Melanie Smith
[1337380] 2014
“Syria is not for the Syrians, and Iraq is not for the Iraqis”:
The Islamic State ‘Foreign Fighter’, Transnationalism
and Baghdadi’s ‘Khilāfāh’
This dissertation is submitted as part of a MA degree in Geopolitics, Territory &
Security
at King’s College London.
KING’S COLLEGE LONDON
UNIVERSITY OF LONDON
DEPARTMENT OF GEOGRAPHY
MA/MSc DISSERTATION
I, ………MELANIE SMITH……… hereby declare (a) that this
Dissertation is my own original work and that all source material
used is acknowledged therein; (b) that it has been specially prepared
for a degree of the University of London; and (c) that it does not
contain any material that has been or will be submitted to the
Examiners of this or any other university, or any material that has
been or will be submitted for any other examination.
This Dissertation is ………11,982……………words.
Signed: …………MSMITH…...…….
Date: …………20/08/2014…………….
2
Section
Heading
Page Number
Declaration Form
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements
Abstract
2
3
4
5
1
Introduction
6
2
Methodology
9
3
3.1
3.2
Literature Review
The Foreign Fighter
Transnationalism and
Identity
Citizenship and the State
The Resurgence of panIslamism
Historical Perspectives
The Spanish Civil War,
the ‘Arab-Afghans’ and the Sinjar Records
From ISI to ISIS to IS
Territorial Expansion and
Khilāfāh-building
13
13
15
Chapter One
Rayat al Tawheed
Qawafil Muhajireen
Citizenship of the
Khilāfāh
‘Mujatweets’
‘There is no life without jihad’
Dabiq
‘Eid Greetings from the land of the Khilāfāh’
28
29
31
33
Chapter Two
‘There is no life without jihad’
‘The End of Sykes-Picot’
‘Mujatweets’
Dabiq
‘Eid Greetings from the land of the Khilāfāh’
45
46
Conclusion
62
Bibliography
64
Appendices
Research Ethics
Screening Form
Departmental Risk Form
68
68
3.21
3.3
3.31
3.32
3.4
3.41
4, 4.1
4.2
4.3
4.4
4.5
4.6
4.7
4.8
5, 5,1
5.2
5.3
5.4
5.5
5.6
6
17
18
19
20
23
24
35
38
40
42
48
51
55
58
69
3
Acknowledgements
Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor Daanish Mustafa, whose work
and teaching have afforded continual inspiration. I would also like to
express my gratitude to Richard Schofield for his support and
encouragement throughout the GTS programme. Many thanks to the
International Centre for the Study of Radicalisation, without whom this
dissertation would have proven truly impossible.
Above all, an immeasurable ‘thank you’ to my family (Smith, Tembey and
canine units) for keeping me safe, determined and laughing.
4
Abstract
The Islamic State, formerly known as the ‘Islamic State of Iraq and Sham’ or ISIS, as an international jihadist militia has attracted global attention
for numerous reasons since its inception in April 2013. IS’s recruitment
and involvement of thousands of ‘foreign fighters’ within the Syrian conflict and more recent Iraq insurgency, and its declaration of the
establishment of a Caliphate across large swathes of these two nation
states, constitute the two research components of this study. This study
utilizes media, discourse and narrative analysis in the hope of contributing
an enhanced understanding of the socio-geographical identity nexus of
transnational or ‘foreign fighting’.
Additionally,
it
deconstructs
the
consequences of the establishment of this new territorial pseudo-state for
the fields of geopolitics, conflict scholarship and terrorism studies. By
advocating this dual approach, this study uncovers the ways in which IS
signifies a fissure within the established academic understanding of
transnational jihadist mobilizations.
5
1. Introduction
On the 29th of June 2014, the extreme jihadist group, the Islamic State
(referred to as ‘Dawlah’, the ‘Islamic State of Iraq and Sham’, ISIS or the ‘Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant’) declared the creation of a new Islamic Caliphate in the Iraq and Syria, simultaneously re-branding itself
as simply ‘Islamic State’ (hereafter IS). This announcement captured the attention of international news organizations and academic and policybased institutions as well as broader cohorts of society. However, it is
imperative to gain an understanding of what this group represents, how it
is constituted and where its ambitions lie in order to determine the
veracity of this declaration. While the rebirth of Islamist and particularly
jihadist thought since 1980 is far from novel or under-researched, I aim to
elucidate how IS represents a new generation of transnational insurgency
by focusing upon three distinct features; the involvement of foreign
fighters, the establishment of the Caliphate or Khilāfāh and IS’s revolutionary media propaganda campaign.
The review of the relevant literature will focus upon how the concept of
the ‘foreign fighter’ has been previously researched under the umbrella of conflict, radicalization and terrorism studies. At present, little effort has
been made to establish the implications of this transnational phenomenon
for
socio-geographical
citizenship.
Equally
concepts
insufficient
like
identity,
attention
has
the
nation-state
been
paid
to
and
the
consequences of foreign fighter mobilization for the geopolitical dynamics
of both the conflict itself, and the conceptual arena in which it is situated
internationally. In attempting to reconcile these shortages, and to provide
a renewed perspective on transnational identity within the context of IS I
have drawn on a broad range of intellectual fields, spanning human
geography, sociology, history and war studies.
6
The intersection between media and conflict has been well documented in
these fields of study, however by providing comprehensive evidence of the
employment of social media to garner support for transnational conflict, I
aim to show how IS has developed a pioneering strategy. I will discuss
what Thomas Hegghammer (2011) refers to as the, ‘globalization of jihad’ with relation to cyberspace as a platform for the sharing of social,
ideological and political collectivities.
Through the lens of the IS official
media department, Al-Hayat Media Center, I will deconstruct IS’s overarching propaganda narratives using Wilson’s (2001) three-step media
message analysis process.
In chapter one I will leverage these academic perspectives to evaluate the
prominence of the ‘foreign fighter’ contingent currently involved with IS as an instructive case on the relationships between society, identity and
territory. This chapter will analyze multimedia material from both official
and unofficial IS outlets to gain a more comprehensive estimation of how
these foreign fighters self-identify with respect to nationality and how this
perspective is channeled by IS to develop and promote an effective
jihadist recruitment strategy. By drawing on a wealth of literature from a
diverse range of academic specialisms, I will evidence the assertion that
the foreign fighter embodies the ‘cosmopolite’ as defined by normative international relations theory.
This discussion will lead to the recognition of the significance of
geographical units to international jihadist groups with global ambitions.
By embodying the ‘cosmopolite’, the IS foreign fighter has been shown to discard socially bestowed identity, instead prioritizing a certain strand or
element of religious belief. In most cases, this priority is the perceived
individual responsibility to protect fellow members of the ummah (global
Muslim community) from persecution. As this study will illuminate, the
ummah concept has been championed by figures such as Abdullah Azzam,
to rationalize the call for jihad (holy war) in various recent conflicts.
7
Mobilizations such as the ‘Arab-Afghans’ and Bosnian mujahideen deliver a
valuable comprehension of the ‘foreign fighter’ as a figure of distinct
geopolitical repercussions, and will be reviewed accordingly.
These themes will guide the analytical discussion towards Chapter Two’s focus on the geopolitical consequences of the declaration of the
establishment of the Khilāfāh as a territorial entity. The implications of
this for the entrenched understanding of sovereignty are evident in IS
Emir Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s declaration speech and subsequent IS media coverage, analyzed in both audiovisual and written form. I will utilize
these sources to demonstrate how the absence of previously tangible
geographic borders in the consolidated regions that form the new
Caliphate directly represents IS’s global territorial ambitions. Not only does IS wish to transcend these obstacles but it aims to obliterate them in
their entirety under the banner of pan-Islamist unification, a practice that
has already been undertaken with regard to the Sykes-Picot border.
8
2. Methodology
I employ an entirely qualitative strategy in this study to assimilate
existing social science methods and contribute a renewed emphasis on
multimedia analysis to the various disciplines involved. Epistemologically,
the data that has been selected, collated and coded lends itself naturally
towards qualitative examination, by virtue of its physically visual nature
and ideologically complex origin. Structurally, this study will investigate
two core research objectives: to contribute an enhanced understanding of
the social movement-identity nexus of transnational or ‘foreign’ fighting and to illuminate the consequences of the establishment of a new
territorial entity, in the context of the Islamic State.
The method of discourse analysis was popularized by the works of Michel
Foucault and has evolved to encompass the study of publicly available
material to discern the internal and external interactions of a community.
Methodologically,
discourse
analysis
adheres
to
the
focus
post-
structuralism places on semiotics but also prioritizes contextual analysis.
As Keller notes, “the field of social science analysis of discourse has grown enormously and the number of approaches has also expanded” (2012, p.1). Therefore, I have taken a deconstructive discourse analysis
approach as the core of this study, with explicit emphasis placed upon
how discourse can inform geopolitical narratives.
Keller’s (2012) suggestion that discourses may be expressed as “attributions of meaning and orders of interpretation…a collectively binding order of knowledge” (p.2) reinforces the significance of discourse
analysis for social and political geographies. In the case of the Islamic
State, I aim to leverage multimedia sources to gain a valuable the insight
into social movement, primarily by allowing for a comprehensive analysis
of collectively self-appointed values and cultures. This is particularly
significant in the case of a jihadist organization like the Islamic State, in
9
which the decoding of social collectivities can provide a concrete basis of
comparison with previous mobilizations.
De Gialdino (2009) offers a tri-fold paradigm to the question of
epistemological reflection within the social sciences. These namely
encompass the historical materialistic approach, the positivist approach
and the interpretive. In order to garner the most information possible
from these selected research sources, my analysis falls entirely into the
‘interpretive’ of De Gialdino’s (2009) distinctions. However, it is important to note that this study advocates a blend of primary and secondary data
sources, also traversing official and unofficial media outlets.
Whilst the examination of various secondary sources afforded a valuable
perspective, the individual primary research undertaken on social media
to delve deeper into popular propaganda narratives furnishes this study
with heightened legitimacy. Primarily constituting material encountered on
platforms like Twitter, Facebook and Instagram, as well as IS’s infamous media center ‘Al-Hayat’, this data comprises of written and visual sources, around which the analytical discussion is structured. It is the juncture at
which these primary and secondary data sources intersect that gives rise
to the questions around which this research pivots. In this way, I hoped to
observe Müller’s vital caution that, “different forms of discourse analysis
need to be tailored to the goals of the study…to fully harness their analytical power” (2010, p.6) by exercising discretion in both source selection and analysis. However, there is significant subjectivity inherent
in any purely qualitative research, particularly given the employment of an
interpretive analytical approach. I exercised caution in the selection and
verification of media sources, attempting to determine their original
production means prior to in-depth inquiry.
Given the assumption in numerous social sciences fields that the
relationships between humans and their environments “are mediated by 10
means of collectively created symbolic meaning systems or orders of
knowledge” (Keller, 2012, p.2), I seek to deconstruct IS’s semiotic
philosophy to uncover how these systems of meaning have been
established and proliferated as narratives. In this case, these narratives
are often expressed most vehemently through multimedia production.
Accordingly, underlying this study will be a prominent emphasis on the
significance of digital media for the realms of social and political
engagement. As Hegghammer (2011) notes, “communication and publishing technology affects the reach, speed, and impact of recruitment
propaganda” (p.69) and therefore, previous logistical difficulties have
been alleviated for insurgent organizations and those who research them.
This study is structured to afford equal significance upon two IS official
narratives that are particularly informative for the field of geopolitics: the
‘foreign fighter’ as a transnational citizen, and the declaration of IS-held
areas as a functioning state. This research approach is therefore heavily
informed by the critical geopolitical contention, made principally by van
Houtum (2005), that space and identity are both socially constructed and
mediated. Müller (2010) notes that a ‘one-size-fits-all’ formula for undertaking a discourse analysis within a critical geopolitical approach
does not currently exist. Rather, Müller (2010) advocates that this form of
discourse analysis be organized into three core strands: context, analytic
form and political stance. Since the dataset selected comprises entirely
propaganda sources, I have employed an analytical-interpretive approach
and as such, the analytical discussion in both chapters circumnavigates a
number of visual sources.
I would argue that O’Tuathail & Agnew’s comment that “a discursive analysis of geopolitics must take into account the particular political and
social contexts in which geopolitical power is embedded” (1992) corroborates
the
importance
of
such
an
individualized
method.
Additionally, and in order to remedy the common oversight of divorcing a
11
geopolitical event from its context, I have included a brief summary of the
evolution of IS in the literature review. In accordance with accepted
understanding of narrative analysis, my examination intends to fully
appreciate the socially constructed nature of the ‘online’ existence of media and to comprehend these popular discourses as ‘storied’. As Paul Ricoeur (1991) remarks, narratives are often central to the construction of
identity – whether individual or collective. This Aristotelian concept lends
itself appropriately to the socio-geographical production of transnational
or anti-nationalist thought, as will be explored through the medium of IS’s propaganda apparatus.
As Berts & Stevens (2011) iterate, cyberspace presents a sociogeographical conundrum. As well as forsaking all sense of ‘place’ in the context of globalization, cyberspace also acts as a political equalizer as
any one with access can harness it for any cause. As John Perry Barlow
states, “it is vast, unmapped, culturally and legally ambiguous, verbally terse…hard to get around in, and up for grabs” (in ibid, p.14), hence the
barriers of participation and political activism on social media are lowered.
However, these conditions are applicable to both user and researcher. As
Shirky (2011) explains, the use of social media tools like e-mail, text
message and social networking “does not have a single preordained outcome” (p.2) and as such, this study must be understood to present an subjective and interpretative understanding.
12
3. Literature Review
This review of the relevant literature will require a four-stage process.
Primarily, I will examine the existing approach taken by geography and
conflict studies scholars to characterize the profile of the foreign fighter
and define this group within the context of violent non-state actors.
Secondly, I will discuss the existing theories surrounding transnationalism
and identity among foreign fighters as a social movement. This will
necessitate a review of the dichotomy between cosmopolitanism and
communitarianism that is often debated in normative international
relations theory. I aim to elucidate this discussion on geopolitical identity
structures with particular reference to the dynamic nature of the
relationship between foreign fighters and the state, exercising Mustapha’s (2013) account of the ‘Bosnian’ mujahideen.
Subsequently, I aim to assess the relevance of the re-emergence of panIslamism to the foreign fighter phenomenon, focusing specifically upon the
entrenching of the ‘ummah’ doctrine as an ideological narrative and
Abdullah Azzam’s consecration of jihad as an individual obligation. I will
explore the academic perspectives gleaned from past mobilizations,
charting the evolution of the foreign fighter from the Spanish Civil War
until the present day. In this section I will establish the shortcomings of
the current literature in terms of both structure and content, and aim to
outline how this study will reconcile the fields of geopolitics and conflict
studies. Following a concise summary of IS’s development, I will
ultimately concentrate upon the existing literature surrounding the
creation of an Islamic State or ‘Khilāfāh’. This will encompass historical conjectures and prospective implications of the establishment of such an
entity for customary Western territorial conventions.
3.1 The Foreign Fighter
13
Foreign fighters have been documented extensively across numerous
academic
fields,
drawing
bridges
between
specialisms
like
social
anthropology, terrorism studies and popular geopolitics. However, the
literature as a whole lacks the structural cohesion that could seal the
chasm between the common case study approach and a nuanced
historical perspective. Similarly, insufficient attention has been paid to the
geographical dispersion of foreign fighters, compounded by confusion
between ‘regional’ and ‘global’ jihadism. As Thomas Hegghammer (2013)
notes, within foreign fighter scholarship to date “few have distinguished analytically between different types of violent activism, and even fewer
have asked why jihadists fight in different places” (p.2). In general, the specific characteristics of foreign fighting both as a splinter of Islamist
activism and as an identity puzzle are notoriously understudied. One
possible explanation for this absence of academic narrative is the level of
complexity encountered when attempting to define what constitutes a
foreign fighter.
Hegghammer’s (2011) own criterion for delineating foreign fighter status comprises four qualities; the individual must be engaged in active combat,
in a nation to which they display no citizenship, they must be unpaid and
finally that they must not retain connections with a formal military. In this
way, Hegghammer’s structure subsequently eliminates mercenaries, state soldiers operating abroad, returning diaspora members and out-of-battle
terrorists. It appears that academia has universally concentrated upon the
final two criteria, confining the study of foreign fighters to terrorism
studies due to a seemingly instinctive conflation with Al-Qaeda (ibid,
p.55). However, positionality is far from redundant, since, as Mendelsohn
reminds, research is “shaped by our state-centric perspective. When we
speak about “foreign”, we refer to nationality” (2011, p.192). Accordingly, it is important to distinguish geospatially between ‘global’ and ‘regional’ foreign fighter with regard that “some foreign fighters are more foreign than others” (Hegghammer, 2011, p.59). 14
Regardless, the mobilization of international insurgency is far from a novel
concept; since 1980 there have been numerous conflicts that have
involved unpaid and ‘foreign’ combatants with no evident national link. These fighters are usually instrumental in the organization and activity of
the transnational jihadist group with which they align – as such foreign
fighters provide valuable insight into understanding Islamist militancy
(ibid). However, the concept of foreign fighting is neither limited to Islam
as
a
religious
identity,
nor
to
Islamism
as
a
political
identity
(Hemmingsen, 2010; Malet, 2009) and many academics stress that whilst
the concept is frequently linked to jihad, foreign fighting can also be
politically or ethnically reasoned (Mendelsohn, 2011). That is to say,
foreign fighting is inherently related to self-identification.
3.2 Transnationalism and Identity
In reviewing the existing literature on the subject of transnationalism and
identity structures among foreign fighters, it is necessary to first unpack
the
dichotomy of
cosmopolitan-communitarian. Chris Brown’s work advocates a historical trajectory to understanding the significance of the
‘cosmopolitan’ and in terms of the expression itself, he reminds that, “in Classical Greece, the polis was at the centre of the lives of its citizens” (1992, p.23). Whilst ‘polis’ can be roughly translated into ‘city’, the concept comprises a much more complex relationship between a territorial
entity and the inhabitants of such a space, normally operative as a bond
of citizenship. However, being a free citizen of a polis was not deemed
constitutive to one’s ability to lead a morally unquestionable existence, rather the desirable attitude was “that of a citizen of the one universal city” (ibid). Accordingly, the ‘cosmopolite’ specifically represents an individual excommunication from geographical ties in favour of a more
nuanced interpretation of citizenship (reminiscent of Immanuel Kant’s ‘weltbürger’ figure). This is a global perspective commonly attributed to the foreign fighter. As Mustapha (2013) corroborates, the act of migrating
15
for the purposes of involving oneself in a foreign conflict “can be framed as an act of cosmopolitan citizenship” (p.742).
At a time in which the globe is organized into distinct territorial segments
by the Westphalian state system, cosmopolitan citizenship is not easily
performed. Benedict Anderson’s influential Imagined Communities (1983)
describes the contrast of communitarianism, generally understood to
signify the connection between a human and a wider community with
specific geographic ties. Anderson expands that nationality is the pillar of
communitarianism and therefore acts as the defining identity structure of
the modern world: “everyone can, should, will ‘have’ a nationality” (p.49). However, Anderson also stresses that nationality itself remains ‘imagined’ (ibid) and similarly reminds that nationalism entails the invention of a
nation-state as a unit of territorial, political and social value. Whilst
cosmopolitanism is not viewed as the antonym of nationalism, it is the
assumption that a ‘cosmopolite’ rejects this ideological narrative that makes this paradigm significant in the case of the foreign fighter.
Brown extends his examination of cosmopolitanism to proffer that it “is compatible with a rejection of politics” (1992, p.24). Jennifer Mustapha’s assessment of several thousand-strong foreign fighter contingent in
Bosnia during the Yugoslav wars as cosmopolites hinges upon this claim of
a fighter’s self-enforced emancipation from their previous state in favour
of a supra-nationalist identity structure. These foreign fighters are
consequently heralded as “’the cosmopolitan ideal’” (Mustapha, 2013, p.742) as they embody a citizenship that actively seeks to transcend and
discard territorial borders. Moreover, Balibar (2006) argues in favour of an
academic distinction between ‘cosmopolitanism’ as an ideal
and
‘cosmopolitics’ as a lived practice, imbued with the intrinsic transnational
motive that encourages one to “escape sovereignty and cross boundaries” (in ibid).
16
3.21 Citizenship and the State
Mustapha’s research into the foreign fighters involved in the 1990s Yugoslav wars spans numerous academic fields to draw connections
between this case and various established socio-geographical and legal
concepts. Mustapha (2013) recounts the granting of Bosnian citizenship to
many foreign fighters as a reward for their military bravery (Zosak, 2009)
shortly after 1996, despite the explicit statement in the Dayton Peace
Accords that the previous foreign ‘mujahideen’ must evacuate. This appeals directly to ‘acts-citizenship’, which is closely aligned with ‘cosmopolitics’. ‘Acts-citizenship’ decrees the importance of comprehending citizenship as a fluid concept, enacted by practices that
“can actually serve to de-localize borders and challenge existing notions of
state-centered citizenship” (Mustapha, 2013, p.745). In this case, allowing ‘foreign’ individuals to become citizens of a state that they previously bore
no national ties to. This will be examined in-depth in Chapter One with
regard to the production of collective systems of meaning.
After over a decade of residency - a decade that bore witness to a number
of terrorist attacks on the West at the hands of extreme Islamist
organizations - the Bosnian government became increasingly concerned
about the former-mujahid community (Mustapha, 2013). In 2007 the
government in
Sarajevo
revoked around 600
of these
previously
‘rewarded’ citizenships (Erjavec, 2009). Mustapha posits that this illustrates “the power of the state sovereign over the modern subject, as well as the power of the state to produce the ‘stateless’ modern subject” (2013, p.743), recalling Hannah Arendt’s (1951) prompt that individual
human rights are intrinsically bound to the modern nation-state system.
Therefore,
a
modification
of
these
rights
necessarily
entails
a
readjustment of the citizen-state interrelationship (Mustapha, 2013). In
the case of the newly-Bosnian foreign fighters, this readjustment appears
simply that “the state has simply decided that its hospitality should no 17
longer extend to them” (ibid, p.751); extracting nationality and (by
extension) civil rights from these individuals. However, this retraction has
implications in realms other than the legal; in a social context, these
previously ‘heroic’ foreign fighters became vilified in popular discourse. As Vaughn-Williams discusses, the “propensity to equate cosmopolitanism with grand gestures of inclusion” (2007, p.44) has limited practical applicability.
3.3 The Resurgence of pan-Islamism
Much has been made of the elastic association between foreign fighters
and identity, in which the re-emergence of pan-Islamism appears vital.
Malet (2009) describes that foreign fighters constitute “a particular identity community whose members have salient transnational identities” (p.109)”. In this way, it is argued that the foreign fighter’s sense of belonging is closer allied with a supra-nationalist belief rather than a
nation-state construct. This supra-identity structure aligns with many of
the basic foundations of Islamism as a political ideology. Hence, much
literature on foreign fighters has conceptualized these transnational
mobilizations concomitantly with the post-1980 Islamist resurgence, which
itself necessitates further deconstruction.
The pre-modern Islamic conception of the ‘ummah’, referring to a global community of Muslims that ignores all local distinctions, has been
harnessed regularly by extremist organizations to garner support for
foreign conflicts (Hegghammer, 2011). Olivier Roy characterizes the split
in Islamist ideology at the turn of the millennium as a choice between
integration and normalization within the framework of the state (2006,
p.1) and what he terms ‘neofundamentalism’;; “a closed, scripturalist and conservative view of Islam that rejects the national and statist dimension
in favour of the ummah” (ibid). However, it is the tying of this universal
unification concept to the ‘religious duty’ of jihad that is credited as the
vital driving force for the resurgence of Islamism (Hafez, 2009).
18
Though this study does not take the rebirth of modern Islamism as its
impetus, especially in light of its political heterogeneity (Hegghammer,
2011), it is necessary to review this ideological development to establish
its impression upon social movement. Islamism as a political ideology is
noted to have undergone a comprehensive renovation over the last
century - particularly since the 1967 Arab-Israeli conflict – as Joffé writes,
its resurrection is “a striking testament to Arab perceptions of the bankruptcy of nationalism” (2007, p.173). Joffé furthers that this antinationalist movement was paralleled by the overwhelming rejection of the
Western state systems of democracy and capitalism.
The employment of the ‘ummah’ doctrine in foreign fighter recruitment discourse represents not only a divergence from the Westphalian sociopolitical norm but also a fundamental contradiction in identity. As
Mendelsohn argues, while many violent non-state groups with whom
present-day foreign fighters are affiliated (including IS) have historically
criticized nationalist structures to “make space for a true a-nationalistic,
ethnicity-surmounting Islamic order” (2011, p.196), their recruitment strategy often capitalizes on these ‘imagined’ identities. Hegghammer (2011) corroborates that “extreme pan-Islamism - arguably has more in
common with nationalisms than with utopian religious constructions” (p.89); this ideal will be expanded upon during the discussion on the
publicity of the ‘Islamic State’ in Chapter Two. 3.31 Historical Perspectives
The influence of past mobilizations on foreign fighter trends cannot be
underestimated and suitably, the literature leans heavily upon the
expectation that jihadi knowledge and networks outlive the original
conflict. This focus is undeniably rooted in the first notably Islamist foreign
fighters, known as the ‘Arab Afghans’, as well as the renewal of the jihad
dogma. Abdullah Azzam, often referred to as ‘the man before Osama bin 19
Laden’ (Emerson, 1994), is widely acknowledged as responsible for recasting the Islamic concept of jihad as a personal duty into the call for
international holy war. Previously, prominent Islamic theorists such as
Sayyid Qutb, a leading member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood
during the 1950s and 60s, had advocated revolution in predominantly
Muslim states (Hegghammer, 2011). However, with the Soviet invasion of
Afghanistan in 1979, Azzam issued a fatwa explicitly encouraging all
Muslims to rise and fight in defense of the oppressed members of their
ummah. This territorially pan-Islamist perspective and the apparent “need to repel infidels from its historic lands” (Malet, 2009, p.105) resonates
strongly with the current objectives of IS, as it sits on the cusp of bi-state
control.
Thomas Hegghammer’s work on the chronological distribution of mobilizations proffers that the marked increase in foreign fighting since
1980 can be principally ascribed to “the emergence of a qualitatively new ideological movement or subcurrent of Islamism” (2011, p.71). As this new ideological movement became entrenched in Islamist communities,
the focus shifted away from the defense of the ummah towards an offense
strategy for the ‘reinstallment’ of the Islamic Caliphate. Abdullah Azzam’s approach, codified in his prolific texts, both differs from and converges
with the prevailing orthodoxy on jihad. Whilst Azzam stresses individual
obligation,
he
also
guides
prospective
foreign
jihadists
towards
transnational identity.
3.32 The Spanish Civil War, the ‘Arab-Afghans’ and the Sinjar Records
Mendelsohn (2011) claims that foreign fighters are most often implicated
in situations of asymmetric conflict or by the use of disproportionate force,
which typically involves non-state actors - “usually a guerilla force or another irregular outside group” (p.190). In this manner, foreign fighters evade the laws of their donor state and explicitly violate international law
20
by offering combat and administrative services to so-labeled ‘terrorist organizations’ (Malet, 2009). Therefore, many cite the involvement of an estimated 32,000-35,000 foreign volunteers in the ‘International Brigades’ during the Spanish Civil War as incongruent in the historical development
of the phenomenon. The Soviet-backed contingent (including the Abraham
Lincoln Brigade, as popularized by Ernest Hemingway) comprised of
combatants from an estimated 53 countries (Durgan, 1999). Though, by
Hegghammer’s (2011) analysis, the majority of these would be deemed ‘regional’ foreign fighters – with overwhelming numbers hailing from
France and Italy.
It is discernible that the instrumental foreign fighter motivation for the
International Brigades was a collective determination to suppress the
extension
of
fascism
across
Europe.
However,
the
chronological
distribution of foreign fighter movements as detailed by Hegghammer
(2011) is informative of the advancement of incentives. Mohammed Hafez
credits the nine-year occupation of Afghanistan by the Soviets as the
“start of the global jihadist movement whose milestones include Bosnia, Somalia, Chechnya and present-day Iraq” (2009, p.73). The dominant narrative amongst foreign fighters during the Soviet occupation of
Afghanistan emphasized fervent opposition to Communism as an atheistic
system of governance. Therefore, as I have outlined with respect to
Abdullah Azzam, the animation of the jihad dogma as international holy
war was formulated during this time, with influential input from Osama bin
Laden and the ‘Arab-Afghans’. Despite these revolutionary ideological advancements, the ‘Arab-Afghans’ are often referred to from even within Islamist circles as “jihad tourists” on account of their late arrival and an extremely low death rate (2-6%)
(Hegghammer, 2011, p.63). However, many authors note that the
principal value of studying past mobilizations lies in the formation and
maintenance of intricate socio-geographic networks which, given the
21
appropriate motivational catalyst, can develop into global insurgent
organizations. Mendelsohn observes that these networks collectively
obtain vast knowledge and often produce individuals “who are comfortable as terrorists, recruiters, trainers and media propagandists” (2011, p.189). It is the transferability of these skills that forecasts the spawning of
‘stateless’ Islamist mobs like the Islamic State. Hafez (2009) explains that, “the diversity of nationalities…reminded Muslims of the universality of their faith and…imbued them with a modern cosmopolitanism” (ibid,
p.79). As such, the Arab-Afghans re-established the archaic demand to
unite the ummah within a territorial homeland known as the Caliphate.
There is a wealth of literature on the subject of the emergence,
composition and significance of the ‘Sinjar records’, which were seized in a raid near the Iraqi town of Sinjar and received by the Combating
Terrorism Center at West Point in November 2007. These records note the
personal details of around 700 foreign nationals who entered Iraq in 2006
and 2007 for combat purposes. The vast majority of these individuals
crossed the border with Syria in order to join the splinter group ‘Al-Qaeda
in Iraq’, a vital component of IS’s development. Felter & Fishman (2007) surmise that these records are testament to the group’s efforts at international recruitment and act to construct a biographical norm of the
average foreign fighter in Iraq, which may be instrumental in identifying
the global contingent. The ‘Sinjar records’ additionally afford a unique understanding of how foreign fighters travelled to Iraq and the duties
undertaken once affiliated with an insurgent cluster (Mendelsohn, 2011).
It is crucial to emphasize that whilst the literature on previous conflicts
can be informative, the foreign fighters received by the Islamic State of
Iraq and Sham (IS) between 2011 and 2014 represent a total rupture
with historical circumstances. In terms of scale, ideological narrative,
territorial objectives and media involvement, IS’s incorporation of truly ‘global’ foreign fighters necessitates an exhaustive analysis. In order for 22
this to be appreciated, the inclusion of an evolutionary overview of IS
from an Al-Qaeda splinter to an international terrorist organization is
advantageous.
3.4 From ISI to ISIS to IS
The roots of the group now referred to simply as ‘Islamic State’ (previously IS) are tethered to the allied invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the
subsequent civil war of 2006-2007. On October 13th 2006, shortly after
the death of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, an influential figurehead of the antiAmerican Iraqi insurgency, the formation of Dawlat al-Iraq al-Islamiyya
(or ‘Islamic State of Iraq’, hereafter ISI) was announced. In reality, this
‘new’ jihadist party was an offshoot of Al-Qaeda in Iraq, who had already
claimed authority over 7 Iraqi governorates, including Baghdad. However,
according to Felter & Fishman (2007) this institutional name-change was a
merely intended as a political decoy “designed to put an Iraqi face on alQa’ida’s effort” (p.5). The establishment of an ISI cabinet of governance to
administrate
and
unify
resistance
to
US
occupation
attracted
international attention, despite overwhelming academic reflection upon its
relative failure (ibid).
Following a number of particularly brutal attacks on Iraqi civilians in the
last two years of US occupation, ISI was popularly deemed insignificant on
behalf of poor ideological unity and a lack of clearly defined objectives.
Nevertheless, ISI expanded to encompass areas of Northern Syria (known
as ‘Sham’ or the ‘Levant’) and seized the opportunity of governmental weakness during the Syrian uprising to advance into this region in 2012.
The newly amalgamated ‘Islamic State of Iraq and Sham’ (now IS) initially encountered hostility from the Al-Qaeda-affiliated Jabhat al-Nusra (JN),
another noteworthy rebel militia.
IS Emir Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi’s suggestion of an orchestrated merge of the two armed jihadist groups in 2012 was bluntly rejected, inspiring JN to
23
renew its ba’yah or ‘allegiance’ to Al-Qaeda central leader Ayman alZawahiri. Amongst expressed trepidation over IS’s brutal rule in the Syrian town of Raqqah, Zawahiri himself publicly announced his intention
to disassociate and disband the organization from the global Al-Qaeda
umbrella. As Al-Tamimi notes, “the JN-IS split is perhaps the greatest
internal division in the transnational jihadist movement in a single
country” (2014, p.7). To date, the relationship between JN and IS remains vitriolic, with rebel ‘in-fighting’ dominating the focus of combat in Syria
since early 2014.
3.41 Territorial Expansion and ‘Khilāfāh’-building
There have been many notable trends sparked by IS’s actions in Syria and Iraq thus far: the aforementioned direct challenge to Al-Qaeda central
(and the resultant in-fighting), and secondly the expression (and
arguably, the demonstration) of the ultimate Islamist goal to build a
functioning Caliphate. Many authors have cited the importance of these
extensive territorial gains and acts of Caliphate-building, both in Syria and
more recently in Iraq, for the inept labeling of IS as a ‘non-state’ actor. Al-Tamimi (2014) discusses that the effort expended by IS to cement
territorial gains in Syria with administrative systems is testament to IS’s objective of true Islamic governance, both within its consolidated territory
and internationally. By this measure, it is evident that IS have exerted a
much more accomplished approach to political control in their Syrian
territory than ISI achieved during the Iraq war (ibid).
In June 2014, in a ‘Sinjar-esque’ intelligence raid, Iraqi security services seized 160 USB drives from the home of IS’s head military council. This trove of information included the names of foreign fighters, senior leaders
and embedded ministry sources as well as a comprehensive breakdown of
the group’s finances (Chulov, 2014). IS’s economic resources were estimated at $2 billion at this time (including Syrian oil reserves),
24
inevitably bolstered by the take-over of major Iraqi cities like Mosul and
Tikrit in June.
However, Al-Tamimi (2014) insists that the most momentous feature of
IS’s operational capability remains the group’s successful state building. He furthers that IS have launched “a political strategy through social services, the media and educational outreach” (ibid, p.13) which is likely
to produce a new prototype for any jihadist movement seeking to control
territory. “IS has carved a de facto state in the borderlands of Syria and
Iraq” (Ollivant & Fishman, 2014, unpaginated) and whilst the state itself
remains understandably unrecognized by the international community and
therefore ‘extralegal’, IS appears to be fully functioning as a state power. Ollivant & Fishman (2014) warn that this power is the fundamental
dissimilarity between IS and ISI as its predecessor, as it pertains the
capacity to both expand and defend territory simultaneously, despite
accusations that it “may be less a state with an army than an army with a state” (unpaginated).
Al-Tamimi (2014) explains that the Caliphate is intended to eventually
dominate the entire rest of the world, with competing religious ideologies
crushed by the dictum (originally outlined by Osama bin Laden) that
“there are only three choices in Islam: conversion, subjugation, or death” (p.11). As adopted by IS in matters of administrating religious minorities
in currently held territories, this pronouncement hints at current attempts
at state building that expose a hybrid of theocratic and totalitarian
governing strategies. In this fashion, Malet (2009) argues that IS’s definitive schema is more focused upon social dynamics than purely
territorial expansion;; “they fight not to protect a territory but to recreate a community” (p.110). Though there is a case to be made concerning the community cohesion aspect of IS’s strategy, it is undeniable that a statebuilding approach has been realized and enacted. These foundational
activities include dispensing ‘justice’ (as defined by sharia law), collecting
25
tax, expanding and administrating a compliant armed force and providing
education.
The latter, known as da’wah, has seen IS concentrate upon children as
easily indoctrinated political agents to foster an ideological vision and
guarantee future support (Al-Tamimi, 2014), to be illustrated in Chapter
Two. IS’s production and distribution of bread has drawn similar scrutiny, with journalists claiming that the group has capitalized on the appalling
living conditions induced by rebel warfare in order to seduce local
populations
who
may
have
otherwise
sided
with
secular
forces.
Regardless, this program exhibits unambiguous state-building targets,
with IS even introducing a formal ration card system in some Aleppo
suburbs.
Malet (2009) argues that these types of activities perennially damage the
universal perception of state constitution, weakening conventions that
have been enshrined within international law; namely sovereignty,
effective control and territorial integrity. Similarly, and as will be
illustrated in the forthcoming analysis, IS has crippled the notion of
national citizenship, with both its employment of foreign fighters and its
disregard for established national borders. As Malet regards, these
institutions
will
grow weaker “as the number and proportion of insurgencies that go transnational rise” (2009, p.112). The declaration of the establishment of the Caliphate on the 29 th of June
by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi signifies a colossal shift in the discursive
narrative surrounding IS. Ollivant & Fishman (2014) have described this
consolidation of previously Syrian and Iraqi regions into a new ‘Islamic State’ as a “safe haven for transnational ambitions” (unpaginated). This is
testament to the concern that this land could become a nucleus for the
proliferation of extremely brutal sharia rule. Additionally, the estimation of
over 3,000 European foreign fighters resident within the Caliphate as of
26
August 2014 (ibid; Williams, 2014), the majority of which hold EU
passports, exacerbates the fear that this territory may act as a
springboard for international terrorism.
27
4. Chapter One:
‘Sometimes You Just Gotta Get Up and Go’
4.1
This chapter will focus on the contention explored in the literature review
that the foreign fighter represents the ultimate cosmopolitan figure. Using
IS’s official media outlet, Al-Hayat Media Center, among other individual
social media output, I will discuss how IS foreign fighters portray,
embrace and sanction the social phenomenon of transnationalism. It is
vital to distinguish between IS propaganda aimed at recruitment and
multimedia produced for the purposes of endorsing the Islamic State as a
legitimate territorial entity. Whilst these two strategies often intersect, the
techniques by which they are executed are vastly divergent. In the
interest of accomplishing a comprehensive analysis, I have divided these
strands into two isolated chapters.
These propagandist media sources that are intended to promote the
transcendence of geographic borders in favor of the global ummah often
paradoxically exploit nationally specific symbols and popular cultural
references in order to capture the desired audience. As such, the foreign
fighter/presenter figure can often simultaneously embody a patriot and a
vehement anti-nationalist. This appeals directly to David Malet’s (2009) understanding of foreign fighter identity as fluid and mulltifarious. Malet
explains
that
consequently,
successful
recruitment
requires
an
increasingly specialized approach on behalf of the recruiter to target
“outside groups expected to identify with their cause because of some relation” (ibid, p.100). The amalgamation of these multiple identities is
therefore made salient by a sense of threat that appeals to one or more
facets. In the case of IS’s direct recruitment, these facets are namely oppression and obligation, as will be elucidated by the forthcoming
examples.
28
Thus far, “researchers have largely overlooked transnational recruitment” (ibid, p.97) to foreign conflict. However, there have been attempts to
codify a structural process by which to effectively analyze these sources.
Accordingly, I have employed John Wilson’s (in Schiffrin et al., 2001) 3stage message deconstruction method, as supported by Hegghammer
(2011). This process necessitates the distinguishing of the diagnosis, the
prognosis and the rationale of the ‘problem’ that the propaganda narrates. 4.2 Rayat al Tawheed
The IS sub-cluster known as ‘Rayat al Tawheed’ (meaning loosely ‘Banner of God’) presents an impressive model of multimedia as operated by an insurgency for the purposes of recruitment. Comprising of a majority of
British foreign fighters, the group portray adept audiovisual production
and editing skills and also social media strategy for post-production
proliferation. At the peak of the online jihadist recruitment trend in late
2013, the group ran a Twitter account, an Instagram profile, a YouTube
channel, a Facebook page and an AskFM account. The group’s social media avatar can be seen in figure 1, displaying the flag of IS surrounded
by gold Kalashnikovs.
29
Figure 1: Rayat al Tawheed Avatar (courtesy of YouTube.com)
As a response to the ‘shahadah’ [martyrdom] of one of Rayat al Tawheed’s key members, a video was released on the subject of the
individual duty of Muslims that have remained in the West to support the
families of the deceased fighter. In this video, entitled ‘Know Your Role’, one balaclava-clad combatant exclaims,
“It’s a disgrace that brothers know where these wives are, that brothers know where these families are, and yet you might be
buying your nephew or your child a PS4, and you’re taking them out to Nando’s. And you’re okay, your BT bill is getting paid for.”
There are numerous embedded semiotic references in this passage,
presumably applied in order to draw the viewer into a sense of a shared
culture. By illustrating this statement with allusions to a comfortable
Western lifestyle complete with the luxuries of eating out, playing video
games and telecommunications services, the contrast provided by the
stark desert background in which the video is filmed, is made evermore
drastic. This disparity undoubtedly enhances the tone of shame that the
30
narrator is attempting to impress upon the viewer. ‘Know Your Role’ continues with the narrator imitating various excuses given by Muslims
who he purports to be ‘shirking their responsibilities to the ummah’. He teases,
“The government was too harsh on us…David Cameron and his kufr,
the alliances was too harsh on us, we couldn’t move, we were too scared to go and put something through the letter box. Wallahi
[brother], you should be ashamed of yourself.” This explicit reference to the British government bolsters Malet’s (2009)
observation of the multiplicity and fluidity of foreign fighter identity. Whilst
the viewer in this case may identify themselves as a Muslim primarily, and
a citizen of Great Britain latterly, this disparaging comment would appeal
to those who feel under-represented or even oppressed in their country of
origin – a common grievance, and therefore motivation, cited among
Western foreign fighters. In this way, nationalistic semiotics are employed
in the hope of fostering guilt and ultimately, anti-nationalism. As the
Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium states, Rayat al Tawheed
“functions mainly as a graphic design team, creating images that are
shared via social media with most of the images reflecting…anti-Western
messages and direct threats to the United Kingdom and United States” (2014, unpaginated).
4.3 Qawafil Muhajireen
Similarly, and with a possible yet currently unproven connection, is an
account named ‘Qawafil Muhajireen’. Translating roughly to ‘convoy of jihadists’, this media outlet was chiefly operated on Instagram by a small
contingent of British foreign fighters, one of whom is currently on trial for
Syria-related terrorism offences. Qawafil Muhajireen, during its brief stint
of activity, created a wealth of propagandist images and frequently shared
videos of group military training and physical combat. The group’s 31
signature style evokes many references to British and, more specifically,
London culture. Figure 2 is a photograph posted to Instagram by Qawafil
Muhajireen that manipulates the emblem of the London red bus to
galvanize anti-Western sentiments and encourage Muslims in London to
fight jihad abroad.
Figure 2: ‘Sometimes You Just Got to Get Up and Go’ (courtesy of instagram.com)
Figure 3, entitled ‘The London to Shaam Collection’ appears to imitate the more sincere photographs posted by various foreign fighters detailing the
essential equipment needed to fight jihad abroad. This mimicking of
previous foreign fighter movements strengthens Mendelsohn’s (2011) notion of the legacy of transnational jihadism. In the Qawafil Muhajireen
version, the inclusion of items like Lynx body spray, Hollister underwear,
Body Shop moisturizer, and an Ultimate Fighting Championship boxing
glove, may serve specifically to target a younger British generation. As
such, Qawafil Muhajireen is inciting support for the jihadist cause by
utilizing multimedia to popularize and normalize fighting in a foreign
conflict. This photograph appears to carry the underlying message of ‘we 32
used to be London boys, accustomed to a comfortable Western lifestyle,
just like you’. Figure 3: ‘The London to Shaam Collection’ (courtesy of Instagram.com)
4.4 Citizenship of the Khilāfāh
One particular thread of foreign fighter-produced media to emerge during
the Syrian conflict has attracted overwhelming attention from British news
organizations. Photographs and videos of foreign fighters setting fire to
their passports (Dutch, in the case of figure 4) has drawn critical
questions of national citizenship status and self-enforced ‘statelessness’, such as those discussed in the literature review, to the forefront of
conversation surrounding the involvement of European combatants in IS.
This recalls Hegghammer’s oft-cited phrase with irony; foreign fighters
“are insurgents in every respect but their passports” (2011, p.55). 33
Figure 4: Profile
Picture (courtesy of
Facebook.com)
However, following the declaration of the establishment of the Caliphate
on the 29th of June, another passport craze captured the attention of
international news outlets. The below photograph of IS ‘passports’ (figure 5) encapsulates the significance of the drive for an Islamic heartland to
unify
the
ummah
and the foreign fighter’s ultimate shunning of conventional Westphalia-dictated nationality. Whilst these documents are
evidently far from legitimate, their significance lies in the notion that IS is
shown here to be inviting prospective citizens to the new ‘Islamic State’ whilst forthrightly rejecting the ‘idol’ of nationalism in other recruitment propaganda.
Figure 5: ‘Passports’ of the Islamic State (courtesy of Instagram.com)
34
4.5 ‘Mujatweets’
IS’s official media center, ‘Al-Hayat’ has been the nucleus of the group’s media production efforts, focusing initially on recruitment of foreign
fighters to jihad and more recently on encouraging all Muslims to make
‘hijrah’ (migration for the purpose of establishing a better life) to the
Islamic State. Al-Hayat Media Center produces and publishes high-quality
videos featuring foreign fighters, which are subsequently circulated on
open platforms like Twitter. These videos and in particular a series of
short films dubbed ‘Mujatweets’, are exceedingly informative for understanding the scale and range of nationalities affiliated with the
organization, providing a rare immediate perspective of the phenomena
that Ollivant & Fishman (2014) have described as the creation of “a multiethnic army;; almost a foreign legion” (unpaginated).
In the fourth of the Mujatweets series a German foreign fighter (seen
below in figure 6) takes the audience into a field hospital in Northern Syria
to visit an injured fellow IS combatant. Speaking in German, with subtitles
available in English, Russian and Arabic, the foreign fighter expresses his
elation to be living in “the land of honor” and encourages others to make hijrah to the Caliphate to join the mujahideen. The German references
35
various
hadiths
(Islamic
teachings)
to
advise
the
viewer
on
the
significance of IS fighters obtaining injuries in battle and speaks of the
global importance of maintaining Islamic solidarity. The truly global reach
of this video both in terms of production capability and discursive message
exemplifies IS’s exploitation of the omnipresence of social media to
promote transnational fighting.
Figure 6: Mujatweets #4 (courtesy of Al-Hayat Media Center)
The sixth Mujatweets video features a French foreign fighter (whose nom
de guerre is given as Abu Tamimah) and adheres flawlessly to John
Wilson’s (2001) three-step process of recruitment message analysis. Abu
Tamimah begins by making a diagnosis of the problem facing his
community, as Hegghammer (2011) articulates, this usually details “that the Muslim nation (umma) faces an existential external threat” (p.73).
The fighter consequently, once again subtitled in English, reminds of every
Muslim’s individual duty [fard ayn] to perform jihad as defined by
Abdullah Azzam, providing Wilson’s structure with its prognosis stage. He communicates in French (as shown in figure 7):
36
“I would like to invite my brothers in faith to leave the lands of the
tawaghit [unbelievers] and join the Islamic state because it is an
obligation on you today”
Figure 7: Mujatweets #6 (courtesy of Al-Hayat Media Center)
Abu Tamimah furthers this contention with a warning to all Muslims to
comprehend of the gravity of their choice with reference to giving ba’yah [allegiance] to IS’s Emir and Khalifah Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi (as seen in
figure 8).
Figure 8: Mujatweets #6 (courtesy of Al-Hayat Media Center)
37
Finally, Abu Tamimah verbalizes Hegghammer’s expectation of Wilson’s third stage: rationale, commonly “that all able Muslim men worldwide join the fighting because Islamic law requires it” (2011, p.74). The French foreign fighter encourages all Muslims to do “jihad for the sake of Allah, in
support of the Khilafah and the ummah”, reminding prospective foreign fighters viewing the material that nationality is subordinate to the
responsibility to protect ‘oppressed brothers and sisters’.
4.6 ‘There is no life without jihad’
This notion of obligation to protect is particularly vehemently expressed in
a 13-minute video entitled ‘There is no life without jihad’, again produced by Al-Hayat. The video features three British and two Australian foreign
fighters, three of whom can be seen below in figure 9. A British fighter
with a heavy Welsh accent begins by detailing the transnational nature of
IS and stating the crucial motivation for all foreign fighters:
“We have brothers from Bangladesh, from Iraq, from Cambodia, Australia, UK. Nothing has gathered us except to make Allah’s word the highest.”
Figure 9: ‘There is no life without jihad’ (courtesy of Al-Hayat
Media Center)
38
Another British foreign fighter continues with the empathetic assertion
that Muslims living in the West are oppressed by their respective
governments:
“To all my brothers living in the West, I know how you feel. When I used to live there…in the heart you feel depressed…you feel like you have no honor...all my brothers, come to jihad and feel the honor
we are feeling”
By contrast to the narrative exhibited in the ‘Mujatweets’ series, ‘There is no life without jihad’ focuses initially on the grievances felt by its potential audience and latterly on the obligation of jihad for all Muslims. This hybrid
prognosis may allow the viewer to first identify a sense of solidarity, which
39
is then maneuvered into a message of recruitment and duty. As an
Australian foreign fighter demands the justification for abstaining:
“This is a message to the brothers who have stayed behind…you need to ask yourselves what prevents you from coming to the land
of Izzah, what prevents you from joining the ranks of the
Mujahideen”.
The Australian foreign fighter continues delivering his moral warning by
animating the contrast between the lives of the fellow Muslim Syrian
people and the Muslim living in the West who has not yet ‘fulfilled his responsibility’. This tactic of ‘lifestyle-shaming’ is common throughout IS propaganda
and
has
proven
particularly
effectual.
The
Australian
exclaims,
“While you’re sitting in comfort, while you’re sleeping, while you’re going shopping, they’re giving their blood, they’re sleeping on the floor”.
4.7 Dabiq
The Al-Hayat Media Center is however not limited to video production and
in July 2014, released the first official IS magazine, which takes its name,
‘Dabiq’, from the area of Northern Syria where Muslims believe the Armageddon will begin (Hickey, 2014). By comparison to Al-Qaeda’s infamous Inspire publication, Dabiq prioritizes collective recruitment over
individual training, focusing on motivating readers to make hijrah to the
Caliphate rather than waging jihad both against the West.
40
Figure 10: Dabiq #1: The Return of the Khilāfāh (courtesy of AlHayat Media Center)
The publication of the first issue of Dabiq (cover shown in figure 10)
coincided seamlessly with the declaration of the Islamic State. As such, it
is entitled ‘The Return of the Khilāfāh’ and comprises mostly of Quranic references and information on regional issues in the consolidated
territories, known as ‘Islamic State Reports’. However, the account given of the previous foreign fighter mobilization in Afghanistan is enlightening
of IS’s internal historical narrative and corroborates Malet’s (2009)
emphasis on past mobilizations. It reads:
“many of the muhajirin found themselves fighting a war similar to
the
one
being
fought
in
Sham
now.
Parties
with
different
backgrounds fought a “common” enemy…the biggest of these distinguishing factors were nationalism that tainted many of the
banners and parties in Afghanistan” (Dabiq #1, 2014, p.35)
This particular quote encapsulates the IS approach to foreign fighting. By
unifying the Muslim ummah in a singular narrative, IS attempts to order
and police the limits of what can be included and excluded from this unity.
It is clear that IS seeks to abolish all Western-centric political convention,
41
including nationalism, democracy and secular liberalism within the
territorial limits of the Caliphate. These systems would be replaced
singularly by sharia as the main governmental structure, vilifying any
form of alternate forms of power. These sentiments are reinforced in the
second
issue
of
Dabiq,
published
in
late
July,
with
the
explicit
encouragement of Muslims to make hijrah with their “parents, siblings, spouses, and children” (Dabiq #2, 2014, p.3).
4.8 ‘Eid Greetings from the land of Khilāfāh’
Another full-length Al-Hayat creation, labeled ‘Eid Greetings from the land of Khilāfāh’ showcases an impressive diversity of foreign fighters who are captioned by two pieces of information (seen in figure 11).
42
Figure 11: ‘Eid Greetings from the land of Khilāfāh’ (courtesy of AlHayat
Media
Center)
Identifying these eight foreign fighters by both their nom de guerre and
country of origin, Al-Hayat reminds its audience that these men were once
spectators of jihad and previously self-identified in accordance with a
Westphalian nation-state. The international mujahideen convey varying
messages through the medium of Al-Hayat, the majority of which focus
upon the encouragement of Muslims to make hijrah, to be further
discussed in chapter two. However, the Finnish Abu Shu’ayb as-Somali
43
explicitly makes the call for “all the Muslims living in the West, America,
Europe and everywhere else”, demonstrating a nuanced perspective of transnationalism.
Additionally, Abu Jandal Al-Yemeni makes a personalized plea for the
muwahiddin [Sunni Muslims] of Indonesia to perform jihad with the
Islamic State (seen in figure 12). Whilst this video explicitly adheres to
another IS media strategy, the promotion of the Caliphate as a fully
functioning state, the significance of the international approach taken by
Al-Hayat cannot be underestimated. With the inclusion of foreign fighters
from eight different nations, speaking in five different languages, and with
subtitles available in English, Russian and Arabic, it clear that IS’s media division have embraced the transnational nature of its fighting contingent
as much as it seeks to buttress this phenomenon.
Figure 12: Eid Greetings from the land of Khilāfāh’ (courtesy of AlHayat Media Center)
44
5. Chapter Two:
“You will conquer Rome and own the world, if Allah wills”
5.1
This chapter will focus upon the media strategy employed by IS to
promote both the establishment of the Islamic Caliphate and to cement
this notion as a territorial and geographical entity within international
discourse. Through the method of propaganda message analysis, I seek to
situate
the
official
narrative
proliferated
by
IS
within
the
re-
territorialization of Islamism using popular media sources to evidence the
surpassing of Westphalia-dictated geopolitical borders. In the drive for the
creation of a new pseudo-state, IS has undergone a significant process of
re-branding itself from a global insurgency into a functioning territorial
unit
that
is
undertaking
solidifying
state-building
practices
while
simultaneously attempting to expand territorially.
As an organization with two distinct territorial objectives articulated in its
name, ‘the Islamic State of Iraq and Sham’, the eventual prominence of territorial objectives was arguably inevitable. However, the scale upon
which IS has been capable of acquiring territory was unprecedented.
Estimates of IS territorial control differ greatly, however it is possible to
discern that as of August 2014, the group controlled large swathes of
Northwest Syria and Eastern Iraq, spanning Deir Ez-Zor, Anbar and
Nineveh provinces (as shown in figure 13). Both the limits of IS presence
and military proficiency are no longer transparent. However, gathering
material from official IS media outlet allows for an enhanced perspective
on the group’s current understanding of its own territorial intentions as well as its future intentions.
Figure 13: Map showing IS control of Syria and Iraq (courtesy of
The Economist, August 2014)
45
5.2 ‘There is no life without jihad’
In the aforementioned ‘There is no life without jihad’ video, produced once more by IS’s sophisticated multimedia department, Al-Hayat Media
Center, the British and Australian foreign fighters featured discuss the
gravity of the establishment of the Caliphate with regard to the previous
geopolitical borders. One individual, named ‘Abu Bara al-Hindi from
Britain’ expresses: “We are a state who is implementing the sharia in both Iraq and Sham, and look as soldiers we understand no borders, we have
participated in battles in Sham, and we will go to Iraq in a few days
and we will fight there bismillah [in the name of God]. And come
back, and we will even go to Jordan and Lebanon with no problems.” This statement fully delimits IS’s goal of the abolition of all geographical borders in the regions of its occupation to serve the formation and
subsequent expansion of the Khilāfāh. Accordingly, foreign fighters often express their transnationalism by offering combat services across nations.
As another British foreign fighter pronounces in a personal address to his
Emir, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi:
46
“We are your sharp arrows, throw us at your enemies wherever they may be, we will return the borders which goes all the way to AlAndalus and Al-Jazeera”
The IS principle that the limits of territorial integrity should physically
resemble frontiers rather than concrete and visibly demarcated borders in
the classical geopolitical sense is evident here. In the description of these
limits as frontiers, IS has implied the potential for immediate expansion
and outlined a strategy of constant combat engagement. Further evidence
of this approach to traditional territorial margins is exhibited by figure 14,
showing a British foreign fighter standing in front of IS graffiti. In lieu of
its mass regional takeover, IS continues to capture and oversee the
subsequent eradication of numerous border crossings with Iraq and more
recently, Lebanon.
Figure 14: ‘This Khilāfāh will have no borders’ (courtesy of twitter.com)
47
5.3 ‘The End of Sykes-Picot’
The obliteration of the Sykes-Picot border and the accompanying highquality Al-Hayat video provoked global concerns over IS’s seemingly unstoppable territorial aspirations. ‘The End of the Sykes-Picot’ systematically ridicules both the border agreement wagered between
governments of France and the United Kingdom in 1916 and the recent
fleeing of the Iraqi army from IS advance. Originally intended to
orchestrate the division of spheres of control or influence in the Middle
East in secret, the agreement spanned areas of Jordan, Turkey, Iraq,
Syria and Lebanon (Friedman, 2000), seen below in figure 15.
Figure 15: Map of the ‘Sykes-Picot Agreement’ of 1916 (courtesy of International Business Times)
However, when the agreement was exposed during the Bolshevik
Revolution
a
year
later,
Britain
and
France
were
understandably
humiliated – compounded with its calamitous concurrence with the Balfour
declaration, published just three days earlier (Fromkin, 1989).
Featuring an ethnically Chilean foreign fighter named Abu Safiyya who
came to jihad from Finland, the video begins with a brief introduction to
the location (seen in figure 16) and a tour of the dilapidated border
checkpoint. Abu Safiyya indicates where Iraqi army soldiers would have
stood guard and gestures to a large IS flag flying above the area. He
narrates,
48
“This is the so-called border of Sykes-Picot, alhamdulilah [thanks and
praise to god] we don’t recognize it and we will never recognize it.
Inshallah [god willing] this is not the first border we will break, inshallah
we will break all the borders also” Figure 16: ‘The End of Sykes-Picot’ (courtesy of Al-Hayat Media
Center)
Abu Safiyya continues his tour by stating his admiration for Abu Bakr alBaghdadi’s idealist foreign policy:
“He is the breaker of barriers, inshallah [god willing] we will break the
barrier of Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, all the countries”. He later reiterates,
“the other countries are on their way, they’re on the list inshallah.
Dawlatul-Islam [Islamic State] will take all of the countries of Islam”.
At present, it is unclear how realistic this aspiration may be with reference
to the potential of Western intervention. However, it is evident that IS’s ‘worldview’ is heavily reliant on the successful expansion of the Caliphate to encompass not least the ‘Muslim world’ at present but to relentlessly 49
spread its ideological narrative through da’wah [preaching of Islam] and
jihad to the rest of the globe. Abu Safiyya further evokes this notion of
global unification under the banner of pan-Islamism and the previously
mentioned ‘ummah’ doctrine. In figure 17 the Chilean foreign fighter can be seen standing by a map demarcating the Iraqi-Syria border. He
narrates, while gesticulating at either side of the map,
“This was Iraq, this was Sham. But now, this is all one country
inshallah, one dawlah [state] inshalllah, one ummah inshallah.” Figure 17: “This is a map of the border” (courtesy of Al-Hayat
Media Center)
Abu Safiyya continues with an exploration of the administrative buildings
that surround the border crossing, denigrating the supposed frailty of the
Iraqi national army and criticizing Iraqi nationalism as un-Islamic. Pointing
to an Iraqi flag above a doorway (seen in figures 18 and 19), the foreign
fighter exclaims:
“This is the flag of Iraq, flag of shirk [idolatry]. Prophet Muhammad
said ‘whoever calls to a nationality is not from me’”.
50
Figure 18: “Flag of Iraq” (courtesy of Al-Hayat Media Center)
Figure 19: “Flag of shirk” (courtesy of Al-Hayat Media Center)
5.4 ‘Mujatweets’
The Al-Hayat-produced Mujatweets series mentioned in chapter one also
provides a valuable perspective on the geopolitical narrative that IS
attempts to broadcast and how these ambitions are digitally proliferated
and therefore socially embedded. In the sixth Mujatweets episode, Abu
Tamimah reminds the viewer of the importance of proper implementation
51
within the territories under current IS control. The emphasis he places
upon the implementation of sharia (see figure 20) as the essential and
ultimate form of governance seeks to animate the depiction of the
Caliphate as a sovereign state.
Figure 20: Mujatweets #6 (courtesy of Al-Hayat Media Center)
However, Abu Tamimah introduces a novel dimension to the debate
surrounding the administration of the Khilāfāh: that of da’wah. Loosely
translated into the ‘proselytizing or preaching of Islam’, da’wah
encompasses activities such as Islamic education, the provision of basic
services and contributions of aid to the local community. Filmed in
Raqqah, the ‘capital’ of IS’s unified territory, Abu Tamimah reminds the
audience that in the ‘holy month’ of Ramadan, IS is working to provide aid to fellow Muslims who have been brutally oppressed and deprived by
Assad’s regime. Delivered in immaculate French (shown subtitled in figure 21), he states, “there are children, orphans, and poor families, and we
help them”. This affirmation utilizes the ummah dogma to galvanize
sentiments of gratitude and honorability for IS, elevating the group to the
status of a ‘state-actor’. Figure 21: Mujatweets #6 (courtesy of Al-Hayat Media Center)
52
Similarly, the seventh video in the Mujatweets series is filmed in a food
market in central Raqqah and appears to exhibit a utopian scene, ordered
around a successfully orchestrated daily life. With high-definition shots of
fresh, exotic produce, of foreign fighters browsing tranquilly with children
smiling and waving at them, Al-Hayat has achieves the normalizing and
glorifying of jihad (see figures 22 and 23). This scene of quotidian
normality is set against the backdrop of an area that has suffered
infrastructural devastation and a significant loss of life at the hands of
regime barrel bombs.
Figure 22: Mujatweets #7 (courtesy of Al-Hayat Media Center)
53
Figure 23: Mujatweets #7 (courtesy of Al-Hayat Media Center)
This narrative of peaceful and diplomatic administration of Raqqah as the
nucleus of the Khilāfāh continues in the most recent installment of
Mujatweets, which focuses upon a communal iftar meal (taken after
sunset during Ramadan). A Dutch foreign fighter explains that some of
the IS mujahideen are preparing food in a cafeteria for other fighters and
their families to enjoy (seen in figure 24). He concludes with a message of
encouragement for those wishing to make hijrah:
“My message to every Muslim is that we call them to Sham so that you can see with your own eyes what’s happening in the land of Khilāfāh”.
Figure 24: Mujatweets #8 (courtesy of Al-Hayat Media Center)
54
5.5 Dabiq
Al-Hayat’s narrative on the subject of the Khilāfāh is taken up once again in the form of Dabiq magazine, as discussed in chapter one. Circulated
purely online, and easily downloadable in PDF format, Dabiq provides an
idyllic platform for IS to engage a broad audience at low cost and low risk.
The first issue of Dabiq explicitly concentrated on the implications of the
establishment of the Caliphate, not only for the ummah but also for the
international community. Featuring a lengthy summary of Abu Bakr alBaghdadi’s 29th of June declaration speech, Dabiq charts the historical
collapse of the ancient Islamic Caliphate at the hands of the West to
emphasize the importance of its re-establishment and catalyze contempt
for the West (figure 25).
Figure 25: Dabiq #1: ‘Khilāfāh Declared’ (courtesy of Al-Hayat
Media Center)
55
In his speech, Baghdadi utilizes emotive to justify the political magnitude
of his declaration of the establishment of the Khilāfāh. Dabiq quotes from
his speech, “We announce a new legacy of victories, further construction
of the Islamic State and expansion of its territory” (2014, p.13). However,
Baghdadi continues his euphoric lecture with the articulation of the official
IS
bipolar
world-view,
characterizing
the
globe
into
two
distinct
geopolitical ‘camps’ – the ‘camp of Islam and faith’ and the ‘camp of kufr
(disbelief) and hypocrisy’ (figure 26). This simplistic polarization recalls the
classical
socio-geographical distinctions of ‘inside/outside’, ‘included/excluded’ and ‘good/evil’. These distinctions are subsequently capitalized upon to provide a motivating factor in the audience’s prospective decision to make hijrah.
Figure 26: ‘The World Has Divided’ (courtesy of Al-Hayat Media
Center)
56
Baghdadi poignantly announces,
“Rush O Muslims to your state…Rush, because Syria is not for the Syrians, and Iraq is not for the Iraqis...The land is for the Muslims,
all the Muslims. O Muslims everywhere, whoever is capable of
performing hijrah to the Islamic State, then let him do so.” (Dabiq
#1, 2014, p.11)
The IS Emir continues his diatribe of Western political systems with the
assertion that Muslim boots “will trample the idol of nationalism, destroy the idol of democracy and uncover its deviant nature” (ibid). This is
coupled with his maligning of civilization, peace, co-existence, freedom,
patriotism and secularism as “dazzling and deceptive slogans” (ibid). As
such, Baghdadi explains that the Khilāfāh is intended to function as a 57
transnational and therefore, extra-territorial entity, with the coalescing of
all previous nationalities under the banner of pan-Islamism. In doing so,
he specifically makes reference to the trans-nationality of IS’s foreign fighter contingent, again to ostensibly normalize hijrah and jihad as
individual obligations. Baghdadi states,
“It is a Khilāfāh that gathered the Caucasian, Indian, Chinese,
Shami,
Iraqi,
Yemeni,
Egyptian,
Maghribi,
American,
French,
German and Australian.” (Dabiq #1, 2014, p.11)
In terms of future management, Baghdadi uses the opportunity afforded
by such a public platform to target exact social sub-groups to make
hijrah. Presumably in the interests of state building, he urges scholars,
fuqahā (experts in Islamic jurisprudence) and all Muslims with medical,
engineering and military expertise to relocate to the Islamic State. As
Ollivant & Fishman (2014) warn, “The Islamic State in Iraq and Syria
(ISIS) is no longer a state in name only...IS has carved a de facto
state…[it] holds territory, provides limited services, dispenses a form of
justice (loosely defined), most definitely has an army, and flies its own
flag” (unpaginated).
5.6 ‘Eid Greetings from the land of Khilāfāh
The Al-Hayat video ‘Eid Greetings from the land of the Khilāfāh’ presents a khutbah [religious sermon] taking place at a mosque within IS-held
territory. The Imam preaches,
“the nationalistic borders were broken, borders which divided the Muslims and weakened their strength after decades of division and
expulsion.” The sermon continues with the Imam detailing IS’s state-building efforts
and to lead a pledge of allegiance to Baghdadi, in which his audience vow
to “hear and obey, in our times of ease and hardship, in times of our pleasure and displeasure, with selflessness. We pledge not to dispute the
58
authority of the leaders”. This pledge explicitly recalls the contention discussed in the literature review that IS has attempted to form a
governmental hybrid of theocracy and totalitarianism that fosters blind
loyalty in the drive for an Islamic utopia.
The video continues with the inclusion of several foreign fighters, filmed
testifying to the euphoric atmosphere within the Caliphate. These fighters
apply the over-arching identity structure of pan-Islamism and the
‘ummah’ doctrine to encourage transnational migration of the entire global
Muslim population. For example, Abu Shuaib al-Afriki from South Africa
(figure 27) declares,
“There is no place in the world at the moment where you will have such safety…because when Allah is with you, there is no better place
to be…This is the wish of all sincere Muslims…to be part of one ummah”.
This sentiment is echoed by Abu Hanifah al-Belgiki (figure 27), who
declares,
“In my whole life I have never felt like a Muslim as I do now, living among the Muslims…we are living here wonderfully in great happiness.”
Figure 27: ‘Eid Greetings from the land of the Khilāfāh’ (courtesy of Al-Hayat Media Center)
59
However, Abu Shu-ayb as-Somali from Finland articulates a more forceful
message on the subject of IS’s expansionist foreign policy (figure 28). Figure 28: ‘Eid Greetings from the land of the Khilāfāh’ (courtesy of Al-Hayat Media Center)
60
As evidenced by the multitude of media sources employed, IS’s official narrative of the establishment of the Caliphate is proliferated through
various identity-based mechanisms. By placing emphasis on the historical
collapse of the former Caliphate in 1924, Baghdadi animates his
declaration speech with images of glory and justice. Al-Hayat’s production of ‘The End of Sykes-Picot’ indicates clearly the futility of geopolitical borders as installed by the West, while using a Chilean-Finnish foreign
fighter to deliver this message reminds the audience of the truly multiethnic army that have ‘answered the call’ (Ollivant & Fishman, 2014). Additionally, the pronouncement of both a bipolar world-view and an
expansionist foreign policy, made particularly obvious in Baghdadi’s address with the phrase “you will conquer Rome and own the world, if
Allah wills” (Dabiq #1, 2014, p.11) has clarified IS’s prospective territorial objectives.
61
6. Conclusion
Within the integrated framework of methods employed, with a primary
focus
on
propaganda
message
analysis,
I
have
conducted
a
comprehensive analysis of several research objectives. These are divisible
into an investigation of the role of identity for ‘foreign fighter’, both in a historical context and for IS, and the implications of the creation of an
‘Islamic State’ for conventional understandings of territory. I have discussed the significance of past mobilizations for grasping the
origins and evolution of the foreign fighter as a transnational phenomena.
However, throughout chapter one I have emphasized the importance of
identity in a geopolitical context, particularly in relation to an individual’s self-classification within the notional boundaries of ‘citizen’, ‘nationality’ and cosmopolitanism. As Bosniak (2000) asserts, understandings of
citizenship are becoming increasingly denationalized, in part due to the
communications
technology
revolution.
Therefore,
this
exploration
necessitated further deliberation on the re-emergence of overarching
identity structures like pan-Islamism and the influence of figures like
Abdullah Azzam on the anti-nationalist ideological movement.
This research pivots around the refocused use of new media outlets for
political engagement. As such, I have taken at its core the contention that
cyberspace represents a conundrum for many social science fields since it
both forsakes all sense of ‘place’ and acts as a political equalizer. However, in the case of IS, new media has been operated to a highly
contradictory
effect.
In
its
implementation
of
sophisticated
media
production and proliferation strategy across a number of platforms, most
notably via its own media branch, Al-Hayat Media Center, IS has
facilitated the exposure of its material for propaganda and recruitment
purposes. This media dexterity coupled with IS’s capitalization upon Islamist beliefs in the ummah and the obligation of jihad has proven
62
remarkably successful both in terms of foreign fighter enlistment and the
broadcasting of its global objectives.
Throughout chapter two I have examined IS’s approach towards communicating these global objectives to an international audience, by
way of digital technology. In this case, the palpable territorial gains of IS
in Syria since 2012, and in Iraq during the summer of 2014, have been
harnessed as a vehicle to project a broader intention; the transcendence
of historically Western-dictated boundaries such as the Sykes-Picot border
to signal the unification of all Muslims within a Khilāfāh. As such, I have analyzed numerous media sources in order to better comprehend how this
message is engendered and manifested. By transcribing videos, using
visual image analysis techniques and employing Wilson’s (2001) 3-stage
process
for
message
deconstruction,
I
have
illuminated
how
IS
functionally fosters and mobilizes not only foreign fighters but also
overarching ideological narratives.
With additional research funding and an extended time frame, I would
develop a more in-depth research design, amassing a larger sample size
of propaganda data. Much academic attention has been paid to the
influence of media upon the relationship between state and citizens,
especially in the cases of Iran, Turkey and the potential for digitally
enabled revolution illuminated by the Arab Spring. In most cases, by
closing off “avenues for legitimate political expression” (Berts & Stevens, 2011, p.123) the state can execute what Howard Rheingold dubbed the
‘Always On Pan-Opticon’ (in ibid): an Orwellian blanket policy that buries
popular grievances and therefore inhibits political upheaval. In light of this
assertion, I would utilize existing connections within British press
organizations as a platform to conduct a comparative analysis of
narratives proliferated by IS’s official media branch and Western news organizations.
63
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Appendices
A – Research Ethics Screening Form
68
B – Departmental Risk Form
69