Party Discipline in the Contemporary Congress:
Rewarding Loyalty in Theory and in Practice
Kathryn Pearson
Chapter 3
Do Leaders Reward Loyalty on the Legislative Calendar?
When describing how party leaders determined whose legislation to bring to the House
floor for consideration from 1995 to1998, former House Speaker Newt Gingrich explained that
the loyalty of the bill’s sponsor was important: “Jim Nussle (R-Iowa), who had been heroic on a
huge range of things for the party, had to have that opportunity (to have his ethanol legislation
considered).”1 Near the end of the 107th Congress, Republican leaders pulled Congressman
Christopher Smith’s (R-NJ) legislation to provide loans to small businesses in developing
countries from the House calendar to punish him for deviating from the party position on
unrelated legislation (Pomper 2002). In the contemporary congressional environment, do party
leaders systematically reward loyalty and punish disloyalty in the legislative process as a way of
implementing party discipline, or are these examples anomalies?
The legislative calendar provides party leaders with many opportunities to exert
discipline. This chapter evaluates how majority party leaders allocate legislative opportunities to
their rank-and-file members. The empirical focus is on how party leaders in the congresses from
1987-2002 decided which members’ bills, amendments, resolutions, and “suspensions” were
considered on the House floor, and under what conditions. I pay particular attention to the
interplay between the majority party’s electoral motive of maintaining a partisan majority and
the policy motives of enhancing party unity and passing legislation.
Despite increases in the power and prerogatives of party leaders in the post-reform
Congress, congressional party discipline is difficult to identify. Some scholars question whether
parties matter at all controlling for members’ policy preferences (e.g., Krehbiel 1993, 1998,
2000). Many find that parties exert influence in post-reform congressional politics (e.g., Aldrich
and Rohde 2000; Binder, Lawrence, and Maltzman 1999; Rohde 1991; Sinclair 1995, 1999), but
there is no consensus on the causes or consequences of party effects. In analyses of members’
roll call votes, scholars detect party influence, but they do not specify how leaders exact party
loyalty (Ansolabehere, Snyder, and Stewart 2001; Snyder and Groseclose 2000; McCarty, Poole,
and Rosenthal 2001; Cox and Poole 2001).
Cox and McCubbins (1993) argue that parties are—and have been historically—stronger
than most scholars recognize. They model parties in the House as a “legislative cartel,” whereby
the majority party wields power over every stage of the legislative process. The majority party’s
ability to solve the institution’s inherent collective action problem rests on this “automatic”
control, but also on their “active” control, i.e., their power to punish their members. Analyses
focusing on overt punishment will not get very far: the use of potent sanctions, such as expelling
a member from the party caucus or a committee, is rare (Schickler and Rich 1997). When it
comes to rewarding loyalty, Cox and McCubbins’ empirical evidence shows that parties indeed
provide selective incentives to loyal party members in the form of desirable committee transfers.
Party loyalty is a significant factor explaining members’ transfers to exclusive committees from
the 80th to the 100th Congress (Cox and McCubbins 1993). They do not, however, specify the
electoral and institutional conditions in which leaders are more likely to use incentives, nor do
they explore other potentially important, less visible tools employed by party leaders to
advantage loyal members as a means of discipline.
As parties became more ideologically homogeneous beginning in the mid-1970s, rank
and file members ceded more legislative prerogatives to their leaders (Rohde 1991; Sinclair
1995). On the majority side, the most significant leaders include the Speaker of the House, the
Majority Leader, the Majority Whip, the Caucus or Conference Chair, and the chair of the
party’s campaign committee (i.e., the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee or the
National Republican Congressional Committee). On the minority side, the leadership group
consists of the Minority Leader, the Minority Whip, the Caucus or Conference Chair, and the
chair of the campaign committee. Party leaders in the contemporary House of Representatives
allocate many scarce resources and opportunities to their rank-and-file members, e.g., committee
assignments and transfers, conference committee assignments, campaign resources, and the
consideration of their legislation. Given the limited amounts of exclusive committee positions,
campaign resources, and available time on the House floor, party leaders have many
opportunities to reward and punish members of their caucus.
1
Quote from author’s interview with former House Speaker Newt Gingrich October 8, 2003.
2
Majority party leaders set the overall legislative agenda and fill the House calendar,2
which has space for a small fraction of the thousands of bills and amendments introduced.
Majority party leaders determine whose bills are considered on the House floor and under what
conditions. Leaders generally work closely with committee chairs to determine which bills are
reported out of committee and in what form. They shepherd some bills through committee from
start to finish, carefully monitoring their legislative progress. In other instances, they evaluate
the legislation marked up by a committee or committees and determine whether it will be
considered on the House floor. Pursuant to the rules of the House—and in actual practice—the
Speaker determines whose bills are considered under “suspension of the rules,” a procedural
shortcut used to expedite non-controversial legislation. Using their influence over the House
Committee on Rules, leaders decide which amendments are in order during the consideration of
legislation, increasingly employing restrictive rules that permit the amendments of just a selected
few members. In sum, by employing their prerogatives, leaders pick and choose among
members’ requests for legislative preference. Given a massive pool of legislation (e.g., over
6,000 pieces in the 107th Congress) introduced by 435 members of varied backgrounds and
institutional positions to choose from, leaders must weigh many factors when deciding whose
bills, resolutions, and amendments to bring to the House floor. They have incentives to reward
loyalty and recognize legislative entrepreneurship, and they naturally want to help their
electorally vulnerable members.
Leaders’ Pursuit and Prioritization of Goals
As outlined in detail in Chapter 1, I test three hypothesis to explain party leaders’ goals
when they determine the legislative agenda: a “policy control” hypothesis that party leaders
reward members’ past loyalty in policy and procedural voting in order to provide incentives for
future loyalty; an electoral hypothesis that party leaders seeking majority control assist
electorally vulnerable members—regardless of their party loyalty—and reward members who
provide campaign contributions to their colleagues; and an institutional maintenance hypothesis
that legislative entrepreneurs, committee chairs, and senior members are likely to see their
efforts, experience, and expertise pay off. These are not mutually exclusive alternatives. In
2
Members have some limited checks on majority party leaders’ authority in the form of both negative and positive
agenda control. A majority of members can prevent legislation from being considered, as bills need a special rule to
pass with a majority of votes before being considered. Legislation opposed by party leaders can be considered on
the House floor if 218 members sign a discharge petition, though these are rare.
3
interviews, leaders and former leaders have stressed that they are well aware of members’ voting
records, fundraising efforts, districts, electoral situations, and legislative activities and are in fact
likely to consider all of these factors. Multivariate analyses over several congresses allow me to
assess the use and prioritization of each hypothesized consideration.
I argue that leaders pursue each of these goals; their relative priority depends on the
particular electoral and institutional context in a given Congress. Specifically, strong leaders
interested in centralizing power and passing a party program, particularly in congresses with
narrow margins where they need almost every vote to pass a legislative program, are more likely
to exert party discipline by rewarding loyalty. In congresses where leaders are particularly
concerned about reelecting their members, i.e., many of their members face competitive races,
they increase their efforts to pursue electoral goals.
Congressional leaders have an incentive to pursue policy control by exerting party
discipline, i.e., rewarding loyal party members with legislative opportunities and punishing
defectors by keeping their bills off the legislative calendar. Party discipline helps leaders
cultivate something akin to responsible party government (APSA 1950) in which they can
promulgate a partisan policy agenda. In congresses with narrow majorities, majority party
leaders need the votes of nearly all their members on nearly all important issues, given the
increased polarization on significant roll call votes (Sinclair 2000). Using rewards to provide
members with extra incentives for voting with the party could thus make the difference in policy
outcomes. Beyond attaining the 218th vote necessary to pass legislation, party leaders also strive
to maximize the support of their members to present a united front to the public. Dissent from
fellow partisans makes it more difficult attract public support for the party’s position.
Dissenters’ cues provide the attentive public reasons to oppose the majority’s legislative
program, reducing its ultimate chances for enactment in its House-passed form and diminishing
the party’s political gain.
For their part, members have incentives to obtain preferential treatment from the
leadership by demonstrating their loyalty in their policy and procedural voting. Reelection and
policy achievements are primary goals for members of Congress (Fenno 1973), and legislative
accomplishments and the attendant publicity they receive bolster members’ chances of reelection
(Wawro 2000). As new policy issues emerge and electoral dynamics change, loyal members
have reason to seek continued party support from party leaders.
4
An obvious litmus test of party loyalty is consistently voting with the party majority on
policy legislation considered on the House floor. Such loyalty is particularly valuable in an era
of tight competition for party control of Congress, when both parties want to be able to point to a
record of legislative accomplishment and every vote counts. But according to several current
and former members of Congress and their senior aides, voting with the party on rules is the
ultimate test of loyalty. Rules set the terms of debate on legislation, giving party leaders control
over the consideration of legislation.
That said, party leaders also want to maintain or attain electoral majorities, and this can
militate against an overly rigid use of party loyalty as a criterion for allocating legislative
preference. Losing seats may cost leaders their jobs, and leading the majority party is far better
than leading the minority party. The House is a majoritarian institution. Majority party leaders
are far better positioned to maintain and enhance their own power, and they have a much better
chance of achieving their party’s policy goals. Accordingly, party leaders strive to elect as many
fellow partisans as possible, regardless of their loyalty to the party’s ideological core. The need
to win a majority of seats focuses attention on the party’s vulnerable incumbents, and this can
limit the selective use of legislative benefits to enhance party loyalty, particularly as partisan
margins have narrowed. Given leaders’ desire to provide vulnerable members with legislative
accomplishments as an aid for reelection, they should bring their legislation to the floor for
consideration, regardless of their level of party loyalty.
In the electoral domain, members can demonstrate party loyalty by forming leadership
PACs or making contributions from their own campaign coffers to fellow incumbents and the
party congressional campaign committee, thereby increasing their party’s chances for retaining
seats in the next election. As variance in party loyalty in roll call voting declines, large
contributors can distinguish themselves from other consistent party line voters. Party leaders
also have an incentive to reward loyal fundraisers as a means of encouraging other members to
raise campaign funds.
Party leaders have a significant interest in institutional maintenance. They need to pass
annual appropriations bills and other necessary legislation to keep the Congress functioning and
the government running. Party leaders therefore depend on the expertise and efforts of the senior
members, committee chairmen, and legislative entrepreneurs in their caucus or conference.
5
In the contemporary congressional era, majority party leaders often shepherd legislation
through the legislative process from start to finish. When determining whether to schedule
legislation, they sometimes bypass the committee system altogether (Davidson 1999; Sinclair
2000). 3 A surprisingly large number of bills considered in committee hearings and even marked
up in a full committee do not reach the floor, and a surprisingly large number of bills considered
on the floor are not the subject of committee hearings. Nonetheless, I predict that leaders should
be more likely to consider legislation introduced by committee chairmen. Committee chairs and
subcommittee chairs convene hearings and mark ups of their own legislation, launching a bill on
a traditional path to floor consideration. When party leaders are indifferent to the policy in
question, they are likely to defer to committee chairs. Further, committee chairmen often work
with party leaders to craft party policy on significant issues within their jurisdiction. It is not a
coincidence that the tax bills considered on the House floor are usually written by the Chairman
of the Committee on Ways and Means. Committee chairs are thus likely to see much more of
their legislation considered on the House floor. In addition, seniority may enhance a member’s
ability to have her legislation considered. Experience enhances institutional and policy expertise,
helping members to take advantage of policy gaps with their own legislation.
Party leaders need their members to help develop policy proposals on a variety of
complex issues of public concern—many more than party leaders could master on their
own—and to overcome the collective action problem of passing the mundane legislation
necessary to keep the Congress functioning (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Sinclair 1995; Wawro
2000). Although many members may focus on their district careers rather than their legislative
careers (Fenno 1973, 1978), most members are motivated to sponsor some legislation for
electoral reasons. Sponsorship provides members with opportunities for position-taking and
advertising (Mayhew 1974). But, legislative success is necessary for credit-claiming. Members
who introduce many bills without translating them into new public policy run the risk of being
labeled ineffective. Further, there is a significant difference between introducing legislation for
symbolic reasons and introducing legislation intended to bring about major policy change. When
leaders determine whose bills to consider, they send a signal to members considering whether to
engage in serious policy-making. If majority party “work-horses” don’t have their legislation
brought to the House floor, as should naturally occur in a competitive environment, other
3
Unless 218 members sign a discharge petition.
6
members may be discouraged. By giving legislative entrepreneurs, senior members and
committee chairmen legislative preference, party leaders provide all members incentives to
introduce good public policy and gain policy expertise. All else equal, then, members who are
more legislatively active should have more of their legislation considered on the House floor.
Majority party leaders fill most of the legislative calendar. Minority party leaders are left
with limited opportunities to grant legislative preference, e.g., through motions to recommit,
minority party substitutes to major bills, and even determining the sponsors of party-supported
discharge petitions.4 In this analysis, I therefore consider majority party leaders’ allocation of
legislative opportunities to their caucus or conference members, analyzing Democrats from
1987-1994 and Republicans from 1995-2002.
Legislative Preference as a Mechanism of Discipline
The legislative calendar is not an immediately obvious place to search for party
discipline. Although the power of committee chairs is diminished, they still have the power to
forward legislation from the hearing stage through committee mark up. Much of the legislative
calendar is pre-determined. It contains “must-pass” legislation, including the 13 annual
appropriations bills and conference reports, rules and resolutions necessary for House operations
and maintenance, rules that govern the terms of consideration of most bills, and periodic
continuing resolutions necessary to keep the federal government operating, and occasional
increases in the debt ceiling. Majority party priorities by definition have a reserved place on the
congressional agenda. Significant domestic and international events may necessitate the
consideration of legislative solutions. The party of the president is compelled to pursue
presidential priorities. But even in the management of these legislative musts, party leaders have
opportunities to delegate sponsorship to individual members or to adjudicate between members’
competing proposals. And beyond these constraints on the shape of the legislative calendar,
leaders can select from among their caucus members’ legislation to fill the remaining space.
Because the number of bills introduced in a given Congress far exceeds the time available on the
House floor, leaders must pick and choose among many requests.
Changing Institutional and Electoral Contexts
4
Ascertained in an interview with a senior staff member to Democratic leaders, August 2003.
7
To review the critical changes from the 100th to the 107th Congress (1987-2002),
described in greater detail in Chapter 2, this analysis encompasses four Democratic-controlled
congresses under the leadership of two Speakers, Jim Wright (TX) and Tom Foley (WA), and
four Republican-controlled congresses, led by Speakers Newt Gingrich (GA) and Dennis Hastert
(IL). In all but the 103rd and 107th Congress, the majority party faced a president of the opposite
party.
With large margins in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Democratic leaders assumed that
they would be in the majority for the foreseeable future. This did not mean, however, that they
were never concerned about the size of their margins. In 1992, many Democratic incumbents
were vulnerable. Congressional redistricting, the House Bank scandal, and the public’s generally
low opinion of congress meant that Democratic leaders were more concerned than usual
(Jacobson 2000).
Democratic leaders’ behavior toward Republicans in the minority reflected their electoral
advantage. By the early 1980s, leading a caucus of increasingly like-minded members,
Democratic leaders and committee chairmen no longer needed Republican votes to pass their
legislation, and they had begun to shut Republicans out of the legislative process. The
Republican “bomb-throwing” faction emerged in response, led by Newt Gingrich and Bob
Walker (Connelly and Pitney 1994; Fenno 1997), and partisan politics dominated much of the
legislative process.
Partisan conflict only grew more intense after the 1994 elections when party control of
the chamber switched and suddenly was up for grabs every two years. Republicans gained 52
seats in the 1994 elections, giving them a majority in the House of Representatives for the first
time in 40 years, stunning Democrats and Republicans alike. In their new role, Republican
leaders pushed a vigorous legislative agenda, learning to govern along the way, and Democrats
were forced to adapt to life in the minority (Fenno 1997).
At the start of the 100th and 104th Congresses, newly elected Speakers Jim Wright (DTX) and Newt Gingrich (R-GA) actively pursued a partisan policy agenda and expanded leaders’
powers. The careers of both Speakers ended prematurely, and they were succeeded by more
pragmatic, less controversial Speakers. Speaker Jim Wright was more aggressive in
promulgating a party program and centralizing power than his successor, Tom Foley. In January
8
1987, Wright succeeded Tip O’Neill as Speaker of the House. The context was ripe for a
relatively powerful Speaker. Democrats “at last saw an opening for their policy agenda, and they
expected their leadership to knock down any internal obstacles” (Connelly and Pitney 1994:82).
Wright articulated a partisan legislative agenda, further developed the leaderships’ powers in
pursuit of the agenda, and used procedural maneuvers to block Republican-supported alternatives
to ensure the passage of Democratic legislation (Connelly and Pitney 1994; Rohde 1991).
Wright’s use—or, in the view of Republicans, abuse —of partisan tactics intensified
Republicans’ pursuit of ethics charges against Wright, which eventually led to his resignation
(Connelly and Pitney 1994).
Though a relatively homogeneous membership is a necessary condition for strong
leadership, the goals and skills of individual leaders also matter (Rohde 1991: 172). Tom Foley
had risen through the party’s leadership ranks, but he had a reputation for prioritizing governance
over partisan politics. When Foley was elected Speaker in June 1989, he was seen as “the
antidote to Wright’s roughshod partisanship” (Hoy 1994: 3290). But by the time he was
defeated for reelection in 1994, Speaker Foley was viewed as a weaker Speaker than Wright.
His “characteristic graciousness . . . thwarted him as he struggled to balance his dual role as the
institutional leader of the House against his partisan position as the congressional torchbearer of
his party” (Hoy 1994: 3290).
The change in majority party control ushered in a powerful Speaker—many Republican
members credited Speaker Gingrich as the architect of the Republican takeover—determined to
pass the party program outlined in the “Contract With America.” Committee chairmen, lacking
experience and independent power bases, were often bypassed altogether in the 104th Congress
(Davidson 1999). The Republican majority operated in a different political context than their
Democratic predecessors had. Democrats’ majorities from 1987 to 1994 ranged anywhere from
81 to 100 seats, dwarfing Republicans’ 12 to 26 seat majorities. Since the 1994 elections, the
narrow margins between the parties have meant that either party could conceivably be in the
majority after the next election, and Republican leaders, pursuing a partisan agenda, have needed
almost every Republican vote to pass their major legislative agenda.
Republican leaders centralized their power in many of the same ways as their Democratic
predecessors had in the 1970s. Moreover, under Gingrich’s leadership Republicans made
additional changes in the rules of both House of Representatives and the Republican Conference
9
to tighten their control over the institution and over rank-and-file members. Most notable were
changes in the rules governing committee chairs’ tenure and selection. In 1995, Republicans
enacted six-year term limits on their new committee chairs and decreased the importance of
seniority in the selection process. Republican Conference rules specifically stated that the
member designated by the Steering Committee for each chairmanship “need not be the member
with the longest consecutive service on the committee” (Foerstel 2000: 1443). By the 105th
Congress, Gingrich was weakened by inta-party conflict, a “coup” attempt, and a series of media
gaffes.
The disappointing results of the 1998 election caused Gingrich to step down as Speaker
(Fritz 1998). Contrary to expectations set by historical precedent and pollsters alike,
Republicans lost congressional seats in the 1998 mid-term elections, and their eleven seat margin
was reduced to a six seat margin. Speaker Gingrich’s would-be replacement, Robert Livingston
(R-LA), withdrew from the contest and resigned from the House when his extra-marital affairs
were exposed. In the midst of this turmoil, Deputy Whip Dennis Hastert emerged as the party’s
choice for Speaker in the 106th Congress, his reputation as a serious legislator and avoidance of
the limelight making him the antidote to Gingrich. Speaker Dennis Hastert inherited the strong
partisan tools established by Gingrich, but he did not adopt his combative style or quest for
media attention. Though he has generally received high marks from his colleagues, he is known
for his even-handedness and demeanor, not his partisan combativeness (Foerstel 2000a).
Periodically, journalistic accounts question his power relative to his deputy, Majority Whip (now
Majority Leader) Tom DeLay, who brings “potent mixtures of anger and persuasiveness, partisan
fervor and political practicality . . . and relishes his nickname—“The Hammer” (Martinez and
Koszcuk 1999: 1322).
Changes in electoral competitiveness, party control, leaders’ agendas and institutional
rules from congress to congress shift the relative emphasis of leaders’ priorities when the allocate
opportunities to their members. The hypotheses below specify how I expect majority party
leaders to allocate legislative preference to their members between 1987 and 2002.
Hypotheses
As indicated, the main hypotheses regarding the allocation of benefits are:
10
H1.
Policy Control Hypothesis: Majority party leaders will, all else equal, grant legislative
preference to loyal partisans. Majority party members should reward their members who
demonstrate loyalty in their voting records, both on policy and procedural issues, with
legislative benefits, bringing their bills and resolutions to the House floor and making
their amendments in order under restrictive rules.
H2.
Electoral Hypothesis: Party leaders, in their attempt to help bolster the campaigns of
electorally vulnerable members, will prioritize the consideration of vulnerable members’
bills and amendments on the House floor, particularly in congresses with many
vulnerable members. Majority party leaders will also reward members for their
fundraising efforts, including members’ leadership PAC contributions and contributions
from their campaigns to fellow incumbents and congressional campaign committees.
H3.
Institutional Maintenance Hypothesis: In a competitive environment, party leaders will
recognize the expertise, experience, and effort of their committee chairmen, senior
members, and legislative entrepreneurs. This will encourage them, and others by
example, to further develop their policy expertise and contribute to the party’s legislative
program and institutional maintenance.
H4.
Leaders should increase the relative weight of their members’ loyalty on policy and
procedural votes in their decision-making process in congresses with narrower margins,
particularly after 1994. Narrow margins mean that leaders need most every vote to pass
their legislative program and thus they are more likely to provide incentives to their
members to vote with the party.
H5.
In congresses where there are a relatively large number of vulnerable members, leaders
should prioritize electoral concerns by assisting vulnerable members, regardless of their
loyalty, and by rewarding members who express loyalty by raising large contributions for
their colleagues and party’s congressional campaign committee.
Data and Measures
Legislative Data and Measures
The data on bills, resolutions, and amendments, come from the THOMAS website
maintained by the Library of Congress. It contains information about bills and amendments
from the 93rd Congress on, including sponsors and cosponsors; official, short and popular titles;
committee, floor and executive actions; a detailed legislative history; Congressional Record page
references; and bill summaries. Within this large collection of legislative data, there are many
types of legislation of varying importance and content. I thus code and analyze them separately.
11
I examined every piece of legislation, including bills, resolution, and amendments,
considered on the House floor between 1987 and 2002. This includes legislation subject to a
recorded vote, voice vote, or that was withdrawn after having been brought up and debated.
Many data sets only include legislation and amendments on which there were recorded votes,
relying on such data sets would miss significant (albeit less controversial) legislative action. I
began by compiling a list of every piece of legislation considered on the House floor in each
Congress. I then coded the legislation along many dimensions. I attributed the legislation to its
sponsor according to one of the numerous codes I developed to capture its significance, purpose,
and even content.
Bills and Resolutions
There are a variety of types of legislation considered, and there are many ways that
leaders can bring legislation to the House floor for consideration. I distinguish between pieces of
legislation according to whether they are bills, meaning they have an H.R. number, or they are
resolutions, i.e., are preceded by H.Con.Res., H.Res., or H.J.Res. Bills effect changes in the law,
whereas resolutions express the sense of the Congress or change the rules of the House itself.
When coding bills, I categorize them in the several ways. Two important categories are policy
bills and district bills, respectively. A bill is coded as district bill when its description mentions a
geographic region in the member’s state. District-specific and policy legislation of broad interest
should be considered separately, as leadership incentives in allocating legislative preference may
differ given the seemingly natural congruence between loyal members’ policy goals and party
leaders’ policy goals. A more direct test of the effect of loyalty is the party leaders’ response to
members’ district-specific legislative requests. Unfortunately, in most analyses I pool district
bills and policy bills together because there are not sufficient numbers of district bills to allow
for multivariate analysis. The thirteen appropriations bills are categorized separately because
they are “must-pass” legislation and are always introduced by the relevant “cardinal,” i.e., the
chair of the appropriations subcommittee from which it originated. Annual budget resolutions
are also coded separately. Since the passage of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment
Control Act of 1974, the House of Representatives has usually considered the majority party’s
budget blueprint on the floor, sponsored by the Chairman of the House Budget Committee. I
also separate bills passed by unanimous consent and bills taken from the corrections calendar,
12
recognizing that these two types of bills are of less significance than legislation debated on the
House floor.
More and more bills are passed as “suspensions,” including legislation authorizing
significant programs. Roughly three-fourths of the bills enacted in the 106th Congress were
initially considered in the House under suspension of the rules (Wolfensberger 2002). Under
clause 1 of Rule XV, the Speaker may entertain motions to “suspend the rules and pass
legislation” referred to as suspensions. Suspensions require a vote of two-thirds of the members
present and voting. No amendments are in order, and debate is limited to 40 minutes. Unless a
waiver is included, the cost of legislation considered under suspension generally cannot exceed
$100 million. Accordingly, suspensions are usually bipartisan and relatively non-controversial,
otherwise they fail. The Speaker determines which bills are called up and considered as
suspensions, though committee chairs are involved. In recent years, minority party Democrats
have threatened to vote against legislation considered under suspension if Democratic-sponsored
legislation didn’t comprise around a quarter of the calendar. Needing Democratic votes to meet
the two-thirds requirement for passage, Republicans conceded, though the Speaker always
recognizes a majority party member to offer the legislation, even if its sponsor is a Democrat.
As is the case with all bills, these suspensions are coded according to their sponsor, not the
members offering them on the House floor. The majority leadership schedules the bills under
suspension of the rules, usually on Mondays and Tuesdays, in accordance with the rules of the
House.
Suspensions range from significant policy legislation to resolutions that merely provide
symbolic benefits. I develop three codes for H.R. legislation considered under suspension:
international relations bills passed under suspension, district bills passed under suspension, and
all other policy bills passed under suspension. I code resolutions passed under suspension
separately, in four ways: as policy resolutions (expressing Congress’ support for a policy but not
constituting an actual policy change), resolutions expressing the views of Congress with regard
to an international situation, resolutions recognizing one’s district, and resolutions honoring a
specific person or group.
During Democratic-controlled congresses, members proposed hundreds of
commemoratives to name a day, week, or even year in honor of a person, group, or issue. For
example, a law was passed designating November 16, 1989, as "Interstitial Cystitis Awareness
13
Day," January 16, 1993, as "National Good Teen Day,” and May 3, 1992 through May 9, 1992,
as "Be Kind to Animals and National Pet Week.” As inconsequential as these examples seem, a
number of former Democrats interviewed insist that commemoratives were quite important to the
members who introduced them on behalf of their constituents. Hence, I code them separately.
Amendments
The majority party leadership controls the structure—and often the content—of the
amendment process in conjunction with the House Committee on Rules. Bills, except privileged
matters and suspensions, can be brought up on the House floor only after a rule is adopted.
Rules set the time allocated for general debate and the structure of the amendment process.
Rules are written and reported to the House from the Rules Committee, which acts as an arm of
the majority leadership. Since 1975, the Speaker has appointed majority party Rules Committee
members and the minority party leader has appointed minority party members. The majority
party has a 9-4 supermajority on the Rules Committee, ensuring that the majority party controls
the process. Before the House considers a rule, the Rules Committee convenes a hearing to give
members a chance to testify to urge committee members to make their amendments in order, i.e.,
to allow them to offer them.
There are many types of rules that provide or deny members opportunities to offer
amendments, but I classify all amendments in one of two ways: “leadership controlled” and
open. An open rule allows any member to offer an amendment that complies with the standing
rules of the House. The leadership thus relinquishes control of the sponsors and substance of the
amendments offered. As leaders have become more creative, they have used many different
types of rules to deal with amendments on the House floor. Bach and Smith (1988) categorize
rules as: open, organizing, expansive, closed, restrictive, and complex. The distinction I make in
the analysis to follow, however, focuses only on whether or not the leadership controls a
member’s ability to offer an amendment. Restrictive rules of any sort that preclude amendments
other than those specified by the rule fall into the “leadership controlled” category, and open
rules, of course, fall into the “open” category. Departing from some previous scholarship (e.g.,
Bach and Smith 1988), I consider a rule that limits amendments to those submitted in advance to
the Congressional Record to be open. Although such rules are not traditionally considered to be
open, any member has the opportunity to submit an amendment to the Congressional Record,
thus only a lack of forethought impinges on a member’s ability to offer an amendment.
14
Categorizing complex rules is complex, as their name suggests. When a complex rule protects
certain amendments from points of order, or specifies that a certain member shall offer them,
those amendments are coded as leadership-controlled. The same rule, however, may open
certain titles of a bill to amendment. Those amendments are then categorized as open. For the
purpose of comparison, I collect data on amendments offered under open rules as well.
To illustrate the general trend, Figure 3-1 illustrates the number of majority party
members’ legislation considered on the House floor under leadership control in the 106th
Congress. This includes the bills and resolutions described above and leadership-controlled
amendments. Forty-five Republicans in the 106th Congress did not have any legislation
considered on the House floor that was subject to majority leaders’ control. Of all leadershipcontrolled legislation combined, the mean was 2.4 pieces of legislation considered on the House
floor (with a standard deviation of 2.7) and the median was 2 pieces. Among Democrats, the
mean was .3 pieces of legislation, and 164 Democrats had no Republican “leadership controlled”
legislation considered.
[Insert Figure 3-1 about here]
Party Loyalty
Members can express party loyalty in many ways. Leaders’ view of what constitutes
loyalty and its significance may vary depending on the electoral and institutional circumstances.
I operationalize party loyalty in three ways: policy loyalty, procedural loyalty, and fundraising
loyalty.
Policy Loyalty in Policy Voting
An obvious litmus test of loyalty is the rate at which members vote in favor of legislation
supported by the majority party and opposed by the minority party on the House floor. To pass
their legislative program (and to avoid embarrassment), the majority party needs 218 of 435
votes. But even in congresses with large majority party margins, attaining 218 votes is not
always easy. The majority whip and his team keep track of members’ votes and leaders
remember who fails to support the party when it comes to important votes. I capture members’
support in voting with scores compiled by Congressional Quarterly. At the end of each year,
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report publishes members’ “party unity scores,” the percentage
of votes in which a member of Congress votes with his or her party on roll call votes where the
majority of each party opposes the majority of the another, adjusted for participation.
15
Figure 3-2 plots the members’ average CQ party unity scores, by party, in each of the
eight congresses in my study. From 1987-2002, party loyalty in roll call voting increases
significantly among members of both parties. As members become more loyal, on average, the
standard deviations also drop: members are increasingly clustered at the loyal end of the
continuum.
[Insert Figure 3-2 about here]
Some have argued that the increase in party line voting exhibited in Figure 3-2 by itself
demonstrates an increase in party discipline in the House of Representatives. If each party’s
members vote with their party more frequently, does this mean their leaders have tightened party
discipline, or provided more incentives to vote with one’s party? Unity is not in and of itself
evidence that leaders effectively worked to produce loyalty (see, e.g., Krehbiel 1993). The
increase in party line voting among members could also be explained by the increasing
homogeneity of members’ policy preferences within each party. The continuing partisan
realignment in the South is reducing the share of conservatives in the Democratic Caucus and it
increasing it in the Republican Conference. Because roll call votes in support of the party’s
position could simply be a reflection of members’ preferences, I define party loyalty in two
additional ways. The first, procedural voting, helps leaders attain policy control, and the second,
fundraising, helps leaders pursue electoral goals.
Party Loyalty in Procedural Voting
Most major legislation is brought up for consideration on the House floor only after a rule
is passed that sets the terms of debate and the amendment process, as explained above.5 Rules
make legislating in the House more efficient and orderly. More significantly, they allow the
majority party to structure the choices available to members and thus achieve political or policy
objectives and even “tilt the outcome of a choice among alternatives” (Bach and Smith 1988:
87). If, for example, a member wants to offer an amendment to a bill that would garner at least
218 votes but is opposed by the majority leadership, the Rules Committee, under the direction of
the Speaker, will simply not allow the member to offer that amendment. Occasionally, this
strategy of precluding members from offering amendments backfires, and majority party
members vote against the rule, to the distress of majority party leaders.
5
There are notable exceptions. Many appropriations bills are considered without rules, and more non-major
legislation is considered under “suspension of the rules.”
16
Because rules allow majority party leaders to control both the process and content of the
policies under consideration, it is very important to leaders that they pass. Open rules tend to
pass by voice vote, but rules that limit amendment opportunities often engender fierce opposition
from the minority party and thus pass on party line votes. Votes on rules, according to several
current and former members and their staff, are the ultimate test of loyalty. In the words of a
former Democratic (majority) party leader: “it’s all about the rule.”
When members cannot vote with their party on substantive issues, leaders still expect
them to vote with the party on the rule. When the policy issue in question generates significant
opposition from a member’s constituents, leaders will give the member a “pass,” provided they
have the requisite 218 votes necessary to pass the bill. Rule votes, however, are largely invisible
to constituents. Procedural intricacies are difficult to explain and of no interest to almost all
constituents. As a result, rules rarely fail, although at least one rule failed in every congress
under consideration except during the 106th Congress. One rule failed in the 100th Congress,
three failed in the 101st, one failed in the102nd, six failed in the 103rd, one failed in the 104th, five
failed in the 105th, and two failed in the 107th.6
Because of the significance of votes on special rules, I create a measure of procedural
loyalty derived from members’ voting records on special rules where a majority of each party
and each party’s leaders vote the opposite way. Figure 3-3 reveals that procedural loyalty is
quite high, though it is generally lower among minority party members, except in the 103rd
Congress.
[Insert Figure 3-3 about here]
Fundraising Loyalty
Party leaders look to their members for assistance in pursuing electoral majorities. Most
members of Congress represent relatively safe districts and face weak challengers. Thus with
regard to their own campaigns, they have little incentive to raise large sums of campaign money
above and beyond what they need to ward off potential challengers. Beginning in the 104th
Congress, leaders of both parties recognized that majority party status rested on the outcome of a
handful of districts. Vulnerable members need as much money as they can get, including
contributions from party leaders and their colleagues. This poses a collective action
6
According to former leadership aides, sometimes leaders knew rules would fail and brought them to the House
floor anyway for political purposes, other times the leadership miscounted votes.
17
problem—why should members in safe seats spend time and resources fundraising for other
candidates when they will still share in the benefits of majority party status? Nonetheless,
members and leaders have taken on a much bigger role as financiers of their colleagues’
campaigns.
Leaders provide incentives to help overcome this collective action problem.
Increasingly, leaders encourage the safer members of their caucus to help raise funds for the
party’s marginal candidates in the upcoming elections (Kolodny 1998; Sabato and Larson 2002).
A current Republican member of Congress revealed in a recent interview that party leaders
approached him and informed him that his subcommittee chairmanship obligated him to
contribute at least $50,000 to his party.7 Many members’ contributions exceed these requests,
especially contributions from rank-and-file members with ambitions of being a committee chair
or future leader. Members’ campaign contributions are an expression of party loyalty above and
beyond supporting the party position in roll call votes. Generally requiring more effort than
voting with one’s party on a special rule or bill, raising money for one’s party and colleagues sets
members apart from colleagues whose party loyalty is expressed only in their voting records.
I distinguish between three types of fundraising: contributions members make from their
personal campaigns to other House candidates of their party; contributions members make from
their personal campaigns to their party congressional campaign committee (i.e., the Democratic
Congressional Campaign Committee or the National Republican Congressional Committee); and
contributions members make from their own leadership PAC. I obtained data from the Federal
Election Commission for the 1988-2002 election cycles. Specifically, I calculated every
contribution made from incumbents to candidates running in the general election for the House
of Representatives (which includes incumbents, challengers and open seat candidates) and to the
party’s congressional campaign committee and national committee. I also collected data on
every member of Congress’ leadership PAC contributions to general election candidates and
party committees.
Members are increasingly active fundraisers, as illustrated in Table 3-1. Members’
contributions to the party’s campaign efforts, whether from their own campaigns and leadership
PACs to individual members or to the congressional campaign committees, generally increased
from one Congress to the next. In the 1988 election cycle, Democratic members gave, on
7
However, his contributions were well below $50,000, and he remains a subcommittee chair.
18
average, $2,768 to other congressional candidates, $649 to the DCCC, and $5,328 from their
own leadership PACs. By the 2002 cycle, these totals were $12,418; $14,124; and $21,037
respectively. Republican members contributed, on average, $1,693 to other congressional
candidates, $22 to the NRCC, and $555 from their own leadership PACs in the 1988 cycle. By
the 2002 cycle, these totals for Republicans were $5,985; $54,287; and $38,772 respectively. In
addition, forming a leadership PAC is increasingly common, especially among members who
aspire to become committee chairs (Pearson 2001). A sharp increase in contributions from both
Republican and Democratic members occurs in the 103rd and 104th Congresses, concomitant with
the onset of an era of electoral uncertainty.
[Insert Table 3-1 about here]
Measuring Electoral Vulnerability
In an era of tight party competition, leaders have incentives to help their most vulnerable
members in any way they can, including helping them achieve legislative successes. One
leadership aide referenced recent legislation on the House floor that the leadership “gave” a
vulnerable member to help him in his next reelection campaign. I rely on Congressional
Quarterly race rankings to measure members’ electoral situation in each congress. These
rankings are superior to simply using a member’s margin of victory in the previous election. The
race rankings take a member’s past performance into account, but they also incorporate dynamic
changes in a member’s electoral situation since the last election. A member may be facing a
tougher, or weaker, opponent, or they may have been involved in a scandal, or their party may be
unpopular. Every fall of an election year, Congressional Quarterly categorizes the 435 House
races based on their electoral competitiveness: “toss up,” “leans Democrat or Republican,”
“favors Democrat or Republican” and “safe seat.” Using these data, I create four dummy
variables of competitiveness. As illustrated in Figure 3-4, Congressional Quarterly data indicate
that 1992 and 1996, party leaders had more members to worry about. Overall, however, most
members running for reelection from 1988-2002 had little to worry about. In 2002, a
redistricting year, only 9 incumbents’ races were ranked as a “toss up” by Congressional
Quarterly. As a result, I combine in my analysis the “toss up” races and “leans Democrat or
Republican” races into one “competitive race” category.
[Insert Figure 3-4 about here]
19
Measuring Legislative Entrepreneurship
Members demonstrate legislative entrepreneurship in a variety of ways. They may
actively participate in committee deliberation (Hall 1996), lobby committee chairs and party
leaders to have their legislation considered, appear before the Committee on Rules to request that
their amendments be made in order, actively collect cosponsors for legislation, send many “Dear
Colleagues” urging consideration of their legislation, or sponsor and cosponsor many bills. It
would be difficult to track all of these activities, so I follow Wawro’s (2000) lead and measure
legislative entrepreneurship by totaling the number of pieces of legislation a member introduces.
Like Wawro, I exclude cosponsorships and special rules from the members’ scores. Unlike
Wawro, however, I include resolutions introduced to recognize international and domestic
events, policies, and groups. The legislative entrepreneurship indicator captures a member’s
level of legislative activity, which includes drafting and pressing resolutions. Resolutions are
significant to the members who sponsor them.
Figure 3-5 reveals that the average level of legislative entrepreneurship among majority
party members is increasing. Not surprisingly, given their decreased chances of success,
minority party members introduce, on average, fewer pieces of legislation throughout both
Democratic and Republican-controlled congresses.
[Insert Figure 3-5 about here]
The institutional hypothesis predicts that committee chairs and senior members should
have more legislation considered on the House floor. Seniority is measured by the number of
terms a member has served in Congress, and I include dummy variables for committee chairs in
the analysis.
Because the distribution of legislation considered on the House floor is skewed toward
zero, as is often the case with count data (see Figure 3-1), I employ negative binomial regression
techniques. Poisson regressions are not appropriate here because the data violate the assumed
equality of the conditional mean and variance functions (see Greene 2000: 886-887). Tables 2-7
report the changes in the expected number of a majority party member’s bills (or amendments,
suspensions, resolutions, commemoratives) considered on the House floor given the following
shifts in the independent variables: from rank and file member to committee chair; from a noncompetitive race to a competitive race; from contributing no money from a leadership PAC to
20
fellow members to contributing the mean amount; from contributing no money from one’s
campaign to the party congressional campaign committee; from contributing no money to fellow
members to contributing the mean amount; and from the mean to one standard deviation above
the mean for two indicators of party loyalty (voting and rule scores), legislative entrepreneurship
(the number of bills sponsored) and seniority (the number of years served in Congress).
Calculations are made using Gary King’s CLARIFY program for Stata (King, et al. 2000; Tomz
et al. 1999).
Major Legislation
The results of eight separate analyses of major legislation are shown in Table 3-2. The
dependent variable includes all major legislation in each congress other than the 13 annual
“must-pass” appropriations bills. In all of the categories of legislative preference under analysis,
having major legislation considered on the House floor is the most valuable reward to members.
When it comes to having one’s major legislation considered on the House floor, no one
factor explains consideration across all eight congresses, or even across the four congresses of
Democratic or Republican party control. Party loyalty expressed in roll call votes increases the
number of bills a member has considered by .09 in the 100th Congress and by .38 in the 104th
Congress, ceteris paribus. It has no significant effect in any of the other congresses. As
anticipated, the aggressive, newly elected Speakers in these congresses (Jim Wright and Newt
Gingrich, respectively) were more likely to pursue party control during these congresses. Each
of these newly elected Speakers actively pursued a party policy agenda in an era of divided
government. Not surprisingly, Gingrich rewarded loyalty at a higher rate. His policy agenda
was particularly pronounced; it took the form of the “Contract with America,” a legislative
program designed for the 1994 elections containing ten policy changes guaranteed to be
considered within 100 days. To pass his program, Gingrich needed almost every Republican
vote.
[Insert Table 3-2 about here]
In the Democratic congresses, fundraising doesn’t buy members much in terms of major
legislation. Loyalty expressed by making leadership PAC contributions is associated with a .48
increase in legislation in the 100th Congress and loyalty expressed by making contributions to
other candidates is associated with a .01 increase in the 102nd Congress. Fundraising does matter
in both of the Hastert-led congresses where Republicans hold narrow partisan margins. In the
21
106th Congress, contributing the mean amount of money to House candidates is associated with
.02 more bills. In the 107th Congress, contributing the mean amount to the NRCC is associated
with .02 more bills, and the mean level of leadership PAC contributions is associated with .01
more bills.
Not surprisingly, leaders recognize legislative entrepreneurs. In six of the eight
congresses (all but the 101st and 106th), the more bills a member introduces, the more likely she
is to have her legislation considered on the House floor. In four of the eight congresses (102nd,
103rd, 105th, and 106th), senior members have more legislation considered, and in four of the
congresses (101st, 102nd, 104th, and 107th), committee chairs have more of their legislation
considered. Given the power of committee chairs to mark up legislation and report it out of
committee, it is striking that, all else equal, committee chairs don’t see more of their major
legislation considered in every congress.
Legislation and Resolutions Considered under Suspension of the Rules
The requests made to the Speaker for legislation to be considered under suspension of the
rules exceed the scope of his ability to accommodate them. When it comes to passing H.R.
legislation under suspension, Speakers consistently recognize legislative entrepreneurs, as Table
3-3 reveals, rewarding them for their policy work. It is hardly surprising that as leaders look to
fill the legislative schedule with suspensions while the details of more complex major legislation
are being worked out, the more bills a member has sponsored, the more likely it is that one of
them will be considered. Given that suspensions must pass with the support of two-thirds of
those voting, thus requiring minority party votes, such bills are generally not part of leaders’
party program, but reflect routine congressional business, e.g., the reauthorization of noncontroversial programs. For example, legislation reauthorizing Veterans Administration health
programs was passed under suspension in 1999. Leaders reward party loyalty in roll call voting
only in the 104th Congress.
Leaders prioritize electoral goals in the 102nd Congress. This is not surprisingly, given
that the 102nd Congress and concomitant 1992 election cycle saw an unusually large number of
vulnerable incumbents because of redistricting, a stagnant economy, the House Bank scandal,
and the public’s particularly low regard for Congress (Jacobson 2000). Only in the 102nd
Congress do Democratic leaders reward fundraising efforts and favor their more vulnerable
22
incumbents by bringing more of their legislative suspensions to the floor. Leaders thus send
signals that fundraising is appreciated. By helping the vulnerable, leaders provide them with an
accomplishment to publicize in their campaign.
[Insert Table 3-3 about here]
Speakers pursue different goals when determining which resolutions to bring up under
suspension of the rules. Resolutions, especially those requiring support of two-thirds of the
House, are not part of a party’s policy agenda—they may praise or condemn a particular
international or domestic event, express support for a change in policy, or honor a person or
group—but they do not enact policy change. Nonetheless, such resolutions are important to
members, so they provide leaders with a relatively easy, low-cost way to reward or assist their
members.
Party loyalty is also rewarded in some contexts: Speaker Foley rewarded party line voters
in the 102nd Congress with .16 more resolutions, all else equal. The Speaker pursues electoral
goals in the suspension calendar with resolutions too. As shown in Table 3-4, Speakers Wright
and Hastert rewarded those making contributions to candidates with 1.64 more resolutions and
.03 more resolutions in the 100th and 107th Congresses, respectively. Republican leaders in the
106th Congress use resolutions considered under suspension to help their vulnerable incumbents,
providing vulnerable incumbents with .59 more resolutions, all else equal. As in the case of H.R.
suspensions described above, in every congress except the 103rd, legislatively active members
are more likely to see their resolutions pass under suspension.
[Insert Table 3-4 about here]
Whose Amendments are in Order?
Leaders appear to pursue a mixed strategy when determining whose policy amendments
will be considered under restrictive rules, as seen in Table 5. Party loyalty affects the terms of
special rules in different ways in different congresses. Only in the 106th Congress does loyalty
expressed in roll call voting increase the number of amendments a member has considered (by
.18, all else equal). Procedural loyalty, however, is more complicated for leaders to grapple
with. In the 101st Congress, members who consistently voted with their party on special rules
saw .48 more amendments made in order under restrictive rules. However, procedurally loyal
members had significantly fewer amendments made in order in the 102nd and 106th Congresses.
23
Instead of rewarding loyalty, it seems leaders were trying to prevent defectors from defecting
again, appeasing them by making their amendments in order and giving them an additional
reason to vote for special rules.
Helping the party’s team in the upcoming elections by contributing leadership PAC
dollars to fellow partisans significantly increases the number of amendments a member has
considered (by .17) only in the 100th Congress. Legislative entrepreneurship is recognized in
five of the eight congresses. It is not surprising that legislatively active members are more likely
to offer amendments and also be recognized for their policy alternatives and additions.
Democratic committee chairs’ amendments are prioritized in only the Foley congresses, further
evidence of Foley’s increased deference to committee chairs relative to Speaker Jim Wright.
Republican committee chairs’ amendments are made in order significantly more in the 104th and
107th Congresses. The seniority of the sponsor is never significant.
[Insert Table 3-5 about here]
When determining whose amendments are in order and protected from points of order on
appropriations bills, leaders weight the party loyalty of the sponsors in only two of the eight
congresses, as Table 3-6 shows. In the 102nd and 105th Congresses, leaders again pursue
preventive strategies by making the amendments of rule defectors in order more often than other
members’ amendments. Only in the 105th Congress does party loyalty expressed in policy votes
translate into more opportunities to amend appropriations bills. In an analysis of members’
appropriations amendments offered under open rules (not shown), members who are
procedurally disloyal, i.e., vote against the rule more often, offer more appropriations
amendments in the 107th Congress when they have the opportunity to do so, suggesting that
those who are procedurally disloyal may be prevented from offering amendments in the 107th
Congress after all.
[Insert Table 3-6 about here]
Democrats’ Commemoratives
Democratic leaders had the opportunity to reward or assist members by bringing their
commemoratives designating days, weeks, and months to the House floor for consideration.
Commemoratives were rarely, if ever, controversial, yet they allowed members to curry favor
with their constituents by bringing national attention to their cause or group. As shown in Table
3-7, in the 102nd and 103rd Congress, Democratic leaders rewarded loyalty when it came to
24
scheduling commemoratives. In the 103rd Congress, party loyalty in roll call voting was the only
significant variable in the model explaining the consideration of members’ commemoratives. In
the 102nd Congress, loyalty was the most important factor, associated with a .1 increase in
commemoratives, but legislative entrepreneurship also mattered (a .07 increase). Speaker Foley,
but not Speaker Wright, rewarded party loyalty when the stakes were low. Citing the high cost
to taxpayers, Republicans banned commemoratives when they gained majority control in 1995.
[Insert Table 3-7 about here]
A Closer Look at Party Control, Electoral Concerns, and Party Leaders
The legislative calendar provides leaders with opportunities to exert discipline in pursuit
of policy goals. This chapter evaluates how majority party leaders allocate legislative
opportunities to their rank-and-file members, in particular, party leaders’ decisions regarding
which members’ bills, amendments, resolutions, and “suspensions” are considered on the House
floor. It gives particular attention to the interplay between the majority party’s electoral motive
of maintaining a majority and the policy motives of enhancing party unity and encouraging
legislative entrepreneurship. The results show that party leaders pursue multiple goals—policy,
electoral, and institutional—when they allocate benefits to their members.
From 1987 to 2002, legislative preference is indeed a mechanism of discipline;
Democratic and Republican majority party leaders reward party loyalty in some legislative
domains. The allocation of legislative opportunities on the basis of party loyalty varies from
congress to congress, hinging primarily on the electoral context and party leaders’ policy agenda.
In congresses with more vulnerable members, leaders respond by pursuing electoral goals, i.e.,
rewarding fundraisers and helping vulnerable incumbents. In almost every legislative domain,
leaders pursue institutional goals by recognizing their legislative entrepreneurs. Committee
chairs are often sponsors of the legislation that reaches the House floor, although the effects of
institutional changes diminishing the power of committee chairmen are visible, particularly in
Republican-controlled congresses, as committee chairs are not always more likely to see even
their major legislation reach the House floor.
Party leaders’ aggressive efforts to pass a policy program and centralize power drive the
use of discipline. Leaders’ disciplinary tactics, however, can be constrained by their standing
within the party caucus. The Speakers who were most active in pursuit of a party policy agenda,
Speakers Jim Wright and Newt Gingrich, rewarded loyalty when it mattered most: in the
25
consideration of major legislation in the 100th and 104th Congresses. But as the reputation and
concomitant power of each of these Speakers diminished, they were less likely to use their
prerogatives to exert party discipline on the legislative calendar. Speaker Gingrich exerted party
discipline more forcefully in the 104th Congress than he did in the 105th Congress, and Speaker
Wright exerted party discipline more frequently in the 100th Congress than he did in the 101st
Congress.
In the Republican-controlled congresses, Republican leaders exert party discipline by
rewarding party loyalty expressed in roll call voting in three of the last four congresses—all but
the 107th. However, the significance of the legislative rewards vary, resulting in the “checker
board” pattern of results displayed in Tables 3-2 through 3-7. In some of the Republican
congresses, members who demonstrate policy loyalty and procedural loyalty reap significant
rewards, as hypothesized (H1). Analyses of the most significant bills considered in the 104th107th Congresses show consistent party-line voters in the 104th Congress are more likely to see
their major legislation and H.R. suspensions reach the House floor. The legislative benefits
accrued by loyal policy and procedural voters are less significant in the other congresses, but
loyalty still has consequences. In the 105th and 106th Congresses, loyalty in roll call voting is
rewarded when it comes to determining whose amendments are made in order or protected by
the rule governing consideration of major legislation.
Despite the theoretical availability of legislative preference for leaders to use consistently
to enact strict party discipline, there are clearly constraints on its use, including the leadership’s
responsibility to ensure the reelection of its members and pass necessary legislation. In pursuit
of electoral goals, leaders have an incentive to reward fundraisers. As hypothesized (H5), they
do so when their assistance is most critical: leaders reward fundraisers in the 106th and 107th
Congresses—the congresses with the narrowest margins. In the 107th Congress, fundraising
loyalty trumps loyalty in voting; leaders reward large contributors—but not loyal voters—in
several domains.
Leaders also have an incentive to recognize legislative entrepreneurs, and Republican
leaders generally do so when it comes determining whose major legislation, suspensions of both
types, and policy (but not appropriations) amendments are considered on the House floor. It is
therefore also not surprising that the statistical analyses of major legislation considered on the
26
House floor reveal that committee chairmen and senior members often have more of their bills
considered than other members, all else equal, as predicted in H3.
Speaker Newt Gingrich, known for his aggressive pursuit of a partisan legislative
program, was more willing to exert party discipline by rewarding loyal policy voters than his
successor, Dennis Hastert, who put a premium on fundraising loyalty. The effects of Speaker
Gingrich’s leadership, including both his policy goals and centralization of power, lingered in the
two congresses following his resignation. Though Speaker Hastert has maintained a much lower
public profile, he has attained higher levels of party line policy and rule voting than Gingrich, as
illustrated in Figures 3-2 and 3-3.
Democratic leaders in Democratic-controlled congresses governed in a different political
context than their Republican successors. They governed with wider margins and less concern
over losing party control, yet their caucus had many more members who deviated from the party
line. Given the slimmer margins in Republican-controlled congresses, it is not surprising that, as
hypothesized (H4), Republican leaders pursuing policy control rewarded loyalty slightly more
frequently than Democratic leaders (excluding commemoratives): they needed almost every vote
to pass their legislative program.
His large majority notwithstanding, Speaker Wright had to contend with many caucus
members who regularly voted against the party. Wright, in his aggressive pursuit of policy
control, thus exerted discipline in the 100th Congress, especially where it counted most—in the
consideration of major legislation. In the 100th Congress, party line voters saw more of their
major bills considered on the House floor, all else equal. When Wright’s power was weakened
by an ethics investigation, however, his disciplinary tactics subsided. In the 101st Congress,
which witnessed Speaker Wright and Democratic Whip Tony Coelho (D-TX) brought down by
scandal, the only remaining evidence of party discipline in the legislative calendar was in the
domain of policy amendments.
Speaker Foley was not known as a partisan leader. By the 103rd Congress, discipline
governed the legislative calendar only in domains without major legislative implications. In both
Foley-led congresses (1991-1994), discipline governed the consideration of commemoratives,
whereas it had not during the Wright years. Given Foley’s consensus-oriented leadership style, it
is not surprising that he would exert discipline where it would be least likely to cause resentment
among members of his caucus.
27
Speaker Foley had good reasons to focus on electoral goals: the many vulnerable
Democratic incumbents going into the 1992 elections. As seen in Figure 3-4, as the election
approached, according to Congressional Quarterly more House Democrats faced competitive
races than in any other election from 1988-1994. In response, Speaker Foley prioritized electoral
goals in the allocation of legislative preference in the 102nd Congress, as predicted (H5). He
rewarded loyal fundraisers when it came to the consideration of major bills and H.R.
suspensions. Further, the only instance where Democratic leaders provided their vulnerable
incumbents with legislative opportunities was in the 102nd Congress: vulnerable incumbents had
.48 more suspensions on the House floor, all else equal.
This chapter is an analysis of just one domain in which party leaders allocate scarce
benefits. The results reveal that in their pursuit of policy control, leaders in the eight congresses
under consideration exert party discipline by rewarding party loyalty in voting. The significance
of the legislative reward and the types of loyalty rewarded, however, vary from congress to
congress. Leaders also pursue electoral and institutional goals, prioritizing them when
necessary. The powers and prerogatives that enable party discipline also enable leaders to assist
vulnerable incumbents, reward fundraisers, and recognize legislative entrepreneurs. The next
two chapters investigate and compare leaders’ allocation of resources and opportunities in many
additional arenas from 1987 to 2002, including committee assignments, committee
chairmanships, conference committee assignments, and campaign assistance.
28
References
In addition to the sources cited, this chapter is based on interviews conducted by the author.
Unattributed quotes are from those interviews.
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Political Parties: Party Government in the House.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 19:21531.
29
Cox, Gary W., and Mathew McCubbins. 1997. “Toward a Theory of Legislative Rules Change:
Assessing Schickler and Rich’s Evidence.” American Journal of Political Science 41:
1376-1386.
Davidson, Roger H. 1999. “Building the Republican Regime: Leaders and Committees.” In
New Majority or Old Minority?, eds. Nicol C. Rae and Colton C. Campbell. Lanham:
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc.
Fenno, Richard. 1973. Congressmen in Committees. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
Fenno, Richard. 1978. Homestyle. Boston: Little, Brown and Company.
Fenno, Richard. 1997. Learning to Govern: An Institutional View of the 104th Congress.
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
Foerstel, Karen. 2000. “Choosing GOP Chairmen.” Congressional Quarterly. 17 June.
Foerstel, Karen. 2000a. “Hastert and the Limits of Persuasion.” Congressional Quarterly. 30
September.
Fritz, Sara. 1998. “From the Editor.” Congressional Quarterly. 7 November.
Greene, William H. 2000. Econometric Analysis, 4th Edition. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice
Hall.
Hoy, Anne Q. 1994. “Foley’s Gracious Style Was Key to His Rise—and to His Fall.”
Congressional Quarterly. 12 November.
Jacobson, Gary. 2001. The Politics of Congressional Elections, 5th ed. New York: Longman.
King, Gary, Michael Tomz, and Jason Wittenberg. 2000. “Making the Most of Statistical
Analyses: Improving Interpretation and Presentation.” American Journal of Political
Science 44 (2): 347-361.
Kolodny, Robin. 1988. Pursuing Majorities: Congressional Campaign Committees in American
Politics. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
Krehbiel, Keith. 1991. Information and Legislative Organization. Ann Arbor: The University
of Michigan Press.
Krehbiel, Keith. 1993. “Where’s the Party?” British Journal of Political Science 23: 235-266.
Krehbiel, Keith. 1995. “Cosponsors and Wafflers from A to Z.” American Journal of Political
Science 41: 958-964.
30
Krehbiel, Keith. 1998. Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking. Chicago: The University
of Chicago Press.
Krehbiel, Keith. 2000. Party Discipline and Measures of Partisanship. American Journal of
Political Science 44(2): 212-227.
Martinez, Gebe, and Jackie Koszczuck. 1999. “Tom DeLay: ‘The Hammer’ That Drives the
House GOP.” Congressional Quarterly. 5 June.
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Press.
McCarty, Nolan, Keith T. Poole, and Howard Rosenthal. 2001. “The Hunt for Party Discipline
in Congress.” American Political Science Review 95(3): 673-687.
Pearson, Kathryn. 2001. “Leadership PACs: Who Benefits?” Presented at the Annual Meeting
of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois.
Pomper, Miles A. 2002. “GOP Leaders Pull Microloan Bill To Punish N.J. Rep. Smith.”
Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. November 23: 3091.
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Price, David. 2000. The Congressional Experience, 2nd ed. Boulder, CO.: Westview Press,
Rohde, David W. 1991. Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House. Chicago: Chicago
University Press.
Sabato, Larry J., and Bruce Larson. 2002. The Party’s Just Begun: Shaping Political Parties for
America’s Future, 2nd ed. New York: Longman.
Schickler, Eric, and Andrew Rich. 1997. “Controlling the Floor: Parties as Procedural
Coalitions in the House.” American Journal of Political Science 41:1340-1375.
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Representatives in the Postreform Era. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
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Roll-Call Voting.” American Journal of Political Science 44(2): 193-211.
31
THOMAS. The Library of Congress’ Legislative Information on the Internet. Bill Summary
and Status, 100th-107th Congress. http://thomas.loc.gov/
Tomz, Michael, Jason Wittenberg, and Gary King. 1999. CLARIFY: Software for Interpreting
and Presenting Statistical Results. Version 1.2.1. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University,
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Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press.
Wolfensberger, Don. 2002. "Suspended Partisanship in the House: How Most Laws Are Really
Made." Paper prepared for delivery at the 2002 Annual Meeting of the American Political
Science Association, Boston, August 29-September 1.
32
Figure 3-1. Majority Party Members’ Legislation Considered on the House Floor under Leadership Control, 106th
Congress
60
Number of Members
50
40
30
20
10
0
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36
Number of Pieces of Legislation Considered on the House Floor
Source: Data compiled from THOMAS.
33
Figure 3-2. Party Loyalty in Roll Call Voting, 1987-2002
95
Average CQ Party Loyalty Score
90
89.5
89
87
86.5
85.5
85
84
83.5
83.5
82.5
81
80
80
80
80
78.5
75
73.5
73.5
70
100th
101st
102nd
103rd
104th
105th
106th
107th
Congress
Republican Party Unity
Democratic Party Unity
Source: Congressional Quarterly 1987-2002.
34
Figure 3-3. Loyalty on Rule Votes, 100th Congress – 106th Congress
100
98.91
97.37
96.04
94.99
95
Percent Voting with Party
92.89
93.57
94.77
93.12
90.98
90.87
90
88.68
84.78
85
80
88.72
78.89
75
100th
101st
102nd
Democrats
103rd
104th
105th
106th
Republicans
Source: Data compiled from THOMAS.
35
Figure 3-4. Competitive Seats, 1988-2002
100%
90%
80%
Percent
70%
Safe Seats
60%
50%
40%
30%
Competitive
Seats
20%
10%
Toss Up Seats
0%
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
Election Year
Source: Data come from Congressional Quarterly. “Toss up” races are shown separately and the “favors” and “leans” categories
are combined into the “competitive seats” category.
36
Figure 3-5. Legislative Entrepreneurship, 100th - 107th Congress
20
Average Number of Bills
15
10
5
0
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
Congress
Democrats
Republicans
Source: Data compiled from THOMAS.
37
Table 3-1. Fundraising Loyalty
100th
101st
102nd
103rd
104th
105th
106th
107th
Average Contribution to
NRCC
$22
(163)
$7
(67)
$178
(1626)
$6095
(9803)
$19401
(45685)
$55402
(84967)
$63969
(115271)
$54287
(79488)
Average Total
Contributions to House
Candidates
1693
(5309)
3036
(5719)
1787
(7766)
8848
(22955)
6952
(1132)
12454
(22353)
18236
(66489)
5985
(14197)
Leadership PAC
Contributions
555
(4456)
1193
(11405)
1486
(12256)
3505
(28344)
10015
(60216)
24901
(101518)
31239
(112199)
38772
(155706)
Total Number of
Leadership PACs
5
6
6
8
23
36
51
61
Average Contribution to
DCCC
$649
(2581)
$1145
(2763)
$1343
(3110)
$6231
(5433)
$8866
(7521)
$12808
(11877)
$51079
(64813)
$14124
(14212)
Average Total
Contributions to House
Candidates
2768
(7712)
3135
(6775)
2045
(5812)
3087
(9683)
5960
(14058)
9798
(78605)
15520
(25026)
12418
(16424)
Leadership PAC
Contributions
5328
(35260)
3719
(23808)
2869
(19982)
6948
(5599)
4241
(27510)
6427
(31618)
17946
(867241)
21037
(91980)
Total Number of
Leadership PACs
16
16
15
14
14
17
22
38
REPUBLICANS
DEMOCRATS
Cell entries are average dollar amounts, with standard errors in parentheses. Data come from the Federal Election
Commission, entries are calculated by the author.
38
Table 3-2. Explaining the Consideration of Majority Party Members’ Major Legislation on the House Floor
Congress
100th
101st
102nd
103rd
104th
105th
106th
107th
Party Loyalty:
Roll Call Votes
.09
[.01,.20]
.03
[-.06,.15]
-.00
[-.08,.09]
.08
[-.03,.29]
.38
[.06, .77]
.03
[-.06,.17]
.04
[-.07,.16]
.04
[-.02,.11]
Party Loyalty:
Rule Votes
-.01
[-.10,.10]
-.01
[-.07,.09]
.02
[-.06,.13]
-.03
[-.10,.65]
-.11
[-.35,.15]
-.01
[-.09,.08]
.12
[-.02,.30]
.03
[-.02,.09]
Party Loyalty: $
Contributions to
Candidates
8.9
[-.21,38]
.00
[-.02,.02]
.01
[.001,.03]
.24
[-.17,.49]
-.02
[-.14,.11]
.00
[-.00,.01]
.02
[.002,.04]
.00
[-.02,.02]
Party Loyalty: $
Contributions to
Party CCC
--
.00
[-.02,.02]
-.01
[-.04,.01]
.00
[-.21,.66]
-.09
[-.22,.02]
.02
[-.05,.08]
.00
[-.06,.06]
.02
[.002,.04]
Party Loyalty: $
Leadership PAC
Contributions
.48
[3.1,21]
.00
[-.00,.01]
.00
[-.00,.01]
.59
[-.08,3.05]
-.00
[-.05,.05]
-.01
[-.04,.02]
-.04
[-.08,.00]
.01
[.004,.01]
Legislative
Entrepreneurship
(Bills Sponsored)
.06
[.02,.12]
.05
[-.01,.13]
.08
[.01,.17]
.09
[.03,.18]
.97
[.60,1.45]
.12
[.01,.26]
.05
[-.04,.17]
.06
[.02,.11]
Competitive Race
.11
[-.12,.68]
-.04
[-.18,.36]
.01
[-.11,.16]
.01
[-.09,.18]
-.05
[-.54,.51]
-.07
[-.31,.38]
-.09
[-.41,.44]
.13
[-.07,.47]
Seniority
.05
[-.00,.11]
.05
[-.02,.15]
.07
[.01,.17]
.08
[.02,.21]
.06
[-.22,.02]
.18
[.05,.36]
.43
[.28,.62]
.04
[-.00,.10]
Committee
Chairman
.18
[-.01,.52]
.50
[.07, 1.4]
.68
[.21,1.5]
.22
[-.00,.67]
1.31
[.23,2.87]
.15
[-.13,.67]
.05
[-.21,.38]
.37
[.12,.77]
Log likelihood
-150.45
-133.43
-166.19
-148.461
-329.021
-171.36
-214.03
-134.44
χ2
59.39***
44.02***
63.33***
47.74***
100.20***
38.79***
61.86***
61.06***
.16
254
.14
254
.16
264
.14
255
.13
222
.10
220
.13
216
.19
222
Pseudo R2
N
Cell entries are first differences as described in the text from negative binomial regressions, confidence intervals are in parentheses.
Entries in bold are significant at p<.05 or better.
39
Table 3-3. Explaining the Consideration of Majority Party Members’ H.R. Suspensions on the House Floor
Congress
100th
101st
102nd
103rd
104th
105th
106th
107th
Party Loyalty:
Roll Call Votes
-.06
[-.23,.12]
.13
[-.16,.50]
.06
[-.11,.26]
-.07
[-.30,.20]
.34
[.01,.76]
-.01
[-.21,.20]
-.02
[-.22,.23]
-.01
[-.21,.22]
Party Loyalty:
Rule Votes
-.04
[-.33,.30]
-.07
[-.33,.28]
-.10
[-.25,.08]
.05
[-.20,.38]
-.08
[-.30,.21]
.12
[-.09,.40]
.15
[-.10,.43]
.17
[-.33,.01]
Party Loyalty: $
Contributions to
Candidates
67
[-1.3,160]
.03
[-.06,.12]
.04
[-.00,.07]
6.7
[-.66,6.7]
.03
[-.11,.18]
.00
[-.01,.02]
-.04
[-.13,.03]
.03
[-.05,.10]
Party Loyalty: $
Contributions to
Party CCC
--
-.06
[-.15,.02]
.06
[.01,.10]
1.64
[-.97,5.9]
-.13
[-.28,.02]
.02
[-.16,.18]
-.24
[-.46,.-02]
-.05
[-.19,.06]
Party Loyalty: $
Leadership PAC
Contributions
4.3
[-1.15,39]
-.01
[-.04,.02]
-.01
[-.03,.01]
-.38
[-.83,.89]
-.05
[-.14,.04]
-.08
[-.15,-.00]
-.04
[-.13,.03]
.01
[-.03,.04]
Legislative
Entrepreneurship
(Bills Sponsored)
.83
[.48,1.25]
.72
[.36,1.17]
.53
[.32,.80]
.72
[.46,1.06]
.90
[.51,1.41]
.74
[.33,1.23]
.95
[.56,1.38]
.77
[.46,1.18]
Competitive Race
-.08
[-.75,.97]
.50
[-.26,1.6]
.48
[.12,.93]
.34
[-.00,.38]
-.05
[-.52,.50]
.12
[-.52,1.06]
-.40
[-1.04,.43]
.50
[-.36,1.5]
Seniority
.04
[-.17,.31]
.11
[-.11,.4]
.09
[-.07,.29]
.17
[-.00,.38]
-.02
[-.25,.26]
.23
[-.01,.54]
-.05
[-.31,.26]
.19
[-.03,.43]
Committee
Chairman
.45
[-.37,1.7]
.63
[-.22,1.9]
.34
[-.16,1.2]
.66
[.01,1.74]
.40
[-.34,1.63]
.44
[-.27,1.56]
2.09
[.59,4.21]
.44
[-.22,1.4]
Log likelihood
-377.85
-361.93
-373.53
-324.10
-290.98
-308.01
-348.81
-334.99
χ2
Pseudo R2
N
57.97***
.07
254
48.71***
.06
254
86.19***
.10
265
92.51***
.12
255
66.33***
.10
222
64.84***
.10
220
81.58***
.10
216
71.29***
.10
222
Cell entries are first differences as described in the text from negative binomial regressions, confidence intervals are in parentheses.
Entries in bold are significant at p<.05 or better.
40
Table 3-4. Explaining the Consideration of Majority Party Members’ Resolutions under Suspension on the
House Floor
Congress
100th
101st
102nd
103rd
104th
105th
106th
107th
Party Loyalty:
Roll Call Votes
.04
[-.02,.13]
.06
[-.06,.32]
.16
[.04,.36]
.07
[-.04,.32]
-.01
[-.05,.05]
-.07
[-.16,.02]
-.04
[-.13,.08]
.03
[-.09,.16]
Party Loyalty:
Rule Votes
.01
[-.06,.13]
.10
[-.09,.51]
.04
[-.08,.24]
.01
[-.06,.17]
-.02
[-.06,.03]
.04
[-.08,.20]
.00
[-.10,.14]
.01
[-.11,.10]
Party Loyalty: $
Contributions to
Candidates
1.64
[1.0,2.7]
.02
[-.01,.05]
-.02
[-.05,.01]
6.97
[-.13,3.8]
.02
[-.01,.05]
.002
[-.01,.01]
.02
[-.00,.04]
.03
[.001,.07]
Party Loyalty: $
Contributions to
Party CCC
--
-.01
[-.04,.03]
.00
[-.03,.03]
4.31
[-.14,2.1]
.01
[-.02,.03]
-.01
[-.13,.09]
.02
[-.04,.07]
.04
[-.03,.11]
Party Loyalty: $
Leadership PAC
Contributions
4.8
[-.14,16]
.06
[-.17,1.14]
.00
[-.00,.01]
5.34
[.06,6.66]
-.01
[-.11,.29]
-.00
[-.00,.00]
-.01
[-.04,.03]
-.03
[-.08,.02]
Legislative
Entrepreneurship
(Bills Sponsored)
.06
[.01,.13]
.11
[.01,.29]
.10
[.02,.23]
.02
[-.01,.10]
2.01
[.001,.12]
.20
[.02,.48]
.27
[.12,.47]
.29
[.15,.48]
Competitive Race
-1.36
[-.16,.05]
.05
[-.13,.48]
-.04
[-.16,.09]
-.03
[-.09,.05]
.01
[-.09,.18]
-.04
[-.31,.52]
.59
[.06,1.59]
.50
[-.02,1.3]
Seniority
-.01
[-.04,.05]
.15
[.02,.37]
-.00
[-.06,.09]
-.01
[-.05,.05]
.01
[-.04,.08]
.06
[-.06,.23]
.04
[-.08,.20]
-.04
[-.13,.08]
Committee
Chairman
.42
[.03,1.44]
-.08
[-.18,.04]
.17
[-.1,.86]
.41
[.02,1.47]
.02
[-.08,.29]
-.04
[-.29,.42]
.04
[-.31,.58]
.02
[-.32,.53]
Log likelihood
-104.52
-96.88
-118.15
-81.55
-78.91
-166.22
-229.62
-239.55
χ2
Pseudo R2
N
36.31***
.15
254
22.71**
.10
254
24.36**
.09
266
21.04
.11
255
27.14**
.15
222
24.38**
.07
220
36.62
.07
216
29.95***
.06
222
Cell entries are first differences as described in the text from negative binomial regressions, confidence intervals are in parentheses.
Entries in bold are significant at p<.05 or better.
41
Table 3-5. Explaining the Consideration of Majority Party Members’ Policy Amendments on the House Floor
Congress
100th
101st
102nd
103rd
104th
105th
106th
107th
Party Loyalty:
Roll Call Votes
-.01
[-.03,.04]
-.13
[-.27,.04]
.09
[-.07,.29]
.09
[-.13,.43]
.05
[-.05,.20]
-.04
[-.16,.10]
.18
[.04,.34]
-.04
[-.10,.02]
Party Loyalty:
Rule Votes
.01
[-.03,.07]
.48
[.05,1.13]
-.14
[-.24,.01]
.07
[-.24,.15]
-.06
[-.15,.04]
.04
[-.10,.22]
-.07
[-.13,-.002]
.00
[-.08,.09]
.02
[-.03,.06]
.01
[-.02,.05]
.15
[-.47,.87]
-.00
[-.06,.05]
-.02
[-.10,.06]
.01
[-.01,.03]
.01
[-.02,.04]
Party Loyalty: $
Contributions to
Candidates
Party Loyalty: $
Contributions to
Party CCC
--
.03
[-.02,.07]
.02
[-.03,.06]
5.07
[-.67,2.1]
.04
[-.01,.09]
-.03
[-.14,.07]
.001
[-.05,.05]
.02
[-.02,.06]
Party Loyalty: $
Leadership PAC
Contributions
.17
[.001,.67]
-.01
[-.03,.01]
.01
[-.00,.03]
.59
[-.47,5.1]
-.02
[.04,.01]
.004
[-.04,.05]
.02
[-.01,.04]
.001
[-.02,.02]
Legislative
Entrepreneurship
(Bills Sponsored)
.01
[-.01,.05]
.33
[.14,.54]
.24
[.08,.44]
.21
[.05,.43]
.08
[.001,.18]
.09
[-.06,.26]
.24
[.10,.39]
.04
[-.02,.12]
Competitive Race
1.3
[-.07,1.6]
-.09
[-.38,.40]
-.06
[-.26,.17]
.03
[-.24,.47]
.04
[-.16,.33]
-.02
[-.36,.53]
.08
[-.22,.53]
-.04
[-.22,.29]
Seniority
.01
[-.02,.05]
.00
[-.12,.16]
-.13
[-.21,.03]
.07
[-.07,.25]
.04
[-.05,.16]
.08
[-.07,.25]
-.03
[-.13,.07]
-.001
[-.07,.08]
Committee
Chairman
.01
[-.06,.24]
.31
[-.17,1.2]
2.49
[.80,5.8]
.75
[.02,1.94]
.58
[.07,1.38]
.32
[-.18,1.12]
.04
[-.25,.54]
.66
[.14,1.46]
Log likelihood
-42.85
-270.10
-273.09
-244.76
-184.248
-219.65
-202.88
-164.26
χ2
Pseudo R2
N
11.81
.12
254
39.69***
.07
254
40.88***
.07
266
28.82***
.06
254
37.25***
.09
222
12.08
.03
220
25.78**
.06
216
22.96**
.07
222
Cell entries are first differences as described in the text from negative binomial regressions, confidence intervals are in parentheses.
Entries in bold are significant at p<.05 or better.
42
Table 3-6. Explaining the Consideration of Majority Party Members’ Appropriations Amendments on the
House Floor
Congress
100th
101st
102nd
103rd
104th
105th
106th
107th
Party Loyalty:
Roll Call Votes
-.00
[-.02,.01]
-.01
[-.04,.04]
-.03
[-.06,.00]
.02
[-.02,.12]
-.02
[-.05,.02]
.10
[.05,.02]
-.01
[-.03,.01]
-.002
[-.05,.06]
Party Loyalty:
Rule Votes
.12
[-.02,.56]
.01
[-.03,.10]
-.04
[-.07,-.01]
-.01
[-.03,.03]
.01
[-.03,.07]
-.06
[-.10,-.02]
-.01
[-.03,.01]
-.07
[-.00,.21]
Party Loyalty: $
Contributions to
Candidates
1.04
[-.03,5.1]
.01
[-.01,.02]
.01
[-.01,.02]
3.0
[-.06,5.8]
-.01
[-.05,.03]
-.004
[-.03,.03]
-.01
[.06,.03]
-.01
[-.10,.06]
Party Loyalty: $
Contributions to
Party CCC
---
.00
[-.01,.02]
-.02
[-.05,.01]
3.21
[-.05,1.9]
.02
[-.00,.08]
-.01
[-.06,.04]
-.01
[.05,.02]
-.01
[-.08,.08]
Party Loyalty: $
Leadership PAC
Contributions
3.28
[-.04,14]
3.4
[-.08,11]
-.00
[-.03,.02]
9.5
[-.03,73]
4.17
[-.12,2.4]
.01
[.01,.03]
.01
[-.06,.03]
-.01
[-.14,.38]
Legislative
Entrepreneurship
(Bills Sponsored)
.00
[-.01,.02]
.01
[-.02,.07]
.05
[.01,.14]
-.00
[-.02,.02]
.02
[-.03,.13]
.03
[-.02,.11]
.05
[.01,.13]
.02
[-.02,.11]
Competitive Race
1.4
[-.04,1.1]
.11
[-.04,.62]
-.02
[-.09,.08]
.02
[-.02,.12]
-.01
[--.09,.10]
.06
[-.10,.38]
.11
[-.02,.38]
7.24
[-.16,2.3]
Seniority
.01
[-.00,.03]
.02
[-.01,.10]
.04
[-.01,.16]
-.01
[-.02,.01]
-.02
[-.06,.04]
.08
[.002,.18]
-.02
[-.05,.02]
-.01
[-.06,.08]
Committee Chairman
.08
[-.01,.41]
.01
[-.08,.25]
.07
[-.07,.62]
.38
[.01,1.71]
.06
[-.09,.64]
.13
[-.07,.62]
7.04
[-.12,3.2]
.35
[-.09,2.7]
Log likelihood
-22.12
-49.38
-61.06
-58.12
-52.716
-98.19
-42.80
-32.94
χ2
Pseudo R2
N
12.70
.22
254
6.26
.06
254
17.48*
.13
264
10.59
.08
254
11.19
.10
222
19.77*
.09
220
19.88*
.19
216
15.99
.20
222
Cell entries are first differences as described in the text from negative binomial regressions, confidence intervals are in parentheses.
Entries in bold are significant at p<.05 or better.
43
Table 3-7. Explaining the Consideration of Commemoratives on the House Floor
Congress
100th
101st
102nd
103rd
Party Loyalty:
Roll Call Votes
.03
[-.06,.17]
.04
[-.03,.13]
.10
[.02,.23]
.14
[.02,.33]
Party Loyalty:
Rule Votes
.01
[-.07,.15]
-.001
[-.08,.11]
.21
[-.01,.65]
.01
[-.22,.32]
Party Loyalty: $
Contributions to
Candidates
12
[-.20,35]
.02
[-.01,.04]
.01
[-.00,.02]
4.3
[-.14,1.7]
Party Loyalty: $
Contributions to
Party CCC
--
.01
[-.03,.01]
-.00
[-.02,.02]
3.5
[-.16,8.5]
Party Loyalty: $
Leadership PAC
Contributions
56
[-.17,37]
.002
[-.004,.01]
.04
[-.00,.01]
.44
[-.00,1.8]
Legislative
Entrepreneurship
(Bills Sponsored)
.02
[-.03,.09]
.05
[-.01,.14]
.07
[.01,.17]
.03
[-.00,.09]
Competitive Race
.15
[-.10,.68]
.03
[-.16,.28]
-.06
[-.14,.04]
.02
[-.07,.16]
Seniority
-.01
[-.06,.07]
-.03
[-.08,.04]
-.07
[-.11,.-03]
.00
[-.04,.06]
Committee
Chairman
.25
[-.07,.83]
.26
[-.06,.98]
.45
[-.01,1.5]
-.04
[-.13,.14]
Log likelihood
-144.72
-127.29
-131.71
-86.27
11.47
.04*
254
12.9
.05
254
26.14***
.09
266
19.09*
χ2
Pseudo R2
N
.10
255
Cell entries are first differences as described in the text from negative binomial regressions, confidence intervals are in
parentheses. Entries in bold are significant at p<.05 or better.
44