Science Oxford, 24 October 2007
UK population in the 21st Century
D.A. Coleman
University of Oxford
[email protected]
http://www.apsoc.ox.ac.uk/oxpop
•
•
•
•
•
Health warning
The UK and the world
The UK in Europe
Births and Deaths
Family and the ‘Second Demographic
Transition’
• Ageing, Dependency and ‘Time bombs’.
• Migration and Ethnic Change
• The Future
The future of population – what we
think we know.
All population projections are always wrong.
What matters is how wrong.
Some future changes are as inevitable as anything
can be. Five good bets for the future:
World population will increase by 3 billion.
Almost all increase will be in the third world.
Almost all increase will be in cities.
Almost all birth rates will stay low or decline
Almost all populations are getting older.
The 21st century will have two problems at once:
rapid increase in poorest countries; rapid ageing
and (?) decline in richer ones.
The future of population: what we know we
don’t know.
• Why does anyone ever have any children?
• What are the limits to lifespan, if any?
• Are there no limits to the ‘second
demographic transition’?
• Is ethnic transformation inevitable in the
developed world?
Forecast distribution of world population (fractiles).
Source: Lutz, Sanderson and Scherbov (2001)
The end of world population growth.
Nature 412, p 543-7
Population projections, major world regions to
2050
World Population by major geographical area 1950 - 2050 (millions)
.
Source UN World Population Prospects 2004
6000
5000
4000
Africa
Asia
Europe
Latin America
North America
3000
2000
1000
0
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Europe as a percent of world population 1950 - 2050.
Source: UN Population Prospects 2004
23
750
19
17
650
15
13
600
11
9
550
Europe
7
Europe as percent of world
2050
2045
2040
2035
2030
2025
2020
2015
2010
2005
2000
1995
1990
1985
1980
1975
1970
1965
1960
5
1955
500
1950
population in millions
700
Europe as percent of world population
21
US and EU compared: adding people vs.
adding territory
Population projections, USA and EU 15 and EU 25, 2004 2051 (millions). Sources: US Bureau of the Census 1999 and Eurostat 2005.
500
450
400
350
2049
2046
2043
2040
2037
2031
2028
2025
2022
2019
2016
2013
2010
2007
250
2004
300
2034
USA medium variant
EU 25
EU 15
Major European regions
Population projection,major regions of Europe 19502050 (millions). Source: UN 2004-based medium variant
350
300
250
200
150
100
Eastern Europe including European FSU
Northern Europe including Baltic States
Southern Europe including Balkans
50
Western Europe
2050
2045
2040
2035
2030
2025
2020
2015
2010
2005
2000
1995
1990
1985
1980
1975
1970
1965
1960
1955
1950
0
A closer view – selected European
populations 2004-2050
Population projection, selected European countries 2004-2051
(millions).
Source: Eurostat medium projection 2004-based.
85
80
Germany
Italy
UK GAD High migration
France INSEE
75
70
65
60
55
2050
2048
2046
2044
2042
2040
2038
2036
2034
2032
2030
2028
2026
2024
2022
2020
2018
2016
2014
2012
2010
2008
2006
2004
50
United Kingdom population projections 2006 - 2081.
2006-based Principal Projection and Natural Change variant. Source: GAD 2007.
UK population projected to 2081, GAD Principal Projection and Natural Change
(millions).
90.0
85.0
80.0
Source: GAD 2007
Principal projection
Natural change
75.0
70.0
65.0
60.0
55.0
50.0
2006 2011 2016 2021 2026 2031 2036 2041 2046 2051 2056 2061 2066 2071 2076 2081
UK population 1900 – 2031, actual and
projected (millions) : Source: ONS.
UK population 1900 - 2031 (millions), actual and projected.
Source: ONS
75
70
UK population
65
60
2006-based
projection
55
50
45
40
2030
2025
2020
2015
2010
2005
2000
1995
1990
1985
1980
1975
1970
1965
1960
1955
1950
1945
1940
1935
1930
1925
1920
1915
1910
1905
1900
35
Declining fertility? ‘Total fertility’ trends,
groups of Western countries, 1950-2004
TFR trends Major European Regions and USA 1950 - 2004.
Unweighted means. Source: National Statistical Yearbooks, Council of Europe
3.5
3.0
CEE
Southern Europe
Northern Europe
Western Europe
USA
2.5
2.0
2004
2002
2000
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
1988
1986
1984
1982
1980
1978
1976
1974
1972
1970
1968
1966
1964
1962
1960
1958
1956
1954
1952
1.0
1950
1.5
Fertility can go up as well as down
Total Fertility trends, industrial higher-fertility countries 1945-2006
4.5
Source: Council of Europe and national statistical yearbooks
4.0
Denmark
France
Netherlands
NZ
USA
Norway
United Kingdom
3.5
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
2005
2002
1999
1996
1993
1990
1987
1984
1981
1978
1975
1972
1969
1966
1963
1960
1957
1954
1951
1948
1945
1.0
TFR trends, components of the United
Kingdom 1945 – 2005
Total Fertility, components of the UK 1945 - 2005.
Source: ONS
4.0
England and Wales
3.5
Scotland
Northern Ireland
3.0
2.5
2.0
1.5
2005
2002
1999
1996
1993
1990
1987
1984
1981
1978
1975
1972
1969
1966
1963
1960
1957
1954
1951
1948
1945
1.0
Background: the end of the ‘West
European Marriage System’
Mean age at marriage, bachelors and spinsters, England and Wales 1889 - 2001. Source: ONS Series FM2
34
32
30
28
26
24
22
bachelors
spinsters
2001
1997
1993
1989
1985
1981
1977
1973
1969
1965
1961
1957
1953
1949
1945
1941
1937
1933
1929
1925
1921
1917
1913
1909
1905
1901
1897
1893
1889
20
More recent trends:
Mean Age at First Marriage (females), groups of European countries 1960 2002
30.0
Scandinavia mean
29.0
Southern Europe mean
NW Europe mean
28.0
CEE mean
27.0
FSU mean
former Yugoslavia mean (ex Bosnia)
26.0
25.0
24.0
23.0
22.0
2002
2000
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
1988
1986
1984
1982
1980
1978
1976
1974
1972
1970
1968
1966
1964
1962
1960
21.0
Topics in Inglehart’s ‘post-materialist’ questionnaire.
Bold = short questionnaire. Blue = ‘materialist’ responses; green =
‘postmaterialist’ responses
A
B
C
D
Maintain order in the nation.
Give people more say in the decisions of the government.
Fight rising prices.
Protect freedom of speech.
E
F
G
H
I
J
K
L
Maintain a high rate of economic growth.
Make sure that this country has strong defence forces.
Give people more say in how things are decided at work and in their community.
Try to make our cities and countryside more beautiful.
Maintain a stable economy.
Fight against crime.
Move towards a friendlier, less impersonal society.
Move towards a society where ideas count more than money.
Births outside marriage
Births outside marriage per 1000 live births, selected countries 1945 -2001.
Source: Council of Europe, National Statistical Yearbooks
600
Bulgaria
Denmark
500
Estonia
FRG
Greece
400
Italy
Poland
300
Sweden
United Kingdom
200
100
2001
1999
1997
1995
1993
1991
1989
1987
1985
1983
1981
1979
1977
1975
1973
1971
1969
1967
1965
1963
1961
1959
1957
1955
1953
1951
1949
1947
1945
0
Is the ‘Second Demographic Transition
sustainable’?
• Fiscal burdens e.g. divorce adds 15% to UK
benefit bill (£15 bn); creates 3 for 2 new
households.
• Can we afford welfare AND population
ageing at the same time? The latter is
unavoidable.
• Psychosocial externalities. Long-term
consequences on cohorts?
Expectation of life at birth, both sexes,
latest data (quintiles) source: WHO
Upper
4-th
3-rd
2-nd
Lower
No data
Min = 64.94
Male expectation of life at birth,
trends 1950-2002
Male expectation of life at birth, selected European countries, 1945 - 2003.
Sources: WHO, Council of Europe, national statistical yearbooks.
80
Germany m
Hungary m
75
Italy m
Russia m
Switzerland m
70
65
60
2003
2001
1999
1997
1995
1993
1991
1989
1987
1985
1983
1981
1979
1977
1975
1973
1971
1969
1967
1965
1963
1961
1959
1957
1955
1953
1951
1949
1947
1945
55
UK 1981 – 2056 period expectation of
life at birth (females). Source: GAD 2007.
Population Pyramids – 2005
Western Europe
Female
Eastern Europe
Male
Female
Male
80
60
40
20
AGE
% of Population in Age Group
% of Population in Age Group
Population Pyramids – 2025
Western Europe
Female
Eastern Europe
Male
Female
Male
80
60
40
20
AGE
% of Population in Age Group
% of Population in Age Group
Japan population pyramid 2000,
2050.
source http://www.ipss.go.jp/pp-newest/e/ppfj02/suikei_g_e.html
UK population pyramid 2006 (percent).
Source: GAD Principal Projections 2004.
UK population distribution by age and sex 2006
(percent)
100+
90-94
80-84
70-74
60-64
50-54
40-44
30-34
20-24
10-14
0-4
4.00
3.00
2.00
1.00
0.00
1.00
males females
2.00
3.00
4.00
UK population projected to 2056, GAD 2006-based
assumptions on fertility and migration, mortality as in 2004based projections.
UK population distribution by age and sex 2056 (percent)
GAD 2006-based PP assumptions on fertility and
migration (mortality as 2004-based).
100+
90-94
80-84
70-74
60-64
50-54
40-44
30-34
20-24
10-14
0-4
-4.00
-3.00
-2.00
-1.00
0.00
males
1.00
females
2.00
3.00
4.00
No such thing as ‘Europe’?
Projections of population aged 20-24, selected European countries, 2000 = 100
120
110
100
90
France
Germany
Italy
Netherlands
Spain
UK UN 2002 projection
UK GAD 2002 projection
80
70
60
50
40
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
Aged potential support ratio, selected countries 2000
and 2050. Source: UN 2004 medium variant.
4.50
4.17
4.00
4.17
4.17
4.00
3.70
3.50
3.00
2.63
2.50
2.13
2.00
2.00
1.52
1.45
1.50
1.00
0.50
0.00
United
Kingdom
France
Germany
2000
2050
Spain
Italy
Immigration as demographic salvation?
• Do we need to be saved? Why should ‘no decline’ targets be met
(UN 2000)? Is zero growth or decline axiomatically undesirable?
• Immigration can keep population, or workforce size,
approximately constant.
• But that can require large inflows; and adjustment difficult.
• Immigration can only 'solve' population ageing with huge
population increases.
• Given sub-replacement fertility, migration to maintain constant
size must eventually replace original population with immigrant
population.
• Should not ignore environmental and social problems of
population growth.
UK population size required to maintain given PSRs by immigration, 2000
- 2100 (millions)
350
300
250
200
150
100
50
PSR 3.0
PSR 3.5
PSR 4.22
2100
2080
2060
2050
2030
2025
2020
2010
2000
0
Can higher fertility save the day? Only up to a
point.
• Replacement TFR (2.08) would eventually
maintain population size and raise PSR to
near 3. If no net migration, no popn. growth
• TFR would need to rise to about 3.5 to
‘preserve’ current PSR of about 4.
• That would raise population growth rate to
about 1.8% per year: considerable
population growth though not as great as
‘equivalent’ effect with immigration.
Demography isn’t everything
Ageing Vulnerability Index 2003
Overall Index
Rank
Australia
UK
US
Canada
Sweden
Japan
Germany
Netherlands
Belgium
France
Italy
Spain
Score
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
Public
Fiscal
Benefit
Elder
Burden
Room
Dependence
Affluence
Rank
Rank
Rank
Rank
-1
7
18
42
48
50
52
62
63
81
84
93
weight
Source: Jackson and Howe 2003, Figure 18
2
1
3
6
4
9
7
8
5
10
11
12
1/3
2
1
4
6
3
9
5
7
8
10
11
12
1/3
4
6
3
5
8
1
11
9
10
12
2
7
1/6
6
11
1
2
10
3
5
4
9
8
12
7
1/6
Managing population ageing
• Improve the actual support rate
• (a) increase workforce participation
•
•
•
retraining unemployed, discouraging early retirement and perpetual students,
more flexible labour market arrangements
help women to combine work with childcare (part-time work, school hours)
• (b) increase the average age of retirement
•
•
•
increase pension entitlement age
remove tax and other disincentives for working pensioners
end of ‘cliff-edge’ retirement.
• Moderate financial burden
•
limit state pension, 'second and third pillar' funded pensions .
• Increase labour productivity
Potential increase in EU 15 workforce , 1999,
given Danish participation rates (millions)
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
Economically active
Actually employed
all
males
females
Effects on UK PSR of higher
retirement ages Population Trends 103
7.0
6.0
Ratio
5.0
4.0
72
Long-term TFR: 1.8
Long-term annual net inward migration: 95,000
71
70
69
68
67
66
65
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
1980
2000
2020
2040
Year
2060
2080
2100
Real support ratios – some scenarios
Table 4 Real Support Ratios (Equivalent Adults, Zero Migration)
A
B
C
Constant
High
Very High
Age-specific Employment
Employment
Employment
Path
Path
Rates
2000
2050
2050
2050
France
0.84
0.66
0.99
1.15
Germany
0.99
0.66
0.87
1.01
Italy
0.67
0.45
0.79
0.93
Japan
1.09
0.70
0.85
0.99
UK
1.17
0.92
1.02
1.18
USA
1.33
1.00
1.07
1.24
Notes
Real support ratio = number of persons employed / number of equivalent
adults not employed; 1 child = 0.33 adults.
Employment rate = percentage of age-group in employment.
Employment rates for 15-64 year olds in 2000 as given in table 1;
employment rates for other age groups in 2000 are assumed to be zero.
Employment rates in 2050 under the various scenarios are as follows:
Comparison of results of European
‘foreign-origin’ projections
Projected growth of population of immigrant or foreign origin 2000-2050,
selected countries, as percent of total population.
35
Germany medium variant
30
USA medium variant (excludes black population)
Netherlands base scenario
Denmark 2002- based medium variant
Sweden foreign background 2004 based
Austria 'Compensating' scenario, no naturalisation.
percent
25
20
15
10
5
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
Projected ethnic change in the UK given 2001
data.
Percent of UK population in three major ethnic categories, 2001 - 2051
100
90
80
70
60
British, Scottish, Irish
non-white ethnic minority
white non-British
50
40
30
20
10
0
2001
2006
2011
2016
2021
2026
2031
2036
2041
2046
2051
The irrelevance of population growth and size
for individual welfare
Figure 1a
GDP per head and population size in Western Countries and Japan in 2000
10.8
10.6
logarithm GDP per capita
10.4
10.2
10.0
9.8
9.6
Source: Penn World Table
9.4
5.0
7.0
9.0
11.0
13.0
logarithm population
Figure 1b
Growth of Per Capita GDP and Population in Western Countries and Japan 1980-2000
12.0
per capita GDP growth (percent p.a.)
10.0
8.0
6.0
4.0
2.0
Source: Penn World Table
0.0
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
population growth (percent p.a.)
2.0
2.5
3.0
Demographic expectations for next 10 -15
years
• Substantial increases will continue in life expectation,
especially the ‘oldest-old’ (over age 85) and (hopefully) in
the expectation of active older life.
• Postponement of childbearing in most (not all) countries
will moderate, allowing modest increase in birth-rate.
• Migration will dominate dynamics, and will remain
politically salient in UK and abroad. Unintended
consequences of policy always important.
• Is resistance growing to ‘Second Demographic
Transition’?
• Ethnic change will become more visible.
Wider demographic considerations.
• End may be in sight for global, as well as regional,
population growth. Europe’s relative decline unavoidable.
• Population ageing inevitable, cannot be ‘solved’, only
ameliorated and managed.
• Major differences in forecast ageing between Western
countries, due to fertility differences. UK in highest group:
makes non-demographic management easier.
• TFR of about 1.7 or higher (as in UK) is regarded as a
‘safe’ level; below that management difficult, may be ‘low
fertility trap’
• Immigration can augment total and working age
population. ‘Replacement’ migration to maintain agestructure impossible.
• In longer run, adverse effects of global warming may arise
within time horizon of population projections.