Eurasianism and Contemporary Russian Culture and Cultural Politics – Policy of the Ministry of Culture This paper analyzes the cultural policy of today’s Russia through the prism of its liability to engaged self‐representation as the key ideological institution of a pronouncedly anti‐ideological regime. As some researchers claim, contemporary Russian political regime wallows in ‘presentism’ or time of ‘pure inoperosity’ antagonistic to whatsoever ideological meta‐narrative with clear‐cut teleological goals and retrospective all‐explaining take on history (Koposov, Prozorov, Torbakov). In Prozorov’s langue, ‘inoperosity’ refers to the aimless play of political forces, which are no longer directed either to construction of communism (under the Soviet regime), nor to catching up with the capitalist West (as in the 1990s), but solely to solipsist preservation and perpetuation of the present regime. Recently, however, meaningful developments have been made in order to regain the sense of time and to ideologically embed the current regime into a ‘big picture’ of Russia’s ‘universally important destiny’. These developments could be attributed to loosely defined neo‐
Eurasianism, which seems to be the most probable candidate for the role of the new state‐
sponsored ideology, judging from President Putin’s programmatic article in October 2011 issue of Izvestiia. In this text Putin provided ideological rationale for the ongoing processes of the Eurasian integration, which soon thereafter (1 January 2012) passed through the stage of the ‘Single Economic Space’ with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan and which should culminate into the creation of the Eurasian Economic Union (thereafter EEU, 1 January 2015) with a single currency and supra‐national administrative and legislative organs. Putin’s views can be condensed in three statements: first, EEU links together EU and the growing East‐Asian economies; second, EEU utilizes cultural and structural resources of integration inherited from the Soviet Union; third, EEU should not be opposed to the EU, by contrast, as members of EEU countries could negotiate with the EU on better terms.1 The single most ideologically important Putin’s speech made on 19 September 2013 at the Valdai discussion club, results his musings on ideology and history in a way which connects EEU 1
Izvestia, V. Putin, “Novyi integracionnyi proekt dlia Evropy – budushee rozhdaetsia segodnia”, 3 Oct. 2011, http://izvestia.ru/news/502761, last checked 21.10.2013 with his vision of how the world order of the 21 century is to be shaped. The three points of his Izvestia article boil down here to two principles of 1) historical and 2) geographical unity of the post‐Soviet space. On the one hand, obliquely referring to the (in)famous dictum of Mackinder (‘who rules…’) Putin says that EEU would become a new geopolitical center in Eurasia and raise its members from backwater periphery of world processes to the role of the strategic leaders. On the other hand, EEU would symbolically re‐connect the post‐Soviet history with the Soviet and pre‐revolutionary periods in the life of this region according to Putin’s explicit claim to darn the torn fabric of Russian history. All these – in the long run – leads to the idea of cultural authenticity as the highest political value, thereby revealing Putin’s ideological genealogic ties with Slavophilism, and its subsequent ideological evolutions (in the text itself Putin overtly refers to ‘neo‐Slavophiles’ and Konstantin Leont’ev, the late 19th century arch‐conservative ideologue). My opinion is that Putin’s take on EEU signalizes the rejection of the conscious pragmatism of the 2000s, and embracement of ideological methods of mass mobilization in order to underpin the stumbling Russian economy and shrinking support of the ruling regime. The ‘time of presentism’ is ending, and the state undertakes unprecedented efforts to enact historical and teleological ‘grand narrative’ through the Ministry of Education (e.g. the ‘single history textbook’ project), and the Ministry of Culture. Unlike the ‘single history textbook’, it is still not clear what is going to be the dearest brainchild of the Ministry of Culture which as of today has too many irons in the fire (ranging from censorship in film‐production to purges in the Ministry’s Institute of Cultural Studies and Institute of Fine Arts) but no show‐case project. On the one hand, the Ministry in its present stature is very young, it was established in 2008, and on the other hand, its budget is notoriously scarce. It is true that this, 2014 year, which is proclaimed as the ‘Year of Culture’ in Russia, followed by the 70th anniversary of the victory in the Great Patriotic War in 2015, gives us much more clues about the Russian ‘Ministry of Truth’. However, already at the moment we can observe remarkable growth of financing of the Ministry (90 billion rubles in 2012) and its ambition to become a strong political player in Russia by means of a greater support (and control) of cultural and artistic life. As Valentina Matvienko, one of the leaders of ‘United Russia’ party, said, previously the Ministry of Culture was the ministry of the Bolshoi Theater, Hermitage and Mariinskii Theater, now its regional programs make it the Ministry of the whole of Russia.2 The Ministry, already reinforces by the department of archives, department of tourism, and department of international cooperation (including cooperation with the Russian diaspora), plans to acquire control over the ‘Rosspechat’, the department of the press. Having done so, the Ministry would amass considerable resources to carry out a consolidated cultural policy. As Sergei Cherniakhovskii remarked, Medinskii, the Minister from May 2012, had potential to become a new Lunacharskii, the legendary First Commissar of Enlightenment back in the 1920s.3 This is especially significant in a country which has no single state‐sponsored cultural policy for the last 25 years. Vladimir Medinskii (born in 1970) is the member of the Highest Council of the ‘United Russia’ political party (position, analogous to Central Bureau of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union). In 1999 he defended his Doctor of Science dissertation in political science, and in 2011 another Doctor of Science dissertation in history. In 2010 and 2011 a series of his non‐fiction books entitled ‘Myths about Russia’ were published and soon became bestsellers of sorts. They purport to repudiate negative stereotypes about Russia by means of constructing and reinforcing negative stereotypes about the West; for example, he argues that medieval Russia was healthy and well sanitized country comparing to disastrous dirtiness of the West European towns of that time. In 2012 he released a book of historical fiction from the 17 century’s defense of Smolensk from the Poles’ siege. This book encapsulated much of his idiosyncratic thinking such as the idea of eternal struggle of Russia with Western Europe and the idea of the treacherous ‘fifth column’ inside Russia which – according to his plotline – finally led to the break of the Russian defense against the Poles and massive bloodshed in the cathedral. Symptomatic, that while pious 2
Komsomol’skaia Pravda, Elena Krivliakina, ”Glava Sovfeda Valentina Matvienko – Dmitriu Medvedevu ’Minkul’tury dolzhno perestat’ byt’ ministerstvom Bolshogo i Mariinskogo teatra!”, 17.09.2012, http://www.kp.by/daily/25950.5/2893525/, last checked 21.10.2013 3
Km.ru, Sergei Tcherniakhovskii, “U Medinskogo est’ shans stat’ novym Lunacharskim”, 7.06.2012, http://www.km.ru/v‐rossii/2012/06/07/pravitelstvo‐rossii/u‐medinskogo‐est‐shans‐stat‐novym‐lunacharskim, last checked 21.10.2013 Russians, singing a motet, perished with no resistance from the sables of the Poles, the traitor was killed by the cross, fallen from the cathedral. His anti‐Western and anti‐liberal views made his reputation, so when he was appointed to the post of the Minister of Culture on 21 May 2012, this appointment caused much controversy in the Russian society. Whatever the case, a newcomer to the Russian Government soon voiced an idea that culture is Russia’s ‘colossal competitive advantage’ on the global stage4 – thereby echoing Putin’s long‐
cherished thought of linking culture and politics. His specification should be much to Putin’s liking too; Mediskii maintains that Russia’s cultural greatness consists first and foremost in Russia’s ability to preserve her cultural identity (read: authenticity).5 For Medinskii this is not new. Already his doctoral (in political science) dissertation of 1999 was devoted to the problem of how geo‐strategic thinking in Russia was and would be influenced by her incorporation into the global information space, that is how to utilize Russia’s soft‐power resources (language, nation‐branding, heritage of arts and literature) for geopolitical purposes.6 In an article which could be considered as his declaration of intentions, and meaningfully entitled ‘Culture Matters’, Medinskii said that culture should become and was in fact becoming the centerpiece of the state’s concern, and the approaching ‘Year of Culture’ (2014) should demonstrate this. In this text he proclaimed the necessity to forge a single culture, ‘with common goals and values’ in Russia as the precondition of ‘making our country more comfortable for living’. However, he described his own role as the role of a ‘manager’ not a chief propagandist.7 In any case, Medinskii supports the idea that the Ministry can and should interfere with the cultural product, if its production is financed by the state. The underlying idea is simple: he who pays the pipe calls the tune. 4
TV program “Pozner”, Interview of Vladimir Pozner with Vladimir Medinskii, 2 December 2012, http://poleplayg.ru/watch/pozner‐medinskij‐video‐842, checked 21.10.2013. 5
Ibid. 6
Vladimir Medinskii, Teoretiko‐metodologicheskie problemy formiriovania strategii vneshnepoliticheskoi deiatel’noski Rossii v usloviiah stanovlenia global’nogo informacionnogo prostranstva, Dr. Habil. Dissertation, Mosocw, 1999. 7
Kul’tura, Vladimir Medinskii, “Kul’tura imeet znachenie”, 5.10.2012, http://portalkultura.ru/articles/country/kultura‐imeet‐znachenie/, checked 21.10.2013. Thus, Medinskii argues that the state‐sponsored films should reflect what is termed in the departmental papers ‘goszakaz’, that is the ‘government order’. Medisnkii’s emissaries who become ice‐rectors at the departmental institutes (e.g. the Institute of Cultural Studies) try to impose this ‘goszakaz’ on its researchers. The system of Ministry’s influence is being institutionalized both in capitals and in the province. If the two political initiatives meet – Medinskii’s building up institutional muscles of the Ministry, and Putin’s recognition of the political importance of culture, one can expect pumping up the Ministry with financial resources. But the question remains, is the Ministry of Culture going to be an instrument of ideological consolidation on the basis of Eurasianism? Eurasianism is not alien to Medinskii. In the aforementioned doctoral dissertation he maintains that Russia’s Eurasian position secures her double role as a mediator of civilizational ‘polilogue’ among Western Europe, Central Asian region, and East‐Asian regions; at the same time Eurasian geopolitics provides for fostering of Russia’s cultural authenticity.8 In his more recent text Medinskii warmly supports the idea of the Eurasian integration and even called it the major "macro‐task" of Russia. Thus, he actively entertains the idea of a Eurasian union and considers Eurasianism one of the most fruitful doctrines aiming at Russian inner and foreign politics. In September 2012 the right‐wing political analysts backed by the Kremlin’s money and ‘organizational resources’ established the so called “Club of Izborsk”; Medinskii was the honorary representative of the Russian government who welcomed the new conservative think‐tank whose main task is to provide ideological support for the EEU. In his interview in February 2012 he pronounced that creation of a Eurasian Union might become to a certain degree as important for the future several generations of Russian people as was creation of Communism in the Soviet Union. Neatly reflecting on the ‘time of presentism’, Medinskii scathingly remarked, “In the many years that passed I could not understand why and what’s for the Russian Federation continues to exist. What is the essence of its existence? […] What is the task of our state? Of our power?” He continued to elaborate on the contours of the future teleology: “Russia always used to be a country, which solved some 8
Vladimir Medinskii, Teoretiko‐metodologicheskie problem, op.cit., pp. 268-267.
macro‐economic tasks. Russia was either building the Third Rome, or fighting for Dardanelles, or uniting all Orthodox believers, or building common Communist happiness, or saving the world from antichrist – Napoleon, or antichrist – Hitler. It was a task for accomplishing which people were ready to overcome sufferings […] And it was like this during 1000 years Russian history. And now we do not know what’s for we are living. But what our power did in 2011 made me hope that we might have the new macro‐task in front of us. Let us not be shy and name this task, which the future Russian president would have to solve. This task is – re‐
creation of the new big country. […]”9 With such a teleology at hand, the task for the future turns out to be totally oriented towards the past. As Sergei Cherniakhovskii, a friendly commentator on Medinskii’s initiatives, says, the Minister has now to unite three groups of the Russians, those who like the Soviet Union, those who like Imperial Russia, and those who place their hopes on the short period of parliamentary democracy between the February and October revolutions in 1917. This could be done precisely by reuniting all the three moments of the Russian history into a non‐contradictorily single whole.10 Still, such a retrospective futurology imparts a pessimistic sensation; thus, in an interview to Orthodox journalists on 31 October 2012 Medinskii – closely following Jean Thiriart’s metaphor on the broken chocolate bar, compared the collapsed of the Soviet Union to a broken pottery: ‘to be sure, it is necessary to clue together what has been broken. But this is tremendously difficult a task;’ one would argue that this is a hopeless task as well, because the pottery will never become intact again. Still, why gluing parts together can be a worthwhile business? In his ‘Myths about Russia’ Medinskii reflected upon Eurasianism which according to his assessment ‘could be interesting precisely as an attempt to represent Russia as a multi‐national state, but not an empire’.11 In his not ingenious interpretation, Russia differs from the ‘typical’ 9
Vladimir Medinskii on Eurasian Union, at Ria‐Novosti press‐conference, February 2012, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4Ts1vKYZ1EQ, checked 21.10.2013. 10
Sergei Cherniakhovskii, “KM: Uzly Medinskogo”, http://www.medinskiy.ru/uzly‐medinskogo, checked 21.10.2013. 11
Vladimir Medinskii, Mify o Rossii. O russkom rabstve, griazi i “tiur’me narodov”, Moscow, ‘Olma Media Grupp’, 2010. colonial empires of the Western Europe by its ability to non‐violently, harmoniously incorporate other peoples similar to how, for example, Gascogne was incorporated to France in the 15th century but by no means like Algeria was colonized by France four centuries later. Medinskii insists that unlike the Western colonial empires, Russia itself has never been a nation state, so having incorporated the other peoples, Russians did not develop antagonisms with them; and – most important – Russia used to incorporate only those peoples which had had close ties with Russia, or kindred culture, or ‘common historical destiny’. As a result by the beginning of the 20th century Russia was empire by title but by its essence was an absolutely different entity for which we have no term in political science. Perpetuated under the Bolsheviks, this system was later attributed as a multi‐national state based on the friendship among peoples. Another Eurasian trace in Medinskii’s thought is more connected with the ‘last Eurasianist’, Lev Gumilev, whom he amply quotes and whose theory of ‘passionarity’ he considers as ‘anticipating its time, very Russian, lying at the heart of the Russian philosophy’.12 One of the recurrent themes in Medisnkii’s writings has to do with biology, the energy of a people, and ‘gene pool’. Thus, he argues that while the ‘gene pool’ of the Europeans has been undermined by the Inquisition, today’s Russians inherited healthy ‘gene pool’ of their ancestors, so that the Russian women are considered as a perfect match by many European men. Although Medinskii argues for the ideological function of culture, Eurasianism is primarily considered to be a force of cultural and political re‐integration of Russia with former Soviet territories and other neighboring countries. This force is seen as first and foremost determined by economic reasons and ‘pragmatism’, and Medinskii eagerly undermines his own statements and rationale by saying that Eurasianism is such a reunification on the territory of the former Soviet Union, which is motivated by mutual benefit and pragmatic calculation.13 For Putin too, the economic aspect of integration stands on the forefront. Is this truly so, or this rhetoric masks the ideological rationale? To be sure, Eurasian rhetoric operates mostly on ‘demagogical 12
Vladimir Medisnkii, O russkom vorovstve, osobom puti I dolgoterpenii, Moscow, ‘Olma Media Grupp’, 2010, P. 477. 13
23.11.2011, Radio ‘Golos Rossii’, http://rus.ruvr.ru/radio_broadcast/no_program/60921034/, checked 21.10.2013. level’, the term ‘Eurasianism’ still has no meaning per se, without connection to very direct political actions. Not only Putin underestimates the meaning of Asian part of Eurasian Union and aiming to create from Russia some sort of the European Union, which has also a big Asian part. Russian population on periphery and recently in the center does not welcome at all the idea of equal union with Asian lands and refuses to treat Asian peoples as equal. There was organized a series of the “round tables” called “Eurasian Union, Utopia or Reality” in the Rotov‐on‐Don University, where in December 2012 presenters were very critical about the perspectives of the Eurasian Union particularly because the role of the Russian peoples in it was not clearly stated. The director of the Center for the Studies of Conservatism, professor Viktor Tchernous, argued that not only the building of Eurasian Union, but also the national politics of contemporary Russian government is absolutely unclear: “What are we creating – Russian peoples or multi‐national state? The governmental project on national politics was unsatisfactory, and our arguments in this respect were supported by the Patriarch. Instead of stating that Russian peoples is a core of the Eurasianist Union there appeared a very strange formula about the ‘dominating role of the Russian culture, which was created by all the peoples of Russia’. In the Eurasianist Union also the ‘multinational peoples of Russia’ are mentioned. And what will be the role of Russians in this union? The power does not want to answer these questions at all. Until these problems are not going to be solved the Eurasianist Union would remain a very dangerous trap for the Russian peoples.”14 In the southern part of Russian Federation – i.e. in the place where the visionary Eurasian Union should firstly come into being ‐ Russian population feels itself being constantly sieged by the peoples of Caucuses. The governmental forces seem unable neither to protect population, not to solve the inter‐racial conflicts. The recent anti‐migrant pogroms in Biriulievo district of Moscow epitomize the tendency. Medinskii seems to be preoccupied with the similar migrantophobia15 which has no logical reconciliation with the vision of the Eurasian Union. 14
15
http://xn‐‐d1abkafekl0b.xn‐‐p1ai/ To sum this up, it seems that the mobilizing resources (of the lack thereof) of ‘glamorous pragmatic capitalism’ in the time of ‘presentism’ have been exhausted and the Russian political elite is looking for a viable ideological adhesive with Eurasianism as the favorite candidate. Vladimir Medinskii and his Ministry of Culture embraces the Eurasianist teleology and rhetoric, but it is not consistent in implementing it in its cultural initiatives. Eurasianism still seems to be too radical an ideology which represents a threat of destabilizing the existing regime rather than the pillar to support it. So the state wants as much Eurasianism as is ‘pragmatically effective’, thereby effectively undermining the whole enterprise, because even the ideologically sustained critique from the right is after all the critique too, while the Putin’s henchmen want only loyalty.