New America Foundation
Militancy in Pakistan and Impacts
on U.S. Foreign Policy
Saba Imtiaz, International Security Program Carnegie Fellow
August 2014
“What is happening now, seems almost a writing
on the wall and God help us if we do not stop
these ignorant people from cutting each other’s
throat and thus bringing comfort and cheer to
our enemies.”i
Executive Summary
The state of internal security in Pakistan is a
potentially disruptive factor for the U.S.-Pakistan
relationship. Even if there is no threat posed to
the U.S. and/or American interests by Pakistanbased militant groups, the United States is
concerned by the rise of religious militancy in
Pakistan and the risks it poses to the state, to its
ability to govern effectively, and the toll it is
taking on the civilian population.
The focus of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship in
recent years has been on the Haqqani network,
and to a lesser extent, the Tehrik-e-Taliban
Pakistan, which are based in Pakistan’s tribal
areas. These groups have been the target of the
controversial C.I.A.-run drone program, which is
largely the prism through which the U.S.Pakistan relationship is seen. Homegrown
militancy in Pakistan’s urban areas has not been
a major issue in the bilateral relationship, though
it has been a source of contention. But drone
strikes – including the legality of the program and
the issue of civilian casualties– have
overshadowed the U.S.-Pakistan relationship and
discussions on counter-terrorism.
However, the fact that Pakistan is still a training
and recruitment ground for militants who would
seek to attack the United States, and that
transnational terrorism plots have been traced
back to Pakistan, is a key concern. Additionally,
this is a concern because of the intensive growth
of militant networks in urban Pakistan. This
concerns the United States because these factors
together enable a network for anti-American
militancy in addition to the existing threat from
insurgent groups based in Pakistan’s tribal areas.
This was underscored by the failed bombing
attempt on Times Square in New York in 2010
that combined both homegrown radicalization
and the supporting apparatus of Pakistani
militant networks based in the tribal areas.
The main purpose of this paper is to examine the
current U.S. assessment of the threat posed by
homegrown militancy in Pakistan’s urban centers
to American interests in South Asia, as well as to
the American homeland. It will also comment on
the reported resurgence of groups such as Jaish-eMohammad, which for several years went
dormant but today appears to be rebuilding a
public profile; implications for the future of
homegrown militancy groups are also assessed. It
will also look at the role Pakistan-based,
homegrown militant groups could play in
destabilizing South Asia, as seen by American
analysts and experts on the region. It will also
briefly analyze the growing transnational
ambitions of groups like the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi,
which has signaled that it could take its campaign
of attacking Shi’ites elsewhere in the region.
There is also the potent question of Pakistan’s
complicity in allowing militant groups to operate
within the country. The long-standing view in
Pakistan is that anti-India militant groups pose
no imminent or internal threat to Pakistan – yet
could be a useful proxy force in India and
Afghanistan – is still ingrained in its military
establishment and political sphere. There is little
belief amongst U.S. experts in Pakistan and
former and current policymakers that this policy
has changed. However, many do see a growing
realization in Pakistan that there is a problem
with homegrown militancy, yet no understanding
of how to resolve it.ii
For the purpose of this paper, I am studying the
threats posed specifically by two strains of
homegrown militancy in urban areas. The first is
the ‘traditional’ anti-India groups that have or
could potentially morph into anti-state groups.
The second is the sectarian groups that have yet
to express any aims of attacking the U.S. but
contribute to militancy in Pakistan.
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1. Introduction
A. Militancy in Pakistan
Since Pakistan’s creation in 1947, religious
intolerance and violence has plagued the country.
The division of the Indian subcontinent that saw
the creation of Pakistan was marred by one of the
largest population displacements in the world
and religious violence amongst Hindus,
Muslims, and Sikhs. Since 1958, Pakistan has
seen protracted periods of military rule. Its first
elected Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the
leader of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), was
executed under the military regime of General
Zia-ul-Haq on charges that he had abetted a
conspiracy to murder a political rival. After a
decade of military rule, Pakistan returned to
being a “democratic” country with the election of
the late Bhutto’s daughter, Benazir Bhutto, as
prime minister. Her fractious coalition and
allegations of corruption led to her dismissal by
President Ghulam Ishaq Khan two years later.
Her rival – the conservative politician Nawaz
Sharif of the Pakistan Muslim League –was voted
into power in 1990 until he too was removed
from office.
One more term followed for Bhutto (1993-1996)
and Sharif (1997-1999) respectively until General
Pervez Musharraf overthrew Sharif’s government
in a military coup on October 12, 1999.
The identity of Pakistan – whether it was meant
to be a secular or Islamic state – has long been
debated by scholars and is closely linked to the
idea of militancy in Pakistan.iii Militant groups’
goal to establish a “true” Islamic state in the
country takes root from this identity.iv It also
remains a rallying cry for right-wing groups– with
leaders of conservative parties like the Jamaat-e-
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Islami criticizing secularismv – even though the
country’s “Islamic” credentials were strengthened
by the passage of the Objectives Resolution in
1949. The Objectives Resolution is part of the
Pakistani Constitution and states that all laws
must be in line with Islamic principles.vi A
Council of Islamic Ideology exists to advise
Parliament on legislation; however, it has no
binding authority but remains an influence on
lawmakers and politicians.
Successive military and democratic regimes have
used religion for political gain as well as exploited
religious fault lines in the country that had
existed since its creation. These fault lines were
not just about different religions. Intra-Muslim
conflicts began to emerge as early as 1951, when
the first reports of violence against Shi’ites began
to emerge. While many Deobandi Muslim groups
had not supported the idea of Pakistan’s creation,
they began to take charge of Pakistan’s shift to a
Deobandi state through rhetoric and riots. Of
note is the Majlis-e-Ahrar’s anti-Ahmadi
movement in the 1950s, as well as protests by
smaller religious groups like the Islam League,
“demanding the amelioration of suffering [during
a food crisis] and a greater Islamization of
government.”vii
In the 1950s, right-wing groups launched a
massive campaign against the Ahmadi sect of
Islam, calling for its followers – who they
considered apostates – to be excommunicated
from Islam in the constitution.viii
These riots laid the groundwork for what was to
become the intensely influential role played by
the clergy and right-wing politicians in Pakistani
society and governance. This has also inspired
and provided a precedent for the militant groups
that exist in Pakistan today.ix
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In the 1970s, the anti-Ahmadi campaign resurged
and the Ahmadi sect was legally excommunicated
from Islam through an amendment to the
Pakistani constitution.x Prime Minister Zulfikar
Ali Bhutto’s government also sought to appease
right-wing groups by imposing a ban on the sale
of alcohol to Muslims.xi
In 1977, the Pakistan Army, led by General Ziaul-Haq, launched a coup and overthrew the
government. Two years later, Bhutto was tried
and executed after being convicted on charges of
abetting a conspiracy to murder a political rival.
General Zia-ul-Haq’s regime strengthened the
role of hardline Islamism in Pakistan. Measures
included legal ordinances that equated rape with
adultery, thus placing the onus on the victim,
changing the law of evidence to reduce the
standing of female witnesses, and rewriting
school textbooks to place more importance on
jihad.xii The Zia regime also further exploited
sectarianism in the country, allowing groups like
the anti-Shi’ite Anjuman-e-Sipah-e-Sahaba (later
renamed to the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan) to
flourish. The regime feared the influence of a
post-revolution Iran and its support to Shi’ite
activist groups in Pakistan, and sought to counter
it with groups such as the Sipah-e-Sahaba
Pakistan.xiii
B. Pakistan: Fighting by Proxy
Pakistan had long used the idea of militias as a
proxy of sorts in its constant war with India over
the disputed territory of Kashmir, enlisting the
support of tribes as well as battalions from
religious and political parties.xiv It also replicated
this strategy in 1971 during the war with India
that led to the split of Pakistan and the creation of
Bangladesh.
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The Pakistani military and intelligence services
had provided training and funneled support to
Afghan insurgent groups during the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan and duplicated this
strategy to the disputed territory of Kashmir in
the 1990s. There is considerable evidence that the
Pakistani military and intelligence services
recruited, trained and supported the anti-India
militias. However, these charges are routinely
denied by the military.xv These include groups
like the Hizbul Mujahideen, Lashkar-e-Taiba,
Jaish-e-Mohammad
and
Harkat-ul-Jihad-alxvi
Islami. Their use was part of a strategy to
subvert India through proxy groups while
claiming plausible deniability, and came with a
“supreme confidence” that Pakistan could control
them in the long run.xvii
Only a decade later, however, these proxy groups
became sworn enemies of their former trainers
and paymasters, almost stoking war between
India and Pakistan and embarking on a campaign
of attacks against Pakistani civilians and military
officials.
C. Homegrown Militancy and the U.S.-Pakistan
Relationship
The issue of homegrown militancy in Pakistan
has long been a policy concern in the United
States. This precedes the events of September 11,
2001 and the ensuing Operation Enduring
Freedom mounted by NATO and U.S. coalition
forces in Afghanistan that drew the world’s
attention to Pakistan.
American policymakers and analysts feared that
the violence would destabilize a volatile region.
By 1992, there was a push to designate Pakistan
as a global sponsor of terrorism because of its use
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of anti-India militant groups in Kashmir. “There
was a strong inclination inside the counterterrorism community, including the State
Department and the Bush Sr. White House, to
put Pakistan on the list of state sponsors of
terrorism,” said analyst Bruce Riedel.xviii The
move was scuttled because it was being mulled
during the transition period between the
outgoing Bush Sr. administration and the
incoming Clinton administration.xix
The threat resurfaced in 1993 as President
Clinton’s administration also considered placing
Pakistan on the list of state sponsors of
terrorism.xx Administration officials, including
Secretary of State Warren Christopher, warned
Pakistan that if circumstances did not change in
its support for militant groups, it would be forced
to take action against the country.
None of these warnings manifested into action
and they never led to any checks and balances on
Pakistan’s support and use of militias, even when
they began to develop transnational aims and
targeted foreign citizens. They began plotting
attacks against foreign citizens in India,
including kidnapping foreign tourists in
Kashmir, in the 1990s.xxi
This pattern – from being one of many groups
fighting in Kashmir to developing transnational
aims and then carrying out large-scale attacks –
would see itself repeat throughout the 2000s.
While the U.S. government’s moves to censure
Pakistan for its use of militant groups were
scuttled, there was also little leverage that the
United States had with Pakistan. During the
1990s, engagement between the two countries
was at a low, though the Bush Sr.
Aadministration had attempted to forge a
working relationship with Benazir Bhutto during
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her first term in government (1988-1990). In
1990, sanctions were enforced against Pakistan
for embarking on a nuclear weapons program.xxii
Among other sticking issues was the sale of F-16
fighter jets to Pakistan. Nuclear tests by Pakistan
in May 1998, a tit-for-tat response to tests carried
out by India, led to a further derailment of ties as
the United States placed sanctions on Pakistan.
While the idea that militant groups in Kashmir
were under the state’s control existed,
homegrown militancy in other forms began to
manifest in Pakistan. The rise of the Sipah-eSahaba Pakistan led to a spike in sectarian
killings throughout the 1990s, including that of
the head of the Iranian Cultural Centre in Lahore,
Sadiq Ganji, as well as Shi’ite professionals.xxiii
The Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan attempted to evolve
into a mainstream political party, often publicly
disavowing links to the murders of Shi’ites. It
also enjoyed electoral success, winning seats in
the lower house of parliament.
The militant offshoot of the Sipah-e-Sahaba
Pakistan, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, formed in 1996
and came into its own with a firebrand leadership
that sought to enlarge its scope of attacks on
Shi’ites.xxiv Among its plots included a failed
assassination attempt against Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif in January 1999.
While Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif, as
prime ministers and heads of the most popular
political parties in Pakistan, did not seek to
abolish the military’s role in the Kashmir conflict,
they did realize that Pakistan faced an internal
security threat. Benazir Bhutto was concerned
about the rise of Islamic fundamentalism and
admitted this to American interlocutors.xxv
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By 1999, the Sharif government had begun to
take on the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. The Punjab police
launched a campaign against sectarian militants,
killing up to thirty-six in extrajudicial killings that
year.xxvi
But their short stints in power did not allow for
any long-term counter-terrorism strategy to deal
with these groups. Pakistan faced a number of
other security challenges that consumed the
efforts of the civilian governments, including
ethnic and political conflict in Karachi and a
constant, pervasive fear of the government being
overthrown. But the 1998 nuclear tests and a war
with India in 1999 overshadowed many of these
developments taking place in the heart of
Pakistan. In 1999, an embattled Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif sought U.S. President Bill Clinton’s
support while Clinton pressed him to withdraw
troops from Kargil.xxvii
But Sharif lost his job just four months after
meeting President Clinton, and General Pervez
Musharraf’s government was only forced to
address the issue under intense U.S. pressure in
2001. In December 1999, India was forced to free
Pakistani militants, Masood Azhar (who would go
on to found the Jaish-e-Mohammad), Ahmed
Omar Saeed Shaikh, and Mushtaq Ahmed
Zargar, while negotiating the release of a hijacked
Indian Airlines plane that had been forced to land
in Kandahar.
In the days after the September 11, 2001 attacks,
Pakistan – as has been well documented– agreed
to work as a coalition partner with the United
States in the ‘War on Terror’ and support the U.S.
presence in Afghanistan.xxviii While the United
States was concerned with eliminating the al
Qaeda network in Afghanistan and required
Pakistan’s support for everything from sharing
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intelligence about suspects to renditions and
interrogations, Pakistan was able to sign on
without promising the United States it would do
anything to dismantle homegrown militant
networks or to end its policy of using proxy
groups in Afghanistan and India.
While Pakistan may have acceded to the United
States’ demand to help with al Qaeda in
Afghanistan, then-military ruler General Pervez
Musharraf did not agree to work on tackling the
homegrown threat. “When I went to talk to
Musharraf on September 13 (2001)xxix and then on
September 15 (2001), he agreed to help us
unstintingly with al Qaeda in Afghanistan
because they attacked us. But he did not agree to
help us go after Pakistani groups inside Pakistan.
What he said was that was his responsibility, not
ours,” said Wendy J. Chamberlin, who served as
U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan from September
2001 to May 2002.xxx
Chamberlin recalled that the U.S. concern about
homegrown militancy in Pakistan predated the
events of September 11, 2001. American diplomats
regularly sent Pakistani officials démarches on
the issue. “When I arrived our policy was clearly
that these homegrown groups – Lashkar-e-Taiba,
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, all of those – were very, very
dangerous and we saw connections between the
Pakistani government using them as proxies,
particularly across the border with India. And we
were opposed to it.”xxxi
Even though several suspects – including alleged
al Qaeda leaders and self-confessed 9/11 plotter
Khalid Sheikh Mohammad – were detained from
the houses of supporters of mainstream political
parties like the Jamaat-e-Islamixxxii or safe houses
run by the Lashkar-e-Taibaxxxiii, Pakistan did not
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act against these facilitating networks or the antiIndia militias until December 2001.
On December 13, 2001, militants launched an
attack on the Indian parliament in New Delhi.
India blamed Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-eTaiba for the attack, and reports of an armed
escalation between both countries began to
surface.xxxiv This was the first indicator of how
Pakistan’s support of anti-India groups could
potentially stoke war between two nuclear-armed
countries, and that Pakistan’s use of proxies no
longer gave it any plausible deniability. A million
troops amassed on the border and there were
reports that nuclear missiles had been
unsheathed in India, while Pakistan would not
rule out the possibility of a first strike. The
United States– fearful of a nuclear war between
the two countries – intervened, with Secretary
Colin Powell playing a key role in negotiating
with Pakistan.xxxv The United States then asked
General Musharraf to not just make a statement
against anti-India groups, but that he begin to
rein them in.xxxvi
General Musharraf made a key policy speech
against militancy and said that while Pakistan
supported the Kashmiri cause, it would not allow
organizations to “carry out terrorism under the
pretext of Kashmir.”xxxvii The government
subsequently placed bans on a number of groups:
Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, Sipah-eSahaba Pakistan, Tehrik-e-Jafria Pakistan, Tehrike-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi and the Tehreeke-Islami.xxxviii However, the Jamaat-e-Islami
remained a key ally of General Musharraf, as part
of a six-party coalition called the Muttahida
Majlis-e-Amal.
While the bans caused militant groups to curtail
their activity in the immediate short-term, each
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group resurged in the months to follow. Many,
like the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan and Lashkar-eTaiba, changed names and continued to operate.
The
Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi
would go on to cause a surge in militancy in the
Swat and Malakand districts of the Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa province, resulting in a military
operation in 2009.xxxix
There was also a concern from Pakistan that the
anti-India groups – the key threat at that point in
time – could disband and ‘freelance’ with other
militant networks. The United States noted that
while training camps for these groups were being
moved away from the Pakistan-India border, they
were moving into the west and north center of
the country.xl
to the military and the civilian government.
However, as attacks against U.S. troops in
Afghanistan intensified and began to be linked
back to the Haqqani network – which the United
States accuses Pakistan of sheltering – the
relationship worsened.xliii
“This sanctuary, it became very real. It wasn’t just
simply
people
who
were
destabilizing
Afghanistan – they were people who were directly
responsible for our guys getting killed,” said
Marvin Weinbaum, a former State Department
official, describing the mood in Washington as
reports emerged on the links between insurgent
groups operating out of Pakistan and attacks on
U.S. forces.xliv
Many of the groups involved in stoking the
violence in Pakistan were those that the state had
once supported.xlii That Pakistani militant groups
were able to resurge and operate is an example of
how Pakistan has been unable to ever crack down
on militancy. Moreover, because bans on the
groups came as a result of U.S. pressure and the
stand-off with India as opposed to any real
domestic opposition to them, there was little buyin for the policy measure or its implementation.
“The big change here goes back a number of
years, which I think is a strategic change in terms
of Pakistani calculations,” said scholar Stephen P.
Cohen.xlv “In the early 2000s, when American
troops were in Afghanistan, they realized very
quickly that they were being shot at by guys who
were being supported by Pakistan. I had a lot of
contact with American military which was fresh
back from Afghanistan saying ‘Professor, why is
our ally Pakistan supporting people trying to kill
me because I’m going back for another tour?’ So
they lost their traditional alliance among the
American conservatives. Soldiers told the Bush
administration this. Congress – especially
[Senator] John McCain – was very angry with
Pakistan.” Cohen noted that American
conservatives – traditionally supportive of
Pakistan’s military – were now worried about it.
“I tell Pakistani officials here, ‘Your lobby is gone,
it’s completely wiped out. It’s not something the
Indians did. It’s something you did.”
In 2008 the United States was willing to work
with a democratic government, offering support
For many in the United States, the breaking point
was when Admiral Mike Mullen testified in the
The red lines began to shift in Pakistan with the
evolution of militant groups. Despite the bans,
sectarian attacks continued throughout General
Musharraf’s tenure, particularly in Karachi.xli
Moreover, militant groups began to launch an
insurgency in the Federally Administered Tribal
Areas as well as in the Swat and Malakand
districts of the North West Frontier Province
(now known as Khyber Pakhtunkhwa).
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Senate that the Haqqani network was a “veritable
arm of the ISI, ”Pakistan’s intelligence service. xlvi
On the Hill, sanctions for Pakistan went under
consideration again – almost two decades after
they had first been considered by the Bush Sr.
administration.
D. Pakistan’s Relationship with Militant Groups
While the current relationship between groups
like
the
Lashkar-e-Taiba,
the
Pakistani
government, and security establishment remain
unclear, there is a historical relationship between
these groups and the state. The linkages from the
1980s and 1990s, as a result of the state’s support
and creation of the groups, are unlikely to ever
break completely. There is also a well-established
connection between Lashkar-e-Taiba and the
government of the Punjab province (which has
been controlled by the Pakistan Muslim LeagueNawaz party from 2008 to date).
Despite the evidence from the David Headley trial
that linked the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)
agency’s officers to the November 2008 attack,
U.S. officials and experts are still divided on the
full extent of culpability by the Pakistani state in
the November 2008 attacks in India.xlvii As a
result, there is a reluctance to blame the Pakistani
government for the attacks. Pakistan’s case, on
the other hand, has been bolstered by the
plausible deniability since Lashkar-e-Taiba is not
an official government organization. While there
is suspicion still at the role of the Pakistani
military, it is widely acknowledged that at least
the civilian government was completely unaware
of an attack being planned, given its willingness
to work with India on investigating the case.
President Asif Ali Zardari, for example, offered to
send then-director general of the ISI Lt. Gen
Ahmad Shuja Pasha to India in the days after the
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attack, a move that was scuttled by the Pakistani
military.xlviii
After the November 2008 attacks, the United
Nations proscribed the Jamaat-ud-Dawa under
UN Resolution 1267, a sanctions regime against
Al Qaeda and associated groups and individuals.
Pakistan detained Jamaat-ud-Dawa chief Hafiz
Saeed under the Maintenance of Public Order act
and held five Lashkar-e-Taiba activists, including
Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, under the Anti-Terrorism
Act. Saeed was freed after the Lahore High Court
ordered his release in June 2009 because the
government could provide no evidence for his
detention to be extended further.xlix The trial of
the latter five suspects is still ongoing in a special
court designated for terrorism cases in Lahore,
and has been marred by extensive delays, security
risks to legal staff, including the presiding judge,
and criticism from India.l
In its implementation of the designation of
Jamaat-ud-Dawa under UN Resolution 1267,
Pakistan blocked the organization’s bank
accounts.li However, the Zardari-led federal
government believed the provincial Punjab
government had tipped off the group about the
assets freeze; as a result, the bank accounts were
nearly empty.lii
However, U.S. officials believe that even if
Pakistan does not support or completely control
the Lashkar-e-Taiba, they have a working
relationship and a set of red lines the group
cannot cross.
“You hear two arguments from the Pakistani
military,” Cohen said. “One is that ‘We have to
stay close to them to control them.’ The other is
‘Well, there are some people beyond our reach,
we are as surprised as you are.’ And I think from
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the American point of view, since American lives
are at stake, we have to be much tougher on
Pakistan.”
“The first response is ‘where’s the proof,’” Riedel
said, when asked what Pakistani officials say
when confronted with accusations of supporting
militant networks such as Lashkar-e-Taiba.liii
“Which gets pretty thin and you do have the
confessions of Mr. Headley and a mass of other
evidence. Secondly, and in a more subtle way, you
get the answer ‘Well we’re keeping them under
control.’ I’ve heard this described as ‘We have the
problem corralled… We know it’s a dangerous
organization, we have influence over it and we’re
going to keep it within certain boundaries.’ It’s a
very revealing answer because it implies that ‘If
we want we can remove the restraints.’ I don’t, as
an outside observer on the other side of the
planet; don’t see a lot of corralling going on.
Maybe I’m missing it. But that’s the more subtle
response. And it’s usually given off the record.”
“It strikes me that militancy writ large in Pakistan
has gained in strength in terms of its political
influence and its ability to shape the media
message and to impact foreign relations and
domestic relations,” said Shamila Chaudhary,
former Pakistan director on the National Security
Council.liv “In the past we’ve looked at Pakistan
and said ‘there’s a state within a state’, that is the
military and the civilians. I actually think there is
a third pillar now of who is running the country.
That third group is a huge security threat for the
state. It’s not as if they’re just planning attacks
and killing Shias or attacking India. They’re
collaborating with al Qaeda, and this is not just
based on ideological connections.”
The ramifications of Pakistan’s policy of
supporting anti-India militant groups – and
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whether it continues to date – were laid bare by
the November 2008 terror attacks in India and
the subsequent investigation. Investigations and
legal proceedings by the United States and India
– and a subsequent underway judicial trial in
Pakistan – have found that the Lashkar-e-Taiba
was responsible for the attacks in India and
received support from individuals associated with
the ISIS agency.lv The trial of Tasawwur Hussain
Rana in a U.S. federal court– particularly witness
David Headley’s testimony and evidence –
provided deep insight into the operational
activities of the Lashkar-e-Taiba and how the
India attacks were planned.
According to The Guardian newspaper, “‘These
groups operated under the umbrella of ISI … they
coordinated with ISI,’ Headley testified under
questioning.lvi He said that he had received
weapons and leadership training with Lashkar-eTaiba since 2000 and it was his understanding
that the group and the ISI helped each other.
‘They coordinated with each other and ISI
provided assistance to Lashkar,’ said Headley.”
“David Headley’s testimony, the detail that he
provided about the hands-on involvement of his
ISI handlers, the training provided and the
support that… the public description of the depths
of that relationship confirmed what some have
long stated about the nature of the relationship,”
Tricia Bacon, a former State Department official,
said.lvii “One of the things that Headley provided
was that this relationship remains intact.
Arguably, if the Haqqanis are an arm [of the ISI],
then LeT is a gland or the legs or something.”
In January 2013, Headley was sentenced for his
role in plotting the November 2008 terror attacks
in India.lviii Rana was sentenced for providing
material support to Lashkar-e-Taiba and the plot
to attack a Danish cartoonist.lix
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More so than the attacks of December 2001, the
scale of the 2008 attacks – which saw direct
attacks on foreign citizens, including Americans,
as well as key Indian officials and buildings – was
a sign that Pakistan had ‘crossed a line’.
It also served to put LeT firmly on the U.S. radar.
2. Pakistan’s Militant Networks and the
Risk to the United States
Since 2001, the risk posed by militancy has
largely been seen through the prism of al Qaeda.
In the United States, there has been a push to not
lump all militant networks in the al Qaeda
bracket, but this comes at the cost of ignoring the
mingling and cross-pollination of groups based in
Pakistan. There is a realization in counterterrorism and policy circles of the latter, but this
complicates the domestic narrative in the United
States on Afghanistan, because it undercuts the
objectives behind which the United States went to
war in Afghanistan in the first place. Moreover,
the threat posed by groups such as the LeT is
often seen as secondary, with analysts saying that
the real threat to the U.S. is still posed by groups
like the Haqqani network.
However, there is now a concerted effort in the
U.S. intelligence community to study and
understand the threat posed by Pakistan-based
militant groups and to analyze potential scenarios
that could arise as a result of a major attack on
the United States, its interests, or in South Asia
that links back to Pakistan. There has been
planning by the U.S. government to parse out
what potential scenarios could arise from such an
attack. I have attempted to outline which groups
pose a risk to U.S. national security interests and
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how these are being calibrated by observers and
analysts in the United States.
A. Lashkar-e-Taiba
Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) is considered to be
amongst the most important homegrown
militant groups operating out of Pakistan. This is
largely based on the threat it poses to Pakistan
and the region.lx There is significant interest in
the counter-terrorism community about the
growth and threat perception of LeT, which has
been bolstered further since the attacks in India
in 2008.
While the top priority of the United States
remains al Qaeda and the Haqqani network, the
LeT is of concern because it is believed to have
links with al Qaeda. It has proven its ability to
stage large-scale transnational attacks in India,
destabilize Pakistan-India relations, and target
foreign citizens.
The key concern for many observers is how the
Lashkar-e-Taiba – believed to be operating under
the guise of the Jamaat-ud-Dawa, which is led by
Hafiz Saeed and works as a pressure group – has
been allowed to expand rapidly.lxi The Jamaat-udDawa currently has an extensive presence in the
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, Sindh and Punjab
provinces through a network of seminaries,
schools and offices. It is also embarking on an
expansion in the Balochistan province.lxii The
Jamaat-ud-Dawa’s philanthropic wing, the Falahe-Insaniat Foundation, has played a key role in
relief and rehabilitation efforts during natural
disasters and humanitarian crises in urban and
rural Pakistan.
The threat is also crystallized by the nature and
expansion of the group. According to scholar
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Tricia Bacon: “As the U.S. draws out of
Afghanistan, the LeT is one of the few groups
that I would say remains virtually entirely
unscathed by the counter-terrorism efforts of the
last ten years. Most of the groups operating in the
region have at least experienced some pressure
and some losses over the course of the counterterrorism campaign. LeT stands as a very clear
contrast to that as a group that’s led by its
founding leaders, still has a fairly overt presence
in Pakistan, and has a transnational network that
is still operating.”lxiii
It is also interesting to look at why there has not
been an attack since 2008 by LeT. There are
several theories: one, that the group was damaged
by the investigation and extensive details that
emerged, and would make a stronger effort to
hide its involvement in another attack. Another is
that there are stronger counter-terrorism efforts
against the group, not just by India but also by
the British and American intelligence agencies. A
third is that the Pakistani government has
warned the group against another attack because
it is directly detrimental to the state.lxiv
The Jamaat-ud-Dawa has also evolved into an
influential pressure group on channeling antiIndia and anti-U.S. sentiment, particularly
through its role in the multi-party Defense of
Pakistan Council. While the Jamaat-ud-Dawa
denies that it is linked to the LeT, the United
States believes the latter is used as a cover for the
former’s activities.
Why is the Lashkar-e-Taiba a threat to the United States
and U.S. interests?
 Attack on the U.S. homeland: An attack on the
U.S. homeland is highly unlikely and would be far
more difficult to execute given the evolution of the
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security apparatus in the U.S. post-2001. However,
the LeT has proven that it can recruit foreign
individuals to carry out terrorism plots, which
make it a risk.
 Attacking U.S. interests in South Asia: The LeT
could also potentially attack the United States via
embassies or consulates elsewhere in South Asia.
There have been various reports and statements
since 2008 that indicate LeT is planning an attack
on the United States, including a plot to attack the
U.S. Embassy in Bangladesh.lxv
 Al Qaeda: Analysts and former officials believe the
LeT has close links to al Qaeda, and can serve as a
“host” to the remnants of the group in Pakistan.
Reports of communication between Jamaat-udDawa leader Hafiz Mohammad Saeed and Osama
bin Laden have strengthened this perception.lxvi
Moreover, the groups have enjoyed a relationship
in the past when the LeT gave refuge to al Qaeda
members. However, al Qaeda in Pakistan has been
weakened extensively by an aggressive drone
campaign and reports indicate it may be refocusing
on countries such as Syria.lxvii
 Afghanistan: Reported increased LeT activity in
Afghanistan could lead to an attack on American
interests – consulates, troops or officials –
emanating from Afghanistan.lxviii
 State support: The LeT, or its public face as
Jamaat-ud-Dawa, is widely believed to have strong
links to the state. Pakistan has consistently denied
it was responsible for the November 2008 attacks.
But there is considerable suspicion of the Pakistani
state’s or Pakistani officials’ involvement with the
group. The David Headley testimony at the
Tasawwur Hussain Rana trial has strengthened
this perception, because it detailed the links and
training provided by serving officers of Pakistan’s
ISI agency to LeT.lxix Several experts and former
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officials in the United States and Pakistan believe
that elements in the Pakistani state have close
connections with the group, though they may not
have the same relationship as they did in the
1990s. The Jamaat-ud-Dawa’s leadership, in its
public statements and rallies, is careful to not
criticize the military establishment in Pakistanlxx
incendiary speech by Azhar.lxxvi It remains
unclear to most observers in Pakistan why Jaishe-Mohammad and Azhar have resurfaced. The
group has largely been overshadowed by the
Jamaat-ud-Dawa as far as being a leading voice on
anti-India and the sectarian organizations.
Why is the Jaish-e-Mohammad a threat to the United
 Political influence: The Jamaat-ud-Dawa has,
since 2008, become a highly effective pressure
group in Pakistani politics and society. Through its
effective use of protests on political and security
developments – from the Raymond Davis caselxxi to
drone strikes and the NATO airstrikelxxii that killed
24 Pakistani soldiers in Salala – it has managed to
become a leading voice to channel anti-Indian and
anti-U.S. sentiment. It has also been a driving force
behind the Defense of Pakistan coalition of over 30
political and religious groups, which have
organized massive countrywide protests and sitins since its inception in 2011. By his own
admission, Hafiz Mohammad Saeed sees the
Jamaat-ud-Dawa as a “political party,” albeit one
that does not contest elections.lxxiii
B. Jaish-e-Mohammad
Jaish-e-Mohammad has been under the radar for
several years. Its activities and recruitment in
Punjab have continued despite founder Masood
Azhar curtailing his public profile.lxxiv Jaish-eMohammad publications detail the group’s
recruitment drives in urban cities such as Karachi
and reported deaths of its fighters in the disputed
Kashmir territory.lxxv
A massive rally organized by Jaish-e-Mohammad
in January 2014 has prompted fears of
‘resurgence by the group’. The rally, which took
place in Pakistan-held Kashmir – once used as a
conduit for sending fighters to the disputed
Kashmir territory – featured a recorded,
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States and U.S. interests?
 Jaish-e-Mohammad is not seen as a major threat to
the United States, largely because it has shown no
transnational aims as a group. However, its
potential to cause instability in Pakistan and in
India has put it on the U.S. radar. Indian observers
fear that Jaish-e-Mohammad could stir up violence
in Indian-held Kashmir again, even though there is
little appetite in Kashmir for the kind of militancy
that plagued it in the late 1980s and early
1990s.lxxvii
C. Sectarian Groups
Sectarianism in Pakistan is a concern for the
United States, but it is not a high-ranking one by
any means. Sectarian groups have not attempted
to attack the United States or its interests in the
region or directly targeted American citizens.
They have yet to display transnational aims in the
same manner as the anti-India groups. The most
prominent sectarian group is the Lashkar-eJhangvi, which has carried out a significant
number of attacks against Pakistani Shi’ites.
Why are sectarian groups a threat to the United States
and U.S. interests?
 Transnational aims: There is sufficient evidence
of sectarian groups moving in this direction.
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi is believed to have been
responsible for an attack on a visiting Sri Lankan
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cricket team in Lahore in 2009 and an attack on
Shi’ites in Kabul in 2011.lxxviii
 Relationship with Al Qaeda: The Lashkar-eJhangvi has long been believed to have links with al
Qaeda, and many analysts now say that because of
the evolution of the militant networks in Pakistan,
there is far more cross-pollination between groups
like the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and al Qaeda.lxxix
 Political influence: The Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, via its
political network – the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan
(now known as the Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat) – has
considerable political influence in southern Punjab,
where it is based. This provides the group with the
legitimacy many other militant networks do not
have, and allow it to have a platform to preach
sectarianism.
3. Policy Options for the United States
Experts and officials interviewed for this paper
were asked to surmise what a potential response
to an attack by a Pakistani militant group in the
United States, against the U.S. interests, or
against India would look like after 2014 and the
diminished presence of U.S. troops in
Afghanistan. Respondents could only offer their
best hypotheses using past precedents and
attempting gauge the variables involved. Others
noted that another cause for concern for the U.S.
would be an attack by militants on Pakistan’s
nuclear facilities. The reason for this exercise was
to try and understand what potential American
policy towards Pakistan could be in the wake of
any of the attack(s) described above.
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A. Investigation
The first step would be to establish a link between
the attack and the Pakistani state. This is
inherently problematic because Pakistan has and
can continue to claim plausible deniability. The
United States, as one source said, could justify
any measures against Pakistan on the grounds
that it had not acted against Lashkar-e-Taiba or
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, for example. Moreover, this
may not be a viable option for Pakistan given the
American footprint in Pakistan, as well as what
one can assume is fairly extensive surveillance of
Pakistani militant groups. “For those in Pakistan
who think that they are hiding a relationship
between these groups and officialdom is possible,
I think they should really rethink that, because
the last decade has allowed the coalition and the
U.S. to work inside Pakistan in a way which is
unprecedented. So very little is protected.
Everything really revolves around the extent to
which you can establish a link,” said the Atlantic
Council’s Shuja Nawaz.lxxx
There is also the issue of how long it would take
to establish such a link. It is likely that by the
time any Pakistani official complicity is revealed –
as it did months later in the November 2008
attacks in Mumbai – there is little political will in
the United States to proceed against another
state.
There are several other options to consider in
terms of the nature of the attack.
 Attack against the U.S. homeland: In the event of
an attack on American soil, the American response
would be similar to the one after September 11,
2001. However, the possibilities of such an attack
are still considered to be highly unlikely by U.S.
officials and analysts.
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 Attack against U.S. interests: An attack against
U.S. interests – whether on troops, citizens, or
military or diplomatic facilities – that links back to
Pakistan-based militant groups would not be
equated with an attack on U.S. soil. It would
certainly damage U.S.-Pakistan relations, and
depending on the scale of the attack, would lead to
repercussions for Pakistan in the short term.
However, the past precedent associated with
attacks by the Haqqani network on U.S. diplomatic
facilities and troops in Afghanistan has led to the
perception that the United States has limited
options in such cases.
 Attack against India: An attack against India –
akin to the November 2008 attacks – would likely
lead to the U.S. acting as an intermediary between
India and Pakistan. The United States would step in
to defuse tension between India and Pakistan, and
would ensure there is no build-up of troops on the
border or threats of nuclear war. The U.S. would be
acknowledged as having a peacemaker role in this
regard and it would act to ensure that the region
remains stable.
B. Policy Options
 Military options: Any policy option that the
United States would have is undeniably
constrained by two factors. The first is that
Pakistan is a nuclear-armed state. This makes the
possibility of a military option, akin to President
Clinton ordering airstrikes in Afghanistan and
Sudan after the bombings of the U.S. embassies in
1998, difficult.lxxxi Secondly, the United States
would be highly unlikely to bomb Pakistani
military installations or hideouts of militant groups
that are based in urban Pakistan because of the
inevitable civilian casualties.
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 Economic assistance: The United States could
limit, delay or entirely cut down aid to the
Pakistani military or to the executive branch.
However, Pakistan’s other allies – such as the Gulf
countries or Russia – could step up to fill the gap.
The United States could also use its leverage with
international donors such as the International
Monetary Fund or the World Bank to limit
assistance.
 Diplomatic ties: The United States could delay or
cancel scheduled visits by Pakistani and U.S.
officials, as well as postpone any high-level
dialogues.
 Sanctions: Pakistani officials could be placed on a
list of sanctions. However, there is great skepticism
amongst foreign policymakers that this would be
ineffective because of the United States’ experience
with sanctions against Pakistan in the 1990s.
Sanctions are already in place against militant
groups and their leaders, including Hafiz Saeed.lxxxii
Any efforts to sanction Pakistan through the United
Nations could also be inevitably blocked by China
or Russia. Pakistan could be designated as a
Country of Particular Concern under the
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998,
which could involve sanctions against Pakistan by
the United States.lxxxiii The increasing violence
against religious communities in Pakistan,
including Christians and Ahmadis, has served to
highlight the role that militant networks are
playing in Pakistan. Pakistan would be forced to
confront its policy vis-à-vis militancy; however,
such a move is contingent on U.S.-Pakistan policy
after 2014 where the U.S. could enact such a
measure without stoking the expected backlash
from Pakistan that could harm the U.S. military
presence in Afghanistan. “My hope is that our
involvement in Afghanistan lessens and our
reliance on supply routes through Pakistan as well
as Uzbekistan – which is one of the worst places in
the world for religious freedom – will give us more
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flexibility to push on human rights agenda,” said
Knox Thames at the United States Commission on
International Religious Freedom.lxxxiv
4. Militancy in Pakistan – The Risk to
South Asia
Pakistani militant networks also pose a risk to
security in the South Asia region. All four of its
neighbors – India, China, Iran and Afghanistan –
have blamed Pakistani militant networks for
carrying out terrorist attacks. This situation
causes more foreign policy concerns for the U.S.
vis-à-vis Pakistan. India, China and Afghanistan
have all pressed the United States to get Pakistan
to do more to control militant groups, while
Iran’s Foreign Minister wrote to the United
Nations after Iranian soldiers were kidnapped by
a group reportedly operating out of Pakistan.lxxxv
But the United States can only do so much in
terms of passing these concerns on to its
Pakistani counterparts, and it only has a limited
amount of influence on Pakistan.
“How it happens is that any one of these
countries – with the exception of Iran – will go to
the U.S. and say ‘Put pressure on them’,”
Chaudhary explained. “We can because we have a
strong role right now, but we’re not going to have
that in the future. The leverage that we have is
going away and the leverage we will have is
through the security assistance to the Pakistani
military. As long as we give them money, we can
convey messages to the military on behalf of
China, India or Afghanistan. But if we don’t give
them that much money, what are we going to be
able to do? Nothing, actually. In some ways – it’s
really messed up – but it actually does help
Pakistan’s interests because having these
problematic groups in the country keeps the U.S.
engaged and money coming into the military’s
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coffers. This has been my point for a long time
that assistance to Pakistan doesn’t get us results,
it gets us access and it doesn’t get us the best
access. But if we didn’t do that, we would
basically be in the dark.”
Pakistan, observers say, does realize that it risks
regional security because of the militant groups
that are using the country as a base. However,
Pakistan prioritizes these issues depending on its
relationship with other countries: if China is the
top of the list, Afghanistan is possibly the last
because of the difficult relationship between the
countries.
China has been pressing Pakistan to take action
against Uighur militants that it believes are
carrying out attacks in China.lxxxvi There have also
been a string of attacks against Chinese workers
in Pakistan. Pakistan – which considers China to
be a strong ally – has reportedly acted several
times to allay China’s concerns. China has also
been pressing the United States to get Pakistan to
act against homegrown militancy that poses a risk
to China, but the United States has indicated that
China should probably play a stronger role in
Pakistan given that it enjoys a far better
relationship with the government than the United
States does. Moreover, Pakistan has managed to
effectively portray to its neighbors that it is as at
risk from militancy as the region is. This
perception of being weak has sympathy in China.
As Vanda Felbab-Brown explained,lxxxvii based on
a recent dialogue with Chinese officials on
Afghanistan and Pakistan: “The Chinese also had
something on the same lines. I asked them how
they find this narrative and it was quite
interesting that they were quite sympathetic. ‘We
are concerned about Pakistan stability or
instability; we are concerned about militants in
Xinjiang,’ for example. ‘You cannot assume we
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can push Pakistan too much. We have to be very
careful. ’ They used this phrase that ‘It’s like
holding an egg shell… you squeeze too much on
either end and it’ll break.’ It’s also a cop out. But
it also reflects some reality, or some reality of
their thinking, that they have bought into the
fragility narrative.”
The Afghan government has long blamed
Pakistan for violence in the country and for
aiding the Haqqani Network. This indicates a
larger problem – whether the Pakistani state – in
particular the military – still uses proxy groups
such as the Haqqani network or the LeT to
influence India or Afghanistan, and if it still
wields control over militant groups that it may
have supported in the past.
The idea of influencing or destabilizing
Afghanistan via proxy groups has been disavowed
over the years by many Pakistani officials,
including the military. But this claim is backed by
little action.
“Many Pakistani officials and academics disavow
it but then they’ll turn around and say
‘Afghanistan cannot be controlled by an Indiafriendly government,’” Felbab-Brown noted. “The
notion of strategic depth in the sense of using
actual physical territory might not be there… but
that’s quite different from saying Pakistan does
not have a very strong interest in Afghanistan and
arguably an interest that is not consistent with
Afghanistan’s sovereignty.”lxxxviii
India’s main concern stems from the anti-India
groups such as LeT and Jaish-e-Mohammad and
their ability to recruit and work openly in
Pakistan. It has pressed for Pakistan to move
forward with the trial of suspects arrested for
their alleged role in the 2008 attacks in Mumbai.
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These concerns have been relayed to the United
States and then to Pakistan several times over the
past six years.
A repeat of a November 2008-style attack in India
could destabilize South Asia. India is unlikely to
react mildly to another attack, and there remains
a risk of repeating 2001 with an escalation of
troops and/or threats of nuclear strikes. While
there are several factors to take into account – for
example, the targets and nature of the attack, the
stability of Pakistan and India at that time, and
the governments in power in both countries– the
ability of Pakistan to claim plausible deniability of
such an attack would be far reduced, given the
rapid expansion of Jamaat-ud-Dawa since 2008.
There would be inherently stronger pressure on
the U.S. and India to respond to an attack by a
group operating out of Pakistan.
However, Indian and U.S. policy towards
Pakistan will be more complicated by the election
of the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party leader
Narendra Modi as Indian prime minister.lxxxix
Prime Minister Modi brought up security issues
with Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif in
their first meeting after Modi’s inauguration,xc
but it is hard to predict what the Modi-led
government’s policy towards Pakistan will be .
Many analysts believe Modi as prime minister
would not be as accommodating of Pakistan as
his predecessor, Manmohan Singh, was. U.S.
observers are also assessing what Modi’s policy
towards the United States will be, given the
countries’ fairly rocky relationship in the past few
months.xci
India is also concerned that a Pakistani military
operation in North Waziristan against the Tehrike-Taliban Pakistan could drive fighters into India.
However, with an operation in North Waziristan
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currently underway, there is little evidence to
support this argument. There is also a concern
that after the withdrawal of active combat troops
from Afghanistan by the end of 2014, LeT and
associated groups will refocus their attention on
India and the insurgency in Kashmir, which,
unlike Afghanistan, is still a heavily contested
issue.xcii It is highly unlikely that the civilian
government in Pakistan would support such a
shift. Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif is a
strong proponent of building a relationship with
India and is hoping to sign a trade agreement
with a new Indian government. According to one
observer, Pakistan would consider the return of
Pakistani militant groups to Kashmir a
disaster.xciii
Iran’s key concern is Sunni militant groups that
allegedly operate out of Pakistan’s Balochistan
province, including Jundullah.xciv A 2009 attack
on the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps led to
intense pressure on Pakistan to act against the
group. There have been reports of Pakistan’s
intelligence services cooperating with Iran over
Jundullah. However, indications that Pakistan is
currently tilting towards stronger ties with Saudi
Arabia over Iran bode badly for Pakistan-Iran
relations and any cooperation on militancy.
Prime Minister Sharif visited Iran in May, when
Iranian leaders expressed their concerns about
security issues.xcv
Moreover, a recent attack on the Iranian
Consulate in Peshawar led by Mast Gul – a
former Hizbul Mujahideen commander –
indicate how the Pakistani state’s former proxy
groups have evolved into having transnational
aims beyond India and Kashmir.xcvi
Iran has also threatened to take military action in
Pakistan and there have been numerous reports
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from Balochistan indicating rocket attacks by Iran
into the province.xcvii While Iran is not going to
ask the United States to tell Pakistan to control
militant groups, it will be interesting to gauge in
the future how Pakistan will work with Iran in
the event that relations between Iran and the
United States improve.
5. Pakistan – Complicit or Stuck
Between a Rock and a Hard Place?
Despite the anger at Pakistan, there is a degree of
sympathy in the United States for the degree to
which violence has pervaded the country. Many
acknowledge – whether in the U.S. government
or outside – that the Pakistani government and
military now understand that they face an
internal threat from various militant groups,
including the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, whose
goal is an Islamic state that follows the dictates of
Sharia law, and the ‘Punjabi Taliban’ – believed to
be a network of smaller militant groups that have
also declared war against the state. The key threat
is widely considered to be from the Tehrik-eTaliban Pakistan, largely because of its modus
operandi of attacking the state and the military.
The group has been the focus of military
operations.
Attacks against the Pakistani state have also come
from its former proxy groups, highlighting the
repercussions of Pakistan’s strategy in the 1990s.
The leadership of the Red Mosque that launched
an insurgency in Islamabad against the state had
been supported by General Zia-ul-Haq’s
regime.xcviii Among those responsible for stoking
violence in Pakistan included Ilyas Kashmiri of
the 313 Brigade, a unit of the Harkat-ul-Jihad-alIslami. Kashmiri and the Harkat-ul-Jihad-alIslami had once been part of the coterie of
militias that Pakistan unleashed on India.
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Kashmiri instead turned on the state, attempting
to assassinate General Musharraf. He was
released from jail in 2003 because of a lack of
evidence against him and has since been
implicated in attacks on Pakistani military bases
as well as the November 2008 attacks in India.xcix
Kashmiri relocated to the tribal areas and worked
on a terrorism plot in Denmark. Rumors of his
death in a drone strike have circulated since 2011.c
The Pakistani government launched an operation
against militant groups – including foreign
militants affiliated with the Islamic Movement of
Uzbekistan – in June 2014 in the North
Waziristan area, a region where the United States
had long pressed the Pakistani government to act
against militants. However, with no independent
reporting from the warzone and the operation
still underway, it is hard to determine what the
scale of the operation against the militant groups
will be and to what extent it will decimate these
groups.ci
“I think there is an acknowledgement that there
is an internal militant threat to the Pakistani state
and the military recognizes that in the form of the
Pakistani Taliban, and some of the groups that
were once thought as proxies which have
fractured – groups like Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami
and Jaish-e-Mohammad,” Bacon said. “There are
elements within those groups – like the Ilyas
Kashmiri story. He kind of captured that [as] a
militant who was wedded to the state who very
viciously turned against it. There is that cadre of
militants that I think the military does see as a
threat. I think to some degree there is recognition
that sectarianism is related to that although
maybe not as much as we would all like. I think
Lashkar-e-Taiba stands as a very clear exception to
that because the group still eschews violence in
Pakistan. So it doesn’t present the same kind of
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internal threat as the groups that the military is
looking at.”cii
What can Pakistan do? When it comes to the TTP
it has chosen to launch a military operation, as it
has done in the past. But with the groups that are
based out of key metropolitan cities and major
urban centers – groups such as the Lashkar-eTaiba, Jamaat-ud-Dawa, and the Lashkar-eJhangvi – the options are fairly limited. Militant
groups have largely ignored the Punjab province
in recent years, where the Pakistani military and
current ruling party, the Pakistan Muslim League
Nawaz, are based, and given that these groups are
not directly attacking the state, they have been
pushed down on the priority list. However, a
recent series of attacks in Islamabad may shift
this relationship and emphasize the need to act
against militancy.
Pakistan also believes that keeping the groups
together is far better than having them fractured
and splintered as a result of an aggressive
counter-terrorism campaign or actual law
enforcement measures being taken against them.
Right now, the Pakistani state can wield influence
or control over groups that are still cohesive and
retain a central leadership.
“One of the points to make is that division
[between militant groups] no longer holds and the
state’s problem now is a very interesting paradox
where the easiest way to deal with non-state
actors is to keep them coherent,” said Moeed
Yusuf of the United States Institute of Peace. “As
soon as they become desperate in terms of how
they operate, it becomes much tougher. On the
other hand, if you want to keep them together
you’ve got to keep them weak, because as soon as
you go in and try to take them out they’re going to
splinter and splinters are tougher to deal with. I
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don’t think the Pakistani state has figured out
where that sequencing lies in terms of targeting
these groups and where that balancing lies
between saying, ‘Okay, let’s not let everyone
splinter but these ones we have to take on.’ I also
want to be clear that ‘taking on’ doesn’t mean
taking military action. There are a number of
other longer-term things you have to do. But this
is why this will-versus-capacity debate is never
resolved. Is the Pakistani state not touching
Lashkar-e-Taiba because it’s an asset against
India…? Or has it decided to get rid of all groups
but because the other groups are out there and
targeting the state, this is not the time to go after
Lashkar-e-Taiba. What do you want to do? You
want to give them some space so that they don’t
come after you. There’s no winning this debate.”
“In so many ways when you talk about the
internal security problem in Pakistan and how
that has become a greater concern, it’s probably
very difficult to persuade a country to cause a new
threat which acting against Lashkar-e-Taiba could
potentially do,” Bacon said. “It’s very hard to get a
county to act directly against what it perceives as
its own interest, even if over the long term this
could be an incredible liability.”ciii
The flip side is that while the groups remain
‘cohesive’, they are also still operating and
expanding, and could potentially be planning
attacks against the United States. While analysts
hold that the fact that Lashkar-e-Taiba has not
been able to carry out a plot since 2008 is
because
of
aggressive
counter-terrorism
operations and revelations about the group, there
is an understanding that it continues to produce
people who could attack the United States. That is
the inherent risk that Pakistan’s current strategy
holds, and it is a risk that concerns the United
States. In the short-term, this may be a viable
new america foundation
solution for Pakistan, but in the long run this is
inherently dangerous for Pakistan, the region and
the United States. There could be several
implications of this strategy: even without any
state action, a militant group could fracture in any
case as a result of internal divisions or frustration
with its leadership for not carrying out its goals.civ
Moreover, even maintaining relationships with
individuals who may be influential with militants
has largely been ineffective.cv
The problem, is that Pakistan does not know
what to do about militancy without suffering a
violent backlash. “I think some of the security
establishment does see it as a problem, they
acknowledge it, and they understand that they
can’t control or influence them 100 percent,”
Chaudhary said. “They may have realized that in
the past as well, and they have been comfortable
dealing with the costs of that. But the costs have
gotten too high now given the landscape of what
is happening in the region, because of the war in
Afghanistan, because there is a heightened
international focus on Pakistan and what it is
doing with India. Enduring the costs of this have
become harder and harder for the Pakistani
government. I don’t think they know what they
can do here. They know what they have to do and
yet to actually do it, they can’t deal with the
repercussions.”
6. Future U.S.-Pakistan Foreign Policy
While Pakistan and the United States are likely to
maintain a working relationship, it is evident that
there exists little appetite for supporting Pakistan
and great skepticism for its promises to clamp
down on militancy at home. However, there have
been some indications that the United States and
Pakistan are working together on counterterrorism: notably, that the drone program halted
page 19
while the Pakistani government was attempting
to engage the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan in peace
talks, and resumed when the government opted
for a military operation in North Waziristan.
The drone program plays a role in how the
United States and Pakistan work together in the
future. There is little political support in Pakistan
for the drone program – neither from the current
Sharif administration or opposition parties. If
drone strikes resume after the military operation
in North Waziristan, it is likely to lead to a flareup of the same concerns – civilian casualties and
the fact that drone strikes are a violation of
Pakistan’s sovereignty – that have loomed large
over the U.S.-Pakistan relationship since the
program began.
Moreover, drone strikes do not address the root
causes of militancy in Pakistan; whether it is in
the tribal areas or in the rest of the country. And
the Pakistani government has shown no signs of
acting against groups like the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
or the LeT that may have transnational aims; its
counter-terrorism strategy is restricted to the
tribal areas. While urban militancy has registered
as a concern with the Pakistani government, it is
as yet unclear how it plans to deal with these
groups going forward, and whether it can stop the
groups and their transnational aims. Moreover, it
has not registered as significantly with the United
States as yet – partly because of the focus on the
Haqqani network; and partly because of the U.S.
security concerns elsewhere in the world,
including Ukraine, Syria and Iraq.
It is unlikely that the U.S.-Pakistan relationship
will cease completely. This is partly to avoid a
repeat of the 1980s, when the United States was
perceived as having pulled away from Pakistan,
but also because Afghanistan is still a factor in
new america foundation
the relationship. With a reduced U.S. footprint in
Afghanistan, Pakistan may still be the United
States’ first call in a crisis situation. However,
Pakistan’s much-vaunted role as a broker
between the Afghan Taliban and the United
States may have waned with the emergence of
Qatar’s role in negotiating with the Afghan
Taliban.
Pakistan’s role in a stable Afghanistan is still
largely contingent on how Pakistani militant
groups operate in the months ahead. President
Hamid Karzai blamed Lashkar-e-Taiba for an
attack on the Indian Consulate in the Afghan city
of Herat this May; if such attacks continue, this
will not only lead to destabilization in
Afghanistan but also will have a spillover effect in
how Pakistan deals with countries in South Asia
and the United States and vice versa. In essence,
these attacks will lead to the need to develop a
policy response.
i
Government of Pakistan, Report of the Court of
Inquiry constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954
to enquire into the Punjab disturbances of 1953,
305
ii Interviews with experts, congressional aides and
current and former U.S. officials conducted in
Washington DC during March – April 2014.
iii Ayesha Siddiqa, “The Islamisationof Jinnah’s
Pakistan,” Newsline magazine, February 2014.
iv“TTP Warning: ‘Assaults to continue even after
US exit’”, The Express Tribune, May 27, 2011.Ziaur-Rehman, “A profile of Ansar-ul-Hind and
Ansar-ul-Mujahidin in Pakistan,” CTC Sentinel,
May 29, 2014.
vNoman Ahmed, “In conversation with Syed
Munawar Hasan,” The Express Tribune, April 26,
2013.
page 20
viText
of the Objectives Resolution. Also see:
Ayesha Siddiqa, “Islands in the Sand,” The
Express Tribune, January 8, 2014: “How could
liberalism survive in a country where the liberalsecular elite ensured the death of this principle?
The liberal Liaquat Ali Khan, who otherwise
impressed his Western audience with his high
capacity to ‘hold his drink’ gave a structure to the
principle
of
religious
nationalism
by
incorporating religion as the formula for
governance in the Objectives Resolution 1949.
Subsequently, the state’s title was changed from
dominion to Islamic Republic in the country’s
first 1956 Constitution. The Objectives Resolution
established
religion
as
the
country’s
grundnorm.”Also see: Husain Haqqani, Pakistan:
Between Mosque and Military (Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2010), 17:
“After the Objectives Resolution there was no
turning back from Pakistan’s status as an Islamic
ideological state.”
viiSeyyedVali Reza Nasr, The Vanguard of the
Islamic Revolution: the Jamaat-e-Islamiof
Pakistan (University of California Press, 1994),
133.
viiiNasr, The Vanguard of the Islamic Revolution,
136. Also see: “Ahmadiya Sect and Legislative
Action,”
https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/1974ISL
AMA06907_b.html
ixGovernment of Pakistan, Report of the Court of
Inquiry constituted under Punjab Act II of 1954
to enquire into the Punjab disturbances of 1953
x
The National Assembly of Pakistan,
‘Proceedings of the Special Committee of the
Whole House Held In Camera to Consider the
Qadiani Issue: Committee Report.’
xiHusain Haqqani, Pakistan: Between Mosque
and Military (Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace, 2010), 123.
new america foundation
xii“The
Islamization of Pakistan 1979-2009,” The
Middle East Institute Viewpoints.
xiiiKamran, Contextualizing Sectarian Militancy in
Pakistan.
xiv The Ahmadiyya sect, for example, had a
battalion in Kashmir.
xvHaqqani,
Pakistan: Between Mosque and
Military, 292.
xvi
Stephen Tankel, “Lashkar-e-Taiba: Past
Operations and Future Prospects,” April 2011,
New America Foundation.
xvii Interview with Shuja Nawaz, Atlantic Council,
Washington DC, March 2014.
xviii Interview with Bruce Riedel, Brookings
Institution, Washington DC, March 2014.
xixIbid.
xx Douglas Jehl, “Pakistan is facing terrorist
listing,” The New York Times, April 25, 1993.
xxi Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark, The
Meadow: Kashmir 1995 – Where the terror began
(Harper Collins, 2012)
xxiiAdrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark, Deception:
Pakistan, the United States and the the Secret
Trade in Nuclear Weapons (Walker & Company,
2007) Also see:
xxiiiInternational Crisis Group, The State of
Sectarianism in Pakistan, April 18, 2005.
xxiv Ibid.
xxv Imtiaz, Saba. “Wikileaks: Militancy in Punjab,
circa 1998,” The Express Tribune, September 10,
2011.
xxviOwen Bennett Jones, Eye of the Storm (Yale
University Press, 2003), 23.
xxviiElias Groll, “The story of how Nawaz Sharif
pulled
back
from
nuclear
war,”
ForeignPolicy.com, May 13, 2013.
xxviiiSuzanne Goldenberg, “Bush threatened to
bomb Pakistan, says Musharraf,” The Guardian,
September 22, 2006.
page 21
U.S. Department of State, Cable, "Deputy
Secretary Armitage’s Meeting with General
Mahmud: Actions and Support Expected of
Pakistan in Fight Against Terrorism," September
14, 2001.
xxix The date Ambassador Chamberlin presented
her credentials to General Musharraf in
Islamabad.
xxx Interview with Wendy Chamberlin, Middle
East Institute, Washington DC, March 2014.
xxxi Ibid.
xxxii “Top al Qaeda operative caught in Pakistan,”
CNN, March 1, 2003.
xxxiiiLASHKAR-E-TAYYIBA:
United
Nations
Security Council Committee pursuant to
resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011)
concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals
and entities
xxxiv Steve Coll, “The Stand Off”, The New Yorker,
February 13, 2006.
xxxv Ibid.
xxxviInterview, Wendy Chamberlin.
xxxvii “Musharraf declares war on extremism,”
BBC News, January 12, 2002.
xxxviii“Proscribed/banned organizations,” Pakistan
Ministry of Interior, 2012.
xxxixJane Perlez and PirZubair Shah, “In Pakistan,
Guile Helps Taliban Gain,” The New York Times,
April 26, 2009.
xl Interview, Marvin Weinbaum, Middle East
Institute, Washington DC, March 2014.
xliOwaisTohid, “Descent into Anarchy,” Newsline
magazine, June 15, 2004.
xliiThe
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi was implicated in
facilitating the kidnapping of Wall Street Journal
reporter Daniel Pearl in Karachi. Pearl was
reportedly killed by Khalid Shaikh Mohammad,
alleged to be the mastermind of the September 11,
2001 attacks.
new america foundation
xliiiElisabeth
Bumiller and Jane Perlez, “Pakistan’s
Spy Agency Is Tied to Attack on U.S. Embassy,”
The New York Times, September 22, 2011.
xliv Interview, Marvin Weinbaum
xlv Interview, Stephen P. Cohen, Washington DC,
March 2014.
xlvi“Pakistan’s Spy Agency Is Tied to Attack on
U.S. Embassy,” The New York Times.
xlviiSebastian Rotella, “David Headley, witness in
terror trial, ties Pakistani spy agency to militant
group,” The Washington Post, May 23, 2011.
xlviiiZahid Hussain, Matthew Rosenberg and Peter
Wonacott, “Pakistan’s Probe Finds Local Links to
Attacks on Mumbai,” The Wall Street Journal,
December 31, 2008.
xlixWaqarGillani and SominiSengupta, “Pakistan
Court Orders Release of Militant Suspected of
Ties to Mumbai Attacks,” The New York Times,
June 2, 2009.
l Malik Asad, “Trial of Mumbai attacks case
suspects stalled,” Dawn, April 4, 2014.
li “Dawa offices in most cities and towns sealed:
Hafiz Saeed, others in custody,” Dawn,
December 12, 2008.
lii Saba Imtiaz, “Pakistan: WikiWreaks havoc,”
The Express Tribune, December 2, 2010.
liiiInterview, Riedel.
livInterview with Shamila Chaudhry, Washington
DC, March 2014
lvSebastian Rotella, “Four Alleged Masterminds of
2008 Mumbai Attacks Are Indicted in Chicago,”
ProPublica, April 25, 2011. Rotella, “Trial
Testimony Intensifies Allegations Pakistan Is
Playing
Double
Game,”
ProPublica,
May 23, 2011. Colin Freeze, “Accused in India
massacre claims ties to Pakistani secret service,”
The Globe and Mail, April 11, 2011.
lvi Ben Quinn, “Mumbai terror trial hears claim
that ISI and LeT coordinated with each other,”
The Guardian, May 24, 2011.
page 22
lviiInterview
with Tricia Bacon, American
University, Washington DC. March 2014.
lviii “David Coleman Headley Sentenced to 35
Years in Prison for Role in India and Denmark
Terror Plots,” U.S. Department of Justice,
January 24, 2013.
lix “Tahawwur Rana Sentenced to 14 Years in
Prison for Supporting Pakistani Terror Group
and Terror Plot in Denmark,” U.S. Department of
Justice, January 17, 2013.
lxInterview, Riedel.
lxi“Amendments to the Terrorist Designations of
Lashkar-e-Tayyiba,” U.S. Department of State,
June 25, 2014.
K. Alan Kronstadt, “Pakistan – U.S. Relations”,
Congressional Research Service, February 6,
2009, 158.
lxiiAuthor was told this by Jamaat-ud-Dawa
spokesperson in 2012.Jamaat-ud-Dawa press
releases detail activities in Balochistan,
specifically setting up medical camps and relief
work during natural disasters.
lxiiiInterview, Tricia Bacon.
lxivInterviews, Stephen Cohen, Tricia Bacon.
lxvInterview, Riedel.
Speech by Ambassador Daniel Benjamin, the
Coordinator for Counterterrorism at the State
Department from 2009-2012, at the Jamestown
Conference in December 2009: “Lashkar e-Taiba
has made it clear that it is willing to undertake
bold, mass-casualty operations with a target set
that would please al-Qaida planners. The group’s
more recent thwarted conspiracy to attack the US
embassy in Bangladesh should only deepen
concern that it could evolve into a genuinely
global terrorist threat.”
Randeep Ramesh, “Mumbai attackers had hit list
of 320 world targets,” The Guardian, February 19,
2009.
new america foundation
lxvi
Carlotta Gall, “What Pakistan Knew About Bin
Laden,” The New York Times Magazine, March
19, 2014.
lxvii Eric Schmitt, “Qaeda Militants Seek Syria
Base, U.S. Officials Say,” The New York Times,
March 25, 2014.
lxviiiInterview with former U.S. government
official, name withheld on request, Washington
DC, March 2014.
lxix“Interrogation
report of David Coleman
Headley,” National Investigation Agency,
Government of India, 4.
“Government’s Santiago Proffer”, United States
District CourtNorthern District of IllinoisEastern
Division, United States of America v. Tahawwur
Hussain Rana, 27. Ginger Thompson, “Terror
Trial Witness Ties Pakistan to 2008 Attacks,” The
New York Times, May 23, 2011.
lxxAuthor’s own observations of Jamaat-ud-Dawa
rallies and Hafiz Saeed speeches. In 2011, Saeed
said during a press meet that he didn’t single out
the military in his criticism because
constitutionally the military is controlled by the
civilian government.
lxxiMark Mazzetti, The Way of the Knife: The CIA,
a Secret Army and a War at the Ends of the Earth
(Penguin Press HC, 2013), 1. Declan Walsh and
Ewan MacAskill, “American who sparked
diplomatic crisis over Lahore was CIA spy,” The
Guardian, February 20, 2011.
lxxii“Pakistan outrage after ‘Nato attack kills
soldiers,’ BBC, November 26, 2011.
lxxiii “Ahead of 40-party rally, JuD chief parries
questions on political ambitions,” The Express
Tribune, February 1, 2012.
lxxiv Saeed Shah, “Terror group builds big base
under Pakistani officials' noses,” McClatchy
Newspapers, September 13, 2009. Mohammad
Asghar, “Ban on hides collection ineffective:
Banned outfits earned over Rs780 million,”
page 23
Dawn, December 9, 2012. Ayesha Siddiqa,
“Contextualizing militancy in Punjab,” The
Express Tribune, February 27, 2013.
lxxvArchives of Jaish-e-Mohammad publication Al
Qalam. Example: “Miracle in Pulwama, Jaish-eMohammad’s Abdul Waheed is martyred,” Al
Qalam, May 22, 2014.
lxxvi Tariq Naqash, “Banned group holds rally in
Muzaffarabad,” Dawn, January 27, 2014. Also see
- recording of Masood Azhar speech, available on
the Jaish-e-Mohammad’swebsite.
lxxviiShivamVij, “Feared this summer: Ferment in
Kashmir,” Scroll.in, February 2014.
lxxviiiOmar Waraich, “Pakistan’s Sectarian Killers
Operate with Impunity,” Time, September 23,
2011. Amir Mir, “Blood flows freely in Pakistan,”
Asia Times, October 5, 2011. Rod Nordland, “Rare
Attacks on Shiites Kill Scores in Afghanistan,”
The New York Times, December 6, 2011.
lxxix Interview, Shamila Chaudhry, Washington
DC, March 2014. Also see – Asif Farooqi, “Profile:
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi,” BBC, January 11, 2013.
lxxxInterview, Shuja Nawaz.
lxxxi “Clinton defends military strikes,” BBC,
August 20, 1998.
lxxxii Bill Roggio, “US adds 2 Lashkar-e-Taiba
leaders to list of terrorists,” The Long War
Journal,
September
28,
2011.“Terrorist
designations of Lashkar I Jhangvi and Malik
Ishaq,” U.S. Department of State, February 6,
2014.
lxxxiii U.S. Department of State: “The designation
by the Secretary of State (under authority
delegated by the President) of nations guilty of
particularly severe violations of religious freedom
as ‘Countries of Particular Concern’ under the
International Religious Freedom Act of 1998
(H.R. 2431) and its amendment of 1999 (Public
Law 106-55). Nations so designated are subject to
new america foundation
further actions, including economic sanctions, by
the United States.”
lxxxiv Interview with Knox Thames, United States
Commission
on
International
Religious
Freedom, Washington DC, March 2014.
lxxxv See - letter by Iranian Foreign Minister M.
JavadZarif to United Nations Secretary General
Ban Ki-Moon, March 26, 2014: “It is extremely
regrettable that all available evidence indicate that
these cowardly acts of terror targeting the Islamic
Republic of Iran and its citizens have been
perpetrated by State-sponsored extremist groups,
with similar patterns of funding, coordination,
support and direction. The entire international
community should be alarmed by the regional
and extra-regional ramifications of sectarian
tension and extremist violence, which are being
systematically
organized,
sponsored
and
orchestrated in various parts of our region.”
lxxxviInterview,
Shuja Nawaz. “China details
overseas links for Xinjiang militants,” Reuters,
April 6, 2012.
lxxxvii
Interview with Vanda Felbab-Brown,
Brookings Institution, Washington DC, March
2014.
lxxxviiiIbid.
lxxxix Jason Burke and IshwarRauniyar, “India
elections: subtle foreign policy could take tougher
line under Modi,” The Guardian, April 11, 2014.
xc “India PM NarendraModi presses Pakistan’s
sharif on militants,” BBC, May 27, 2014.
xciFrank Jack Daniel and David Brunnstrom,
“U.S. ambassador to India Nancy Powell resigns
after diplomatic row,” Reuters, April 1, 2014.
xciiInterview, Stephen Cohen.
xciiiInterview withMoeed Yusuf, United States
Institute of Peace, Washington DC, March 2014.
xcivAbubakar Siddique, “Jundullah: Profile of a
Sunni Extremist Group,” October 20, 2009,
Radio Free Europe Radio Liberty.
page 24
xcvMehrdadBalali,
“Iran prods Pakistan leader on
U.S. ties, security, pipeline,” Reuters, May 12,
2014.
xcvi “Suicide attack at Iranian consulate in
Peshawar kills two,” Dawn, February 24, 2014.
Zahid Hussain, “From jihad to terrorism,” Dawn,
February 12, 2014.
xcviiInterview, Shuja Nawaz. Also see: “Iran may
send forces to Pakistan to free border guards,”
Reuters, February 17, 2014; Malik Siraj Akbar,
“Iran’s Border Violations in Balochistan,” The
Baloch Hal, December 12, 2013.
xcviiiSyed Shoaib Hasan, “Profile: Pakistan’s Red
Mosque,” BBC, July 27, 2007.
xcix David Gritten, “Obituary: Ilyas Kashmiri,”
BBC, June 4, 2011. Carlotta Gall, “Pakistani
Militant Chief is Reported Dead,” The New York
Times, June 4, 2011.
c Carlotta Gall, “Pakistan Militant Chief is
Reported Dead,” The New York Times, June 4,
2011.
ciIsmail Khan and Declan Walsh, “Pakistani
Military Wages Assault Against Militants,” The
New York Times, June 15, 2014.
cii Interview, Tricia Bacon
ciii Ibid.
civThis has been evidenced in the case of the
Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, where its leadership has
faced a crisis as it struggles to evolve into a
political party and give up its day-to-day
new america foundation
operational activities, with its membership
flocking to more active leaders such as Malik
Mohammad Ishaq of the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi. It
could also fracture away from the state, as has
been seen with the Jamaat-e-Islami, a highly
centralized mainstream political party that has
struggled with keeping its membership attracted
to politics in the face of recruiters for militant
groups that offer more ‘attractive’ options for
acting against the state and/or establishing a
more hardline Islamic state. The Jamaat-e-Islami
– once considered as close to the military
establishment – openly revolted against the
military by questioning if soldiers who had died
while battling militants were not martyrs in the
Islamic tradition, since they were fighting a war
against their own people.
cv When the Pakistan Army headquarters in
Rawalpindi were under siege by a group of
militants in 2009, the army flew in Malik Ishaq
and Ghulam Rasool Shah of the Lashkar-eJhangvi – who were imprisoned as various
murder trials continued – to negotiate with the
attackers.See interview with Al Hurriya
magazine, August 2011, 14. Malik Ishaq: “I sat in
the General Headquarters and refused any ‘deal’
[for my release] and made it clear that that we will
be released via the courts. We will be released if
the courts release us and if [they] sentence us, we
will accept it.”
page 25
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