Rafael Varón Gabai. Francisco Pizarro and His Brothers: The

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Reviews of Books
crisis, specific to Cochabamba, deepened prewar tendencies toward fragmentation.
Farmers also protested against land taxes based on
pre-slump valuations and against higher freight costs
on the Cochabamba-Altiplano railway than on the
cheaper track from Argentina. Pressures to equalize
freight charges were resisted, as the La Paz government needed cheap grain for the Altiplanic mining
cities in order to keep wages down (many mineworkers
were Cochabamba migrants). Mill construction in the
valleys only began in 1929. But imported machinery
required imported materials, including grain types,
and Bolivia's dependence on imported flour continues
today, aggravated by "donations" from wheat-producing countries like the United States.
Jackson's univocal idea of modernization is disappointing: "The goals of Cochabamba farmers conflicted with the objectives of the modernizing liberal
state" (p. 123). There are several routes to modernity,
even liberal modernity, and a Hamiltonian version
current in Bolivia and elsewhere during the 1830s and
1840s sought national production for protected internal markets and export of surpluses to other economies. We need a fuller analysis of the institutional
constraints on price formation in early republican
marketplaces.
J ackson analyzes in depth the partition of specific
estates before 1953, but his title promises coverage of
420 years. The first 250 are given short shrift. His
understanding of pre-Hispanic land rights, particularly
complex in Cochabamba, is confused: the later agrarian structure is said to reflect colonial determinants
only. Indian labor services to Charcas encomenderos
are mistakenly said to disappear in 1550. Amalgamation of silver with mercury, Potosi's main refining
method after the 1570s, is wrongly described as "a
common technique used in Europe" (p. 40). Oruro's
population in 1670 is given as 70-80,000, although Ann
Zulawski's census-based estimate gives only 2743 Indian males in 1683 ("Forasteros y yanaconas: la mano
de obra en un centro minero en el siglo XVII," in
Olivia Harris, Brooke Larson, and Enrique Tandeter,
eds., La participaci6n indigena en [os mercados surandinos [1987]). Larson is said to use Indian migration to
Cochabamba (forasteros) as evidence for money rather
than labor rents, when her table shows competition for
labor beween Cochabamba estate owners and PotoS!
miners (p. 36, n.55; cf. Larson, pp. 100-101). Such
errors vitiate the early pages of this rather ungainly
book, whose impact is weakened through trying to
straddle too much.
TRISTAN PLATT
University of St. Andrews,
Scotland
RAFAEL VARON GABAI. Francisco Piza"o and His Brothers: The Illusion of Power in Sixteenth-Century Peru.
Translated by JAVIER FLORES ESPINOZA. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1997. Pp. xvi, 352. $34.95.
AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW
This carefully researched book presents a detailed
picture of the political and economic "empire" forged
by Francisco Pizarro and his kinsmen following their
invasion of the Inca Empire in 1532. Rafael Var6n
Gabai joins a growing list of scholars wishing to dispel
the myth of the conquistadors as ruthless soldieradventurers intent only on plunder and glory. Instead,
he has culled archival data from Europe, Peru, and
Bolivia indicating that the Pizarros intended the conquest largely as a family political and business enterprise. As a result of their hard-headed realism and
entrepreneurial acumen, the Pizarros amassed a huge
complex of indigenous labor and tax resources, estates,
mines, and commercial enterprises that dwarfed even
the impressive holdings of Fernando Cortes, the leader
of the earlier expedition to conquer Mexico. Moreover, in chronicling the rise and fall of the conquistador elite, Var6n has made an important contribution
to what he calls "future research on Hispanic and
Indian Peru" that manages "to assemble both worlds,
native and foreign" (p. 296).
In the first section of the book, Var6n outlines the
business and entrepreneurial dimension of the Spanish
invasion of the Andean world. He contends that the
main goal of the "company" founded by the Pizarros
and Diego de Almagro was to establish permanent
settlements and to exploit the fabled resources of the
Inca Empire. As a result, following the division of the
spoils gained after capturing the Inca ruler at Cajamarca, the invaders began utilizing the empire's
system of communication, tax collection, and storage
to plunder and control Andean resources. They also
forged political and kinship ties with dissident Andean
ethnic groups that provided pivotal support in the
ultimately successful campaign to overthrow the Inca
state. Then, the Pizarros used their political power to
alienate lands, to gain control over indigenous taxes
and labor, and to exploit highland silver and gold
mines. The ensuing civil wars among the conquistadors
largely revolved around disputes over access to political power and to Andean economic resources. In the
end, the death of Francisco Pizarro, ongoing strife
among the Spaniards, the outbreak of dangerous Andean resistance movements, and the assertion of royal
power in the Andes undermined and ultimately destroyed the political and economic power of the
Pizarro family in Peru.
In the second section of the study, Var6n provides a
painstaking reconstruction of the Pizarro's economic
empire. Francisco, Hernando, Juan, and Gonzalo
Pizarro-and their extended network of allies from
Extremadura-managed a vast network Of business
holdings. Initially, the encomienda (a grant issued to a
Spaniard, giving him the right to collect taxes and
often labor from a given number of indigenous polities) formed the center of these enterprises. Indeed,
Francisco Pizarro alone controlled grants that encompassed over 30,000 Andean charges. Building on the
labor and taxes provided by these indigenous groups,
the Pizarros also accumulated rich mines, particularly
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Latin America and the Caribbean
in Porco, and large estates producing wheat, maize,
and coca. The Pizarros reinforced their political and
economic power in Peru by cultivating powerful patrons at court, such as the wealthy and influential
Gaspar de Espinosa. Despite the chaos that enveloped
Peru after the assassination of Francisco Pizarro in
1541, Hernando managed to consolidate most of the
family's holdings by marrying his elder brother's mestiza daughter and principal heir, Francisca. The downfall of the Pizarros was assured, however, with the
rebellion of Gonzalo against the royally appointed
viceroy, Blasco Nunez Vela, in 1544. This defiance of
the royal prerogative destroyed the family's political
power at court and in Peru, leading ultimately to the
eclipse of their vast business empire during the viceregency of Francisco de Toledo (1569-1581).
Var6n has presented a vivid and compelling vision of
how the Pizarro family created and then lost the
tremendous political power and economic wealth that
it had gained by force of arms and entrepreneurial skill
after overthrowing the Inca Empire. Like all good
books, this study also raises important questions for
future research. How, for example, did the rise and
AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW
decline of the Pizarro empire in Peru parallel the
fortunes of other conquistadors in the heartland of the
former Inca Empire and in more peripheral zones,
such as Quito or Charcas? Moreover, how did the rise
of royal power both undermine the conquistador elite
and also empower a new class of merchants, bureaucrats, clergymen, and landowners? Finally, how did the
various indigenous groups (both allies and enemies)
respond to the rise and fall of the political and
economic fortunes of the Pizarros? In fairness, these
are all issues touched upon to some degree in this
book. In so doing, Var6n has provided a key building
block for future attempts to write studies of the period
that encompass the reciprocal contributions of both
Spaniards and Andeans to the formation of the new
colonial society that emerged atop the ruins of the Inca
Empire. This is a fine study in its own right, however,
which should also appeal to students of Latin America,
early modern business and economic historians, and
specialists in European colonization.
KENNETH J. ANDRIEN
Ohio State University
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1998