The shape of things to come: world population to 2050.
D.A. Coleman
Contribution to the Engelsberg Seminar 2005. To be published by the Ax:son Johnson
Foundation, Stockholm, in Empire and the Future World Order.
Introduction
It is sometimes said that demographers conjure up problems of population which are
then left to economists to solve. Naturally in a fast-moving world the problems
change. This essay reviews some of the problems – and opportunities – that are likely
to emerge from global and regional demographic change up to mid-century. Some
possible responses will be reviewed as well. Demography is not destiny, and human
societies and economies should be able to adapt to many, but not all, of the situations
described here, although often with pain and inconvenience. Being forewarned, we
may be able to prevent or at least moderate others. Coping with some, however, such
as the consequences of the fastest population growth in the poorest-poor countries,
defies any obvious solution. I will take it as read that population matters, because of
its associated effects on power, poverty, environment and security arising from global
and regional, and particularly differential, population growth and composition. Those
issues, some of which remain controversial, are extensively discussed elsewhere (e.g.
McNicoll 1995; Dyson, 1995; Livi Bacci and de Santis 1998; Birdsall, Kelley et al.
2002; Cincotta et al 2003).
It is widely believed that the problem of population growth, one of the great
preoccupations of the later 20th century, has now given way to a new question of
population stagnation and prospective decline in the 21st. It is not so widely realised
that population is quite capable of presenting us with two problems at once, not just
one: in fact both of the propositions above run in parallel. Populations of poor
countries, especially of the poorest, continue to grow fast, while many of the rich ones
face ageing and decline, both in absolute and particularly in relative terms.
These two very different demographic scenes typical of ‘North’ and ‘South’ combine
to create a third, more global issue: the differential population growth that will
radically transform the international political and economic order, and in some
respects restore an earlier balance of power disturbed only transiently by the rise of
the West over the last half a millennium.
Looking forward to that future, a fourth and final issue confronts us in the even longer
run: the fact that modern populations – and all populations will eventually become
‘modern’ – are heading for an unknown destination. It is generally believed that the
demographic characteristics of the developed world: fewer children, longer lives,
diverse families, will eventually be shared by all human populations, even those today
which are the most backward.
In the developed world, however, in the richest environment of demographic data that
the world has ever seen, our explanations of the mechanisms of demographic
behaviour, and hence our ability to predict its future, remain poverty-stricken
(Coleman 1999). There is no real consensus as to why, for example, people in some
1
rich countries choose to have more children than others (United Nations Population
Division 1997), very little idea why enlightened people ever choose to have any
children at all (Foster 2000), and fierce controversy on whether there are any limits to
the prolongation of life (Olshansky 2004) (Oeppen and Vaupel 2002) or to the retreat
from marriage and from childbearing (Lesthaeghe and Surkyn 2004). We do not know
of any fundamentally good reason why the birth rate, here in Europe or anywhere
else, might conveniently come to rest at about the level required to maintain the
population in the long run, as many demographers used to assume (United Nations
Population Division 2002). Much of this uncertainly arises because we have taken
control of our own biological destiny in reducing our fertility, and in prolonging our
lives. But gaining that power makes the long-term future less predictable, until we
have made up our minds what we want.
Population projections – how much can we know?
Let us start with some population developments that are as nearly certain as anything
can be. We can state some things with confidence, even though it is true that all
population projections are always wrong. At times in the past, the record of
population projections has indeed been deplorable, failing, for example, to forecast
the baby boom, or its end ten years later. The errors of projections made in the 1950s
and 1960s plunged demographers into a depression from which they have only
recently emerged. What matters, however, is not whether projections are wrong in
detail, as they must be, but how wrong they are. Many projections can be accurate
enough to serve as a basis for policies. Partly this is because techniques have
improved, but mostly because there are certain fundamental regularities about the
mathematics of population which make some outcomes almost certain. The vital rates,
growth rates and age-structures of populations are firmly linked by mathematical
laws, so that the one can be predicted from the other, and some outcomes can be ruled
out. In the long run, for example, a population will always assume an age-structure
wholly determined by the schedules of fertility and mortality that it is experiencing, as
long as these remain unchanged, forgetting any age-structure that it has inherited from
the past. Current age-structure is the child of previous vital rates. That is why
population ageing is inevitable in the West, our current age-structures being a
vanishing inheritance from the vital rates of the 20th century.
Much of the demographic change in the world arose from the process of the
‘demographic transition’; that is, a progression from the high birth and death rates of
traditional society, to the low birth and death rates of modern society, through a
transient period of population growth. European countries are emerging from the final
stages of that process, into the ‘unknown world’ noted above, while most of the rest
of the world is part way through, at various stages, with late starters still growing at
various rates, and others whose growth rates are already starting to decline, and their
populations to age. About fourteen countries have not begun their fertility transition at
all, and because their death rates have fallen, their population growth remains
astonishingly high.
The diversity of growth and age-structure
It is thus almost certain the world population will increase by a further three billion
people plus or minus half a billion or so, perhaps ceasing to grow once it has reached
about 9 billion. Almost all this increase is going to be in the third world and
particularly in the poorest parts of the third world. Almost all the increase is going to
2
be in the cities, and almost all populations except for the fourteen mentioned above
are already getting older as a consequence of declining birth rates. Some countries
therefore experience rapid growth, others incipient decline. Some are burdened by
youth dependency at the beginning of the transition; others - a growing number – by
age dependency at its end. But in the middle of this process, transition brings a
benefit, in the form of the ‘demographic bonus’ or window of opportunity, a
potentially favourable, albeit transient, age-distribution of population. That arises
some years after the onset of fertility decline, when cohorts under age 15 are
becoming less numerous at a time when the cohorts in the older ages of dependency,
over 60, are still small as an inheritance from the more pyramid-shaped population
distributions typical of pre-transitional and early transitional societies. Such a
demographic bonus can only last for a few decades. But during that time the
dependency ratio, that is the ratio of people of working age to those of dependent
ages, becomes more favourable than before or afterwards. That can greatly enhance
economic growth as long as the country concerned has the institutional, constitutional
and financial settings to permit the productive employment of the additional workingage population. Where these are present, as in China and India, they will underwrite
the economic growth that is forecast to be so strong in the early 21st century (Riley
2004). Where those preconditions are absent, as in much of sub-Saharan Africa, the
future bonus of ‘workers’ threatens simply to swell the ranks of the under-employed.
In any case the populations of sub-Saharan Africa have only recently passed the
highest point of youthful age-dependency, thanks to the very late onset of fertility
decline, and in come countries the numbers of young adults of working age are
severely depleted by AIDS. The ‘demographic bonus’ in Sub-Saharan Africa cannot
arrive before mid-century (Bloom, Canning and Sevilla 2002). Europe has enjoyed
that bonus – it contributed much to post-war economic growth- and is now paying the
inevitable later bill of population ageing as the smaller cohorts move up the age-scale
to shrink the working population.
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Population momentum
More specifically, one of the reasons we can be fairly confident about some of these
predictions is because through demographic momentum, much of the
future is built into the current structure of populations. Population pyramids are the
conventional way of describing population structure by age and sex. Figure 1 shows
the population pyramid of Uganda in the 1990s and of Italy in the 1990s: that of
Uganda guarantees (unless the ladies of Uganda decide tonight to have no more
children at all henceforth) very considerable further growth. Even if they were
determined to have no more than two children from tonight onwards (they are actually
having seven), the population of Uganda would nearly double and would grow for
another 50 years. That is ‘positive momentum’.
Figure 1.
Momentum – and its absence
Population by sex and age, Uganda 1991
(percent)
Population by sex and age, Italy 1998
(percent)
95-99
95-99
90-94
90-94
85-89
85-89
80-84
80-84
75-79
75-79
70-74
70-74
65-69
65-69
60-64
55-59
Ag e-g rou p
Age-group
60-64
50-54
45-49
40-44
55-59
50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39
35-39
30-34
30-34
25-29
25-29
20-24
20-24
15-19
15-19
10-14
10-14
5-9
5-9
0-4
0-4
25.0
20.0
15.0
10.0
5.0
0.0
5.0
Percent by sex
Males Females
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
10.0
8.0
6.0
4.0
2.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
Percentage by sex
Males
Females
On the other side of the transition, Italy has shot its demographic bolt. All the positive
momentum of the Italian population has been dissipated by decades of fertility below
the replacement rate. The Italian population now has negative momentum. That is,
it has accumulated such an unfavourable age structure that future decline for some
years would be guaranteed even if fertility were to return to replacement level instead
of the 1.3 implied by their current behaviour. Around the beginning of the new
century, many European populations entered this new phase (Lutz, O'Neill et al.
2003)
Global forecasts
With that in mind, Figure 2 presents some population projections for the whole world.
According to the central forecast, world population is expected to stabilise (United
Nations 2003, 2005) at about nine billion. The upper line in Figure 2 is the UN high
variant, which assumes slow declines in fertility and faster increase in expectation of
life. The lower line is more interesting. It is only in the last ten years or so that the
United Nations and other agencies have taken seriously the possibility that global
population might actually decline before the end of the century. The assumptions in
this variant are perhaps unlikely to be realised. Nonetheless, the authoritative
4
International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis in Austria, on the basis of an
alternative, probabilistic projection model, considers that global population is most
likely to be declining by the end of the of the century (Lutz, Sanderson et al. 2003).
Figure 2.
World population 1950 - 2050, three variant projections.
Source UN Population Prospects 2004.
12000
11000
World
High variant
Low variant
10000
9000
8000
7000
6000
5000
4000
3000
2050
2045
2040
2035
2030
2025
2020
2015
2010
2005
2000
1995
1990
1985
1980
1975
1970
1965
1960
1955
1950
2000
Much of the projected increase of about three billion is inevitable, being merely a
consequence of population momentum. The rest of the increase depends upon
assumptions about the continued decline of mortality (usually relatively steady and
reasonably predictable, despite AIDS, although its fall in recent years has been underestimated) and the pace of fertility decline. Fertility is falling almost everywhere apart
from a few places mostly in sub-Saharan Africa. While it has ceased to fall in Europe
and North America it has already declined to a low European level in many nonEuropean societies – both rich (Japan and Korea), less rich (Thailand, Sri Lanka) and
even poor (Bangladesh). The last has confounded expectations by substantial falls in
the birth rate despite the most unpropitious economic, social and religious
circumstances.
The decline of the birth-rate
There are two kinds of uncertainty here. First, it is not easy to find compelling reasons
why the populations of the Third World should not reduce their fertility below the
level required for replacement in just the same way that all European populations
have done (United Nations Population Division 2002). Some third world populations
have already done this, some southern states of India, Thailand, Sri Lanka have
fertility rates below 2 ; Chinese TFR is 1.6; at least 7 out of the 28 provinces of Iran
now have a birth rate of less than replacement level, as does Brazil as a whole. The
other uncertainty points the other way. It remains an assumption, though a plausible
one given the evidence, that all countries once begun on this route, will continue it.
But there have been failures, though possibly temporary. Fertility decline has stalled
since the late 1990s in Egypt, Bangladesh, Malaysia and some African countries
(Bongaarts 2002). There are numerous reasons, which include the diversion of effort
from family planning to the fight against AIDS and elsewhere (Cleland and Sinding in
press). At the very influential Cairo World Population Conference in 1994, the
ideological concerns of various pressure groups tended to prevail over scientific
5
concerns. The widespread adoption of the Cairo agenda has diverted attention from
meeting the simple family planning needs of women in poor countries to more
ideologically acceptable formulations of ‘reproductive health’, in which concern
about population growth is at a discount
Changes in population balance
Despite the onset of family limitation in most countries, the great variation of the pace
and timing of the decline in fertility and in population growth has had a number of
important consequences. The relative population balance in the major regions of the
world, and between rich and poor will inevitably change radically, not in favourable
directions (Figure 3).
Figure 3.
Projections of world population by level of development, 1950 - 2050.
Source: UN World Population Prospects 2004
10000
World
9000
More developed regions
8000
Least developed countries
7000
Less developed regions, excluding least developed countries
6000
5000
4000
3000
2000
1000
2050
2045
2040
2035
2030
2025
2020
2015
2010
2005
2000
1995
1990
1985
1980
1975
1970
1965
1960
1955
1950
0
Almost all the increase in world population will be in the less-developed countries.
And in the less developed world, a disproportionate share of that increase will be
among the poorest-poor – populations in the past, and even now, demographically
minor which seem certain to grow to very large size in the next half century. That
growth, will, of course, subvert any hope of easy escape from the Malthusian trap into
which they have fallen.
Table 1 summarises the demographic futures of some contrasting sets of countries.
The few in the world which have not yet started the fertility transition already have
relatively low death rates but their birth-rates are still equivalent to six or seven
children per woman. That implies considerable growth, currently about 3% per year,
so that by mid-century countries such as Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Ethiopia,
Congo, Somalia are very likely to have between three and a half and four times their
present population. Even today, their relatively small populations already present
problems of environmental degradation, resource inadequacy, high dependency and
chronic insecurity. In 2004 the population of Somalia was nine million, it was 24
million in Uganda and in Ethiopia. Somalia is projected to have 40 million by midcentury, Uganda 103, Ethiopia 171 million. In all, the countries that have not yet
started the fertility transition are likely to number almost a billion people by 2050.
They are all ‘poorest-poor’ and comprise much of the ‘least-developed’ category of
population in Figure 3.
6
Table 1
Some notable increases and declines projected to 2050
12 pre-transitional countries
51 declining countries
2000
2050
2000
2050
1.8
1.7
8
5
Afghanistan
21
70 Botswana
Angola
12
43 Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
12
42 Estonia
1.4
0.7
Burundi
6
20 Germany
82
79
Guinea-Bissau
1
5 Hungary
10
8
Congo ('democra
49
152 Korea
48
45
Ethiopia
66
171 Italy
58
45
Mali
12
46 Japan
127
110
Niger
11
53 Spain
41
37
40 Romania
22
17
146
102
50
32
594
482
Somalia
9
Uganda
24
Yemen
18
Total
240
change
103 Russia
84 Ukraine
828
3.4
0.8
Others of interest
Bangladesh
China
138
1315
255 Israel
1392 Occupied territ
6
7
3
11
Nigeria
115
259 Iraq
23
58
Pakistan
143
348 Saudi Arabia
22
55
Source: UN World Population Prospects 2002 Revision volume 1 and 2004 based highlights..
Despite their poverty some countries with small populations today, noteworthy only
as the locations of famine or as security trouble spots, are going to become
demographically very large. It very difficult to see how such populations can be
sustained. Similar concerns extend to the Middle East and North Africa. Despite the
oil wealth of some of its member countries, the populations of that region remain
socially undeveloped. Partly because of the low status of women, female economic
activity and unemployment are very unfavourable. Fertility is generally much higher
than expected given the average income levels, population growth is rapid, and the
economic dependency of the population is the highest in the world (PRB 2002).
On a regional scale, Asia will continue to eclipse all others (Figure 4). Not only does
it include both the super-giants of India and China with over 1 billion people each, but
also a number of major demographic runners-up in the form of Pakistan, Indonesia
and Japan, despite the onset of natural decline of the latter announced in August 2005.
Asian growth is predictable and its pace is slowing. Not so that of Africa, which has
emerged from demographic mediocrity in the mid 20th century to become the fastest-
7
growing region, its population increasing fast as a proportion of the global total and
likely to overtake that of China before mid-century. In Africa are concentrated the
majority of the fastest-growing, poorest-poor countries discussed above. Latin
America continues a much more modest growth, nearly paralleled by the growth of
the United States. In sharp contrast, Europe’s population is projected to decline from a
peak soon to be reached; it is the only region expected to lose numbers. Europe’s
demographic future, as defined here, is heavily weighted down by the rapid decline of
the Russian Federation and other members of the former Soviet Union. Europe, as
now defined by the UN, extends from Reykjavik to Vladivostok.
Figure 4.
World Population by major geographical area 1950 - 2050 (millions)
Source UN World Population Prospects 2004
6000
5000
4000
Africa
Asia
Europe
Latin America
North America
3000
2000
1000
0
1950 1955 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045 2050
Asian countries head the top ten countries in terms of projected population growth by
2050 (Table 2): India, where the fertility decline has been much slower than in China,
will contribute almost half a billion more people by mid-century, Pakistan is likely to
add a further 150 million, and Bangladesh 100 million. Inevitably, African countries
are also prominent: Nigeria adding 127 million, Congo adding 120, and Uganda
almost 100 million. The USA is the only western country in the top ten, although,
according to its most recent projections, it will acquire 80% of its additional
population from third-world immigrants and their descendants. (US Bureau of the
Census 2000)
The marginalisation of Europe
While Africa greatly increases its share of world population, Europe shrinks. Its
marginalisation is put into context in the Figures 5 and 6 below which show the total
population of Europe as rather precariously estimated back to the time of
Christ, and a projection of European population in absolute numbers and in percent.
For three-quarters of the last two millennia, Europe’s population has been hovering at
about 20% of the world’s total: a peak at the time of the Roman Empire, a collapse
afterwards and then a slow crawl back to its previous position.
8
Table 2.
Contributions to future world population growth 2005 - 2050 (millions)
India
Pakistan
Nigeria
Congo
Bangladesh
Uganda
USA
Ethiopia
China
Population
2005
1103
158
132
58
142
29
298
77
1316
2050
1593
305
258
177
243
127
395
170
1392
Increase
2005 - 2050
489
147
127
120
101
98
97
93
77
Total
World
3312
6465
4660
9076
1348
2611
Source: United Nations 2004-based projections
For a brief moment towards the end of the last millennium, at the end of the ’triumph
of the West’ (Jones 2003), Europe achieved its biggest–ever share of the world¹s
Figure 5.
Europe's place in world population, AD 0 - 1970.
20
450
18
400
16
350
14
300
12
250
10
Europe without USSR
Europe as %
200
8
150
6
100
4
50
2
0
percent of world total
population in millions
Source: Biraben 2004 table 1.
500
0
0
200
400
500
600
700
800
900
100
1100 1200 1300 1400 1500 1600 1700 1800 1900 1970
population. That, like the triumph, is now gone for good. Europe’s population is
projected to descend from about 20% at the present time to about 7 % by the next
century. There is almost nothing to be done about it.
9
In the very long run, as technical knowledge and standards of living that they support
become globalised, it is often assumed that the rest of the world will build up its
economic power pro rata with its population numbers. Day by day China is achieving
that goal; reformed India may not be too far behind. While their rapid population
growth, chronic poverty, instability and environmental precariousness may exclude
many of the poorest-poor from that destiny, it must be clear that Europe will become
not just demographically marginalized but is likely to become economically and
militarily marginalized as well. In absolute terms, the prospect of decline is
concentrated in Eastern Europe and to a lesser extent in Southern Europe. Almost all
the former communist countries are on a downward slope, those of the former Soviet
Union fastest of all. Hungary is projected to decline from ten to eight million,
Bulgaria from eight to five, Russia most interestingly from 143 to 100. The changing
world balance is underlined by the United Nations projection (2003) that the
population of Russia on its way down will be overtaken by the population of Uganda
on its way up by around 2050, with Yemen not far behind: an interesting prospect for
the world strategic balance.
Figure 6.
Europe as a percent of world population 1950 - 2050.
Source: UN Population Prospects 2004
750
23
population in millions
700
19
17
650
15
13
600
11
9
550
Europe
Europe as percent of world population
21
7
Europe as percent of world
2050
2045
2040
2035
2030
2025
2020
2015
2010
2005
2000
1995
1990
1985
1980
1975
1970
1965
1960
1955
5
1950
500
The predominance of the United States
The only major exception to this general decline in the fortunes of the west is that of
the United States, where impressive population growth is projected by the US Bureau
of the Census (2000) and all other agencies. At present, US population is almost 200
million fewer than that of the enlarged EU25. However, US population is projected to
grow to over 400 million by mid-century and over 570 million by its end; partly
thanks to its higher birth rate but primarily because of the assumed continuation of
mass immigration and of the higher fertility of South American immigrants and
minorities. On forecast trends, US growth will overtake EU25 decline by about 2060
(Figure 7). Even without migration the official US forecast is that the US population
will grow very substantially from the present 290 million to over 300 million. If the
much higher projection with migration comes to pass; the US position as the global
superpower will be confirmed for a very long time. It will be the only one of the
‘western’ countries in the world’s top ten demographically. That, allied to the highest
western
10
Figure 7.
Population projection US 1999-based, EU 25 2004-based (millions).
Sources: US Bureau of the Census, Eurostat
600
US medium projection
US zero migration
EU25 medium variant
EU25 zero migration
550
500
450
400
350
300
2098
2095
2092
2089
2086
2083
2080
2077
2074
2071
2068
2065
2062
2059
2056
2053
2050
2047
2044
2041
2038
2035
2032
2029
2026
2023
2020
2017
2014
2011
2008
2005
2002
1999
250
GDP per head, will keep it in the lead in terms of economy and military power
as well. Europe, in the meantime, will go on growing for a while, but by mid-century
it will have declined to somewhat less than its present number and its population will
be considerably older. The only precautionary note might be that the further preeminence of the US might be bought at the cost of adverse effects on national
coherence or productivity arising from a radically changed composition of population.
Population ageing
Population ageing, as noted above, is one of the future developments that can be
predicted with certainty. How much do we need to worry about European population
ageing and decline? Can anything be done about it? Population decline, as long as it is
slow and eventually comes to an end, might be beneficial to many European
countries. There is no point in attempting to compete demographically with the
United States or expecting any large-scale source of further growth except through
immigration, which brings its own problems. The economic effects of the end of
growth have been little discussed in recent years, but earlier analysis saw some
advantages, and environmental concerns – and some public opinion – argue in its
favour (Royal Commission on Population 1949; Population Panel 1973; Teitelbaum
and Winter 1985) . Population ageing is a different matter and is widely discussed
elsewhere (Chand and Jaeger 1996; Daykin and Lewis 1999; EU Economic Policy
Committee 2001)McMorrow and Röger 2004). The forecast rate of population ageing
in some European countries, e.g. Germany, Southern Europe and Eastern Europe, is
severe and will be difficult to manage even if necessary reforms to pensions systems,
workforce participation and, above all, retirement age are implemented – and the
recent political record there is dismal. In western and Northwestern Europe, the
position is different, thanks partly to higher birth-rates and partly to more favourable
labour market and pensions funding arrangements. Problems arising out of the age
structures generated by the birth rates of Sweden, Norway, France and Britain,
although far from trivial, can be managed non-demographically at least for a while.
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An increase in the birth rate would moderate but certainly not ‘solve’ and TFR trends
are upwards in a number of countries. Measures to help the birth-rate demographically-aware family welfare polices – are now being discussed publicly in
ways hitherto difficult (EU Commission 2001, 2005). Although immigration does
tend to moderate population ageing, the gearing is very unfavourable and any
substantial amelioration would require huge increases in population (Coleman 2004).
In general, the English-speaking world seems to come off best when demographic and
labour market considerations are taken together (Jackson and Howe 2003).
Nonetheless, some reduction in GDP growth per head, compared to what might have
been if the previous demographic bonus could have persisted, is inevitable, in Europe
and in the future, in the rest of the world.
European diversity
All that underlines the point that from a demographic point of view there is no such
thing as ‘Europe’. While all Europe’s populations do share certain problems and
trends, there remains great demographic diversity. Without a change of course, this
diversity will grow. For example the numbers entering the population of working age
in the North Western countries is expected more or less to hold its own on current
forecasts; those in the Southern European countries are likely to decline to
considerably lower levels (Figure 8; the trends include immigration). That combines
with other trends to diversify the future European pattern of potential support ratio
(that is, the ratio of persons of nominal working age to those of retirement age). That
benchmark of population ageing will decline from the current level of about four
throughout Europe today, to, at most, two-and-a-half in Northwestern Europe, but to
only just over one in southern Europe.
Figure 8.
Population aged 20-24, selected European countries 2000 2050 (2000 = 100). Source: United Nations 2003, GAD 2004.
115
105
95
85
75
65
55
45
35
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
Norway
France
Germany
Italy
Spain
UK (GAD 2003-based PP)
2050
12
Figure 9.
Potential Support Ratio, selected
countries 2000, 2050
4.08
4.13
4.15
4
4.01
3.73
3.5
3
2.5
2.15
2.12
1.83
2
1.47
1.5
1.36
1
0.5
0
2000
2050
F
UK
G
I
Sp
Divergent birth rates, if they continue, must imply a slow change in the European
balance of power. As the North West grows, the South and Centre decline. Even with
substantial immigration, the German population will slowly fall. French population
will grow even faster than Figure 10 suggests because those data do not incorporate
the latest increase in the French birth rate (now 1.92). Without migration, French
population would at last will overtake that of Germany by mid-century, restoring the
situation at the time of Napoleon. That might happen even with migration, depending
on its level. Despite universal media complaints about ‘Europe’s declining
Figure 10.
Comparative population size, selected countries 2004-2051, without
immigration (millions). Source: Eurostat 2004 based
85
80
2004
2051
75
70
65
60
55
50
45
40
France
UK
Germany
Italy
13
population, it is important to realise that some countries are still growing quite
substantially. In Sweden the official forecast of population predicts 18.% growth to
mid century, about the same as the Netherlands. In the UK the official projection is a
further 6.5 million or 9% growth. In all these countries about 85% of the projected
growth will be the direct or indirect consequences of migration.
Regional contrasts
These divergent trends create many interesting contrasts between neighbours and
competitors on a larger scale. The widening US/Europe gulf has been noted. The
Mediterranean has been described as the biggest demographic economic and cultural
fault line in the world (Chesnais 1995). The southern European countries put together,
and the North African countries, had almost identical populations in the 1990s - 140
million. But a huge divergence is in store, powered by population momentum – or its
absence – and delayed decline in fertility. By mid century the North African
populations are expected to double to about 300 million, whereas that of southern
Europe will be declining. Given the continuing tenfold gap in incomes, pressures on
migration, already strong, are unlikely to decline
Figure 11.
Southern Europe and North Africa: Projections 1990 - 2050 (millions).
Source UN World Population Prospects - the 2002 revision
350
300
Southern Europe
North Africa
250
200
150
2050
2045
2040
2035
2030
2025
2020
2015
2010
2005
2000
1995
1990
100
The prospect of Turkey’s EU membership focuses attention on its demographic
profile, which is more advanced than that of North Africa (Table 3).
Table 3.
A Simple Demographic Comparison of Turkey and EU15, 2001
population growth (per thousand)
natural increase (per thousand)
natural increase (thousands)
Total Fertility Rate
Expectation of life at birth (male)
Expectation of life at birth (female)
Infant deaths per 1000 live births
population aged 0-14 (percent)
Turkey EU15 Ratio to EU15
16
4
3.9
14
1
13.0
1009
404
2.5
2.5
1.5
1.7
66
75
0.9
71
81
0.9
39
5
8.4
30
17
1.8
source: EU; Eurostat 2002. Turkey, Council of Europe 2003.
14
Further afield, the contrast is not so great between Russian decline and the growth of
the central Asian Republics, formerly part of the Soviet Union. The birth rates of
those countries are already quite low; equality of numbers is not yet in sight although
the gap is certainly narrowing. The demographic and economic decline of Siberia,
however, which shares a long and formerly contested border with China, has
provoked security concerns (Hill and Gaddy 2003). At least half a million illegal
Chinese immigrants have been estimated (probably very unreliably) to be resident
there. On the other hand the US is even keeping pace with its neighbours (Figure 12),
not least because it is itself absorbing some of their natural increase through very high
rates of immigration. Although the US population is holding its own against its
southern neighbours, it is doing so by becoming at least in terms of the origin of its
population, rather more like its southern neighbours than previously was the case.
Figure 12.
USA, Central and South America. Projections 1990 - 2050 (millions)
600
USA
Central America
South America
500
400
300
200
2050
2045
2040
2035
2030
2025
2020
2015
2010
2005
2000
1995
1990
100
Immigration at that pace – actually quite similar to the rate into many Western
European countries – cannot occur for any time without creating considerable
domestic ethnic change. Thanks to high immigration combined with the projected
higher fertility of most minorities of immigrant origin, the US population is officially
projected to be transformed just after mid-century, with the white non-Hispanic
population becoming the minority (Figure 13) while the Hispanic population is
projected to continue to grow fast.
The ethnic transformation of the developed world
Official projections for the few European countries where data are available tell a
surprisingly similar story. All project a foreign-origin population (defined in various
ways) of between 15% and 35% of total population by mid-century (Figure 14). That
applies to Sweden, the Netherlands, Austria, Denmark and the United Kingdom. That
development depends primarily on the continuation of current patterns of migration,
not of higher fertility, even though the birth rates of foreign-origin populations, taken
together, tend to be somewhat higher that the native average. These changes are not
graven in stone; in Denmark and in the Netherlands, recent immigration and asylum
15
policy changes have substantially reduced net inflows and, as a consequence, the
latest projections of foreign-origin population have been moderated.
Figure 13
US population 1999 - 2100 Middle Series, ethnic group. Source; US Bureau of the Census 2000.
250.000
200.000
150.000
100.000
50.000
Hispanic
White non-Hispanic
Black NH
American Indian NH
2098
2095
2092
2089
2086
2083
2080
2077
2074
2071
2068
2065
2062
2059
2056
2053
2050
2047
2044
2041
2038
2035
2032
2029
2026
2023
2020
2017
2014
2011
2008
2005
2002
1999
0.000
Asian and Pacific NH
Figure 14.
35
30
Projected growth of population of immigrant or foreign origin 2000-2050,
selected countries, as percent of total population.
Germany medium variant
USA medium variant (excludes black population)
Netherlands base scenario
Denmark 2002- based medium variant
Sweden foreign background 2004 based
Austria 'Compensating' scenario, no naturalisation.
percent
25
20
15
10
5
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
2035
2040
2045
2050
Concluding remarks
Despite the difficulties of population projection, some future patterns can be set out
with considerable confidence. Global population growth is slowing down. The total is
unlikely to exceed 10 billion and there is even the prospect of global population
16
decline by the end of the century. Population ageing will be nearly universal and is in
general unavoidable, although its severity will vary greatly depending on birth-rate
trends, and in the more favourable cases, much can be done to moderate (but not to
solve) its deleterious effects though non-demographic measures. This brief overview
also shows some of the trends, contrasts and re-alignments that are more or less
certain to develop in the rise and fall of the populations of nations and hence in the
pattern of the international world order (McNicoll 1999) over the next fifty years.
Considerable rearrangements in the long run economic, political and military rank
order of countries and regions are more or less inevitable, with the relative
marginalisation of Europe being particularly marked. There will also be substantial
changes change in the national-origin composition of the western world itself, as a
result of immigration. These cannot be without interesting and important
consequences, making internal policy more complex and bending foreign relations
into new pre-occupations, as a result of the continuing overseas connections of an
increasing proportion of voters of recent immigrant origin.
On the global scene, one of the big problems is that the fastest growth is certain to
happen in the poorest countries of the world, the populations of which will become
seriously large in absolute terms and as a proportion of the world total. It is difficult to
understand how Somalia is going to be able to support a population of about 50
million, how Ethiopia will support one of 100 million, how Bangladesh will support
one of 50% greater than that, given the difficulties that they are having at present.
But in the longer run it is important to remember that we are moving into an unknown
world in demography. As countries complete the demographic transition, there is no
reason to suppose that the convenient equilibrium which obtained before the
demographic transition, of more or less zero growth, more or less coherent population
structure, will obtain in the future. At present, theory on the matter is depressingly
weak; we will have to await events.
17
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