Armed Forces & Society OnlineFirst, published on April 7, 2010 as doi:10.1177/0095327X09358649
Army and Politics in the
Czech Republic Twenty Years
after the Velvet Revolution
Armed Forces & Society
XX(X) 1­–20
© 2010 Inter-University
Seminar on Armed Forces
and Society. All rights reserved.
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DOI: 10.1177/0095327X09358649
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Zdeněk Kříž1
Abstract
This article focuses on relations between army and politics in the Czech Republic
after the 1989 Velvet Revolution. This article concludes that these relations in the
Czech Republic achieved the parameters typical of consolidated democracies. The
many problems that continue to exist in this area in the Czech Republic do not in any
significant way deviate from what is typical of consolidated democracies. Therefore,
the transformation of civil–military relations can be regarded as successful.
Keywords
the Czech Republic, civil–military relations, transformation, the Velvet Revolution
In 2009 the Czech Republic commemorates the twentieth anniversary of the Velvet
Revolution, an event that led to the fall of communism at the turn of the 1990s. The
radical changes that were to come were ushered symbolically as early as the end of
1989 by the election of Václav Havel as president and by the declaration of the necessity to carry out fundamental reforms. That was the time when the former Czechoslovakia started the difficult process of transition from a totalitarian society of the Soviet
type to a standard liberal democracy with a market economy, a process that has been—
and is going to remain for some time to come—at the center of attention for many
researches. The aim of this case study is to gauge the results of the transformation of
civil–military relations in the Czech Republic and to find out whether these relations
achieved the parameters typical of consolidated democracies.1
Taking into account the above intention, it seems appropriate to use the ideal type
methodology, which best corresponds to the research aim, and the case study
1
Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Republic
Corresponding Author:
Zdeněk Kříž, Masaryk University, Department of International Relations and European Studies, Joštova 10,
602 00, Brno, Czech Republic
Email: [email protected]
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technique. In the first stage, categories of the ideal type of civil–military relations
between army and politics in consolidated democracy are defined. The available theoretical literature is used for the creation of a (working) ideal type.2 In the second stage,
the relations between army and politics in the Czech Republic are gauged according to
the ideal type. In the end of this article, the differences from the ideal type are revealed.
Despite the fact that in Western sociology and political science research into civil–
military relations has a long tradition that includes works of such authors as Samuel P.
Huntington, Morris Janowitz, Samuel E. Finer, and many others, researchers have to
deal with the problem of defining the ideal type of relations between army and politics
in a consolidated democracy.3 Even though the issue has been investigated for decades,
Western political science and sociology have not yet succeeded in creating a universally accepted ideal type. Nevertheless, it is at least possible to propose, on the basis
of the available literature, a working concept of the ideal type of relations between
army and politics in a consolidated democracy for the purposes of this article.
Civil–military relations in the Czech Republic differ in one important feature from
the situation in consolidated Western European democracies. The main distinction
rests in the fact that, in contrast to the West, Czech civil–military relations went
through a very dynamic transformation process, which also affected the relations
between army and politics, from the civil–military relations typical of countries ruled
by a communist party to the Western type.4 On the other hand, when comparing the
Czech Republic with the other Central (Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia) and
Eastern European (Ukraine) countries, we should note that the radical transformation
of civil–military relations was not a feature unique to this country. This civil–military
relations transformation was motivated by the desire of Czech political elites to establish a stable, standardized, and viable democracy. Another very important aspect was
the pressure exerted by NATO and the European Union because the Czech Republic
sought membership in these organizations.
The Ideal Type of Relations between Army and Politics
in Consolidated Democracies
Formal Relations between Military and Political Institutions
Robert Dahl concludes that even though democracy requires civil control of the military, civil control in itself is no guarantee of democratic control if the civil political
elites, in their turn, are not subject to a democratic process.5 No doubt Dahl is right
here. As history shows, civilian control of the military is not always democratic control. The military was under civilian control in both Nazi Germany and the Soviet
Union as well as in many other countries where communist parties held a monopoly
on power. Both Nazi and communist regimes were antidemocratic on principal. Therefore, the military was under civilian but not democratic control.
It follows from Dahl’s thesis that the subordination of the military to democratically legitimated political elites is the most important feature of the relations between
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army and politics in consolidated democracies. A precondition for that subordination,
as classic approaches to civil–military relations based on the work of Huntington
emphasize, is the separation of the civilian political sphere on one hand and the military sphere on the other hand. Both of these principles (separation of the political
sphere from the military and the subjection of the military to the political sphere) are
the starting points for the creation of a working ideal type of relations between army
and politics in a consolidated democracy.
Furthermore, if one accepts the idea of subordination of the military to the democratically legitimated politicians, it is clear that the military can participate in
decision-making processes only as an advisor. The military is not allowed to formulate
state policy. Beside, because of the division of power in democracy, it is also typical
of consolidated democracies for control over the military to be divided between civil
political authorities.
It can be also inferred from the thesis of the primacy of democratically legitimated
politicians with respect to the military that they should be entrusted with the command
of the armed forces. It is usual in consolidated democracies to give the function of the
commander in chief to a democratically legitimated, civilian, political person. Beside,
elected politicians decide who fills important positions in the top management of the
military.
With respect to the question of the importance of civil control for the consolidation
of democratic regimes, we should keep in mind that, as Larry L. Watts notes, “there is
great variation in the degree of civilian presence even among NATO member countries.”6 Even though the degree to which civilian control is necessary for a successful
democratic transformation is still a matter of discussion among sociologists and political scientists, most of whom give more importance to democratic control, it should be
noted that the armed forces of consolidated democracies are subjected to both of these
forms—civilian and democratic—of control.
The idea of subordination of military institutions to the democratically legitimated
political elites is closely connected to the issue of their loyalty. The question is to
whom the military is supposed to be loyal. In consolidated democracy, the military is
not usually obliged by the military oath to be loyal to a specific individual (e.g., the
fuehrer in Nazi Germany) or a specific group (e.g., the Communist Party in the former
Czechoslovakia and other communist countries in the past) but to the state or nation
represented by the political representation. This is in accordance with the concept of
armed forces as a neutral tool of the state, an instrument to be used by the political
elites who have gained power by democratic methods.
Legal Framework
In a consolidated democracy, civil–military relations are characterized by the existence of a clearly defined legal framework for the behavior of armed forces, which
also forms the basis for the relations between army and politics. Jurisdiction, authority, and the tasks of individual state institutions in relation to the military are usually
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delimited at a general level by the constitution of each democratic country. In peacetime, the military is not above the law but, as any other institution, has to conform to
the principles of the rule of the law.
Day-to-Day Relations between Military and Political Elites
in Consolidated Democracy: Consensus or Conflict?
Subordination of the military to the democratically legitimated political elites in consolidated democracies opens the question about the nature of day-to-day relations
between the military and political spheres. Huntington, on the basis of his research on
civil–military relation in the United States, warns that there is a cleavage between the
military, which is an expert at performing acts of state-organized violence, and the
civilian sphere, and this cleavage should produce inevitable tensions.7 Nevertheless, in
consolidated democracies, the conflict between political and military spheres is not
inevitable.8 Sam C. Sarkesian says, “The relationship between the military and society
is symbiotic. The perpetuation of the liberal democratic system is based on the partnership between the military and society.”9 Also, Rebecca L. Schiff believes that there
is a desire to establish a concordance among political elites, military elites, and the
citizens.10 Taking into account the experience gained in consolidated democracies, it
is possible to conclude that consensus about the principal orientation of the country is
the prevailing mode for the relationship between the political sphere and the military.
The separation of political institutions from the military is not a priory reason for the
existence of an inherent conflict between the civilian and military elements posing a
serious threat to the existence of a democratic regime.
Such a conflict, if it occurs, is a symptom of a crisis in civil–military relations; a
democratic society in which it occurs can hardly be regarded as consolidated. For
instance, the conflict between part of the French military and de Gaulle with respect to
the French colonial war in Algeria, which led to the infamous attempt at a military coup, is one example of such an antisystemic—and in a democracy generally
unacceptable—conflict. Military coups, their preparation, and politically motivated
appearances of the military in the public are unacceptable in consolidated democracies. They are considered to be symptoms of regime malfunction.
On the other hand, political and military elites often differ in their attitudes toward
many political problems. For example, the military usually tends to support policy of
rising military expenditures and tries to get as much national resources as possible.
Naturally, politicians usually resist such requirements. Such differences are common
and generally acceptable provided the military respects the dominant position of
elected politicians in the process of forming state policy in general and allocating
resources to defense in particular. Nevertheless, in consolidated democracy the military is not in a position to initiate an open battle for a rising military budget. If that
happens, it might also be a symptom of an incipient crisis in civil–military relations.
On one hand, in ideal consolidated democracy the military should not interfere in
political matters. On the other hand, in reality the military always has an influence on
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5
politics. There are a number of possibilities for soldiers to participate in political life.
As Sarkesian says, “In reality, the military is among other things a political institution
and does have influence and access do the political process through a variety of informal, as well as formal, channels.”11 The usual forms of the influence of the military on
politics in consolidated democracies include the use of professional military expertise
in providing advice to political elites and pushing the institutional interests of the
armed forces through lobbying to follow the common interests of the military institution. Nevertheless, the military is not an institution endowed with the authority to
make final decisions about the character of national security policy.
The priority of elected politicians in decision-making processes is an important
feature of civil–military relations in a consolidated democracy. It is equally important
that politicians not interfere in special military matters that are beyond their competence. Thus, in all democracies there is one basic, permanently controversial problem,
a problem that is being constantly redefined and new solutions to which are repeatedly
suggested: when implementing a policy, what is the competence of politicians, and
what falls within the powers and authority of the military?
Character of the Military
In consolidated democracies, soldiers are still citizens, which entails both certain
rights and duties on their part. The civic character of the military in consolidated
democracies seems often to be neglected in classic concepts of civil–military relations
that, building on theses of Huntington, assume as a principle the existence of conflict
between the civil and military components of society. On the other hand, the civil–
military relations equilibrium concept, developed by Sarkesian, makes it possible to
give sufficient attention to the civic identity of the military.12 Civic identity (even in
professional and voluntary armies) is what, in a consolidated democracy, establishes
the link between army and politics. In a democratic country, any violation of the principle of the civic identity of the military personal creates potential for conflict in civil–
military relations. The participation of soldiers, qua citizens, in the democratic political
process is an important socializing factor drawing soldiers into the life of society at
large and preventing them from forming a closed cast separated from the rest of society and rejecting its democratic principles.
Therefore, it has been established in consolidated democracies that soldiers (in
their capacity of citizens) should not be banned from participating in politics completely. They are usually allowed to vote and take part in political gatherings, provided
they are not dressed in uniform and the gathering takes place after their working hours.
Furthermore, they can have political opinions, and in some countries (e.g., in Germany) they can even be elected as independent candidates on ballots of political parties. In addition, it is quite common that military professionals try to push their interests
through membership in various profession associations. Even though such associations are usually not allowed to engage in certain forms of political activities (going
on strike, organizing demonstrations or public gatherings, political propaganda in the
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armed forces, etc.), they still have the right to negotiate their interests with the representatives of the political decision-making system and therefore, in this sense, have an
impact on political matters.
Type of Oversight of Security Policy and Military Institutions
In consolidated democracies, all aspects of relations between army and politics, no
matter whether they fall within the sphere of civilian political authorities or military
authorities, are subject to public oversight. They should also be to a certain degree
transparent. To determine the dividing line between what is public and what is not
public in military matters falls ultimately to the elected political representation.
The main instruments of public oversight include the mass media, independent controlling institutions, and the security community. The media in consolidated democracies play a significant role, and the same is true regarding oversight of the military. In
addition to the independent media, some consolidated democracies set up institutions
that are independent of the military and whose aim is to exercise oversight of the military. An example is the Bundeswehr Plenipotentiary (Wehrbeauftragte) in Germany.
Furthermore, consolidated democracies are characterized by the existence of security
communities that are independent of the military and provide political elites with analytical support in the process of creation and assessment of military and security policies. The civilian part of the security community, which is independent of the military,
makes it easier to impose a qualified oversight of the military institution.
When analyzing civil–military relations in a consolidated democracy, we have to
take into consideration the fact that the decision making of political elites is, to a large
extent, dependent on the knowledge and expertise possessed by the military. The military may be tempted to take advantage of their information monopoly and try to steer
the political decision making of political elites in a direction that suits their own interests. It can be assumed that in the relation between the army and politics where the
actors are, as the Tofflers call them, third-wave armies, the importance of knowledge
of military matters for the adequate control and oversight of the military is growing.
Since the main production factor in economies of the third wave is knowledge—data,
information, images, symbols, culture, philosophy, and values—and the same factor
plays a key role in the postmodern army, it is possible to assume that the power of
experts who can understand this knowledge factor is growing.13
Army and Politics in the Czech Republic
Formal Relations between Military and Political Institutions
The primacy of democratically legitimated political representation over the military is
not an entirely new idea in the Czech Republic. It was an integral part of the political
culture in the former Czechoslovakia already in the period 1918 to 1938. Nowadays in
the Czech Republic, the military is fully subordinated to the elected politicians, and
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Table 1. Ideal Type of Relation between Army and Politics in Consolidated Democracy
Ideal type categories
Formal relations between
military and political
institutions
Legal framework
Day-to-day relations between
political and military
institutions
Character of the military
Type of oversight of security
policy and military institutions
Subcategories
Separation of the political sphere from the military and
the subjection of the military to the political sphere
Division of power with respect to the military
Function of the commander in chief is given to a
democratically legitimated, civilian, political person
Loyalty of the military to the state or nation
Clearly defined legal framework for the behavior of
armed forces; in peacetime, the military is not above
the law but, as any other institution, has to conform to
the principles of the rule of law
Consensus about the principal orientation of the country
is the prevailing mode of relationship between the
political sphere and the military
Military uses only indirect ways for exerting influence on
political matters
Politicians do not interfere in explicitly military matters,
and military experts have autonomy in areas of their
competence
Civic character of the military; military personnel
are recruited from citizens who have the right to
participate in their citizen capacity in the democratic
political process
Values preferred in the military are not in contradiction
to democratic values
Public oversight of security policy and military
institutions; mass media can oversee the military
institution
Existence of supervising institutions that are independent
of the military
Existence of a security community, which is independent
of the military and capable of giving advice to political
elites
the basic powers with respect to the military are mainly divided between the executive
and the judiciary. The government is one of the poles of the executive beside the president. It has relatively more influence on political matters than the president, and that
is also true with respect to the military. The government is responsible for the creation
of security and defense policies and makes decisions about the main directions of
army buildup, training, and use. It also approves the concepts of the military’s mobilization and operational plans.14 The government sets up the State Security Council
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(SSC), whose members are the prime minister and selected government ministers. The
SSC is responsible for optimizing cooperation among individual ministries in the process of making the security policies, giving advice, and preparing proposals regarding
security matters.15
According to the Constitution, one of the important tasks of the government is to
propose the size of the defense budget. Last but not least, the government, together
with Parliament, decides whether to send Czech troops abroad and whether to allow
foreign troops to be stationed within the territory of the Czech Republic. The last version of the Constitution allows the government to rule on some types of military
deployments more independently than in the past.16
The Defense Secretary as a member of government is responsible for the military.
In October 1990, the former Czechoslovakia got the first civilian Defense Secretary in
many decades (Luboš Dobrovský). This trend was interrupted under the social democratic government in the period from 2001 to 2004, when the post of secretary of
defense began to be filled with (former) soldiers again. Both Secretaries of Defense in
that period (Jaroslav Tvrdík and Miroslav Kostelka) were career soldiers who had
changed their uniforms for civilian clothes only shortly before their appointment to the
post and had little or no background in terms of a previous political career or links to
political elites. This practice continued until 2004, when, under the government of
Vladimir Špidla (Social Democracy), the post of the secretary of defense was given to
a real politician, Karel Khünl.
The military used to voice objections against this principle in the early 1990s. At
present, the military does not openly dispute the principle that the secretary of defense
should be a civilian politician. The trust of the military in the office of minister of
defense was changing from 1996 to 2004 from the initial 34.5 percent to 92.8 percent
in 2002 and to 61.5 percent in 2004.17 As far as the trust of soldiers in the office of
minister of defense is concerned, one possible explanation of the above variation is
that a substantial part of the military prefers a soldier minister of defense to a civilian
minister. This explains why the popularity of the office culminated when it was held
by Jaroslav Tvrdík and Miroslav Kostelka—soldiers who changed their uniforms for
civilian dress only shortly before becoming Ministers of Defense. On the other hand,
the above figures support the idea that the vast majority of the military is ready to
accept a civilian politician as minister of defense. In view of this fact, it is possible to
conclude that this principle has become an integral part of Czech political culture that
seems to be generally accepted by the military.
In the early 1990s, there were also arguments about where the line between the
powers of the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff should be drawn. This controversy, which, by the way, did not attract much interest from society at large, was
finally resolved through a series of reforms in the 1990s.
On the basis of an older Czech historical tradition going back to the period from
1918 to 1938, the president, who is an important part of the executive, has several
powers with respect to the military.18 First and foremost, according to the Constitution of the Czech Republic, the president is the commander in chief of the Armed
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Forces of the Czech Republic. In addition to this, the Czech president has the power
to appoint and promote generals. According to the Czech Constitution, the decisions
of the president in the above areas, to be valid, must also be cosigned by the prime
minister or by a government member who was authorized by prime minister.19 As the
commander in chief of the army, the president also has these powers: to approve basic
military regulations, to confer honorific or historic names on military units, and to
bestow military flags to units.20 Furthermore, the Chief of General Staff is chosen by
elected politicians, that is, by the president according to a proposal by the
government.21
The tasks of the Parliament of the Czech Republic with respect to the army consist
mainly of the following: to take part in the preparation and realization of the concept
of security policy; to oversee the executive branch (which includes the military); to
pass the government budget, which also includes the finances allocated to the army; to
participate in the process of creating laws relating to the armed forces; to decide
whether to declare war; and to decide whether to send troops abroad and whether to
allow stationing foreign troops within the territory of the Czech Republic, provided
the decision does not belong to the government.22
As was concluded above, in consolidated democracy military is obliged to be loyal
to society at large and not to a specific leader or political party. The evolution of
Czechoslovak and Czech military oaths reflects the changing preferences of society
with respect to the values of the military. All variants of the military oath after 1990
show a distinct tendency to return to the tradition of the First Czechoslovak Republic.
The obligations to defend socialism and preserve loyalty to the Communist Party and
the Soviet Union were abandoned in the early 1990s, and the civic and patriotic values
were stressed in the Czech military oath. The latest version of the Czech military oath
brings yet another new element—the promise to defend freedom and democracy.23
Czech NATO membership also has found its way into the text of the oath, which now
contains the promise to defend allied countries.
Taking into account the above data, it is possible to conclude that, with respect to
the formal relations between political and military institutions in the Czech Republic,
civil–military relations have reached parameters typical of consolidated democracies.
The military is subjected to democratically elected politicians, the commander in chief
is the president of the Czech Republic, the minister of defense is an elected politician,
and the military is obliged to be loyal to the Czech Republic and not to a specific
political party or external power (which was the situation characteristic of the communist period).
Legal Framework
The Czech armed forces are not exempt from the principles of the rule of law, and any
deficiencies in that area have always been symptomatic of more general deficiencies
in the application of the principles of the rule of law in the Czech Republic at the time
of transformation. Each law bearing on the military has to be approved through the
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same procedure as any other law of the country, that is, it has to be passed by the Parliament of the Czech Republic. There were certain problems connected with insufficient defense legislature in the 1990s that were not satisfactorily resolved until the end
of the decade. On the other hand, nowadays the Czech defense legislature is regarded
as sufficient.
In the Czech Republic there is no separate and specialized military juridical system.
The system of military courts (particular courts for military personal) and procurators
(particular procurators for military personal) that had existed in the era of the Socialist
Czechoslovak Republic was not taken over by the Czech Republic. In the early 1990s,
as a result of the process of the transformation of civil–military relations, the institution of military courts was abolished, and that situation continued to exist after the
Czech Republic began to exist as an independent state. Both criminal and civil lawsuits in which a soldier is involved as either of the two sides are subject to the standard
procedures of criminal and civil law. The Czech army has retained the institute of the
military police, whose investigations have to obey the same rules and principals as
those of the police of the Czech Republic.
Beside the legal norms, an important role is played especially by the so-called
“Basic Order of the Czech Armed Forces,” in which the general principles of conduct
of military people are set out. It is the highest military norm. This document, which is
prepared by appointed military personnel and approved by the president of the Czech
Republic, sets up a comprehensive system of internal rules for the military and specifies in detail the basic rights and duties of soldiers, disciplinary punishments, and
rewards for exemplary fulfillment of duties. The most important thing with respect to
the aim of this study is that disciplinary proceedings against soldiers can be reexamined by an independent civilian court.
Taking into account the above data, it is possible to conclude that the Czech military is not above the law and has to conform to the principles of the rule of law.
Day-to-Day Relationships
The military elites in the Czech Republic did not overtly interfere in the political discussions in the early phases of the transformation after 1993, when the Czech Republic was established. Nor do they do so today. The representatives of the army exercise
great restraint in making public statements that might be given a political interpretation. That restraint contrasts especially with the situation that occurred in Poland in the
first half of the 1990s.24
In regard to the situation in the Czech Republic, there is nothing to suggest that the
consensus between political elites and the military with respect to the main political
orientation of the country should be threatened. The arguments are following.
Political preferences of soldiers changed and reached the parameters typical of the
rest of the Czech population in the early 1990s, and the period characterized by a
prevalence of support for the Communist Party ended. Before the 1990 election, the
communists were preferred by 41 percent of regular soldiers according to research.
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In contrast to this, in 1991 only 13 percent of regular soldiers supported the Communist Party.25
The level of trust of Czech soldiers in the political institutions of the state is a relatively stable factor in the long term, and, importantly, it tends to follow the development of the corresponding attitudes prevalent in society at large. In the period 1996 to
2004, the trust of Czech soldiers in the office of president of the republic—the commander in chief of the military—varied, starting at 70.3 percent in 1996 and sinking to
45.0 percent in 2001 (during the presidency of V. Havel) only to rise again to 82.4
percent in 2004 (V. Klaus). The trust of soldiers in the government and Parliament is
much lower. It has been oscillating around the level of 20 percent for a long time,
roughly following the same trajectory as in the rest of society.26
The Czech army is deployed intensively in various operations of crisis management conducted out of the territory of the Czech Republic. Since this policy obviously
tends to make the life of the military more difficult and threatens the prospects of soldiers for an ordinary life in peacetime service, one would expect that it could be a
source of controversy between Czech political elites and the military. Nevertheless,
this is not borne out by the available data. According to the latest available survey, in
2004, 87 percent of Czech soldiers agreed with the deployment of the Czech army in
Kosovo, 68 percent agreed with the deployment of Czech soldiers in Afghanistan, and
66 percent agreed with deployment of the Czech military in Iraq.27
Naturally, there are a lot of differences between the Czech military and political
elites regarding many specific military issues. One of the key issues of civil–military
relations that is currently of concern to the military is the army reform launched in
2002 by the former coalition government of the Social Democrats, Freedom Union,
and Christian Democratic Party–Czech People’s Party. According to the latest available data (from 2004), only one-fourth of Czech soldiers approve of the timetable of
the military reform and the overwhelming majority believe that the resources allocated to defense are insufficient and inefficiently used. Only one-third of them say that
the current army reform is in agreement with their own ideas as to how the Czech
armed forces should develop.28 Nevertheless, this dissatisfaction with the reform has
not led to any overt and regularly expressed form of resistance to it on the part of the
military. This disharmony only occasionally surfaces in the media or in public debate.
On the whole, there is no evidence to suggest that the military is questioning the
democratic character of the Czech Republic or the current orientation of its foreign
policies. The available data do not show any significant differences between soldiers
and civilians in terms of their respective levels of support to the institutions of the
Czech political system—a difference one would suppose would be there if soldiers
were opposed to the democratic regime. On the other hand, one should pay attention
to the fact that according to the last available survey (2004), the trust of Czech soldiers
in government and Parliament is low. The most trusted institution is the president.
Czech soldiers also support the participation of the Czech Republic in international
peacekeeping missions, which in fact can again be interpreted as reflecting their support for the current orientation of the country’s foreign policies. If the majority of
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Czech soldiers were opposed to the membership of the Czech Republic in NATO and
the European Union, they probably would not support Czech participation in missions
conducted within the NATO and EU frameworks.29
It is sometimes criticized that many countries undergoing the process of transformation from the totalitarian model of the soviet type to the liberal democracy failed to
protect their armed forces from politically motivated interference of political elites.
This thesis can be also applied to the Czech Republic.
Looking with hindsight at the past twenty years in the Czech Republic, we can
distinguish among three phases. During the first phase, which began with the breakdown of communism (at the turn of 1989 to 1990) and ended with the disintegration
of Czechoslovakia (1992), the interference of political elites in the military sphere was
relatively frequent and was connected especially with purges at the upper layers of the
military organizational pyramid, a considerable societal pressure being exerted to
push the reform of the armed forces. Particularly active in this respect were especially
officers who had been previously (after the Soviet invasion in 1968) forced to leave
the armed forces. The purges led to dramatic changes at the top of the command of the
armed forces. The aim of the purge was a riddance of unreliable officers connected to
the communist regime; by September 1990, 15.0 percent (9,640 officers) of the whole
body of officers left, but only 5.5 percent of these left because of the incompetence
and 18.5 percent retired. One can assume that the rest left because of political reasons.
The purge had a fundamental impact on army generality because of 157 generals, 87
left the army voluntarily or were dismissed. Purges in the military continued in 1992.
Officers who had collaborated with intelligence services during the communist period
had to leave the military (more than 1,000). During the second phase, after the establishment of the independent Czech Republic in 1993, another wave of “personnel
evaluations” (i.e., purges) took place, examining personal records of people who had
served in the armed forces in the period of socialist Czechoslovakia.30 Paradoxically,
some of the officers who had been ousted from the armed forces during the communist
purges after 1968 and could only reenter the military after the collapse of the communist regime were now made to leave the armed forces for the second time. In this
period, the pressure exerted on the military by the political sphere continued undiminished because of the Czech Republic’s preparation for its accession to NATO.31
The third phase, the period of consolidation during which the political elites gradually reduced their interference in the internal matters of the military, began in 1998
with the coming in power of the social democrats. Under the social democratic governments of that period, the pressure on purging the armed forces of people who had
been loyal to the communist regime ceased and the military was given more and more
autonomy in internal military matters. In most cases, these governments were willing
to accept suggestions and proposals prepared by the military.
Watts says that it was characteristic of some Central and Eastern European countries for their political elites to interfere in internal affairs of the armed forces and
organize purges, which is a practice that can destroy the trust of soldiers in
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politicians.32 As far as the Czech Republic is concerned, the Watts conclusion does
apply, but only to the first and second of the above-mentioned phases. But even there,
the interference should be seen in the historical context of the Czech Republic and the
region to which it belongs. In Czechoslovakia, regime changes or crises (1918, 1938,
1948, 1968, and 1989–1990) were always accompanied with more or less extensive
purges of the armed forces. Therefore, in this geographical region, a purge aimed at
getting rid of politically disloyal elements of the armed forces is perceived as a natural
accompaniment of regime change, something that is expected and reckoned with by
both military and politicians. The phenomenon is difficult to understand outside of its
specific historical context. Empirical data on regime changes, which in the region of
Central and Eastern Europe, unlike in Anglo-Saxons countries, is a relatively frequent
occurrence, show that political regime changes in different countries are accompanied
with varying intensities of attempts to subject the army to the new regime.
Western authors who (like Watts) criticize such purges should ask themselves how
rational, from the point of view of the chances for survival of democratic regime, it
would be to build the armies of the new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe on
the foundation of military elites loyal to the ideas of Marxism–Leninism, the Communist Party, and the Soviet Union, professionally anchored in the military doctrine of
the Warsaw Pact, and intellectually incapable of adapting to the new realities after the
end of the cold war.
Furthermore, it is questionable if, without these personnel changes in the armed
forces, it would have been possible to reverse the negative perception of the armed
forces by Czech society at large. The mistrust of society at large toward the military
was especially high at the turn of 1989 to 1990 when many people feared that the army
might attempt to uphold the communist regime by the use of force. This mistrust was
partly feeding on the generally antimilitaristic (hostile toward the military, one could
almost say) attitudes of the Czech public. Indeed, at the end of 1989, when Czechoslovakia still existed, some elements in the army high command sought to organize a
military action to save the collapsing communist regime.33 This shows that the mistrust toward the military elites was not entirely unfounded. The army was perceived as
a potential threat to the democratization of society. In such an atmosphere, it would
have been rather difficult to try to reform civil–military relations without any personnel changes (purges) in the army.
It should further be taken into consideration that further personnel changes (purges
for part of military personal) in the army were taking place against the background of
an overall downsizing of manpower. While in 1993 the armed forces of the Czech
Republic had 106,679 soldiers, currently (2009) they have only about 24,103 soldiers.34 Therefore, the reduction of the Czech officer corps is to be accounted for primarily by the overall processes of demilitarization and disarmament that, at that time,
were taking place in the Czech Republic.
On the whole, at present the military elites in the Czech Republic are largely autonomous in their decision making about purely military matters, and the political elites
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tend to avoid (almost openly) any unnecessary interference. Even though political parties have deeply permeated into the inner core of the civilian sector of the Department
of Defense, they have been kept out of all components of the military. Therefore, taking into account results of the Czech military transformation, it is possible to raise the
questions of whether the large degree of autonomy the military elites are currently
enjoying is fully justifiable and whether it is really matched by the corresponding level
of their professional competence.
In the past, the Czech government often simply respected the professional opinion
of the military; unfortunately this professional opinion often proved rather unprofessional and incompetent at a later stage. For example, the inability of military elites
to correctly determine the numbers and types of hard military equipment the
army would need led, in the past, to the irrational project of modernization of T-72
tanks, the purchase of more L-159 ALCA light combat aircraft than needed, the
proposal (not implemented because, in the end, the Czech Republic hired only fourteen JAS-39 Gripen) that the Czech Republic should purchase several dozens of
supersonic JAS-39 Gripen, whose insufficient interoperability with NATO is still
criticized in the Czech Republic, and many other similarly ill-conceived steps.35
In addition, a lot of top military officers responsible for military procurements
are suspected of corruption, and a lot of scandals have occurred in the Czech Republic during the past two decades. Many high-ranking officers have been involved in
them.
Taking into account all available data, with respect to the day-to-day relations
between military and politics, it is possible to conclude that the consensus about the
principal orientation of the country is the prevailing mode of relationship between the
military and political elites; the military does not have a direct influence on political
matters and the Czech military enjoys a large degree of autonomy in specific military
matters.
Character of the Military
Although since 2005, when the compulsory military service was abolished, the Czech
army has been built on the voluntary method of recruitment, it continues to be an army
of citizens.36 Soldiers who decide to serve in the Czech army of their own will are still
citizens of the Czech Republic, connected through their own identities with the
past, present, and future of this country. Only Czech citizens are allowed to join the
Czech army.
Therefore, Czech soldiers have the right to participate in political process in their
citizen capacity. The most serious limitation on the political activities of Czech soldiers is the ban on their membership in political parties, together with the ban on forming trade unions and organizing political meetings in military facilities. These bans put
them at a considerable disadvantage when it comes to pushing for and mediating their
interests through participation in the democratic political process, even though they
Kříž
15
still have the rights to both vote and be elected. Out of all the institutions through
which civilian citizens in democratic countries mediate their interests through participation in the democratic political process, soldiers on active duty can use only professional interest organizations.37
While the older generation of soldiers who served in the period of communism
used to be politically active or at least to pretend that they were politically active, a
wave of lack of interest in politics is spreading among the younger generation of soldiers as well as among their civilian contemporaries.
Values preferred in the Czech army are summarized in the “Code of Ethics for
Career Soldiers and Active Reserves.” This document is a relatively new phenomenon in the Czech Republic because was accepted only in December 2002. With this
code, the army command is trying to reestablish a link to, and to build on, the First
Republic tradition from the period of 1918 to 1938. To a large extent, the code serves
as the standard for the optimum behavior of the Czech soldier. The code combines
such classic military traits—the warrior traits—as honor, bravery, readiness to obediently follow orders, loyalty, and readiness for self-sacrifice. From the point of view
of an analysis of the level of the consolidation of civil–military relations in the Czech
Republic and especially relations between military and politics, it should be noted
that the principles and values preferred by the code are slightly different from the
values of the majority of Czech society but are not in contradiction to the principles
and values typical of a democratic political regime.
Therefore, the above data justify the conclusion that in spite of the abolition of
compulsory military service, the civic character of the Czech military is further
guaranteed.
Type of Oversight of Security Policy and Military Institutions
In contrast to the situation before 1989, the Czech armed forces are now subject to
public oversight. In this respect, the most noticeable is the activity of the media. The
legal framework regulating access to classified information, set up in connection with
the accession of the Czech Republic to NATO, leaves Czech journalists enough space
for their work.
A relatively well-tested method of public oversight of the military used in consolidated democracies is the institute of the parliamentary plenipotentiary for the armed
forces. The proposal to set up the office of the parliamentary plenipotentiary had
already been presented to Parliament in 1993. In the 1990s, several discussions took
place of the question whether to set up the institution of a military ombudsman, who
would stand outside the military and whom soldiers could turn to with their complaints. All these discussions, conducted by political elites, petered out, and, in the
end, no office of plenipotentiary (e.g., as the German Bundestag Wehrbeauftragte)
was established. Its critics argued that there was no need to have such a costly office
on top of the already existing standard controlling mechanisms.
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Armed Forces & Society XX(X)
In the period of communism, no experts were allowed to carry out an in-depth
analysis of the military, unless they were, in one way or another, connected to the
Communist Party and the military. That is why the Czech security community specializing in military issues independent of the military could start forming only after 1989.
Nevertheless, a closer look at the composition of that community reveals that its
experts have mostly already had a military career, and, therefore, not even today are
there many really independent (of the military) experts.
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the oversight of military matters in the
Czech Republic has not been exercised by a security community independent of the
military, which is a deviation from the (working) ideal type of relations between military and politics in consolidated democracy. In addition, there are no institutions independent of the military, such as parliamentary plenipotentiary in Germany, for oversight
of the armed forces in the Czech Republic. On the other hand, the military has been
overseen by the media in ways similar to other institutions in the Czech Republic.
Conclusion
During the 1990s, the condition of relations between the army and politics in the
Czech Republic was gradually approaching the state that is characteristic of consolidated democracies. Even though Western countries served as a model for this transformation process, the desire to become a NATO member was not the only factor
influencing the acceptance of the Western model. It is also necessary to consider, as a
factor, the historical tradition of Czechoslovakia that, in the period of 1918 to 1938,
was a standard democracy whose civil–military relations were not very different from
those in other democracies at that time. Even thought we should not overrate the influence of this tradition because, after all, it was interrupted twice—first by the Nazi
occupation (1939–1945) and then by the communists (1948–1990)—it did have some
influence on the views of what the optimum form of civil–military relations should be,
and thus it contributed to the relatively smooth mental acceptance of the Western
model in Czech society.
Soon after the 1989 revolution, while Czechoslovakia was still in existence, the
armed forces came under control of democratically elected political institutions. Their
powers with respect to the military are divided. Importantly, Czechoslovakia, unlike
Poland, was not witness to any fighting of opposing political forces for control over
the armed forces.38 As early as 1990, the armed forces were subjected to civilian
control, and since then, despite some weakening of civilian control under social democratic governments, the principle of civil control has been an integral part of Czech
political culture. Even though the military does not always perceive civil control as
pleasant, it does not question it as a principle.
Until 1999, there had not been a satisfactory legal framework clearly defining the position of the armed forces within society. Some of the imperfections of the legal framework
were responsible for problems in the area of civil–military relations in the 1990s.
Kříž
17
Czech soldiers did not—and still do not—even try to directly influence political
decision making at a large scale. They participate in the political process only qua
citizens or use indirect methods such as expertise, consultation, and so on. Moreover,
there is no evidence that the attitudes of the Czech military toward the main parameters of Czech foreign and security policies or toward the character of the political
regime are principally different from the attitudes prevalent in society at large. While
in the 1990s there was too much interference of political elites in military matters,
now the military seems to enjoy a relatively large autonomy, which does not always
lead to the best results in terms of effective functioning of the military institution. As
for the purges that took place in the military in the first half of the 1990s, the current
military does not mostly feel antagonism or mistrust toward elected politicians
because of them. After all, it was exactly these purges (and the subsequent vacation
of many army posts previously occupied by communist cadres) that often helped to
speed up their military careers.
Even though compulsory military service has been abolished and the Czech army
now fully relies on volunteer recruits, it still is an army of citizens. Except for certain
limitations, soldiers, qua citizens, can participate in the democratic political process.
The military code of ethics, created after 2000, is not in contradiction to the values
preferred by civilian society.
Public oversight of the military issues is quite week because there are still some
problems relating to the quality of that control caused by the lack of experts on military affairs truly independent of the military.
The relations between army and politics in the Czech Republic are definitely
not free of any problems. But, on the whole, they are close to what is usual in consolidated democracies. It is possible to agree with Jeffrey Simon, who in 2004 concluded
that “the Czech Republic has made enormous progress on their ten-year road
to achieving democratic oversight of the military.”39 Nowadays, there are not any
apparent systemic deviations or conflicts in relations between army and politics
threatening the existence of the democratic regime. The many problems that continue
to exist in the area of Czech civil–military relations (general spread of corruption that
affects both political and military elites, unwillingness of the majority of Czech
society to serve in the army and to allocate resources in favor of the military, lack
of interests of Czech society with respect to the military) do not in any significant
way deviate from what is typical of other comparable consolidated European
democracies.
Acknowledgments
I wish to thank the anonymous reviewers for their insightful comments on a previous draft.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the authorship and/or
publication of this article.
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Funding
The author performed this study during his participation in the project “The Image of the
Democratic Soldier. Tensions Between the Organization of the Armed Forces and the Principles
of Democracy in European Comparison” organized by Peace Research Institute Frankfurt
(PRIF), Baseler Str. 27-31 D-60329 Frankfurt am Main, Germany. He received financial support for his research from PRIF but did not receive money for writing this specific and concrete
article.
Notes
1.The Czech Republic is a small Central European country comparable, in terms of its size and
population, to the Netherlands, Belgium (Western Europe), and Austria (Central Europe).
The aim of its military is to defend Czech territory and take part in peacekeeping operations.
The defense of the territory of the Czech Republic against external aggression is perceived
as a rather unlikely variant of the use of the Czech Armed Forces in the near future. But if
such a situation were to arise, the defense should be realized within the frame of the NATO
collective defense.
2.Douglas L. Bland, “Patterns in Liberal Democratic Civil–Military Relations,” Armed
Forces & Society 27, 4 (2001): 525-40; Douglas L. Bland, “A Unified Theory of
Civil–Military Relations,” Armed Forces & Society 26, 1 (1999): 7-26; Peter D. Feaver,
“The Civil–Military Problematigue: Huntington, Janowitz, and the Question of Civilian
Control,” Armed Forces & Society 23, 2 (1996): 149-78; Samuel P. Huntington, “Civilian
Control and the Constitution,” American Political Science Review 50, 3 (1956): 676-99;
Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil–Military
Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957); Rebecca L. Schiff, “Civil–
Military Relations Reconsidered: A Theory of Concordance,” Armed Forces & Society
22, 1 (1995): 7-24; Rebecca L. Schiff, “Concordance Theory: A Response to Recent Criticism,” Armed Forces & Society 23, 2 (1996): 277-83; Richard S. Wells, “The Theory of
Concordance in Civil/Military Relations: A Commentary,” Armed Forces & Society 23, 2
(1996): 269-75.
3.Huntington, Soldier and the State; Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and
Political Portrait (New York: Free Press, 1960); Samuel E. Finer, The Man on Horseback.
The Role of the Military in Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1988).
4.Otto Pick, Stefan Sarvas, and Stanislav Stach, “Democratic Control over Security policy and Armed Forces,” in Demokratische und Zivile kontrole von Sicherheistpolitik und
Streitkräften, ed. Laurent F. Carrel, Otto Pick, Stefan Sarvas, Andreas Schaer and Stanislav Stach (Zurich: Eidgenössische Technische Hochschule 8092 Zürich, 1997), 76-120;
and Zdeněk Kříž, “K některým aspektům aplikace západního modelu civilního řízení a
demokratické kontroly ozbrojených sil v podmínkách ČR,” Politologický časopis 4, 2
(1997): 142-51.
5.Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (London: Yale University Press, 1989), 250-51.
6.Larry L. Watts, “Reforming Civil–Military Relations in Post-Communist States: Civil Control vs. Democratic Control,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology 30, 1 (2002): 54.
7.Huntington, Soldier and the State, 143-62.
Kříž
19
8.The same is true with respect to communist countries. Also see David E. Albright, “Comparative Conceptualization of Civil–Military Relations,” World Politics 32, 4 (1980): 574;
and Dale R. Herspring, “Samuel Huntington and Communist Civil–Military Relations,”
Armed Forces & Society 25, 4 (1999): 574.
9.Sam C. Sarkesian, “Military Professionalism and Civil–Military Relations in the West,”
International Science Review 2, 3 (1981): 291.
10.Schiff, “Civil–Military Relations Reconsidered,” 7-24.
11.Sarkesian, “Military Professionalism,” 293.
12.Ibid., 283-97.
13.Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Making Sense of Today’s Global Chaos
(New York: Warner Books, 1993), 73-93.
14.Act no. 222/1999 coll., “On the Czech Defense Provision,” consolidated version, art. 5; and
act no. 219/1999 coll., “On the Czech Armed Forces,” consolidated version, art. 6.
15.Act no. 110/1998 coll., “On Security of the Czech Republic,” consolidated version, art. 9.
16.Constitution of the Czech Republic, act no. 1/1993 coll., consolidated version, art. 43.
17.Ministry of Defence, Personnel Section, Vojáci důvěřují ve stejné míře ministrovi obrany
i náčelníkovi GŠ [Trust of soldiers in Minister of Defence is the same as their trust in the
Chief of General Staff] (Prague: Ministry of Defence, 2004), 2-3.
18.It should be noted that a rather illogical definition of armed forces is used in the Czech Republic. The Armed Forces of the Czech Republic consist of the Army, the Military Office of the
President of the Republic, and the Castle Guard (i.e., the presidential guard). The police and
the customs service personnel are not included in the legal definition of the armed forces.
19.Constitution of the Czech Republic, act. no. 1/1993 coll., consolidated version, art. 63.
20.Act no. 219/1999 coll., “On the Czech Armed Forces,” consolidated version, art. 5.
21.With respect to the civil–military relations, it is very important that the Chief of General
Staff appointment is usually not a bone of contention among political parties. The right of
the president to appoint the Chief of General Staff is deduced form the Constitution of the
Czech Republic, act. no. 1/1993 coll., consolidated version, art. 63.
22.Constitution of the Czech Republic, act no. 1/1993 coll., consolidated version, art. 15, 30,
31, 42, 43, and 53.
23.Paradoxically, it seems to be a variant of the promise to defend socialism that can be found
in the 1961 oath. Only the specific values preferred by society were exchanged; the frame
remained unchanged.
24.For more about Poland, see Elizabeth P. Coughlan, “Democratizing Civilian Control: The
Polish Case,” Armed Forces & Society 24, no. 4 (1998): 525-29.
25.Antonín Rašek, “Demokratizace, humanizace, armáda: zkušenosti čtyř let” [Democratization, humanization, military: Experience of four years], Vojenské rozhledy 2, 10 (1993): 19.
26.Ministry of Defence, Personnel Section, Vojáci důvěřují, 2-3.
27.Ministry of Defence, Personnel Section, Postoje vojáků k naší účasti v Kosovu, Afghánistánu a Iráku [The attitudes of soldiers to our participation in Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq]
(Prague: Ministry of Defence, 2004), 1.
28.Ministry of Defence, Personnel Section, Kritika reform souvisí s nízkou informovaností
[Criticism relates to low soldier awareness] (Prague, Ministry of Defence, 2004), 1.
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29.Unfortunately, no opinion research results directly describing the levels of support among
soldiers for the democratic regime and the orientation of Czech foreign policy are available.
30.Pick, Sarvas, and Stach, “Democratic Control,” 111-12.
31.This pressure had a negative impact on the structure of the Czech officer corps because
especially young officers decided to leave the military.
32.Watts, “Reforming Civil–Military Relations,” 57-65.
33.Stefan Sarvas, “Professional Soldiers and Politics: A Case of Central and Eastern Europe,”
Armed Forces & Society 26, 1 (1999): 103.
34.Ministry of Defence, “Vývoj skutečných počtů osob v resortu MO ČR v letech 1993–2009,”
http://www.army.cz/scripts/detail.php?id=5342 (accessed October 25, 2009).
35.For more in English, see Jeffrey Simon, NATO and the Czech and Slovak Republics: A Comparative Study in Civil–Military Relations (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004),
60-133; and for more in Czech, see Bohuslav Pernica, “Obranné plánování České republiky.
Tři kritické poznámky,” Obrana a strategie 4, 2 (2004): 105-9.
36.Bohuslav Pernica, Profesionalizace ozbrojených sil. Trendy, teorie a zkušenosti (Prague:
Avis, 2007).
37.Act no. 221/1999 coll., “On Career Officers,” consolidated version, art. 44 and 45.
38.For more about Poland, see Coughlan, “Democratizing Civilian Control.”
39.Simon, NATO and the Czech and Slovak Republics, 142.
Bio
Zdeněk Kříž is associate professor at Masaryk University in Brno, Czech Republic.