Intra-party democracy in Belgium: On paper,
in practice and through the eyes of the members
Bram Wauters1
University College Ghent and Ghent University
[email protected]
Paper prepared for the ECPR Joint Sessions
Lisbon 14-19 April 2009
Workshop 21: Promoting Internal Party Democracy:
A Selling Point, A Serious Danger, Or A Redundant Exercise?
1
1. Introduction
Political parties are thought of as being in crisis. This is not entirely true, though. Mair
(1994) proposed to split up the party organisation into three parts in order to facilitate
analysis: the ‘party in public office’, being the party in parliament and in government,
the ‘party on the ground’, i.e. the party members and also the party voters, and the ‘party
in central office’, being the central party organization. Rather than talking about a general
‘decline’ of parties (Wattenberg, 1984 ; Webb, 1995) it is better to call recent evolutions
a change within parties where the balance between the three components has been altered
to the detriment of the ‘party on the ground’. The two other components have grown in
importance due to the generous system of public financing and to the intra-party
professionalisation. This implies that when one is speaking of a decline of parties, one
refers mainly to the ‘party on the ground’, featuring a decline of trust in parties, a reduced
identification with parties and a decline in the number of party members. The decrease of
the number of party members is a phenomenon that occurred the last decades all over
Europe (Mair & Van Biezen, 2001). This decrease is also apparent in Belgium. In 1980,
all Belgian parties together counted 618.540 members, while in 1999 this had dropped to
471.420, which is a decrease of 24 % (Biondi et al., 2000). Also in trust rankings, Belgian
political parties always lag far behind other actors and institutions such as Parliament, the
press and the judicial system (Elchardus & Smits, 2002)
Most political parties continue, however, to make every effort to attract as many
members as possible. This can be explained by the benefits that members offer to parties,
that still outnumber the costs (Scarrow, 1994).
One of the means to attract members is giving them a voice in the internal functioning of
the party. By giving the rank and file a greater say, parties have tried to increase the
involvement of the members with the party and hoped in this way to stick them to the
party. Owing to secularization and de-pillarization, the traditional reasons to join a party
have lost much of their power. Moreover, the last decades new social movements and
new parties such as the green parties, who value involvement and participation highly,
have gone into competition with traditional organizations and parties (Deschouwer,
2
1994). These new movements succeeded in attracting a lot of people, especially young
people, mainly at the expense of more classic organizations (Katz, 1990). These latter
movements tried to anticipate this trend by providing more participatory procedures in
their internal functioning (Scarrow, 1999). In addition, the rise of postmaterialistic values
in most Western societies has had as a consequence that participation and involvement
have become important issues. Inglehart (1990) has found a clear shift in the culture and
attitudes of Western societies from materialistic to postmaterialistic values, focussing on
the quality of life and self-expression. This shift coincided with an improvement in
education and the extension of communication means and mass media. Thus, people have
not only the desire to participate, but also the knowledge and skills to become involved.
Procedures granting party members more involvement include among others party
leadership elections (LeDuc, 2001 ; Denham & O’ Hara, 2007 ; Wauters, 2009), giving
members the right to vote on party conferences (Dewachter, 2003) and involvement in
the composition of the candidate lists for elections (Pennings & Hazan, 2001 ; Katz, 2001
; Rahat & Hazan, 2001). The question arises whether this introduction of participatory
procedures constitutes a real empowering of the rank and file. Most studies about intraparty participation demonstrate only a limited influence of the rank and file and even see
these procedures as instruments to reinforce the power of the party elite (Mair, 1994 ;
Scarrow, 1999 ; Wauters, 2003).
In this paper, it is our aim to give an overview of intra-party democracy in Belgium by
bringing together existing data and presenting new material about this topic. Belgium has
witnessed the rapid introduction of intra-party democratic procedures in the course of the
1990s, following the rise of the green parties and the radical transformation of the
Flemish liberal party (De Winter, 2000).
Four participation procedures will be scrutinized in ths paper: party leadership elections,
member participation in party conferences, party member involvement in the composition
of candidate lists and intra-party referenda. For each of these procedures, three types of
analyses will be run: an analysis of the changes in the party constitution (formal rules)
and the motives used to undertake these changes, an analysis of the functioning in
3
practice of these intra-party procedures and an analysis of how the members perceive
these procedures. Our approach is summarized in this figure:
Formal party
rules
Practice
View of
members
Party leadership elections
Right to vote in party conferences
Compostition of candidate lists
Intra-party referenda
2. Change in formal party rules
2.1 An overview of the changes
a) party leadership elections
The party leader is a crucial and powerful actor in Belgian politics (Fiers, 1998) who is
responsible for both the internal organisation of the party and the external relations and
activities, such as acting as spokesperson in negotiations and appointing ministers.
Formerly, Belgian political parties used to assign their party leader by a decision of the
party executive or the party conference containing only a selected elite of party members.
In the 1970s only the French-speaking2 christian-democratic party PSC elected their party
leader in internal elections. The members of the francophone nationalist party FDF
elected their leader in that decade on a party conference where all members could
participate in. At the end of the 1980s, the French-speaking liberal party PRL followed
the example of the PSC by organising leadership elections. In the beginning of the 1990s,
the radically transformed liberal party VLD introduced as first party in Flanders internal
elections to designate the party leader (De Winter, 2000). Soon, most other parties
followed and by now, almost all Belgian parties use internal elections with member
suffrage to assign their party leader
4
There are three different means to collect members’ votes in leadership elections (Maes,
1990 ; Fiers, 1998 ; Biondi et al., 2000) :
-
by asking a member to vote by post or via electronic way (internet, …)
-
by arranging polling booths in every local party section
-
by inviting all members to attend a party conference where they can vote
We include only elections using the first two means in our overview, since attending a
conference clearly involves much more effort for the rank and file (Rahat & Hazan,
2001). In this way, internal elections in a.o. FDF and the green parties are excluded from
the analysis. (for an overview of all party presidential elections until 2004: see
Appendix).
While in the 1970s only 8 % of the party leadership appointments were decided by
internal elections, this figure had risen to 38 % in the 1990s and it seems very likely that
it will have further increased in the first decade of the new millennium.
Table 1: Number of party leader appointments and number of party leadership elections3
in Belgian political parties (1944-2000)
(Maes, 1990 ; Biondi et al., 2000 ; Wauters, 2003)
Decades
1944-1949
1950-1959
1960-1969
1970-1979
1980-1989
1990-1999
Number of party leader
appointments
12
21
28
50
38
47
Number of party
leadership elections
0
0
0
4
2
18
Percentage party
leadership elections
0
0
0
8.00
5.26
38.30
All parties4 represented in Parliament give their members nowadays a direct say in the
appointment of the party leader, be it on a party conference be it via internal elections.
The exception is formed by the Flemish extreme right party Vlaams Belang where the
party council holds a vote and the preferred candidate is subsequently acclamated by a
party conference.
We should note, however, that parties limit the number of competitors by (to a varying
degree) imposing conditions on potential candidates.
5
Table 2: Means of assigning the party leader in Belgian political parties5
(current situation)
Party
CD&V
Party leader assigned by Conditions for candidates
All members
- Nominated by either at least 1 provincial
section, 2 regional section or 3 local sections
SP.A
All members
- Nominated by at least 10 local sections from at
least 2 provinces, who together count at least
5000 members
- Candidate deputy party leader of the other sex
OpenVLD All members
- Member of the party since at least 2 years
- Nominated by at least 2 regional sections from
different provinces or by at least 1 local section
in every province or by 500 members
Groen!
Party conference with No conditions
participation
of
all
members
N-VA
All members
No conditions
S-LP
All members or Party No conditions
conference
with
participation
of
all
6
members
LDD
All members7
No conditions
Vlaams
Party council
- Member of the party council
Belang
CDH
All members
- Member of the party since at least 3 years
PS
All members
- Member of the party since at least 5 years
- Member of a party committee on the
arrondissemental level
MR
All members
- Member of the General Council
Ecolo
Party conference with - Member of the party since at least 6 months
participation
of
all - One member of the Brussels region and one of
members
the Walloon region8
The Flemish liberal party VLD introduced as first and only party up to now also internal
elections for the national party executive.
b) right to vote on party conferences
The party conference is, according to the formal party rules, the supreme party institution
(Dewachter, 2003). Although their role in intra-party decision making has recently been
challenged, they continue to play a crucial role in the life of political parties (FaucherKing & Treille, 2003).
6
As for the party conferences in Belgium, there has been in the 1990s an extension of the
number and type of members that has the right to intervene and to vote on these
conferences. The traditional system of delegation has recently been replaced by a system
where every individual member is entitled to attend party conferences and to express a
vote. An analysis of the formal party rules9 in the 1980s shows that all Flemish parties
except the green parties Agalev and Ecolo used a system of delegates for their party
conferences. It should be noted, however, that there still were large differences between
the systems of delegation used at that time. In the social democratic party SP, for
instance, there was only one delegate per 300 members and this delegate was assigned on
the arrondissemental level, which groups several local party sections. In the christiandemocratic CVP on the contrary, there was already one delegate for 50 members and they
were designated at the local level. It is straightforward that the participation threshold for
grass-roots members is higher when there are more members needed to have a delegate.
Table 3: Formal rules for participation to party conferences (1980s)
(Dewachter et al, 1988)
Party
CVP
SP
PVV
Agalev
VU
PSC
PS
PRL
FDF
Ecolo
Who is allowed to participate? (both the right to Assigned by…
intervene and to vote)
1 delegate per 50 members
Local sections
1 delegate per 300 members
Arrondissemental
Federations
1 delegate per 1250 votes at the parliamentary elections and Arrondissemental
1 delegate per 150 members
Federations
All members
2 delegates per section and 1 additional delegate per 25 Local sections
members
1 delegate per 500 members
Arrondissemental
Federations
1 delegate per 250 members
Arrondissemental
Federations
1 delegate per 500 votes at the parliamentary elections and 1 Arrondissemental
delegate per 50 members
Federations
delegation according to the number of members (not further Local sections
specified)
All members
7
The radically reformed liberal party VLD enfranhised as first major ‘traditional’ party all
their members on party conferences in 1992. Again, soon most other parties followed
their example.
Table 4: Formal rules for participation to party conferences (current situation)
Party
Who is allowed to participate? (both the right to Assigned by…
intervene and to vote)
CD&V
All members
SP.A
1 delegate for each section with a minimum of 50 Local sections
members and one additional delegate per 200 members
OpenVLD All members
Groen!
All members
N-VA
All members
S-LP
All members
LDD
All members
CDH
All members
PS
1 delegate per 250 members
Arrondissemental
federations
MR
System of delegation of the components of the party10
Party
components
Ecolo
All members
Nowadays, almost all parties accord their ordinary members the right to intervene and to
vote on party conferences. When parties still use a delegation system (SP.A for example),
participation hurdles are lowered in comparison with the past. Non-members are in
general allowed (and increasingly invited) to attend party conferences, but not to
intervene nor to vote.
c) intra-party referenda
The last decades, referenda are worldwide increasingly used (Butler & Ranney, 1995). A
referendum can be defined as a process that allows the electorate to approve or reject a
policy proposal (Matsusaka, 2004). An initiative process even allows citizens to propose
items to be put forward to the population, by collecting a predetermined number of
signatures from their fellow citizens.
In a party referendum, the party elite presents one or more propositions to the rank and
file who approve or disapprove these propositions. These propositions could be policy
8
propositions to be included in the party’ s electoral manifesto or modifications to (intra-)
party procedures or more fundamental changes to the party’ s core elements.
An intra-party referendum should be discerned from internal opinion polls about general
(VU in 1983 e.g.) or very specific topics (VLD in 1994 on judicial topics e.g.). In a
referendum, approval is asked for clear propositions presented to the members, while in
internal opinion polls their opinion is asked without any further obligations. A second
condition for an intra-party referendum is that all members, and only they, are entitled to
participate. The VLD organised in 1995 for instance a referendum where all Flemish
voters could participate in. This is not an intra-party referendum.
The Flemish green party Groen! is the only party who has included rules about a
referendum in its party constitution.11 If a two-third majority of the participants of a party
conference or one fifth of all members or one third of the local party sections demand for
a referendum, the party is obligated to organise one. This referendum have to be about
political relevant topics and should contain clear and straightforward propostions. The
results are binding when a two third majority agrees with a propostion. In other parties,
intra-party referenda can be organised as well, but on an ad hoc basis.
Given the high cost of an intra-party referendum, to date only 3 such referendums have
been organised in Belgium: one by the Flemish social democrats of SP in 1993 and two
by the French-speaking christian-democrats PSC in 1996 and in 200212. In each case, it
was always the party elite that took the initiative to organise a referendum. In none of
these referenda, there was bottom-up involvement of the members from an early stage, as
is the case in a popular initiative.
Table 5: Intra-party referenda in Belgium
Date
Party
Subject
November 1993
SP
June 1998
PSC
20 topics of the party
manifesto
renewal of the party
April 2002
PSC / cdH
new name and new party
concept
Number of Participation
participants
rate
41 255
46.35 %
12 661
48.32 %
4 920
25.04 %
9
d) composition of candidate lists
Despite the increasing percentage of preferential votes and a recent electoral reform
halving the impact of list votes on the allocation of seats, the list order, and consequenly
the list composition, remains to a large extent decisive in determining who will be elected
in Belgian Parliament (Wauters & Weekers, 2008). The composition of the list and the
choice of the list order is important in deciding who will be elected.
Contrary to the other procedures granting members involvement in the party, Belgium
has a long tradition of member participation in the composition of the candidate lists.
Already in the 19th century, the composition of candidate lists of Belgian parties was
discussed and decided by assemblies open to all members (so-called ‘polls’ ). In the 1960s
and 1970s, however, these ‘polls’ did not attract a large number of members anymore or
were even no longer organized. Whereas in 1958 still 90 % of the members of the House
of Representatives were placed upon a candidate list by a ‘poll’ , this has declined in 1978
to only 10 % (De Winter, 1988). The composition of the candidate lists was then mostly
decided by assemblies of delegates or by a selected party institution, and no longer by all
members. This has, however, changed again and Belgian parties, together with a large
number of other European parties (Pennings & Hazan, 2001), have re-introduced member
involvement in the candidate selection process at the end of the 1980s and in the course
of the 1990s. We should note, however, that formal membership involvement in the
composition of candidate lists is less prevalent than in leadership appointements for
instance.
We restrict our analysis here to the composition of the candidate lists for the elections for
the Senate and the European Parliament. These elections are organised in region-wide
electoral districts and consequently the candidate selection process also takes place at the
level of a region, i.e. Flanders and Wallonia. The limitation of our research object allows
us to control for local differences. It appears from the statutory rules that the influence of
the rank and file in this candidate selection process is considerable.
Table 6: Formal rules concerning the composition of the
candidate lists for the European elections and the elections of the Belgian Senate
10
Party
CD&V
SP.A
OpenVLD
Groen!
Who decides?
All members in a secret poll
Party conference (delegates)
All members in primaries
Party conference (all members)
N-VA
SLP
Party council
Party council
LDD
Vlaams Belang
CDH
PS
MR
Ecolo
Party executive
Party council
Party conference (all members)
Party conference (delegates)
Electoral commission
Party conference (all members)
On what?
Model list
Model list
Individual candidates
Individual candidates
model list
Model list
Individual candidates
model list
Model list
Model list
Model list
-
or
or
Rahat & Hazan (2001) make a distinction between appointment systems and voting
systems. In a pure voting system, all candidates are selected by a voting procedure and no
other party organ can intervene in the result. In an appointment system, on the contrary,
candidates are appointed by a selected party organ without any further need of approval.
Most of the Belgian parties can be located in between these two extremes: the party elite
designs a model list, which must be approved by the party members (ranging from all
members to those at a party conference or a party council).
2.2 Reasons for these changes
Now the reasons why parties introduced these changes will be described. We categorize
them into four groups. For this analysis, we rely on newspaper articles and party
publications about intra-party democracy.
a) attractiveness for (new) members
Granting members a say in the policy of the party is seen as a strategy to make party
membership more attractive (Scarrow, 1999). The underlying hypothesis is that all
(future) members are keen on participation - which is by the way not the case (Wauters,
2009). Parties use their democratic functioning as an argument to convince people to join
the party. Parties that were amongst the first to introduce internal party democracy
11
stressed the unique characteristic of it. In 1993 when the VLD held for the first time
leadership elections, Bart Somers (now party leader, but at that time only a junior party
official) wrote in the party member magazine: “This weekend we organise something
completely new for Belgian politics: internal elections in which every member is allowed
to participate (…). In no other party in Western Europe, members have a greater say than
in our party!” (Somers, 1993:1)
In the early years of the new millenium, both the Flemish social-democrats (SP.A) and
the Flemish liberals (VLD) set up an advertisement campaign stressing their internally
democratic profile in order to attract new members. Now, several parties mention on their
website the involvement of the grass roots members in determining the party’ s policy as
one of the motivations to join the party.
Some illustrations: “Enough of waiting, I want action! I’ ll join the S-LP and I’ ll have the
right to vote so that I can determine how our party project will further be built up” (S-LP,
2009). On the sp.a-website, four reasons to become party member are summed up. The
fourth one is: “because my opinion counts within the party” (SP.A, 2009) On the
OpenVLD website, the party gives four motives to join the party. One of them is “An
unequalled internal democracy: VLD members are to large extent involved in the party’ s
internal functioning. The VLD was the first party that allowed their members to elect
directly the party leader and the party executive. The rank and file have the final say (and
recently also the first say) on the compostion of the candidate lists. We welcome our
members with open arms on party conferences (…) to decide actively on the general
party line and on governmental participation. (...)” (OpenVLD, 2009)
b) reinforcing the bottom-up communication
Parties are increasingly loosing their link with society (Mair, 1994). In order to keep
abreast of the problems and needs of their followers and of society as a whole, parties
rely on intra-democratic procedures. The opinion of the grass roots is used to test whether
the party’ s policy is in line with the public opinion. The SP party leader at that time Frank
Vandenbroucke formulated the motivation of his party to organise an internal referendum
in 1993 as follows: “… it was decided that, in order to get tuned in with the rank and file
12
and to become a modern political member movement, we had to adapt our internal
procedures drastically. It was our aim to become more involved in politics together with
our members. We succeeded. Party’ s viewpoints that were formerly approved by some
hundred party activists at a party conference, are now read, weighed, discussed and
deliberated by more than 40,000 members.” (SP, 1993: p. 85)
Internal democratic
procedures are instruments allowing the party elite to keep track of evolutions in society.
c) attractiveness for voters
Parties like to spotlight their internal democratic character also to the voters. A leadership
contest for instance can be a spectacular opportunity to advertise itself to the electorate as
an open and democratic party (Punnett, 1992). The internal democratic functioning is
clearly used as an element of electoral competition between parties. In 1993 when the
VLD introduced party leadership elections, the party’ s spokesman Guy Vanhengel wrote:
“ Last month, Frank Vandenbroucke was elected party leader of the SP. He obtained 294
of the 394 expressed votes. Only 0,27 per cent of the 98.000 SP members were entitled to
vote. We, as party of the citizen, on the contrary, invite all the 80,000 VLD members to
express their vote." (Vanhengel, 1993: 1). The preceived success at that time of the VLD
internal elections, and of this reformed Flemish liberal party in general, incited other
Flemish parties to introduce also leadership elections. As a consequence of this contagian
effect, most parties changed their formal rules in order to give members a greater say in
amongst other the choice of the party leader.
In the communication of the results of the internal democratic procedures, parties always
stress over-enthusiastically how well these procedures functioned. After the SP
referendum, the party described it as “ a dialogue without predecessor” and “ an immense
succes” . The PSC called their 2002 referendum “ a brilliant proof of the members’ interest
in their party” .
This not a particular Belgian phenomenon: because parties are convinced that voters are
in favour of these new procedures, the party elite pays lip service to these reforms and
make efforts to publicize them for a wide audience (Scarrow, 1994).
13
The question arises whether the introduction of internal democratic procedures produces
really any effect in electoral terms. A condition for such an electoral effect is the
awareness of the existence of these intra-party democratic procedures among voters. As
the internal functioning of parties often remains hidden for non-members, this condition
seems not to be met. This is confirmed by a survey of the KU Leuven13 conducted among
the entire Flemish population. Respondents were asked to indicate for four organisations
whether the members could vote in internal elections for either their leader or their
national council. Two political parties were included in the analysis: one that organises
such internal elections (VLD) and one that does not organise such elections, but operates
in a hierarchical manner (Vlaams Blok) (Deschouwer, 2001). The questionnaire
contained also two organisations that are organising internal elections but that are not
political parties (the semi-public catholic health insurance company CM and the
disciplinary organisation for doctors Order of Medecins).
.
Table 7: Could you indicate for each of the following organisations whether the rank and
file could elect directly via internal elections their leader and/or their council?
(Student survey KU Leuven)
Organisation
VLD
Vlaams Blok
CM
Order of Medecines
Election
N
386
325
152
210
%
78.62
66.19
30.96
42.77
No election
Don’t know
N
20
64
205
133
N
85
102
134
148
%
4.07
13.03
41.75
27.09
%
17.31
20.77
27.29
30.14
No less than 78 % of the respondents correctly states that VLD members can elect their
party leader in internal elections. This is significantly higher than the CM and the Order
of Medecins who organise also internal elections. Although Vlaams Blok functions in a
hierarchical way without internal elections, about two-third of the respondents are
convinced that their members can elect directly either the party leader or the party
council.
From these results, it appears that citizens do know that political parties organise internal
elections (but not that other organisations are organizing them as well). Citizens do,
14
however, not make a clear distinction between parties that do organise such elections and
parties that do not. This begs the question how parties can benefit in electoral terms from
their intra-party democracy if citizens hardly make a distinction between the internally
democratic parties and more hierarchical functioning parties.
d) legitimisation of the party leaders
A party leader devoting himself to a renewal of the party, but fearing resistance from
long-established party figures or party groups can search backing from the rank and file
in order to realise his ambitions. This support can be made public by using intra-party
democratic procedures.
The PSC Referendum of 1998 for instance was held in a period when the party was
internally divided and was performing badly in the opinion polls. In order to be able to
renew the party with a powerful hand, the candidate party leader Philippe Maystadt asked
the grass roots-members to express their opinion about him as a party leader in party
leadership elections, but also about his ideas of party renovation which were bundled in
the ‘Contract de relance’ (Recovery Contract). He took himself the initiative to organise
an intra-party referendum about this Contract in order to settle down possible opposition
against it.
Another example is provided by Elio Di Rupo, who declared after his election as PS party
leader in the first party leadership elections in that party in 1999: “ I will use the mandate
you gave me to further renew the party. I would like to see more women in our party, we
will work more open than in the past, and so on.” (Di Rupo, 25/10/1999)
Opposition from people or intra-party groups who have something to loose with party
renovation can be overruled by referring to the mandate one was awarded by the rank and
file, either by being elected party president either by the endorsement of a particular
program of renewal. Sometimes, the party elite introduces internal democratic procedures
especially for these purposes. These procedures accord legitimation to the party elite,
which can be used to further their goals more powerfully.
15
3. In practice
3.1 Observations
Formal rules are not always a good indicator of the functioning in practice of
participatory procedures. More than half a century ago, Lipset, Trow & Coleman (1956:
1) already wrote about member participation in trade unions: “ In few areas of political
life is the discrepancy between the formal juridical guarantees of democratic procedure
and the actual practice of oligarchic rule so marked as in private and voluntary
organisations.” This also applies to political parties. Consequently, it is important to
consider not only the formal rulesn but also the practice of member involvement in
parties. It might be that the party elite is strengthening its influence by limiting in practice
the extensive influence on paper of the rank and file. As Mair (1994:17) states:
“ democratization on paper may actually coexist with powerful elite influence in
practice” . It seems that members are often only giving a formal stamp of approval to
decisions made elsewhere.
a) party leadership elections
The democratic character of internal elections is measured here by three indicators: the
number of (serious) candidates, the difference between the contenders and the
percentages of votes casted.
Firstly, up to 2007 there have been 41 party leadership elections (see also Appendix) in
Belgium. In 20 of them (48.8 % of all leadership elections), there was only one candidate.
This means that in almost half of all internal elections grass roots members can only
approve or disapprove the candidate put forward by the party elite. It is evident that their
impact can only be limited then.
Secondly, when there are more candidates, there often is no real contest between the
candidates. Most of the time there is a candidate preferred by the party establishment who
only has to struggle with a minor, often not well-known contender who obtains only a
limited share of votes. In elections with more than one candidate, the winning candidate
has on average 36.8 % more votes than the runner up. Up to now, only in two internal
16
elections the difference was smaller than 10 %: in 1996 when Charles-Ferdinand
Nothomb was elected president of the PSC against Joëlle Milquet (a difference of only
0,01 %) and in 2000 when Geert Bourgeois beated Patrik Vankrunkelsven in the VU
leadership contest with a difference of 7,8 %.
Thirdly, the average participation rate in Belgian party leadership elections is only 40,09
% (expressed on the number of party members). In general, less than half of the party
members participates in internal elections.
A further statistical analysis of all Belgian party leadership elections reveals some factors
that influence this participation behaviour. These results show that there is a (negative)
correlation between the percentage of votes for the winner and the participation rate in
internal elections. The higher the score of the winner, the lower the participation rate.
There is also a significant correlation between the difference between the winner and the
runner-up, and the participation rate (when there is more than one candidate).
Table 8: Correlation coefficients between participation rate and the score of the winner,
and between participation rate and the difference with the runner-up
in Belgian intra-party elections
Correlation between participation rate and…
N
Percentage votes obtained by the winner
41
Difference with the runner-up14
21
* p < 0.1 ** p < 0.05 *** p < 0.01
Correlation
coefficient
- 0.41**
- 0.39*
Also the mean participation rates differ considerably between elections with only one
candidate (average participation rate of 36.92) and elections with more than one
candidate (average participation rate of 43.10).
We can conclude by stating that voters will participate more to internal elections when
there is more than one candidate, when the score of the winning candidate is not
extremely high and when there is a runner-up with a considerable share of support. In
most Belgian party leadership elections, however, these elements are absent.
b) member participation in party conferences
17
Although in most parties all party members are enfranchised on party conferences, their
real influence seems not to be increased. There are three indications for.
First of all, party conferences tend to be more open and more visible than in the past.
Given the extensive media coverage of these events, parties make every effort to show up
well. As a result, party conferences are to a large extent directed by the party elite who
ensures that the party is depicted in a positive manner. Consequently, profound and
heated discussions are avoided. The testimony of former MP Herman De Loor (sp.a)
speaks volumes: “ Formerly, we used to hold in-depth discussions on party conferences.
Now, they put on a show, where it is decided beforehand who can intervene and how."
(De Loor, 2002)
Secondly, an analysis has shown that the party elite has an influence over 13 different
stages of the party conference which enables them to take control of the conference
(Dewachter, 2003). These stages range from deciding whether to organise a party
conference or not, over a.o. choosing the topic to be discussed, designating the
conference leadership and establishing the voting procedures, to delivering an extensive
speech themselves. Despite the apparent increase in power of the rank and file, the party
elite retains much power about party conferences in its own hands, even when members
are granted the right to vote on these conferences.
A third remark that should be made about party conferences is that they in practice
almost never take binding decisions on important issues. A conference sets the party
ideology and the general party line, but does not impact on the way this general line is
day-to-day put in practice (Faucher-King & Treille, 2003). As long as the party in central
office determines the daily functioning of the party, the final effect of members’
involvement about for instance party ideology remains limited.
c) intra-party referenda
There are two weaknesses in the functioning in practice of intra-party referenda in
Belgian political parties (apart from the sparse use of them): almost all propositions are
approved with a large majority and the party elite remains autonomous in interpreting the
results.
18
First of all, the high approval rates of the propositions strike the eye. In the SP member
referendum, all 20 propositions were endorsed, and the lowest score for a proposition was
65 %. In the 1998 PSC referendum, all 10 propositions except one were supported by the
members and yielded results ranging from 75 to 97 %. Only one proposition (“ the party
leader can intervene in the candidate selection process in order to give non-members a
place on the list” ) obtained only 46,9 % of the votes and was consequently disapproved.
These high acceptance rates can be explained by two factors:
Firstly, parties select only non-controversial issues to be put to the members. In the
review report of the results of the SP referendum, it was said that three types of
propostions were included in the referendum: propositions where the position of the party
was already longtime known, positions that are already some time defended by the party
elite but that were not yet approved by a party conference, and new propositions.
Including only non-controversial issues limites the impact of the rank and file, and allows
the party elite to prove that they are tuned in with the grass roots: party leader at that time
Vandenbroucke concludes: “ The fact that these 20 propositions are approved by a large
majority, proves that these are in line with the common sense of social and democratic
people” (SP, 1993: 85)
A second factor that can explain the high acceptance rates is the inclusion of one-sided
arguments in the propositions. In the SP referendum there was an issue on compulsory
voting, which was formulated as follows: “ At elections all people must go to the polls.
Compulsory voting guarantees that the voice of as many people as possible is heard.
Without such an obligation, particularly people with social problems will abstain. This is
proven by the practice in the US.” (SP, 1993: 66) This could be a textbook example of
how the phrasing of a questionnaire could influence the results. It is difficult to be against
compulsory voting with this partial information in favour of it in the phrasing of the
proposition. In the 2002 PSC referendum about a change of the party name, the following
question was included: “ Do you think that, in order to have a chance to strengthen the
party and in order to propagate our ideas in the population and in particular among the
young generation and in order to have the capacity to defend our values in practice, the
PSC should find a new acronym that continues nevertheless to identify the party with its
19
particular political project?” The arguments in favour of a change of name are mentioned,
while possible drawbacks are not included in the question. Moreover, the crucial
question, the new acronym itself and whether there needs to be a c of christian(democratic)15 in it, was not put to the members.
Secondly, the party elite keeps the hands free for the interpretation and consequences
attached to the results of the referendum. Since intra-party referenda are almost never
included in the party’ s formal rules, the party elite can set autonomously the rules on an
ad hoc basis. In the 2002 PSC referendum about a change of name, only 47 % of the
participants of the intra-party referendum agreed that the party should adopt a new
acronym. The party changed its name despite having only obtained a relative majority in
the referendum. The party elite justified this decision by referring to the fact that only 42
% of the members16 did not agree with a change of name and that 60 % of the elected
representatives of the party did agree.
From this analysis, it appears that in intra-party referenda the consent with the proposals
of the party elite is considerable. Intra-party referenda seem to look for confirmation with
the views of the party elite rather than granting the rank and file a real say in the
determination of the party program or the positions of the party.
d) compostion of the lists
Unlike Anglo-Saxon countries, there is no legal obligation to put candidate lists to the
members or the voters for approval. Consequently, parties in Western Europe have more
leeway in determining the rules of the candidate selection process and as a consequence a
greater chance to control this process (Pennings & Hazan, 2001).
Although most parties have granted their rank and file according to the statutory rules
more power in the composition of the candidate lists, the party elite remains the most
powerful actor in this process. The recent comments of incumbent Flemish MP Anissa
Temsamani (SP.A), who was granted an inferior position on the model list, confirm this
view: “ [The provincial party leader] (… ) advises me to dispute the model list on a party
conference, but I know beforehand that I will bite the dust then. Everyone knows that the
20
decision on candidate lists by a party conference is entirely a matter of form.”
(Temsamani, 24 February 2009).
Most of the time, the central party office daws up a proposition for the whole list or for
the most crucial positions on that list. The party members can most of the time only
approve or disapprove this model list designed by the party leadership. The latitude of
members to disapprove is further limited by the press coverage of this model list. The
party elite already communicates about the list composition before the model list is
endorsed by the rank and file. When party members reject a model list, this constitutes a
public disapproval of the party elite and exhibits a detrimental image of a divided party in
the build-up to the elections. Parties themselves make every effort to avoid intra-party
struggles becoming public. For the upcoming regional elections of June 2009, the liberal
party OpenVLD decided in the East-Flanders district to reach an agreement with the three
contenders for the top position of the list (Senator Jean-Jacques De Gucht, former
Flemish minister Fientje Moerman and former MP Filip Antheunis), rather than allowing
the rank and file to express their preference as is required by the formal party rules.
A model list is nearly always approved by the members. An exception is formed by the
green party Groen! were the composition of the list is publicly announced only after the
poll results and where model lists (if used) sometimes are rejected. In 1999 the model list
for the European Parliament was disapproved and all members could express their vote
for the two contenders for the top position, Isabelle Vertriest and Patsy Sörensen.
It also happens in other parties sometimes that model lists are eventually altered, but it is
apparent that the rank and file do not play any role in this process.17
A final remark about the low impact of party members in the candidate selection process
refers to the number of participants. Participation rates of internal democratic procedures
in this selection process are generally low. For the primaries for the Senate in 2003 for
instance only 14 % of the VLD party members casted their vote (Lucardie & Voerman,
2004). These figures are clearly lower than those for party leadership elections (see
above) and provide an indication of the limited impact of party members in this process.
21
3.2 Explanations
Three explanations for the limited involvement in practice can be formulated.
a) Individualisation of involvement
A remarkable feature of the changes in the statutory party rules is the strong focus on the
individual party member, rather than for instance on local sections or on intra-party
groups.
In their classic study about internal democracy in unions, Lipset, Trow and Coleman
(1956) have named the existence of organised sub-groups within an organization the most
crucial factor in producing real internal democracy. Such sub-groups of members permit
organisations, contrary to what Michels stated in his iron law, to function democratically,
Lipset et al claim. This also applies to political parties. Intra-party democracy tend to
flourish in parties where members make up organised and structured intra-party groups,
while maintaining at the same time loyalty towards the party. ‘Faction’ has long had a
negative connotation because it has been perceived as representing divisiveness
(stemming from power battles between personalities rather than between ideas). It has,
however, also been recognized that factions have positive functions (Beller & Belloni,
1978). These intra-party groups are playing in this perspective a role comparable with
that of parties in society: bundling claims, raising grievances, recruiting candidates,
mobilizing members to vote, communicating about the points at stake, and so on
(Wauters, 2004). Consequently, parties that are approaching the individual party member
and that are neglecting groups of party members (local sections, factions, etc.) tend to be
detrimental for the members’ impact in practice.
b) law of curvilinear disparity
We will add here to the above reasoning about individualisation that parties do it
intentionally. Individual party members are more docile and tend to follow the party
leaders more easily than committed party groups or party activists (Mair, 1994). We can
refer in this respect to the ‘law of curvilinear disparity’ (May, 1973; Kitschelt, 1989;
Mulé, 2001). According to this law, the views of party activists will always be more
radical than those of the party elite and those of the ordinary members. The leading
22
politicians of a party are dependent upon the voters for their re-election, therefore they
are going to moderate their points of view in order to enlarge the electorate. Meanwhile,
party activists have no mandate to lose, so there is no need for them to pursue a more
pragmatic policy. Moreover, they are not involved in any daily or regular negotiations
with other parties. As a consequence, rank-and-file members are often ideological
hardliners who may have problems with the more pragmatic attitude of salaried
politicians. Although contested (Weldon, 2007), this law provides us with useful insights
in the motivations of the party elite.
By granting the ordinary party members a say in the party’ s policy on paper, the party
elite circumvents these party activists (often backed by a local section or a faction) and
keeps much of the power in their own hands. This consultation of the (docile) rank and
file-members yields the party elite legitimation and the image of an open and democratic
party, while avoiding the drawbacks of participation which would impinge negatively on
their own power and on the party’ s efficiency. For instance for the candidate selection
process which requires a balancing of a.o. ideological, geographical, age and gender
factors, it is much more efficient for the central party office to have full control rather
than empowering the different opinions of a broad range of party activists.
In sum, parties grant participation opportunities deliberately to individual members
instead of to delegates of local sections or factions. This allows them to enjoy the
advantages (legitimation, image of open party) while avoiding the drawbacks (inefficient
internal party functioning, too much influence for extremist party activists) of intra-party
participation.
c) pillarized parties in a consociational democracy
A final reason for the lack of impact of the rank and file is particular for Belgium.
Belgium is generally known as a textbook example of ‘consociational democracy’
(Lijphart, 1969). This concept refers to the cooperative government of party elites in
order to establish and maintain a stable democracy in divided societies. In such a system,
the leading elite of ‘pillarized’ parties (i.e. parties as part of structured network of
organisations) is supposed to diminsh the society-threatening tensions by negotiating with
party elites from other ‘pillarized’ parties. Elite control, a great amount of freedom for the
23
elites and apathy of the masses are essential characteristics of such a system (Huyse,
1971 ; Deschouwer, 2006). Moreover, state reforms that turned Belgium into a federal
state introduced a complex institutional framework with a.o. mutual vetoes, that obligates
party elites to continue to cooperate with each other.
Political parties, and in particular a limited number of top party figures, play a major role
in the negotiations out of political crises. As apathy of the masses and a free hand for
party leaders are key features of this kind of political system, it becomes clear why party
elites in Belgium are not very keen on giving a great say to the rank and file. This
bottom-up participation could undermine the delicate system of elite accomodation and
eventually the whole fragile system of Belgian’ s consociational democracy.
4. The view of the members
In the previous section, the involvement in practice of the members has been described as
inglorious. This raises the question how members themselves perceive the intra-party
procedures granting them greater involvement: are they aware of the limitations of these
procedures, or do they continue to believe that by participating they can have a large
impact upon the party’ s policy? The view of the members is of considerable relevance
since the support of the rank and file for measures of intra-party democracy is crucial for
the success of these measures (Young & Cross, 2002). We indicated already in the
introduction of this paper that parties created intra-party procedures in order to attract
(new) members. When members are not convinced they can have a real impact, it seems
that these intra-party procedures cannot produce any effect.
In this section, we will use data from various Belgian surveys among party members and
party activists. There is first of all, the 1999 party activists project of the KU Leuven
(further referred to as the ‘party activists project’ ).18 Non-salaried active members of
Flemish political parties were interviewed about their activities in the party and about the
perception of their influence within the party. Secondly, there was a party member survey
conducted at the 2001 party leadership elections of the Flemish liberal party VLD
(referred to as ‘VLD project’ ).19
24
We start with a general assessment of the power the rank and file enjoy in practice. There
was a list of 10 party actors or institutions put to the party activists and they were asked
to indicate which of these actors or institutions possessed the least influence in the party.
In order to make the question more concrete, the phrasing of that question referred to the
influence in the composition of the party manifesto.
Table 9: Who has the least influence within the party20 (party activists project)
(N = 296)
%
51.35
16.22
6.42
5.41
4.05
Rank and file
Local party section
Arrondissemental party section
Study- and workgroups
Party conference
Despite the changes in the statutory rules in favour of the grass roots members, party
activists estimate that the rank and file have the least influence of a series of party actors.
More than half of the party activists indicate the rank and file as having the least
influence in the party.
a) party leadership elections
For the opinion of party members about party leadership elections, we will rely on an
analysis of the VLD leadership elections. The VLD members were asked to assess the
influence they enjoy by participating in intra-party elections.
Table 10: To what extent do you have via these internal elections an influence on the
party policy? (VLD project) (N = 330)
Very limited influence
Limited influence
Average influence
Much influence
Very much influence
Don’ t know
No answer
%
13.33
20.00
38.79
16.06
3.03
7.27
1.52
Cumulative %
13.33
33.33
72.12
88.18
91.21
25
Less than 20 % of the VLD party members state that they have much or very much
influence when they cast a vote in the party leadership elections. One out of three
declares, on the contrary, that their impact is limited or very limited. It seems that the
rank and file are fully aware of the limitations that the party elite imposes on internal
elections. Research has shown that Belgian party members estimating their impact by
casting a vote in internal elections as low will be less likely to participate in these internal
elections (Wauters, 2009). This confirmation of the so-called instrumental motivation
model is in line with research results in other countries (Seyd & Whiteley, 1992 ;
Hillebrand & Zielonka-Goei, 1990).
The awareness of limited influence does, however, not preclude members from
appreciating these internal elections. When asked whether these elections are a good
thing, a bad thing or none of these two, a very large majority of 84.85 % calls the internal
elections a good thing, while only 3.33 % says that internal elections are a bad thing. This
is good news for the party elite, as one of the objectives for the introduction of intrademocratic procedures was the perceived attractiveness to members.
To sum up, party members seem to appreciate the existence of internal elections, but are
well aware of the limited impact they can have by participating in these elections.
b) enfranchisment on party conferences
The party activist project shows that party activists do regularly attend party conferences:
more than 70 % of them declares to have participated at least once in such a conference.
The results do not demonstrate large differences between parties granting all members the
right to participate (VLD, Agalev, VU) and parties using a system of delegates (SP and at
that time also CVP). This is logic since party activists are more active than grass roots
members and consequently they will be more often designated as delegate of the local
party section or of the arrondissemental federation. Therefore, the difference between a
delegation system and a system open to all members is small when only party activists
are considered.
Table 11: Have you ever been to a party conference ? (party activists project)
26
N
%
No
Yes
CVP
SP
VLD
Agalev
VU
15
28.9
37
71.2
17
35.4
31
64.6
18
35.3
33
64.7
13
27.1
35
72.9
11
23.0
37
77.0
Vlaams
Blok
13
26.5
36
73.5
Total
87
29.4
209
70.6
It was also investigated to what extent conference participants could raise their points of
view. About 85 % of the party activists who ever attended a party conference declares
that they had the opportunity to express their opinion on that conference.
Table 12: Do you have the feeling that you can express your opinion on a party
conference (only for those who has already attended a party conference)
(party activists project)
N
%
No
Yes
CVP
SP
VLD
Agalev
VU
8
21.1
30
79.0
3
9.7
28
90.3
4
12.5
28
87.5
1
2.9
34
97.1
8
21.6
29
78.4
Vlaams
Blok
8
22.2
28
77.8
Total
32
15.3
177
84.7
This finding seems at odds with the analysis in the previous section about an increasing
streamlining of party conferences by the central party office which limits the impact of
the rank and file. We should note, however, that only members who went to conferences
were included in the analysis. It might be that party activists are not going to a conference
because they know their influence is limited. Another warning concerns the phrasing of
the question. It was asked whether party members could express their opinion. The
question was not about intervening in public nor about being listened to nor about
whether the expression of their opinion yielded any results on the conference or
afterwards.
c) intra-party referenda
For the view of the members on intra-party referenda, the analysis will be limited to the
SP, the only Flemish party that has organised such a procedure. When asked whether the
party has already organised such a consultation of the members, only 56.3 percent of
27
them gives an affirmative answer (party activists project). Given that at that time the
intra-party referendum was held only 6 years before, the rather low percentage of
members remembering this referendum indicates that it has failed to impress large parts
of the membership. More than 70 percent of the members remembering the referendum
declare that the party has taken the results into account. Since the number of observations
is small, these figures should be interpreted with caution.
d) composition of the lists
Party activists were asked to score the impact they can have in the candidate selection
process on a scale range from 0 (totally no impact) to 10 (full impact).
Table 13: Evaluation of the involvement in practice in the composition of the candidate
lists of the Senate 1999 (scale 0-10) (party activists project)
Party
N
Average
Standarddeviation
CVP
50
1.40
1.85
SP
43
2.19
2.78
VLD
49
4.02
3.61
Agalev
41
7.12
3.06
VU
45
2.89
3.03
Vlaams Blok
45
2.47
3.17
Total
293
3.28
2.91
With a general average score of 3.28, party activists are clearly well aware of their
limited impact in the composition of the candidate lists. With the exception of the green
party Agalev, all parties attain a result closer to the no-impact pole than to the full-impact
pole of the continuum. This result of Agalev is in line with what was earlier said about
the leeway provided for the rank and file in this party. Moreover, the rejection of the
model list for the European elections in November 1998 and the close contest between
Patsy Sörensen and Isabelle Vertriest was at the time of conducting this research project
still fresh in the minds of the party activists. The visible process of party primaries results
in a slightly better score for the liberal party VLD, but it nevertheless still inclines more
to the no-impact end.
In sum, party activists seem to be well aware of the limited impact they enjoy in the
candidate selection process.
28
5. Conclusions
The last decades, political parties, and ‘the party on the ground’ in particular, have been
in crisis. In order to put a stop to this decline, parties have increasingly given individual
participation opportunities to their members. This paper has scrutinzed four participation
procedures in Belgian political parties: leadership elections, participation to party
conferences, intra-party referenda and participation in the composition of candidate lists.
We focussed for each of these participation procedures on three aspects: the change in
formal party rules, the functioning in practice and the opinion of the members.
Since the beginning of the 1990s, Belgian parties have carried out substantial changes
regarding the statutory rules. This is most pronounced for the party leadership
designations. Whereas in the 1980s only a few parties used internal elections, it is now
common practice in almost all parties. The same applies also more or less to the other
three participation procedures. Four motives for these changes can be identified:
increasing the attactiveness to members, reinforcing the bottom-up communication,
legitimation of party leaders and increasing the attractiveness to the voters (electoral
competition). It should be noted for this last motive, however, that voters are in general
not very well informed about intra-party democratic procedures.
Despite these important changes on paper, the intra-party power balance has in practice
not drastically been altered. The central party office keeps control over the participation
procedures by a number of strategies: they limit the number of (serious) candidates in
leadership elections, they include one-sided arguments in the phrasing of items in intraparty referenda, they give members only a say about a model candidate list that is already
communicated to the press, they ensure that decisions of party conferences does not
impinge greatly on the day-to-day functioning of the party, etc. Party elites appreciate the
advantages of intra-party democracy (legitimation, image of an open and democratc
party), but tend to avoid the drawbacks (inefficiency, too much influence for extremist
party activists).
Three explanations for the malfunctioning of intra-party democracy in practice can be
summed up: members are granted participation on an individual basis, while organization
29
studies have pointed to sub-groups as a crucial (f)actor in realizing internal democracy in
practice ; the party leadership circumvents intentionally ideologically committed party
activists and the party leadership needs to have the hands free in order to negotiate and
compromise with other pillarized parties to ensure stability in a divided society such as
Belgium.
In a final section, the view of the members on these procedures is investigated. The
members’ opinions matter since they are the main target of reforms granting members a
greater say and since their support is crucial for the succes of internal democratic
procedures. In general, party members appreciate the existence of intra-party democracy,
but are well aware of the limited influence they have in practice.
All in all, the introduction of internal democratic procedures has constituted effective
formal changes on how parties in Belgium designate their leader, compose their
candidate lists, etc. The power balance between the central party office and the rank and
file has not been altered, however. Members do appreciate internal democracy, but
realize that its influence is limited in practice.
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Appendix 1: List of Belgian political parties
CD&V (previously CVP): Flemish Christian democrats
CDH (previously PSC): French-speaking Christian democrats
SP.A (previously SP): Flemish Social democrats
PS: French-speaking Social democrats
VLD (previously PVV): Flemish Liberals
MR (previously PRL): French-speaking Liberals
Groen! (previously Agalev): Flemisch Greens
Ecolo: French-speaking Greens
FDF (merged with MR): French-speaking Regionalist party in Brussels
LDD (founded in 2006): Populist Flemish Liberals around charismatic J-M Dedecker
VU (split up in 2001): Flemish Regionalist party
N-VA (former members of VU): Flemish Regionalist party
SLP (previously Vl.Pro., previously Spirit, former members of VU): Flemish Regionalist
party with a social-liberal profile
Vlaams Belang (previously Vlaams Blok): Extreme right Flemish Regionalist party
FN: French-speaking Extreme right party
34
Appendix 2: List of party leadership elections in Belgium (only those by
postal/electronic ballot or in a system with polling booths) (until 2007)
Election of…
Party
Date
Number of
candidates
Participation
rate
L. Servais
Ch-F Nothomb
Ch-F Nothomb
P. Vanden Boeynants
G. Deprez
G. Deprez
A. Duquesne/D. Ducarme
J. Gol
G. Verhofstadt
J. Van Hecke
G. Deprez
J. Gol
H. De Croo
Ch-F Nothomb
M. Van Peel
L. Michel
G. Verhofstadt
L. Tobback
Ph. Maystadt/J. Milquet
S. De Clerck
E. Di Rupo
P. Janssens
D. Ducarme
K. De Gucht
G. Bourgeois
K. De Gucht
P. Janssens
S. De Clerck
Y. Leterme
A. Duquesne
J. Milquet
E. Di Rupo
S. Stevaert
D. Reynders
G. Lambert
J. Vandeurzen
B. Somers
J. Vandelanotte
E. Di Rupo
B. Geysen
C. Gennez
PSC
PSC
PSC
PSC
PSC
PSC
PRL
PRL
VLD
CVP
PSC
PRL
VLD
PSC
CVP
PRL
VLD
SP
PSC
CVP
PS
SP
PRL
VLD
VU
VLD
SP.A
CD&V
CD&V
MR
CDH
PS
SP.A
MR
Spirit
CD&V
VLD
SP.A
PS
Spirit
SP.A
22/06/1970
22/03/1972
8/10/1977
8/10/1979
10/02/1982
28/06/1988
20/01/1990
14/03/1992
19/06/1993
4/12/1993
8/07/1994
1/07/1995
16/09/1995
29/03/1996
30/11/1996
23/02/1997
7/06/1997
13/12/1997
19/06/1998
9/10/1999
9/10/1999
16/10/1999
20/11/1999
20/11/1999
15/01/2000
21/04/2001
13/10/2001
9/11/2002
28/06/2003
29/06/2003
15/09/2003
27/09/2003
11/10/2003
10/10/2004
16/10/2004
29/10/2004
4/12/2004
15/10/2005
11/07/2007
13/10/2007
21/10/2007
2
4
1
2
3
2
2
1
2
1
3
1
11
3
1
1
15
1
1
1
4
1
1
9
2
2
1
1
1
1
4
1
1
1
3
3
5
1
2
1
2
47,7
53,4
29,3
39,4
36,6
40,7
16,6
19,5
43,8
36,0
45,5
14,5
34,7
63,9
34,1
40,0
40,6
63,1
44,9
20,7
38,7
48,9
37,0
26,7
59,0
32,8
56,4
24,8
23,1
31,0
67,6
35,0
48,5
50,7
60,0
50,6
37,3
48,6
24,9
32,3
44,6
Percentage
votes of the
winner
74,6
45,7
92,8
65,5
77,6
60,7
80,7
93,7
62,5
88,4
51,1
92,7
49,5
47,9
92,5
96,3
52,1
83,9
90,2
96,4
71,4
81,6
94,2
68,1
53,9
86,1
82,5
91,2
93,1
94,3
62,6
93,9
95,5
93,1
88,8
53,8
50,5
93,4
89,5
88
66,4
Difference
with second
candidate
50,3
23,3
/
31,1
59,3
21,4
61,4
/
33,8
/
12,1
/
21
0,01
/
/
24,6
/
/
/
54,5
/
/
38,9
7,8
72,3
/
/
/
/
34,3
/
/
/
83,9
18,5
12,1
/
79
/
32,8
35
1
The author would like to thank Carl Devos for comments on an earlier version of this paper.
In Belgium, there are no national parties. Parties are organized on the regional level. As a consequence,
there are French-speaking and Flemish parties who function autonomously from each other (for an
overview: see Appendix 1).
3
Without appointments of the party leader by party conferences where alle members have the right to vote
(for instance FDF, Groen!, Ecolo)
4
Despite several attempts, we did not manage to collect the statutory rules of the French-speaking extreme
right-wing party FN. This party is rather chaotically organised (party leaders are dismissed, etc.) and counts
only one representative in the House of Representatives.
5
In each table, first the Flemish parties and then the French-speaking parties are included according to a
fixed order: christian-democrats, social-democrats, liberals, greens, regionalists and extreme right. We
always the party name at the time of the research (for an overview of current and past names of Belgian
parties: see Appendix 1)
6
According to the party rules, a party conference decides on the party leader, but in practice there always
have been leadership elections organised to designate a party leader. A party offical explained that as long
as all party members are involved, the methods of designating a party leader are in line with the rules
7
Not yet organised hitherto
8
There is a system of co-party leadership in Ecolo: there are two party presidents
9
The Flemish extreme-right party Vlaams Belang is left out of the analysis here. On Vlaams Belang party
conferences there are in general no ballots held. A party conference is, according to their statutory rules, a
confrontation of party members aimed at reaching a consensus. An analysis of who has the right to vote on
a party conference is not relevant since no votes are taken. An exception is formed by conferences on
changing the party statutes when executive party members on the national and local level are enfranchised.
10
MR is a federation of three parties: the French-speaking liberals PRL, the francophone party from the
Brussels region FDF and MCC, a christian-democratic splinter group. Each of these components can assign
delegates to the MR party conference. In practice, however, each MR member is allowed to attend the party
conference on which almost never a vote is taken
11
In the statutory rules of Ecolo, an intra-party referendum is mentioned as a possibility without further
specifying any rules
12
In 2002, there were also opinion questions included in the questionnaire. It can nevertheless be seen as an
intra-party referendum because members were amongst others asked to give consent to the new name and
the concept of the party.
13
Survey conducted by students political science of the KU Leuven among the Flemish population of 18
years and older (supervision: Bram Wauters and Wilfried Dewachter), 6-29 November 2001, N = 491
14
Only for internal elections with more than one candidate
15
The PSC changed his name in CDH (“ Democratic Humanistic Centre” ). As a protest against the change
of name, and in particular against dropping the c of christian-democratic in the name, some prominent
former PSC members, including former Brussels minister Dominique Harmel, founded a new party called
CDF (French-speaking Christian-democrats). This party performed badly in electoral terms, however.
16
11 % of the participants of the party member referendum abstained on this question.
17
In 1999, the CVP party executive (and not the party members) decided that fromer prime minister
Wilfried Martens was not granted the top position of the list for the European Parliament. In the VLD, it
was again the party executive that decided in 1999 to remove Leo Goovaerts from the Senate list after
criticising the party in an interview. In 2009, MR party leader Didier Reynders decided autonomously to
remove Rudy Aernoudt from the candidate list for the European Parliament after sharp criticism from FDF,
one of the constituting parts of the MR.
18
Within the framework of the workshop on Political Sociology of the KU Leuven, a standardized
questionnaire was administered from 296 party activists from different parties between 16 January and 24
February 1999. Party activists were sampled by the local section presidents that were selected by the
students. Party activists have no political mandate nor a paid function within the party.
19
One letter and two reminders were sent in April and May 2001 to a randomly selected sample of VLD
members. We received 330 usable questionnaires, which was reponse rate of 42 %.
20
Other answer categories: party leader, party executive, party council, parlementarians en cabinet
members.
2
36