Caya c. Renaud
2015 QCCS 36
SUPERIOR COURT
CANADA
PROVINCE OF QUEBEC
DISTRICT OF LONGUEUIL
No: C.S. 505-17-006896-130
No: C.Q. 505-61-101045-110
DATE:
January 13, 2015
______________________________________________________________________
IN THE PRESENCE OF: THE HONOURABLE KAREN KEAR-JODOIN, J.S.C.
______________________________________________________________________
Jacques Caya
Applicant
-v.Honourable Marc Renaud
Respondent
-andAutorité des Marchés Financiers
Mise-en cause
______________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
______________________________________________________________________
[1] The Applicant requests the Court to review and annul the judgment of Renaud J.
dated September 3, 2013, wherein he dismissed the Applicant's Motion in Recusation.
JK0238
[2] The Mise-en-cause, Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF), submits that the
Applicant's Motion for Judicial Review should be rejected because the judgment is
correct.
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No: C.Q. 505-61-101045-110
PAGE: 2
BACKGROUND
[3] At all times relevant times, the Applicant carried on business as a registered life
insurance representative through his company, Placements Jacques Caya Inc.
[4] On March 16, 2007, AMF launched an investigation as to the activities of the
Applicant during the period from April 1st, 1997 to November 1st, 2005.
[5] On December 10, 2010, AMF charged the Applicant with 123 counts of violations
under la Loi sur les Valeurs Mobilières.1
[6] On January 7, 2011, the Applicant entered a plea of not guilty to all charges. The
file was referred to Renaud J.
[7] On April 19, 2013, Renaud J. disclosed to the parties, at a preparatory conference,
that he had been employed as a prosecutor at the AMF for five (5) years prior to his
appointment to the Quebec Court in May 2005. He confirmed that he was not employed
with AMF when the investigation of the Applicant was launched in 2007 and that he had
no knowledge of the matter. He further indicated to the parties that he had established a
self-imposed guideline whereby he would hear any matters involving the AMF provided
that the investigation leading to the accusations commenced subsequent to his
departure. In such instances, Renaud J. had no reservations with regard to any possible
apprehension of bias.
[8] The merits of the matter were scheduled to be heard before Renaud J. from
September 22, 2014 until October 3, 2014.
[9] On June 17, 2013, the Applicant presented a Motion in Recusation before
Renaud J. The Motion was dismissed on September 3, 2013.
ISSUES
[10] The issues to be determined are:
A.
What is the appropriate standard of review?
B.
Is the judgment of Renaud J. correct or is there a reasonable
apprehension of bias?
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
A.
1
What is the appropriate standard of review?
Loi sur les valeurs mobilières, LRQ, c V-1.
No: C.S. 505-17-006896-130
No: C.Q. 505-61-101045-110
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[11] The parties agree on the standard of review to be applied in this matter. The Court
agrees with their submission that the appropriate standard is that of correctness. As
stated by Justice LeBel in Toronto (City) v. CUPE [2003] 3 RCS, at page 117:
"… Certain fundamental legal questions – for instance, constitutional and human
rights questions and those involving civil liberties, as well as other questions that
are of central importance to the legal system as a whole… typically fall to be
decided on a correctness standard. Indeed, in my view it will rarely be necessary
for reviewing courts to embark on a comprehensive application of the pragmatic
and functional approach in order to reach this conclusion."
[12] The legal question before this Court relates to judicial impartiality which has been
referred to as "….the key to our judicial process."2
[13] Judicial impartiality is pivotal to the integrity of our legal system. Moreover, it is a
right protected by the Quebec Charter of Rights:
23. Every person has a right to a full and equal, public and fair hearing by an
independent and impartial tribunal, for the determination of his rights and
obligations or of the merits of any charge brought against him.
The tribunal may decide to sit in camera, however, in the interests of morality or
public order.3
1975, c. 6, s. 23; 1982, c. 17, s. 42; 1993, c. 30, s. 17.
[14] The Superior Court has previously addressed the applicable standard of review in
cases of recusation. Justice Bellavance held:
[83]
Si cela est nécessaire, parlons maintenant du critère d’intervention. La
poursuite suggère la décision raisonnable, la défense suggère la décision
correcte. Il est question ici de compétence, non pas celle de la juridiction mais
celle de l’inhabileté à entendre un dossier pour appréhension de partialité. En
fait, la situation est plus pointue. Le fait d’entendre le témoignage d’un ancien
client, que l’on veut faire témoigner pour attaquer la crédibilité de d’autres
témoins, risque-t-il de placer un décideur dans une position inconfortable ou
encore de paraître le placer dans une telle position? Pensons encore une fois au
témoin côté , lui qui bénéficie du secret professionnel pour tout ce qu’il a dit à
son avocat, il va témoigner devant son avocat, maintenant pour tout ce qu’il a dit
à son avocat, il va témoigner devant son avocat, maintenant juge, sur un sujet
qui, avec égard pour l’opinion contraire, a des liens, même si c’est indirectement,
avec les accusations. Il n’a pas consulté Me Champoux pour un problème de
vices cachés sur une maison.
2
3
Wewaykum Indian Band v. Canada [2003] SCR 259, at page 288.
Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, 1975, c.6, s. 23, Chapter III, Judicial Rights.
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[84]
La nature et le contenu des propos entendus par Me Champoux,
possiblement des informations privilégiées lors de sa rencontre avec son client,
risquent-ils d’avoir un impact ou de paraître avoir un impact et d’infléchir la
décision de culpabilité ou de non-culpabilité et, le cas échéant, d’une sentence
sévère ou moins sévère? Peut-il y avoir ici une partialité inconsciente menant à
une idée préconçue?
[85]
La réponse à ces questions m’apparaît commander un exercice critique
rigoureux et une décision qui ne peut être l’une des décisions possibles dans un
faisceau de décisions. La réponse est oui ou non. La réponse doit être la
décision correcte, l’impartialité d’un décideur étant un droit constitutionnel (art.
11d, Charte Canadienne). On est ici en droit pénal.
[86]
La Cour du Québec n’est pas un Tribunal spécialisé en matière de
récusation. On ne peut pas ici retourner le dossier au juge intimé pour une
nouvelle décision ou demander à un autre juge d’examiner toute la situation.
Contrairement à la règle habituelle voulant que le juge siégeant en révision
n’examine que la légalité de la décision sans rendre celle qui aurait dû être
rendue, il faut, je le répète, que la Cour supérieure qui, en passant, est aussi le
Tribunal d’appel désigné pour la partie XXVII, rende ici la décision qui aurait dû
être rendue.4
[15] The standard of review is that of correctness. Therefore, this Court's task is to
determine if Renaud J. rendered the correct judgment and to annul the judgment if he
was wrong.
B.
Is the judgment of Renaud J. correct or is there a reasonable apprehension
of bias?
[16] The Applicant does not allege actual bias. He alleges that a reasonable
apprehension of bias arises from Renaud J. prior employment with AMF and counsel’s
alleged perceived uniformity in judgments that Renaud J. has rendered in similar
matters.
[17] Applicant argues that Renaud J. erred in applying the criteria to establish
reasonable apprehension of bias and in concluding that Applicant failed to submit
sufficient evidence to support the allegation of an apprehension of bias.
[18] Counsel also asserts that Renaud J. failed to address a critical argument raised
by Applicant, namely the possible influence of AMF upon its employees, even after their
departure from the organization.
[19] The Court finds that the judgment of the Renaud J. is correct and after an analysis
of the allegations the Court concludes that there is no reasonable apprehension of bias.
4
Gabriel Montambault c. Honorable Serge Champoux et al, 2011 QCCS 5885.
No: C.S. 505-17-006896-130
No: C.Q. 505-61-101045-110
PAGE: 5
[20] The Supreme Court of Canada and our Courts have, on repeated occasions,
endorsed the test for reasonable apprehension of a bias as stated by Justice De
Grandpré in his dissenting reasons in Committee for Justice and Liberty v. National
Energy Board [1978] 1 SCR 369, at page 394:
"…the apprehension of bias must be a reasonable one, held by reasonable and
right minded persons, applying themselves to the question and obtaining thereon
the required information. […] that test is “what would an informed person, viewing
the matter realistically and practically – and having thought the matter through –
conclude. Would he think that it is more likely that Mr. Crowe, whether
consciously or unconsciously, would not decide fairly." 5
[21] The judgment at issue clearly demonstrates that Renaud J. correctly addressed
his mind to the appropriate test to determine if the evidence demonstrated there is a
reasonable apprehension of bias.
[22] He states as follows:
[26]
En fait, la jurisprudence nous enseigne que la notion de partialité doit être
examinée en vertu de la notion de la personne raisonnable ainsi que la notion de
crainte raisonnable.
[27]
Quant à la crainte raisonnable de partialité, le Tribunal doit se demander
à quelle conclusion en viendrait une personne bien renseignée après avoir étudié
l’affaire en profondeur d’une façon réaliste et pratique.
[23] What were the particular circumstances of this matter and what evidence was
before the Court?
[24] Renaud J. was employed as an attorney with AMF for five years prior to his
appointment to the Quebec Court in May 2005.
[25] The evidence reveals that, two years after his departure from the organization,
namely, in March 2007, the AMF commenced an investigation into the activities of the
Applicant. The investigation led to 123 charges against the Applicant relating to events
which occurred from April 1, 1997 to November 1, 2005.
[26] The Court underscores that although the charges relate events which occurred
during the above-noted period, the actual investigation by the AMF only commenced
two years after Renaud J.'s departure.
5
See also : R. c. Lippé (1991), 2 R.C.S. 114; Valente c. La Reine (1985), 2 R.C.S. 673; 9004-6673
Québec Inc. c. Roxboro excavation inc., CanLII 12969 (QC C.A.); Droit de la famille – 1559, 1993
CanLII 3570 (QC CA).
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PAGE: 6
[27] Charges were laid against the Applicant three years thereafter. Renaud J.
asserts that he had no knowledge of the facts relating to the accusations against the
Applicant and there is no evidence to suggest otherwise.
[28] The Applicant argues that prior to his departure from AMF, Renaud J. may or
may not have been privy to certain discussions at the office dating back to 1997, which,
may or may not, have been related to the Applicant and/or others. Such an assertion is,
at best, pure conjecture and is supported by no evidence whatsoever.
[29] In Développements récents en droit civil (2000), Justice Louis Paul Cullen (prior
to his appointment to the bench) prepared an exhaustive review of the case law relating
to recusation. He states:
“[…]
[…] il doit y avoir une réelle probabilité de partialité. Suppositions et conjectures
ne suffisent pas. Il faut que les circonstances soient telles qu’une personne
raisonnable puisse penser qu’il est probable ou vraisemblable que le juge ou le
président favorise ou a favorisé injustement l’une des parties aux dépens de
l’autre. La cour ne cherchera pas à savoir si le juge a effectivement favorisé
injustement l’une des parties. Il suffit que des personnes raisonnables puissent le
penser. La raison en est évidente. La justice suppose un climat de confiance qui
ne peut subsister si des personnes sensées ont l’impression que le juge a fait
preuve de partialité.
[…]
Pour établir la partialité ou une crainte raisonnable de partialité, une “preuve
convaincante” d’une « réelle probabilité » de partialité s’avère nécessaire. Un
simple soupçon est insuffisant. L’exigence d’une telle qualité de preuve se justifie
en raison de la présomption d’impartialité des juges, née notamment de leur
prestation du serment d’office. On pourrait aussi ajouter le fait que la demande
de récusation constitue non seulement une remise en cause de l’intégrité
personnelle du juge visé, mais encore de « celle de l’administration de la justice
tout entière.»6
(Emphasis my own)
[30] Renaud J. was not employed at AMF when the investigation was launched in
March 2007. There is no evidence he had prior knowledge of the Applicant and, or the
events leading up to the accusations.
[31] Applicant's argument is that AMF may have ongoing influence on employees
even after the termination of their employment was not alleged in his Motion in
6
Louis-Paul Cullen, "La récusation d’un juge saisi d’un litige civil" dans Développements récents en droit
civil (2000), Service de la formation permanente du Barreau du Québec 2000.
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Recusation and, in any event, there is no evidence to support this assertion. Applicant's
argument has no merit.
[32] Applicant's contention that Renaud J. must be disqualified because of an alleged
perception that there is uniformity in his judgments rendered in similar matters cannot
be maintained.
[33] As a preliminary observation, there is insufficient evidence to suggest that there
is uniformity in Renaud J.’s judgments relating to matters similar to the accusations
against the Applicant. [Emphasis my own]
[34] Associate Chief Justice Fraser of the Alberta Court of Appeal provides a review
of Canadian authorities addressing the issue of whether prior opinions expressed by a
judge are grounds for disqualification. He states:
"[4] In particular, a member of a tribunal is not disqualified from sitting merely
because he or she has previously heard and decided similar cases.…
[5] That must be so, because the Tribunal must be free to follow precedent even
when it is not obliged to. It would be mischievous to oblige a Tribunal to shut his
eyes to its own previous decisions, policies and interpretations. One of the very
reasons to create specialized tribunals is to build up expertise, experience and
policy and promote consistency and predictability."
[35]
Fraser CJA further adds :
"[23] Subject to the strong presumption of impartiality of judges described above,
the test is similar for prejudgment by administrative tribunals and for judges. It is
not whether the judge or tribunal has opinions or has previously expressed them.
It is whether his or her mind is closed, or strongly resistant to persuasion, and
cannot be swayed by reasonable argument or evidence (as assessed by that
reasonable observer)."7
[36] There is no evidence to indicate that Renaud J. shall not hear the matter with an
open mind, receptive to all evidence and arguments and in a manner that is fair to all
parties.
[37] The Court is of the view that the judgment of Renaud J. is correct and that no
reasonable apprehension of bias is established.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT:
7
R. v. J.L.A., 2009 ABCA 344.
No: C.S. 505-17-006896-130
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[38]
DISMISSES the Applicant's Motion for Judicial Review;
[39]
WITH costs.
__________________________________
KAREN KEAR-JODOIN, J.S.C.
Me Chloé de Lorimier
ALLALI BRAULT
Procureur du Requérant
Me Philippe Levasseur
CONTENTIEUX DE L’AUTORITÉ DES MARCHÉS FINANCIERS
Procureur de la Mise-en-cause
Date of hearing:
25 avril 2014