Education and State Control in Turkey and Iran: Playing the Same
Game, Following the Same Rules
Kismet El Husseiny, Support Teacher at El Alsson International
School
[email protected]
Introduction
The Rise of Secularism
Both Turkey and Iran were greatly exposed to the western world through the
encroachment and retraction of empires, especially in the 19th and early 20th centuries.
This exposure has led to a form of modernization in both countries. This also led both
countries to seek the development of their respective educational systems, mainly in
order to modernize their armies to protect their empires against external threats. Many
scholars described this process as ‘defensive modernization’.
Accordingly, schools and institutions providing technical areas of study during this
time were secular, rather than theological, to serve the military and bureaucracy of the
state. This need for ‘defensive modernization’ led, in both countries, to the hiring of
European instructors to transfer modern knowledge into national educational
institutions, and to sending local students to study in Europe (Syzliowicz, 1969).
The resulting increasing influence of western ideology led reformists in Turkey and
Iran during the 1920s onwards to adopt the modern and secular form of Western
education. Such a move was also accompanied by the stripping of the two countries’
educational systems from any religious content, as it was seen to be an impediment to
the process of modernization (Syzliowicz, 1969).
School curricula were revised by the reforming governments to modernise and
secularise the content of all taught subjects. This spread of modern educational
institutions created an educational system which both paralleled and opposed
traditional religious methods (Syzliowicz, 1969). As a result, two educational systems
came to exist within each country. One of these systems propagated religious
ideology and was delivered to the masses, while the other propagated European
ideology and was usually delivered to the elite.
Kemalism
By 1923, the Ottoman Empire in Turkey had fallen and given way to the founding of
modern Turkey under the presidency of Mostafa Kemal (Ataturk)1. Ataturk, who
fervently sought to part ways with the empire’s traditional methods, viewed
secularism as a force with the ability to strengthen Turkey and propel it into
modernization. Therefore, in 1924, Ataturk began the secularization process with the
abolition of religious schools, and the placement of all educational institutions,
including foreign schools, under the control of the Ministry of Education such that
“all religious instruction in schools were put under the control of the state”
1 ‘Ataturk’ was the name given to Mostafa Kemal who was the leader of the Young Turks Movement. It’s direct meaning is ‘father or the Turks’. 1 (Syzliowicz, 1969, p.197). That way, the government believed, all children would
grow up to hold dear the concept of secularism and more importantly, nationalism.
Furthermore, the language reform that introduced the Latin alphabet to replace the
Arabic alphabet, which aimed to signal a complete break with the Ottoman past,
greatly restricted the spread of Islamic education.
Mohamed Reza Shah Similar to Kemalist ideology, when
Mohamed Reza became the of Iran in
1921, he took bold steps towards
modernizing the country. He founded a
national education system for the
earlier schooling levels that attempted
to curtail the power of the country’s
religious institutions, abolish religious
instruction from state schools, and
remove any religious
http://turkey.blogactiv.eu/2010/06/15/why-persist-in-calling-turkey’s-european-identity-into-question-israel-and-the-world/
The Shah was criticized by religious groups within Iran for introducing anti-religious
elements into school textbooks. One such example is a 1975 social science textbook,
which states that “as religion is mixed up with superstition, the people who are well
educated have ceased to hold religious beliefs” (Mohsenpour, 1988, p.79). However,
the modern educational system that was introduced in Iran was not as comprehensive
as its counterpart in Turkey and affected mostly the elite. The spread of modern
educational institutions such as schools and universities was also much slower than in
Turkey. Moreover, a large movement led by the clergy was created to counteract the
western ideological penetration, which they felt was being signalled into the country
by the Shah (Syzliowicz, 1969).
The Effects of Secularism
As a result of the increased secularism and inflow of western ideology into Turkey
and Iran, religious groups reacted2 in strong opposition to the governments’ attempts
to modernize, adopt Western cultures of authority, and separate religion from the
state. This type of governance was seen to be alien to the vast majority of the Muslim
citizens of Turkey and Iran (Guven, 2005).
Furthermore it is important to note that the shift towards secularism led to an abrupt
change in the power balances within the two countries. With the application of
secularist policies, professionals tied to religious institutions as well as the clergy,
found themselves stripped of their former power, influence, and economic comfort.
Consequently, those who were harmed by the enforcement of secularism, often led
the struggle for Islamic resurgence in both countries.
2
This form of reaction was later described by the more expressive term ‘Political Islam’.
2 The Struggle for the Rise of Islam’s Influence in Turkey
In the years following Ataturk’s strong movement towards secularization, Islam
embracing groups continued to work mostly underground, and were able to build
alliances with other political parties such as the Democratic Party, which came to
power in 1950 and ruled until 1961. By that date, the constitution was readapted to
include an article, which proclaims that everyone is free in his/her own religious
beliefs. However, it was not until Necermetin Erbakan founded the National Order
Party (NOP) in 1970 that Islamic political principles were openly announced,
campaigned for, and promoted as a party’s political platform (Guven, 2005) (Zurcher,
2004). The increase in freedom for Islamic groups to proliferate their ideas led to
exhibitions of the many varying interpretations of Islam that each of the existing
groups held. Accordingly, it became increasingly difficult to control all of these
different groups, thereby creating a threat to the maintenance of state unity and
Kemalist nationalism.
The abrupt and radical secularist movement led by Ataturk, had led to the polarization
of the Turkish society largely into the proponents of secularism, and the more
religious masses. There was also a lack of communication between the two poles, and
the creation of a threatening image of the ‘other’. This societal divide caused a violent
increase in tensions between the two groups bringing the country to the brink of civil
war. It was not until 1980, when a bloodless military coup took place, serious
attempts to reconcile the views of the Islamists and the secularists were initiated.
By 1983, the new political
system, which was overseen by
the largely secular military,
also saw a strengthening of the
importance of the Islamic
movement. The new power
structure in Turkey led to the
creation of a novel ideological
concept, the “Turkish Islamic
Synthesis”, which attempts to
reconcile between Turkish
nationalism and the Islamic
community (Guven, 2005)
(Kurt, 2010). Finally, in 2002,
the Justice and Development
http://www.google.com.eg/imgres?q=photo+school+children+iran&um=1&hl=en&client=safari&rls=en&biw=1103&bih=706&tbm=isch&tbnid=HJdteFpB6-_BQM:&imgrefurl=http://iranpoliticsclub.net/photos/rezashah/pages/Reza%2520Khan%2520%26%2520children%2520%40%2520school_jpg.htm&docid=fni_UZ530u2MsM&imgurl
party (AK), a party with mild Islamic references, came to power after succeeding at
the elections (Smith, 2005). It became noticeable afterwards that Turkey had
witnessed a significant resurgence of the Islamic movement. The significance that
Islam held within the contemporary Turkish society was embodied in the acceptance
of Islam as a resource for educational policy, the allowing of Islamic scholarly
activity in book writing and in holding seminars and discussions, and the appointment
of Islamic scholars as advisors to ministers, as heads of universities, and as academic
staff (Guven, 2005).
3 The Reaction Against Secularization and Europeanization in Iran
Similar to the perception in Ataturk’s Turkey, many in Iran, especially those who
more strictly adhered to Shi’ite beliefs, viewed the Shah’s regime to be extremely
hostile against Islam (Mohsenpour, 1988). During the reign of the Shah, in 1938, the
increase in the number of private schools was claimed by the proponents of the
Islamic revolution to have been used as a method of creating an elite class that was
educated in a western way (Mohsenpour, 1988). They saw that the methods used in
the Shah’s modern educational system encouraged children to adopt alien western
values. Some have even gone further to claim that the education policies under the
Shah’s rule aimed to spread atheism, weaken students’ religious beliefs, and even
propagate polytheistic teachings. The pre-revolution curricula were also criticised for
presenting the monarchy as the only viable political system (much as the current
Islamic government presents itself in school textbooks today (Mohsenpour, 1988).
The Evolution of Educational Provision
In both countries, the educational systems and curricula came to include more
religious and Islamic content over time, be it abruptly, as was the case in Iran post the
1979 revolution, or more gradually as was the case in Turkey. The difference in the
extent of Islamic influence over education policies in Turkey and Iran, may be owed
to the differences in the strengths of the political forces present in each of the two
countries. Whereas Ataturk was able to build a large constituency of fervent secular
nationalists in Turkey, Mohamed Reza Shah was not as successful, as his secular
constituency was limited to an elite minority. Accordingly, in Turkey the rise of
Islamic influence was met with fierce opposition from the large secularist base that
led to the reaching of a compromise in ideology from both sides, which was reflected
in the educational policies and curricula. Meanwhile, the Islamic movement was able
to gain a strong hold of Iranian political life, which was reflected in post 1979
educational policies and curricula.
The Slow Emergence of Islam in Turkish Education
For many years after the spread of Kemalism and the secularisation of the state, any
form of religious education was entirely banned from the Turkish educational system.
It was not until 1949, when after much controversy and debate at the National
Assembly, religious studies were permitted in the fourth and fifth grades of state
primary schools, and a Faculty of Divinity established at Ankara University.
Furthermore, during the decade of rule of the Democratic Party (1950-1961), the
government introduced religious education in secondary schooling (Guven, 2005),
which was further extended in the early 1960s to be included into the curricula of the
first and second grades of middle school (Guven, 2005). By this time the concept of
“Turkish-Islamic Synthesis” was on the rise and became a key and dominant element
in the Turkish education system from 1984 to 1989. By the end of the 1980s, there
were more religious high schools in Turkey than there were technical vocational high
schools (Guven, 2005). Yet it is apparent that the reforms that have taken place
maintain government provision of such religious education. As such, the government
tried to ensure that only its version and interpretation of Islamic education will be
taught. Some scholars and political analysts consider this range of freedom to have
been provided by the army to the Islamic groups as a tactical move to secure these
groups’ support for the regime, and to keep religious education under the control and
surveillance of the government (Guven, 2005).
4 Nonetheless, secular nationalists in Turkey have been even more worried since the
beginning of the new millennium, by the permeation of Islam into school textbooks
since the AK party took power. Examples of such permeation can be exemplified by
the removal of Darwin’s theory of evolution and its replacement by the concept of
Creationism. In all cases, it has become apparent to modern Turkish governments that
the “Kemalist Straightjacket” no longer fits modern Turkey Therefore, these
governments are in a search to find ways to reconcile Islam, which the vast majority
of the Turkish population adhere to, with modernity (The Economist, 2008).
The Islamic Indoctrination of Iran
In Iran the change in educational policies was less smooth. Abruptly, following the
Iranian revolution in 1979, many school cultures changed, such as the morning
national salutes, which were replaced by reciting Quranic verses, and prayers for the
victory of Muslims (Mohsenpour, 1988). The revolution as such, was seen to be the
process of “resocializing the Iranians to Islamic ideals” (Shorish, 1988, p.60). The
post revolution theocratic government quickly revised and altered the school curricula
in order to implant Islamic ideals and values that were believed to belong to the dawn
of Islam (Shorish, 1988). All curricula, from history to sciences, were revised in order
to remove all secular content, and replace it with Islamic content that reinforces the
ideological base of the Islamic Republic of Iran (Mohsenpour, 1988). School
textbooks are currently filled with political symbolism to represent the great
personalities in Islam, the current leaders of Iran, and the victory of the Islamic
revolution over the assumingly atheist monarchy of the Shah (Shorish, 1988). In
reality, both the Shah and the current Iranian leaders’ representation in textbooks have
almost the exact same purpose politically, which is to build feelings of loyalty and
submission towards the leaders, as well as patriotism among students (Mohsenpour,
1988).
Very similar to the recent government attitude towards Islam in Turkey, the Iranian
government also goes to great lengths in order to propagate and establish a certain
understanding of Islam. The aim of the post 1979 educational policies in Iran was to
consistently reinforce Islam in student curricula, in order to Islamize the people of
Iran (Shorish, 1988). There are furthermore two major interwoven themes in Iranian
textbooks, which are religion and patriotism. The textbooks in Iran also stress the
importance of the prophets and imams as God’s representatives on earth. By
deduction, according to such texts, those mentioned imams would include the political
leadership in Iran (Shorish, 1988). Therefore, it becomes very difficult to separate
support for the Iranian leadership and faithfulness to God. Pressure continuously
exists to consider loyalty to the leadership as equivalent to loyalty to God (Shorish,
1988).
Conclusion
The two countries researched in this essay share a common history of exposure to the
West, followed by a strong movement towards modernization and secularization. Yet
although each country seemingly took a different path of political evolution, many
similarities exist between the two countries today. Indeed, governments of both
Turkey and Iran shared, in essence, the goals and used similar tools to reach these
goals. Both governments have tried, and continue to try, to maintain sovereignty and
national unity through the implementation of educational policies especially with
5 regards to religious education, and the modification of religious content in national
curricula.
It is also interesting to note that the changes in state ideology in both Turkey and Iran,
from Islam to secularism and back to Islam once again, have always been directly
reflected in the shifting policies that governed public educational systems and the
contents of national curricula. As such, educational policies can be seen to mirror the
political struggles for power in both countries and the quests for state hegemony.
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