Berlin Crisis, 1958-1961: Origins of the Wall
Peter Lucas-Roberts
Observers have long regarded Berlin and the construction of the Wall that divided it as
central to the development of the Cold War. In the years before the East built the Berlin Wall,
“nobody questioned that Berlin was by far the world’s most volatile flash point.”1 Forty years
later, scholars still regard the construction of the Wall on August 13th, 1961, as “the most
poignantly dramatic event of the Cold War.”2 As more information becomes available from the
East about the events that led up to the physical division of Berlin, its importance only grows.
Since the fall of the Wall and demise of the communist order, scholars have attempted to
fill the void left by the uncertainties concerning Eastern European actions during the Cold War.
As archives open more to Western historians, new ideas have become commonplace. As Gaddis
points out, there is much value in constructing the history of the Cold War after its conclusion.
Increased archival access and retrospect have allowed this “new” Cold War history to become “a
truly international history, affirmative action for the ‘second’ as well as the first and third
worlds.”3 Moving away from focusing completely on the discussion of East vs. West and
Kennedy vs. Khrushchev, the literature on the subject has begun to address the broader, deeper
trends that developed throughout this period. With this movement, the roles of men like First
Secretary of
__________
1. Peter Wyden, The Wall: The Inside Story of Divided Berlin (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1989), 28.
2. Kara Stibora Fulcher, “A Sustainable Position? The United States, the Federal Republic, and the
Ossification of Allied Policy on Germany, 1958-1962,” Diplomatic History 26 (Spring 2002): 301.
3. John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1997), 282.
1
the German Democratic Republic (GDR), Walter Ulbricht, are beginning to come out from under
the shadow of the USSR.
Although the reasons for the construction of the Wall in 1961 now seem clearer than ever,
opposing views remain. Hope Harrison represents one of a growing number who have elevated
Walter Ulbricht above the status of simple Soviet stooge. Rather than blindly following
Khrushchev’s commands, she claims that Ulbricht “simply drove Khrushchev up the wall.”4
Alternatively, Petr Lunak has attempted to establish the key role of the United States in forcing
Khrushchev’s hand to build the Wall. He argues that “Ulbricht’s persistence may have allowed
the construction of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 but without American determination in the
summer the ending may have been very different.”5 In the face of this expanding scholarship on
the East, this essay will sort through the events of the Cold War to better understand the origins
of the Wall. It seeks to prove that placing responsibility for the construction of the Wall too
narrowly detracts from the overall understanding of the issue. Analyzing the developments of
this period without considering the role of Khrushchev, Ulbricht and their relationship together
constructs a limited image of the period. Failure to consider the progression of the nuclear arms
race or the decline of the GDR’s economy creates a similarly simplified picture. In order to
completely grasp the origins of the Wall, all these issues deserve consideration. As a result, this
paper will provide an account of the status of Cold War diplomacy, the economic conditions
within the GDR, and the nuclear arms race as they combined to create a climate that led the East
to construct the Berlin Wall.
__________
4. Hope M. Harrison, “Driving the Soviets Up the Wall: A Super-Ally, a Superpower, and the
Building of the Berlin Wall,” Cold War History 1, (2000): 70.
5. Petr Lunak, “Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis: Soviet Brinkmanship Seen from Inside,”
Cold War History 3 (Jan 2003): 78.
2
On November 27, 1958, Nikita Khrushchev declared that the West had six months to
agree to a treaty concerning the divided status of Germany and the transformation of West Berlin
into a neutral city. If nothing happened after that time, the USSR would sign a separate treaty
with the GDR and let the East Germans control the fate of West Berlin.6 The prospect of the
latter occurring was something the West could not permit. As a result, this declaration singlehandedly focused the entire conflict of the Cold War once again onto the question of access
rights in Berlin. From this point on, the intensity of the Cold War increased to levels seen only
once since the East-West conflict began. As a result, a three-year period of tension ensued that
became the Berlin Crisis. With Khrushchev’s 1958 ultimatum providing a clear beginning for
the road to the construction of the Berlin Wall, this discussion of the latter’s origins will focus on
the development of the Cold War from 1958-1961.
However, to understand the enormity of the implications of Khrushchev’s ultimatum on
the status of Berlin in 1958, one must look back at events that began even while Hitler still ruled
the Third Reich. By September 12, 1944, the Allied Powers had already mapped out “a special
Berlin Area which will be under joint occupation” within a greater occupied Germany. An
amendment to the September protocol gave the United States control over Berlin’s southern
sector and Great Britain the northwest, joining the already established Soviet northeast zone.7
Out of this initial decision to share the responsibility of governing Germany, the Yalta
Conference assumed that “Germany will be given the opportunity to prepare for the eventual
construction of their life on a democratic and peaceful basis. If their own efforts are steadily
directed to this end, it will be possible for them in due course to take their place among the free
__________
6. U.S. Department of State, Documents on Germany 1944-1985 (Washington, DC: Office of the Historian,
1985) 552-558.
7. The French sector was taken from British and American zones at the Yalta Conference in February 1945
3
and peaceful peoples of the world.”8 When Germany was sufficiently democratized,
demilitarized and denazified, the nation would regain its sovereignty. Despite these statements
of a goal to reunify Germany, time further solidified its division. Over the next few years, the
unnatural wartime alliance between communism and capitalism rapidly broke apart. Tensions
mounted as each side shaped their respective zones around their opposing ideologies. In 1945,
Peter Wyden could already see, from his position within Berlin, that “something seismic was
happening…Berlin was becoming the weathervane” of the greater Cold War climate.9 The
struggle over Berlin had developed into a microcosm of the growing international conflict. The
stage was set for an East-West showdown in the former capital of Germany.
This growing conflict over Berlin reached an early apex in 1948. Reacting to the Western
Zone’s planned introduction of a new German currency and a draft constitution, Stalin closed off
Western land routes to Berlin on June 24. In response to this blockade, the West initiated a
massive effort to supply the city by air. Providing upwards of 6000 tons of food and coal a day
for almost a year, the Western Allies’ reaction to the blockade demonstrated their commitment to
maintaining their occupation rights.10 Stalin’s hope to kick the West out with this obstacle
proved a gross miscalculation. As a result, instead of forcing the West to leave Berlin, Stalin
gave in. After eleven months, he ended the blockade. In this way, the blockade “symbolized
Western resolve to halt the encroaching Sovietization of Central Europe.”11 After surviving this
__________
8. Konrad H. Jarausch and Volker Gransow, Uniting Germany: Documents and Debates, 1944-1993
(Oxford: Berghahn Books, 1994) 2-6; U.S. Department of State, Documents on Germany, 1-11.
9. Wyden, The Wall, 180.
10. David Clay Large, Berlin (New York: Basic Books, 2000) 408.
11. Catherine Epstein, The Last Revolutionaries: German Communists and Their Century (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 2003) 105.
4
effort to cut them off, the West could not and would not give up West Berlin.
Although in 1949 the Basic Law and GDR Constitution granted the German occupation
zones considerable sovereignty, the United States and Soviet Union both held tightly to their
rights to Berlin. The issue of Berlin had become far bigger than one about the rights of East and
West Germany. Keeping the city from falling to the other side was a matter of global prestige in
the growing dynamics of the Cold War. For the West, this was a battle it was not willing to lose.
As a small Western island precariously situated within an Eastern sea, its survival showcased the
strength and resolve of the West.
Despite the closure of the general border between East and West Germany in 1952, travel
to the East or West through Berlin remained open. This presented two problems for the Soviet
bloc. Here the GDR saw itself particularly vulnerable to the Western Allies’ policies of
aggression. The open border provided a means by which the West could operate what future
GDR chief Erich Honecker called a “transit center for the trade of human beings”12 among other
“subversive” actions. The broadcasts of Radio in the American Sector (RIAS) became one such
way the West aimed to draw East Germans away from the GDR. It assumed such a high profile
that “rebelling workers expected the RIAS to be their central coordinating point”13 as they rose
up against the Ulbricht regime in 1953. The presence of the RIAS remained just as strong
through the end of the decade.
The other problem for the Soviet bloc owed in part to the diverging economic paths of
East and West Germany. While the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) came out of the war
under the watchful eye of the Marshall Plan and experienced an “economic miracle,” the East
__________
12. Erich Honecker, From My Life (Oxford: Pergamon, 1981) 209.
13. Christian F. Ostermann, ed., Uprising in East Germany 1953 (New York: Central European University
Press, 2001) 172; For more on the 1953 GDR uprising see p. 8 below.
5
toiled under the strain of Soviet reparations demands. Instead of being boosted by their
occupying power, East Germany lost 54 billion Reichmarks, at current price levels, to the Soviet
Union in the eight years after the war’s end.14 Separated from the Western zone, East Germany
lacked the raw materials needed “to fuel the sinews of industry.”15 This would prove increasingly
important under the future emphasis on their development of heavy industry. To compound the
problem, Cold War division meant that the GDR had to replace trade partners like Britain with
less developed East European nations. As a result, Soviet policies and postwar realities did little
to help the GDR’s economic situation.16 Free of such restraints, the FRG’s prospering economy
tempted residents of the GDR to flee west with the promise of a better life.17
While Soviet reparations left the infant GDR on unstable ground, the policies behind the
“planned construction of socialism” launched in 1952 further worsened the overall living
conditions in East Germany. The rapid speed at which the economy implemented socialization
and collectivization drove it into the ground.18 From the outset, Ulbricht’s optimism set standards
higher than the GDR could possibly attain. He promised that within four years industrial
production levels would double those of 1936, and everyone would have as much meat, milk,
and sugar as they did in 1936.19 The grand scale of the project “was far too ambitious,
__________
14. Mike Dennis, The Rise and Fall of the German Democratic Republic, 1945-1990 (Harlow, England:
Pearson Education, 2000) 41.
15. David Childs, The Fall of the GDR: Germany’s Road to Unity (Harlow, England: Pearson Education,
2001) 23.
16. Gaddis, We Now Know, 45.
17. Dennis, Rise and Fall, 55.
18. Ostermann, Uprising, 1.
19. Walter Ulbricht, “Our Five Year Plan for Peaceful Reconstruction,” German Propaganda Archive,
Calvin College, 2.
6
and overstretched the nation’s limited means.”20 In order to achieve the high levels of industrial
output, production of consumer goods suffered. Popular dissent grew as people saw their living
standards sacrificed for the implementation of this plan.
After Stalin’s death on March 5, 1953, Soviet officials began an effort to redirect the path
of socialism. Within a few days, Lavrenty Beria, Georgi Malenkov and Khrushchev rose as
unofficial leaders of the pursuit to de-Stalinize Soviet policy. As a primary example of this shift,
Khrushchev adopted a “strikingly more conciliatory approach to the outside world.”21
Khrushchev’s diplomacy became focused on the cause of peace and easing of international
tensions. He talked of “returning Soviet-American relations to the path they were on in the times
of [Franklin] Roosevelt”22 rather than continuing the warlike policies that had characterized
Stalin’s last years. At the same time, the Soviet leadership attempted to rid socialism of its
repressive past. By catering more to the needs of the people, the New Course policy represented
this effort. Observing the troubling conditions within the GDR, the New Course called for
“stopping forced collectivization, supporting small and private enterprises, and promoting the
production of consumer goods.”23 New Course proponents promoted concessions to appease the
popular unrest.
Adoption of these policies of de-Stalinization was going to be a much more difficult task
for Ulbricht. Rather than alter the construction of socialism, “like so many other little Stalinists
in Eastern Europe, Ulbricht was opposed to reform.” In the aftermath of the Soviet Union’s
__________
20. Dennis, Rise and Fall, 61.
21. Gaddis, We Now Know, 129.
22. Lunak, “Soviet Brinkmanship,” 70.
23. Harrison, “Driving the Soviets,” 57.
7
suggestions for reform, Ulbricht concluded “it was never our intention to choose such a false
course and we will never choose it.”24 Likewise Ulbricht reacted harshly to GDR colleague
Franz Dahlem’s openness to a conciliatory approach to West Germany in 1953.25 Ulbricht did
not welcome such diversions from the hard-line communist path. His understanding of socialism
clashed with the New Course.
So instead of working to ease the strain of his economic plan on the public well being,
Ulbricht continued ahead with his construction of socialism. In this way, he intended to enforce
a ten percent increase in work norms on June 30, 1953 that threatened to cut worker wages by up
to thirty percent after the loss of bonuses.26 This became the final grievance that pushed public
unrest into the streets. On June 17th 1953, a popular uprising against the Ulbricht regime began
that lasted until August. Rather than seeking to appease the strife and meet the terms of the
people, Ulbricht responded with force. Arresting 13,000 people, he had “no intention of
abandoning his power monopoly”27 or his vision.
As a result of his handling of the uprising, Ulbricht battled much opposition within the
GDR political ranks. His position of power seemed more vulnerable and fragile than ever.
However, support of the Soviet leadership eventually prevented any attempts to unseat Ulbricht.
When Soviet officials sided with Ulbricht instead of risk the instability of a new regime, the
GDR Secretary seized this opportunity to initiate an offensive28 that would purge his rivals and
__________
24. Dennis, Rise and Fall, 78.
25. Epstein, Last Revolutionaries, 126.
26. Dennis, Rise and Fall, 62.
27. Ibid., 78.
28. Epstein, Last Revolutionaries, 161.
8
solidify his personality cult. After this demonstration of Soviet approval, Ulbricht’s power was
never again so deeply threatened within the GDR or USSR. Zubok notes that by the “second
half of the 1950s Ulbricht was beyond criticism from the Soviets.”29
Just as Ulbricht confronted many of his rivals during the summer of 1953, Khrushchev
began his own quest to purge the Soviet leadership. As a result, the post-Stalin attempt at
leadership by committee started to dissolve as soon as it began. Although Beria, Malenkov and
Khrushchev expressed many of the same visions for de-Stalinization, each remained ever
suspicious of the true intentions of the other. Khrushchev’s belief that Beria “would get him if
he didn’t get Beria first”30 played a central role in Beria’s arrest and execution. In Khrushchev’s
quest to secure his position within the Soviet Union leadership, he later demoted Malenkov from
Prime Minister to a position as the director of a far off power station. By 1958, Khrushchev had
rid the Party of his chief rivals. He stood tall as the “unchallenged authoritarian leader” of the
USSR and entire Eastern bloc.31
In their parallel consolidation of power, Khrushchev and Ulbricht became tied together in
one of the more unique relationships of the Cold War. Despite their differences, they were
linked by a common interest in the survival of the GDR. Involved in the construction of the
GDR from its beginning, Ulbricht embodied the philosophy expressed by a colleague that “if we
found a government we will never again give it up.”32 Khrushchev’s position on this effort came
with his rise to power on the wave of an accusation that Beria and Malenkov were
__________
29. Vladislav M. Zubok, “Khrushchev and the Berlin Crisis (1958-1962).” Cold War International History
Project, 9.
30. William Taubman, Khrushchev: The Man and His Era (New York: W.W. Norton & Co, 2003) 249.
31. Zubok, “Khrushchev and Berlin,” 2.
32. Hilde Eisler. Public Lecture, Institut fur politische Bildung, Berlin, 25 April 1995 quoted in Epstein,
Last Revolutionaries, 123.
9
willing to give up the socialist vision for the GDR.33 In the following years, he developed a
“dream to create such conditions in Germany that the GDR would become a showcase of moral,
political, and material achievement – all attractively displayed for the Western world to see and
admire.”34 Although they were not friends, they recognized the important role the other played in
seeing about the realization of a socialist GDR.
This equal commitment to the victory of a socialist GDR paired two personalities that
could not have been more different. Khrushchev addressed diplomats with a crude sense of
humor and dramatic personality that at times could be attractive. After an encounter with the
Soviet Chairman in 1958, one American senator raved, “I liked him like nobody’s business.”35
Khrushchev also had moments in which he conducted himself in ways uncommon to a politician.
Banging his shoe on a table during the October 1960 meeting of the UN was one such example.
Fifty years after his role as Soviet Chairman ended, Khrushchev is best remembered for the
actions that betrayed his peasant upbringing.
In contrast to Khrushchev, Ulbricht stood stiff and lifeless. Upon meeting the First
Secretary, Peter Wyden notes how Ulbricht was “a mechanical voice box, a mask with perfect
posture droning out the same phrases that stuffed the Eastern party newspapers.”36 All accounts
suggest he was a menacing presence, needing no myth of toughness with which to confront his
adversaries. In his rise to power he instilled fear and alienated potential allies rather than make
__________
33. Zubok, “Khrushchev and Berlin,” 9.
34. Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, trans. Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown & Co, 1970)
456.
35. Hubert Humphrey, “Trip Files: Russia,” Senatorial Files 1949-1964, quoted in Taubman, Man and His
Era, 406.
36. Wyden, The Wall, 187.
10
friends. He built this reputation with “his merciless ‘purification’ of any within the exiled Party
who veered from the straightest of ideological lines” while in Moscow from 1938- 1945.37 Even
Khrushchev and Erich Honecker do not speak fondly of Ulbricht in their memoirs.38 They give
him only passing mention, though their political careers often intersected with Ulbricht’s. Clearly,
Ulbricht did not succeed in endearing himself to others. He was all business in his pursuit of
strengthening the GDR and building his own power.
As authoritarian leaders of the GDR and USSR, the development of Khrushchev and
Ulbricht’s relationship during the Berlin Crisis left a profound legacy on the path to August 13
1961. Gaddis captures this reality in his remark “that [events] would hardly have happened in
the way that [they] did had the asymmetries of the period not intersected with the distinctive
personalities of Khrushchev and Ulbricht.”39 It was only time before their opposing personalities
clashed over the appropriate means by which to resolve the Berlin question. Thus, in examining
the origins of the Wall, one simultaneously follows the two men in their battles with the West
and with each other.
While Khrushchev and Ulbricht were solidifying their power in the East, the prospect of
nuclear conflict with the West continued to loom. Growing despair at the catastrophic
implications of using nuclear force characterized the years following the bombings of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki. In time, the “elemental feelings of awe mixed with dread” that filled those
scientists who had witnessed the explosions of the 1950s40 began to filter through the leaders of
__________
37. Ann Tusa, The Last Division: A History of Berlin 1945-1989 (Reading, MA: Addison and Wesley,
1997) 10.
38. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers; Honecker, From My Life.
39. Gaddis, We Now Know, 139.
40. Gaddis, We Now Know, 224.
11
the East and West. Fathoming the “probability of civilization destroyed” was impossible for
Eisenhower.41 Burdened with the responsibility for such destruction “Khrushchev claimed to
have not been able to sleep for several days after learning of the physical effects that one bomb
would have on its target.”42 As one wrong step might mean global annihilation, both sides
hesitantly approached the possibility of using their new nuclear technology.
However, at the same time, East and West continued to advance a new breed of
imperialism. The ultimate goal now was to spread the global influence of one ideology before
the other. The further advancement of nuclear arms technology seemed a natural result of this
climate. As the only two great powers that remained, the USSR and United States became the
single largest obstacles in each other’s paths. Despite what either side said about peace, the
World War II mentality never completely disappeared. Both believed that they would be forced
into a defensive war in order to protect their interests against the increasing pressure of the other
side. Kennedy demonstrated this mindset in a television address to the world in declaring that
“we can not and will not permit the Communists to drive us out of Berlin.”43
Throughout the acceleration of the nuclear arms race, Khrushchev wavered between
confidence and fear as he gauged the Soviet Union’s military and technological capabilities. By
the end of the fifties Khrushchev’s belief in the superiority of his arms convinced him that the
“time seemed appropriate for a bold initiative to wrest concessions from the West.”44 In 1958, he
expressed to the Polish leadership that because “now, the balance of forces is different… [and]
__________
41. Eisenhower, Speech, on December 8, 1953, to the UN General Assembly, Eisenhower Public Papers
817, quoted in Gaddis, We Now Know, 227.
42. Ibid., 229.
43. U.S. Department of State, Documents on Germany, 764.
44. Dennis, Rise and Fall, 91.
12
our missiles can hit them directly,” the East’s international policies could change.45 At the same
time, he recognized that the Soviet Union presented a very open target for a Western attack.46
Khrushchev utilized the current conditions of the nuclear arms race as fuel for a strategy of
diplomatic aggression. No matter what his private beliefs on the capacity of his weaponry,
Khrushchev publicly boasted of the military capabilities of the USSR. Knowing that Eisenhower
shared his fear of nuclear holocaust, Khrushchev took this approach in order to further the cause
of peace. According to his logic, “accumulating –or at least appearing to accumulate- the means
of fighting” a war of annihilation was the best way to prevent war from breaking out.47 As a
result, Khrushchev adopted a tough stance based on the Soviet Union’s apparent determination to
achieve nuclear equality with the United States. Khrushchev reminded the west that “the USSR
was in a position to raze West Germany to the ground.”48 With the advancement of Soviet
technology, none of the Western Allies were completely safe. With Khrushchev’s rhetoric that
they were “still stronger than [the US], and they know that there is Russian supremacy here,” he
reasoned that the West would have to agree with the steps taken by the East. None of the
Western powers would react aggressively and in so doing “risk a war, which would destroy their
country.”49 In saying these things, he hoped to frighten the West into an agreement on Berlin.
Khrushchev utilized the global fear of nuclear warfare to work toward peaceful negotiations.
In the context of these Cold War conditions, Khrushchev declared his ultimatum for a
__________
45. Nikita Khrushchev and others, Minutes, Delegation of the PRL and the USSR. Moscow, 10 November
1958, trans. Douglas Selvage, in Cold War International History Project, 5.
46. Taubman, Man and His Era, 332.
47. Gaddis, We Now Know, 235.
48. Khrushchev, PRL and USSR, 4.
49. Nikita Khrushchev and others, Meeting, Presidium of the CC CPSU. Moscow, 26 May 1961, trans.
Olga Rivkin and Timothy Naftali, 5.
13
resolution on the question of Berlin. Zubok notes that Khrushchev’s “genuine concern of West
German designs against the GDR and for nuclear armament” was one factor that pushed him to
issuing his ultimatum.50 West German development into a European power posed a threat to the
East. If West German rearmament spread to West Berlin, “nuclear weapons would be, not near
our borders, but quite simply on our territory.”51 Khrushchev also desired to improve the
economic conditions in the GDR and broaden its global recognition.52 Engaging in an East-West
peace agreement would force the West finally to validate the GDR’s claim to nationhood.53
However, as the past had demonstrated, achieving such aims would prove difficult. As a result,
these same issues continued to dominate policy making for the entirety of the crisis.
In attempting to achieve these aims for the GDR, Khrushchev strongly held to the overall
superiority of the communist system. Throughout his political career, he remained a true
believer in its merits. As a result, he assumed that time would pull the FRG and West Berlin
away from the Western camp toward the East as the advantages of socialism became more
obvious. For many years, he continued to state that “the West Berlin problem would solve itself:
the people would run away and the city’s economy would collapse.”54 Khrushchev’s desire
throughout the crisis to designate West Berlin a “free city” demonstrated this belief. Under this
policy, he proposed, “West Berlin will become an open city with social and political conditions
decided by its inhabitants.” Then it would be possible to tempt West Berliners to embrace the
__________
50. Zubok, “Khrushchev and Berlin,” 31; Gaddis, We Now Know, 241.
51. Sergei Khrushchev, Nikita Khrushchev and the Creation of a Superpower, trans. Shirley Benson
(University Park, PA: Penn State University, 2000) 304.
52. Dennis, Rise and Fall, 91.
53. For more on the Western policy toward the GDR see pp. 19-20 below.
54. Willy Brandt, My Life in Politics (New York: Viking, 1992) 23.
14
“crisis-free and prosperous socialist economy.”55 If the East could not get the West to give them
West Berlin outright, then transforming it into a “free city” seemed the next best thing.
However, Khrushchev lacked a plan by which to accomplish these desired ends for Berlin.
Zubok concludes that Khrushchev’s ultimatum in November 1958 “was ninety percent
improvisation.”56 He did not prepare for how to react if the West did not concede to his terms.
Khrushchev’s response to his son Sergei’s question regarding “what will happen after May 27”
displays this lapse. Rather than firmly state that it would mark the end of East-West discussion
on Berlin, Khrushchev only laughed and said “May 28.”57 As a result, his six-month deadline for
a bilateral resolution on the German question was not strictly adhered to. British Prime Minister
Harold Macmillan’s visit to Moscow in February 1959 demonstrated enough Western goodwill
for Khrushchev to postpone any unilateral agreement with the GDR.58 When deadlines passed,
they did so without fanfare as long as he determined progress was made toward ending global
conflict. He seemed almost content to wait for events to develop, believing that they would go in
the favor of communism.
The earliest diplomatic progress encouraged Khrushchev’s optimism. After the events of
the summer of 1959, achieving a peaceful solution to the question of Germany seemed possible.
In July, an invitation to visit the United States was “just the breakthrough [Khrushchev] had been
waiting for.”59 Although his meetings with Eisenhower at Camp David later that year were not
__________
55. Sergei Khrushchev, Creation of a Superpower, 303-304.
56. Zubok, “Khrushchev and Berlin,” 12.
57. Sergei Khrushchev, Creation of a Superpower, 310.
58. Taubman, Man and His Era, 411.
59. Taubman, Man and His Era, 416
15
absent arguments and frustrations, Khrushchev returned to the USSR in a very euphoric mood.
He regarded the President’s agreement to participation in a four powers summit meeting as a
demonstration that the East and West could coexist.60
The economic vision for the GDR during this period also remained optimistic. Just as the
Soviets spoke of surpassing the economic giant of the United States, the GDR aimed equally
high. Ulbricht’s promise to “bring our economy and our own living standards to previously
unknown heights” characterized this mindset during the 1950s.61 Rather than deepen the gap
between rich and poor that Ulbricht saw occurring in the West, he began a push toward
increasing the overall living standards. Emboldened by his secure position atop the GDR
leadership, Ulbricht proudly declared, in July 1958, that in three years the GDR would exceed
the FRG’s “per capita consumption of all important foodstuffs and consumer goods.”62 This
assertion suggested that East Germany had overcome the destruction of Soviet reparations and
was flourishing.
As late as the Khrushchev-Ulbricht summits in Moscow on June 9 and 18, 1959, this
rhetoric of confidence still characterized their discussions. Ulbricht proposed postponing the
resolution of the German question. He proudly spoke of the “well known-successes” in chemical
industry and construction in recent months. As a result, by waiting a year and a half, he
determined the West “will be weaker, and we will be stronger.” This potential position of
strength would significantly increase the East’s ability to gain concessions from the West.63 All
__________
60. Ibid., 440.
61. Ulbricht, “Five Year Plan,” 2.
62. Dennis, Rise and Fall, 86.
63. Nikita Khrushchev and Walter Ulbricht, Meeting Record, Moscow, 9 and 18 June 1959, trans. Hope M.
Harrison, in Cold War International History Project, 8-9.
16
they had to do was wait.
Highlighted by the 1953 uprising, popular unrest in the GDR continued into the crisis
years. However, even in the presence of setbacks, the East moved forward. Instead of
shouldering the burden himself, Ulbricht continued blaming the FRG “campaign of lies and
slander against the GDR and the massive recruitment of people from the GDR…that pursues the
goal of spreading alarm and uncertainty in the GDR” as the cause of these problems.64 As a
result, he could hold on to the belief that absent western subversion the construction of socialism
would have progressed as planned. This prevented him from seeing the havoc his own policies
wreaked on the population. Combined with Khrushchev’s optimism in the ultimate success of
socialism despite the current difficulties, the GDR’s condition continued to worsen.
So it was that amidst all the rhetoric of a growing economy, the reality of the situation
was much different. The GDR was suffering and the people felt it the most. Ulbricht’s proposed
goal to overtake the FRG in 1961 initiated the collectivization of over ninety percent of the
GDR’s private farms within two years.65 This policy put an incredible strain on the economic
livelihood of those forced out of their former occupations. However, the impact went deeper
than financial standing. People also voiced their frustration over “seeing their children educated
along Communist lines and the lack of opportunity to travel abroad.”66 These repressive policies
drove many to escape west.
Escalating defector totals threatened to force the GDR into premature extinction. Nearly
__________
64. Walter Ulbricht, CC CPSU, Moscow, 3 August 1961, trans. Hope M. Harrison. Appendix H, in
“Working Paper #5: Ulbricht and the Concrete ‘Rose’: New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of Soviet-East
German Relations and the Berlin Crisis 1958-1961,” in Cold War International History Project, 1 January 2001, 112.
65. Childs, Fall of the GDR, 24.
66. George Bailey, “The Disappearing Satellite,” The Reporter 24, (1961): 20.
17
four million out of a total population under 20 million had escaped to the west by 1958. Eight
years after Ulbricht’s “planned construction of socialism” promised prosperity, 200,000 people
continued to leave the nation through West Berlin each year. Childs notes that things got so bad
that “if someone did not turn up for work on Monday morning, their boss did not know whether
they were just ill or whether they had joined the exodus to the West.”67 Although the overall rate
of defection in 1957 and 1958 dropped, the CIA reported that there was a 300% increase in the
number of doctors, dentists and veterinarians that left.68 In addition, fifty percent of those leaving
were under the age of twenty five.69 In the face of the loss of its youth and intelligentsia the GDR
could not possibly survive in the long run. After looking at these statistics, it is clear “that this
was no emigration problem but a population emergency, a national bloodletting.”70
Khrushchev’s diplomatic optimism aside, real progress toward an agreement within the
current division of the Cold War seemed in many ways impossible. Both sides expressed a
marked inflexibility to compromise on their positions even slightly. Despite the East’s claims to
hoping that “the heads of government will succeed in finding the right paths to the successful
solution of the current problems,”71 it did not give the Western powers so many options. There
was only one path that coincided with the Warsaw Pact’s desires. Eastern proposals for peace
always seemed filled with steps the western nations needed to take in order to bring about
successful negotiations. From the East’s perspective, settlement of the Berlin question amounted
__________
67. Childs, Fall of the GDR, 22.
68. Donald P. Steury, On the Front Lines of the Cold War: Documents on the Intelligence War in Berlin,
1946 to 1961 (CIA History Staff Center for the Study of Intelligence DC 1999) 420.
69. Bailey, “Disappearing Satellite,” 20.
70. Wyden, The Wall, 45.
71. Jagdish P. Jain, Documentary Study of the Warsaw Pact (London: Asia Publishing House, 1973), 354.
18
to turning West Berlin into a free city. Ridding East Berlin of Soviet influence was never an
issue. The East had adopted a policy that American journalist Edward R. Murrow described as
“what’s mine is mine and what’s yours is negotiable.”72 There was rarely a sense that the East, as
a long time proponent of peace and the easing of international tensions, should compromise its
position. It left this task up to the West.
Within this context, blame fell on the West when the peace process slowed. Soviet
Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko noted that the unacceptable nature of Western proposals was
the reason why the Geneva conference of foreign ministers resulted in little progress toward a
resolution of the Berlin question.73 Likewise, initial hopes for a treaty in February 1960 were
replaced by discouragement thirteen months later over the fact that “the aggressive [Western]
circles continue to obstruct an improvement in the international situation.”74 Ulbricht shared this
belief that Western proposals “were completely negative and worthless,”75 filled with policies
that would increase tension instead of encourage peace. If the diplomatic process did not
produce a solution, the East did not assume responsibility.
Although the fault for the failure of diplomacy during the Berlin Crisis was not
completely one sided, there was some justification for the East’s frustration with the West.
Observation of the diplomatic conditions within the Western Alliance reveals a divided policy.
From the start, the Western Powers could not agree on how to deal with Germany.76 This lack
__________
72. Edward R. Murrow to Kennedy, John F. Kennedy Library, Boston, quoted in Wyden, The Wall, 77.
73. U.S. Department of State, Documents on Germany, 645.
74. Jain, Warsaw Pact, 365.
75. Walter Ulbricht, Whither Germany?: Speeches and Essays on the National Question (Dresden: Zeit Im
Bild Publishing House, 1967) 215.
76. Wyden, The Wall, 182.
19
of alignment persisted to one degree or another throughout the crisis period.
Among the Western allies, the Federal Republic became the greatest obstacle to an
agreement. The Hallstein Doctrine stood out as a premier demonstration of this impediment.
With this document the FRG outlined its position as the “only free and legal German
government.” Any act to establish relations with the ‘so-called GDR’ was deemed entirely
unfriendly to the Federal Republic.77 Likewise, according to Khrushchev, FRG Chancellor
Konrad Adenauer was the West’s “chief organizer in the ‘crusade’ against communism.”78
Grounded in the desire to isolate the East German ‘zone,’ Adenauer’s foreign policy
demonstrated his leading role. He could not accept either the call for a German confederation or
the transformation of Berlin into a free city. Each concession would mean recognition of the
GDR. In the end, because he feared the Western Powers would establish peace at the expense of
Germany as he thought they had at Potsdam, Adenauer worked to block attempts by the Western
powers to compromise.79
Even if the Western Powers were to compromise, their pursuit of a resolution operated
under far less urgency than the East’s. Future Chancellor of the FRG Willy Brandt notes that the
Western Powers only cared about maintaining “Allied presence in Berlin, access to it, and
securing the liberties of its citizens.”80 With such a policy, the United States was not
“wholly displeased with the reality of an East and West Germany.”81 West Germans were not
__________
77. Jarausch, Uniting Germany, 13.
78. U.S. Department of State, Documents on Germany, 707.
79. Manfred Gortemaker, “Germany Between the Superpowers 1948-1968,” trans. Terence M. Coe, in The
United States and Germany in the Era of the Cold War 1945-1968, ed. Detlef Junker (Washington DC: German
Historical Institute, 2004) 115.
80. Brandt, Life in Politics, 49.
81. Frank Ninkovich, “The United States and the German Question, 1949-1968,” in The United States and
20
leaving in mass to find a better life, and the economy continued to grow stronger. Things
seemed to be developing quite nicely from the Western perspective. As a result, rather than push
for agreement that would alter the situation, the Western Allies “hoped to prolong the apparently
stable status quo.”82
The downing of an American U-2 spy plane over the Soviet Union on April 9, 1960
became a landmark event in the development of this diplomatic environment. Although only a
month before he would meet with the leaders of the West to discuss the future of Berlin,
Khrushchev initially choose to disregard this treachery. He believed it was an operation led by
the Pentagon not the White House. As a result, he could maintain his genuine belief that the
Western diplomats sincerely desired to reach an agreement on Germany. However, the events
that followed shattered Khrushchev’s trust in Eisenhower’s pure intentions. When he learned
that the President had approved of the U-2 flights, Khrushchev decided to pull out of the
Paris summit. Eisenhower had betrayed him. Although he still hoped to avoid unilateral actions,
Khrushchev’s previous diplomatic optimism never returned. These events erased all advances
made toward a resolution of the Berlin question since Khrushchev’s November 1958
ultimatum.83
By late 1960, general concern among East German leaders began to grow that current
economic conditions threatened the GDR’s survival. Ulbricht’s shift to a more pessimistic
outlook was profoundly evident in a November 30th meeting with Khrushchev. In Ulbricht’s
opening statement, he admitted that although the GDR’s economic plan continued on, “the
__________
Germany in the Era of the Cold War 1945- 1968, ed. Detlef Junker (Washington DC: German Historical Institute,
2004) 122.
82. Fulcher, “Sustainable Position,” 285.
83. Taubman, Man and His Era, 458-462; Sergei Khrushchev, Creation of a Superpower, 380-389.
21
situation in Berlin has become complicated, not in our favor.” Going on to detail the problem of
the 50,000 Grenzgangers that entered West Berlin every day for work, his tone was of utter
helplessness. In response to suggestions that the GDR could simply raise its own wages to keep
the doctors and teachers from leaving, he admitted that “we don’t have the means.” He also
realized that his rhetoric of optimism was no longer sufficient to boost any lags in production
growth. The value of rallies to encourage the workers of the GDR had since passed. He
confessed “that we cannot achieve our goals with the help of just propaganda.” The bright lights
and booming economy in the West was simply draining the GDR’s workforce dry. The proud
leader of the pearl of the communist bloc was now forced to reach out for whatever aid was
available. Although Ulbricht noted that it was “unpleasant for us to direct such requests” to
other members of the Warsaw Pact, he did it because survival demanded it. There was no longer
any mention of surpassing the living standard of the FRG in the revamped Seven Year economic
plan. Instead, the new focus promised that by 1965 the GDR would be completely free of USSR
and socialist aid.84
West Germany’s decision in September 1960 to “terminate the interzonal trade
agreement in protest against restrictions imposed on West Germans seeking entry into East
Berlin,”85 further weakened the GDR’s industry. This development proved the degree of its
dependence on West German aid. Economic conditions had deteriorated to such an extent that a
__________
84. Ulbricht’s statements are found in two sources. Nikita Khrushchev and Walter Ulbricht. Meeting
Record, 30 November 1960. trans. Hope M. Harrison. Appendix A, in “Working Paper #5: Ulbricht and the
Concrete ‘Rose’: New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of Soviet-East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis
1958-1961.” In Cold War International History Project, 1 January 2001, 68-78; Walter Ulbricht, Walter Ulbricht to
Nikita Khrushchev, 18 January 1961, trans. Hope M. Harrison, Appendix B, in “Working Paper #5: Ulbricht and the
Concrete ‘Rose’: New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of Soviet-East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis
1958-1961,” in Cold War International History Project, 1 January 2001, 79-87.
85. Dennis, Rise and Fall, 89; Signed on September 20, 1951, the interzonal trade agreement between the
GDR and FRG became a demonstration of the superiority of the FRG economy more than anything. The GDR
22
“threat of conquest without war existed by economic strangulation.”86 It was crucial that East
Germany find another source of economic assistance. Increasing the already taxing reliance the
GDR had on the other members of the Warsaw Pact states seemed imminent.
Ulbricht was not alone in the realization of the GDR’s dilemma. Khrushchev also
believed that “the socialist camp as a whole, acted incorrectly here… We didn’t know that the
GDR was so vulnerable to West Germany.” However, for Khrushchev this problem evoked a
different response. While he had once showed sympathy for his East German allies, the toll of
the economic crisis had begun to wear on him. His irritation over the GDR’s continued
economic dependence prevented him from rising to its aid as he had in the past. During his
meeting with Ulbricht on November 30th, 1960, Khrushchev blamed the GDR for its economic
conditions wondering aloud “what do we have to do so that you will be independent from the
capitalist world.”87 While he maintained his calm in a letter that expressed “[the USSR] shared
completely in the idea of broadening the economic cooperation between the GDR and USSR,”88
this outburst illustrated that Khrushchev had mixed feelings about the situation. Twelve years
after the GDR had been granted sovereignty he demanded that the GDR had to stop “reaching
your hands into our pockets.” This “old habit” could not go on.89 The USSR did not have the
__________
heavily relied upon this supply of goods from the FRG. Throughout much of the crisis East worried that the West
might respond to unilateral Eastern actions by discontinuing these favorable trade relations with the GDR. However
it was only when the FRG finally ended the trade agreement that the East realized the extent to which the GDR
economy had been dependent on West German aid.
86. Zubok, “Khrushchev and Berlin,” 8.
87. Khrushchev and Ulbricht, Appendix A “Concrete Rose,” 72-73.
88. Walter Ulbricht, Walter Ulbricht to Nikita Khrushchev, 18 January 1961, trans. Hope M. Harrison,
Appendix C, in “Working Paper #5: Ulbricht and the Concrete ‘Rose’: New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of
Soviet-East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis 1958-1961,” in Cold War International History Project, 1
January 2001, 88.
89. Khrushchev and Ulbricht, Appendix A “Concrete Rose,” 74, 76.
23
resources to give. The GDR could no longer continue to “request crediting an account with 170
million rubles,” to be repaid in 1966.90 It was time that the GDR demonstrated that it could stand
on its own.
Despite the negative trends, Khrushchev’s fear of the humiliation of international
socialism left him reluctant to seek a unilateral solution for Berlin. Khrushchev considered the
loss of the GDR a significant impetus to set the overall demise of the East in motion.91 They
were in the middle of a very precarious balance of power between East and West. Any slight
disruption of the status quo either way might result in the other side gaining control of much of
the world. As a result, Khrushchev’s fight for the GDR always remained subordinate to the
greater aim of protecting the socialist movement. Worried that the West might respond with
nuclear force, his policy exercised extreme caution regarding even the smallest unilateral steps
toward a resolution of the Berlin problem.
Ulbricht, on the other hand, did not share Khrushchev’s broader interest in the success of
international socialism. Harrison contrasts what she calls Khrushchev’s global interests of East
vs. West with Ulbricht’s much narrower focus on building up the strength of the GDR.92 As the
GDR’s survival became threatened, Ulbricht’s attention directed more toward keeping control of
his nation. Ulbricht could thus afford to adopt a bolder approach than Khrushchev in dealing
with Berlin.
As a result, the GDR’s worsening conditions soon threatened Khrushchev and Ulbricht’s
___________
90. Ulbricht, Appendix B “Concrete Rose,” 86.
91. Gaddis, We Now Know, 134.
92. Harrison, “Driving the Soviets,” 59.
24
previous united pursuit to strengthen the nation. As Harrison points out, though they both
desired to uphold socialism and decrease the Western presence in Berlin “they differed on how
important these were and what they were willing to risk” in order to attain them.93 So,
Khrushchev’s hesitation to save the GDR from its demise impelled Ulbricht to begin to break
from the Soviet Chairman’s leadership. In response to Khrushchev’s relatively passive approach,
Ulbricht took the initiative to push on the resolution of the Berlin problem. In January 1960, he
independently sent a note to the Western powers protesting their actions in West Berlin. He
followed this by putting proposals before the Warsaw Pact member states. Although denied in
his request for the construction of a wall at a March 29th 1961 meeting of the Central Committee
of the Communist Parties of the Soviet Union (CC CPSU), he nonetheless “told Honecker to
start the planning and collecting of materials.”94 By July 1961, his plans for the division of Berlin
involved stopping the metro and train to West Berlin, and separating the main station with a
glass wall.95 For Ulbricht, the time to act had come.
While Khrushchev pursued a bilateral agreement on Berlin, Ulbricht’s diplomacy more
naturally resorted to attacking the “enemies” of the GDR. Ulbricht’s strict interpretation of
socialism led to his harsh and accusatory view of the conditions within the FRG. References to
the Hitler generals that still governed in Bonn featured prominently throughout his speeches.
According to Ulbricht, West Germany was heading down the same path the Nazis had gone “in
using the defeat of Germany in [World War I] to stir up chauvinism and justify revanchist
__________
93. Harrison, “Driving the Soviets,” 56.
94. Brandt, Life in Politics, 48.
95. Hope M. Harrison, “Ulbricht and the Concrete ‘Rose’: New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of
Soviet-East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis 1958-1961,” Cold War International History Project, 53.
25
demands.”96 This home of ‘militarists’ seeking to win back land they had lost sharply contrasted
Ulbricht’s own ‘peace loving’ country. Although he called for the end of West German policies
of aggression, Ulbricht spared nothing in addressing the FRG with the harshest of wartime
propaganda.
Even within the Eastern bloc Ulbricht’s words did not help the cause of unity. There was
always a certain air of condescension in what he said. He frequently hammered on the
importance of the GDR in the international struggle for socialism. Ulbricht littered his speeches
with lines referring to how the “founding of the GDR was a turning point in the history of
Europe.”97 It is not surprising that with this arrogance “he made himself particularly unpopular
among the Warsaw Pact countries.”98 When it became time for him to ask for help, he found
little support. Although he probably did not choose to recognize the reasons behind its isolation,
Ulbricht noted that, aside from Soviet support, the GDR was alone in its attempt to resolve the
Berlin question in January 1961.99
Embracing Khrushchev’s presentation of nuclear power as truth, Ulbricht’s aggressive
approach to relations with his Cold War adversaries was also a reflection of the nuclear arms
race. Like Chinese Chairman Mao Zedong, Ulbricht confronted the prospect of nuclear conflict
believing that Soviet superiority meant “[Western] plans of revenge are doomed to failure.” Due
to the sheer power of the Eastern nuclear arsenal, “within a few minutes of attack on the GDR,
__________
96. Ulbricht, Whither Germany, 16.
97. Ulbricht, Whither Germany, 47.
98. Wyden, The Wall, 87.
99. Ulbricht, Appendix B “Concrete Rose,” 82.
26
Bonn and other military centers in West Germany will have ceased to exist.”100 From this
position of strength, he was confused by Khrushchev’s hesitation to anger the Western powers
with unilateral action. When China adopted a similar view of what the USSR needed to do, the
pressure that pushed Khrushchev toward an undesirable decision grew. In November of 1957,
Khrushchev recalled Mao Zedong boasting that “[the East] shouldn’t fear war…we’ll win. As for
China, if the imperialists unleash war on us, we may lose more than three hundred million people.
So what? War is war.”101 One can only imagine how unsettling this was for Khrushchev to hear.
Believing in the East’s military strength, Mao’s growing dissatisfaction with the policy of the
Soviet Union with regard to the West became one of the main pressure points confronting
Khrushchev.102 Khrushchev could not afford to severely alienate the Chinese Chairman. As a
result, the nuclear arms race became yet another front that forced Khrushchev’s hand during the
crisis years. Khrushchev had to act before the GDR or People’s Republic of China did first.
Despite the harsh rhetoric about a war of annihilation, within the leadership of the Soviet
Union and United States there existed a common understanding that neither side would respond
to the other with force. In May 1961, Khrushchev heard directly from US Ambassador
Llewellyn Thompson that the maintenance of Western access rights to West Berlin was all that
mattered.103 As long as the status quo continued regarding their rights, the West would have no
grounds for complaint. Likewise, the sentiments of Khrushchev and Kennedy concerning
__________
100. Ulbricht, Whither Germany, 233.
101. Nikita Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers: The Last Testament, trans. Strobe Talbott (Boston:
Little, Brown & Co, 1974), 255-257, quoted in John L. Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 249.
102. Harrison, “Driving the Soviets,” 56.
103. Khrushchev, 26 May 1961, 2.
27
the prospect of war over Berlin demonstrated the shared view that united them underneath the
drama of the period. Where Khrushchev believed that “starting war over Berlin would have been
stupid,”104 Kennedy shared in the conclusion of the particular “stupidity of risking killing a
million Americans over an argument about access rights on an Autobahn.”105 It is in statements
like these that history reveals it was a crisis only in name. The threat of nuclear conflict was in
the process of making the Cold War not a war at all.
After a long period of negotiations with little if any concessions made on either side,
there was a growing sense that bilateral diplomatic attempts were entirely futile. Khrushchev
expressed his mounting frustration with the West in May of 1961. Thirty months had gone by
since the proposed signing of a peace treaty and “now nothing can be changed because you
simply don’t want it.” Realizing a treaty with the West was not probable, Khrushchev followed
that “therefore, we will do it ourselves.”106 After his meeting with Kennedy in June became only
a glorified attempt at intimidation, time for East-West negotiations had passed. Due to his
commitments to the GDR, “the failure of another summit left Khrushchev no more room for
procrastination.”107 If there was to be a resolution of the Berlin question, it was going to come
from the unilateral action that Ulbricht had initiated.
By the summer of 1961, concerns about the state of the GDR’s economy had grown
feverish. Although the GDR’s leaders tried, nothing stopped the lure of the Federal Republic’s
__________
104. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, 458.
105. John F. Kennedy, quoted in Michael Beschloss, The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev 1960-63
(New York: Harper Collins, 1991), 225.
106. Nikita Khrushchev, 26 May 1961, 3.
107. Zubok, “Khrushchev and Berlin,” 24.
28
freedoms and excesses.108 It was becoming clear that the GDR could not survive
the instability caused by Berlin’s open border. Ulbricht claimed that the GDR could be “faced
with serious crisis manifestations” if the Warsaw states did not supply them with much needed
currency and materials.109 Even Kennedy noted that “Khrushchev faces an unbearable
situation…East Germany is hemorrhaging to death, and as a result the entire East bloc is in
danger. He has to do something to stop this.”110 Reality demanded a firm and fast solution. By
July 1961, the “flood of GDR refugees was obviously forcing Khrushchev’s hand.”111
Khrushchev could not let his “showcase” continue to suffer as such. The status quo had taken
too great a toll for too long. After Khrushchev joined with Ulbricht in noting the situation’s
urgency, a resolution with or without the West was only a matter of time.
Ulbricht called together a meeting of the CC CPSU for August 3-5 in order to again push
for the construction of a wall.112 It was here that Khrushchev finally relented knowing as he did
that encircling West Berlin would not cause war.113 That same day Ulbricht gave Honecker the
instruction to prepare for the construction of the Berlin Wall.114 Beginning as a barbed wire
barrier, the East would build the Wall when it became apparent that the West was not going to
__________
108. Bailey, “Disappearing Satellite,” 20-23.
109. Ulbricht, Appendix B “Concrete Rose,” 86.
110. Walt W. Rostow, The Diffusion of Power (New York: Macmillan, 1972), 231, quoted in Wyden, The
Wall, 124.
111. Wyden, The Wall, 81.
112. Nikita Khrushchev, CC CPSU, Moscow: 3 August 1961, trans. Hope M. Harrison, Appendix G, in
“Working Paper #5: Ulbricht and the Concrete ‘Rose’: New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of Soviet-East
German Relations and the Berlin Crisis 1958-1961,” in Cold War International History Project, 1 January 2001, 106.
113. Lunak, “Soviet Brinkmanship,” 73.
114. Honecker, My Life, 210.
29
resist. Because it was a weekend and the Grenzgangers would not be going into West Berlin to
work, August 13th became their d-day.
In order to insure the success of the effort, Eastern officials guarded the operation of the
next ten days with the greatest secrecy. In retrospect, CIA spies have admitted that “only agents
close to Ulbricht could have” known of the Wall in the week before it went up.115 The goal was
to maintain an appearance of business as usual in East Berlin. It was in this shroud of secrecy
that Erich Honecker led his Einsatzstab of eight men to implement the last details of the Wall. In
many ways, Honecker seemed perfect for the job. After a lifetime of service to the Communist
Party and “a flawless political pedigree”116 he had been rewarded with the leadership of the
GDR’s top defense agency. Up until the final hours before the construction, Honecker
meticulously oversaw an operation that had orders which “were either transmitted orally or they
existed only in handwritten drafts composed by one man.”117 Although Ulbricht and Soviet
Marshal IS Konev outranked him in the operation, this was merely a formality. No one
threatened his position. So, after years of conflict and indecision, the job of watching over the
GDR’s survival went from Khrushchev and Ulbricht to Honecker and a small group of rather
ordinary men. It was in this environment that the East divided Berlin on August 13th 1961 with
only the slightest response from the West.118
__________
115. David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev, and George Bailey, Battleground Berlin: CIA vs. KGB in the
Cold War (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997) 377.
116. Wyden, The Wall, 196.
117. Ibid., 133-135.
118. The largest clash of military forces came on October 28, 1961 when ten American tanks, providing
support for a bulldozer crew, lined up along the West Berlin side of Checkpoint Charlie. For several hours, they sat
silently facing a similar collection of Soviet tanks. After this stalemate persisted for a few days, each group quietly
turned around and went away.
30
In the aftermath of the Wall’s construction, the GDR and USSR leaders attempted to cast
the August 13th operation as a cause for celebration. Ulbricht reported in a letter to Khrushchev
on September 15th that the immediate positive results of the event included the significant growth
of the authority of the GDR state in the people’s consciousness.119 Honecker voiced this
enthusiasm in a later statement that the “unity in the effort showed the superiority of their
political system.”120 Even Khrushchev shared in this mood. He wrote in his memoirs that “we
had good reason to celebrate this moral and material victory, for we had forced the West to
recognize the GDR’s unwritten rights” to control its own territory and borders.121 The presence
of sadness and frustration over the decision to build the Wall was utterly absent among the East’s
leadership.
However, contrary to all the talk of success, the construction of the Wall represented a
monumental declaration of failure. It demonstrated the inability of socialism to compete with the
capitalist economy and the giant reach of the American dollar. It was a determined retreat from
open interaction with the West. After years of losing its population to the West, the GDR was in
desperate need of a boost. The Wall forced Khrushchev and Ulbricht to recognize, if not publicly
to admit, the inferiority of their policies lest they weaken the future ability of the GDR to survive.
Likewise, Khrushchev had tried to wrest a Berlin treaty from the West for so long. As late as
August 3 1961, Khrushchev continued to emphasize that “we, of course, must try again and
again to use all means and possibilities which we have to persuade the
__________
119. Ulbricht, Walter Ulbricht, Walter Ulbricht to Nikita Khrushchev, 15 September 1961, trans. Hope M.
Harrison, Appendix I, in “Working Paper #5: Ulbricht and the Concrete ‘Rose’: New Archival Evidence on the
Dynamics of Soviet-East German Relations and the Berlin Crisis 1958-1961,” in Cold War International History
Project, 1 January 2001,126.
120. Honecker, From My Life, 212.
121. Khrushchev, Khrushchev Remembers, 460.
31
Western powers to agree to the conclusion of a peace treaty.”122 After such aims were not
achieved, he resorted to unilateral action. It was the East that finally made the concession.
Considering these conditions, it is hard to credit anyone in the East as the originator of the Wall.
One must look at the entire environment that influenced motivations during this period to
understand the Wall’s origins. In revisiting how these years progressed toward the construction
of the Berlin Wall, the decision to implement it loses some of its glamour. Rather than an
unprovoked action of communist villains, it largely coincided with the Cold War climate both
East and West had created. First, it represented a calculated unilateral action in the wake of the
long failure of productive diplomatic negotiations. Secondly, it was a relatively peaceful
resolution of the issue at hand. Lastly and most importantly, it provided a solution for the GDR
population exodus and protection from Western “saboteurs.” The combination of the breakdown
of diplomacy, peril of the GDR economy, and passivity of nuclear war created the conditions
necessary for the construction of the Wall.
This knowledge of the complexity of the Wall’s origins demands a reanalysis of the past.
Failing to mention the independent role of any of these factors as well as the connections
between them all seems historically unjust. Within this “new” history, the origins of the Berlin
Wall become more diverse. This is how it should be.
__________
122. Khrushchev, Appendix H “Concrete Rose,” 106.
32
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