected countries in 2009 is 1 200. Only a fraction of
these trips, however, are destined to a
real risk area from where the ASF virus
in theory could be carried from.
In 2007 about 14 700 foreign workers worked on more than 2 000
Finnish farms or horticulture companies.
The foreign workers constituted mostly
of seasonal labour force and worked on
an average 40 days per person a year.
Of the foreign labour force two thirds
worked on farms specialized in horticulture, consequently a little less than
5 000 people worked on animal farms
(TIKE 2008). As the number of pig farms
constitutes less than 10 percent of all
domestic animal farms in Finland,
presumably less than 10 percent of these
5 000 people worked in the pig
industry, that is, 500 people at the
most. If we assume that these people
stayed on an average half of the year
in Finland and made during that time a
trip abroad once a month, these people
made 3 000 trips a year at the most.
Russian citizens that work on pig farms
in Finland need a worker’s residence
permit. It is usually granted for a certain
occupation. A residence permit may
either be for a fixed term or be permanent. A fixed-term residence permit
is granted either as a temporary or a
continuous residence permit. The first
residence permit is always issued for a
fixed term (Ministry of Employment and
the Economy 2006). In 2010 the num-
ber of pending residence permit applications from the Russian Federation was
1 029, which no doubt constitutes the
largest nationality (Finnish Immigration Service 2011). Simultaneously the
number of decisions regarding worker’s
residence permits were 3 852, of these
22 percent was rejected. Russian
citizens were granted 734 worker’s
residence permits (Finnish Immigration
Service 2011). According to judgments
on a part of an action of the Employment and Economic Development Offices regarding residence permit applications in 2010, 54 citizens of the Russian
Federation were granted their first
permit as farm workers. In addition 49
Russians were granted a continuous
permit (Employment and Economic
Development Office 2011). Farm workers
have not been specified according to
production form, hence there is no
information available on how many
farm workers have been working in a
pig farm. Even if all Russians with work
permits for farm work would work in
the pig industry, they would only
constitute about 1 percent of the whole
labour force in the pig industry. If these
103 persons made a trip home once a
month, 1 200 trips were made in 2010.
Relief workers
The number of foreign relief workers is
very small. In 2008 there were totally
14 921 relief workers on domestic animal farms. Of these 14 598 were Finns,
4 Swedes, 235 Estonians, 36 Russians
and 29 from other countries. (Mela
2011). On Finnish pig farms there were
8 Russian pig farmer relief workers
from 1.1.2008 to 5.2.2010. During that
time they worked from 4 to 301 days in
Finland, totally 649 days. (Mela 2011).
Of these people only 2 stayed in Finland
for more than a month during the period mentioned above. Assuming they
went home every month, the number
of trips is calculated to 50. The number
of trips to possibly ASF- infected farms is
even smaller, but unknown.
31
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
People working in pig production in
ASF risk areas and their travels to
Finland
In Russia 7.7 million people worked in
the agriculture industry in 2005. Furthermore 23.7 million people were
engaged in cultivation for domestic use
and 45 percent of these informed that
cultivation for domestic use is their main
occupation. Russia’s agriculture employs totally 16.5 million full-time workers,
that is, 22% of the Russian labour force
(Bogdanovskii 2005). Statistical information on people working with pigs in
Russia is not available, but they form
a small group of the previously men-
tioned people engaged in agriculture.
Assuming that farm workers make trips
to Finland as eagerly as people from
other lines of business and assuming
that only people belonging to the
labour force travelled to Finland, about
7 000 Russian farm workers registered
in tourist accommodations in February
2011, of which only an insignificant part
constitutes of pig farm workers.
People arriving in Finland from ASF
infected farms probably only compose
a small fraction of pig farm workers
visiting Finland and only seldom, if ever,
they are in contact with the Finnish pig
industry.
Person contaminated
abroad while visiting
an infected pig farm
Travels to Finland
BORDER
Foreign pig farm
worker/agricultural
holiday substitute/
consultant
BORDER
Finnish pig farm
worker/pig farm
owner
BORDER
Rural tourism/
other visitor
Non-compliance with ETT
disease prevention
guidelines in connection to
trip
Susceptible
pig
Figure 6. People can introduce the disease from an ASF infected area to the Finnish pig population.
32
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
Summary of people’s routes
People can carry ASF to Finland only if
they are in contact with infected pigs or
body fluids of these pigs. ASF that has
entered the country can end up in the
pig production chain only if a person
shortly after the event is in contact with
the Finnish pig industry. It is difficult to
estimate how common the above-mentioned events are and even their extent.
However, people moving between
potential ASF regions and Finland are
possible, as well as people coming from
ASF regions having contact with the
Finnish pig industry.
Import of pig meat an wild boar
meat
Import of infected wild boar meat or pig
meat or hunting trophies can be a route
for the virus to enter into the country
(Figure 7). Also different contaminated appliances, objects and equipments
that have been used in connection to
infected meat or other products of animal origin can spread the infection.
Introduction into the country may be
intended for commercial or for private
use and both may be legal or illegal.
The meat may be fresh or cooked in
moderate temperatures (e.g. sausages,
salami). Also hunting trophies as
souvenirs can carry the virus into
Finland. A person being in contact with
infected meat/meat product/trophy or
a formite that has been in contact with
these, must on the Finnish side be in
contact with a susceptible pig/farmed
boar. An alternative is feeding a pig
with an unheated infected meat product
brought into the country as a souvenir
(for example a sausage).
Import of pig meat from Russia is
banned, but ignorance regarding the
decision or unwillingness to take notice of the decision is possible. The fact
that the virus survives for long in inadequately heated, salted, smoked, dried
or frozen meat products increases the
probability of the virus entering the
country through the products mentioned above. The introduction of products
of animal origin may cause a risk of animal diseases spreading to live animals.
Therefore passengers play an important
role regarding keeping animal diseases
out of the EU area. The regulations concern consignments that are ordered or
sent or brought along with a passenger.
Important factors in the spreading of virus diseases through meat products is
the stabilizer in relation to the pH value
and the temperature, target animals,
survival of the virus in pig meat and
pig meat products and the quantification of the agent (i.e. virus titre in meat
compared to an ineffective oral dose).
The ASF virus survives well in meat and
meat products. 104 days in deep freezed meat, 399 days in Parma ham and
39 days in salami. Thermal inactivation happens at 69 °C. The infective oral
dose has in experimental surveys been
104.3–105.4 HAD50. The titre in muscle in
an experimental infection was 106.6,
in salami 103.0–103.25. (Farez & Morley
1997).
It has been possible to connect many
ASF spreading cases to the feeding of
meat products to pigs (Portugal 1957,
Cuba 1971, Belgium 1985) (Farez &
Morley 1997). The disease cases in the
Leningrad region in the autumn of 2009
and at the end of 2010 were probably caused by feeding catering waste
to pigs. Feeding catering waste to pigs
cannot be considered a very common
procedure, especially as it is forbidden
in Finland.
Souvenirs from the EU
Foodstuffs of animal origin brought from
an EU member state by a private person intended for his or her private use
or that are sent to a private person to be
used in his or her private household, are
not subject to controls at point of entry. It is allowed to bring in reasonable
33
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
quantities of foodstuffs of animal origin
or products containing these foodstuffs
intended for personal consumption. It
is not obligated to report the introduction of foodstuffs intended for these purposes. If these products, on the other
hand, will be distributed or sold, this is
considered as an operation subject to
control at point of entry. (Evira 2010f).
From EU countries passengers may bring
with them a game animal or animals
they have shot themselves. This, however, must comply with the upper limit of
tax-free import, CITES (the Convention
on International Trade in Endangered
Species of Wild Fauna and Flora) regulations and decisions on protection. (Evira
2010f).
There is no information on the amount
of souvenirs and their countries of origin, neither on how well guidelines are
acknowledged nor how well they are
applied to. This route of entry can pose
a risk if the labels on the consignments
do not match with the original (i.e. the
meat or meat product originates from
an ASF risk area) or if there is an unidentified ASF epidemic in the EU area
from where ASF contaminated foods
have reached retail sale.
among other things, lists of approved
establishments in both EU countries and
countries outside the EU, Commission
protection regulations on restriction of
transport of foodstuffs of animal origin
and information about CITES Convention
on trade in endangered animal species.
Since 1 May, 2008 Evira has on a national scale planned and supervised the
control at point of entry as the control
earlier was covered by the responsibility
of foodstuff supervision of the municipalities. Evira buys the majority of the
controls at point of entry from the
municipalities in accordance with the
Food Act (23/2006, § 42). The municipalities carry out the controls according
to the agreements made with Evira and
under Evira’s guidance. (Evira 2010a).
The ASF virus may enter into the country
through EU import if safety measures in
other member states “leak” and hence,
ASF contaminated meat or meat products have entered the EU area. Another
risk is inaccurate original labels. There is
no knowledge of the frequency of cases
like these, but presumably they are not
very common.
Souvenirs from third countries
Commercial import from the EU
If foodstuffs of animal origin are imported in intra-community trade to Finland for commercial purposes (distribution of sale), the operation is subject
to controls at point of entry. Control at
point of entry is part of food supervision
and concerns foodstuffs of animal origin
that are introduced into Finland from
other EU member states and some
other countries. The aim of the control
at point of entry is to ensure the food
hygiene quality of the foodstuffs and
to hinder the spread of animal diseases
transmitted by these.
Concerning commercial import, several
factors have to be taken into account,
34
When souvenirs are introduced into the
country, decisions on protection shall
always be complied with. Decisions of
protection are fixed-term, country- and
region-specific import bans laid down
by the EU, related to the outburst of
certain animal diseases in a specific
country or region. The importer is
always responsible for pursuing the
decisions on protection.
Imports of meat, meat products, milk,
dairy products and hunting souvenirs
from other countries than Croatia, the
Faroe Islands and Island:
A passenger may bring meat, meat products, milk and dairy products or feeds
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
containing the above-mentioned constituents or hunting souvenirs into
Finland only through such points of entry
where there are veterinary border
inspection posts (irrespective of quantity, ever how small). The border veterinarian performs a chargeable import
inspection. The introduction of products
is only allowed from countries and
establishments outside the EU that are
approved for export of these products
according to legislation of the Ministry
of Agriculture and Forestry. The products
shall be accompanied by a health certificate of conforming format and authorized by the authority in the country
of origin. The value of the consignment
must not exceed upper limits approved
by the customs. (Evira 2011c).
Hunting souvenirs (meat, trophies) are
subject to strict import regulations and
it is not allowed to bring gifts of animal
origin containing pig or wild boar meat
from countries where African swine
fever occurs. It guidelines are not pursued
it may increase the risk of the disease
entering the country.
Commercial import from third countries
Importation is allowed from countries
regards which the veterinary certificate
format conforming to said consignment
is mentioned in column 4 in the table in
part 1 of Annex II in Article 14 of
Commission Regulation (EC) No
206/2010. Fresh meat is allowed from
the following third countries: USA, New
Zeeland, Canada, Australia and Chile.
There are approved establishments in
USA (16), Canada (5) and Chile (7).
No fresh pig meat was imported from
third countries in 2010 and not even
before that importation from third
countries was frequent. In 2009 and
2008 occasional imports for catering on
ships occurred, but not for intra-community trade. (Juselius 2011).
According to Commission Decision
2007/777/EC, pig meat products
require a certain treatment according to
country and furthermore an approved
establishment. Below treatments are
listed and also the countries from where
import of meat products is allowed on
the condition that the products have
undergone the treatments listed below
and provided that there are approved
establishments in the country (number
of establishment in brackets).
Treatment A = No minimum specified
temperature or other treatment is
established for animal health purposes
for meat products and treated stomachs,
bladders and intestines. However, the
meat of such meat products and treated
stomachs, bladders and intestines must
have undergone a treatment such that
its cut surface shows that it no longer
has the characteristics of fresh meat and
the fresh meat used must also satisfy
the animal health rules applicable to
exports of fresh meat into the Community. Countries from where import is
allowed provided that the products have
undergone the above-mentioned treatment and provided that there are
approved establishments: Canada (2),
Chile (4) and USA (several establishments).
Treatment B = Treatment in a hermetically sealed container to an Fo value
of three or more. Countries from where
import is allowed provided that the products have undergone the above-mentioned treatment and provided that
there are approved establishments:
Senegal (1).
Treatment C = A minimum temperature
of 80°C which must be reached throughout the meat and/or stomachs, bladders and intestines during the processing of the meat product and treated
stomachs, bladders and intestines.
Countries from where import is allowed
provided that the products have undergone the above-mentioned treatment
35
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
and provided that there are approved
establishments: No approved establishments.
Treatment D = A minimum temperature of 70°C which must be reached
throughout the meat and/or stomachs,
bladders and intestines during the processing of meat products and treated
stomachs, bladders and intestines, or
for raw ham, a treatment consisting of
natural fermentation and maturation of
not less than nine months and resulting
in the following characteristics:
-Aw value of not more than 0.93,
-pH value of not more than 0.6.
Countries from where import is allowed
provided that the products have undergone the above-mentioned treatment
and provided that they are approved establishments: Serbia (4).
According to authority data, pig meat
products were neither imported from
third countries in 2010 nor during recent
years (Juselius 2011).
Smuggling
It is not allowed to bring meat or meat
products or milk and dairy products from
countries outside the EU, with exception
of consignments of 10 kg from the following countries: Croatia, Faroe Islands,
Greenland and Island. (Evira 2011c).
This being the case, the introduction of
pig meat and pig meat products from
Russia is not allowed.
The National Board of Customs compiles annually data according to EU custom regulation, that is, the total amount
(in kg) of confiscated meat products and
dairy products (Commission Regulati-
36
on (EC) No 206/2009). Risk-based and
random checks of people, luggage and
vehicles are carried out. Due to limited
control capacity the majority of souvenirs are in practice checked, for example,
at Vaalimaa and Nuijamaa border posts
as random tests are mostly carried out
due to other reasons for checking a
vehicle.
In 2010 7 552 meat or milk consignments
were confiscated from personal luggage.
Of these 606 kg contained meat or meat
products and 280 kg milk or dairy product.
Confiscations concerned mostly people
from the following third countries:
Russia, Ukraine, China, Kazakhstan and
Belaya Russia. Mostly Russian passengers
were checked, approximately a hundred
people. Usually passengers and lorry
drivers brought with them an amount
ranging from 0.1 to 1.0 kilos of meat
and dairy products. (Finnish National
Board of Customs 2011) To prevent
African swine fever from spreading,
the customs have intensified inspections and according to customs statistics about 15 000 inspections have
been done in the eastern and northern
customs district, that is at the eastern
border and 345 illegal consignments
have been revealed.
At border posts, hours of waiting for
border crossings are possible. It is
possible that persons frequently crossing the border (truck drivers etc.) bring
along meals in their cars while waiting
for to cross the border and may throw
catering waste into the nature. The waste
may attract wild animals and consequently also wild boar. In this way
infected pig products may infect a wild
boar near the border area, and hence
infect the wild boar population in
Finland.
Vector
Infected pig meat in
Finland
Disposal as category 1
waste or composite
waste
BORDER
Susceptible pig
Feeding pigs with
infected catering
waste
Infected wild boar
meat in Finland
BORDER
Illegal import
Legal introduction for
personal use
Figure 7. ASF can be introduced into Finland through pig meat, wild boar meat or hunting trophies.
Infected catering
waste in nature
BORDER
Commercial import
Infected wild boar
meat/insufficiently
heated processed wild
boar product
Infected pig meat/
insufficiently heated
processed pork
product
Contaminated
instrument, object,
equipment or trophy
in contact with
infected meat in
Finland
BORDER
Instruments, object,
equipments and
trophies contaminated
while handling
infected meat
Hunting trophies
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
37
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
Summary of introduction of products
of animal origin as a transmission
route
There is no exact knowledge about the
amount of potential ASF contaminated
meat and/or trophies introduced into
Finland. In order for the ASF contaminated meat and/or trophy to be a risk it
must enter the production chain of pigs.
This is possible, for example, by feeding
pigs and/or wild boar with contaminated meat. Concerning trophies there is
no direct route to the pig production
chains. The route of ASF contaminated
meat to Finnish pig production is considered possible.
Import of live domestic pigs
The African swine fever can be introduced into Finland through domestic pigs
(Figure 8). Pigs can legally be imported
from countries where infection has still
not been detected or be imported
illegally from countries where the disease occurs. The imported pig must be
in contact with a susceptible Finnish pig
or farmed wild boar, either directly or
transmitted by body fluids.
Transports of live pigs to Finland from
both other EU and third countries are
registered in the Traces-system. Statistics beginning from 2003 reveals that
live pigs have been imported regularly
from Norway and one import consignment came from Denmark in 2010. In
addition 18 wild boars were imported
from Estonia to a farm in Finland in
2008. Importation of pigs and wild boar
from Russia is banned (Evira 2010d).
Concerning production animals the
Traces system is comprehensive, but
mini pigs are noticed to have been
imported a few times against regulations, and hence there have been no
Traces health certificates either (Evira
2011a).
There are no discoveries of smuggled
domestic pigs or wild boar. The trans38
mission route does not seem likely, as
only few animals are imported and only
from countries where there is not any
ASF. The number of smuggled domestic
pigs and wild boars is unknown, but as
marketing and selling the meat for pig
production would be difficult, it can be
assumed that smuggling is more prosperous elsewhere. Especially smuggling
of live pigs from ASF areas does not
seem very likely.
Import of pig semen
ASF may also be spread by semen
(Figure 8). Pig semen is regularly
imported to Finland from Norway and
to one farm from Sweden. Furthermore
some import consignments were
imported from Denmark and Germany
to one quarantine breeding unit in 2009
(not directly to farms). From Germany
the importation continued with two
consignments in 2010 (Nauholz 2011).
In 2009 several consignments were
imported from the above-mentioned
countries and additionally five consignments from Denmark. Statistics beginning from 2003 reveal that pig semen
has not been imported to Finland from
other countries (Evira 2010d). Importation of pig semen from Russia is banned.
There is no information and discoveries
about smuggled pig semen.
Semen has only been imported from
ASF-free countries. In order for the
importation to be a risk, import should
happen from countries where ASF transmission is possible. In order for the
semen to cause infection it should
originate from an ASF-infected hog
and be used for inseminating sows in
Finland. At present this is not likely.
Livestock transport vehicles
The disease may be introduced into the
country also through livestock transport
vehicles (Figure 8). A possible scenario
could be the following: There have been
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
infected pigs in the vehicle and the
virus occurs in body fluids or bedding
left in the vehicle. The vehicle returns
dirty to Finland and is thereafter reloaded with susceptible Finnish domestic pigs or farmed wild boars which are
transported to a farm. Another potential
route of infection is the possibility that
there are contaminated appliances and
equipments in the vehicle and that they
eventually will be in contact with
Finnish pigs.
Transit transports via Finland shall be
recorded in the Traces system. In 2010
cattle, goats, horses and poultry were
transported via Finland from other EU
countries to Russia, but no pigs. From
Finland directly to Russia 290 pigs were
transported with two vehicles before
Christmas 2010 and in one vehicle a
consignment of 180 pigs in January
2011. These pigs were fetched directly
from farms with Russian transport
vehicles, but the farms from where the
pigs were obtained, were in quarantine
use, and not authentic pig farms. For
many years there have not been any
transports of pigs from other EU countries to Russia. In 2007 a few consignments of Spanish breeding pigs were
transported to Russia via Finland. (Evira
2011a).
Commission decision on measures to
prevent the spread of the disease from
Russia to the EU area, regulates that
vehicles having transported pigs to
Russia shall be cleaned and disinfected
after unloading and before entering the
EU area. A verification of this has to be
presented to the customs authority. Also
the pig industry presents its own guidelines through The Association for Animal
Disease Prevention (ETT) in order to
manage risks related to animal transports.
Regulation No 401/2011 of the Ministry
of Agriculture and Forestry on import
control of objects causing risk of spreading disease entered into effect in April
2011. The regulation concerns vehicles
used for transportation of livestock and
cloths, equipments, bedding and other
objects used where the animals are
kept, as well as objects used for transport of dead and alive animals and for
transport, storage and packing of products originated from these animals.
At the customs the importer is obligated to present potential risk objects that
are brought into the EU, as well as
documents concerning these objects. To
bring in these objects is only allowed if
they are cleaned and treated in such a
manner that they do not cause any risk
of spreading animal diseases.
Concerning Russian vehicles, the
decision was issued in the beginning of
February and the regulation on inspection of objects causing risk of animal
disease and import documents in
connection to these, came into force in
April 2011. For this reason there is no
statistics available at present on the
movements of empty livestock transport
vehicles across the Finnish borders.
39
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
Infected pig
Infected semen
Empty livestock
transport vehicle
contaminated with the
virus
Smuggling
BORDER
No desinfection/inadequate
desinfection prior to border
crossing
Import
BORDER
Contaminated livestock
transport vehicle in
contact with pigs in
Finland
BORDER
Infected pig/semen
in Finland
Susceptible
pig
Figure 8. Importation of live pigs or semen and contaminated vehicle used for animal transport are potential routes
of entry into the country
There is a risk of introduction into the country, but risk
management measures are
effective
Catering waste from means of transport operating internationally
Means of transport operating internationally (planes or ships) can bring along
contaminated catering waste (Figure 9).
In accordance with EU legislation the
waste must be delivered for disposal
as category 1 waste, which in practice
means that it is collected into different collection containers and thereafter
40
delivered to be incinerated either in an
approved incineration plant or buried at
an approved landfill site. At the landfill
site the waste is immediately enclosed
with a layer of soil. (Evira 2009a). The
risk of the disease entering the country
increases if catering waste from means
of transport operating internationally is
disposed of through illegal means and
ends up as feed on a wild boar farm or
pig farm or in nature and consumed by
free-living wild boars.
It is most likely that ASF spread from
Angola to Portugal in 1957, to a pig
farm near the airport in Lisbon as a
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
result of feeding catering waste. ASF
was also introduced into Cuba in 1971
and 1978, Malta, Sardinia, Brazil and
the Dominican Republic in 1978 and
Belgium in 1985 with catering waste
from means of transport operating
internationally.
In Finland the international air traffic
is concentrated to Helsinki-Vantaa airport. On shorter flights, the served
meals usually originate from Finland,
also concerning the return trip. On
flights to Asia and on other long distance
flights, catering on return flights constitutes of foodstuffs from the place of
destination and the catering waste from
these flights are appropriately collected
and delivered to be disposed of from
Helsinki-Vantaa airport as category 1
waste. Catering waste is also produced
on train transports from St Petersburg
and Moscow to Helsinki. In passenger
trains from Russia, either Finnish or
Russian food is served. Catering waste
from passenger trains from Russia is
collected in Helsinki as category 1 waste.
Also catering waste from international
cruise ships are picked up at Helsinki
port as category 1 catering waste.
From the airport, Finnish railways and
the port, the above-mentioned waste is delivered in a container for category 1 waste to Ämmässuo waste
management centre in Espoo. (Airaksinen 2011).
Kukkuroinmäki waste handling station
in Konnunsuo in Lappeenranta handle waste from the ports of the region
Lappeenranta-Imatra-Joutseno, that is,
catering waste from ship traffic from
Russia via Saima channel. The station
is near an area densely populated with
wild boar. However, according to Heidi
Oksman at Etelä-Karjalan Jätehuolto Oy
there were observations of single wild
boars when the waste handling station
was established, but today wild boars
have not been seen for several years.
The enclosure of the waste handling
station is not that inaccessible that it
would hinder wild boars from getting
into the area to root about. The timing,
however, would have to be exact, as
there is already a pit dug for the catering waste, and as the waste is dumped
into the pit it is immediately buried.
Nevertheless, it is possible that wild
boar may root around and find waste
under the earth layer at night and
consequently get hold of possibly
infected waste. Nonetheless, the
amount of catering waste form means
of transport operating internationally
is small and, thus this risk cannot be
considered very significant.
There has been a follow-up of the
accumulation of catering waste from
means of transport operating internationally during several years. The amount
of delivered waste for disposal has
during the last years ranged from 1 million kilograms to 1.7 kilograms. The
major part of waste has been collected
from the Helsinki area, especially from
air traffic and delivered to YTV Ämmässuo waste management plant. In 2010
about 14 tons of the above-mentioned
waste was delivered to Kukkoroinmäki
regional waste handling station in
South-Karelia. (Airaksinen 2011).
If regulations are complied with there
is no direct route for International
catering waste to reach the population
of domestic pigs or wild boars.
41
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
Infected catering waste
from means of transport
operating internationally
(planes or ships )
BORDER
BORDER
Feeding pigs with
infected catering
waste
BORDER
Disposal as
household waste
BORDER
Infected
catering waste
in nature
Disposal as
category 1 waste
Infected catering
waste on a wild
boar farm
Susceptible
farmed wild boar
Infected
catering waste
on a pig farm
Wild boar feeding
on landfill site
Susceptible
pig
Susceptible wild
boar
Carrier animal
(e.g. rat , bird)
Figure 9. Catering waste from means of transport operating internationally (planes, ships) can introduce the
disease into the country, if not appropriately disposed of.
The risk of introduction into
the country is real but possibilities for risk management
are small
Wild boars crossing the border
Infected wild boar from Russia can cross
the border to Finland (Figure 10). They
may also be runaways from farms in
Russia. In order for the infected wild boar
to transmit the disease to the Finnish
pig population it would have to get in
contact with, either a domestic pig
staying outdoors or with a farmed wild
42
boar. Interaction between farmed wild
boar and natural wild boar is not very
likely. Wild boar herds avoid farms as
strange animals do not attract them and
the welcome, especially during sows’
mating time, would not be a warm one
(Heiskanen 2010). Another viewpoint is
that natural wild boars might attempt to
get near farms as they are gregarious
animals (Ermala 2010).
For the disease to transmit from wild
boar to domestic pigs, the density of the
wild boar population would have to be
high and domestic pigs stay outdoors.
The project for foot-and-mouth dise-
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
ase which was carried out by Evira’s risk
assessment unit estimated the number
of pigs kept outdoors to be 6 percent of
all domestic pigs. On organic farms it is
compulsory to keep pigs outdoors. There
were nine organic farms in Finland in
2010 and only one of those was situated
near the eastern border. On that farm
there was only one sow in 2010 (Evira
2011b).
where ASF has occurred is the Leningrad
region, but there the virus has only been
detected in domestic pigs. The disease
should thus first spread to wild boars. It
is not likely that wild boar migrate all the
way from that region to Finland, especially as the form of the disease that has
occurred in Russia has been so acute that
it probably kills the wild boar before it
has time to spread the disease.
Hitherto the wild boar population on the
Russian side is so small that the animals
are not forced to spread to the Finnish
side. Feeding of wild boar may, however,
increase the movements of wild boar in
the area and consequently increase the
possibility that an ASF infected wild boar
travels from Russia to Finland. Until now
the nearest place to the Finnish border
Due to reasons mentioned above the
risk of an infected wild boar transmitting
the disease to farmed wild boars or the
domestic pig population is small. If,
however, a wild boar infected with
African swine fever is detected in
Finland, it will cause massive protection
measures and export restrictions.
Infected farmed wild
boar
Escape
Infected wild boar
Person
contaminated
abroad while visiting
an infected wild boar
farm
Travel to Finland
BORDER
See Figure 6. With
people
Transport
Smuggling
Migration
See Figure 7.
Infected pig
meat
BORDER
BORDER
Hunting
Livestock transport
vehicle
contaminated by
the virus
Contact with natural or
farmed wild boar
Contact with outdoor
pigs
Hunting
Infected wild boar
meat in Finland
Susceptible pig
See Figure 7.
Infected pig
meat
Figure 10. An infected wild boar can cross the eastern border to Finland.
43
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
Examples of existing risk
management measures
Legislation and related control
Cleansing and disinfection of livestock transport vehicles
The Commission issued its safeguard
measures 2011/78/EU on preventing
transmission of ASF from Russia to the
EU area. The decision argues that there
have been numerous outbreaks of ASF
in Russia since 2007, and in the St
Petersburg region the outbreak was
very close to the Union border in
January 2011. Even if import of pig and
pig meat is not permitted from Russia
to the EU area, the disease may spread
with empty vehicles used for transportation of livestock. For this reason cleansing and disinfection of livestock transport vehicles play a most significant
role.
The decision lays down that livestock
transport vehicles transporting pigs
to Russia must be cleansed and disinfected after unloading and before entering the EU area. A declaration of this
has to be presented to the customs authorities. Border authorities must check
that the transport vehicle is satisfactorily cleansed and disinfected. If this is
the case the authority issues a certificate. If cleansing and disinfection have not
been satisfactorily carried out, the border authority may refuse the entry into
the territory of the Union or subject the
vehicle to proper cleansing and disinfection. Models of both forms are included
44
in the decision: Declaration of cleansing
of vehicle used for animal transports and
certificate of satisfactorily cleansing
issued by the authority.
In addition Evira has written a guideline on disinfection of livestock transport vehicles operating internationally
(15103/2) (Evira 2010c), which is based
on the Decree of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry No 3/EEO/2001. The
following means are described: Cleansing and disinfection of livestock transport vehicles from Russia and other
third countries, cleansing and disinfection of vehicles used for livestock transport within the Union and approval of
place for cleansing and disinfection.
Livestock transport vehicles coming
from third countries must be re-cleansed and re-disinfected before reloading.
If the vehicle has been used for transporting cattle and pigs, re-disinfection
must be performed in a place approved
for disinfection. In Finland there is one
approved place for disinfection and it is
situated in Southern Karelia, in Taavetti
in the municipality of Luumäki.
Guidelines
The Association for Animal Disease
Prevention (ETT) has laid down guidelines for visits abroad and especially for
animal disease risks on foreign livestock farms. ETT especially warns about
the risk of viral and easily spreading animal diseases entering one country from
another as easily as via clothing, shoes
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
and animal products. ETT gives the fol
lowing advice for people travelling
abroad in areas where an easily spreading animal disease has been detected
or where there is no information on the
disease situation:
Take good care of your personal
hygiene on your trip (wash your
hands).
Do not visit the country side if a
dangerous or easily spreading animal disease has been detected or is
suspected to occur in the country.
Do not bring home any gifts or
products of animal origin.
Bring along spare shoes you can
change into at the airport (after
customs) after you have arrived in
your home country. Put the shoes
you have used during your trip in a
plastic bag.
Immediately disinfect your clothes,
shoes and suitcase for a couple of
hours in a hot sauna (+ 70 °C). Do
not use the same clothes you used
on your trip when entering places
where animals are kept.
Take a sauna bath as soon as
possible after your trip.
Do not visit animal farms in your
home country within 48 hours from
your arrival.
If you fall ill during the trip or shortly
thereafter, suffer from fever or
diarrhoea, call the doctor and get
tested for salmonella.
If you visit cowsheds abroad, act
in addition to what is mentioned
above as follows:
• Use appropriate protective
equipments during your visit to
a farm.: Firm disposable slippers
to protect shoes, disposable coat
and protective head covering
• Do not unnecessarily touch the
animals
Information
Evira issues information and guidelines
with regard to souvenirs of animal origin
intended for personal use. Information
is directed to citizens, customs, border
veterinarians, travel operators, different
associations and import dealers. Guidelines are given in bulletins, letters, by
telephone and on Evira’s website. The
customs give information on posters at
the border posts and if required brochures on import restrictions. You can also
find information on the customs website and if required guidelines are also given orally.
45
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
Information on other
projects and reports
The risk of ASF spreading to the EU
area has activated several ASF survey
projects. In this risk profile some central
projects are presented and their most
important results. Results of other
researchers may be estimated as regards
to our own situation and applied to the
circumstances in Finland.
The source of data used for this risk
profile is the commonly used scientific
opinion on ASF by the EFSA panel on
Animal Health and Welfare (AHAW).
In connection to the scientific opinion
even a qualitative risk assessment was
made. By means of a developed model,
the impacts of means of managing
the disease on the spread of ASF were
evaluated.
The European Union supported ASFRISK
project will provide new tools and
strategies for the control of ASF in
Africa and reduce the risk of spread of
the disease in EU member states. The
46
project focuses on research in four main
areas: 1) epidemiology, risk assessment
and control strategies 2) development
and validation of sensitive diagnostic
techniques, including pen-side tests
3) host-pathogen interactions and
viral immune response in view of the
development of a vaccine 4) training
and technology transfer.
In addition this risk profile depicts main
points of the risk evaluation of a British
quantitative risk assessment (Woolridge
et al. 2006) that focuses on the risk of
animal diseases in relation to smuggled
meat and meat products.
There is no information on the amount
of smuggled meat in Finland, but
amounts can be estimated against the
results of the British survey.
More detailed data from these surveys
are presented in annex 1.
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
Main information gaps
The prevalence of the tick of the
genus Ornithodoros in the EU area.
(see section African swine fever as a
disease, spreading, page 14).
The role of wild boar as a reservoir
and spreader of disease (see section
African swine fever as a disease,
spreading, page 15).
Wild boar hunting trips made by
Finns: Number and to which countries? How many of the travellers are
in contact with Finnish pig production? (See section Routes of entry
into the country of ASF, tourism,
page 24).
People working in pig production
in Finland and their contacts with
infected pigs in ASF areas (see
section Routes of entry into the
country of ASF, travels of persons
working in swine production in
Finland, page 24)
Amount of smuggled meat and
meat products from ASF risk areas
(see section Routes of entry into the
country of ASF, import of pig meat
or wild boar meat, smuggling, page
31)
Movements across the border of
empty livestock transport vehicles
(see section Routes of entry into
the country of ASF, through vehicles
used for livestock transport, page
33).
47
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
Consequences
ASF causes serious socioeconomic
consequences. Especially in Africa the
poorest pig producers have suffered the
severest financial losses as they do not
have any efficient strategies for disease
prevention and control. As ASF was
introduced to Ivory Cost and Madagascar
30 to 50 percent of the pigs were lost. In
addition to high mortality rates, the ASF
infection has impacts on international
trade and causes expensive measures
for eradication of the disease. In Cuba
ASF caused losses of US$10 million in
1980, including an eradication programme. In Spain the costs for the ASF
eradication programme during the last
five years are estimated at US$92 million.
(Costard et al. 2009).
Economic consequences of
introducing African swine
fever into the country
The introduction of African swine fever
into Finland would have a serious
impact on Finnish pig farming, causing
considerable economic losses for the
whole industry. This risk profile did not
assess economic losses due to the
disease, but used conclusions in a
survey published in 2005 by the
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and
the National Veterinary and Food Institute in Finland (Niemi et al 2005 and
Raulo & Lyytikäinen 2005). The classical
swine fever and the African swine fever
are so similar, as regard to the clinical
48
picture and prevention measures, that
the subsequent economic consequences
are assumed to be very similar as well.
In the study by the MTT and EELA,
economic impacts of an outbreak of
classical swine fever were evaluated.
The objective was to investigate how
severe the economic impacts of classical
swine fever would be on the pig
industry, its product processing industry
and tax payers if the disease would
spread, and which the factors causing
losses would be. By applying the
Monte Carlo simulation model, the
survey simulated the spread and eradication of swine fever in Finland and the
direct economic losses of an outbreak
were calculated (Niemi et al. 2005). The
outbreak of the disease and related
losses due to a possible collapse of
export demand were modelled using a
dynamic, partly equilibrium model. The
models contained data, for example on
the number of pigs and transports on
pig farms, the prevalence of a disease,
care procedures and pork trade in
Finland.
The outburst of the disease causes
direct and indirect losses. The extent of
the losses and their variation is dependent on both the number of infected pig
farms and factors that are not directly
dependent on the number of infected
farms. The basic scenario of the economic calculation due to an outbreak of
the disease, showed a 50 percent drop
in the demand of pig meat for export.
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
Simulated outbreaks caused on an
average losses of 7.6 million Euros
(equivalent to 8 percent of the pig
industry’s agriculture income), of which
direct losses made 8 percent. The
impact on farms suffering damages was
relatively more severe than the impact
on the whole industry. As demand for
export declined 10 percent, the losses
reached 1.7 million Euros. Pursuant to
the basic scenario, an outbreak on at
least five farms caused losses of 13.6
million Euros.
The results of the survey suggest that
African swine fever, if introduced into
the country, will cause considerable
losses even when the number of
infected farms is small. The reason for
this is that an infection on a single farm
can cause disturbances on the pork
market. By taking steps to prevent
disturbances on the market it is possible
to achieve savings on this branch of
industry.
As the background information dates
from 2001, it is partly out of date.
Finnish export of pig meat has increased
significantly during the 2000’s. The
export had increased more than three
times before 2008 in comparison to the
export in 2000 (Ministry of Agriculture
and Forestry 2009) Thus, a disease that
at present would cause export restrictions would cause considerably more
serious losses than what was presented
in the survey of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry. On the other hand
hindered export can also be beneficial,
as the domestic consumer price is
expected to drop due to export restrictions and this will partly compensate
national economy losses (Lyytikäinen et
al. 2011).
49
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
Discussion
Recently African swine fever has occurred
less than 200 kilometers from the
border of Finland. With regard to the
spread of the disease the distance is
very short. A considerable number of
Russians visit Finland for work as well
as for leisure and it is even common for
Finns to visit near-by areas in Russia. It
is even possible that wild boar migrate
to Finland from areas where there is an
outbreak of the disease. However, this
will not happen quickly.
The introduction of a disease into the
country is a two-phased event. First of
all the disease has to be introduced
inside the borders of the country in
some way, and secondly be in contact
with a susceptible animal population
in our country. In order for the disease
to end up in the Finnish pig population
prevention during both phases has to
fail. If the first one fails, the second phase
can still serve as a good protection.
Farm specific biosecurity plays a very
significant role.
When an infected wild boar has come to
Finland and has settled, it signifies that
ASF has entered into the country. ASF is
as a severe disease for wild boars as for
domestic pigs, hence, the wild boar will
probably pass away soon after falling ill.
The infection will continue provided that
the carcass is eaten or that the carrier of
the disease spreads it from the dead pig
either to the domestic or wild boar
50
population. As the wild boar population in Finland is scarce and domestic
pigs seldom stay outdoors (and even if
they do, they stay in enclosure), the
spread of the disease to domestic pigs
through the ways mentioned earlier is
considered unlikely. It is also rather
unlikely that an infected wild boar
interacts with farmed wild boars. A
possible, but unlikely contact is possible
if a farmed wild boar escapes and
meets a wild boar. The consequence
of this could be transmission of ASF to
farmed wild boars, if the animal that
escaped returns.
People traveling in ASF infected areas
can be considered a bigger threat to
the domestic pig population. By means
of good biosecurity on farms it is
prevented that people carry the disease
to the farm with their clothes, equipment or food souvenirs. Especially
feeding catering waste has been discovered to spread the disease, as the ASF
virus survives well in dried, smoked and
salted meat products. Biosecurity can be
improved by giving the right information
to the farm owners and farm workers.
It is worthwhile to appropriately inform
especially guest workers from countries in Russia and Caucasia about means
to prevent the disease from spreading.
Even if there is information on the ban
of meat products at the border, it is
necessary to ensure that the guest
workers have understood that it is
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
forbidden to feed pigs with catering
waste due to the risk of the disease.
Information material in the workers’
own language improves the effect of
the information.
Very few live pigs and small amounts of
semen have hitherto been imported to
Finland. It is possible to control the risk
of the disease in relation to import by
using consideration as regards import
countries, by checking animals and
semen in connection with import and
during quarantine before the animals
join the animals on the farm. Further
guidelines can be requested from the
Association for Animal Disease Prevention ETT for import inspections and animal quarantine in Finland.
This risk profile describes the results of
a few other surveys on ASF. The results
of a qualitative risk assessment survey
as a part of a report carried out by EFSA
panel on Animal Health and Welfare
(AHAW) can, where applicable, also be
utilized in our country. The risk of the
disease spreading into the EU area was
estimated to be average and most
likely to happen through catering
waste. On farms with high and limited
biosecurity (Finnish farms are included
in this group) the likelihood of ASF
becoming endemic was considered
negligible or low. The reason for this is
that in connection with an outbreak of
the disease it is possible to put effective
disease control measures into practice.
The risk of ASF remaining endemic in
wild boar in Russia and the disease
spreading with them to the European
Union was considered moderate in the
same survey. As regards wild boar the
risk of the disease becoming endemic
in the EU was considered moderate. This
is mostly due to the fact that the first
case is difficult to detect and it results in
an average risk of spreading. On areas
with a dense wild boar population this
is most significant (not in Finland). The
disease can spread long distances only
if the wild boars have spread evenly.
For this reason the risk of transmission
was estimated to be low, which also
concerns Finland.
A survey examining the risk of the
disease in relation to meat smuggling
(Woolridge et al. 2006), irrespective of
the fact that it was carried out in
Great Britain, raises important issues
also concerning Finland According to the
survey, on an average 0.046 kilos of
meat infected with African swine fever
is smuggled into Britain every year. The
infection frequency related to smuggling of meat and meat products was
annually 6.1 x 10-4 and introductions
from East Africa constituted the greatest
risk (96% of infections derive from that
area). Personal luggage constituted the
most important route of entry into the
country. As regards Finland, results can
partly be implemented to circumstances
in Finland, but as there is much less
passenger traffic to Finland than to
Great Britain, both the amount of ASF
meat introduced into the country and
the infection frequency is considerably
lower.
51
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
Conclusions
The spread of ASF into Finland is a
noteworthy threat (Figure 11). Especially
infection of the wild boar population
is possible. Whereas direct infection
from wild boar to domestic pigs is
unlikely, as domestic pigs are not kept
much outdoors. An indirect infection
through a vector, object or person from
wild boar to domestic pig is depending
on good biosecurity. Personal food
souvenirs brought into the country
constitute a high risk if they get in
contact with pigs in Finland. Also travelers themselves are a risk factor if they
are in contact with pigs in ASF infected
areas and visit pig farms after their trip.
Pig farm owners should care for that
pig farm workers (especially foreigners,
from ASF areas) are well informed on
the spreading mechanism of the disease.
Regarding importation of live pigs and
semen it is necessary to take considerable precautions. The risk of disease
posed by livestock transport vehicles
can be controlled by means of good
cleansing and disinfection. Catering
waste from international transport must
be appropriately disposed of. Biosecurity
on farms and information on risks related
to the disease have a key role in the
protection of the domestic pig population in Finland.
With people from an
ASF infected area
Infected pork or pork
product
ASF introduced
into the Finnish
pig population
With live pigs and
semen
With contaminated
livestock transport
vehicles
Figure 11. Most probable routes of introducing ASF into the country
52
With catering waste
from means of
transport operating
internationally
With infected wild
boar moving cross
the border
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
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Legislation
National legislation
(Decrees of Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry (In Finnish))
(http://www.mmm.fi/en/index/ministry/legislation.html)
MAF (402/2011). Maa- ja metsätalousministeriön asetus Euroopan unionin ulkopuolisista maista tuotavien lemmikkieläinten, eläinperäisiä tuotteita sisältävien henkilökohtaisten lähetysten ja eläintautien leviämisen vaaraa aiheuttavien tavaroiden
tuontitarkastuksesta. Suomen eläinlääkintölainsäädäntö Eb 7.
MAF (3/EEO/2001). Maa- ja metsätalousministeriön asetus maantiekuljetuksiin käytettävien kuljetusajoneuvojen desinfioinnista eläintautien leviämisen estämiseksi.
Suomen eläinlääkintölainsäädäntö D 26.
MAF (6/EEO/2003). Maa- ja metsätalousministeriön asetus afrikkalaisen sikaruton
vastustamisesta. Suomen eläinlääkintölainsäädäntö D 41.
EU legislation
57
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
Commission Regulation
(EC) No 206/2009 on the introduction into the Community of personal consignments
of products of animal origin and amending Regulation (EC) No 136/2004. Official
Journal of the European Union. L 77/1–19.
Commission Decision 2003/422/EC. approving an African swine fever diagnostic
manual. Official Journal of the European Union. L 143/35–49.
Commission Regulation (EC) 206/2009 on the introduction into the Community of
personal consignments of products of animal origin and amending Regulation (EC) No
136/2004. Official Journal of the European Union. L 7/1–19.
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2009:077:0001:0019:
EN:PDF
Commission Regulation (EC) No 206/2010 laying down lists of third countries, territories or parts thereof authorised for the introduction into the European Union of certain
animals and fresh meat and the veterinary certification requirements.
Official Journal of the European Union. L 73/1–121
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2010:073:0001:0121:
EN:PDF
Commission Decision 2007/777/EC laying down the animal and public health
conditions and model certificates for imports of certain meat products and treated
stomachs, bladders and intestines for human consumption from third countries and
repealing Decision 2005/432/EC. Official Journal of the European Union. L 312/49–67
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:312:0049:0067:
EN:PDF
Commission Decision (2011/78/EU) on certain measures to prevent the transmission
of the African swine fever virus from Russia to the Union Official Journal of the European Union. L 30/40-43.
Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007 on organic production and labelling of organic
products and repealing Regulation (EEC) No 2092/91
Official Journal of the European Union. L 189/1–23.
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2007:189:0001:0023:EN
:PDF
Council Directive 2002/60/EC laying down specific provisions for the control of African swine fever and amending Directive 92/119/EEC as regards Teschen disease and
African swine fever. Official Journal of the European Union L 192/27–46.
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Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
Annex 1.
Information on other ASF-related
projects and surveys whose results are
interesting from Finland’s point of view
The EFSA report (EFSA 2010a)
As a part of the scientific opinion on
African swine fever carried out by EFSA
panel on Animal Health and Welfare
(AHAW), the working team made a
qualitative risk assessment on African
swine fever becoming endemic in
the EU area if ASF spreads into the EU
(Wieland et al. 2011). The objective was
to assess how current means for disease
prevention and management can abate
the risk so that decision-makers can
assess the impact of effectuated monitoring and means of disease prevention
on the risk of the spread of the disease.
Risk factors that were taken into consideration concerning the spread of the
disease were regarding domestic pig as
follows:
Movements of pigs that cause direct
contact between pigs (deliberate in
transports and non-deliberate concerning free range pigs)
Pig meat products that cause
indirect contact between pigs (for
example feeding of catering waste)
Movements of livestock transport
vehicles between farms causing
indirect contact
Contamination of feed that cause
indirect contact
Professionals, for example veterinarians and the equipment they
carry with them causing indirect
contact
Other people and the equipment
they carry with them causing indirect contact
Spreading through pets and vermin
causing indirect contact and serving as mechanical vectors, that is,
carriers of disease
Contamination of the environment
that cause indirect contact
Infection of ticks can cause indirect
contact
Spread to wild boar population can
cause direct or indirect contact.
The following factors concerned wild
boar:
The impact of behavioral ecology
concerning encounters between
wild boar groups and feed on
carcass
Contamination of the environment
that cause indirect contact
Hunting behavior causing indirect
contact between different habitats
Infection of ticks causing indirect
contact
The risk was estimated into four categories: negligible, low, moderate and
high (Wieland et al. 2011).
The risk of ASF remaining endemic in
the area was considered moderate, but
the risk of the disease spreading inside
the area considered high. The risk of the
disease spreading into the EU area was
59
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
considered moderate and most likely
to happen through catering waste. The
risk of ASF remaining endemic in wild
boars and spreading with them into the
European Union was considered low
as regards countries in Caucasia and
moderate as regards Russia. The
difference is considered to be due to the
density of the wild boar population in
Russia and its close contacts to the wild
boar populations on certain areas in the
EU.
The risk of ASF infection through feeding
catering waste was considered possible,
but low concerning free range pigs and
low concerning pigs in the biosecurity
sector. If the above-mentioned pigs get
infected, the risk is high that they spread
the disease before it is detected, directly
and through means of transport. The
infection in free range pigs becoming
endemic was considered to be moderate in comparison to the contact with
wild boar, due to non-compliance with
animal movement ban and due to difficult access to the animals.
The risk of the wild boar population
becoming endemic was considered
moderate, especially on areas where
wild boars are in contact with wild
boars from earlier infected areas. Due
to the long lifespan of the tick, the role
of the O.erraticus in maintaining a local
ASF infection was considered important
on areas where pigs are raised traditionally, that is, free range pigs. The ticks,
however, do not play an active role in
the geographical spread of the virus.
Wild boars have never been found infested by this tick, as they do not rest in
burrows infested by ticks (EFSA 2010a).
The risk of endemicity of the disease,
subsequent of its entry into the EU, was
estimated according to three different
production sectors: high biosecurity,
limited biosecurity and free-range
farms. This survey considered high
biosecurity farms to be farms with
physical barriers for preventing spread
of the disease, minimal and control60
led people traffic and good disinfection
practice. Limited biosecurity farms were
considered to be farms with not all of
the above-mentioned features, but not
allowing free ranging. Free range pigs
were considered those that were not
kept in an enclosure. The differences in
biosecurity were considered most signi
ficant in relation to the spread of the
disease and especially with regard to
means of preventing the disease. On
high and limited bio-security farms, the
likelihood of ASF becoming endemic
was considered negligible or low. The
reason for this is that in connection with
an outbreak of the disease it is possible
to carry out effective measures of
disease control. The risk concerning
free-range pigs is moderate. Parallel
differences were also discovered
concerning the spread of the disease
prior to the detection of the first case.
As regards wild boar the risk of the
disease becoming endemic in the EU
was considered moderate. This is mostly
due to the difficulty of detecting the first
case that results in a moderate risk of
spreading. On areas with a dense wild
boar population this is most significant
(Germany, Northern France and Central
Italy). The disease can spread long
distances only if the wild boas have
spread evenly. For this reason the risk of
spreading was estimated to be low. Still
the efficiency of means for disease
management was considered so futile,
that they did not lower the risk.
The conclusions of the EFSA report urge
for an improved exchange of information between Caucasian countries,
Russia and the EU. Furthermore the
report recommended intensifying the
control of raised wild boar, veterinarians’ and producers’ identification of the
disease, the risk-based surveillance of
wild boar in risk areas, that is Poland,
Lithuania and Romania and ensuring
that catering waste from means of transport operating internationally is disposed of according to EU legislation.
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
The EFSA report can also be implemented to the circumstances in Finland
as regards discussions on the risk of
endemicity of the disease subsequent
to its entering into the EU area. As
regards Finland, only those parts of the
report that discuss limited or high biosecurity farms are taken into account.
The tick’s role in spreading the disease
is not considered (as an applicable tick
is not presumed to be found in Finland’s
nature)
The ASFRISK project
The European Union supported ASFRISK
project (Evaluating and controlling the
risk of African swine fever in the EU) is
in progress. The coordinator of the
project is Prof. Carlos Martins and the
Faculty of Veterinary Medicine of the
University of Lisbon. The project
commenced in April 2008 and will
continue for a little more than 3 years.
The project will proved new tools and
strategies for the control of ASF in
Africa and reduce the risk of spread
of the disease in EU member states.
Development and research is focused
on four main areas: epidemiology, risk
assessment and control strategies,
development and validation of sensitive
diagnostic techniques, host-pathogen
interactions and viral immune response
in view of the development of a vaccine,
training and technology transfer.
ASFRISK had not yet published its
conclusions In June, 2011.
Risk assessment related to
meat smuggling in Great
Britain
In Great Britain a quantitative risk
assessment case study (Woolridge et al.
2006) was published in 2006. The study
examines smuggled meats and disease
vectors. What initiated the study was
the outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease
in Britain in 2001. The disease was
suspected to be caused by smuggled
infected meat, which was inadequately
handled and fed to pigs. The analyses
were carried out at the Veterinary
Laboratories Agency and the results
were published by Defra.
The risk of foot-and-mouth disease,
African swine fever, classical swine
fever and SVD (swine vesicular disease)
were examined. The risk assessment
model composed of three different
components: Future amounts of smuggled meat into Great Britain were assessed, the likelihood of smuggled meat
being contaminated by a virus and
routes of exposure were identified and
the likelihood of cattle in Great Britain
being infected by a virus through smuggling. By means of these components
it was possible to present several routes
along which the virus can be introduced
into the British cattle from the country
of origin.
Necessary data was received from the
register of confiscated meats. The
register contained data on meats
confiscated from passenger luggage, but
also confiscations of products smuggled in consignments sent by plane, ship
and by post. Also confiscated smuggled products being for sale were included. The amount of confiscated meat
reached 11 875 kilos per year (4 398–
28 626 kg, CI 90%) during 2004 and 2005.
The amount of confiscations during a
period from 1.4.2001 to 31.3.2002
totaled 2 053, whereas from 1.4.2004
to 31.3.2005 the number of confiscations was 25 610.
The occurrence of a disease on different
areas was used to estimate the percentage of smuggled meat being contaminated with a virus. In addition by
means of earlier studies, the quantity of
the virus in infected meat was estimated. Furthermore the survival of the
virus was taken into account during
61
Possible routes of entry into the country for African swine fever – Risk profile
different stages of processing and
during storage. This data was combined
with the manufacturing time of the product and to the time used for transport.
Through this data it was possible to give
estimation on the percentage of meat
being contaminated when introduced
into the country. The model gave as a
result that on an average 0.046 kilos of
meat infected with African swine fever
is smuggled into Britain every year.
Corresponding numbers concerning
other diseases were: Classical swine
fever 263 kg, SVD 0.007 kg and footand-mouth disease 214.2 kg.
The
last
component
described
mechanism through which the introduced meat can get in contact with the
animal population. Also the pathogen
dose animals are exposed to was
estimated. Described mechanisms were
feeding catering waste to pigs, catering
waste ending up on as composite waste
on a landfill site and other ways of disposal including littering. When estimating an ineffective dose, data from
earlier studies was used. The infection
frequency related to smuggling of meat
and meat products was annually accor
ding to disease the following:
ASF 6.1 x 10 -4, classical swine fever 0.3, SVD
6.9 x 10 -10 and foot-and-mouth disease
0.015.
Risk related to an area:
The survey concludes that the foot-andmouth disease most probably originates
from the Near or Middle East, as 47
percent of the infections originate from
there according to the risk assessment
model. Introductions from East Africa
constituted the greatest risk as regards
62
African swine fever (96 percent of the
infections originated from that area).
Introductions from West Africa constituted the greatest risk as regards classical swine fever (79%). The majority of
SVD-cases originated (70%) from
Eastern Europe.
Risk related to meat product:
Beef and pig meat constituted the greatest risk with regard to foot-and-mouth
disease (88%). Meat detached from the
bone is the most likely product causing
ASF infection (77%). Dried meat
detached from the bone is more likely
to cause infection of classical swine
fever (70%) and minced meat SVD
infection (52%).
Risks influencing on routes of entry into the country and on routes of
transmission
Personal luggage is the greatest risk, as
regards every examined disease. Large
amounts introduced in the luggage suggest that they are intended for commercial import more than for personal use.
People may dispose the meat waste in
an inappropriate way (littering, feeding
animals or littering main roads). The
second significant risk is related to
feeding production animals with catering waste and the third risk is related
to carcass feed on landfill sites. However,
the two latter risks compose a very
small part of the total risk. The risk
related to feeding backyard pigs and
wild boars was considered small. As
regards the foot-and-mouth disease,
industrially raised pigs were considered
to be the target animals (96%). The risk
related to backyard pigs and wild boars
was considered small.
Cover picture: ScandinavianStockPhoto/Mats Tooming
Finnish Food Safety Authority Evira
Mustialankatu 3, FI-00790 Helsinki, Finland
Tel. +358 20 69 0999, Fax +358 20 77 24350
www.evira.fi
Evira Research Reports 5/2011
ISSN 1797-2981
ISBN 978-952-225-094-0 (pdf)