Zvi Gitelman, editor. Bitter Legacy: Confronting the Holocaust in the

Europe: Early Modern and Modern
of your neighbors. Elleman's study deserves a place on
the shelf with earlier studies of the subject, but it does
not replace them, say what he will.
STEVEN I. LEVINE
University of Montana
TALINE TER MINASSIAN. Colporteurs du Komintern:
L 'Union sovietique et les minorites au Moyen-Orient.
Paris: Presses de Sciences PO. 1997. Pp. 353. 178 fr.
This book discusses the way the Soviet Union used
minorities to advance its interests in Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Egypt from the 1920s to the start
of the Cold War. Taline Ter Minassian's use of
archives of the former Soviet Union raises the hope of
new insights into the much-studied subject of Soviet
relations with the Middle East. Unfortunately, there
are none.
A fundamental issue that Ter Minassian does not
address is the profound difference in what it meant to
be a minority in the cases she considers. The Azerbaijani and Kurdish populations in northwestern Iran and
the Jews of Palestine, all of them numerous and living
in concentrated areas, were not only unlike each other
but also unlike the Armenian diaspora, which figures
prominently in the book, or the Greek Orthodox
Arabs, who receive some attention. Much of the book
summarizes what Soviet policy was toward the countries under consideration. That has already been covered in several scholarly works, many of them in
English and cited by the author.
The book tosses out intriguing pieces of information
without discussing their implications. For example,
both A. Sultanzadeh, who was a leading Communist in
Iran in the early 1920s, and L. Karakhanov, the Soviet
representative in Turkey from 1934 to 1937, were
Armenians (although they adopted non-Armenian surnames). Yet there is no discussion of how this affected
the way they were perceived in Turkey or Iran or
whether this caused any problems in the promotion of
Soviet interests, especially given the recent history of
violence between Armenians and both Ottoman Turks
and Azerbaijanis (in Russia).
For all the book's repeated assertions that minorities in the Middle East constituted a pool from which
the Soviets drew agents of influence, it also shows that
this reliance on minorities was often a liability from
Moscow's perspective. The fact that Jews predominated in the Communist Party of Palestine in the
interwar years and that Armenians and other minorities played similar roles in Syria and Lebanon was one
of the reasons few Arabs joined the party, much to
Moscow's dissatisfaction. Arabization became both a
policy objective and an excuse to purge the existing
party leaders.
The discussion of what happened in Iranian Azerbaijan while it was controlled by the Azerbaijan Democratic Party (ADP) and Soviet occupation forces in
1945-1946 focuses on the way the ADP used Sovietstyle nationality policies promoting the use of the local
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281
language in education and publishing. Yet, for all Ter
Minassian's emphasis on minority tactics, there is no
discussion of the way these policies won at least the
initial support of some non-Communists Azerbaijanis
who perceived the Iranian central government as
discriminating against them. Nor is there any discussion of the fact that policies which favored Azerbaijani
culture were not enough to reconcile many other
Azerbaijanis to ADP rule. ADP policies in non-cultural spheres, such as land redistribution, bank nationalization, or labor legislation, receive no attention.
At times, the author's historical understanding is
shaky. She makes the reasonable argument that Soviet
policy toward the Middle East was shaped not only by
revolutionary ideology but also by attitudes inherited
from the Russian Empire. However, she depicts those
attitudes as more obsessive than they really were.
Thus, Ter Minassian mistakenly treats the aggressive
rhetoric of some nineteenth-century Russians toward
the Ottoman Empire and the Balkans as identical with
the views of Russian foreign policy makers, even
quoting an inflammatory passage by Fyodor
Dostoyevsky in that regard, although that great writer's views did not in fact reflect the government's. She
also points to the determination of Paul Miliukov,
briefly foreign minister in the Provisional Government
of 1917, to obtain the Straits as proof of the same
obsession; there is no mention of the fact that Miliukov's views were extremely unpopular and led to his fall
from office. The talks in 1939 and 1940 between
then-allied Germany and the Soviet Union are interpreted as proof of the survival of the Russian drive to
expand southward despite the fall of the tsarist regime.
Yet the published records of those talks show that it
was Germany that pushed the idea of Soviet expansion
"in the direction of the Persian Gulf" in an unsuccessful attempt to distract the Soviets from the German
build-up in eastern Europe.
The Soviet Union pursued several different kinds of
minority tactics in the Middle East. There are already
some valuable studies on certain aspects of this,
though much more work remains to be done. The book
under review is not a major contribution to the field.
MURIEL ATKIN
George Washington University
ZVI GITELMAN, editor. Bitter Legacy: Confronting the
Holocaust in the USSR. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1997. Pp. viii, 332. $35.00.
The bitter legacy of the Holocaust consists only in part
of the facts about the killing of Jews; another part is its
rhetoric. The fourteen essays in this book, with few
exceptions, are arguments about innocence and guilt.
In the twentieth century, in the wake of the Russian,
German, and Austro-Hungarian imperial collapses,
there arose two pernicious cliches about Eastern Europeans: Jews are Communists, and the rest of the
populations are fascists and anti-Semites. The irony is
that, although these bromides arose in the imperial
FEBRUARY 1999