Military Alliances in the 21st Century: Still
Relevant after all These Years?
August 9, 2013
By James L. Cook
James L. Cook is a Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Naval War College in
Newport, Rhode Island. He specializes in Strategy, Force Planning and the Greater Middle
East. He is an active participant in the Naval War College’s International Engagement
program.
Abstract: While military alliances have always been important to the United States, some experts
wonder about their future. In today’s uncertain security environment, they question whether these
alliances may have outlived their usefulness. The author argues that U.S. national security leaders
face some difficult choices as they formulate strategy and determine the number and types of collective
security arrangements the nation will require to secure its national interests in the future.
T
he contemporary international security environment presents a spectrum of
daunting challenges for both the strategist and senior national security
decision-makers. Recent events—from North Korea's provocative threats to
the territorial disputes in the South and East China Seas, from the Arab awakening
to the civil war in Syria to Iran's apparent trajectory to obtain nuclear weapons, from
terrorism to cyber-attacks—raise questions .regarding how the United States can
best secure its national interests. Additionally, the economic crisis has resulted in a
reduction of resources for defense, requiring greater emphasis on achieving security
on a collective and cooperative basis. A species of collective action, the formal
military alliance, served the nation well during the Cold War. However, assessing its
continued utility in an uncertain security environment requires closer examination
on three fundamental questions: Why do states join military alliances? What are the
benefits, challenges, and costs associated with military alliances? And what are the
collective security alternatives to military alliances?
U.S. joint doctrine defines an alliance as a “relationship that results from a
formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that
further the common interests of the members.” 1 Formal U.S. collective defense
The Joint Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms (Washington, D.C., Nov. 8, 2010), p. 13.
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COOK
arrangements include the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO); an
agreement with Australia and New Zealand (i.e., the ANZUS treaty); the Southeast
Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO); and bilateral treaties with the Philippines,
Japan, and South Korea. 2 Additionally, the United States has informal alliances that
do not take the shape of a treaty or accord but nevertheless imply a security
guarantee, e.g. the relationship between the United States and Taiwan, Saudi Arabia
and Israel. In total, the United States maintains formal defense commitments to
nearly 50 states around the world. 3
An alliance can feature prominently in a nation’s grand strategy. For
example, Robert Art argues that “America’s unipolar moment is over” as its current
fiscal condition and other challenges will weaken and eventually overturn its
position as the world’s only superpower within the international system.
Consequently, he advocates “some adjustment in the nation’s international
ambitions” and offers a grand strategy of selective engagement for the United States
that focuses on the three regions of the world most important to secure its national
interests—East Asia, the Middle East and Europe. In order to favorably “shape
events” in these key regions, Art recommends an in-theater military presence and
emphasizes the criticality of retaining the two central alliances with Japan and
NATO “not only because they enable a forward defense posture, but also because
they are tools of political management and enhance cooperative solutions to
regional security issues.” 4 Art’s emphasis on these regions and alliances is consistent
with the recently-published Defense Strategy Review Sustaining U.S. Global
Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense that describes a rebalance to the AsiaPacific, while “hedging” against crises in the Middle East and stressing the
importance of NATO and other allies and partners.
Why Do States Enter into Military Alliances?
In his book, The Origins of Alliances, Stephen Walt offers some insights
regarding alliances as a state’s response to threats. Traditional international relations
balance of power theory contends that states form alliances in an attempt to prevent
stronger powers from dominating them. According to Walt, states may try to offset
an unfavorable balance of power through either balancing by means of an alliance in
order to counter a threat before it becomes too powerful, or by bandwagoning, for
example, aligning with the source of danger or strength. In other words, a state
forms an alliance either by allying against, or with, the principal external threat. 5
However, this calculus becomes complicated by the fact that, according to the
2 Department of State, U.S. Collective Defense Arrangements,
http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/collectivedefense.
3 Bruno Tertrais, “The Changing Nature of Military Alliances,” The Washington Quarterly,
Spring 2004, p. 136.
4 Robert J Art, “Selective Engagement in the Era of Austerity,” in Richard Fontaine and
Kristin M. Lord, eds., America’s Path: Grand Strategy for the Next Administration (Washington,
D.C.: Center for a New American Security, May 2012), pp. 15-19.
5 Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca: Cornell University Press 1987), pp. 17-19.
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National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2030 report, “by 2030, no country—
whether the U.S., China, or any other large country—will be a hegemonic power.” 6
This suggests a “multi-polar” world where the diffusion of power will most likely
result in a combination of balancing and bandwagoning as states take necessary
steps to ensure their security and secure their national interests.
Bruno Tertrais offers another perspective and argues that two main factors
drive the formation of alliances. The first is “idealism,” describing a situation in
which states commit themselves to fight alongside others because of shared values
and ideas such as freedom, democracy, etc. 7 This was most prevalent during the
Cold War when two distinct ideological models were in competition and manifest
themselves in two separate alliances: NATO and the Warsaw Pact. However,
Karsten Jung argues that, since the end of the Cold War where the “fundamental
antagonism between East and West wound down, national interests of alliance
members were less and less determined by a priori ideological considerations, but
instead shaped and shaken on a case-by-case basis depending on the distinct
characteristics of each situation.” 8
Tertrais’ second factor is “realism,” which depends on each state’s costbenefit analysis. This perspective recognizes that alliances can reduce costs and
multiply benefits through the division of responsibilities, the sharing of common
assets, or simply the protection provided by having a stronger country as an ally. 9
This essay focuses on Tertrais’ second factor: what are the benefits, costs, and
challenges associated with military alliances?
Benefits of Joining a Formal Military Alliance
A perceived benefit of joining a formal military alliance is the belief that because
such a form of collective defense enhances security by providing a formal
commitment of military and other elements of national power between the
signatories, the alliance deters actions by potential enemies. There is also a symbolic
dimension to formal alliances, one that was succinctly captured by former Secretary
of State Madeline Albright when she stated that “NATO is the expression of the
indispensable transatlantic link.” 10 Alliance advocates believe that these formal
agreements promote peace and avoid wars and offer the example of NATO, which
they contend was instrumental in deterring the Soviet Union and “winning” the
Cold War. Although critics argue that NATO is today little more than an obsolete
Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds (National Intelligence Council, Dec. 2012), p. iii.
Bruno Tertrais, “The Changing Nature of Military Alliances,” The Washington Quarterly,
Spring 2004, pp. 135-136.
8 Karsten Jung, “Willing to Waning? NATO’s Role in an Age of Coalitions,” World Affairs
Journal, March/April 2012, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/willing-or-waningnato%E2%80%99s-role-age-coalitions .
9 Bruno Tertrais “The Changing Nature of Military Alliances,” p. 136.
10 Maartje Rutten, “From St-Malo to Nice, European Defence: Core Documents,” Chaillot
Papers 47 (Paris: Institute for Security Studies Western European Union, May 2001), p.11.
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relic of a past era and an “alliance in search of a mission” after the demise of the
Soviet Union, the fact remains that traditional state-versus-state challenges still exist
and deterrence remains an important part of any national security “toolbox.” Thus
formal military alliances can help to deter war.
For instance, it can be argued that the U.S. military alliance with South Korea
has helped keep the peace on the Korean peninsula for 60 years, despite such North
Korean provocations as nuclear and ballistic missile tests, missile launches, and the
dangerous events of 2010—the sinking of the Cheonan and artillery strikes on the
island of Yeonpyeong. Currently, the United States has some 28,500 troops based
in South Korea, which according to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General
Martin Dempsey, provides “assur[ance] to our allies” in the region. 11 For its part,
the 650,000-strong Republic of Korea (ROK) armed forces are a modern, capable
military force and the U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Commander General James D.
Thurman recently testified that “Our combined, joint team provides the trained,
ready, and disciplined forces that are prepared to fight and win on the Korean
Peninsula, providing a strong deterrent to North Korean aggression.” 12
Although certainly not the only factor, there is little doubt that the US-ROK
mutual defense treaty continues to loom large in North Korea’s calculus even as the
government ratcheted up its provocations in the spring of 2013 and abandoned the
armistice that ended the Korean War in 1953 in response to increased sanctions
aimed at halting its nuclear weapons program. To send an unambiguous message of
commitment to its treaty obligations, the U.S. flew B-52 and B-2 stealth bombers
over South Korea in a public demonstration of U.S. military global strike capability
that includes a “nuclear umbrella,” while also deploying F-22 stealth fighter jets and
ballistic missile defense systems to the region. It is worth noting that subsequent to
these U.S. actions the North Korean military, despite being placed on “high alert,”
showed no signs of large-scale mobilizations or positioning for conflict. 13
Another benefit of alliances is that they facilitate burden sharing between
members. For example, NATO invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty after
the terrorist attacks on 9/11 and subsequently committed military forces to
Afghanistan in its first “out of area” operation. 14 The alliance’s involvement
“Dempsey Visits South Korea, China on Weeklong Asia Trip,” Department of Defense,
April 21, 2013, http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=119830.
12 General James D. Thurman, Testimony Before the House Armed Services Committee,
March 28, 2012,
http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2013/images/03/26/general.thurman.statement.pdf.
13 Mark Landler, and Choe Sang-hun, “U.S. Sees North Blustering, Not Acting,” New York
Times, April 1, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/02/world/asia/south-korea-givesmilitary-leeway-to-answer-north.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.
14Article 5 states, “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently
they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of
individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United
States, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in
concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed
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Military Alliances
enabled the creation of the International Security Assistance Force Afghanistan
(ISAF) that eventually grew to 50 nations. In February 2013, there were just over
100,000 ISAF troops serving in Afghanistan. While the bulk of these forces
(66,000) were U.S. troops, the remaining 34,000 stand as a testament to the enduring
commitment of the alliance and represents additional military resources that the
United States did not have to commit to conduct military operations in Afghanistan
that are in the nation’s vital national interest. 15 The concept of burden sharing is
especially attractive as the U.S. confronts a resource-constrained environment
resulting from a $487 billion defense cut required by the Budget Control Act and
another $500 billion due to sequestration over the next decade. As a result, the
Department of Defense is planning to cut some 100,000 troops, as well as cancelor
delay the delivery of several weapons systems that will affect overall military
capability.
An alliance offers a greater perception of “legitimacy” within the international
system, especially when compared with unilateral action by a single state—no matter
how big or powerful. This is illustrated by comparing two recent uses of force by
the United States. In 1991, the George H.W. Bush administration was able to create
a coalition of over 30 countries working within a United Nations Security Council
Resolution 678 that authorized the use of force against Iraq. 16 In contrast, the 2003
decision by the George W. Bush administration unilaterally to invade Iraq after it
failed to rally support for military action in the United Nations and within NATO, is
believed to have caused problems for the United States in the international arena.
For instance, the United States has seen its favorability ratings plummet over the last
decade and, as David Hendrickson and Robert Tucker argue, remains “hobbled by a
reputation for the reckless use of force,” that is going to take a long time to
overcome. 17
Finally, alliances offer geostrategic access (i.e., basing rights, overflight
permissions, etc.) to key areas where national interests are at stake. That said, even
allies retain their sovereign right to refuse access as evidenced by Turkey’s decision
to deny the U.S. the use of its territory during the 2003 Iraq invasion.
force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.” For more
information, see “What is Article V?,” http://www.nato.int/terrorism/five.htm..
15 British Broadcasting Corporation, “Q&A: Foreign Forces in Afghanistan,” April 4, 2013,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-11371138.
16 For more information regarding UNSCR 678, see http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/575/28/IMG/NR057528.pdf?OpenElement
17 David C. Hendrickson and Robert W. Tucker, “The Sources of American Legitimacy,”
Foreign Affairs, Nov./Dec. 2004, http://www.cfr.org/world/sources-americanlegitimacy/p7473.
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Challenges to Military Alliances
Rajan Menon described the effect of national interests on the efficacy of
formal military alliances when he wrote, “When circumstances change, shared
practical objectives, which are far more vital to the health and life spans of alliances
than ethereal sentiments, begin to erode. In the words of the nineteenth century
British foreign secretary Lord Palmerston, nations do not have ‘permanent friends,
only permanent interests.’ The next decade will reveal the veracity of Palmerston’s
dictum.” 18 The tension that exists in balancing national interests with alliances is
exacerbated when member states have divergent views surrounding a controversial
issue such as the 2003 invasion of Iraq. At that time NATO members France and
Germany, faced with the prospect of a domestically unpopular war that included a
number of civil protests, openly opposed military action and led efforts to deny a
U.S. request for military planning and defensive support for Turkey in the event of a
war with Iraq. This resulted in a heated and bitter debate that included Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld’s barbed statement about “old and new Europe,” contrasting the
support for U.S. actions by new NATO members Poland and the Czech Republic
with the lack of support from Germany and France. 19 In addition, U.S. Ambassador
to NATO Nicholas Burns asserted that NATO faced a “crisis of credibility,” 20 all
of which threatened to fracture the alliance.
Another challenge facing military alliances is the concern that certain states
become “free riders,” willingly receiving the security benefits without accepting the
financial and military responsibilities associated with membership. For example,
decreased defense spending in Europe resulting from the global economic crisis has
been especially hard on the “Eurozone.” Currently, the United States underwrites
nearly three-quarters of the total military spending within NATO, while only the
United States, the United Kingdom and Greece meet the 28-member alliance’s
defense spending guidelines of two percent of gross domestic product. 21 In light of
this abysmal statistic, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen recently
complained that “This growing transatlantic gap is unsustainable. It undermines the
Alliance principle of solidarity. NATO is about sharing. Allies share the risks and
the responsibilities, just as they share the security benefits.” 22
Rajan Menon, “The End of Alliances,” World Policy Journal, Summer 2003,
http://public.gettysburg.edu/~dborock/courses/Spring/p344/ps344read/menonend%20of%20alliances.pdf, p. 2.
19 “Secretary Rumsfeld Briefs at the Foreign Press Center,” Department of Defense, Jan. 22,
2003, http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=1330.
20 “NATO crisis over veto on plans to defend Turkey,” The Guardian, Feb.11, 2003,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/feb/11/iraq.nato1.
21 Steven Erlanger, “Shrinking Europe Military Spending Stirs Concerns,” New York Times,
April 22, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/23/world/europe/europes-shrinkingmilitary-spending-under-scrutiny.html?_r=0 .
22 “Why we need to invest in defense,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Nov.13, 2012,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_91256.htm?selectedLocale=en .
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Military Alliances
Some U.S. officials have warned that, unless European countries commit
more funding to defense, they risk “collective military irrelevance.” 23 In 2011,
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates warned about NATO becoming a “two-tiered
alliance,” resulting from both a lack of will and resources in an era of austerity. He
went on to predict that “The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and
patience in the U.S. Congress—and in the American body politic writ large—to
expend increasingly precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently
unwilling to devote the necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be
serious and capable partners in their own defense.”24 This is potentially challenging
for the recently-published Defense Strategy Review, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership:
Priorities for 21st Century Defense, that heavily emphasizes the importance of existing
military alliances to support its strategic objectives around the world. 25
That said, there is some room for optimism as demonstrated by newlyelected Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s plans to increase defense spending by
.8 percent to $51.7 billion. This represents the first rise in 11 years and should meet
with approval in Washington. Additionally, despite disagreements surrounding U.S.
military bases in Okinawa, Japan remains committed to providing host nation
support for all military forces in the country and currently spends $2.02 billion per
year on Japanese employee salaries, utilities and base maintenance. 26 Although
constrained by Japan’s “pacifist” constitution, which includes the Article 9 guideline
that limits defense spending to 1 percent of GDP, Abe is discussing changes to the
document that would loosen some of the current restrictions regarding the Japanese
Self-Defense Force by arguing that “It’s been over 60 years since its enactment, and
its contents have become obsolete. The spirit of writing our own constitution is
23 Steven Erlanger, “Shrinking Europe Military Spending Stirs Concerns,” New York Times,
April 22, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/23/world/europe/europes-shrinkingmilitary-spending-under-scrutiny.html?_r=0 .
24 “The Security and Defense Agenda (Future of NATO) as delivered by Secretary of
Defense Robert M. Gates,” Department of Defense, June 10, 2011,
http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1581.
25 For a more detailed discussion regarding the importance of alliances, see Sustaining U.S.
Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, Jan. 2012, pp. 2-4.
26 Hana Kusumoto, “U.S., Japan sign new five-year ‘host nation support’ agreement,” Stars
and Stripes, Jan. 21, 2011, http://www.stripes.com/news/pacific/japan/u-s-japan-sign-newfive-year-host-nation-support-agreement-1.132428. Note: South Korea also provides hostnation support and provided the United States with $765 million in 2012, according to a
recent Congressional Research Service report on U.S—South Korean Relations. When
combined with other compensation outside of the agreement, South Korea offsets
approximately 40-45 percent of the total non-personnel stationing costs for U.S. troop
presence. For the entire CRS Report, see
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=1&ved=0
CC0QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.fas.org%2Fsgp%2Fcrs%2Frow%2FR41481.pdf&
ei=O2aCUbPvMLWr4APy24GYCA&usg=AFQjCNGvhtYFFteHOTdgXXJWHXIovF2w
OQ.
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what will take us to the next era.” 27 These actions suggest that, rather than being a
“free rider,” Japan remains committed to meeting its treaty obligations with the
United States and absorbing a larger share of the collective security burden.
Richard Haass recently examined a third challenge confronting military
alliances, describing the “delicate balancing act” facing American foreign policy that
“must communicate enough resolve so as to discourage aggression against its
friends and allies, but it must avoid signaling unconditional support…lest it
encourage those friends and allies to behave provocatively or recklessly.” 28
Currently, China has a number of territorial disputes with its neighbors in the South
and East China Sea that affect U.S. military allies Japan and the Philippines. The
dispute between Japan and China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island group became
heated last year when the Japanese government purchased three of the five main
islands from private businessman Kunioki Kurihara in September 2012. Prime
Minister Abe has vowed to protect the islands and said that “In the unlikely event
that they [China] were to land, it would be natural to expel them by force.” 29 This is
problematic for the United States. As former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
stated in October 2010, “The Senkakus [Diaoyus] fall within the scope of Article 5 30
of the 1960 U.S.—Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security.” 31 This
sentiment was reinforced during General Martin Dempsey’s visit to China in April
2013 during which he informed the leadership that, although the United States does
not take sides in the territorial dispute, “…we do have certain treaty obligations with
Japan that we would honor.” 32
As Paul Smith recently wrote, “This means that the United States
potentially bears substantial risk in the event of a rapid escalation of tensions
between Japan and China” and that the formal agreement “could paradoxically
exacerbate tensions, by emboldening Japan to initiate provocative actions designed
27 Yuka Hayashi, “Japan Leader Charts Path for Military’s Rise,” Wall Street Journal, April 24,
2013, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1581.
28 Richard N. Haass, “The Irony of American Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, May/June 2013, p.
65.
29 Isabel Reynolds and Takashi Hirokawa, “Abe Vows to Protect Isles as Shrine Visits Hurt
Japan-China Ties,” Bloomberg, April 23, 2013, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-0423/japan-lawmakers-visit-war-shrine-after-china-s-korea-protest.html .
30 Article 5 states that “Each Party recognizes that an armed attack against either Party in the
territories under the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety
and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its
constitutional provisions and processes.” For more information regarding the U.S. – Japan
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, see http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/namerica/us/q&a/ref/1.html.
31 Department of State, Joint Press Availability with Japanese Foreign Minister Seiji Maehara,
Kahala Hotel and Resort, Honolulu, HI, Oct. 27, 2010,
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/10/150110.htm.
32 Karen Parrish, “China Visit Sparks Dynamic Engagements, Dempsey Says,” Joint Chiefs of
Staff, April 24, 2013, http://www.jcs.mil/newsarticle.aspx?id=1132.
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Military Alliances
to consolidate its sovereign claims over the islands.”33 Indeed, there are concerns
that miscalculation on the part of either country in the midst of elevated tensions
surrounding the islands and the U.S. rebalance to the Asia-Pacific region could
trigger an “accidental war.” A recent white paper released by the People’s
Liberation Army illustrates the danger, stating that “some countries are
strengthening their Asia-Pacific military alliances, expanding military presence in the
region, and frequently making the situation there tenser.” 34
Despite these concerns, the Japan–U.S. alliance remains a cornerstone of
regional security, a point that Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel recently confirmed
when he said that “Strengthening our security alliance is also critical to achieving the
goal of the U.S. rebalance, enhancing prosperity and promoting peace and stability
in the region.” 35 Such pledges of enduring commitment are admirable; however, a
failure to act in the event of an armed conflict between Japan and China over the
Sankaku/Diaoyu Island group risks the loss of credibility on the part of the United
States, leading other allies to conclude that it will not fulfill its other mutual security
treaty obligations. This, in turn, could embolden potential adversaries and isolate
allies who might then feel compelled to engage other, more reliable, security
partners.
Georgia offers another example of the risks associated with collective
defense arrangements and potential conflict. A major issue associated with
Georgia’s potential membership in NATO concerns Article 5 of the Washington
Treaty: would NATO actually come to the country’s defense in the event of an
attack by an adversary? This is one of the reasons why, despite President Mikheil
Saakashvili’s efforts to join NATO that were intensified after the Russian attack
against Tbilisi in August 2008, the alliance has been hesitant to allow Georgia as a
member. Perhaps to curry favor with the United States and NATO, Georgia has
committed military forces to Iraq and is currently the largest non-NATO troop
contributing nation to the ISAF operation in Afghanistan. 36
Unfortunately, it is clear that the prospect of Georgia’s joining the alliance
will only exacerbate relations with Russia, which seeks to halt NATO’s eastward
expansion that began in the 1990s and also believes that Georgia’s membership only
“encourages the Georgian authorities in their efforts to seek revenge” for the 2008
Paul Smith, “The Senkaku/Diaoyu Island Controversy: A Crisis Postponed,” Naval War
College Review, Spring 2013, p. 40.
34 Anna Mulrine, “US General aims to ease China’s concerns over Obama’s ‘pivot’ to Asia,”
Christian Science Monitor, April 23, 2013,
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Military/2013/0423/US-general-aims-to-ease-China-sconcerns-over-Obama-pivot-to-Asia.
35Yasushi Azuma, “Hagel vows defense commitments to Japan, including nuclear umbrella,”
Kyodo News, April 30, 2013, http://english.kyodonews.jp/news/2013/04/222447.html
36 For a list of ISAF troop contributing nations, see http://www.isaf.nato.int/troopnumbers-and-contributions/index.php.
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attack. 37 Karl-Heinz Kamp has categorized Russia’s continued attempts to pressure
NATO not to accept Georgia as a member as “some power play, arm wrestling and
arm twisting.”38 In response to Russia’s efforts, NATO Secretary General
Rasmussen has made clear that “It’s not for Russia to decide whether Georgia or
certain states in the future can join our alliance. It is for NATO and for Georgia to
decide.” 39 That said, while the alliance has agreed that Georgia will become a
member of NATO, the question of when this will occur remains unanswered at the
time of this writing.
Finally, one of the most contentious issues that alliances must contend with is
the use of national caveats, which are the restrictions that member states place on
how the organization can employ their forces. This challenge was highlighted in
Afghanistan, where some of these caveats posed a complex problem for the ISAF
commander’s campaign plan. Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Europe
General John Craddock said that such caveats “increase the risk to every service
member deployed in Afghanistan and bring increased risk to mission success” and
are also “a detriment to effective command and control, unity of effort and
command.” 40 While the adverse impact of these caveats may be mitigated through
robust communication with national capitals and deft operational planning, they
nevertheless remain a reality in modern coalition warfare.
The Alternatives: Coalitions of the Willing and Partnerships
Less formal security arrangements offer the advantage of greater flexibility
and largely avoid the criticisms of a “war by committee” approach that was on
display during the 1999 NATO Operation Allied Force. According to critics, the
requirement to achieve consensus resulted in a “gradualist” approach to the
bombing campaign in Kosovo, diminishing the effectiveness of the air strikes by
limiting the element of surprise and the set of targets. Retired Air Force General
Buster Glosson, who ran the air campaign in the 1991 Gulf War, said that “Their
plans require[d] the approval of the political arm of NATO, the military arm of
NATO and then officials in Washington. With all those bottlenecks, the chance of
success is small.” 41
Statement from Alexander Lukashevich, spokesperson for the Russian Foreign Ministry,
“Russia wary as Georgia cozies up to NATO,” RT.com, Sept. 10, 2012,
http://rt.com/politics/russia-nato-georgia-saakashvili-781/.
38 David Brunnstrom, “Russia, NATO in battle of wills over Georgia, Reuters, May 6, 2009,
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2009/05/06/us-nato-russia-relations-analysis-sbidUKTRE5452M920090506.
39 Kyiv Post, “Rasmussen: Russia cannot decide whether Georgia can join NATO,” Dec.
15, 2012, http://www.kyivpost.com/content/russia-and-former-soviet-union/rasmussenrussia-cannot-decide-whether-georgia-can-join-nato-317703.html.
40 Arnaud de Borchgrave, “Commentary: NATO Caveats,” UPI.com, July 10, 2009,
http://www.upi.com/Emerging_Threats/2009/07/10/Commentary-NATO-caveats/UPI47311247244125/.
41 Michael R. Gordon, “Crisis in the Balkans at NATO; Allies’ War by Consensus Limiting
Military Strategy,” New York Times, April 4,
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Military Alliances
Such criticisms were not lost on the George W. Bush administration, which
believed that formal military alliances were insufficient to successfully wage a
“global war on terror.” Zbigniew Brzezinski observed that, especially after 9/11,
the administration was convinced that in order “to protect America’s national
interests, the United States must have a free hand: The sovereign Gulliver must not
be tied down by feckless Lilliputians.”42 Perhaps Secretary Rumsfeld was addressing
this issue when he said that “Wars can benefit from coalitions of the willing, to be
sure. But they should not be fought by committee. The mission must determine the
coalition, and the coalition must not determine the mission. If it does, the mission
will be dumbed down to the lowest common denominator, and we can't afford
that.” 43
Karsten Jung argues that “Unlike ongoing membership in a security alliance
with a long and complicated history…participation in a coalition does not require
subscription to or acceptance of a general set of principles and values, but only a
pragmatic decision to make a concrete contribution to a clearly defined individual
effort.” She describes three factors that enable coalitions to more effectively cope
with an increasingly uncertain—and situational—security environment when
compared with standing alliances:
ʀ an issue-specific approach that allows for the development of
“custom-tailored responses” to individual threats and challenges.
The threshold for contributors is significantly lowered as each can
cooperate on one issue without having to agree on a variety of
others, and no future obligations are implied by present
agreements.
ʀ a “situational opt-in” that allows a case-by-case commitment of
relevant capabilities for the coalition, based on national interests.
ʀ a corollary “situation opt-out” that allows a case-by-case
alignment of compatible interests. 44
Secretary Rumsfeld captured the essence of this methodology when he said that
“We’re going to have different countries and different people in different countries
supporting us with respect to these [Global War on Terror] activities and possibly
1999,http://www.nytimes.com/1999/04/04/world/crisis-in-the-balkans-at-nato-allies-warby-consensus-limiting-military-strategy.html?pagewanted=all&src=pm .
42 Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Dilemma of the Last Sovereign, The American Interest, Autumn
2005, http://www.the-american-interest.com/article.cfm?piece=56 .
43 Secretary Rumsfeld on “21st Century Transformation” of U.S. Armed Forces, Department
of Defense, Jan. 31, 2002, http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=183.
44 Karsten Jung “Willing to Waning? NATO’s Role in an Age of Coalitions,” World Affairs
Journal, March/April 2012, http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/willing-or-waningnato%E2%80%99s-role-age-coalitions.
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not those…and that’s perfectly understandable. No one agrees with everybody all
of the time on everything.” 45 Additionally, this approach was codified in the 2002
National Security Strategy (NSS) that stated, “America will implement its strategies
by organizing coalitions—as broad as practicable—of states able and willing to
promote a balance of power that favors freedom.” 46 The NSS described these
coalitions as being central to confronting emerging transnational threats that include
terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda. This is important, as the emergence of
non-state actors with global reach requires an expansion of U.S. security
cooperation beyond its traditional allies.
The Obama administration continues to embrace this coalition partner
approach, as reflected in its 2010 NSS emphasizing “comprehensive engagement.”
In addition, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense states
that, “Across the globe we will seek to be the security partner of choice, pursuing
new partnerships with a growing number of nations…whose interests and
viewpoints are merging into a common vision of freedom, stability and
prosperity.” 47
Of course, a coalition of the willing is not a panacea and there are a number of
operational and strategic challenges to consider. In addition to the previously
discussed issues of free riders and national caveats, one of the most difficult hurdles
that a coalition must overcome is interoperability—the ability of diverse systems and
organizations “to operate in synergy in the execution of assigned tasks”—among its
members.48 This is no small task and requires a tremendous amount of effort even
in formal, standing alliances. Supreme Allied Commander Europe Admiral James
Stavridis has argued that “Multilateral coalitions built on an as-needed basis…have
no common doctrine for conducting military operations, no common capabilities or
command structure for quickly integrating national forces into a cohesive campaign,
and no standing mechanisms for debating and then deciding on an agreed course of
action. Such ad hoc coalitions therefore almost always rely disproportionately on a
single nation to bear the brunt of security burdens that ideally should be more
equally shared.” 49 NATO has undertaken a deliberate and comprehensive
interoperability policy to address the technical (including hardware, equipment,
armaments and systems), procedural (including doctrine and procedures) and
human (including terminology and training) aspects of its operations.50
Another challenge facing ad hoc and temporary coalitions of the willing is
sustainability; specifically, how does a coalition maintain its cohesion (politically,
Ibid.
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America , The White House (Washington,
D.C., Sept. 2002), p. 25.
47 Department of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense,
Jan, 2012, p. 3.
48 The Joint Staff, Joint Publication 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and
Associated Terms (Washington, D.C., Nov. 8, 2010), p. 146.
49 James G. Stavridis and Ivo H. Daalder, “NATO’s Victory in Libya,” Foreign Affairs,
March/April 2012, p. 4.
50 “Interoperability: Connecting NATO Forces,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_84112.htm.
45
46,
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Military Alliances
military, and economically) during a prolonged military operation? One can
envision such a scenario in Syria—especially since NATO has no intentions to
intervene militarily in Syria 51—where a coalition of the willing created to remove the
Bashar al-Assad regime faces a more formidable challenge than NATO’s 2011
Operation Unified Protector in Libya that Admiral Stavridis called a “model
intervention.” 52 This is because of Syria’s geopolitical location in the Levant and
the country’s sectarian divisions that could lead to a wider regional war, as well as a
professional and more capable Syrian military. For instance, a coalition of the
willing would be required, at a minimum, to establish and enforce a no-fly zone
intended to neutralize Syria’s air power, help alleviate violence against the civilian
population, and assist the opposition forces. Commenting on the difficulty of
accomplishing these tasks in Syria, General Dempsey observed that, "The air
defense picture in Libya is dramatically different than it is in Syria...Syria has five
times more air defense systems, some of which are high-end systems, that is to say
higher altitude, longer range." He went on to assess that “The U.S. military has the
capability to defeat that system, but it would be a greater challenge, and would take
longer and require more resources" than in Libya. 53 Would the coalition be willing
to accept the potential loss of aircraft and pilots? What about the introduction of
coalition ground troops in a lengthy ground war that includes the possible use of
chemical weapons? Such questions are difficult enough for a standing alliance to
address, let alone an ad hoc coalition of the willing.
An “All of the Above” Approach to Collective Security and Collective Defense
Despite the rise of non-state actors and asymmetric, transnational threats, one
cannot dismiss the requirement to deter and, if necessary, defeat state actors in
“traditional” conflicts where formal military alliances offer distinct operational and
strategic advantages. Consequently, the United States is unlikely to withdraw from
its current formal security arrangements anytime soon. That said, it seems clear that
more flexible approaches vis-à-vis collective security and collective defense are
required in today’s international security environment where challenges are complex
and rapidly changing.
One way to achieve greater flexibility is to refocus and adapt standing alliances
to address contemporary security challenges. For example, Tetrais observes that
“bilateral alliances forged in the fight against communism have found a new
purpose.” For instance, Thailand and the Philippines, which were U.S. allies during
Carlo Munoz, “NATO balks at military intervention in Syria,” The Hill, March 27, 2013,
http://thehill.com/blogs/defcon-hill/policy-and-strategy/290589-nato-balks-at-militaryintervention-in-syria-.
52 Stavridis and Daalder, “NATO’s Victory in Libya,” p. 2.
53 Paul D. Shinkman, “Dempsey: Syrian No-Fly Zone Wouldn’t Work,” US News & World
Report, April 30, 2013, http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2013/04/30/dempseysyrian-no-fly-zone-wouldnt-work.
51
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the Cold War, have become key U.S. partners in the fight against terrorism in Asia. 54
Despite the prediction of skeptics that NATO could not survive the end of the Cold
War, the alliance continues. Admiral Stavridis argues that the NATO operation in
Libya demonstrates “that the alliance remains an essential source of stability.” 55
Nonetheless, he recognizes that NATO needs to address a number of shortfalls in
order to retain its future relevance.
One initiative designed to accomplish this goal is the 2010 NATO Strategic
Concept, Active Engagement, Modern Defense, which outlines three essential tasks
necessary to enable to alliance to meet the evolving set of challenges: 1) collective
defense in accordance with Article 5 of the Washington Treaty; 2) crisis
management that employs a mix of political and military tools to manage developing
crises before they escalate into conflicts, stop ongoing conflicts that affect alliance
security, and help consolidate post-conflict stability; and 3) cooperative security
through partnership with countries and other international organizations. 56 The
alliance is also examining ways to pool and share military capability under its Smart
Defense initiatives, something that is essential in today’s fiscally austere
environment. 57
However, the uncertain and increasingly situational nature of the current
international security environment will continue to demand ad hoc and temporary
coalitions and partnerships. Given this trend, it is difficult to envision an expansion
of U.S. formal collective defense arrangements in the future. Thus, an holistic
approach to collective security that includes formal alliances and coalition partner
arrangements is likely to exist for the foreseeable future. In fact, Sustaining U.S.
Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense directs that “U.S. forces will plan to
operate whenever possible with allied and coalition forces,” while emphasizing the
importance of building partner capacity (whether as part of a formal alliance, a
coalition of the willing, or on a bilateral basis) in order to share “the costs and
responsibilities of global leadership.” 58
The future of alliances and collective security remains an intriguing debate with
significant strategic implications. On one hand, Winston Churchill’s famous
observation that “There is only one thing worse than fighting with allies, and this is
fighting without them” speaks to the enduring value of standing alliances. On the
Bruno Tertrais, “The Changing Nature of Military Alliances,” The Washington Quarterly,
Spring 2004, p. 138.
55 Stavridis and Daalder, “NATO’s Victory in Libya,” p. 2.
56 “Active Engagement, Modern Defense: Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of
Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization,” North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
Nov. 2010, pp. 7-8, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-37B6827441CBB1D2/natolive/topics_84268.htm?.
57 Smart Defense, North Atlantic Treaty Organization,
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&frm=1&source=web&cd=1&sqi=2
&ved=0CC4QFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nato.int%2Fcps%2Fen%2Fnatolive%2F7
8125.htm&ei=qCaAUdXeNse24AOKpICACQ&usg=AFQjCNGrYveiJCWz0KzbVF26Mb
dEm3KwCQ&bvm=bv.45645796,d.dmg .
58 Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, Department of Defense,
Jan. 2012, pp. 3-4.
54
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Military Alliances
other hand, some have argued that the “the end of alliances” is near because, given
the uncertain nature of the contemporary security environment, they have outlived
their usefulness. Senior U.S. national security leadership face some difficult choices
as they formulate strategy and determine the number and types of collective security
arrangements the nation will require to secure its national interests in
the future.
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