Global Connections
March 15, 2013
No Return to the World That Was
Since a member of the FOMC had suggested that quantitative easing of current proportions could be
terminated sooner than planned, the investment community seems to feel supported in its belief of a
normalizing world economy. Moreover, the German IFO index jumped more than expected, raising the
hope in Europe that Germany could pull the rest out of recession. IFO is a sentiment and not a
production index, however, and it is interesting to note that the IFO index has overestimated German
economic performance since the spring of 2011, and it has in particular overstated the true economic
picture in the first quarter of the last two years. Hence, I warn against taking that index as a base to
project the future economic pace.
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We have now gone through several years of monetary stimulation without much success in the
industrialized world’s real economies. And while economic growth improved when fiscal stimulus was
applied, the same cannot be said about monetary stimulation. Some even think it is counterproductive.
Why is the stimulus not leading to what the expert economists are expecting? It certainly has something
to do with balance sheet problems of the average household in many countries and of weakish real
household income. But it also has to do with the demographic structure, to which we may not pay
enough attention.
Economists and investors assume growth rates of the past 30-40 years are the norm and therefore think
once the current “deviation from that norm” terminates, we would return to the world as it was. However,
30-40 years ago the general level of debt in percentage of GDP was decidedly lower than it is today.
More importantly, demographics differ very much from those over a generation ago.
We all know what the life cycle of a person looks like, more or less. During childhood and the
educational years, the child is, purely economically speaking, primarily a cost factor for its parents. As a
young professional, he or she earns little money and cannot save much. Thereafter, marriage and
having children follow. At that time, the young family needs a bigger home, clothes and food for the
children, but due to rising costs for the children, the family cannot save much or – even more likely –
must assume debt to buy a house. Hand-in-hand goes a certain advance in the professional career and
rising income, and from the mid-40s onwards, this couple can build more savings. And once their
children’s education is concluded, costs go down and savings go up even more, until retirement. At that
point, income declines and the retirees begin to draw from their previous savings. By looking at one
person’s life cycle, there is a period of rising indebtedness followed by strong savings and thereafter a
period of saving withdrawals. Moreover, there is also a period of strong growth in expenditures, which
starts on average in the late 20s, levels off in the mid-50s and begins to decline in the mid-60s. Taking
the aggregate population and its demography can therefore hint at higher or lower aggregate growth as
well as to higher or lower aggregate saving periods ahead.
I recently checked some numbers and was shocked when I learned that the age group of 100 years and
older will be the fastest growing group in the world over the next 20 years and is forecast to more than
triple (graph 1), followed by the 85 year old plus and finally the 65 year old plus. The age group 0-65
years is only growing around 10% and that comes primarily from the emerging and developing countries,
as population growth is stagnating to negative in Europe, almost stagnating in China and declining in
Japan. The US has one of the better demographic outlooks and better than virtually all other
industrialized countries, with a forecasted growth rate of 0.8%-0.9% p.a. for the total population.
Felix W. Zulauf is president and founder
of Zulauf Asset Management AG.
Please refer to page 9 of this report for important disclosures, analyst certifications and additional information. Itaú BBA does and seeks to do
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Global Connections – March 15, 2013
World Population Growth by Age Group from 2011 to 2031
360
360
340
340
320
320
300
300
280
280
260
260
240
240
220
Percentage Change
220
200
200
180
180
343.3%
160
160
140
140
120
120
100
100
80
80
60
60
107.9%
40
87.5%
40
20
20
0
0
0-64
65+
85+
100+
Age Group
Source: U.S. Census Bureau
IE815
© Copyright 2012 Ned Davis Research, Inc. Further distribution prohibited without prior permission. All Rights Reserved.
See NDR Disclaimer at www.ndr.com/copyright.html
For data vendor disclaimers refer to
www.ndr.com/vendorinfo/
A look at the working age group of a society can tell you a lot about the future, particularly when
combined with higher debt levels for the economy as a whole. A rising percentage of the working age
potentially leads to rising income and spending, and vice versa. Graph 2 shows how the percentage of
the working age group in the industrialized countries has leveled off from 2006 onwards and will be
declining quite sharply for the next few decades. At the same time, the percentage for emerging nations
is approaching the peak and will begin to level off in about three years’ time for the next 20 years and
decline thereafter.
Itaú BBA
2
Global Connections – March 15, 2013
New Chart
Yearly Data 12/31/1996 - 12/31/2050 (Log Scale)
Developed vs. Emerging Economy Working Age Population
67.99
Working Age Population (Ages 15-64) as a % of Total Population
67.99
67.60
67.60
67.21
67.21
66.83
66.83
Emerging Economies
12/31/2050 = 63.7%
(
)
66.45
66.07
66.45
66.07
65.69
65.69
65.32
65.32
64.95
64.95
64.58
64.58
Developed Economies
12/31/2050 = 58.4%
(
)
64.21
63.84
64.21
63.84
63.48
63.48
63.12
63.12
62.76
62.76
62.40
62.40
62.04
62.04
61.69
61.69
61.34
61.34
60.99
60.99
60.64
60.64
60.29
60.29
59.95
59.95
59.61
59.61
59.27
59.27
58.93
58.93
2050
2045
2040
2035
2030
2025
2020
58.59
2015
2010
(IE819)
2000
58.59
2005
Source: U.S. Census Bureau
Copyright 2011 Ned Davis Research, Inc. Further distribution prohibited without prior permission. All Rights Reserved.
See NDR Disclaimer at
www.ndr.com/copyright.html
. For data vendor disclaimers refer to
www.ndr.com/vendorinfo/
.
The reason I am showing these charts is that demographics do not point to growth as we had it in the
last 40 years. It points rather to stagnation or very low growth in the developed world. While central
bankers are trying to force economic growth into higher gear, it won’t be very successful because
demographics simply are not right for it to happen. Putting more gasoline in a tank where the gearing is
blocked doesn’t get your car moving faster.
Of course, other factors like productivity, innovation or the cost of energy, just to name a few, are also
very important, but the investment community usually does look at those factors closely while neglecting
demographics.
Not all demographic factors look bad, however, as graph 3 shows on the next page. The net savings
influence that has been a drag on Japanese stocks for example should have a positive impact on
equities in the land of the rising sun, although only for a few years. And in the US, demographic factors
should become a positive factor again from approximately the middle of this decade onwards. Moreover,
the echo of the echo-baby boomers may have a temporary positive influence on our economies, but it
will be much weaker than the echo-baby boom effect. Hence, while demographic trends may lead to
mounting problems for the real economies – just think of healthcare costs and the state pension
systems – the savings cycle may show up sometimes in coming years in a positive way in the markets
for a limited period of time.
Itaú BBA
3
Global Connections – March 15, 2013
Bella Italia Opens the Next Euro Chapter
Italian elections have really not surprised me, as I expected at best a weak government that lacks the
broad support of parliament. Monti’s weak performance was also no surprise, as the Italian people are
simply fed up with fiscal austerity without seeing any benefits. Moreover, having a technocrat implanted
as a leader by Brussels bureaucrats is beyond what a democracy can swallow. Prosperity in Italy has
declined, jobs are either gone or less secure, unemployment is rising and GDP is 8% below the level of
six years ago and still declining, with no improvement in sight. Moreover, personal freedom is declining,
as for example, cash transactions are limited to €1000. It is simply ridiculous when a government
doesn’t allow its own money to be accepted in free trade but only where it has control. It is the worst
signal a government can send and a further step towards more totalitarian regimes, which never brought
more but always less prosperity.
Comments about the Italian election outcome in leading German newspapers were simply shocking to
me, as those journalists are generally in line with German politics and big business and very pro-euro.
They cannot understand that this “great project” can be put at risk by other countries. Merkel’s
contender for the upcoming election even remarked that he was shocked that not only one but two
clowns won the election, and Italy’s President Napolitano immediately cancelled a planned meeting with
him. The “Eurocrats” still don’t get it that what would be good for Germany, IF it really worked, is not
acceptable to other nations at the costs imposed. And turning all nations into German clones is not what
European history and culture are all about.
Many may think Italy has always been a badly functioning economy, but actually that is not true. We
have had a competitive north and an uncompetitive south, with a social contract to transfer money from
north to south. True, Italy has devalued its currency many times before entering the euro, which was
okay, as the exporting industries received strong foreign currencies and sent the weaker domestic
Itaú BBA
4
Global Connections – March 15, 2013
money south. Although I am not trying to portray Italy of the old days as an ideal situation, I simply want
to stress that it was working much better for everybody until the bureaucrats decided they wanted a big
European currency empire and everybody had to become the same to make it work and to give the
bureaucrats the power they wanted. What may have excited the shortsighted was a dumb idea from the
beginning. In a democracy, the people want to elect their own government even if it is a bad one, and
they will change it when they think someone can do better. But no nation wants a government imposed
by foreign bureaucrats, and Italians just got rid of one, which I applaud.
Italy is not Spain, as most of its debt is held domestically and it can finance it from domestic savings.
Moreover, Italy is running a primary surplus, while Spain, as an example, is far from it. Italy did not have
a real estate boom like Spain, which built more houses every year from the mid-1990s to the great
financial crisis than Germany, France and the UK together. And while the economy is weak, it is
definitely not as bad as Spain, where nominal retail volume is off by over 10% over the last 12 months.
While I doubt the Italian election will trigger another crisis in the short term, I do believe it is a gamechanger in the medium term, as this message from Italy makes clear that debtor countries cannot and
will not push the reforms through as dictated by Brussels and as the German political leadership has
sold it to its own public. The confrontation that will eventually come will be between the bureaucracy in
Brussels and the national government/parliament in Italy. You can be assured that Spain, Portugal,
Greece and also France will side with the Italians, as they also feel the pressure from their own people.
In the short run, everybody will play down the importance of the upcoming differences of opinion, but it
will be inescapable. My view remains that the euro will not survive without a political union, which is
unlikely for at least another generation, but that easy money and breaking all rules of sound fiscal and
monetary policy will extend the drama for many more years but will make the euro a weak currency.
While some believe the euro-zone economy is close to recovery – that at least is what all the reports I
read are pointing to – I wonder whether they have looked at the latest auto sales, which were down
14.2% in January from a year ago. In fact, they have slumped way below the lows of 2009 and even the
much lower lows of the mid-1990s. It is simply beyond my comprehension how the euro-zone economy
should recover under current circumstances. Interestingly, the luxury brands Mercedes, BMW and even
Landrover increased their sales, which simply confirms how much our society is dividing into haves and
have-nots.
No Foreign Exchange Manipulations?
Despite all the denial by officials and former officials, currencies are more manipulated than ever, and I
rather see an intensification of this trend than normalization. As long as the structural economic
problems remain in our world and technocrats believe they have to manage it the way they think is right,
the more manipulation we will get. No doubt, this will not be good for the world, but we have to live with
it as it is.
The first decline of the Japanese yen against virtually all currencies is most likely over. The move was
driven by changing expectations of an advertised forthcoming aggressive monetary policy in Japan as
requested by the new prime minister. Now, the Bank of Japan has to deliver, and until we see it coming
through as decisively as announced, the yen will most likely congest as traders are taking profits. Any
correction will, in my view, however, be only temporary and counter to the cyclical and most likely even
secular decline of the Japanese unit. Even so, a correction is due. Stay short the yen as a main strategic
position, as the fundamental change driven by its decisive structural deterioration of its balance of
payment will last for a long time.
The other currency that is in a sharp decline is sterling. The current mix of tight fiscal policy combined
with easy monetary policy will continue, and now the Bank of England has assigned a Canadian as its
head. He is one of those technocrats who believe they know how to improve the economic situation. He
even beats Bernanke in his future attempt to print money based on what he outlined as the most likely
way to go. Sterling will certainly continue to be a major casualty. GBP has already declined from over
1.62 against the USD to below 1.52 and is now terribly oversold, which is a sign of weakness. It could
therefore bounce somewhat over coming weeks, but I don’t think this decline is anywhere near a major
bottom yet.
The most important foreign exchange ratio is EUR/USD. While the euro zone represents a chronic
current account surplus region due to Germany, the US is exactly the opposite – but improving. The
Itaú BBA
5
Global Connections – March 15, 2013
problem of the euro lies within the growing imbalances among the creditor and debtor nations. France
has just recently undershot its growth and overshot its deficit target, and president Hollande requested
the ECB to weaken the euro, which immediately triggered a bold response by the head of the
Bundesbank. Many have been surprised by the euro’s rally from 1.20 to 1.37 recently, triggered by
Draghi’s backstop in late summer. My hunch is the recent 1.37 was probably the high for the year. The
stress within the euro zone will grow as the year goes on and the political confrontation will be on the
rise again between debtor and creditor nations. It is conceivable that EUR/USD will take more time to
top out and could bounce in the near term. However, my view is that the primary trend is down for the
euro, as the ECB will eventually turn more dovish due to rising dissatisfaction with the economy.
Moreover, the fundamental problems of the misconstruction remain unresolved, and therefore
imbalances will grow over time. By default, the US dollar will become the least dirty shirt in the laundry
and therefore the strongest currency over the next 12-18 months.
The Controversial Message of Bonds
Bonds are behaving incredibly well in view of all the talk about economic normalization. Obviously,
bonds seem to look more toward commodities that do not send as strong a message as equities. From
a multi-year perspective, bonds are not only unattractive but outright dangerous; however, we don’t see
signs yet among the major currency-denominated bonds of immediate major risks. In fact, we cannot
even exclude another yield decline in coming months within the yield ranges of the last 18 months or so.
A different story is European peripheral bonds, where the cyclical decline in yields from the Draghi
intervention level is most likely over. Italy’s election may just have been a wake-up call to speculators,
and European banks in particular, who have bought these bonds in large quantities over the last nine
months as one of the biggest moral hazard trades ever! Spreads to Bunds are rising again.
Commodities Hardly Signal a Strong World Economy
The economy bulls may be somewhat disappointed by the performance of commodities, as most major
indices have fallen back to the lowest level since last summer. While base metals and the energy
complex had a decent rally since the Draghi lows last summer, they have lost momentum and are
weakening again. This is hardly representative of a robust world economy. While in China the credit
aggregates have been quite strong over this period, their momentum will most likely peak very soon,
pointing to a slower growth pace for the second half of the year.
Gold is disappointing its fans, too. It is indeed somewhat strange for gold to perform relatively poorly in
view of all the money printing going on in the world. Its performance would be logical if the world
economy was normalizing, as the consensus believes, as systemic risks would decline while inflation
remains moderate, at least as measured by the official statistics. It appears that the “normalization
camp” is reallocating more money from gold into equities, and this may have triggered some forced
selling by gold funds. Forced selling usually shows up in the latter stages of a decline, when margin
liquidation sets in. The sharp decline in open interests to the lowest level in several quarters does reflect
deep pessimism, confirming the rising bears by several well-known investor surveys. In the physical
market, it may have been the merchandise coming out of Turkey via Iran and the dampening effect of
the hike of Indian import taxes on gold to reduce gold imports and help prevent a further deterioration of
the Indian balance of payment.
Are Equities in a Crack-Up Boom?
Ludwig von Mises, an economist of the Austrian school, called a rising stock market primarily driven by
central banks’ money printing and not by economic performance, a “crack-up boom.” The French called
it “hausse de misère”, which is probably a more appropriate term. Once a system moves away from free
markets, capitalism and freedom and governments and their central banks choose to create artificial
prosperity via money printing, and it will eventually lead to inflation, hyperinflation and collapse. Crackup booms develop when too much money is chasing not enough equities, in other words what one
would describe as inflation. Investors flee out of paper money into real assets like equities, selective art
or real estate, etc. to protect their wealth against the debasing value of money due to unlimited money
printed by central bankers who do so on the theory that rising asset prices will improve balance sheets
and that in turn will improve purchasing power, which will in turn lead to increasing expenditures. If you
open your mind and look around, that is what our authorities are working on. At its ultimate end, no one
wants any paper money anymore, and that is when a system collapses.
Itaú BBA
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Global Connections – March 15, 2013
I don’t think we have a true crack-up boom situation worldwide yet, but we certainly see signs that fit the
picture. For instance, economic growth is lagging stock market performance in many countries, and the
side effects of this policy, namely the division of our society, is obvious in all industrialized countries. But
most rising equities still have supporting corporate developments, and if those disappoint, they do sell
off hard. Hence, I don’t think we are in a true classic crack-up boom yet, but we are probably near the
threshold of entering one in coming years.
Crack-up booms are dangerous because they are not supported by sustainable economic and corporate
performance but rather by aggressively expansive monetary policy that forces investors out of nominal
assets and paper money into real assets. No question, monetary policy around the world is very
expansive without the beneficial impact of true economic improvement or self-sustainable growth.
Unfortunately, excessive money printing is unsustainable in the long run and leads to extreme
economic, social and political imbalances and is therefore most likely to be an even bigger crisis than
the one our authorities are trying to overcome. Hence, crack-up booms in equities have a limited life
span and usually lead to systemic chaos.
If Japan will do what the prime minister is requesting, it has the potential to lead to a crack-up boom,
and investors will be best served to be long Japanese stocks but short or hedged the Japanese
currency, at least for the next few quarters.
A Medium-Term Top in the Making
I am mentioning the crack-up boom because global equity markets have performed somewhat stronger
than what one would see at a top, and investors are rationalizing their purchases of equities by a lack of
alternatives and the decline of cash’s value. While the rally off the November lows is showing many
divergences, they are not yet of a nature that one usually sees near a top. If this is part of a topping
process, more time will be required. My working hypothesis remains of a medium-term peak in spring,
probably late this quarter with a medium-term correction to follow. Thereafter we will most likely see
another rally attempt as part of a broader distribution process, which should in my view be followed by a
deeper correction. In my expectations that second rally should show weak technicals and rising nonconfirmations, which would then lead to a bigger decline.
Markets are not homogenous any longer, and investors should therefore become step-by-step more
defensive and weed out relative weak performers and concentrate on strong relative performers. The
strongest market I still find is Japan, although some complex correction would be normal after the good
rally. In the US, I see many relative changes in favor of more defensive groups and stocks and against
more cyclical segments, including consumer discretionary. Some selective manufacturing names,
however, remain good performers. Europe is again slipping, and the relative performance of cyclical
groups is clearly deteriorating, even more so than in the US. European automobile stocks are a case in
point, and basic resources are weakening in synch with base commodities. Emerging markets as a
group are underperforming, and some like Brazil or Malaysia are quite disappointing. I still believe China
is one of the more attractive markets in that segment. But even China may enter some choppy water
after the good run since early December.
Felix W. Zulauf is president and founder of Zulauf Asset Management AG. He has worked in the
financial markets and asset management for almost 40 years, working with leading investment banks in
New York, Zurich and Paris. He joined Union Bank of Switzerland (UBS) in 1977 and held several
positions there over the years, including managing global mutual funds, heading the institutional portfolio
management unit and acting as global strategist for the UBS Group. In 1990 he founded Zulauf Asset
Management AG to pursue his own individual investment philosophy. He focuses on managing a
conservative global macro fund and provides advisory services to selected individuals and institutions.
He has been a member of Barron’s Roundtable for over 20 years.
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Global Connections – March 15, 2013
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The analyst expects the stock to perform better than
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S.A., is distributing this report to investors who are Eligible Counterparties and Professional Clients, pursuant to FSA rules and
regulations. If you do not, or cease to, fall within the definition of Eligible Counterparty or Professional Client, you should not
rely upon the information contained herein and should notify Itau BBA UK Securities Limited immediately. The information
contained herein does not apply to, and should not be relied upon by retail customers.
Itaú BBA
9
Global Connections – March 15, 2013
Additional Note to Asia Investors: This report is distributed in Hong Kong by Itaú Asia Securities Limited, which is licensed in
Hong Kong by the Securities and Futures Commission for Type 1 (dealing in securities) regulated activity. Itaú Asia Securities
Limited accepts all regulatory responsibility for the content of this report. In Hong Kong, any investors wishing to purchase or
otherwise deal in the securities covered in this report should contact Itaú Asia Securities Limited at 29th Floor, Two IFC, 8
Finance Street – Central, Hong Kong.
Additional Note for the Middle East: This report is distributed by Itaú Middle East Limited. Related financial products or
services are only available to wholesale clients with liquid assets of over $1 million and who have sufficient financial
experience and understanding to participate in financial markets in a wholesale jurisdiction. Itaú Middle East Limited is
regulated by the Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA). In the Middle East, any investors wishing to purchase or
otherwise deal in the securities covered in this report should contact Itaú Middle East Limited, at Al Fattan Currency House,
Suite 305, Level 3, DIFC, PO Box 65703, Dubai, United Arab Emirates.
Additional Note for Japan: This report is distributed in Japan by Itaú Asia Securities Limited – Tokyo Branch, Registration
Number (FIEO) 2154, Director, Kanto Local Finance Bureau, Association: Japan Securities Dealers Association.
Questions, suggestions and complaints, talk to you Investment Advisor: If necessary, contact our Client Service Center: 40043131* (capital and metropolitan areas) or 0800 722 3131 (other locations) during business hours, from 9:00 a.m. to 8:00 p.m.,
Brasilia time. If you wish to re-evaluate the presented solution, after utilizing these channels, talk to Itaú’s Corporate
Complaints Office: 0800 570 0011 (on business days from 9 A.M. to 6 P.M. Brasilia time) or Caixa Postal 67.600, São PauloSP, CEP 03162-971.
* Cost of a local call.
Itaú BBA
10
Equities
Christian Egan - Global Head of Equities & ETD
Research
Carlos Constantini, CNPI - Head
+55-11-3073-3001
Equity Strategy
Carlos Constantini, CNPI - Head
Florian Tanzer, CNPI, LatAm
Pedro Maia, CNPI
+55-11-3073-3001
+55-11-3073-3025
+55-11-3073-3065
North Andean, Chile & Argentina Research
Ricardo Cavanagh, CFA
+54-11-5273-3593
Chile Research
Barbara Angerstein
Gustavo Fingeret
+56-2-2834-6297
+56-2-2834-6295
Agribusiness
Giovana Araújo, CNPI
Antonio Barreto, CNPI
+55-11-3073-3036
+55-11-3073-3060
Banking & Financial Services
Regina Longo Sanchez, CNPI
Thiago Bovolenta Batista, CFA
Alexandre Spada, CFA
+55-11-3073-3042
+55-11-3073-3043
+55-11-3073-3004
Capital Goods
Renata Faber, CNPI
Thais Cascello
+55-11-3073-3017
+55-11-3073-3019
Consumer Goods & Retail
Joaquin Ley, Mexico
Juliana Rozenbaum, CFA
Barbara Angerstein, Chile
Vitor Paschoal
+52-55-5262-0676
+55-11-3073-3035
+56-2-2834-6297
+55-11-3073-3039
Food & Beverage
Alexandre Miguel, CFA
Felipe Cruz, CNPI
+55-11-3073-3020
+55-11-3073-3007
Healthcare + Education
Thiago Macruz, CNPI
Victor Natal
+55-11-3073-3034
+55-11-3073-3014
[email protected]
Oil, Gas & Petrochemicals
[email protected] Paula Kovarsky, CNPI
[email protected] Diego Mendes, CNPI
[email protected]
Real Estate + Cement & Construction
David Lawant, CNPI
[email protected] Vivian Salomon, Mexico & Colombia
Enrico Trotta, CNPI
Roberto Barba
[email protected]
[email protected] Steel & Mining + Pulp & Paper
Marcos Assumpção, CFA
André Pinheiro, CNPI
[email protected]
[email protected] Telecommunications, Media & Technology
Gregorio Tomassi, Mexico
Susana Salaru, CNPI
[email protected] Ricardo Cavanagh, CFA, Argentina
[email protected] Gustavo Fingeret, Chile
[email protected] Pedro Maia, CNPI
+55-11-3073-3027
+55-11-3073-3029
[email protected]
[email protected]
+55-11-3073-3037
+52-55-5262-0672
+55-11-3073-3064
+52-55-5262-0671
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
+55-11-3073-3021
+55-11-3073-3028
[email protected]
[email protected]
+52-55-5262-0675
+55-11-3073-3009
+54-11-5273-3593
+56-2-2834-6295
+55-11-3073-3065
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
+55-11-3073-3017
+55-11-3073-3019
+52-55-5262-0674
+52-55-5262-0672
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
+55-11-3073-3011
+55-11-3073-3024
[email protected]
[email protected]
+55-11-3708-2807
+55-11-3708-2713
[email protected]
[email protected]
Retail Strategy
[email protected] Lucas Tambellini , CNPI
[email protected] Marcello Rossi, CNPI
Fábio Perina, CNPI
Julia Moraes, CNPI
+55 11 3073-3023
+55-11-3073-3006
+55-11-3073-3431
+55-11-3073-3038
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
North America
Sales - North America
Adam Cherry - Head
Kahlil Adam, CFA
Flavia Stingelin, CFA
Carina Cassab Carreira
+1-212-710-6766
+1-212-710-6767
+1-212-710-6768
+1-212-710-6790
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
+44-20-7663-7845
+44-20-7663-7845
+44-20-7663-7845
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
Transportation , Infrastructure & Logistic
[email protected] Renata Faber, CNPI
[email protected] Thais Cascello
Renato Salomone, CNPI
Vivian Salomon
[email protected]
[email protected] Utilities
[email protected] Marcos Severine, CNPI
[email protected] Mariana Coelho, CNPI
Economics
[email protected] Mauricio Oreng
[email protected] Luiz Gustavo Cherman
Equity Sales & Trading
Latin America
Sales - Latin America
Carlos Maggioli - Head
Flavia Stingelin, CFA
Márcia Sadzevicius
Rodrigo Pace
José Henrique Sapag Arvelos
José Dezene (Macro)
+55-11-3073-3300
+55-11-3073-3162
+55-11-3073-3330
+55-11-3073-3330
+55 11 3073-3330
+55-11-3073-3350
Sales Trading - Brazil
Carlos Maggioli - Head
Alec Cunningham
Aureo Bernardo
Pedro H. Rocha Sauma
Carlos Faria
+55-11-3073-3300
+55-11-3073-3310
+55-11-3073-3330
+55 11 3073-3330
+55-11-3073-3310
Trading - Brazil
Carlos Maggioli - Head
Cristiano Soares
Bruno Campos
Pedro Feres
Marco Barros
+55-11-3073-3300
+55-11-3073-3330
+55-11-3073-3310
+55-11-3073-3149
+55-11-3073-3310
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected] Europe, Middle East & Asia
Sales - Europe
Mark Fenton - Head
[email protected] Aneli Gonzalez, CFA
[email protected] Pedro Villa
[email protected]
[email protected] Sales - Japan
[email protected] Masafumi Nishimura
Sales - Hong Kong
Caio Galvão
[email protected]
[email protected] Sales Trading - North America
[email protected] Kevin Hard - Head
[email protected] Eric Krall
[email protected] Fernando Lasalvia
James Tallarico
Brad Marra
+813-3539-3856
[email protected]
+852-3657-2398
[email protected]
+1-212-710-6780
+1-212-710-6780
+1-212-710-6780
+1-212-710-6780
+1-212-710-6780
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
+55-11-3073-3657
+55-11-3073-3657
[email protected]
[email protected]
+55-11-3073-3310
+55-11-3073-3310
+55-11-3073-3310
+55-11-3073-3310
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
+55-11-3073-3340
+55-11-3073-3340
[email protected]
[email protected]
+55-11-3073-3211
[email protected]
+55 11 3073-3110
+55-11-3073-3150
+55-11-3073-3145
+55 11 3073-3297
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
Futures, Derivatives & Stock Lending
Carlos Maggioli - Head
Futures Desk
Eduardo Barcellos - Head
Fabio Herdeiro
Alan Eira
Alexandre Rizzo
Celso Azem
Thierry Decoene
Hernan Livore
Bruno Giusti
Guilherme Michetti
+55-11-3073-3300
+55-11-3073-3320
+55-11-3073-3320
+55-11-3073-3350
+55-11-3073-3350
+55-11-3073-3350
+55-11-3073-3320
+55-11-3073-3320
+55-11-3073-3320
+55-11-3073-3320
[email protected] Commodities
Roberto Simonsen
Igor Petric
[email protected] Derivatives
[email protected] Fabiano V. Romano - Head
[email protected] Rafael Americo
[email protected] Marcio Caires
[email protected] Vinicius Alves de Pinho
[email protected] FX Spot
[email protected] Manoel Gimenez
[email protected] Haroldo Vasconcellos
[email protected] Stock Lending
João Victor Caccese
Private Banking Desk
Carlos Maggioli - Head
+55-11-3073-3300
[email protected]
Private Banking Sales - High
Felipe Beltrami - Head
Caio Felipe Zanardo Val
Marco Antônio Gomes
Natália Mônaco
+55 11 3073-3110
+55 11 3073-3292
+55 11 3073-3148
+55 11 3073-3297
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
Private Banking Sales - Ultra
Sergio Fonseca Rosa - Head
Edgard Claussen Vilela
Robinson Minetto
Frederico P. Bernardes
+55 11 3073-3110
+55 11 3073-3291
+55 11 3073-3290
+55 11 3073-3290
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
Private Banking Sales - Special
Marcelo Ferri - Head
Guilherme Rudge Simões
Patrick Kalim
Ricardo Julio Costa
Itaú Securities' Global Offices
SÃO PAULO
Itaú Corretora de Valores S.A
Av. Brigadeiro Faria Lima, 3400 - 10º Andar
São Paulo, SP, Brazil, 04538-132
NEW YORK
Itau BBA USA Securities Inc.
767 Fifth Avenue, 50th Floor
New York, NY 10153
LONDON
Itau BBA UK Securities Limited
The Broadgate Tower
20th Floor - 20 Primrose Street
London EC2A 2EW
HONG KONG
Itau Asia Securities Limited
TOKYO
Itau Asia Securities Limited Tokyo Branch
NBF Hibiya Bldg. 12F
1-1-7 Uchisaiwai-cho, Chiyoda-ku
Tokyo, 100-0011, Japan
DUBAI
Itau Middle East Limited
Regulated by the Securities and Futures Commission in Hong Kong
29/F, Two International Finance Centre
8 Finance Street - Central, Hong Kong
Al Fattan Currency House, Level 3
Dubai International Financial Centre (or DIFC)
PO Box 482 034
Itaú´s Complaints Officer (Ouvidoria Corporativa Itaú) may be contacted at 0800 570 0011 (calls from Brazil), on business days, from 9 a.m. to 6 p.m. (São Paulo, Brazil time) or P.O. BOX 67.600, Zip Code 03162-971.
The information herein is believed to be reliable but Itaú Corretora de Valores S.A. does not warrant its completeness or accuracy. Opinions and estimates constitute our judgment and are subject to change without notice. Banco Itaú S.A. may have a position from time to time. Past performance is not
indicative of future results.
This material is not intended as an offer or solicitation for purchase or sale of any financial instrument. This report is prepared by Itaú Corretora de Valores S.A. and distributed in the United States by Itau BBA USA Securities, Inc., and Itau BBA USA Securities, Inc. accepts responsibility for its contents
accordingly. Any US persons receiving this research and wishing to effect transactions in any security discussed herein should do so only with Itau BBA USA Securities, Inc. Analysts who are not CNPI only provide the team with technical support, not issuing personal opinions.