January
17
Putinism:theflipsideofthecoin
OcéaneCrabbé
RussianPolitics(S0B74a)–ProfessorKatlijnMalfliet
Introduction
Putinism as a political regime is at the heart of heated arguments among scholars and
politicians. A major gap has formed between positive and negative interpretations of
Putinism, which are being further exacerbated through the media. On the one hand, Putinism
is depicted as a violent authoritarian regime with rampant corruption and an aggressive
foreign policy1. On the other hand, Putinism is also presented as an alternative to the “failing”
liberal democracies of the West. Arguments against Putinism are well known in the dominant
Western discourses, along with the idea that Russia is a mystery too great for us to
comprehend. However, one aspect of Putinism often overlooked is the way it is being
portrayed in other parts of the world and within Russia itself, where a more positive image
prevails.
Michel Eltchaninoff identified three pillars to Putinism: conservatism, the “Russian way”, and
Eurasianism (Ferenczi: 2015). Conservatism is promoted in order to avoid “Western
decadence” justified by the fact that Western societies have lost touch with Christianity and
collective values. Rather than following in the footsteps of the West, Russia should follow its
own path, incarnated in the second pillar. This path is notably related to the idea of
“panslavism” and the historical opposition between Slavophiles and Westernizers in 19th
century Russia (Malfliet: 2016). Finally, the third pillar rests on the creation of a “greater
Russia”, which includes organizations such as the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), the
Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), or the CIS. Another Russian specialist,
Françoise Thom, argues that the basis of Putinism is to be found in the Stalinist ideology,
which implies that Putinism is in fact not exclusive to Vladimir Putin himself (Ferenczi:
2015).
The aim of this paper is to analyse facets of Putinism that are not captured in the traditional
Western discourse, which mainly reflects a negative image. Putinism seems to always be
defined in complete opposition to Western ideologies or models, and give the impression that
the latter is bound to prevail in a post-modern world. However, Putinism does not have the
same image everywhere, and certainly not within Russia itself. Whether for economic or
identity reasons, some countries, notably in the post-Soviet space, see Russia as a more viable
alternative than the West. Against this backdrop, the aim of this paper is to understand the
facets of Putinism that give it a positive image, both domestically (section 1) and abroad
(section 2). The last section of this paper will then analyse whether Putinism reflects general
characteristics of Russian politics or if it can be attributed exclusively to President Putin
himself. Finally, some conclusions will be drawn about this very intriguing aspect of
Putinism: how a single regime can generate such a perception-gap between societies in the
Eurasian continent.
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The cover of The Economist (22nd of October 2016) shows a very dark Putin against a bright red
background with red Russian-made fighter jets in his eyes, under the title “Putinism”.
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1. Domesticpolicy
According to the Levada Centre, Vladimir Putin had an approval rating of 84% in
December 2016. In fact, this rating hasn’t been lower than 80% since March 2014 (Levada
Center: 2016). Kuzio explains that an important aspect of Putin’s regime is propaganda, used
both to mobilize domestic support (pro-Russian propaganda) and to marginalize opponents,
foreign-funded NGOs and enemies (anti-West propaganda) (Kuzio: 2016, p.5).
First, pro-Russian propaganda aims at giving people within the country a better image of their
government. One major tool to achieve this is Vladimir Putin’s personality cult. The President
has built an image of leader around himself that seems to be widely accepted by the public.
According to Nikolski, Putin legitimizes his regime efficiently by mobilizing traditional
ideals rooted in the collective imaginary, which make him come off as a “good tsar”2. These
ideals are based on a balance between the image of a powerful and manly leader, for example
through pictures of him riding a horse shirtless, and that of a president who is close to his
people and can answer their needs, for example through the establishment of the “Direct
Line”3 (Nikolski: 2010, p.201). Additionally, Putin takes advantage of the Direct Line to
remind the Russian people of the greatness of their country by answering questions from
citizens in Kaliningrad or Sebastopol (Nikolski: 2010, p.205). Another simple reason for
Putin’s popularity is that he was able to find solutions that stabilized the country after the
Yeltsin years, for example through his policies of “verticalization” of power. According to
Sakwa, these solutions “may not have been ideal from the perspective of democratic theory,
but they allowed a stabilization of the political order” (Sakwa: 2008, p.882). However, a
significant part of this success can be attributed to the favourable economic climate, notably
the rise in global oil prices, at the time of his accession to presidency.
Secondly, anti-Western propaganda relates directly to Eltchaninoff first pillar of Putinism:
conservatism. In order to make the Russian government look better at home, propaganda is
directed against its enemies, in this case the West. Kanet calls confrontation with the West “a
useful stimulant” for nationalism and domestic support (Kanet: 2015, p.519). One tool
frequently used in the last couple of years is the depiction of the West as being responsible for
the Maidan revolution in Ukraine, the 5-day war in Georgia, or any secessionist movement in
the post-Soviet sphere that destabilizes Russian control over this region. Another tool is the
“Foreign Agent Law”, by which Western-funded or Western-influenced organizations are
obliged to bear a “Foreign Agent” label to discredit their work. As a consequence, Russians
see the influence from abroad as being destabilizing for the regime (Malfliet: 2016). Whether
as a result of this propaganda or simply because of inherent Russian identity, “71% of
Russians share the conviction that Russia has a completely different civilization” (Malfliet:
2013; p.77).
Putinism uses both types of propaganda to portray the regime in a positive light. However, it
is important to keep in mind that where we see propaganda, Russian people simply see
mainstream media. The problem with the propaganda terminology is that it is often related to
authoritarian-like regimes. With no intention of glorifying the Russian regime, one must not
forget that Western media is not devout of subjectivism either, especially when it comes to
portraying Russia. In economic terms for instance, Alexander Milyutin, chief of the
Economics section of the Russian embassy in Belgium, explains that the Russian economy
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3
“Bon tsar”
Created by Putin himself
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has proved very resilient to sanctions and the decrease in global oil prices. Indeed, despite
these obstacles, Russia remains “among the 10 countries of the world with the lowest
government debt and the highest gold and currency reserves” (Milyutin: 2016). On the same
subject, The Economist prefers to highlight that in recent years, “the Russian economy has
descended into Soviet-era stagnation” (The Economist: 2016, p.4). There is truth in both
statements, but the message that will be internalized by the public depends on the elements
that are being put forward. The main argument here is that regardless of the facts, both
Russian and Western publics may be convinced that their respective media is objective, and in
the end truth is only a matter of perception.
2. Foreignpolicy
According to Latsa, Russia’s image is mostly only negative in the West, where the
political orientation of the dominant media is under profound influence of Washington (Latsa:
2016). In other parts of the world, Russia’s image is not necessarily negative, at least not
more so than the image of Europe or the USA for instance. In the same vein as Eltchaninoff’s
third pillar (Eurasianism), this section will analyse the place of Putinism in the post-Soviet
space.
The first element used to legitimize Russian foreign policy is the protection of compatriots.
Compatriots are people that come from the same Fatherland, who are part of the Russian
civilization (Russkii Mir) (Malfliet: 2016). When these compatriots happen to be minorities in
Russia’s neighbouring countries, Russia has proven that it is willing to violate territorial
integrity of the latter in order to protect them. This was the justification offered by Russia for
the 5-day war in Georgia, where the Abkhaz minority was being persecuted, or the annexation
of Crimea, inhabited by a majority of Russian-speakers. Regardless of whether these
interventions were actually motivated by identity interests or if they were simply items on a
wider geopolitical agenda, the message that Russia sends to “compatriots” everywhere is very
clear: it will do whatever it takes to protect them. This results in a very positive image of
Russia among minorities in the post-Soviet space, whether they identify as Russian or not,
because Russia is able to provide them with basic rights that the country they live in ignores.
The idea behind the protection of compatriots is ultimately to build nationhood within the
post-Soviet space. Nationhood refers to the collective idea of being together (sobornost)
rather than simply bringing together individual interests (Malfliet: 2016). This concept blurs
the distinction between domestic and foreign policy, because it encompasses bringing
together different ethnicities within the Russian Federation as well as bringing together
compatriots within the broader post-Soviet space. Moreover, nationhood is an element of
identity that models collective interests, which in turn will be reflected in the foreign policy of
Russia (whether Russia is understood in the strict sense or in the more general “Greater
Russia” sense).
Another positive image of Putinism abroad has to do with the economic support that Russia
offers to post-Soviet countries. Through the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) for instance,
these countries are drawn closer to Russia and away from the Western sphere of influence.
Whereas the EU’s Eastern Partnership and Partnership and Cooperation Agreements combine
economic development with the promotion of values such as democracy, rule of law and
human rights, the Russian-steered EAEU doesn’t come with such conditions and is often seen
as more effective. An example is the sudden adhesion of Armenia to the EAEU in 2013,
sacrificing its Association Agreement with the EU in the process. In the same vein, it is
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important to take into account the important economic ties that Russia still has with some of
the countries in the post-Soviet space. Popescu explains that as a result of the important
migratory flows of workers between Russia and its neighbours, “large parts of their GDP
depend on remittances from Russia as well. And that is perhaps the single most important
thing that makes them very wary of alienating and upsetting Russia over the EEU” (Popescu:
2014, p.22). Adding the energy factor to this equation only enhances dependency on Russia,
although some oil-rich countries like Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan are rising as independent
players in this field.
However, it can be argued that economic dependence cannot be equated with regime
legitimacy. According to Popescu, post-Soviet States are actually trying to extract as many
concessions from Russia as possible while also trying to avoid complete domination
(Popescu: 2014, p.20). As far as Russia’s interests are concerned, Kanet sees a clear link
between economic revival and foreign policy: “once the Russians had rebuilt their domestic
economy and decided to focus on re-establishing their dominant role in former Soviet space
rather than integrating into Europe, they had clear advantages in competing with the West”
(Kanet: 2015, p.518).
3. Putin’sRussiaorRussia’sPutin?
Despite it being called “Putinism”, it can be argued that the current Russian regime is not
just built around Putin himself but is actually a reflection of a general Russian identity and
political culture. The two sections above highlighted four tools mobilized to legitimize the
Russian regime: pro-Russian propaganda, anti-Western propaganda, compatriotism and
economic incentives. The following paragraphs will analyse to what extent these tools are
exclusive to Putin’s presidency.
The first section examined how pro-Russian propaganda can take the form of a personality
cult built around the leader. In this respect, it can be argued that the icon of leadership belongs
to the political culture of Russia, and that citizens are used to recognizing this icon, which
was built throughout history. This means that Putin simply stepped into that icon of
leadership: he became a leader because people needed one. Who he is as a person becomes
almost irrelevant, because the idea of leader is detached from the individual person (Malfliet:
2016). This idea is confirmed by Kuzio, according to whom Putin’s regime “will not
fundamentally change if Putin were to be replaced because a consensus exists among
Russians for their country to act, and be recognized as a great power” (Kuzio: 2016, p.8).
However, it is undeniable that Putin was able to use the leadership concept that already
existed to his advantage and devoted special attention to it.
The second tool examined was anti-West propaganda and the idea that Russia must follow its
own path. According to Kuzio, “Putin follows in a long line of Russian nationalists stretching
back to the 1917 revolution who believe the West […] are seeking to break apart two
branches of the ‘Russian people’” (Kuzio: 2016, p.6). Putin is not the first to present the
Russian regime in opposition to prevalent Western regimes. In fact, the basis of the Cold War
was a clash of ideologies between East and West. However, the “anti-West” sentiment that
seems to be resurgent today is not intrinsic to Russian history and identity. Starting with Peter
the Great introducing Westernization policies to Medvedev seeing the West as an example to
follow, Russian leaders have not always been antagonistic to the West. Therefore, while this
facet of Putinism has not been recurrent throughout history, it is clear that Putin managed to
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mobilize Russians’ sense of honour and status against Western discourses that undermined
Russia’s place in the international system (Kanet: 2015, p.506). This became more evident in
his third mandate, after the West failed to grant Russia the “special status” it demanded.
Thirdly, Putinism is also characterized by the idea that Russia is a protector of compatriots all
over the post-Soviet space. According to Blank, similar tactics of legitimization of the regime
date back to Peter The Great, who used Orthodoxy as a unifying factor (Blank, cited in Kuzio:
2016, p.3). The Soviet Union’s nationalities policy was also aimed at keeping the country
together and tried to make all individuals feel that they were Soviet citizens before being
Russians, Ukrainians, Tajiks, etc. However, it can be argued that this policy did the opposite
in institutionalizing ethnic awareness through its rather arbitrary delimitation of republics.
Compared to Yeltsin or Medvedev, Putin has shown particular interest in addressing the
“nationalities question” more efficiently and trying to bring back the idea that citizens in the
post-Soviet space all belong to a “Greater Russia”. This was perceived notably through his
recentralization policies aimed to “restore the authority of the State” (Sakwa: 2008, p.887).
Finally, Putin’s policy towards Central Asia, the Caucasus and Eastern Europe is difficult to
compare to other Russian leaders because the context has radically changed over history.
According to Pertsev, “the Russia of Yeltsin, Putin [first and second mandate] or now
Medvedev couldn’t develop a clear and comprehensive policy in Central Asia” (Pertsev),
while today Putin’s foreign policy towards these countries is more assertive and combines
economic and security reforms (EAEU and CSTO). The EAEU only became effective in
2015, and analysts already point to the fact that it is Putin’s personal project before being a
common Eurasian initiative.
Conclusion
The reason Russia is often perceived as being undecipherable is that it has always
been in between: in between Europe and Asia, in between individualism and collectivism, in
between centralization and federalism, in between free economy and patrimonialism. Another
way of looking at Russia is to conceive as being both concepts rather than in between two
concepts. Like the double-headed eagle on its coat of arms, Russia is looking in both
directions in order to find its typical place in the world. In the same vein, Putinism can also be
understood as a mix of seemingly opposite concepts, as a double-sided coin.
This paper offered a brief analysis of the side of the coin that is not often portrayed in the
dominant Western discourse: the side that shines a positive light on Russia. Through both proregime and anti-Western propaganda, the protection of compatriots everywhere and economic
incentives, Putinism has proven to be a valuable asset for Russia to sustain itself in the world.
In many ways, Putinism is the result of Vladimir Putin picking-and-choosing from historical
narratives and values to put together a new political project that will give Russia back its
greatness. In other words, it is both Putin’s Russia and Russia’s Putin.
In Sakwa’s words, Putin’s statism “carried both a positive and a negative charge” (Sakwa:
2008, p.886). My recommendation for the understanding of Putinism, and Russia in general,
is twofold: to adopt a more nuanced picture than the one prevalent in Western discourse; and,
in line with a constructivist perspective, to take into account the role played by the perception
of a particular regime, in this case Putinism.
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