Europe: Early Modern and Modern of your neighbors. Elleman's study deserves a place on the shelf with earlier studies of the subject, but it does not replace them, say what he will. STEVEN I. LEVINE University of Montana TALINE TER MINASSIAN. Colporteurs du Komintern: L 'Union sovietique et les minorites au Moyen-Orient. Paris: Presses de Sciences PO. 1997. Pp. 353. 178 fr. This book discusses the way the Soviet Union used minorities to advance its interests in Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, and Egypt from the 1920s to the start of the Cold War. Taline Ter Minassian's use of archives of the former Soviet Union raises the hope of new insights into the much-studied subject of Soviet relations with the Middle East. Unfortunately, there are none. A fundamental issue that Ter Minassian does not address is the profound difference in what it meant to be a minority in the cases she considers. The Azerbaijani and Kurdish populations in northwestern Iran and the Jews of Palestine, all of them numerous and living in concentrated areas, were not only unlike each other but also unlike the Armenian diaspora, which figures prominently in the book, or the Greek Orthodox Arabs, who receive some attention. Much of the book summarizes what Soviet policy was toward the countries under consideration. That has already been covered in several scholarly works, many of them in English and cited by the author. The book tosses out intriguing pieces of information without discussing their implications. For example, both A. Sultanzadeh, who was a leading Communist in Iran in the early 1920s, and L. Karakhanov, the Soviet representative in Turkey from 1934 to 1937, were Armenians (although they adopted non-Armenian surnames). Yet there is no discussion of how this affected the way they were perceived in Turkey or Iran or whether this caused any problems in the promotion of Soviet interests, especially given the recent history of violence between Armenians and both Ottoman Turks and Azerbaijanis (in Russia). For all the book's repeated assertions that minorities in the Middle East constituted a pool from which the Soviets drew agents of influence, it also shows that this reliance on minorities was often a liability from Moscow's perspective. The fact that Jews predominated in the Communist Party of Palestine in the interwar years and that Armenians and other minorities played similar roles in Syria and Lebanon was one of the reasons few Arabs joined the party, much to Moscow's dissatisfaction. Arabization became both a policy objective and an excuse to purge the existing party leaders. The discussion of what happened in Iranian Azerbaijan while it was controlled by the Azerbaijan Democratic Party (ADP) and Soviet occupation forces in 1945-1946 focuses on the way the ADP used Sovietstyle nationality policies promoting the use of the local AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW 281 language in education and publishing. Yet, for all Ter Minassian's emphasis on minority tactics, there is no discussion of the way these policies won at least the initial support of some non-Communists Azerbaijanis who perceived the Iranian central government as discriminating against them. Nor is there any discussion of the fact that policies which favored Azerbaijani culture were not enough to reconcile many other Azerbaijanis to ADP rule. ADP policies in non-cultural spheres, such as land redistribution, bank nationalization, or labor legislation, receive no attention. At times, the author's historical understanding is shaky. She makes the reasonable argument that Soviet policy toward the Middle East was shaped not only by revolutionary ideology but also by attitudes inherited from the Russian Empire. However, she depicts those attitudes as more obsessive than they really were. Thus, Ter Minassian mistakenly treats the aggressive rhetoric of some nineteenth-century Russians toward the Ottoman Empire and the Balkans as identical with the views of Russian foreign policy makers, even quoting an inflammatory passage by Fyodor Dostoyevsky in that regard, although that great writer's views did not in fact reflect the government's. She also points to the determination of Paul Miliukov, briefly foreign minister in the Provisional Government of 1917, to obtain the Straits as proof of the same obsession; there is no mention of the fact that Miliukov's views were extremely unpopular and led to his fall from office. The talks in 1939 and 1940 between then-allied Germany and the Soviet Union are interpreted as proof of the survival of the Russian drive to expand southward despite the fall of the tsarist regime. Yet the published records of those talks show that it was Germany that pushed the idea of Soviet expansion "in the direction of the Persian Gulf" in an unsuccessful attempt to distract the Soviets from the German build-up in eastern Europe. The Soviet Union pursued several different kinds of minority tactics in the Middle East. There are already some valuable studies on certain aspects of this, though much more work remains to be done. The book under review is not a major contribution to the field. MURIEL ATKIN George Washington University ZVI GITELMAN, editor. Bitter Legacy: Confronting the Holocaust in the USSR. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 1997. Pp. viii, 332. $35.00. The bitter legacy of the Holocaust consists only in part of the facts about the killing of Jews; another part is its rhetoric. The fourteen essays in this book, with few exceptions, are arguments about innocence and guilt. In the twentieth century, in the wake of the Russian, German, and Austro-Hungarian imperial collapses, there arose two pernicious cliches about Eastern Europeans: Jews are Communists, and the rest of the populations are fascists and anti-Semites. The irony is that, although these bromides arose in the imperial FEBRUARY 1999
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