Journal of the War of 1812
An International Journal Dedicated to the Last Anglo-American War, 1812-1815
Fort Dearborn from the Northwest
“The Origins of the War of 1812: Causes, Reinterpretations, and Rumination” by Harold W. Youmans
“The Fort Dearborn Controversy” by Jerry Crimmins
“The Women of Fort Dearborn” by Jerry Crimmins
“The Butcher’s Bill: Casualties Aboard U.S.S. Constitution” by Commander Tyrone G. Martin, U.S. Navy
(Retired)
“1812: Building an Army” by Richard Barbuto
“Isaac Brock: Remembering and Mis-Remembering a Canadian Hero: A Review Essay” by Wesley B.
Turner, on Jonathon Riley’s A Matter of Honour. The Life, Campaigns and Generalship of Isaac Brock
News, Notes, and Opportunities
Upcoming in the Fall 2012 Bicentennial Issue of the Journal of the War of 1812
SPECIAL BICENTENNIAL ISSUE, SUMMER 2012, VOLUME 15, NUMBER 1
The Journal of the War of 1812
An International Journal Dedicated to the Last Anglo-American War,
1812-1815
Exciting and Momentous News!
As of Summer 2012, the Bicentennial of the beginning of the War of 1812, the
Journal of the War of 1812, previously a quarterly subscription newsletter
published by the War of 1812 Consortium, Inc., and mailed to subscribers, has
become a free on-line periodical available to all to celebrate and spread the word
on the Bicentennial of the War of 1812 and beyond.
New pdf copies of the Journal plus back issues will be available for download
and printing as desired.
Now and throughout Bicentennial of this internationally significant war, Journal,
published in Baltimore since 1996, will continue to publish research and the best
information on the war and its era.
We know that our loyal subscribers will have been wondering what happened to
the Journal and why we have switched from subscription, print publication to an
on-line publication. Frankly, it was becoming too expensive for the War of 1812
Consortium, Inc., with our volunteer, unpaid staff to continue to pay the printing
and mailing costs. We hope that you, our subscribers, will continue to support us
and view past subscription moneys as a donation for us to continue to our work.
Your donations will help to continue our work. To donate, send your checks
made out to the War of 1812 Consortium, Inc., to Charles P. Ives III, 802
Kingston Road, Baltimore, MD 21212. Thank you.
Contributions needed from War of 1812 authors!
To discuss articles for submission and receive submission guidelines
email Christopher T. George, Editor, at [email protected]
Page |1
Journal of the War of 1812
An International Journal Dedicated to the Last Anglo-American War, 1812-1815
SPECIAL BICENTENNIAL ISSUE
SUMMER 2012, VOLUME 15, NUMBER 1
Contents
The Origins of the War of 1812: Causes, Reinterpretations, and Rumination
by Harold W. Youmans
2
The Fort Dearborn Controversy by Jerry Crimmins
14
Fort Dearborn Re-Envisioned (Photo Essay)
49
The Women of Fort Dearborn by Jerry Crimmins
53
1812: Building an Army by Richard Barbuto
71
The Butcher’s Bill: Casualties Aboard U.S.S. Constitution After Guerriere and Java
by Commander Tyrone G. Martin, U.S. Navy (Retired)
78
Isaac Brock: Remembering and Mis-Remembering a Canadian Hero. A Review Essay
by Wesley B. Turner, on Jonathon Riley’s A Matter of Honour. The Life, Campaigns and
Generalship of Isaac Brock
97
News, Notes, and Opportunities
112
16th National War of 1812 Symposium, Baltimore, Saturday, October 6, 2012
134
Upcoming in the Fall 2012 Bicentennial Issue of the Journal of the War of 1812
135
Page |2
THE ORIGINS OF THE WAR OF 1812
Causes, Reinterpretations, and
Ruminations
By Harold W. Youmans
Mr. Madison’s War
In its broadest sense, the origins of the War
of 1812 can be said to date from September
3, 1783. It was on that day that the
negotiators representing the thirteen colonies
on the eastern slope of North America and
His Britannic Majesty, King George III
(1760–1820), meeting in Paris, France,
agreed to end the war which had raged
between those two entities since 1775. Yes,
the thirteen united colonies, now the United
States, were to be free, independent, and
sovereign: a state among states in the
international community. A nation!
nation.
For the past two hundred years challenged
diplomatic and economic historians have
debated the causes of the war. Some of
these writers came to the debate with a predisposition, others employed the logic of
their academic discipline, and still others
were writing for the audience of their time.
What we may find is that war between
nations almost never has a single cause. One
cause will bring the political “right” on
board; another the “left.” One or two causes
will combine to produce a majority in the
legislature or among the advisors of the
Executive. Some decisions in a deliberative,
political setting may be inexplicable. While
the causes of the War of 1812 are well
known, the questions for today are which, if
any, cause predominated the others; which
combination produced the “coalition of the
willing” in 1812, and which, viewed today,
withstand the judgment of history laid bare?
Almost from the start, those brave founding
brothers discovered that keeping the peace
and growing a nation was to be as
challenging as winning the Revolutionary
Professor George Rogers Taylor (1895–
War. Almost from the very beginning, the
1983) provided in his short book, The War of
nations of Europe with whom we quickly
1812: Past Justifications and Present
found we must have peaceful relations in
Interpretations (1963),1 a convenient list of
order to prosper were at times uninterested
the causes of the war. These were: British
or even hostile to American interests. The
violation of American rights of
Founders were not unintelligent men. They
uninterrupted commerce on the high seas,
recognized that statecraft, economic
impressment of seamen, arming and
influences, the ability to wage war, and grow
incitement of Indians on the frontier, the
were all within their power. One after the
desire of Americans to annex Canada and
other, Britain and France treated the young
Florida, the belief that British measures
nation in a manner suited to their own
national interests. In the 1790s, more and
1
George Rogers Taylor, The War of 1812: Past
more Americans realized that they, too, had
Justifications and Present Interpretations (Boston:
to assert their own self interests, or fail as a
D.C. Heath and Company, 1963).
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 15, No. 1, 2012—Bicentennial Issue
Page |3
were responsible for depressing prices, and
insults to national honor and self-respect.
This essay will explore but not fully answer
the questions bedeviling historians these
many years. As we examine their
explanations of the causes, ask yourself: Is
the commentator’s reasoning logical and
consistent? Are their arguments plausible?
Are they still pertinent? Are the declared
motives of the contemporary participants the
real ones or are they presented merely to
sway public opinion?
The Challenges to American Sovereignty
As the first decade of the new nineteenth
century opened the main challenges to
American sovereignty were primarily
economic. Along the Atlantic coasts, trade
with customers and suppliers in Europe and
the West Indies dominated economic
thought. The export trade had soared.
Shipbuilding rose in importance. With
Britain occupied in the French
Revolutionary War after 1793 and her
merchant fleet busy with supporting British
interests on the Continent, America was
spreading her influence. China had been
reached and was becoming a regular port of
call. The South Atlantic, Indian and Pacific
Oceans were open to American shipping.
The new nation had proven that she would
assert her rights when she took on the
French in 1797 and the Barbary Pirates in
1801. With France and Britain at war the
Americans expanded into the carrying trade,
serving the interests of both belligerents.
Napoleon’s Continental System, seeking to
drive the British from European ports was
countered by Britain’s Orders-in-Council.
The Americans were being drawn in. Each
move by France or reaction by Britain put
more and more limitations on who
Americans could trade with, what goods
they could carry, and where they could dock.
America’s economy was being controlled by
the belligerents. American independence, at
least her economic sovereignty, was being
frittered away.
As the Napoleonic War continued with the
collapse of the Peace of Amiens Britain
suffered more and more manpower
problems not the least of which was the need
to man the vast navy she had to maintain.
Shipboard life in those days was a “floating
hell” and desertion was high. Many men
assiduously avoided naval service: some by
immigration, mainly to the United States;
some by “self-mutilation;” and some by
active enlistment in American merchant
marine. The British were having none of
that and exercised throughout the pre-war
period the right to stop vessels on the high
seas and “impress” known or suspected
British citizens into their own Navy. There
is some question as to the total number of
seamen impressed during those times, but
there was no question when the Royal Navy
captain of the HMS Leopard hailed, fired on,
and took seamen from the USS Chesapeake
in 1807. With the fortunes of war shifting,
the rate of searches at sea and impressment
spiked in 1811. Impressment was on the
minds of American policy-makers for
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 15, No. 1, 2012—Bicentennial Issue
Page |4
decades before the war.
HMS Leopard (left) fires on USS
Chesapeake off the coast of Virginia, June
22, 1807
In the west, friction was developing along
three lines. To the old northwest, Americans
immediately came into conflict with British
interests in Canada as both nations rushed to
supply the seemingly insatiable appetite for
furs and fur products. On the Kentucky and
Tennessee farmsteads and in the old
southwest, access to markets down the
Mississippi River brought the U.S. into
renewed conflict with a decaying Spain, a
reemerging France, and the ever-hovering
British. While Americans west of the
Appalachians sought markets for their
goods, foreign influences at New Orleans
and above all the Native Americans
supported by Spain and/or England created
obstacles to their growth. Suspicions of
British support to the Native Americans did
no small harm to the fragile peace between
the former colonial master and its
independent offspring.
National Interests at the Beginning of the
19th Century
As the decade came to a close it appeared to
many in the American government that
Great Britain was the greater threat to
America and by 1810, the Madison
Administration was clearly focused on that
threat. What was unclear at the time to most
Americans engaged in this diplomatic effort
was the depth of British commitment to its
perceived national interests in 1810. Nearly
all Britain’s actions between 1793 and 1815
can be attributed to either one of two
overriding national interests. First, was the
defeat of Napoleon (1769–1821) and his
allies on the Continent. But second, was
Britain’s need to maintain access to markets
to feed not only its armies, but also its
people at home. This meant a strong and
positive assertion of political, military and
economic power over the trans-Atlantic and
world-wide trade routes. These interests
brought them into direct and continuing
conflict with the United States.
By 1810, American national interests were
no less compelling. It sought to protect and
grow its “carrying trade,” assert influence
among its border areas (by annexation, if
necessary), eliminate any threats caused by
contact with the Native Americans, and
ultimately gain and maintain respect among
the nations of the world.
Diplomatic Postures and Policies
The British government, controlled most
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 15, No. 1, 2012—Bicentennial Issue
Page |5
often by the Tories, had no real need to treat
with the Americans so long as Britain was at
war with Napoleon. They did make some
early concessions, e.g., the Jay Treaty
(1795–96), but after 1807 the Orders-inCouncil, stridently and strictly enforced by
the Royal Navy, instigated a growing
resentment among a wide swath of
Americans. Further, both Presidents
Thomas Jefferson (1801–1809) and James
Madison (1809–1817), with their
Republican allies, at heart pacifists, tried
“peaceful” economic coercion to bring
around the English policy. Their tools, both
the Embargo (1807) and the NonIntercourse Acts (1809–11), each with their
political variants, failed. What these policies
really did was to play into Napoleon’s hands
without extracting any meaningful
concessions from England.
Although certainly not insignificant, these
diplomatic postures and policies of both
Britain and the United States were
unavailing. They failed to address the
perceived needs of both, and then as now
without a recognition the needs and
objectives of opposing politics entities, there
is no avenue of peaceful reconciliation. War
was coming in 1810; it was only a matter of
time.
President Madison’s War Message
politicians and editors at the time sharply
disagreed over the real causes of the war.
Historians and theorists have continued to
disagree over them ever since. Nonetheless
from June 1812 on, any discussion of the
causes of the War of 1812 have begun with
those outlined in Madison’s Message. In the
U.S., the Orders-in-Council, impressment,
search and seizure, and British support for
the Indian deprecations were held up at the
time as just causes for war. Over time and
particularly in the twentieth century,
however, we have seen major shifts by
historians as they interpret the causes of the
war.
President James Madison
Two works by academics are of particular
interest to those studying the causes of the
By June 1, 1812, that time had run out.
War of 1812, those by University of
Madison sent his War Message to the
Michigan Professor Bradford Perkins (b.
Congress and in less that three weeks the
1925), Prologue to War: England and the
United States was at war. Contemporary
United States, 1805–1812 (1961) and
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 15, No. 1, 2012—Bicentennial Issue
Page |6
University of Wisconsin Professor Reginald
Horsman (b. 1931), The Causes of The War
of 1812 (1962).2 Besides adding much that
is new and revealing on the internal political
situation in Great Britain as well as the
United States, both authors make a serious
attempt to weigh the various factors
involved in the coming war. I have used
both books in writing this essay.
The Maritime Causes
At the beginning of the nineteenth century,
Britain and France had been at war for
almost a decade. Neither paid much
attention to what came to be called the
“Neutral Rights” of non-belligerents.
America claimed its neutrality from the
beginning of the conflict at the same time as
it experienced a tremendous growth in its
trade. It was inevitable that these policies
(proclaimed neutrality with an insistence on
neutral rights) were to produce conflict with
the warring European powers. Neither
Britain nor France would concede the right
of any third party to trade with its enemies
and the seeds of the conflict sprouted from
these opposing interests.
causes. If these were the causes, many,
however, asked why did the U.S. not go to
war earlier than it did when the rates of both
impressment and seizures were higher than
in 1812? As early as 1890, Henry Adams
(1838–1918), the great-grand son of John
Adams, in his monumental, nine-volume,
History of the United States (1890),3 hinted
at a reinterpretation providing a partial
answer. Adams castigated both British
policy, suggesting that it was a challenge to
America’s honor and interests, and the
Republicans, whom he cast as incompetent.
Nonetheless, he still gave maritime issues as
the primary cause.
These views were also echoed by engineerturned-historian John Bach McMaster
(1852–1932) in The History of the American
People (1885–1913) and naval theorist and
philosopher Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840–
1914) in Sea Power in Its Relations to the
War of 1812 (1905).4 Both held that the
British violations of American rights on the
high seas constituted the prime cause of the
war.
The maritime issues were directly
mentioned in Madison’s War Message and
for decades were the most frequently quoted
By the 1940s many historians were still
maintaining that they were the primary
cause. However, Alfred Leroy Burt (1888–
1971), a Canadian-born Rhodes scholar
writing in Minnesota in his The United
2
3
Bradford Perkins, Prologue to War: England and
the United States, 1805-1812 (Berkeley, CA:
University of California Press, 1961); Reginald
Horsman, The Causes of The War of 1812
(Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 1962).
Henry Adams, History of the United States (New
York, NY: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1890), 9 vols.
4
John Bach McMaster, The History of the American
People (New York, NY: D. Appleton, 1885–1913);
Alfred Thayer Mahan, Sea Power in Its Relations to
the War of 1812 (Boston, MA: Little-Brown, 1905).
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 15, No. 1, 2012—Bicentennial Issue
Page |7
States, Great Britain, and British North
America from the Revolution to the
Establishment of Peace after the War of
1812 (1940) and Warren H. Goodman, in his
essay, “Origins of the War of 1812: A
Survey of Changing Interpretations” (1941),
began to show the subtlety of the issue by
discussing the role of international political
theory and the failure of America’s policy of
neutrality. 5 Burt went so far as to state that
Madison’s mention of the Indian menace in
the War Message was an afterthought and
even the Congress did not take that cause
seriously.
1812” (1941). 7 Heaton pointed to the total
failure of American counter-moves vis-à-vis
the Orders-in-Council. Leonard D. White
(1891–1958), the author of four impressive
volumes weighing the administrative
processes of the American presidency. In
The Jeffersonians, a Study in Administrative
History, 1801–1829 (1951), 8 White
concluded that American diplomacy only
delayed, but did not cause the war. Each of
the other two authors would have agreed.
Britain was simply not as vulnerable to this
type of economic coercion as Jefferson and
Madison thought.
Some writers maintained that America could
have avoided the war if its diplomatic
postures had been more attuned to the
realities facing Britain. These writers are
represented by Louis Martin Sears (1885–
1960), Jefferson and the Embargo (1927), 6
who said both Jefferson and Madison were
idealistic dreamers. Another writer pointing
to the U.S. diplomatic failure in dealing with
the maritime issues was the English
economic historian, Herbert Heaton (1890–
1973) in his essay, “Non-Importation, 1806–
The maritime issues were real enough. The
U.S. response to the British policies were in
the end unavailing. It is fully within the
logic of reason to lay at the feet of these
British policies a cause for war in 1812. The
persistent question today, however, is what
would have been the result if America had 1)
abandoned its policy of neutrality early on in
the Anglo-French conflict, or 2) moved
more aggressively diplomatically, or 3)
simply waited to see what outcome the
European war was to bring. These questions
are the fodder of future fulminating on the
causes of the War of 1812.
5
Alfred Leroy Burt, The United States, Great
Britain, and British North America from the
Revolution to the Establishment of Peace after the
War of 1812 (New York, NY: Russell & Russell,
1940); Warren H. Goodman, “Origins of the War of
1812: A Survey of Changing Interpretations,”
Mississippi Valley Historical Review (MVHR) 28/2
(September 1941): 171–186.
6
Louis Martin Sears (1885–1960), Jefferson and the
Embargo (Durham, NC: Duke University Press,
1927).
Land Hunger Causes
7
Herbert Heaton, “Non-Importation, 1806–1812,”
Journal of Economic History 1/2 (November 1941):
118–197.
8
Leonard D. White, The Jeffersonians, a Study in
Administrative History, 1801–1829 (New York, NY:
Macmillan & Co., 1951).
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 15, No. 1, 2012—Bicentennial Issue
Page |8
The leaders in the Congress from the newer
western and older southern states and
territories saw the elimination of European
influences on their western peripheries as
the solution to their economic challenges.
By the early twentieth century the Land
Hunger thesis was all the rage in academic
circles. The first argument to appear in print
was by Howard T. Lewis (1888–1973). In
his 1911 essay, “A Reanalysis of the Causes
of the War of 1812,”9 he flatly stated that
Westerners wanted the rich Canadian lands
and were quite willing to go to war for them.
Dice R. Anderson (1880–1942), also writing
in 1911, advanced the view in his essay,
“The Insurgents of 1811,” that only by
driving the British from Canada could the
economy grow and the Indians be quieted. 10
Columbia University historian and dean,
Louis M. Hacker (1899–1987) in his article,
Western Land Hunger and the War of 1812”
(1924),11 reaching the same conclusion
independently, thought that the hunger for
conquest in West explained the war.
Diplomatic historian, Julius W. Pratt (b.
1888) in “Western Aims in the War of 1812”
(1925),12 vigorously continued the theme,
stating, “[t]he belief that the United States
9
Howard T. Lewis, “A Reanalysis of the Causes of
the War of 1812,” Americana 6 (1911): 506–16,
577–85.
10
Dice R. Anderson, “The Insurgents of 1811,”
American Historical Association, Annual Report for
1911, I: 165–76).
11
Louis M. Hacker,“Western Land Hunger and the
War of 1812,” MVHR 10 (March 1924): 366–395.
12
Julius W. Pratt, “Western Aims in the War of
1812,” MVHR 12 (June 1925): 38–50.
would one day annex Canada had a
continuous existence from the early days of
the War for Independence to the War of
1812. ... The rise of Tecumseh (c1769–
1813), backed, as was universally believed,
by the British, produced an urgent demand
in the Northwest that the British be expelled
from Canada. This demand was a factor of
primary importance in bringing on the war.”
Professor Pratt continued this argument in
his book, Expansionists of 1812 (1925).13
In this book, Pratt suggested that, although
the land hunger thesis was but one set of
causes, the vote in Congress was a bargain
struck between the South and West to
achieve their respective ends. Pratt
maintained that it was not primarily the land
the western states wanted. It was the
elimination of the support provided to the
Indians, by cutting off their supplies and
lowering their resistance to western
expansion. In the South, it was Spanish
protection to runaway slaves and the limited
access to Gulf ports that motivated the
business interests there. Pratt, however, does
not fully explain the results of the vote for
war in Congress. For example, why did
Pennsylvania, who by 1812 had no real
Indian threat or no real desire for Florida,
vote 16–2 in Congress in favor of war?
Lastly while George Dangerfield (1904–
1986), The Era of Good Feelings (1953)14
13
Julius W. Pratt, Expansionists of 1812 (New York,
NY: Macmillan, 1925).
14
George Dangerfield, The Era of Good Feelings
(London: Methuen & Co., 1953).
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 15, No. 1, 2012—Bicentennial Issue
Page |9
also stresses the importance of frontier
imperialism as a cause for the war, Reginald
Horsman concluded that there was simply
too much emphasis given to the expansionist
factors.
Economic Causes
All war on this planet is based in
“economics.” Just ask any twentieth century
historian. Professor George Rogers Taylor
In two 1931 essays,“Prices in the
Mississippi Valley Preceding the War of
1812” and “Agrarian Discontent in the
Mississippi Valley Preceding the War of
1812,” 15 analyzed the “Land Hunger”
argument by bringing forward a thesis that it
was not solely the maritime issues, nor the
land hunger, nor the Indians: rather, it was a
failure of the government to provide an
atmosphere that keep commodity and trade
prices up. The trans-Appalachian western
economies depended on 1) foreign trade, 2)
access to adjoining lands, 3) peace, or at
least accommodation, with the Indians, and
4) importantly, “national respect” (read:
National Honor).
Others joined Taylor. Margaret Kinard
Latimer in the article, “South Carolina – A
Protagonist of the War of 1812” (1956),16
15
George Rogers Taylor, “Prices in the Mississippi
Valley Preceding the War of 1812,” Journal of
Economic and Business History 3 (1930–1931):
148–163; “Agrarian Discontent in the Mississippi
Valley Preceding the War of 1812,” Journal of
Political Economy 39 (1931): 471–74.
16
Margaret Kinard Latimer, “South Carolina – A
Protagonist of the War of 1812,” American
notes that in agricultural areas in the U.S. a
“depression” drove down prices in 1811–
1812. It was no surprise that War Hawks
John C. Calhoun (1782–1850), Langdon
Cheves (1776–1857), and William Lowndes
(1782–1822) were all from South Carolina.
It was the government’s task, said these new
Republicans, to protect and promote the
commerce of the country. The argument
sounded more like the Federalists of the
1790s, than the republicanism of the
Jeffersonian Revolution in 1800, but, what
would accomplish the political and
economic aims “faster” than a removal of
the perceived impediments to “prosperity”?
National Honor Causes
Some other writers rejected the political,
hegemonic, and economic arguments and
based their theory of the causes of the war
on pure jingoistic “honor.” These theorists
were represented by DePauw University
professor, Norman K. Risjord, in the essay,
“1812: Conservatives, War Hawks, and the
Nation’s Honor” (1961), and the renowned
historian Reginald Horsman in “Western
War Aims, 1811–1812,” 17 who zeroed in on
National Honor as the cause.
Risjord maintained that even a casual search
Historical Review 61 (July 1956): 914–29.
17
Norman K. Risjord (“1812: Conservatives, War
Hawks, and the Nation’s Honor,” William and Mary
Quarterly, 3rd Series, 18 (April 1961): 196–210);
Reginald Horsman (“Western War Aims, 1811–
1812,” Indiana Magazine of History 53 (March,
1957): 1–18).
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 15, No. 1, 2012—Bicentennial Issue
P a g e | 10
through the letters and speeches of the day
reveals that those who fought were primarily
concerned with the honor and integrity of
the nation. Stop search and seizure: restore
honor; conquer Canada and take Florida:
increase respect among nations; diminish the
Indian challenge: improve markets and
insure “prosperity.” All this was in the mind
of those voting for war! Does this thesis
bring us back to the Maritime Issues as the
prime causes of the War? Probably, but...
The National Honor thesis, however does
not fully explain sectional divisions. Why
did New England ultimately and vigorously
oppose the war? My answer twofold: First,
New Englanders were traders and
businessmen. Losses at sea were common.
Added to all of the other possible reasons for
a ships’ loss, search and seizure and
impressment were just other costs of doing
business. They could live with that.
Second, going to war offended their
religious upbringing. Note here that the vast
bulk of the religious opposition to the war
sprang from the New England Puritan
traditions.
The Nature of War in 1812
As we today try to understand the causes of
the War of 1812 we must keep in mind that
our view is backward, not forward. We
know today what Madison and the War
Hawks did not; we know what Spencer
Percival (1762–1812) and his Tories did not.
An understanding of what war was from the
top down was known to those learned 18th
and 19th century leaders who had studied
Thucydides, the 5th Century, B.C., historian.
Some may even have read of Gustavus
Adolphus (1594–1632) or even Frederick
the Great (1712–1786). But our view is
tainted today by what we know of Baron
Carl von Clausewitz (1780–1831) and the
modern view of war. Clausewitz, our
modern “God of War Theorist,” was but a
26-year-old Prussian in the service of
Imperial Russia in 1812. At his death in
1831 his work, for which today he is so
renown, was unfinished. Madison never
read it, neither did Andrew Jackson (1767–
1845), or Alexander Macomb (1782–1841),
or Jacob J. Brown (1775–1828), until
perhaps after the War.
In 1812 the activities of the potential
belligerents were only vaguely known to one
another weeks if not months after the event.
Madison and his advisors could not know
what was really happening in London. And
perhaps after all is said, Bradford Perkins,
the Bancroft-Prize-winning Professor, was
right. In his Prologue to War, he maintained
that wars cannot often be explained in
rational terms and that emotional factors
more often than not dictate the course of
history.
A unique way of looking at the causes of the
War of 1812 was the technique employed by
Harold M. Hyman (b. 1924), from Rice
University and Editor of the America’s
Alternatives Series written in the 1970s.
Hyman, too, realized that the decisions made
within the Jefferson and Madison
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 15, No. 1, 2012—Bicentennial Issue
P a g e | 11
Administrations between 1807 and 1812
were made only “in the light of” the
information “available” to the historical
participants. General George C. Marshall
(1880–1959) knew the phenomenon well.
He made life and death decisions for a
decade based upon only the information at
his command at the time. Using the detailed
study of contemporary documents made by
Robert A. Rutland (b. 1922), Hyman
approached the subject asking:
Why did the decision makers (the legislative
and executive branches of the U.S.
Government between 1805 and 1812) adopt
one course of action and reject others? What
influence did then-existing expert opinion
(their Cabinet, with “portfolios” in State,
War, Navy, and the Treasury Departments),
administrative structures (an almost nonexistent military staff structure), and
budgetary factors (the rational opinions of
Albert Gallatin (1761–1849)) exert on the
decision? What did the participants hope
for? What did they fear? On what
information did they base their decisions?
How were the decision executed?
Hyman, in his Madison’s Alternatives: The
Jeffersonian Republicans and the Coming of
War, 1805–1812 (1975), 18 relying on
Rutland’s studies, concluded, too, that if
Madison had waited just one more year, war
could have been averted. However, he also
18
Harold M. Hyman, Madison’s Alternatives: The
Jeffersonian Republicans and the Coming of War,
1805–1812 (Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1975).
notes that Madison and the nation in the
years leading to the war reacted daily in face
of both “known” and “unknown” facts and
factors.
With all this said, here is a strong candidate
for the most immediate cause of the War of
1812:
The “Unknown Unknowns” of 1811
In historians’ discussion of America’s march
to war in 1812, little has been written about
England’s part in precipitating the conflict
and the events in 1811. Relations with
Britain had been up and down since 1783.
Britain had to deal with the perceived threats
from Revolutionary France in the late
eighteenth century and from Napoleon in the
early nineteenth century.
The war between Britain and France had
resumed in 1803 and in the intervening time
came the Chesapeake Incident, the Rule of
1756 enforcement, British intrigues with the
western Indians, and impressment, each of
which focused the minds of American
leaders. Ever hopeful, Thomas Jefferson
and
James
Madison
had pursued
progressively coercive economic retaliation
in an effort to promote a more conciliatory
Britain. Their efforts were to fail by June
1812.
Nonetheless, during the Winter of 18101811, there was renewed American
optimism. There were domestic political
stirrings in Britain that may, just may,
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 15, No. 1, 2012—Bicentennial Issue
P a g e | 12
presage a new policy. King George III had
finally been declared irrevocably insane
following the death of his favorite, Princess
Amelia (1783–1810). His son, the Prince
Regent, later George IV (1820–1830), was a
different fellow who had toyed with both the
hard-line Tories and with the realistic and
commercially minded Whigs.
In July 1811, Madison directed the
convening of what turned out to be the War
Hawk Congress with Henry Clay as the
Speaker of the House for the following
November, and Perceval, brushing aside
Whig suggestions, continued to pursue the
policies in effect since 1807 that were
inimical to the Americans.
A lean towards the Tories would lead to a
quickened march to war; a lean toward the
followers of America’s friend, Alexander
Baring (1774–1848), and the march would
lead to conciliation and peace. Yes, 1811
was to be the year. There were still
“unknown unknowns” ahead, but it could
not go on much longer.
Assessing the attitudes of Madison and the
Congress given what they knew in the
spring of 1811 is difficult. There were still
many “unknowns” ahead. The U.S. would
reinstate Non-Intercourse against Britain.
The USS President would strike back at
impressment during the Little Belt Affair.
Westerners would strike at Tecumseh’s
Indian confederation at Tippecanoe in
Indiana
Territory.
Georgians
would
encourage “revolt” in Spanish East Florida.
And the British ... they would begin their
steady march through the Iberian Peninsula
under the Duke of Wellington (1769–1852)
that would lead to Napoleon’s first
abdication.
February 3rd, 1811, is not a date that quickly
comes to mind when historians assemble
chronologies of the War of 1812, but on that
date perhaps the most significant pre-war
political event of the age occurred. With
authority granted by the Regency Act, the
Prince, on that day, sent the message:
Spencer Perceval’s (1762–1812) ministry
was to stay in office.
The view of Madison and Henry Clay
(1777–1852) that the ascendancy of the
Prince Regent would lead to a repeal of the
Orders-in-Council was dashed. The further
diplomatic efforts of William Pinkney
(1764–1822) as American ambassador in
London, and those of Augustus J. Foster
(1780–1848), the Prince’s man in
Washington, were to come to naught.
The Pulitzer Prize winning newspaperman,
Irving Brant, in James Madison: The
President, 1809–1812 (1956)19 gives
another clue as to Madison’s attitude. The
President
had
received
a
formal
communication from the British Foreign
Secretary, Robert Stewart, Lord Castlereagh
(1769–1822), through Foster that Spring,
19
Irving Brant, James Madison: The President,
1809–1812 (Indianapolis, IN: Bobbs-Merrill Co.,
Inc., 1956).
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 15, No. 1, 2012—Bicentennial Issue
P a g e | 13
which seemed to indicate that the Orders-inCouncil would be obdurately defended.
Neither Perceval’s death at the hand of a
lunatic in April 1812 nor a firm inclination
by the Earl of Liverpool (1770–1828), his
successor, that the Orders-in-Council would
be withdrawn were enough to head off the
declaration of war on June 18, 1812. The
final slide toward war was underway. That
slide began on February 3, 1811, when the
future King George IV, supported one of his
“known knowns,” a political party whose
policies would lead to war with America.
Harold W. Youmans (Colonel, U.S. Army,
retired) is the former editor of the Journal
of the War of 1812. He is a civil hearing
officer and special magistrate in Florida.
This essay, written in October 2011, is
copyright Harold W. Youmans. He can be
reached at [email protected]
CONCLUSION
No doubt, each of the causes of the war have
been and will be thoroughly discussed and
analyzed throughout the bicentennial period.
What is really clear though is that these
present and future discussions will do no
more than echo the contemporary arguments
raised in the Spring of 1812. The decision to
go to war is, and should be, complicated.
One of the enduring strengths of our union is
our ability to debate and put forward various
and alternative explanations of past events.
Whether it was the Prince Regent’s decision
in February 1811, or a broad and deep
economic and diplomatic failure, we should
welcome the further discussion of the
Origins of the War of 1812.
Hal Youmans (right) dressed as a period
judge advocate in January 2012 at
Chalmette, New Orleans, with David A.
Fagerberg who portrays General Andrew
Jackson at reenactments around the country.
Photograph courtesy of Harold W. Youmans.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 15, No. 1, 2012—Bicentennial Issue
P a g e | 14
The Fort Dearborn Controversy
By Jerry Crimmins
One hundred years ago this year, what had been considered one of Chicago’s
foundation documents—a detailed description of the Fort Dearborn Massacre—was
denounced by a young historian as a “fanciful history.”
Milo Milton Quaife made this assertion in a 1912 article entitled “Some Notes On The
Fort Dearborn Massacre,” published in the Proceedings of the Mississippi Valley Historical
Association, one of the predecessors of what is today The Journal of American History. Quaife,
who went on to become one of America’s leading historians, roundly attacked the three
chapters in Juliette M. Kinzie's 19th Century book, Wau-Bun, the Early Day in the Northwest
that described the Fort Dearborn Massacre. Quaife asserted that Wau-Bun was “so unreliable
as to be unworthy of credence.”1
Prior to Quaife's 1912 article, Kinzie's Wau-Bun had been “accepted by the historians of
Illinois as substantially accurate, and other existing accounts” were “generally based on this,”
said Reuben Gold Thwaites, then secretary of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, in
1901. 2 In 1881, two-term mayor of Chicago John Wentworth, who also had been a member of
Congress, said that “Wau-Bun is a historic treasure.” 3
But Quaife in his 26-page article in 1912 said Wau-Bun “abounds in details that could
not possibly have been remembered.’’ It “exaggerates,’’ “glosses over,’’ and is “marred’’ by
author Juliette Kinzie’s devotion to the Kinzie family. Wau-Bun seems in places “altogether too
good to be true,” he wrote, and added that parts of the story are “unworthy of serious
consideration’’ and are “probably largely fictitious,’’ or are “entirely so.” And he said the author
“Mrs. Kinzie … neither possessed historical training nor was she imbued with the historian’s
ideal of reproducing the facts as they really were.’’ 4
Quaife's 1912 article was published a century after the August 15, 1812, battle pitting
Indians against whites and an African American woman and child in early Chicago that has
long been called the Fort Dearborn Massacre. 5 Today, some prefer to call that event the Battle
1
Milo Milton Quaife, “Some Notes on the Fort Dearborn Massacre,” Proceedings of the Mississippi
Valley Historical Association for the Year 1910-1911, Volume IV (1912): 113, 137. The edition of
Wau-Bun chosen for this article is Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, The Early Day in the Northwest.
Portage, Wis.: The National Society of Colonial Dames in America in the State of Wisconsin, 1989.
2
Reuben Gold Thwaites, Introduction to Wau-Bun, The Early Day in the Northwest. Chicago: Caxton
Club, 1901, XIX.
3
John Wentworth in “Fort Dearborn, an Address Delivered at the Unveiling of the Memorial Tablet to
Mark the Site of the Block-house, on Saturday afternoon, May 21st, 1881.” Chicago: Fergus Printing
Co., 1881, 17.
4
Quaife, “Some Notes on the Fort Dearborn Massacre,” 117, 134, 136, 137.
5
The African Americans were Cicily, slave of Rebekah Heald, wife of Capt. Nathan Heald, and
Cicily’s child, identified in Rebekah Heald’s Petition to the U.S. Government to be recompensed for
her property lost in the massacre, reprinted in the Chicago Tribune, (Dec. 8, 1883): 5. For the long
use of the term “massacre,” see see, “Site of Chicago's Ft. Dearborn Massacre to be called 'Battle of
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 15, No. 1, 2012—Bicentennial Issue
P a g e | 15
of Fort Dearborn. 6 This present article will use the historic term.
Quaife's 1912 article, and similar criticisms he leveled against Wau-Bun in his 1913
book about Fort Dearborn, Chicago and the Old Northwest, long considered authoritative, have
prejudiced historians against Wau-Bun and the story it told for a hundred years.
The Chicago History Museum and the Newberry Library in Chicago in their cooperative,
online Encyclopedia of Chicago, state today: “Historians now agree that many of Chicago’s
founding narratives are more interesting as fiction than accurate as history.” Wau-Bun is listed
as the lead example. 7
The Encyclopedia of Chicago attributes this negative judgment on the reliability of WauBun to Quaife. “In the early 20th century historian Milo M. Quaife found Kinzie's account
unreliable in its account of Fort Dearborn, as it relied on family stories that exaggerated the
role of some participants and was unfairly biased against others.” 8
Quaife himself in his 1912 article that set out to debunk Wau-Bun pointed out that he
was not the first to criticize the book. He said that “two workers in the field of local history, Carl
Dilg and W.R. Head, repudiated it entirely; but both of these men betray a feeling of prejudice
in the matter altogether unbecoming to the careful historian; of more importance, neither of
these ever published his work….”
Quaife also noted that two other historians, Henry Hurlbut and Joseph Kirkland, who did
publish their work, criticized Wau-Bun in lesser ways, but Kirkland also relied on Wau-Bun.
Thus Quaife said in his article in 1912 that until Quaife himself came along, “Mrs. Kinzie’s
narrative of the massacre ‘has been accepted by the historians of Illinois as substantially
accurate.’” 9
Quaife then attempted to demolish Wau-Bun’s version of the massacre chapter and
verse.
It is almost unknown today that Quaife later admitted he was wrong in his dismissal of
one of the most controversial incidents in Wau-Bun. Quaife discovered this dramatic incident
was supported by another contemporaneous document written within weeks of the massacre
by an entirely independent source. 10
Ft. Dearborn Park,’” Chicago Tribune, August 14, 2009, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2009-0814/news/0908130999_1_chicagoans-battle-dearborn-group, accessed Jan. 8, 2012. Also see, “Fort
Dearborn,” The Electronic Encyclopedia of Chicago; Chicago Historical Society, 2005. The
Encyclopedia of Chicago, The Newberry Library, 2004,
http://encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/477.html, accessed Jan. 8, 2012. The encyclopedia is a
cooperative work of the two institutions.
6
Ibid.
7
“Fiction,” The Encyclopedia of Chicago, http://encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/448.html,
accessed Aug. 29, 2011.
8
“How Chicagoans Remember Their History; Fort Dearborn: A Case Study,” Encyclopedia of
Chicago, http://www.encyclopedia.chicagohistory.org/pages/410079.html
accessed 9/24/11.
9
Quaife, “Some Notes on the Fort Dearborn Massacre,” 114–115.
10
Admission, see Quaife, “Notes and Documents, the Fort Dearborn Massacre,” The Mississippi
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Likewise, it is rarely if ever mentioned that Quaife, in a book he wrote 21 years after he
first denounced Wau-Bun, suddenly said positive things about the author of Wau-Bun. In that
same book (Checagou, From Indian Wigwam to Modern City, 1673–1835), published 21 years
after his original denunciation, Quaife came to adopt much of Wau-Bun's account of the Fort
Dearborn Massacre without qualification or contradiction.
Bronze plaque at northwest corner of Michigan Avenue and Wacker Drive
Constance R. Buckley, in her 2005 doctoral thesis, “Searching for Fort Dearborn:
Perception, Commemoration, and Celebration of an Urban Creation Memory” (Loyola
University of Chicago) is one of the very few to ever challenge Quaife’s view of Wau-Bun and
Wau-Bun’s account of the Fort Dearborn Massacre. Buckley reported Quaife’s little known
1914 admission that he was wrong when he disbelieved the dramatic incident that is portrayed
in one of Chicago’s principal massacre monuments. Buckley also pointed out that Quaife
began to express uncertainty about whether the supposedly official, written order to evacuate
Valley Historical Review, Vol. I, June 1914 to March 1915, footnote, 564. Contemporaneous
document, see Extract from a Diary Kept by Charles Askin, in Quaife’s “Notes and Documents, The
Fort Dearborn Massacre,” 561–65.
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Fort Dearborn—that Quaife was the first to publish—was truly the official order or whether it
was a forgery. Quaife had relied on that document for one of his principal criticisms of WauBun. 11
However, Buckley never made any attempt to reconstruct the story of the massacre or
to determine what was true and what false. She says in her dissertation, “arriving at a single
truth was not the goal.” Instead, Buckley said her doctoral thesis is a “celebration of an urban
creation memory.” She described how “the ‘truths’ of the Fort Dearborn saga layering and
changing over the years have produced collected stories that retain their discrete elements.” 12
This current essay uses numerous primary and secondary sources to show that WauBun is a substantially accurate account of the Fort Dearborn Massacre. Scores of facts in
Wau-Bun are backed up by other people who were there, or by those who interviewed people
who were there. Wau-Bun is not only substantially reliable, it also appears to be the most
detailed of the first- and second-hand accounts of the Fort Dearborn Massacre that exists.
The author of this essay, submitted here a century after Quaife's denunciation of WauBun and 200 years to the year after the Fort Dearborn Massacre, is a Chicago newspaper
reporter for 40 years and not a historian. This newspaper reporter steps into the dispute with
some trepidation due to Quaife's extraordinary career and superb reputation. Quaife was a
prolific author, superintendent and editor of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, later
secretary and editor of the Burton Historical Collection at the Detroit Public Library. From 1924
to 1931, he was editor of the Mississippi Valley Historical Review, forerunner of the Journal of
American History. 13
I write this essay out of a sense of obligation. The Fort Dearborn Massacre is an
essential part of the origins of Chicago. The record and the documents about the city’s origins
are important in American history now and to the children of the future.
I’m also writing this defense of Wau-Bun to pay an accidental debt. A few years ago, I
set out to write an historical novel about Fort Dearborn and the Fort Dearborn Massacre. For
this, in order to absorb the era of Fort Dearborn from the widely dispersed sources, in order to
learn what the residents of Fort Dearborn knew and to put myself in their place, I constructed a
day-to-day event list of the life of the fort and the life of the United States of that time. I did this
from bits and pieces found here and there in dozens of books, dozens of journal articles, and
scores of personal letters and official documents.
My chronological chart of the day-to-day events of Fort Dearborn became enormous. It
eventually led to 90 pages of source notes in my book chapter by chapter. 14 Going into this
11
Constance R. Buckley, “Searching for Fort Dearborn: Perception, Commemoration, and
Celebration of an Urban Creation Memory,” doctoral dissertation, Loyola University of Chicago
Library, Vol. 2, 283–284 and 335–336.
12
Ibid, 403.
13
Perry R. Duis, “Introduction” to a reprint of Quaife, Chicago and the Old Northwest, 1673 -1835.
Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2001, VII–XV.
14
Jerry Crimmins, Fort Dearborn, A Novel. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 2006, 339–
43.
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project, I had no prejudices on sources because as a newspaper reporter rather than a
historian, I had little detailed knowledge to begin with—the standard start for newspaper
reporters—and was unaware of the scholarly disputes before I began. My need was simply to
know what happened as recorded in the most trustworthy accounts, and to know it thoroughly.
Below: Fort Dearborn and Environs
When my chronological work was completed after several years, based on nearly every
known document, the chronology demanded a conclusion. On the subject of the Fort Dearborn
Massacre and events leading up to it, Juliette Kinzie’s book, Wau-Bun, which by that time I
knew was much scorned, was instead on the money. I suggest that this view would be
unavoidable to anyone who started fresh and went through the same process.
Wau-Bun is not perfect. Some dates in it are off by a day or two. The total of soldiers in
the garrison at the time of the massacre is wrong. The number of blockhouses in the fort at
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 15, No. 1, 2012—Bicentennial Issue
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that time is wrong. There are other errors of details. There are some contradictions with other
accounts about events before and during the massacre that cannot be reconciled.
Contradictions like this are routine in memories of an episode that included scores of
participants and dozens of incidents.
But Wau-Bun’s account of the massacre and related events, published first 32 years
afterward, holds up remarkably well even when compared to letters written within days of some
of those events. I will attempt here to let readers make up their own minds through data and
citations, comparing Wau-Bun to the other primary and secondary sources.
Through this examination, we will also honor the 200th anniversary of one of the
principal events in the founding of Chicago.
Map of the Old Northwest in 1808 demonstrating Fort Dearborn’s isolation
The first Fort Dearborn was a log structure built by soldiers of the American Army
starting in 1803 at what is today Michigan Avenue and Wacker Drive in downtown Chicago. 15
15
Bronze plaque at northwest corner of Michigan Avenue and Wacker Drive, inscribed: “Chicago
Landmark - Site of Fort Dearborn 1803 …” See illustration on page 16. Ulrich Danckers and Jane
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That fort lasted until Indians burned it down August 16, 1812, the day after the Fort Dearborn
Massacre. 16 (According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the generic term that the plurality of
American Indians prefer is Indians, so this article will use that term rather than Native
Americans.) 17
When the United States declared war on Great Britain in June 1812, many Indians east of the
Mississippi River and some from the west side of the Mississippi allied themselves with the
British. The Indians’ hope was that working together, the Indians and the British could stop
American expansion and push the Americans back to recover some of the Indians' tribal
lands. 18
The battle that this article discusses took place when the garrison of 54 soldiers
evacuated Fort Dearborn in the early days of the war, on August 15, 1812, along with about 40
civilians, to march to Fort Wayne. Two miles from Fort Dearborn, they were attacked by 500
Indians. Thirty-three soldiers were killed in the battle or immediate aftermath along with a
prominent ex-soldier, William Wells. Also, 10–12 men and boys in a civilian militia were killed
as well as two women and twelve children for a total of 58 to 60 dead on the Fort Dearborn
side. Three more people died in captivity, for a total of as many as 63 of the Fort Dearborn
folks who ultimately died as a result of this battle. Up to 15 Indians were killed. 19
The account of the battle in Wau-Bun comprises only three chapters out of that book’s
38 chapters. Juliette Kinzie's book is primarily about her life at Fort Winnebago in what is today
Portage, Wis., from 1829 to 1834 where her husband was the U.S. Indian sub-agent. The
three chapters about Fort Dearborn are rich with detail about the soldiers and civilians who
relied on the fort, their fates in the battle, and about the Indians involved, too.
If we break down and summarize the Fort Dearborn Massacre and events leading up to
it into 25 incidents, we are able to see how incidents reported in Wau-Bun are regularly also
found in other primary and secondary accounts. We will put some abbreviated citations here
right into the text so that the reader can see this documentary support at a glance. The longer
Meredith, Early Chicago, A Compendium of the Early History of Chicago to the Year 1835 when the
Indians left. River Forest, Ill.: Early Chicago, Inc., 2000, 406.
16
Captain Heald’s Official Report of the Evacuation of Fort Dearborn to Gen. Thomas H. Cushing in
Quaife, Chicago and the Old Northwest, 1673–1835. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press,
2001, 407.
17
Clyde Tucker and Brian Kojetin and Roderick Harrison, “A Statistical Analysis of the CPS
Supplement on Race and Ethnic Origin,” Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bureau of the Census, Table 4, p
18. www.census.gov/prod/2/gen/96arc/ivatuck.pdf. Accessed Jan. 8, 2012.
18
John K. Mahon, The War of 1812. Gainesville, Fla.: University of Florida Press, 1972), 15, 19, 134,
285-287; Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., “These Lands Are Ours,” American Heritage, Vol. 12, No. 5, (Aug.
1961), 83. William Henry Harrison to Secretary of War, June 26, 1810, in Logan Esarey, editor,
Messages and Letters of William Henry Harrison, Vol. I. New York: Arno Press, 1975, 433–36.
19
Quaife, Chicago and the Old Northwest, “Captain Heald’s Official Report of the Evacuation of Fort
Dearborn,” 406-408; Judge A. B. Woodward to British General Proctor, Oct. 8, 1812, in Clarence M.
Burton, “The Fort Dearborn Massacre,” Magazine of History with Notes and Queries, Vol. XV, No. 2 ,
86-88. American death toll, see also “Author’s Note,” in Crimmins, Fort Dearborn, 418.
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version of these citations will be in the notes.
After this summary, we will discuss Quaife’s criticisms in detail.
Summary of the Fort Dearborn Massacre
1. Trouble between Indians and whites in the area around Fort Dearborn in 1812 begins
in April with Indians killing two white workers at the Leigh Farm, four miles from the fort. This is
found in Wau-Bun and in Army Captain Nathan Heald’s letter to William Wells, April 15, 1812;
and John Lalime’s letter to William Wells, April 13, 1812. Heald was commander of Fort
Dearborn. 20
2. Civilians fortify the Indian Agency building just outside the fort as a place for the
civilians to live during the Indian trouble. In Wau-Bun and Letter of Capt. Heald to Wells, April
15, 1812. 21
3. Indians stage more harassment attacks on the grounds of the fort and its livestock. In
Wau-Bun and Letters of Capt. Heald to Porter Hanks, July 12, 1812, and July 13, 1812. 22
4. In mid-June, John Kinzie the Indian trader who is also sutler or civilian supplier to the
fort, kills the fort's Indian interpreter, in a fight. Kinzie is wounded. NOT FOUND IN WAU-BUN.
Described in A.T. Andreas, History of Chicago from the Earliest Period to the Present Time
and elsewhere. 23
5. In early August, six weeks after Congress declared that the U.S. was at war with
Great Britain in the War of 1812, an Indian messenger arrives at Fort Dearborn with a note
from General Hull ordering or proposing the evacuation of Fort Dearborn and ordering or
suggesting that the goods in the fort be distributed to the Indians. In Wau-Bun, Capt. Heald’s
official report of October 23, 1812, and Lt. Linai T. Helm’s account. Helm was second in
command under Capt. Heald. 24
6. John Kinzie disagrees with Capt. Heald on what the garrison and civilians should do
20
Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, 157–163. Letter of Capt. Nathan Heald to William Wells, April 15,
1812; and Letter of John Lalime to William Wells, April 13, 1812, both in the Draper Mss., State
Historical Society of Wisconsin, 26S45–50.
21
Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, 162-163. Also Capt. Heald to Wells, April 15, 1812, Draper Mss.
26S45–50.
22
Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, 163. Letters of Capt. Heald to Porter Hanks, July 12, 1812 and July
13, 1812; E. A. Cruikshank, editor, Documents Relating to the Invasion of Canada and the Surrender
of Detroit 1812. Ottawa, Government Printing Bureau, 1912, 54–55.
23
Andreas, A. T., History of Chicago from the Earliest Period to the Present Time. Chicago, 1884,
Vol. I, 73–74, 105, 164.
24
Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, 163–65. Quaife, Chicago and the Old Northwest, “Captain Heald’s
Official Report of the Evacuation of Fort Dearborn,” 406–8. And Lt. Linai T. Helm’s account in
Clarence M. Burton, “The Fort Dearborn Massacre,” Magazine of History with Notes and Queries,
Vol. XV, No. 3 (March, 1912): 91.
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in response to the order. In Wau-Bun and in John Kinzie’s narrative. 25
7. Heald decides to give the Indians the property of the fort and the goods from the
government trading post in return for the Indians' promise to escort the garrison peacefully
during the evacuation; PLUS, Heald will give the Indians a reward at the end of the journey. In
Wau-Bun and John Kinzie’s Narrative and also in Darius Heald’s account. 26
8. Heald allegedly tells the Indians he will give them the fort's ammunition, too, and
shows it to the Indians to demonstrate his intent. In Wau-Bun, John Kinzie’s Narrative, and
partially in Lt. Helm’s account. 27
9. Around 500 Indians, principally Potawatomi, gather from near and far, in part
because of the large giveaway expected. In Wau-Bun, Lt. Helm’s account, and Capt. Heald’s
official report of October 23, 1812. 28
10. Former Army captain William Wells arrives from Fort Wayne with some Miami
Indians to help escort the garrison and civilians on their evacuation. In Wau-Bun, Lt. Helm’s
account and in Capt. Heald’s official report of October 23, 1812. 29
11. Kinzie talks Capt. Heald out of his alleged plan to give the fort's ammunition to the
Indians. In Wau-Bun, John Kinzie’s Narrative, and Lt. Helm’s account. 30
12. Residents of the fort and vicinity throw most of the ammunition and Kinzie's whiskey
into a well and into the Chicago River. In Wau-Bun and Capt. Heald’s official report. 31
13. Indians are angered because of the destruction of the ammunition and the whiskey.
In Wau-Bun and Letter of Thomas Forsyth, September 7, 1812. 32
14. The night before the evacuation, a Potawatomi chief, Black Partridge, warns Capt.
Heald that the Indians will attack the soldiers and civilians as they evacuate. In Wau-Bun, Lt.
25
Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, 164-165. Also Mentor L. Williams, “John Kinzie’s Narrative of the Fort
Dearborn Massacre,” Journal of the Illinois State Historical Society, 46 (1953), 347–348.
26
Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, 168. Williams, “John Kinzie’s Narrative of the Fort Dearborn
Massacre,” 348. And Darius Heald in Draper Mss., 23S56, Reel 50.
27
Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, 168. Williams, “John Kinzie’s Narrative of the Fort Dearborn
Massacre,” 348. Lt. Helm’s account in Burton, “The Fort Dearborn Massacre,” 91.
28
Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, 174, and Lt. Helm’s account in Burton, “The Fort Dearborn Massacre,”
91, and Quaife, Chicago and the Old Northwest, “Captain Heald’s Official Report of the Evacuation of
Fort Dearborn,” 406–8.
29
Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, 170. And Quaife, Chicago and the Old Northwest, “Captain Heald’s
Official Report of the Evacuation of Fort Dearborn,” 406–8.
30
Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, 169. Williams, “John Kinzie’s Narrative of the Fort Dearborn
Massacre,” 348. Lt. Helm’s account in Burton, “The Fort Dearborn Massacre,” 91.
31
Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, 169-170. Quaife, Chicago and the Old Northwest, “Captain Heald’s
Official Report of the Evacuation of Fort Dearborn,” 406–8.
32
Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, 170. And Letter of Thomas Forsyth, Sept. 7, 1812, in Clarence Edwin
Carter and John Porter Bloom, editors, The Territorial Papers of the United States. Washington, D.C.:
U. S. Government Printing Office, Vol. 16, 262.
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Helm’s account, and Sgt. Griffith’s account. 33
15. The evacuation from the fort begins at 9 a.m. August 15, 1812. In Wau-Bun and
Capt. Heald’s official report. 34
16. When the march of the soldiers and civilians south on the beach of Lake Michigan
reaches sand hills that separate the prairie from the beach, the soldiers and civilians are on the
beach, and the hostile Indians are behind the sand hills. 35 (The scene is today at about at 18th
Street and Calumet Avenue.) In Wau-Bun and Henry R. Schoolcraft’s interview with John
Kinzie.
17. Wells warns the marchers that the Indians are about to attack. He says the soldiers
should prepare to charge. In Wau-Bun and John Kinzie’s Narrative. 36
18. The Indians fire at the evacuees from behind the sand hills and the soldiers charge
up the sand hills. In Wau-Bun, John Kinzie’s Narrative, and Darius Heald’s account. 37
19. In the fight, the soldiers pursue some, but not all, of the Indians west onto the prairie
and away from the lake and the women and children. As the soldiers are reduced to 28, they
pause on a small rise. In Wau-Bun and in Capt. Heald’s official report. 38
20. The small Miami escort that came with William Wells flees. In Wau-Bun, John
Kinzie’s narrative, and in part in Capt. Heald’s official report. 39
21. Black Partridge carries or drags Margaret Helm, Kinzie's stepdaughter, into Lake
Michigan up to her neck and holds here there until the shooting dies down. In Wau-Bun, in
Harriet Martineau’s interview with the Kinzies, and Charles Askin’s diary. 40
22. A young Indian climbs into a wagon and kills 12 children who were in the
33
Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, 171. And Lt. Helm’s account in Burton, “The Fort Dearborn Massacre,”
94. Sgt. Griffith’s account in Robert B. McAfee, History of the Late War in the Western Country.
Lexington, Ky.: Worsley and Smith, 1816, 113–14.
34
Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, 173. Also, Quaife, Chicago and the Old Northwest, “Captain Heald’s
Official Report of the Evacuation of Fort Dearborn,” 406.
35
Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, 174. And Henry R. Schoolcraft, Narrative Journal of Travels from
Detroit Northwest through the Great Chain of American Lakes to the Sources of the Mississippi River
in the Year 1821. Albany, NY: E. & E. Hosford, 1821, 391.
36
Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, 174. And Williams, “John Kinzie’s Narrative of the Fort Dearborn
Massacre,” 349.
37
Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, 174. And Williams, “John Kinzie’s Narrative of the Fort Dearborn
Massacre,” 349. Also, Darius Heald interview with Lyman Draper in Draper Mss., 23S45.
38
Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, 179. Also, Quaife, Chicago and the Old Northwest, “Captain Heald’s
Official Report of the Evacuation of Fort Dearborn,” 406–408.
39
Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, 175. Williams, “John Kinzie’s Narrative of the Fort Dearborn
Massacre,” 352. And Quaife, Chicago and the Old Northwest, “Captain Heald’s Official Report of the
Evacuation of Fort Dearborn,” 406–408.
40
Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, 176-177. Also, Harriet Martineau, Society in America, Vol. I. London:
Saunders and Otley, 1837, 354. And Diary of Charles Askin in Milo Milton Quaife, “Notes and
Documents, the Fort Dearborn Massacre,” The Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. I, June 1914
to March 1915, 563–565.
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evacuation. In Wau-Bun and John Kinzie’s narrative; the number of children killed is in Capt.
Heald’s report. 41
23. William Wells is killed. In Wau-Bun and Darius Heald’s account. 42
24. The surviving soldiers surrender and the massacre ends. In Wau-Bun, Capt. Heald’s
account, and Lt. Helm’s account. 43
25. The next day when more Indians arrive, the new arrivals threaten to kill the Kinzie
family, too, but Billy Caldwell, also known as Sauganash, saves the Kinzies. In Wau-Bun and
in essence in the interview with William Caldwell, Billy’s Brother, and also in Alexander
Robinson’s account, and with some details verified, although not Caldwell’s role, in John
Kinzie’s Narrative. 44
All these incidents except John Kinzie killing the interpreter, John Lalime are in WauBun. The fact that John Kinzie's daughter-in-law did not publicize the killing of Lalime that was
embarrassing to her family is no surprise. Kinzie, accused of murder by some, was acquitted in
absentia in a trial held by the officers after he fled. He then returned prior to the evacuation of
Fort Dearborn. 45
In one out of the 25 incidents above, Wau-Bun tells one version and the other major
source tells a far different version. This is the description of the killing of William Wells. The
extensive details of Wells' death as described in Wau-Bun 46 and the details as described by
Capt. Heald's wife, 47 who is also Wells' niece, are too different to be reconciled. No other
survivor describes Wells' death in such a wealth of detail as these two accounts do, so these
two different versions must remain unresolved.
The remaining 23 incidents, all from Wau-Bun, are also found in various other accounts
written by people who were there, or by other contemporaries, or written down by those who
interviewed the participants. Fifteen of those primary and secondary sources are listed above,
and there are more. These various accounts of the massacre and events leading up to it differ
from each other and from Wau-Bun in some details. We must recall that the number of details
recorded must be in the thousands.
In summary, of the 24 incidents listed above that are found in Wau-Bun, 23 of them are
41
Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, 179. And Williams, “John Kinzie’s Narrative of the Fort Dearborn
Massacre,” 349. Quaife, Chicago and the Old Northwest, “Captain Heald’s Official Report of the
Evacuation of Fort Dearborn,” 406–408.
42
Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, 179–180. And Darius Heald to Draper in Draper Mss., 23S46–49.
43
Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, 178–179. And Quaife, Chicago and the Old Northwest, “Captain
Heald’s Official Report of the Evacuation of Fort Dearborn,” 407. . And Lt. Helm’s account in Burton,
“The Fort Dearborn Massacre,” 92.
44
Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, 183-186. And Williams, “John Kinzie’s Narrative of the Fort Dearborn
Massacre,” 351. Compare Kinzie to William Caldwell, Jr. interview with Lyman Draper in Draper Mss.
17S212 and 213, and Alexander Robinson to Draper in Draper Mss., 21S283.
45
Andreas, History of Chicago, Vol. I, pp. 74 , 164.
46
Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, 179–80.
47
Draper Ms. 23S46–49. And Joseph Kirkland, The Chicago Massacre of 1812. Chicago, Ill.: Dibble
Pub. Co., 1893, 31–38.
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corroborated in general terms, and often in many details, in at least one and often two
contemporary accounts. The reader can begin to judge for herself or himself whether WauBun’s description of the massacre is fiction.
There are even more incidents from the massacre found in Wau-Bun that are also
supported in other primary and secondary documents that this author is leaving out here for
reasons of space.
Milo Milton Quaife’s Criticisms of Wau-Bun
Now let us consider Quaife’s criticisms of the accuracy of Wau-Bun one by one.
Central to the description of some of the actual events of the massacre in Wau-Bun is
the account told by Margaret Helm, the author's sister-in-law, who was in the midst of the battle
and who was also the step-daughter of John Kinzie. John Kinzie was the most prominent
Indian trader in the area at the time and, as noted above, was the sutler, or civilian supplier, to
Fort Dearborn.
Quaife says Margaret Helm “could not have played the part in (the battle) which is
ascribed to her.” He adds, “There is some reason for thinking that she was temperamentally
incapable of accurately describing such an affair.”
Quaife seems to be referring to the fact that she was female and 17 years old at the
time.
Margaret Helm is the center of one of the most controversial incidents in Wau-Bun, the
account of the Potawatomi Indian Chief Black Partridge hauling Margaret Helm deep into the
lake during the massacre to protect her from the flying bullets and musket balls. This rescue is
the subject of the monument that commemorates the massacre, a sculpture that once stood
from 1893 to 1931 at 18th Street and Calumet Avenue, at the massacre site. The sculpture,
created by Carl Rohl-Smith, is artistically magnificent and reasonably accurate for an artwork
that attempts to be a symbol of a larger event. In 1931, the monument was moved to the
Chicago Historical Society where it stood in the lobby until the 1970s. It was then given away
by the Chicago Historical Society and was moved to a small park south of the Glessner House,
1800 S. Prairie Ave., once again at approximately the massacre site. The statue was
subsequently removed by the Office of Public Art of the Chicago Department of Cultural Affairs
and placed in storage. 48
In Milo Quaife’s 1912 article, which has prejudiced historians against Wau-Bun ever
since, Quaife says of Margaret Helm's rescue by Black Partridge, “I venture to suggest it
seems altogether too good to be true.” Quaife adds, “the story of Mrs. Helm's romantic rescue
by Black Partridge is probably largely fictitious ….”
He repeats this assertion in his later, 1913 book, Chicago and the Old Northwest,
saying again, “Yet it may well be doubted whether the event as described by Mrs. Kinzie in
Wau-Bun ever actually occurred.”49
48
Ulrich Danckers and Jane Meredith, Early Chicago (2011), “Monuments … Fort Dearborn
Massacre.” http://www.earlychicago.com/monuments.php?letter=F. Accessed 8/31/11.
49
Quaife, Chicago and the Old Northwest, 387.
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Statue of Black Partridge saving Margaret Helm (Courtesy Chicago History Museum)
In Wau-Bun, the story of the rescue of Margaret Helm by Black Partridge is short.
Margaret Helm is speaking. “At this moment, a young Indian raised his tomahawk at me. By
springing aside, I partially avoided the blow, which was intended for my skull, but which
alighted on my shoulder. I seized him around the neck, and while exerting my utmost efforts to
get possession of his scalping knife, which hung in a scabbard over his breast, I was dragged
from his grasp by another and older Indian.
“The latter bore me struggling and resisting towards the lake.” She says she passed the
body of the fort's surgeon who had been tomahawked.
“I was immediately plunged into the water and held there with a forcible hand,
notwithstanding my resistance. I soon perceived, however, that the object of my captor was not
to drown me, for he held me firmly in such a position as to place my head above water. This
reassured me, and, regarding him attentively, I soon recognized, in spite of the paint with
which he was disguised, The Black Partridge.
“When the fighting had nearly subsided, my preserver bore me from the water and
conducted me up the sand banks.” 50
That’s it.
Quaife notes that this rescue is not mentioned in a second-hand account of the
massacre by Henry R. Schoolcraft, who passed through Chicago in 1820 and stayed with the
Kinzie family. Schoolcraft said he got his information from John Kinzie and from Capt. Heald's
50
Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, 176–77.
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official report. 51
Quaife did not know it, but there was another interview with John Kinzie recorded in
1820, which was lost until 1953, which truly seemed to support Quaife’s idea that Margaret
Helm's rescue story was fictitious. Here, interviewed by Captain David Bates Douglass, Kinzie
says, “A Potawatamie now came forward & after taking my gun offered to take us to a place of
safety, but my daughter thinking his intentions hostile ran at first into the Lake but soon
returned.” 52 Let’s call this the second version of Margaret Helm in the lake.
In 1912, Quaife was aware there was another version of the rescue of Margaret Helm
published in brief in 1837 by Harriet Martineau in her book, Society in America. Martineau
visited the Midwest in 1835. In Martineau's version, she does not say who told her the rescue
story. The circumstances Martineau describes suggest it is probably Juliette Kinzie. The
Martineau version precedes the publication of Juliette Kinzie’s story of the Chicago massacre
by seven years.
(Juliette Kinzie’s Narrative of the Massacre at Chicago, August 15, 1812 and of Some
Preceding Events, was originally published anonymously in 1844. With some changes, this
narrative was included in Juliette Kinzie’s book Wau-Bun, first published in 1856. 53)
For the reader of this article, struggling over the details of the alleged rescue of a young
woman by an Indian chief 200 years ago may seem to carry small promise of benefit to history.
But there is a very good detective story here. By examining the details like a detective, we will
check the accuracy of one of Chicago’s earliest and potentially most important source
documents. And this reported incident that we are checking did lead to a civic monument in
Chicago that was honored for decades.
Here is Martineau’s version of the rescue of Margaret Helm. Let’s call this the third
version:
“A painted Indian in warlike costume came leaping up to her and seized her horse, as
she supposed, to murder her. She fought him vigorously, and he bore it without doing her any
injury. He spoke, but she could not understand him. Another frightful savage came up, and the
two led her horse to the lake, and into it, in spite of her resistance, till the water reached their
chins. She concluded that they meant to drown her; but they contented themselves with
holding her on horse until the massacre was over, when they led her out in safety.” 54
In Wau-Bun, Margaret Helm starts out the battle on her horse. By the time of the
rescue, she seems to be on foot. As she says in Wau-Bun, “By springing aside, I partially
avoided the blow which alighted on my shoulder.” If Margaret were mounted on her horse in
the lake up to her chin, this would seem to leave the horse entirely underwater.
Due to lack of quotes and lack of he-said-she-said in Martineau’s version, we can't tell if
somebody said Margaret was on a horse when Black Partridge hauled her into the lake, or if
Martineau just assumed this because Margaret was on a horse when the battle began.
51
Schoolcraft, Narrative Journal of Travels from Detroit Northwest, 392–93.
Williams, “John Kinzie’s Narrative of the Fort Dearborn Massacre,” 350.
53
Louise Phelps Kellog, Introduction to Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun. Portage, Wis.: The National
Society of the Colonial Dames of America in the State of Wisconsin, 1989, XIX.
54
Harriet Martineau, Society in America, Vol. I. London: Saunders and Otley, 1837, 354.
52
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Martineau dashes off the story quickly in her own voice.
Now to the fourth version, which became the first reported support for this incident from
someone else who was there. In 1882 Nehemiah Matson was the author of Pioneers of Illinois,
published by Knight & Leonard Printers, Chicago. In it, Matson says, “While in East St. Louis a
short time ago, I heard of an old lady by the name of Besson, who was one of the captives at
the Chicago massacre, and is probably the only one now living.” 55 This old lady, he writes, was
born Mary Lee, a daughter of the Lee Family whose home was where the Cultural Center is
today just south of the site of the fort. 56 The correct spelling of the family is Leigh, and we will
use that spelling here. 57
Mary Leigh was 12 at the time of the massacre, according to Matson. Her three brothers
were killed in the massacre, and her sister, Lillie, age 10 in Matson's account and age 12 in
Wau-Bun, was also killed.
Three of the Leighs survived, including Mary, and were taken captive by the Indians. 58
“In Mrs. Kinzie's account of the Chicago massacre,” Matson writes, “an incident is
related of Black Partridge saving the life of Mrs. Helm, wife of Lieutenant Helm, and stepdaughter of John Kinzie. This story equals, if not surpasses, the most extravagant flights of
romance, but its truth is confirmed by a person now living, Mrs. Besson (Mary Leigh) who was
present at the time….”
Matson then relates the rescue of Margaret Helm in a way that suggests he is taking
much of it from Wau-Bun but changing the wording. He adds that Margaret received a
“ghastly” tomahawk wound in her shoulder, although neither Margaret nor any of the Kinzies
ever claimed this. Matson also says Margaret was “thrown from her horse at the
commencement of the battle.” 59
One of Matson's weaknesses is that like Martineau he does not use attributions, such
as, “according to Mrs. Besson,” or “according to Wau-Bun” to separate the elements of the
story. He seems to want to tell a good story, but gives no source for Margaret Helm’s “ghastly
wound.”
We can't tell who said Margaret was thrown from her horse before her rescue, or if
Matson just added that himself. In Wau-Bun, Margaret Helm says in her own words that at the
start of the shooting, “Our horses pranced and bounded, and could hardly be restrained as the
balls whistled among them.” 60
It may help here to note that in Juliette Kinzie’s original telling of this story in Narrative of
the Massacre at Chicago, she said of Margaret, “in the engagement, she received a slight
55
N. Matson, Pioneers of Illinois, Containing a Series of Sketches of Events that Occurred Previous to
1813. Chicago: Knight & Leonard, Printers, 1882, 245–47.
56
Jerry Crimmins, Fort Dearborn, a Novel. Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 2006,
endnote, 361–62.
57
Rev. William Barry Mss., Chicago Historical Society, Transcript of names in John Kinzie’s account
books kept at Chicago from 1804 to 1822; entries from October 1809 and September
30, 1810.
58
Matson, 259–260. And Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, 191.
59
Matson, 245–47.
60
Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, 175.
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wound in the ankle and had her horse shot under her.” 61
What is impossible to ignore in Matson is that he says Mrs. Besson (Mary Leigh)
confirmed the rescue of Margaret Helm by Black Partridge. 62 The reliability of Matson's
statement that Mrs. Besson verified this story is strengthened by the fact that he adds all sorts
of details about the number of children in the Leigh family and their ages and the description of
the horse that Mrs. Besson's sister, Lillie rode, and the clothes that Lillie wore on the day of the
evacuation of Fort Dearborn. Years ago, I would have been tempted to say that the description
of Lillie's clothes and acts when the evacuation began could not have been related by her
sister almost 60 years later. 63 Author Matson's flowery style is obvious there. On the other
hand, over the years, I have read numerous accounts of World II soldiers who are just as
detailed in their stated recollections decades later, even of training exercises.
Matson's story says Lillie was tied to the saddle to prevent her from falling off. Wau-Bun
says the same. But Matson’s story is strengthened by the fact that Matson then completely
contradicts Wau-Bun when he says who killed Lillie Leigh. Thus Matson indicates again he has
independent information.
Wau-Bun says Black Partridge killed Lillie Leigh in a mercy killing after the battle
because she was grievously wounded. 64 Matson, who says he got his information from Mrs.
Besson (Lillie's sister, Mary Leigh), says another Indian killed Lillie. Matson writes, “Waupekee,
a chief who had often been at Lee's house and trotted little Lillie on his knee, was much
grieved to see her thus wounded, as he loved the child as though she were his own daughter.
On examining Lillie's wound and finding it mortal the chief put an end to her suffering with a
stroke of his tomahawk, saying afterward it was the hardest thing he ever did…..” 65
There is no way Matson accidentally mixed up Waupekee and Black Partridge here.
Much of Matson’s longer story in Pioneers of Illinois is devoted to the deeds of Black Partridge,
always using the name Black Partridge.
Now we come to the fifth and clinching version of this story of Margaret Helm and how
she got into the lake. This is the version that made Milo Quaife do a little-noticed retraction two
years after he denounced Wau-Bun. This very brief version of the rescue caused Quaife to
61
Juliette Augusta (Magill) Kinzie, Narrative of the Massacre at Chicago, (Saturday) August 15, 1812
and of Some Preceding Events, Second Edition, Fergus Historical Series No. 30. Chicago, Ill: Fergus
Printing Co., 1914, 43. This is a reprint of the first edition from 1844.
62
In Nehemiah Matson's account, another possible weakness is that he says, as Wau-Bun does, that
the father of the Leigh family was killed in the massacre. A different source, a letter of Thomas
Forsyth, John Kinzie's half-brother, of July 20, 1813, states that, "The late James Leigh who fell in the
battle on 22nd January last [i.e., the Battle of the River Raisin on January 22, 1813] under Genl
Winchester was absent at Mackinac when that fatal event took place at Chicagou." See Tom Forsyth
to William Clark, July 20, 1813, “Letters sent by William Clark, letters received from Indian agents,” in
Records of the United States Superintendency of Indian Affairs, St. Louis. Topeka, Kansas: Kansas
State Historical Society, Vol. 2, 10.
63
Matson, 259.
64
Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, 191.
65
Matson, 260.
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accept that this story in Wau-Bun was a legitimate event. This version is also one of the first
accounts of the Fort Dearborn Massacre ever recorded. It was buried until Quaife discovered it
more than a century later.
On September 22, 1812, only five weeks after the massacre, Charles Askin in
Sandwich, Canada, just across the river from Detroit, wrote a fairly detailed story of the Fort
Dearborn Massacre in his diary. Charles Askin's diary ended up in the archives of Canada.
There, Milo M. Quaife found the diary in 1914.
The date of Askin’s diary entry is the very day that Capt. Heald and his wife, Rebekah,
on their long journey fleeing Chicago after their rescue from the Indians, arrived in Sandwich,
Canada. Askin writes, “they arrived at Sandwich this eveng Tuesday 22d Sept. '12.”66 When
Quaife introduces his discovery of the Askin diary, Quaife says that Askin got his information
from Capt. Heald. Clearly, Askin heard Rebekah Heald’s experiences, too.
Right after Askin describes the killing of William Wells, presumably heard from Rebekah
Heald with details that are corroborated in other accounts, Askin tells another episode of the
massacre.
Askin says: “Mrs. Helmes the step daughter of Mr. Kenzie an Indian Trader & the Wife
of an American Officer was saved by an Indian who kept her up to her head in Water during
the action and stood between her & the balls which were flying very thick.”
Margaret's rescue by an Indian and the manner of it is recorded here only five weeks
after the massacre based on what the Healds said when they arrived in Sandwich. It
corroborates much of the Wau-Bun version of Margaret Helm's rescue that was first published
in 1844, 32 years later.
Quaife had denounced the Wau-Bun version as “too good to be true” in 1912 and had
pronounced Margaret Helm as “temperamentally incapable” of accurately describing the
events. The retraction he wrote in 1914 is as small as possible, but definite.
In a footnote to the article in which he introduces John Askin's diary, Quaife wrote:
“This was the rescue of Mrs. Helm by Black Partridge, which has been made the
dominant theme of the massacre monument. The present narrative invalidates the inferences
suggested by the writer in his treatment of the subject two years ago.” 67 Quaife is referring to
his inferences that this incident was false.
The true value of Quaife’s action here is that he introduced Charles Askin’s diary to
history and he shows that it compares it favorably it to the Wau-Bun version of the massacre.
Many years later, Mrs. Heald’s son, Darius, who was born after the massacre but heard
the story from his mother, said his mother did not see the rescue of Margaret. This is probably
also true. An awful lot was going on around her, lives being ended moment by moment, and
Mrs. Heald was shot five or six times.
According to Capt. Heald’s own diary, the Healds were spirited away from Chicago the
day after the massacre. Thus, the Healds heard of this rescue of Margaret Helm and accepted
it as true within 24 hours of the massacre, while everyone was still in incredible shock and long
66
Extract from a Diary Kept by Charles Askin, in Quaife’s “Notes and Documents, The Fort Dearborn
Massacre,” 561–65.
67
Ibid, 564.
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before people might start spinning yarns about the past. 68
With that controversial element of Wau-Bun supported by other primary and secondary
sources, we will now examine what Quaife argued were of the most troublesome elements of
Wau-Bun. These are the differences between the account in Wau-Bun on the conduct of Capt.
Nathan Heald, commander of the fort, and the account by Capt. Heald’s own family.
As Quaife wrote in his 1912 article denouncing Wau-Bun, “Let us now consider Mrs.
Kinzie's account of Captain Heald's amazing stupidity respecting the hostile attitude of the
Indians.” 69 When he refers to “amazing stupidity,” Quaife is being sarcastic. Quaife supported
Heald’s actions.
Quaife adds that Wau-Bun, “the Kinzie family narrative … does gross injustice to Capt
Heald” because Heald was determined to evacuate the fort, supposedly against John Kinzie’s
business interests and advice. Kinzie lost his merchandise and lost his trading post at Chicago
for four years when Chicago was evacuated. For this reason, at least according to Quaife, the
Kinzie family was forever after hostile to Capt. Heald. 70
The agreed circumstances are these: Capt. Heald led just over 50 soldiers, including
himself, and 41 civilians including 18 children, the vast majority of them all on foot, out of the
protection of Fort Dearborn on a march intended to go to Fort Wayne, Ind., or Detroit, during a
war. 71 In this war, the Indians were allied with Great Britain against the United States. Heald
was aware, based on his own report, that 400 to 500 armed Indian warriors were outside the
fort, up 10 times the amount of soldiers Heald had. 72 Capt. Heald put his faith in some of the
Indians who had said they would escort the soldiers and civilians safely to Fort Wayne. 73 This
much is agreed to by Quaife in his book, Chicago and the Old Northwest.
As we will show here, Heald knew that many Indians, including those on the Illinois
River, were at war with the United States. His letters show he was also well informed—and
Heald had informed others—of the hostility of the Indians and of months of Indian attacks that
led to killings of American civilians very near the fort and also in the surrounding territories.
Quaife glosses over some of Heald’s documented knowledge of the hostility of many of
the Midwestern Indians.
I will list here Quaife’s arguments against Wau-Bun’s account of Capt. Heald's behavior.
Then I will compare Quaife's arguments to the documentary evidence of that time.
Quaife’s position is that Wau-Bun’s accusations against Heald stem only from Kinzie
family animosity. Wau-Bun alleges with considerable detail that Capt. Heald’s trust in the
Indians was foolish and misguided. 74
68
Darius Heald in Draper Mss. 23S46–49, and 23S55. Also see Nathan Heald’s Journal in Draper
Mss., 17U34.
69
Quaife, “Some Notes on the Fort Dearborn Massacre,” 126.
70
Ibid, 117, 124. Also for Kinzie not returning for four years, Andreas, History of Chicago, Vol. I, 74.
71
Quaife, Chicago and the Old Northwest, 429.
72
Captain Heald’s Official Report of the Evacuation of Fort Dearborn, in Quaife, Chicago and the Old
Northwest, 407.
73
Quaife, Chicago and the Old Northwest, 218–220, and also see footnote 589 on that page.
74
Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, Wau-Bun, 165–171.
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Quaife points out that Capt. Heald in his first official report on the massacre, said the
Indians “conducted themselves with the strictest propriety till after I left the fort.” Quaife also
quotes the account of Capt. Heald's son, Darius, who was born sometime after the battle. In
relating his parents’ memories, Darius Heald stated that the fort was evacuated quietly, “not a
cross word being passed between soldiers and Indians.” 75 Wau-Bun asserts that the hundreds
of Indians outside were hostile.
For a start, let us compare Quaife’s view and Capt. Heald’s view of the Indians’ actions
and the Indians’ mood to a description from a neutral source: Private James Corbin. Corbin,
who was a soldier at Fort Dearborn from its founding to its demise, stated that on the day
before the evacuation:
“The conduct of the Indians around us had excited fears that all was not well; an indian
that day shot at and wounded an ox that was to assist in drawing the baggage, very near the
captain, and we had great fears on account of the Prophet's indians who we knew were
between us and Fort Wayne.” 76 [Emphasis mine.]
The next description is from a non-neutral source, Lt. Linai T. Helm, second in
command at the fort and John Kinzie's son-in-law. (After the massacre, Helm and Heald were
exceedingly critical of each other in written statements.)
In April, “Mr. Kinzie sent in a letter from interior of the Indian country to inform Captain
Heald that the Indians were hostile inclined, and only waiting the Declaration of War to
commence open Hostilities. . . . [omitting some of the narrative] Capt. William Wells arrived
from Fort Wayne on the 12th August (3 days before the massacre) with 27 Miamis, and after a
council being held by him with the tribes then assembled to amount of 500 warriors, 179
women and children, he after counsel declared them hostile and that his opinion was that they
would interrupt us on our route. … Wells demanded of Captain Heald if he intended to
evacuate, his answer was he would.” 77
A neutral source, Sgt. William Griffith, who became the fort's Indian interpreter after
Lalime, stated that the night before the evacuation, Black Partridge warned Capt. Heald that if
the garrison and civilians marched out of the fort, the Indians would attack them. This warning
by Black Partridge is also described by Lt. Helm. (It’s also in Wau-Bun.) 78
How about in the weeks leading up to the evacuation? Were the Indians hostile then?
We will briefly list some descriptions of the mood of the Indians found in letters written from
Fort Dearborn in 1812, including in Capt. Heald’s own letters.
John Lalime, the fort's official Indian interpreter, who would be killed in June in a fight
with John Kinzie two months before the massacre, wrote a letter in April 1812 to describe the
killing of two white men by Indians at the Leigh Farm, four miles from Fort Dearborn. Lalime
75
Quaife, “Some Notes on the Fort Dearborn Massacre,” 127.
M.M. Quaife, Thomas Forsyth, “The Story of James Corbin, a Soldier of Fort Dearborn,” The
Mississippi Valley Historical Review, Vol. 3, Issue 2 (Sept. 1916): 222.
77
Lt. Helm’s account in Burton, “The Fort Dearborn Massacre,” 91.
78
Ibid, 94. Also see Sgt. Griffith in Robert M. McAfee, History of the Late War in the Western Country,
originally published in 1816; Reprint, Bowling Green, Ohio: Historical Publications Company, 1919,
113–114. Also Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, 171.
76
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was writing to William Wells at Fort Wayne. Lalime states, “The Pottawattomies in this quarter
are for war.” 79
The following are extracts from Capt. Heald’s own letters of 1812, beginning in
February:
Capt. Heald’s letter of February 7, 1812:
“An express arrived at this post on the 1st instant from General Clark. He was sent for
the purpose of finding out the disposition of the Indians; he was a Frenchman and well
acquainted with the Indians. He told me that the Indians on the Illinois were hostile disposed
towards the United States, and that the war between the Indians and white people had just
commenced, alluding to the late battle on the Wabash.”80
(Capt. Heald means the Battle of Tippecanoe, November 7, 1811, between U.S. militia
and U.S. Army and the Indians, including Potawatomi.)
Capt. Heald’s letter of March 11, 1812:
“I have been informed, and believe it to be true, that the Winnebagoes have lately
attacked some traders on the Mississippi, near the lead mines; it is said they killed two
Americans and eat them up and took all their goods. … The Winnebagoes who escaped from
the Prophet’s town are still in this neighborhood.” 81
These lead mines were located at what we call today Galena, Illinois.
Capt. Heald's letter of April 15, 1812, four months before the massacre:
“The Indians have commenced hostilities in this quarter. On the 6th inst. a little before
the sun set, a party of eleven Indians, supposed to be Winnebagoes, came to Messrs. Russell
and Leigh’s cabin in a field on the Portage Branch of the Chicago River, about three miles from
the garrison, where they murdered two men. … Since the murder of these two men, one or
two parties of Indians have been lurking about us, but we have been so much on our guard
that they have not been able to get any scalps.” 82
Capt. Heald's letter of July 12, only a month before the massacre:
“The Indians have been a little troublesome to us since the Spring opened, but not half
so bad as you have been informed. They killed two Citizens about 3 Miles from the Garrison in
April, and have since that time killed many of our cattle and stole several horses. We are
somewhat confined to the Fort on account of the hostile disposition of the Winebagoes and
some of the Pottawattamees; and whenever we have occasion to send out 2 or 3 miles for
Wood or any other Article I take the precaution to send an armed party.” 83
The very next day, July 13, 1812, Heald wrote a letter stating that the night of July 12
79
Letter of John Lalime to William Wells, April 13, 1812, in Draper Mss., 26S49-50.
Extract of a letter from Capt Heald, dated Chicago, February 7, 1812, in American State Papers,
Class II, Indian Affairs, Vol. I. Washington, D.C.: Gales and Seaton, 1832, 806
81
Extract from a letter of N. Heald, Captain, dated Chicago, March 11, 1812, American State Papers,
Class II, Indian Affairs, Vol. I, 806.
82
Extract from a letter of Capt. N. Heald, dated Fort Dearborn, Chicago, April 15, 1812, in American
State Papers, Class II, Indian Affairs, Vol. I, 806.
83
Excerpt from a letter of Capt. N. Heald to Lieut. Porter Hanks at Mackinac, in Cruikshank, editor,
Documents Relating to The Invasion of Canada and the Surrender of Detroit, 54–55.
80
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Indians attacked Fort Dearborn’s livestock. Heald said he sent out a squad of soldiers who
exchanged fire with the Indians not “more than 70 or 80 yards from the Fort.” Heald adds, “I
suspect they are Pottawattamies.” 84
This was a month before the massacre. According to Capt. Heald’s own report on the
massacre, most of the hundreds of Indians who gathered outside the fort prior to the massacre
were Potawatomies. 85
Not counting the Battle of Tippecanoe, 46 Americans were killed by Indians in 1812
prior to the evacuation of Fort Dearborn in the places we call today Indiana, Illinois, Missouri
and Iowa. 86 Heald would have been aware of many of these killings. Fort Dearborn had
correspondence through express riders with Wells at Fort Wayne, with General William Clark
at St. Louis, both as shown above, and with the governor of the Illinois Territory, Ninian
Edwards, all of whom constantly reported back and forth about these matters.
For instance, Gov. Edwards told the Secretary of War in March 1812: “Sir, I have the
honor to inform you that I have this moment received communications from Chicago, Peoria
and Fort Madison, which leave no rational doubt of the decidedly hostile views of the major
part of the Indians between the Lakes and the Illinois and Mississippi Rivers. . . .” 87
The weight of the documentary evidence shows it was well known the Indians were
hostile before the evacuation. This is just as Wau-Bun describes.
Now let us examine another important argument of Quaife’s that he believed showed
Wau-Bun is unreliable. Quaife said Wau-Bun slanders Capt. Heald because “there existed at
the time of the massacre an antipathy on the part of John Kinzie toward Captain Heald.” In
another place, Quaife speaks of “hatred by Kinzie for the commander.” John Kinzie, of course,
is the father in law of Wau-Bun author Juliette Kinzie. 88
(John Kinzie’s supposed “hatred” of Heald is not found in any of the primary and
secondary sources about the massacre, or events leading up to it or the aftermath. Quaife
never cites any statement or action by Kinzie to back up this assertion.)
Let us compare this assertion by Quaife of Kinzie’s supposed hatred for Heald to a
number of sources, starting with John Kinzie's account:
After the massacre, “the remaining soldiers were distributed among the different chiefs
& there remained only Capt. H. to be disposed of—a subject which caused them some
discussion. They were inclined to take his life & indeed were emulous among themselves of
dispatching him as being the Chief on our side. . . . After the battle an Indian took me to see
the Capt. He [Capt. Heald] inquired anxiously after his wife & was much relieved by my
84
Letter of Capt. Heald to Lieut. Hanks, July 13, 1812, in Cruikshank, editor, Documents Relating to
The Invasion of Canada and the Surrender of Detroit, 55.
85
Captain Heald’s Official Report of the Evacuation of Fort Dearborn, in Quaife, Chicago and the Old
Northwest, 407.
86
John Sugden, Tecumseh: A Life. New York: Henry Holt and Co., 1997, 261.
87
Letter of Ninian Edwards to Secretary of War, March 23, 1812, in Ninian Edwards and William Wirt,
History of Illinois from 1778 to 1833, and Life and Times of Ninian Edwards. Springfield, Ill.: Illinois
State Journal Co., 1870, 311.
88
Quaife, “Some Notes on the Fort Dearborn Massacre,” 117 and 124.
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account of her wounds—said he apprehended danger from the Indians—they having stripped
him & wished me to devise some way of securing the money he had about him. [Note: Heald
had the money in his wamus, a type of underwear he wore that day under his uniform.] I
accordingly lent him my coat and after sufficient time for him to put the money in the pockets I
took it back. . . .
“In this state things remained with much anxiety for him on our part when a well
disposed Indian advised me to get him away or he would be killed. I then got a faithful fellow to
take Mrs. & Capt. Hill [Heald] to St. Joseph in his canoe, which he did though pursued 15 miles
by some of them—& Robinson the present interpreter took them thence to Mackinaw.” 89
The Heald family, in the accounts told later through their son, Darius, always credited
their rescue to Chandonnais, a man mostly Potawatomi and part French. 90 According to WauBun, Chandonnais was an employee of John Kinzie's. 91 According to a completely
independent source, a Mrs. Baird, Chandonnais was a member of the Kinzie household at
Chicago later—if he wasn’t already. 92
And a neutral source also says John Kinzie ransomed Capt. Heald. The following is
from Private James Corbin.
“The next morning [August 16, 1812] the indians having destroyed the fort by fire,
started with the remaining prisoners into the Illinois country, except Capt. Heil who was
purchased by our sutler John Kinsey an Englishman.”
Quaife contends that John Kinzie hated Capt. Heald. We see here that Kinzie ransomed
Capt. Heald. John Kinzie also arranged to get the Healds out of Chicago before the Indians
could change their minds about letting the Healds go. Kinzie’s account said this deed put his
own family in danger.
Another significant controversy involves Capt. Heald’s alleged promise to give the fort’s
ammunition to the Indians. Wau-Bun and two other accounts, John Kinzie's and Lt. Helm's, say
Heald did do this. All three of these accounts say Kinzie, or Kinzie and Wells together, finally
talked Heald out of it. Heald says it was his own idea not to give the ammunition to the Indians.
Despite the damaging nature of these allegations regarding Capt. Heald in Wau-Bun and
elsewhere, Quaife ignores this controversy. Because Quaife ignored it, we will not go into it
further beyond pointing it out here. 93
89
Williams, “John Kinzie’s Narrative of the Fort Dearborn Massacre,” 350–51.
Darius Heald to Draper in Draper Mss., 23S42 and 23S51–53 and 23S55.
91
Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, 181.
92
“Mrs. Baird’s excursion to Chicago, 1817,” in Milo Milton Quaife, editor, The Development of
Chicago, 1674–1914, Shown in a Series of Contemporary Original Narratives. Chicago, Ill.: Caxton
Club, 1916, 95. Available on Google Books at http://books.google.com/books?id=gN2KXClYo8C&pg=PA95&lpg=PA95&dq=Jean+Baptiste+Chandonnais&source=bl&ots=JM9dJ4i9LU&sig=Qc
2Wfg4C8l8k8BdCWURwnJxH46Q&hl=en&ei=rvRPTpLIEfLLsQKH0IiMBw&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=
result&resnum=4&ved=0CCoQ6AEwAw#v=onepage&q=Jean%20Baptiste%20Chandonnais&f=false;
accessed 8/20/11.
93
Williams, “John Kinzie’s Narrative of the Fort Dearborn Massacre,” 348. Lt. Helm’s account in
Burton, “The Fort Dearborn Massacre,” 91, and Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, 168–170. Capt. Heald
90
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Quaife's four other principal quarrels with the account of the Fort Dearborn Massacre in
Wau-Bun are these:
Number One: Wau-Bun describes an incident where Capt. Heald and John Kinzie held
a council with the Indians outside the walls of the fort three days prior to the evacuation.
According to Wau-Bun, the officers of the fort were warned in advance that the Indians
intended to kill the whites who attended this council. The officers refused to attend and instead
“opened the port holes and pointed the cannon so as to command the whole assembly. By this
means,” Wau-Bun says, “probably, the whites [Heald and Kinzie] who were present in the
council were preserved.” 94 Quaife argues that this story is an “effort to defame Capt. Heald”
that “succeeds only in revealing the prejudice which animates its author.” 95 Quaife offers no
alternative evidence to contradict this story whatsoever.
Number Two: Quaife accurately points out that the Heald family version of how
Rebekah Heald, Capt. Heald's wife, was initially rescued after the massacre is different from
the Wau-Bun version. In the Wau-Bun account, Eleanor Kinzie, from the Kinzie family boat
near the mouth of the Chicago River, where it enters Lake Michigan, sees Rebekah Heald,
wounded and on a horse, being led by an Indian back up the beach away from the battle.
(Eleanor Kinzie, her younger children, their nurse, and several Kinzie employees had planned
to evacuate Chicago by boat. Indians prevented this.) Eleanor Kinzie, according to Wau-Bun,
directs Chandonnai, “one of Mr. Kinzie’s clerks,” to “take the mule that is tied there and offer it”
for Mrs. Heald's release. Chandonnai does so and also tells the Indian that along with the
mule, he promises to deliver 10 bottles of whiskey if the Indian will release Mrs. Heald. The
Indian agrees to release Mrs. Heald to Chandonnai in the Wau-Bun account. Mrs. Heald is
carried to the Kinzie boat and placed under a buffalo robe and told to remain quiet because of
Indians approaching the boat. “The heroic woman remained perfectly quiet,” Wau-Bun says. 96
Quaife says in his article denouncing Wau-Bun, “we learn from the Darius Heald
narrative that there was no rescue of Mrs. Heald; that she (Mrs. Heald) was not near the mouth
of the river,” and that some other details in the Wau-Bun account of the initial rescue of Mrs.
Heald are also not mentioned by Darius Heald. 97 Quaife asserts that this shows Wau-Bun is
wrong.
It is true that Darius Heald's 1868 account of how his mother was ransomed does not
mention the Kinzies helping to ransom her. Darius Heald said his mother had by then read
Wau-Bun and his mother stated “it was exaggerated and incorrect in its relation of the Chicago
massacre.” 98
Darius Heald states, “Chandonnis purchased Mrs. Heald from her captor for an old mule
says the destruction of the ammunition was his own idea. See Capt. Heald’s Official Report on the
Evacuation of Fort Dearborn, Quaife, Chicago and the Old Northwest, 406.
94
Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, 168.
95
Quaife, “Some Notes on the Fort Dearborn Massacre,” 127–28.
96
Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, 181–82.
97
Quaife, “Some Notes on the Fort Dearborn Massacre,” 132.
98
Darius Heald to Draper in Draper Mss., 23S54–56.
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captured there and a bottle of whiskey.” 99
Yet in these three details, Chandonnais purchasing Mrs. Heald with a mule and
whiskey, we see that Darius Heald’s account agrees with Wau-Bun. Both accounts seem to be
talking about the same thing. Chandonnais has been shown in this article to be an employee of
John Kinzie’s.
Number Three: Quaife alleges that Kinzie tried to block the evacuation of Fort Dearborn
because “for Kinzie and the other civilians clustered around the fort this spelled nothing less
than financial ruin.”100 This is supposed to be Juliette Kinzie’s motivation decades later for
allegedly slandering Capt. Heald.
Did Kinzie try to block the evacuation? Lt. Helm, Kinzie's son-in-law, states that the
evacuation order was “brot by a Potowauautimee [sic] chief, Winne Mag, and he informed
Captain Heald through Kinzie to evacuate immediately the next day if possible as the Indians
were Hostile and that the troops should change the usual route to go to Fort Wayne.” 101
“Through Kinzie” means Kinzie translated from Potawatomi to English for Capt. Heald.
John Kinzie says in his own account that as soon as the evacuation order arrived, the
Indian messenger carrying the order “expressed his doubts about the practicality of”
evacuation “unless the troups moved off immediately say the next morning & that by a by rout
as the Wabash Potawatamies were disaffected particularly those of Magoquous Villages and
would undoubtedly stop them.”
Capt. Heald declined the Indian’s advice to leave the next morning. Heald wanted to
wait for William Wells and expected William Wells to bring some Miamis to help them. “The
Indian then pressed him [Heald] through me & I also joined in it to go the following day—which
he also declined.” [Emphasis is mine.] 102
The Wau-Bun version says the Indian messenger, Winnemeg, first advised Kinzie in a
private meeting to hold the fort until reinforcements could be sent. “If, however, Captain Heald
should decide upon leaving the post, it should be done immediately … before those who were
hostile in their feelings were prepared to interrupt them.”
Wau-Bun says Kinzie relayed this advice to Capt. Heald who declined because Capt.
Heald said he had to collect the Indians of the neighborhood and make an equitable division of
the property.
According to Wau-Bun, Winnemeg then suggested marching out “and leaving all things
standing—possibly while the Indians were engaged in the partition of the spoils, the troops
might effect their retreat unmolested.”
“This advice was strongly seconded by Mr. Kinzie,” according to Wau-Bun, but Capt.
Heald would not agree. 103
Capt. Heald took six days to get ready to evacuate, while hundreds of Indians gathered,
99
Ibid, 23S53.
Quaife, “Some Notes on the Fort Dearborn Massacre,” 124.
101
Lt. Helm’s account in Burton, “The Fort Dearborn Massacre,” 91.
102
Williams, “John Kinzie’s Narrative of the Fort Dearborn Massacre,” 347–48.
103
Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, 163–65.
100
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according to his own official account to the government. 104
Thus, there are three versions from the Kinzie family side, two of which say that John
Kinzie advised that if they were to evacuate, they should march away immediately before
hostile Indians could assemble, and the third said Kinzie conveyed this advice to Capt. Heald
from the Indian messenger. This may not prove the matter, if like Quaife, one disbelieves
every statement from the Kinzie family side. But these accounts stand in contradiction to
Quaife's argument that John Kinzie throughout tried to block the evacuation.
Number Four: This next is an extremely important argument to Quaife. Quaife asserts
that Wau-Bun's description of the contents of General Hull's order to evacuate Fort Dearborn is
contradicted by the actual text of the order that Quaife got in 1912 from the Draper
Manuscripts through the aid of Reuben G. Thwaites, secretary of the State Historical Society
of Wisconsin. Quaife published this document in 1912 in his denunciation of Wau-Bun. 105
For comparison,Wau-Bun says: “The orders to Capt. Heald were 'to evacuate the fort, if
practicable, and, in that event to distribute all the United States property, and in the United
States factory or agency, among the Indians in the neighborhood.'“ 106 John Kinzie in his
account said the order was “to evacuate the Fort if possible.” 107Lt. Helm said the order was to
evacuate the fort “if Practicable.” 108
The handwritten order first published by Quaife and considered by Quaife to be
authentic contradicts all these versions. The order first published by Quaife states in part: “It is
with regret I order the Evacuation of your Post owing to the want of Provisions only a neglect of
the Commandant (two words illegible)—You will therefore Destroy all arms & ammunition but
the goods of the factory you may give to the Friendly Indians who may be desirous of escorting
you on to Fort Wayne & to the Poor & needy of your Post …”
The order Quaife believed was authentic tells Heald he must evacuate Fort Dearborn.
Wau-Bun, John Kinzie, and Lt. Helm all say that the order was to evacuate the fort if possible
or practicable.
Was the order first published by Quaife the actual order from General Hull? This
question has an amazing background:
On July 29, 1812, General Hull at Detroit wrote a letter to the Secretary of War in which
Hull stated, “I shall immediately send an express to Fort Dearborn with orders to evacuate that
post and retreat to this place or Fort Wayne, provided it can be effected with a greater prospect
of safety than to remain. Capt. Heald is a judicious officer and I shall confide much to his
discretion.”109
Wau-Bun says that General Hull's order stated if Fort Dearborn were to be evacuated,
Heald was “to distribute all the United States property, and in the United States factory or
104
Captain Heald’s Official Report of the Evacuation of Fort Dearborn, in Quaife, Chicago and the Old
Northwest, 406.
105
Quaife, “Some Notes on the Fort Dearborn Massacre,” 137–38.
106
Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, 164.
107
Williams, “John Kinzie’s Narrative of the Fort Dearborn Massacre,” 347.
108
Lt. Helm’s account, in Burton, “The Fort Dearborn Massacre,” 91.
109
Quaife, Chicago and the Old Northwest, 215.
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agency, among the Indians in the neighborhood.” In the Wau-Bun version of General Hull's
order, no exception was granted to allow Heald to destroy the excess ammunition.
If the Wau-Bun version of General Hull’s order is accurate, it could have led to a
dilemma at Fort Dearborn about what to do with the excess ammunition.
Lt. Helm's account says that dilemma is precisely what took place. Helm's account,
written in June 1814, says on the night of August 12, 1812, he and John Kinzie called on
William Wells, who had just arrived that day, to ask Wells to persuade Capt. Heald to destroy
the excess ammunition and arms before evacuation. Helm said the fort had 200 stand of arms,
four cannons, and six thousand (perhaps pounds) of powder.
“. . . Capt. Heald hesitated, and observed that it was not sound Pollicy to tell a lie to an
Indian, that he had received a positive order from General Hull to deliver up to those Indians all
the public Property of whatsoever nature, particularly to those Indians that would take in the
troops and that he could not alter it, and that it might irritate the Indians and be the means of
Destruction of his men,” Helm said.
Lt. Helm continues: “Kinzie Volunteered to take the responsibility on himself provided
Captain Heald would consider the Method he would point out a safe one. He agreed. Kinzie
wrote an order as if from General Hull and gave it into Captain Heald; it was supposed to
answer and accordingly was carried into effect.” 110 [Emphasis mine.]
The residents of the fort and the civilians then destroyed the excess ammunition.
John Kinzie's account, dictated in 1820, also says Kinzie and Wells told Heald that the
ammunition and whiskey should be destroyed if they were going to evacuate. Kinzie says he
told the captain the whiskey would inflame the Indians, and the ammunition “would
undoubtedly be used in acts of hostility against our people if not against ourselves.” Capt.
Heald agreed, Kinzie says. Heald asked Kinzie to suggest some way to justify this destruction
in the eyes of the Indians since Heald had promised the Indians he would give them the
ammunition.
“Stratagem was accordingly resorted to,” Kinzie says. 111
Kinzie does not explain what the “stratagem” was. Did John Kinzie forge a new order
as Lt. Helm said he did?
Quaife himself notes in his 1933 book, Checagou, “The order is not in Hull’s
handwriting, and in certain respects its contents are such as to defy rational explanation.”
Quaife adds, “These things seem to afford at least negative support to a strange tale told by
Lieutenant Helm in his narrative of the massacre, to the effect that Kinzie overcame Heald’s
scruples against destroying the surplus arms and ammunition by forging an order ‘as if from
Gen’l Hull’ commanding that this be done.”112
There is one other noteworthy contradiction between what the order discovered by
Quaife stated and what Capt. Heald said that order stated.
In Capt. Heald's his first written description of the massacre, Heald’s letter to Adjutant
110
Lt. Helm’s account, in Burton, “The Fort Dearborn Massacre,” 91.
Williams, “John Kinzie’s Narrative of the Fort Dearborn Massacre,” 348.
112
Quaife, “Checagou, From Indian Wigwam to Modern City, 1673-1835,” (Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1933), 121.
111
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General Thomas H. Cushing, Heald said Gen. Hull's order told him “to proceed with my
command to Detroit.” 113 Heald repeats this in his own journal, “rec'd orders from Gen'l William
Hull to evacuate the Post of Chicago and proceed with my command to Detroit.”114
The order discovered by Quaife tells Heald to go to Fort Wayne.
Lastly among Quaife’s complaints in his 1912 denuciation of Wau-Bun, we will examine
his fairly trivial accusation that yet another element of Juliette Kinzie’s book is unbelievable.
This examination has an element of humor. Once again, the details in the primary and
secondary sources support Wau-Bun.
Wau-Bun states that shortly before the evacuation, the residents of the fort threw the
fort’s liquor into the Chicago River. “The same fate,” Wau-Bun says, “was shared by a large
quantity of alcohol belonging to Mr. Kinzie, which had been deposited in a warehouse near his
residence opposite the fort.” Wau-Bun adds, “so great was the quantity of liquor thrown into the
river, that the taste of the water the next morning was, as one expressed it, ‘strong grog.’” 115
Quaife scoffs at this. He argues, “there are indeed more majestic streams than our own
Chicago (River); but even so, how many barrels of liquor must be poured into it in the evening
in order that the following morning the water may taste like ‘strong grog?’” He adds, “Any doubt
which may be entertained in the matter is dissolved for us by the Darius Heald narrative”
where Mrs. Heald states through her son Darius that the fort had only one barrel of whiskey,
which was poured into the well. “Evidently,” Quaife says, “it was Kinzie’s stock of firewater
alone which so generously flavored the river water.”
The documentary support for Wau-Bun’s story of the whiskey flavoring the river so that
it tasted like “strong grog” is as follows: First, the Chicago River was typically plugged by a
sand bar in mid-August, when the evacuation occurred, so much so that it was stagnant, “dead
water” in the words of Lt. James Strode Swearingen. Numerous other accounts attest to the
total blockage of the Chicago River just east of the fort in the summer. 116 And Kinzie had a
phenomenal amount of whiskey to dump into that stagnant river. Kinzie’s half-brother and
business partner, Thomas Forsyth, says in an 1813 letter to Capt. Heald that the amount of
whiskey owned by Kinzie (not the fort’s one barrel, but Kinzie’s store of whiskey on the north
bank) that Kinzie disposed of just prior to the evacuation was 1,200 gallons. 117
Once again, we see that Wau-Bun is well supported when you compare the details to
the documentary record.
There is one other, very dramatic story rescue story told in Wau-Bun that Quaife
ignored in his 1912 article denouncing Wau-Bun, although he did discuss it in a footnote in his
113
Quaife, Chicago and the Old Northwest, 46.
Nathan Heald’s Journal in Draper Mss. 17U33.
115
Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, Wau-Bun, 169 and 171.
116
Journal of Lt. James Strode Swearingen in Quaife, Chicago and the Old Northwest, 373. Also,
Andreas, History of Chicago, Vol. I, 56. See also Theodore J. Karamanski, Schooner Passage:
Sailing Ships and the Lake Michigan Frontier. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 2000, 50–53 for
a lengthy discussion of this problem on the Chicago River.
117
Letter of Thomas Forsyth to Capt. Heald, Jan. 2, 1813, in Quaife, Chicago and the Old Northwest,
246, footnote 632.
114
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1913 book, Chicago and the Old Northwest. Subsequent historians following Quaife’s pattern
scoffed at this second rescue story as “froth” and “a legend.”
We will examine that wonderful story about the half-Indian, half-Irish Billy Caldwell and
the evidence that tends to corroborate it. Then, as promised, we will wind up by showing how
Quaife many years later seems to have come to appreciate that Wau-Bun is a valuable
account of the Fort Dearborn Massacre.
In his 1913 book, Chicago and the Old Northwest, Quaife says, “probably there was a
kernel of fact around which the story of the rescue of the [Kinzie] family by Billy Caldwell from
impending slaughter at the hands of the Wabash band of Indians was developed.” But as
usual, Quaife adds, “here as elsewhere it is evident from a critical reading that the bulk of the
narrative is a product of the author’s literary imagination.” 118
So let’s give this story in Wau-Bun a critical reading and test it.
For background, I will repeat that Eleanor Kinzie, wife of John Kinzie, and her four small
children and their nurse were placed on a boat on August 15, the day of the evacuation, to
travel across Lake Michigan to St. Joseph, Mich., rather than march with the troops and the
rest of the civilians. Friendly Indians detained the Kinzie boat near the mouth of the Chicago
River prior to the massacre, according to Wau-Bun. (The mouth of the Chicago River in those
days was where Madison Street is today. In modern terms of distance, this is several blocks
south of where the river mouth is today. The sand bar that blocked the river was just east of
Fort Dearborn, roughly where Wacker Drive is today. The water in the river between the sand
bar and the river mouth, where the Kinzie boat floated, would have been Lake Michigan
water.) 119
After the battle, the Indians permitted the Kinzie family to return to their house on the
north bank of the Chicago River. 120 (The Kinzie house was about where the taxi turnaround is
today on the east side of Michigan Avenue between the Michigan Avenue Bridge and the
Tribune Tower). 121
Wau-Bun then says: “At their own mansion, the family of Mr. Kinzie were closely
guarded by their Indian friends, whose intention it was to carry them to Detroit for security. . . .
Black Partridge, Wau-Ban-See and Kee-po-tah, with two other Indians, having established
themselves in the porch of the building as sentinels, to protect the family from any evil that the
young men might be excited to commit. . . .”
But a party of hostile Indians from the Wabash River in what is today the state of
Indiana arrived. Those Indians were upset “to learn that the battle was over, the spoils divided,
and the scalps all taken.”
“On arriving at Chicago they [the Wabash Indians] blackened their faces and proceeded
toward the dwelling of Mr. Kinzie,” Wau-Bun relates.
118
Quaife, Chicago and the Old Northwest, 245, footnote 631.
Andreas, History of Chicago, Vol. I, see map following page 112.
120
Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, 173, 181, 183.
121
Don Schlickan, Map. Excerpt of an Architectural Aerial Study of Chicago, 1812–1816, with Forts
Dearborn I and II Overlapped, in Ulrich Danckers & Jane Meredith, A Compendium of the Early
History of Chicago. River Forest, Ill.: Early Chicago, Inc., 2000, 158.
119
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Wau-Bun says the Kinzie family was not well known to the Indians from the Wabash,
due to the distance that separates Chicago from the Wabash River. Margaret Helm, who had
only recently arrived in Chicago, was entirely unknown to them. Black Partridge advised
Margaret to dress in French garb—the Indians were on friendly terms with the French—and go
hide in Ouilmettes’ home. This cabin was quite close, about where the Wrigley Building is
today. 122 Antoine Ouilmette was French Canadian. 123 Margaret did as she was told. The
Ouilmettes hid her under a mattress. The Wabash Indians went to Ouilmettes’ home, saw only
the Ouilmettes and did not bother them. The party of Wabash Indians then went to the Kinzie
house.
Wau-Bun says, “Black Partridge perceived from their moody and revengeful looks what
was passing in their minds, but he dared not remonstrate with them. He only observed in a low
tone to Wau-ban-see: 'We have endeavored to save our friends, but it is in vain—nothing will
save them now.'“
Eleanor Kinzie, from a lifetime among Indians, including several years as a captive of
the Indians when she was a teenager, later from operating as an Indian trader on her own as a
widow, and later as an Indian trader who was the wife of John Kinzie, understood more than
one Indian language and knew what was being said. 124
Wau-Bun: “At this moment a friendly whoop was heard from a party of new-comers on
the opposite bank of the river. Black Partridge sprang to meet their leader, as the canoes to
which they had hastily embarked touched near the house.” Black Partridge tells Billy Caldwell,
who arrived in one of the canoes, “your friend is in danger and you alone can save him.”
“Billy Caldwell, for it was he, entered the parlor with a calm step, and without a trace of
agitation in his manner. He deliberately took off his accouterments and placed them with his
rifle behind the door, then saluted the hostile savages,” Wau-Bun says.
“'How now, my friends! A good-day to you. I was told there were enemies here, but I am
glad to find only friends. Why have you blackened your faces? Is it that you are mourning for
the friends you have lost in battle?' purposely misunderstanding this token of evil designs,”
says Wau-Bun. “'Or is it that you are fasting,” Caldwell asks the Wabash Indians. “If so, ask our
friend here and he will give you to eat. He is the Indians’ friend and never yet refused them
what they had need of.”
The book says the Wabash Indians then relented, and with the presentation of some
gifts, the Wabash Indians departed peacefully. The family was saved. 125
Here is the critical reading part. First, Billy Caldwell was accepted by the Potawatomi
although his mother was a Mohawk. Caldwell’s first wife and the mother of his first child was a
Potawatomi. 126 In the custom of the Indians of the Old Northwest, you were incorporated into
122
Ibid.
George D. Bushnell, Wilmette: a history. Wilmette, Ill.: The Wilmette Bicentennial Commission,
1976, 5.
124
Burton, “The Fort Dearborn Massacre,” Magazine of History With Notes and Queries, Vol. XV,
Number 2 (February, 1912): 75–76.
125
Juliette M. Kinzie, Wau-Bun, 183–86.
126
Clifton, “Billy Caldwell’s Exile in Early Chicago,” 219 and 221.
123
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the Potawatomi if you married a Potawatomi. 127
Second, Billy Caldwell was a highly trusted employee of John Kinzie's in 1812.
According to letters in the Territorial Papers of the United States, Caldwell operated on behalf
of the far flung trading business of John Kinzie and Kinzie’s half brother and business partner,
Thomas Forsyth, among the Indians on the Wabash River. Caldwell reported on the mood of
the Indians on the Wabash to Forsyth. 128 Thus, Caldwell was a friend both of the Wabash
Indians and of the Kinzie family, as Wau-Bun says. This is probably what Black Partridge
meant when he said, “Only you can save them.” Black Partridge and his brother, Wau-BanSee, were both from bands of Potawatomi Indians in the Illinois River country. 129
Finally, Indians of the Old Northwest fasted before battle. 130 Thus Caldwell's remark in
Wau-Bun “Is it that you are fasting?”
So the story in its internal details makes excellent sense.
Historian Mentor Williams makes fun of Caldwell's supposed rescue of the Kinzies
because of John Kinzie's account, discovered in 1953. Mentor Williams says, “John Kinzie
blows the froth from this legend.”131
John Kinzie's account reads as follows: “Some days after [the massacre] 10 or 12
Indians painted black and armed came across the river to my house & anticipating their
demand I warned Mrs. K against the event & enjoined her to meet it with courage. They came
& declared their intentions of taking satisfaction of me for the Hills [Healds'] escape. 5
Potawatie. Chiefs in the house interceded with them & they were quieted finally with
presents.” 132
John Kinzie's story does not mention Caldwell.
Note also that Wau-Bun does not record John Kinzie's presence at this event. Yet in
Wau-Bun, the quotes from both Black Partridge and Caldwell, related above, all refer to the
key Kinzie in this incident as “him” or “he”.
Black Partridge tells Caldwell in the Wau-Bun account, “your friend is in danger and you
alone can save him.” Caldwell says in the Wau-Bun account, “ask our friend here and he will
give you to eat. He is the Indians’ friend and never yet refused them.” John Kinzie himself, in
his account related above, suggests he was there. He says, “They came & declared their
intentions of taking satisfaction of me for the Hills [Healds'] escape.”
127
Douglas C. McMurtrie, editor, “Chicago Indian Chiefs, Biographical Information as recorded in
letters of Juliette A. Kinzie,” Bulletin of the Chicago Historical Society, Vol. 1, No 4, (August, 1935),
110.
128
Letter of B. Caldwell to Thomas Forsyth, July 1812, in Carter and Bloom, Territorial Papers of the
United States, Vol. 16, p. 255.
129
Matson, 242, and Alexander Robinson to Draper in Draper Mss. 21S279–81.
130
Paul A. Hutton, “William Wells: Frontier Scout and Indian Agent,” Indiana Magazine of History, Vol.
74, No. 3 (September 1978): 198. And “Battle of Fallen Timbers,” in Touring Ohio, Adventures,
Itineraries and Dramatic History, Ohio City Productions, http://www.touring-ohio.com/history/battle-offallen-timbers-monument.html, accessed Sept. 17, 2011.
131
Williams, “John Kinzie’s Narrative of the Fort Dearborn Massacre,” 360.
132
Ibid, 351.
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Below: Fort Dearborn and Environs
If John Kinzie was there, why does Wau-Bun not mention him by name as being there? And,
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separately, why does John Kinzie not mention Billy Caldwell saving the day, if Caldwell was
there and did?
Similarly, in the account of Margaret Helm's rescue by Black Partridge, documented
above, John Kinzie says Margaret ran into the lake herself. Other accounts clearly say an
Indian rescued Margaret and took her into the lake.
A common element here is that twice Indians are said to have rescued Kinzie's women
in Kinzie's presence, but Kinzie never mentions it. Wau-Bun, the Kinzie family's account, is
gentle enough not to mention that John Kinzie was standing there in the house when Billy
Caldwell was the only man who could save the family. The quotes portray that John Kinzie was
there, and Kinzie's own account seems to say he was there.
Was John Kinzie, throughout his life, too embarrassed to admit that two Indians, Black
Partridge and Billy Caldwell, rescued his women in two separate incidents when John Kinzie
could not save them? John Kinzie died in 1828, 16 years before Wau-Bun was first
published. 133 The sense of Juliette Kinzie one gets from the entire book of Wau-Bun is that she
would have honored John Kinzie with the finesse shown above.
The comparison of Wau-Bun and John Kinzie's account cannot definitively corroborate
Wau-Bun’s assertion that Billy Caldwell saved the Kinzie family in this incident. But elsewhere,
there are two corroborations to Billy Caldwell's role. In a 20-page, handwritten interview with
respected historian Lyman C. Draper, Alexander Robinson, also known as Che-che-Pin-qua, a
half Ottawa and half Scottish man very important in early Chicago history, said as follows:
Kinzie killed John Lalime in a fight, and “it was an unfortunate affair, & Kinzie employed
Billy Caldwell to go on a mission to Gov. Harrison at Vincennes with a statement of the case, &
Caldwell returned just after the Chicago Massacre, & in time to save the Kinzie family.” 134
Not highly detailed, but very clear.
(The Illinois Territory was once part of the Indiana Territory, and Indiana Gov. William
Henry Harrison at Vincennes was still considered the most influential official in the region.)
In another interview, Caldwell's half brother, William, told Lyman Draper that after the
massacre Billy “came up in time to protect the Kinzies.” 135 Thus it is twice supported by
contemporaries that Billy Caldwell saved or protected the Kinzies after the Fort Dearborn
Massacre.
Because Quaife had so famously denounced Wau-Bun, later historians tied themselves
in knots to avoid accepting Wau-Bun’s story that Billy Caldwell saved the Kinzies.
James Clifton demonstrates the extent to which historians will go to avoid crediting the
Wau-Bun account of Billy Caldwell’s heroism. Clifton, a biographer of Billy Caldwell, wrote,
“Whether or not he actually intervened to rescue some of the few survivors—including the
Kinzies. . . will always remain uncertain. Caldwell apparently told both Alexander Robinson and
his brother William that he had. . . .” 136
Clifton added something here that is not in the historical record. If you read Robinson's
133
Andreas, 75.
Alexander Robinson to Draper in Draper Mss. 21S283.
135
William Caldwell to Draper in Draper Mss. 17S231.
136
Clifton, “Billy Caldwell’s Exile in Early Chicago,” 222.
134
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account and William Caldwell's account, neither says Billy Caldwell “told” them he rescued the
Kinzies. Robinson and William Caldwell simply state it as a fact.
Clifton continues, “If Caldwell did arrive it was not to spring from a birchbark canoe, for
the Potawatomi had long since abandoned that device in favor of horses.” 137
Wau-Bun quoted above says Billy Caldwell arrived in a canoe. All familiar with the Fort
Dearborn days know there were no bridges over the Chicago River then and to get from one
side to the other, people used boats or canoes. Canoes used by Potawatomi Indians and
others are prominent in all accounts of the Healds' escape from Chicago after the massacre.
Part of the way, the Healds were transported in a canoe by none other than the man quoted
above, Alexander Robinson! 138
Clifton also says, if Caldwell did rescue the Kinzies, “it was not the noble deed of a
friendly Potawatomi chief but the dutiful act of a loyal employee.” 139
Here Clifton concedes the story is probably true.
As another example of a post-Milo Quaife historian going to extraordinary lengths to
discredit Wau-Bun’s account of Billy Caldwell's rescue of the Kinzies is Peter T. Gayford in
“Billy Caldwell: An Updated History, Part I (Early Life),” July 17, 2011 in the online Chicago
History Journal. Gayford writes that based on the documentary evidence, “. . . it can be
deduced that there is validity to Mrs. Kinzie's story as to Caldwell being in the area following
the massacre. However, what historically has made the portrayal of this event fictionalized in
many readers' eyes is her use of romanticized language.”140
It's difficult to comment on the idea that somebody in the 19th Century used
romanticized language. (I would say the language is quite clear.) “Romanticized language”
verges on Quaife's sort of criticism of “too good to be true,” referring to Black Partridge saving
Margaret Helm—and event that Quaife later discovered was very true.
Gayford also says that when Alexander Robinson told historian Draper that Billy
Caldwell saved the Kinzie family after the Fort Dearborn Massacre, Robinson may have been
suffering from memory loss due to his age. Robinson's 20-pages of recollections told to Draper
about many characters in the Old Northwest suggest Robinson's memory was fine.
Finally, Gayford notes that Alexander Robinson's daughter, Mary, in 1903 told
anthropologist Charles Augustus Dilg that Alexander Robinson (not Billy Caldwell) and other
Indians saved the Kinzies. Robinson's daughter says Alexander Robinson was angry at Billy
Caldwell for taking the credit. Mary Robinson in 1903 also says amazingly that Billy Caldwell
fought on the Indians' side along with Shaubenna and Tecumseh in the Fort Dearborn
Massacre against the whites. 141
Tecumseh was in the Detroit area, a fact so well documented in American history it is
137
Ibid, 222–23.
Alexander Robinson to Draper in Draper Mss. 21S288.
139
Clifton, “Billy Caldwell’s Exile in Early Chicago,” 223.
140
Peter T. Gayford, “Billy Caldwell: An Updated History, Part I, (Early Life),” in Chicago History
Journal, July 17, 2011, an online publication at http://www.chicagohistoryjournal.com/2011/07/billycaldwell-updated-history-part-1.html accessed Sept. 17, 2011.
141
Ibid.
138
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impossible to doubt. And no one anywhere, in two centuries, says Tecumseh, Shaubenna, or
Shabonna, or Billy Caldwell fought in the Fort Dearborn Massacre.
Mary Robinson's father, Alexander, says plainly that Billy Caldwell saved the Kinzies.
Conclusion
Wau-Bun’s story of the massacre, when one examines it, is highly detailed in itself and
supported by other primary and secondary sources in an extraordinary number of instances.
The mystery of the Fort Dearborn Massacre is not whether Wau-Bun is reliable. I have
shown here that it is well supported. The mystery is, as it always has been, why Capt. Heald
led the garrison and civilians out of the fort into the disaster that followed despite the fact that
he had ample evidence that the 400 to 500 Indian warriors outside were hostile. We do not
know why Capt. Heald chose this course. John Kinzie left us a suggestion of what Capt. Heald
may have relied on. Kinzie stated that in the days before the massacre, the Indians “professed
friendship & gave assurances that they would conduct the troops safely thro….” But Kinzie
added what he saw: “it was always observed that they all came in hostile array,” that is,
dressed for battle. 142
Once the Indians attacked the evacuees two miles from the fort, their situation was
hopeless. Heald, in this author’s judgment, seems to have made the transition then to fighting
and behaved honorably. He was twice wounded. 143
Milo Quaife continued to write negative opinions about the author of Wau-Bun as late as
1932. In his “Historical Introduction” to the Lakeside Press edition of Wau-Bun that year,
Quaife said of Mrs. Kinzie, “accuracy of statement is clearly not her forte” and “the reader
should regard her as a literary artist whose primary ambition was to produce an entertaining
narrative.”
Yet something happened to Quaife’s view soon thereafter. Quaife decided to re-tell the
whole Fort Dearborn Massacre in his 1933 book, Checagou. Quaife says in the Foreword to
Checagou:
“My present narrative … contains, in addition, the results of two added decades of study
and reflection. In this period, much new material has come to light, and some former errors
have been disclosed.” He does not say what former errors he discovered.
In this same 1933 book, Quaife calls Wau-Bun “a charming, semi-historical family
narrative.” “Semi-historical” may seem faint praise to some, but for Quaife, who had
denounced it as fiction, it’s suddenly a huge leap up. 144
Quaife also notes that Juliette Kinzie’s mother-in-law Eleanor urged her to write WauBun. For this, Quaife says in his 1933 book, “succeeding generations owe her (Eleanor) a debt
of gratitude for her share in the production of her daughter-in-law’s book.” 145
142
Williams, “John Kinzie’s Narrative of the Fort Dearborn Massacre,” 348.
Lt. Helm’s account in Burton, “The Fort Dearborn Massacre,” 91-93, my interpretation. And Darius
Heald’s account in Draper Mss. 23S57.
144
Quaife, Checagou, 104.
145
Ibid.
143
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Quaife then uses in Checagou the account of the Fort Dearborn Massacre found in
Wau-Bun—without contradiction or qualification—on pages 126, 128, 130, 131, 137, 141, 142,
147, 148, and 149. Page 147 in Quaife’s 1933 book is the rescue of Margaret Helm by Black
Partridge. Pages 148–149 contain the story of Billy Caldwell saving the Kinzie family. On
pages 141 and 142, Quaife even says that he discovered some documentary support for two
of the lesser known and stranger incidents in Wau-Bun. 146
That’s how Wau-Bun is when you check it out.
This we do know: Wau-Bun presents a substantially accurate narrative of the events we
call the Fort Dearborn Massacre. Historians have good reason to agree with the 1881 opinion
of John Wentworth, publisher and proprietor for 25 years of the Chicago Democrat newspaper,
member of Congress for Chicago for 12 years, a two-term mayor of Chicago. Wentworth
settled in Chicago in 1836.
Wentworth said in an address he delivered at the unveiling of the Memorial Tablet to
mark the site of Fort Dearborn on May 21, 1881:
“Upon this matter and many others appertaining to the early history of Chicago, Mrs.
Juliette A. Kinzie's Wau-Bun, published in 1855, is very instructive; but it is not properly
appreciated because it is written in the shape of leisure sketches instead of consecutive
history. Those who think lightly of her work should call at my office and copy a thorough index
of it, which I have made, and they will find that Wau-bun is a historic treasure.”147
146
Ibid, 141–43.
John Wentworth in Fort Dearborn, an Address Delivered at the Unveiling of the Memorial Tablet to
Mark the Site of the Block-house, on Saturday afternoon, May 21st 1881. Chicago: Fergus Printing
Co., 1881, 17.
147
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Fort Dearborn Re-envisioned: Photo Essay
Illustrations provided by Jerry Crimmins
Above: Fort Dearborn, traditional picture, seen from the
Northwest. Below: Fort Dearborn’s twin, the replica of Fort Wayne, Indiana. Shows how main gate at
Fort Dearborn appeared from the south. (Stockade fences missing)
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Above: How Fort Dearborn's South Barracks and main gate would have appeared from within. Below:
soldier’s bunk beds in barracks. (Both images of Fort Wayne replica)
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Above: Fireplace and cooking equipment (Fort Wayne replica).
Site of Fort Dearborn Massacre—present day 18th Street and Prairie Avenue
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Below: Fort Dearborn Interior Diagram, 1808
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The Women of Fort Dearborn
By Jerry Crimmins
This article is adapted from a speech Mr. Crimmins first delivered in 2006. It has never before been published.
Nine women marched away from Fort Dearborn in what is today Chicago, Illinois, on
August 15, 1812, into the Fort Dearborn Massacre. 1 Two of those women were killed.2
Another died in captivity. 3 Some of the others suffered the deaths of their children in the
battle. 4
Two more women who were nearby attempting to evacuate Chicago by boat the same
day had their own harrowing experiences. 5
The battle for Fort Dearborn is depicted on a bas relief on the Michigan Avenue Bridge in
Chicago. The location of the battle is memorialized today in Battle of Fort Dearborn Park.
Rectangular bronze plaques embedded in the pavement just south of the Michigan Avenue
Bridge indicate the original site of the fort. Photograph courtesy of Jerry Crimmins.
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Women helped found Fort Dearborn from the very first day. On August 17, 1803, a
company of U.S. soldiers under the command of Capt. John Whistler arrived at the mouth of the
Chicago River on Lake Michigan to build the fort and establish the presence of the United
States. Those soldiers were accompanied by two of the Whistler women, his wife, Anne, and
his daughter-in-law, Julia.6
These are the stories of three of the women of Fort Dearborn.
Susan Simmons
Susan Simmons was not the wife of an officer nor a member of a prominent family. She
is barely remembered today. But for that reason, she represents the ordinary female pioneer. We
could multiply Susan Simmons by thousands to picture the pioneers.
On March 14, 1810, Susan’s husband, John, enlisted in the Army. 7 The Simmons family
then lived in near Piqua, Ohio, in the western part of that state. Although Susan and John were a
new family with their first child, a one-year-old boy, John was assigned to Fort Dearborn far off
to the west. He had to leave for almost a year.
Then, in March, 1811, John Simmons came back and asked Susan to pack up their son,
David, and whatever they could carry on one pack horse and move to Fort Dearborn. This
meant they had to leave the areas settled by citizens of the United States and walk almost 400
miles across the wilderness with a two-year-old boy. 8
According to Mapquest.com, this journey from near Piqua, Ohio, to what is now
downtown Chicago by the quickest automobile route is 279 miles. 9 I tried Susan Simmons’
foot journey myself vicariously on Mapquest. If you reduce the journey to five-mile segments,
you get a close enough view to see the rivers and streams they had to cross.
At that season of the year (March and April), the streams were usually full and difficult to
ford, says the account written by one of her descendants more than 90 years later. It goes on to
say that Susan and her husband “were also compelled to make long detours to pass around the
swamps covered with water which lay on their way.” 10
Even today, when the world is somewhat warmer, the average temperature of the
Stillwater River at Pleasant Hill, Ohio, near where the Simmonses had to cross is 43 degrees for
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March – the month in which they crossed this river. And the Simmonses then traveled north
from that location. Water temperatures in the 40s can render a person unconscious in 30–60
minutes. 11
In my vicarious journey from Piqua, Ohio, to Chicago, I found that some rivers and
streams were avoidable. This required regular zigzag travel eventually amounting to many
miles. This is probably why Susan Simmons’s family considered the journey to Chicago to be
almost 400 miles rather than the 279 miles of the direct route composed by Mapquest using the
same stopping places they used.
I also found that 49 rivers and streams seemed unavoidable. How Susan Simmons and
her husband crossed 49 frigid rivers in March and April with their two-year-old boy is
unknown. It’s highly unlikely they carried a canoe the whole way. Packing a canoe through the
woods on a horse is just about impossible, and the horse or one of the adults had to carry the
child. The skills for moving your family this way across river after river with no bridges in
March and April may be lost today.
We do know Susan and her husband and child slept in a tent or under a canvas lean to12
and ate what they could carry or what they could shoot. Two drifters off to see the world.
On the second day of their journey, they reached Fort Greenville, Ohio. 13 This was the
scene of the signing of the Treaty of Greenville 16 years earlier between the Indian
Confederation and the United States.14 That treaty had ended the long Indian wars that had
killed 2,000 Americans and hundreds of Indians. 15
But in Susan Simmons’ journey, her husband probably told her at some point that Indian
troubles had started again in Illinois.
Four residents of Southern Illinois, referred to as the Coles Party, had been killed the
previous summer by a party of Potawatomis. 16
I will note here if the word “Indian” is jarring to some that, when referring to more than
one tribe, Indian is the generic name preferred by Indians, according to the U.S. Census
Bureau.17
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After walking for a full month, Susan and her husband and little David made it to Fort
Dearborn. Susan’s struggles had just begun.
Fort Dearborn was a small, square enclosure, 120 feet long and 120 feet wide near the
juncture of the Chicago River with Lake Michigan. Today that spot is the site of Michigan
Avenue and Wacker Drive in Chicago.18 The author of this article lives in Chicago, and his,
small house lot from the front sidewalk to the alley is 125 feet long, five feet longer than Fort
Dearborn. Most of the interior of the fort was given up to an empty parade ground with a
flagpole in the middle. Yet Fort Dearborn housed, at different times, 50 to 77 soldiers, at least
eight women and up to 13 children, all crammed into two story buildings that formed the
perimeter of the fort.19 It helps to imagine Fort Dearborn that you could probably hear a baby
crying there for most of the hours of its existence.
Susan’s husband was an Army private. In 1811, he made $7 a month. 20 This is the
equivalent of $103 a month or $25 a week today. 21
If $25 a week in today’s dollars seems bone meager, it is. Converted to 2006 dollars, an
Army private’s pay in 1811 was less than one-tenth of what a buck private in the American
Army is paid today. 22 How could Mrs. Simmons buy a dress or cloth to make a dress?
The poverty in the early years of the United States is hard to imagine. Early in the
nation’s history, one of the big inducements for a man to enlist in the military was clothing to
cover himself. 23
To keep body and soul together and also for her son, Susan probably worked as a
laundress. As a laundress, Susan would have helped two or three other enlisted men’s wives
wash the clothes of the entire Fort Dearborn garrison of more than 50 men. Susan’s pay for
doing all this laundry would have been daily rations, perhaps extra to those rations she got as a
soldier’s wife, 24 plus straw to sleep on.25
In the barracks at Fort Dearborn, enlisted soldiers typically slept two to a bed, four to a
bunk bed.26 Up to 16 enlisted men slept in small room. 27 In the cold months, Susan would have
slept amongst all these men. Possibly she was able to sleep in the same narrow bed with her
husband. Or possibly she slept on the floor of the barracks as wives and children sometimes
did. 28
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Yet even under these conditions, life went on, and on February 18, 1812, Susan gave
birth to a daughter. Susan and her husband named their daughter Susan after the mother. 29
In June of that year, the United States declared war on Great Britain, and the War of 1812
was on. In August, Fort Dearborn was ordered evacuated. On August 15, although the fort was
by that time almost surrounded by Indians, Capt. Nathan Heald marched the garrison of 54
soldiers out of the fort along with approximately 23 adult civilians and 18 children. Two miles
south of the fort, this group of 95 people was attacked by hundreds of Indians in what is called
the Fort Dearborn Massacre.30
Susan’s son, David, then three years old, was killed. Her husband was also killed. Susan
and her little daughter, then six months old and whom Susan held in her arms during the battle,
were taken captive.31
The Indians took Susan and her baby to Green Bay, Wisconsin, where they put her to
work for eight months. When freed, Susan made her way back to Ohio and somehow carried
her daughter the whole way.
Mrs. Susan Simmons of Fort Dearborn lived for 45 years after the Fort Dearborn
Massacre.32 In later years, she recalled how she as a young wife walked with her husband and
little boy 400 miles to Fort Dearborn. She called it a pleasant excursion. 33
Eleanor Kinzie
Eleanor Kinzie’s husband, John, was the sutler to the original Fort Dearborn for much of
its existence. This means John Kinzie operated the store inside the fort where soldiers and
officers could buy or attempt to buy a host of things that the government did not supply them,
from tobacco to candy to fishhooks, to playing cards, tools, extra whiskey and a thousand other
such items. John Kinzie also operated a trading house for Indians on the north bank of the
Chicago River, a few yards north of where the Michigan Avenue Bridge now ends.34
Eleanor lived inside Fort Dearborn with her family, in the sutler’s store for weeks at a
time during Indian uprisings. She and four of her five children evacuated the fort on the day of
the Fort Dearborn Massacre. But they escaped the massacre partly because they set off by boat,
partly because the Indians honored John Kinzie, and partly because a fine man, Black Jim, a
slave, came to their aid. 35
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Eleanor’s life is amazing and provides an example of what human beings, women in
particular, can endure and accomplish.
She was born Eleanor Little in 1770 36 in western Pennsylvania,37 one of five children.
In 1779, Seneca Indians kidnapped Eleanor when she was 9 years old, along with her
brother, age 7, and her mother and a sibling who was a babe in arms. This was a regular danger
on the frontier in those days. 38 From the Indian point of view, white squatters had poured into
their lands.39 Two more of Eleanor’s siblings, a brother and a sister ages four and six saw the
kidnapping of the rest of the family and escaped.
The Senecas killed the babe in arms. Then they brought Eleanor, her brother and her
mother to their village near the headwaters of the Alleghany River. Eleanor’s father was able to
ransom the mother and Eleanor’s brother, but an Indian chief’s family had adopted Eleanor. The
Senecas refused to let her go.
Just after the end of the American Revolution, her father and mother tried again to
ransom her, and this time the Indians agreed to let Eleanor go back to her natural parents. The
full story is told in detail by her daughter-in-law, Juliette Kinzie, in the book, “Wau-Bun, The
Early Day in the Northwest.”40 Although controversial, this book has turned out to be
substantially reliable.
By the time Eleanor was reunited with her parents, she had lived as an adopted Indian for
four years, and she found it difficult to leave her Indian family. Her Seneca name in translation
was “Ship Under Full Sail.”
The Little family, including Eleanor, who was by then 13, moved to Detroit, then
dominated by the British. But Eleanor’s adventures were barely beginning.
For one thing, when she was 14, she got married. She married Daniel McKillip in 1784.
McKillip had been a sergeant in a Tory ranger unit that fought for the British against the
Americans in the Revolution. Eleanor’s father had been a Tory, and Eleanor married a Tory.
In 10 years of marriage, she and her husband had three children. They lived just across
the river from Detroit in Canada.
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When Eleanor was pregnant with her fourth child, her husband was killed. He had
volunteered to fight for the British-allied militia against the Americans in the Indian wars.
Canadians and Tories sometimes fought alongside the Indians in these wars, and he was killed
during this service. When her husband died, Eleanor was 24. 41
As a single mother on the frontier, Eleanor became an Indian trader. She sold
manufactured goods to Indians in return for furs and hides that the Indians acquired from
hunting. She then sold the furs and hides to the fur companies. Eleanor understood Indians and
she spoke their languages. According to historian Clarence M. Burton, she also “demonstrated
that she was a business woman, and her bills of account and business letters indicate
considerable force of character.” 42
Somewhere in these years, Eleanor apparently bore the grief of the deaths of her three
oldest children. They disappeared from history. Her youngest child, Margaret, who had been in
her womb when her husband was killed, was the lone survivor.
In 1798, Eleanor married John Kinzie, 43 who was himself a highly successful Indian
trader and a Canadian like Eleanor. She was then 28 years old. She and Kinzie eventually had
four children together. 44
In 1804, Eleanor, John and their growing family moved to Chicago and settled into the
house built on the north bank of the Chicago River by Jean Baptiste Point de Sable. Kinzie had
purchased it years earlier. 45 The house was directly across the river from Fort Dearborn. Today
that spot is just north of the Michigan Avenue Bridge.
Compared to the early struggles of her childhood kidnapping and her single motherhood,
Eleanor now became affluent for the frontier. John Kinzie’s business prospered and expanded to
several locations.46 The Kinzie family maintained servants and at least two African-American
slaves. 47 Financially, the next 7 or 8 years were probably the prime of Eleanor’s life.
But in 1812, Eleanor’s life turned dangerous again. Because hostile Indians murdered two
farm workers near the fort, the Kinzie family moved from their rather lavish home into the very
cramped and crowded quarters of Fort Dearborn.48
Then, after things seemed to quiet down and the Kinzies had moved back home across
the river, Eleanor’s husband got into a violent dispute with the Indian interpreter at Fort
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Dearborn. Kinzie was shot and wounded in this fight, and he in turn stabbed the interpreter to
death. Accused of murder, Kinzie fled Chicago. Once again, Eleanor was left on her own with
her children. 49
Under these trying circumstances, Eleanor and all of the tiny community of Chicago
learned the United States had declared war on Great Britain. This was the War of 1812. In short
order the following took place:
• Kinzie was acquitted in absentia by a trial of the officers on the grounds of self
defense, and he returned after a month.50
• Fort Dearborn was ordered evacuated.51
• From their long and extremely close histories with the Indians, Kinzie and Eleanor
knew how dangerous it was when the Indians went to war. The Indians were allies
of Great Britain, and the Indians at a minimum hoped to drive the Americans out
of all their frontier forts and stop their expansion. 52 Even though for the Kinzies it
meant abandoning their property, home and business, they decided to leave
Chicago at the same time as the garrison. Eleanor’s husband tried to persuade the
commander of the garrison to march out even earlier than he finally did, while
there was still some chance of getting away by surprise, or alternately, to hold Fort
Dearborn against attack.53 Instead, the garrison marched out after a delay of
several days and after hundreds of Indians had gathered.
• By family arrangement, Eleanor, the children, the slaves and the employees tried to
leave on a boat on the same morning. 54
• Eleanor had to say goodbye to her husband and her oldest child, Margaret, the only
survivor of her first marriage. John Kinzie and Margaret, who was by then 17 years
old and married to a Fort Dearborn Army officer, marched away with the
soldiers.55
• The boat carrying Eleanor and her other children had not even moved past the
mouth of the Chicago River by the time the massacre began. Eleanor was forced to
wait hours to find out that John and Margaret had survived. They had been saved
by a Potawatomi chief, Black Partridge. 56
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• After the massacre, Eleanor and John Kinzie used their resources to save Rebekah
Heald, the wife of Fort Dearborn’s commander, and also Capt. Nathan Heald.57
Both the Healds were wounded.
• The day after that, Eleanor herself and her children had to be rescued by another
friendly Indian, Billy Caldwell, or Sauganash.58
Eleanor Kinzie was 42 years old at the time of the Fort Dearborn Massacre. She had been
through plenty of shocks and had more in her future.
The family was in difficult financial straits during the War of 1812 as Kinzie’s business
and the Indian trade in general were disrupted. Indians and Americans were on opposite sides of
the war. Kinzie’s business never recovered. Eleanor’s good times were over.59
Perhaps to survive, Kinzie became an American spy. His half-brother, Tom Forsyth, was
already secretly on the U.S. payroll as a spy against the British and Indians. 60 But the British
captured Kinzie during his spying in 1813.
To the British, John and Eleanor were Canadians, that is, subjects of the crown. The
British charged Kinzie with treason and ordered him sent as a prisoner to England. This
catastrophe put Eleanor on her own with young children for the third time in her life with no
hope of communication with Kinzie. 61
A year later, John Kinzie miraculously returned. He had escaped from British custody on
the Atlantic Coast of Canada and somehow made his way back across the continent.62
In 1816, Eleanor and her husband returned to Chicago, to the same house and trading
post. But they never got out of debt during her husband’s lifetime. 63 John Kinzie died in 1828.
64
In 1833, Eleanor’s oldest son, John H. Kinzie, subdivided and sold the family’s 102 acres
that lay just north of the Chicago River between State Street and Lake Michigan. 65
The family became well to do again, but Eleanor died the next year, 1834, of cancer. 66
She was 64.
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Rebekah Wells Heald
Rebekah Wells Heald, the wife of Captain Nathan Heald, the commander of Fort
Dearborn, was 22 years old at the time of the Fort Dearborn Massacre. She was shot six times in
that battle and saw her uncle, William Wells, killed next to her.
The history of Rebekah Heald’s family seems like a Western movie today. But it is real.
Rebekah was born in Jefferson County, Kentucky, in 1790 67 while the Indian wars of the
Midwest were at their height. 68
Her father was Samuel Wells,69 originally from Virginia. 70 In an interview with historian
Lyman Draper in 1868, Rebekah’s son, Darius, described Rebekah’s father this way:
“He said he was in 32 battles and skirmishes. Indians used to say he must be charmed.
Two or three times he was shot through his queue(the short ponytail a man made with his hair at
the back of his head), and several times through his clothing and his horse was killed from
under him at the Battle of Tippecanoe.’’ 71
Samuel Wells commanded the Kentucky Riflemen at the Battle of Tippecanoe. 72 So that
was Rebekah’s father.
One of Rebekah’s uncles was her father’s younger brother, William Wells. Indians
captured William as a boy and converted William to the Indian life as a member of Miami tribe.
William married the daughter of the primary chief of the Miami Indians, Little Turtle, 73 one of
the most prominent Indian leaders in American history. 74 William fought as an Indian against
whites in major battles. 75 Then one day William Wells met his older brother, Samuel.
Samuel persuaded William that his true identity was as a white man and a Wells.
William gradually became convinced that this was true partly because of some of his
memories. 76 He then switched sides and became a celebrated fighter for the Americans against
the Indians. After peace was declared in 1795, William Wells became United States Indian
agent at Fort Wayne, the fort that preceded the town of Fort Wayne, Indiana. 77 So that was
Rebekah’s uncle.
About 1808, Rebekah went to Fort Wayne to visit this uncle William. There Rebekah met
Army Captain Nathan Heald, who was then the commander of Fort Wayne. Heald was 33. She
was 18. 78
As part of their courtship, Rebekah and Capt. Heald stood together and shot at targets
outside the fort. Both were excellent shots.
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They got married in Louisville in May, 1811, and immediately rode horses to Chicago.
Nathan Heald was by then commander of Fort Dearborn. 79 Rebekah brought along her AfricanAmerican slave, Cicily and Cicily’s young child. 80
Renewed trouble between the Indian tribes and the expanding tribe known as the
Americans had already started in the Midwest. The War of 1812 was just around the corner.
Rebekah gave birth to her first child inside Fort Dearborn in May of 1812. In Capt.
Heald’s words “for the want of a skillful midwife,” the baby boy was born dead. 81 This took
place during a time of scattered Indian attacks on American settlers and forts in what are today
the states of Ohio, Indiana, Iowa and Illinois, including an attack that killed two men near Fort
Dearborn.82
Three months later, on the day of the battle that history calls the Fort Dearborn Massacre,
Rebekah was one 93–95 Americans who marched away from the fort on August 15, 1812.83
Rebekah rode a “fine, spirited” horse 84 and she probably rode side-saddle.85
When the march reached what is today 18th Street and Calumet Avenue in Chicago,86
Rebekah’s uncle, William Wells, who had come to help lead the evacuation, rode far in front to
gauge their overall circumstances. Having seen what he wanted to see, William Wells signaled
by waving his hat in a wide circle around his head. Everyone could see that a line of
Potawatomi Indians was all along their right flank. Rebekah interpreted Wells’ gesture
correctly. She said, “We are surrounded by Indians.” 87
The Indians fired at the front of the column first. The men in front returned fire. Capt.
Wells recommended that the soldiers charge the Indians. The soldiers charged up a line of sand
hills that separated the Lake Michigan beach from the prairie. The rest of the fight between the
main body of the soldiers and Indians took place on the prairie. The civilian men, women and
children remained on the beach. 88
Rebekah, however, did not stay with the other civilians. Independent minded, she rode up
to the top of the sand ridge to follow the battle of her husband and her uncle, and she thought
she saw her husband shot down.89 After the soldiers ran farther out onto the prairie to escape
being surrounded again, William Wells rode back to the beach towards the women and children.
Rebekah rode up to stand alongside her uncle. 90
Wells was already wounded in the lungs and bled from his nose and mouth, 91 but he
continued to draw fire. Every Indian knew William Wells was a famous fighter and a prize.
Wells told Rebekah to go away from him and stay with Kinzie. She refused. 92 She was shot
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across one of her breasts. She was shot in the side. She was shot also three times in one arm and
once in the other arm. One arms was broken, but one arm remained useable. 93
Wells’ own wounded horse fell over on him, and Wells became trapped. An Indian then
shot Wells fatally in the head and they scalped him. Rebekah still refused to flee and stuck by
her uncle’s body.
Indians cut open Wells’ chest and cut out his heart. 94 One warrior held a piece of Wells’
heart on a ramrod toward Rebekah. She said she turned away from that Indian, and he rubbed it
on her cheek.95
The Indians began to call Rebekah “Apekonit,” the same name they used for Wells,
“Apekonit” meant wild carrot and referred to the fact that Wells was a red head. In this instance,
the name meant the Indians knew Rebekah was a Wells. She may have succumbed to fear for an
instant here. Rebekah denied she was “Apekonit.”96
A short while later, however, she told her captors that she was an “Apekonit,” and she
asked if her husband was alive. She asked to share his fate, whatever it was. 97
Rebekah lived despite her wounds and was captured along with her husband, who had
been shot twice. Before 24 hours had passed, Rebekah and her husband, Capt. Heald, were
ransomed by one of John Kinzie’s top hands—who was capable of effecting this rescue because
he was also a Potawatomi Indian. 98
While the Healds were acutely suffering from their wounds, their rescuers hauled them in
a canoe more than 90 miles along the shore of Lake Michigan, then up river to St. Joseph’s,
Michigan. From there the Healds gradually made their way to Kentucky where her family
was. 99
Rebekah Heald and Eleanor Kinzie illustrate the virtues and faults of their time. They
were brave, resourceful and physically and mentally strong. They were also slaveholders.
Rebekah’s slave, Cicily, and Cicily’s child were killed in the battle. Rebekah later filed a
petition with the U.S. government to be compensated for property lost in the battle. The petition
values Cicily and the child together at $1,000. 100
Twenty-two-year-old Rebekah probably rode sidesaddle the day of the massacre as an
assertion of femininity amidst the crudeness of the frontier.
Rebekah Heald and her husband lived to have four more children, three daughters and a
son. For the rest of her life, she defended her husband’s decision to follow his orders and
evacuate Fort Dearborn.
101
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One of Rebekah Heald’s descendants recently visited the Chicago History Museum. 102
We know today that as the wife of the fort’s commander, Rebekah Heald lived
reasonably well there. Eleanor Kinzie, as the wife of the wealthiest man of that tiny community,
also lived quite well during the lifespan of the first Fort Dearborn.
We might ask what motivated Susan Simmons, whose husband was a lowly private
whose pay was almost invisible, to move with him Fort Dearborn and live in the barracks.
Earlier, I called Susan Simmons and her husband in their long journey “two drifters off to see
the world.” That, of course, is a line from the song, “Moon River.” 103
I will speculate that Mrs. Simmons accompanied her husband because she loved him and
wanted to make a life with him. Or in the words of the song “Moon River,” “We’re after the
same rainbow’s end, waiting ‘round the bend….”
The little baby that Susan Simmons carried at her breast during the Fort Dearborn
Massacre grew up. The child also named Susan eventually got married. She had children and
moved to California. The younger Susan, whose married name was Susan Simmons Winans,
died on April 27, 1900, in Santa Anna, California. Baby Susan, grown to the grand age of 88,
was the last survivor of the Fort Dearborn Massacre.
1
Judge A. B. Woodward letter to British General Henry Procter, Oct. 8, 1812. Quoted in Burton, Clarence M., “The Fort
Dearborn Massacre,’’ Magazine of History With Notes and Queries, Vol. XV, No. 3, (March, 1912): 87.
2
Ibid.
3
Mrs. Needs died in captivity. Niles Weekly Register, June 4, 1814, reprinted in Fergus Historical Series No. 16. Chicago:
Fergus Printing Co. (1881): 53.
4
Judge A. B. Woodward letter in Burton: 88.
5
Kinzie, Juliette M., Wau-Bun, The Early Day in the Northwest. Portage, Wis.: The National Society of Colonial Dames
of America (1989): 174 and 181–182.
6
They were Capt. Whistler’s wife, Anne; and his daughter-in-law, Julia, age 16, wife of the captain’s son, Lt. William
Whistler. Hurlbut, Henry H., Chicago Antiquities, Chicago. (1880): 25. Date and time of arrival of soldiers and women at
Chicago is from Swearingen, Lt. James Strode, “Remarks on the Road from Detroit to Chicago,” also known as
“Swearingen’s Journal,” James Swearingen Letters, Mss. copy in the Chicago History Museum.
7
Heald Papers. Draper Mss., 8U70, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, microfilm copy in Newberry Library, Chicago.
8
Simmons, N., Heroes and Heroines of the Fort Dearborn Massacre. Lawrence, Kan.: Journal Publishing Company.
(1896): 20–22.
9
www.Mapquest.com. Accessed August 8, 2006.
10
Simmons, Heroes and Heroines, 24.
11
Eberle, Mike, U.S. Geological Survey, Columbus, Ohio, email to the author, Aug. 7, 2006. And the Simmonses traveled
north from that location. Water temperatures in the 40’s can render a person unconscious in 30–60 minutes, according to:
“Cold Water Survival,” U.S. Search and Rescue Task Force. Accessed July 24, 2006. www.usartf.org/cold_watersurvival.htm.
12
Simmons, Heroes and Heroines, 22.
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13
Ibid, 23–24.
“The Treaty of Greenville,” on “A Chronology of US Historical Documents,” the University of Oklahoma College of
Law. Accessed August. 6, 2006. http://www.law.ou.edu/ushistory/greenvil.shtml.
15
Ibid, and Faragher, John Mack. Daniel Boone, the Life and Legend of An American Pioneer. New York, Henry Holt &
Co. (1992): 144.
16
Stevens, Frank E., “Illinois in the War of 1812,” Transactions of the Illinois State Historical Society, No. 9, Springfield,
Ill.: Illinois State Historical Library. (1904): 67.
17
Tucker, Clyde; Kojetin, Brian; Harrison, Roderick. “A Statistical Analysis of the CPS Supplement on Race and Ethnic
Origin.” Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bureau of the Census. Table 4. Preference for racial or ethnic terminology, all panels,
May 1995. Page 18. Accessed Aug. 24, 2006. Available from http://www.census.gov/prod/2/gen/96arc/ivatuck.pdf.
18
For the dimensions of Fort Dearborn, see Capt. John Whistler’s drawing in the Chicago History Museum archives.
19
For the strength of the garrison in various years, see Kirkland, Joseph, Chicago Massacre of 1812. Chicago, The Dibble
Publishing Co. (1893): 69. The number of women and children is an estimate based on the genealogy of Major John
Whistler in the Chicago History Museum, for the earlier years, and the number of Fort Dearborn dependents at the time of
the massacre in Judge A. B. Woodward’s letter to British General Henry Procter, cited above.
20
Caldwell, Norman W. “The Frontier Army Officer, 1794–1814,” Mid America, An Historical Review, Vol. 37, No. 2.
(April 1955): 105. But the pay may have been less. Privates in the Fort Dearborn payroll for May and June, 1812, got $5
a month. See Heald Papers in Draper Mss., 8U71, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, microfilm copy, Reel 56, in
Newberry Library, Chicago.
21
Sahr, Robert, “Consumer Price Index conversion factors to determine the value of dollars of 1665 to estimated 2016 in
dollars of 2006.” Accessed July 24, 2006. http://oregonstate.edu/dept/pol_sci/fac.sahr/sahr.htm.
22
In 2006, the U.S. Army pay of E-1’s or buck privates was $1,273.50 a month according to: “Basic Pay Rates.” Accessed
July 24, 2006. http://www.army.com/money/payrates_enlisted_a06.html.
23
Coffman, Edward M., Portrait of the American Army in Peacetime 1784–1898. New York: Oxford University Press.
(1986): 16.
24
Caldwell, Norman W., “Civilian Personnel at the Frontier Military Post (1790–1814), Mid-America, An Historical
Review, Vol. 38, New Series Vol. 27, No. 2. (April, 1956): 102.
25
Coffman, 25.
26
Coffman, 150.
27
Bunk beds and 16 enlisted men to a room is from Sean O’Brien and Walt Dubbeld, War of 1812 reenactors of the First
U.S. Light Artillery of Fort Wayne. The full size Fort Wayne replica they use is built on plans made by John Whistler,
who built Fort Dearborn. Whistler’s Fort Dearborn plans in the Chicago Historical Society library show the rooms are of
similar size to those in Fort Wayne.
28
Reenactors Sean O’Brien and Walt Dubbeld mentioned in footnote 27.
29
Simmons, Heroes and Heroines, 26–27.
30
Crimmins, Jerry, “Notes,” in Fort Dearborn, A Novel. Chicago: Northwestern University Press. (2006): 382, 390, 399,
401, 404.
31
Simmons, Heroes and Heroines, 48, 49, 51, 53, for the information in this paragraph and the next.
32
Quaife, Milo Milton, Chicago and the Old Northwest, 1673–1835. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. (2001): 251.
33
Simmons, Heroes and Heroines, 24.
14
34
Andreas, A.T., History of Chicago from the Earliest Period to the Present Time. Chicago: A. T. Andreas.
(1884): Vol. I, 73–76, for a good summary of Eleanor and John Kinzie’s life in Chicago.
35
Kinzie, Juliette, Wau-Bun, 182.
36
Quaife, Milo Milton, Historical Introduction to Wau-Bun, The Early Day in the Northwest, by Mrs. John H.
Kinzie. Chicago: The Lakeside Press, R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co. (1932): xxxvii.
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37
Ibid. Quaife gives her maiden name as “Little.” Another source, Burton, “The Fort Dearborn Massacre,” 74,
gives the name as “Littl” without the final “e”. Juliette M. Kinzie in the edition of Wau-Bun published by the
National Society of Colonial Dames of America in 1989 gives the family version, “Lytle.” Kinzie, Juliette,
Wau-Bun, 210–11. Author’s Note: Most references to Wau-Bun in this paper refer to the 1989 edition published
in Portage, Wis. The exceptions will be any references to Quaife’s Historical Introduction to a separate edition
of Wau-Bun, published by Lakeside Press in 1932.
38
Quaife, Historical Introduction to Wau-Bun, Lakeside Press edition, xlii.
Tanner, Helen Hornbeck, editor, Atlas of Great Lakes Indian History. Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press.
(1986): 57.
40
Kinzie, Juliette, Wau-Bun, 210–27.
A Note on the Reliability of Wai-Bun
Two historians, Clarence M. Burton and Louise Phelps Kellogg, plus John Wentworth, former mayor of Chicago,
wrote favorably of Wau-Bun. One historian, Milo Milton Quaife, denounced Wau-Bun in several articles. As an example
of the latter, Quaife, in his Historical Introduction to Wau-Bun, the Lakeside Press edition, wrote on page xxxvii, “The
story of her [Eleanor’s] long captivity among the Seneca of western New York during the war [the American Revolution]
provides one of Wau-Bun’s most interesting chapters, although in the telling the sober facts of her experience have been
confused beyond the possibility of unraveling.’’
In defense of the work, Burton wrote in “The Fort Dearborn Massacre,” page 74, “This book [Wau-Bun] was
written not exactly as an historical work, but as reminiscences of early Chicago life. It is interesting, attractive and, in the
main, authentic. In recent times some questions have been raised as to its authenticity, but [it] is not well now to undertake
to bring it into disrepute because of trivial errors or mistakes.”
Burton continued: “That this work has great merit and should be relied upon in the main was the opinion of Hon.
John Wentworth in his time…” Burton quotes Wentworth’s opinion as follows: “Upon this matter and many others
pertaining to the early history of Chicago, Mrs. Juliette A. Kinzie’s Wau-Bun published in 1855 is instructive, but it is not
properly appreciated because it is written in the shape of leisure sketches instead of consecutive history. Those who think
lightly of her work should call at my office and copy a thorough index of it which I have made, and they will find that
Wau-Bun is a historic treasure.”
Kellogg in 1930 wrote an introduction reprinted in the 1989 edition of Wau-Bun – the 11th edition of that work.
On page xx of Kellogg’s Introduction to the book, she discusses Wau-Bun’s account of the Fort Dearborn Massacre. Her
remarks can be extrapolated to the account of the childhood of Eleanor Kinzie. Kellogg said, “The writer of this
introduction intends no apology or defense of the historicity of Mrs. Kinzie’s narrative of the Chicago massacre; it is
confessedly a second-hand account, it suffers from the author’s fondness for dramatizing scenes conjured up by her
historical imagination, it may be biased by family traditions. None the less the account is in the main historically true….
No citizen of the great city at the end of Lake Michigan can afford not to read Mrs. Kinzie’s book.”
Finally, the author of this paper has thoroughly researched the history of the first Fort Dearborn. I compared WauBun in numerous places to first-hand accounts of events of those days and also to numerous second-hand accounts. I
found that Wau-Bun stands up very well. It is more reliable than some second-hand versions. And I doubt any reader
would find the account of Eleanor Kinzie’s childhood kidnapping confusing. Finally, I discovered no events in Wau-Bun
that have proven to be imaginary. The principal allegation that Wau-Bun contained an imaginary incident from the Fort
Dearborn Massacre came from Milo Quaife. An honest man, Quaife printed a retraction when he discovered the incident
he doubted had been corroborated. See Quaife, “Notes and Documents, The Fort Dearborn Massacre,” Mississippi Valley
Historical Review, Vol. 1, No. 4 (June 1914 to March 1915): 564. Also see Jerry Crimmins, “The Fort Dearborn
Controversy” in this issue of the Journal.
39
41
Quaife, Historical Introduction to Wau-Bun, Lakeside Press edition, xxxviii and xxxvix, as source for this
paragraph and the two just previous.
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42
Burton, Clarence M., “The Fort Dearborn Massacre,” Magazine of History With Notes and Queries, Vol. XV, No. 2.
(Feb. 1912): 76.
43
Ibid.
44
Andreas, History of Chicago, Vol. I, 73.
45
Swenson, John F., “Jean Baptiste Point De Sable, The Founder of Modern Chicago,” in Danckers, Ulrich , and
Meredith, Jane, A Compendium of the Early History of Chicago to the Year 1895 When the Indians Left; Early Chicago.
River Forest, Ill. (2000): 388–389. For further details, see Danckers and Meredith, 89–90.
46
Andreas, History of Chicago, Vol. I, 73.
47
That Kinzie had at least two slaves is based on both facts and suppositions. First, see Kinzie, John, “Account Books,” a
manuscript abstract created by the Rev. William Barry, found in the Chicago History Museum and typically called the
Barry manuscript. See Gurdon Hubbard’s note next to Black James’ name in this abstract for August 20, 1805. A second
presumed slave, Black Jack, is first mentioned in the Barry manuscript for July 22, 1808. Lt. Helm’s account of the Fort
Dearborn Massacre, in Burton, “Fort Dearborn Massacre,” 94, talks of Kinzie’s “two negros.’’ Finally, Kinzie and his
half-brother kept at least one black slave who ran away. See Quaife, Milo Milton, Chicago and the Old Northwest, 150–
52.
48
Andreas, History of Chicago, Vol. I, 74.
49
Ibid, 73–74.
50
Ibid, 74 and 164.
51
Lt. “Helm’s Narrative of the Massacre,” in Burton, “The Fort Dearborn Massacre,” 90.
52
Josephy, Alvin M. Jr. “These Lands Are Ours,” American Heritage, Vol. XII, No. 5. (August, 1961): 83; see
also Harrison, William Henry to Sec. of War, June 26, 1810, in Esarey, Logan, editor, Messages and Letters of
William Henry Harrison, Vol. I. New York: Arno Press, 1975: 433.
53
Williams, Mentor L., “John Kinzie’s Narrrative of the Fort Dearborn Massacre,” Journal of the Illinois State Historical
Society, 46 (1953): 347–48.
54
Kinzie, Juliette, Wau-Bun, 173–75.
55
Ibid.
56
Ibid, 176. Also, Williams, “John Kinzie’s Narrative,” 350. (For the considerable historical evidence corroborating
Margaret Kinzie’s controversial account of her own rescue by Black Partridge, see Crimmins, Notes to Fort Dearborn.)
57
Kinzie, Juliette, Wau-Bun, 181–82.
58
Ibid, 183–86. This incident also is controversial, but well corroborated. See discussion of Billy Caldwell’s rescue of the
Kinzie women and children in Crimmins, Notes to Fort Dearborn.)
59
Quaife, Historical Introduction to Wau-Bun, Lakeside Press edition, xli and xlii.
60
Forsyth, Thomas, letter to Gov. Edwards, July 13, 1812, in Carter, Clarence Edwin; and Bloom, John Porter, editors,
The Territorial Papers of the United States. Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office. (1934–1969):
Vol. XVI, 252. See also Reynolds, John. The Pioneer History of Illinois. Chicago: Fergus Printing Co., 1887: 249–50.
61
For Kinzie’s spy history, see Swenson, John F., “Kinzie, John,” biographical essay in Danckers, Ulrich, & Jane
Meredith, A Compendium of the Early History of Chicago to the Year 1835 When the Indians Left. River Forest, Ill.: Early
Chicago Corp. , 2000: 224.
62
Ibid.
63
Quaife, Historical Introduction to Wau-Bun, Lakeside Press edition, xli and xlii.
64
Ibid.
65
Ibid, xlviii.
66
Andreas, History of Chicago, Vol. I, 97.
67
Draper, Lyman C., Mss. of interview with Darius Heald, son of Rebekah and Maj. Heald in 1868. Draper Mss., 23S41–
57, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, microfilm edition, reel 50, in the Newberry Library, Chicago.
68
Tanner, Atlas of Great Lakes Indian History, 69.
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69
Draper, Darius Heald interview, 23S41.
Draper, Lyman C., interview in 1868 with Darius Heald re Samuel Wells. Draper Mss., 23S58. State Historical Society
of Wisconsin, microfilm edition in Chicago’s Newberry Library.
71
Ibid.
72
Harrison, William Henry, letter to Secretary of War, November 18, 1811, in Esarey, Logan, editor, Messages and
Letters of William Henry Harrison, Vol. II. Indianapolis, Indiana Historical Commission. (1922): 621.
73
Draper interview with Darius Heald re Samuel Wells. Draper Mss., 23S62–64.
74
Hutton, Paul A., “William Wells: Frontier Scout and Indian Agent,” Indiana Magazine of History, Vol. 74, No. 3,
September, 1978, 184–85, 188–89; and Carter, Harvey Lewis, The Life and Times of Little Turtle, First Sagamore of the
Wabash, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1987: 204.
75
Roosevelt, Theodore, The Winning of the West, Vol. IV, Louisiana and The Northwest. New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons,
1896: 7–80, for a summary of Wells’ career as a warrior for both sides.
76
Draper interview with Darius Heald re Samuel Wells. Draper Mss., 23S62–64.
77
Hutton, William Wells, 203.
78
Draper, Lyman C., interview with Col. Thomas Hunt, in Draper Mss., 21S45–46. State Historical Society of Wisconsin,
microfilm edition, Reel 50, in Newberry Library, Chicago.
79
Heald, Nathan, “Journal,” in Draper Mss., 17U32–33, State Historical Society of Wisconsin, microfilm edition, Reel 58,
in Newberry Library, Chicago.
80
Mrs. Heald’s petition for compensation for property lost in the massacre in “Cicily, She Was the First Slave Ever
Brought to Chicago—Her Mistress Petitions Congress to Pay for Her.” Chicago Tribune, Saturday, December 8, 1883,
page 5. Note as discussed earlier about Kinzie’s slaves, Cicily was not the first in Chicago. In the petition, Rebekah Heald
notes that “The major part of her property lost was her own and over which her husband exercised no control….”
81
Heald,Nathan, “Journal,” Draper Mss., 17U33.
82
Heald, Nathan letter to William Wells, April 15, 1812; and LaLime, John, letter to William Wells, April 13, 1812, both
quoted in the Draper Mss., 26S45–50. See also, American State Papers, Documents Legislative and Executive of the
Congress of the United States, Class II, Indian Affairs, Vol. I. Washington, D.C.: Gales and Seaton, 1832: 807–08.
83
Crimmins, Notes to Fort Dearborn.
84
Kinzie, Juliette, Wau-Bun, 182.
85
Mrs. Heald’s petition for compensation for lost property in the Chicago Tribune includes “one side-saddle…”
86
Kirkland, Joseph, The Story of Chicago. Chicago, Ill.: Dibble Publishing Co., 1892: 71.
87
Darius Heald in Kirkland, Joseph, Chicago Massacre of 1812. Chicago, Ill.: The Dibble Publishing Company, 1893:
31–32.
88
The facts in this paragraph are from a variety of sources listed in Crimmins, Fort Dearborn, 404–10.
89
Darius Heald in Kirkland, Chicago Massacre of 1812, 31–38.
90
Darius Heald in Kirkland, Chicago Massacre of 1812: 34. Also Darius Heald in Draper Mss., 23S48 and Williams,
“John Kinzie’s Narrative,” 349. Note that in Kinzie’s version, Mrs. Heald “fled to her uncle…in terror.” But since she
stood by her uncle and refused to flee while she was shot six times, and she stayed by him while Wells was killed, scalped
and had his heart cut out, and she later related the whole thing in great detail, she seems to have maintained presence of
mind and a clear head.
91
Draper, Darius Heald interview, 23S46.
92
Williams, “John Kinzie’s Narrative,” 349–50.
93
Draper, Darius Heald interview, 23S48.
94
Ibid, 23S46–48.
95
Darius Heald in Kirkland, Chicago Massacre, 31–38.
96
Draper, Darius Heald interview, 23S49–50. In Kirkland’s interview of Darius Heald, Kirkland records the word that the
Indians used to refer to Rebekah Heald was “Epiconier,” meaning she was a Wells. See Kirkland, Chicago Massacre of
70
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1812, 35. It is my opinion that this is a misunderstood form of “Apekonit,” William Wells’ Miami Indian name as
described in Hutton, “William Wells,” 184.
97
Draper, Darius Heald interview, 23S51.
98
Ibid, 23S42 and 23S51–53, and Williams, “John Kinzie’s Narrative,” 351.
99
Heald, Nathan, “Journal,” Draper Mss., 17U34–35.
100
“Cicily,” in Chicago Tribune, Dec. 8, 1883, 5.
101
Heald, Nathan, “Journal,” Draper Mss., 17U38–41.
102
Johnson, Gary, president, Chicago History Museum, email to author, Aug. 20, 2006.
103
“Moon River” music by Henry Mancini, lyrics by Johnny Mercer. Lyrics to “Moon River” from the movie Breakfast at
Tiffany’s (1961) at Reel Classics. Accessed Aug. 26, 2006 at http://www.reelclassics.com/Movies/Tiffanys/moonriverlyrics.htm
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 15, No. 1, 2012—Bicentennial Issue 1
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1812: The United States Builds a Regular
Army
By Richard V. Barbuto
By the end of 1811, the failure of years of
diplomatic and economic efforts to resolve
important issues of neutral rights, impressment, and
Indian affairs persuaded President Madison that war
with the British Empire was necessary to establish
American sovereignty. As the primary force in the
development of the constitution, Madison was
intimately aware of the distinct roles of the three
branches of government. The Congress had
authority to raise an army, not the chief executive.
Madison began collaborating with his supporters in
Congress to shape an effective instrument to carry
on an offensive war, an army that could capture
Montreal and Quebec in 1812 and perhaps move on
Halifax the following year. Volunteers and militia
would be useful to be sure, but the hard work over
the long haul would be done by the regular army.
Madison was not unaware of the immensity of the
task of building an army large enough and effective
enough to achieve the war aims. The Congress had
perhaps the easiest task, authorizing and designing
the regiments. The harder part – filling the
regiments and preparing the men for war – that task
fell to Madison and his War Department.
An army is a system of systems, with large numbers
of moving parts, all of which must be coordinated in
order to succeed. One system selects officers,
another recruits soldiers. Additional systems feed,
clothe, equip, arm them, and provide medical
support. When these pieces come together, they are
still not an army. The men must be formed into
tactical units – companies and regiments, and they
must be sheltered. The recruits and officers must be
taught their duties and disciplined to perform them
under trying, even brutal, conditions. Finally,
organized, trained, and equipped regiments march
to the frontiers to give battle. A failure of any
system to deliver its “product” would affect the
entire endeavor.
The United States was at a very serious
disadvantage in 1812. There was little to build
from; the peacetime army was small and dispersed
widely. Arsenals held some clothing and
equipment, but not enough to satisfy the immense
need. New officers, numbering in the many
hundreds, did not know their duties, could not
impart more than the rudiments of soldiering skills
to the raw recruits. In today’s parlance, the new
officers did not know what right looked like, and
therefore could not achieve it. While there were
bright minds in the War Department and in the
field, the enterprise of coordinating all the moving
parts was almost beyond human capability and
control, given the requirement to successfully
invade Canada in 1812.
The story of the mobilization of the U.S. Army in
1812 would require a monograph or even booklength treatment. This short study looks selectively
at War Department activities in building the regular
army during the crucial early months, particularly in
recruiting. Scholars have tackled the job of
describing what the War Department officials and
senior officers in the field did to raise the forces and
have identified the many factors that resulted in
fielding an imperfect army for the opening
campaigns of the war. J.C.A. Stagg and William B.
Skelton in particular have illuminated the “what”
and “why” of the process as it played out in 1812. 1
This article augments the current scholarship by
revealing some telling correspondence between the
War Department and the officers in the field during
1812.
Prior to 1812, the “peace establishment” consisted
of seven infantry, one rifle, one light dragoon, one
“field or heavy” artillery and one light artillery
regiments plus other specialist units. As early as
1
I found two works particularly helpful in framing my
investigation. J.C.A. Stagg, Mr. Madison’s War: Politics,
Diplomacy, and Warfare in the Early American Republic,
1783-1830 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983) and
William B. Skelton, “High Army Leadership in the Era of the
War of 1812: The Making and Remaking of the Officer
Corps,” William and Mary Quarterly, 51, no. 2, April 1994,
pp. 253-74.
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November 5, 1811, Madison asked Congress for
20,000 men for the regular army. Congress dithered
for two months. Finally, on January 11, 1812,
Congress authorized ten new infantry regiments, the
Eighth through the Seventeenth. Unlike the First
through Seventh Infantry Regiments that were
composed of ten companies, these new regiments
were composed of eighteen companies organized
into two battalions. This act also brought into
existence the Second Regiment of Light Dragoons
and the Second and Third Regiments of Artillery.
Enlistments remained at a term of service of five
years, a policy that probably discouraged many
from joining.
The first order of business for Madison and the War
Department was to select and commission the
officers who would lead the new formations.
Applications and letters of reference arrived at the
War Department. Madison and Secretary of War
William Eustis pored over the hundreds of pieces of
correspondence and received many oral
recommendations from congressmen. Madison
looked for evidence of leadership ability and
military experience. As early as February, the
President submitted nominations to the Senate.
That body refused to consider nominations until a
more fulsome list was presented. The Senate was
responsible for confirming nominations and formed
subcommittees each composed of the two senators
from each state. Each subcommittee would
consider those nominations of its own citizens.
Finally, the Senate confirmed hundreds of
nominations in April and more than one thousand
by the end of the year. 2 The War Department
notified those confirmed by mail, and while many
declined the commission, most accepted and visited
their tailor to order uniforms.
The two systems of selecting and commissioning
officers and of recruiting soldiers were far too much
work for Eustis and his small staff of clerks. Two
talented officers were brought into the process,
Alexander Smyth and Alexander Macomb.
2
Secretary of War William Eustis
Alexander Smyth was a lawyer, an ardent
Jeffersonian, and a Virginia politician. It was his
political contacts that influenced his commissioning
and selection as colonel of the Rifle Regiment in
1808, superseding a number of candidates of
considerably more experience. Smyth was also the
author of a widely-used infantry drill manual.
Clearly his talents did not extend to command, but
he was quite competent in writing, organizing work,
and managing details. He was brought to the War
Department as the Acting Inspector General and he
focused his energies on the recruiting service.
Lieutenant Colonel Macomb was a very highly
regarded engineer. Macomb had an insightful mind
and could readily manage the myriad of details
involved in selecting new officers. As Acting
Adjutant General, Macomb wrote and tracked the
thousands of orders emanating from the War
Department.
In a parallel effort to obtaining officers, the War
Department organized the campaign to recruit
soldiers. Eustis established eight recruiting
departments, each further divided into a number of
recruiting districts. The War Department appointed
generals or colonels to command the departments
Stagg, Mr. Madison’s War, pp. 166-67.
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and field grade officers or captains to superintend
the recruiting districts.
Alexander Macomb, Acting Adjutant General
Once a new officer accepted his commission, the
War Department assigned him to the nearest
recruiting department. The commander of the
recruiting department then assigned the new officer
to a recruiting district. Smyth’s letter of April 22,
1812, to Colonel Peter P. Schuyler in New York is
typical of the coordination made by the War
Department. In it, Smyth informs Schuyler of the
status of new officers regarding their commissions.
“Major Joseph L. Smith has accepted. I am not
notified that a Major Yates has. Lieut. Col.
Livingston has not accepted, for reasons satisfactory
to the Secretary of War, but will hereafter accept.
You will give the command of recruiting districts to
captains, if there are not a sufficient number of field
officers. You will receive in a day or two other lists
of the officers within your Dept. with the places of
residence of all whose acceptances have come to
hand.” 3 Once the department commander received
his list of officers, he exercised his command and
assigned the officers to a district commander, who,
in turn, assigned the new officer to a location from
which to center the recruiting effort.
As an officer received his assignment, he moved
there and began recruiting. He had funds to print
handbills and advertisements in newspapers calling
for recruits. The recruiting officer would hire a
musician to accompany him on recruiting trips to
nearby villages. As recruits came forward, they
would receive a portion of their bounty. This was
often used to settle any debts before being mustered
into service. The recruiting officer selected the
most promising recruits as non-commissioned
officers. As a number of recruits came together,
they would be sworn in and issued uniforms and
what arms or equipment was available. From this
point on, it became the government’s responsibility
to feed the new soldiers and provide medical
services.
Officers generally expected to command the
companies they recruited. However, the War
Department had other notions. Smyth laid out
policy in a letter to Lieutenant Colonel William
Winder written on June 15. “The recruits are
engaged for the service of the U. States; no officer
has a right to those he engages; but he has a claim
which may be respected, if there are no objections.
In selecting officers to march, and others to remain
recruiting, you will have to perform a task
somewhat delicate; but let the public good be your
guide.” 4 District and Department commanders
were required to send weekly reports to the War
Department listing newly sworn in soldiers.
However, they rarely did so, and the Secretary of
War was never certain of the actual number of men
in service.
The War Department was quick to assign officers to
recruiting duties, but few of these officers were
assigned to regiments. Madison and Eustis
meticulously assigned colonels to command
regiments and field grade officers to assist them.
3
Smyth to Schuyler, April 22, 1812. Adjutant General (AG)
Letters Sent, Records Group (RG) 94, National Archives and
Records Administration (NARA).
4
Smyth to Winder, June 15, 1812. AG Letters Sent.
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Acting Inspector General is now occupied in
organizing the Regiments and will forward you a
list of your officers with their proper places as soon
as it is completed. Congress have it in
contemplation to alter the present organization of
the Infantry and in consequence it is not deemed
proper to make any definite arrangements
establishing the regiments.” 6
Lt. Col. William H. Winder
Meanwhile, Smyth was busy gathering companies
of recruits into regiments and notifying the
regimental colonels. His letter of April 15, 1812 to
Thomas Parker is typical of the improvisation of the
expanded army. “Five companies of Virginia, nine
from Maryland, two from Delaware, and two from
Pennsylvania will form a Regiment. Sixteen
companies from Virginia, & two from North
Carolina, will form a Regiment. One of these will
be commanded by you, the other by Col. Campbell
of Orange. Field officers cannot as yet be
definitively assigned to regiments. The
convenience of all will be consulted. Your wishes
will be recollected.” 5 Note that Smyth was
organizing regiments of eighteen companies. This
organization was replaced two months later by the
standard ten-company organization. Thomas Parker
was a veteran of the Revolution. He commanded
the 12th Infantry until his promotion to brigadier
general in March 1813.
In late May, Congress considered reorganizing the
infantry, and therefore the War Department
temporarily stopped assigning officers and
companies of recruits to regiments. The regimental
commanders, anxious to assemble their men and to
start training, were understandably annoyed. In
response to a letter from Colonel Peter Schuyler,
Acting Adjutant General Macomb responded: “The
In the Act of 26 June 1812, Congress added Infantry
regiments eighteen through twenty-five and reorganized the last batch of ten infantry regiments so
that all infantry regiments were authorized 1,070
men and were uniformly organized into ten
companies and a small headquarters staff. The
Rifle Regiment had ten smaller companies totaling
829 men. This act also modified the term of
enlistment from five years to “five years or during
the war.” That same month, Eustis reported to
Congress an army of 6,744 in the old regiments and
about 5,000 recruits.
Smyth was handling a myriad of details in forming
the many new regiments and sending instructions to
his new regimental commanders. His letter of April
23 to Colonel Thomas Parker is illustrative: “The
money for contingencies, is to defray the expence of
quarters, transportation, fuel, straw, and stationary;
tin pans & camp kettles for the soldiers; and the
purchase of the necessary articles of clothing. No
part of it is intended for pay. You will be pleased to
recommend a subaltern as pay master. You will see
in your recruiting instructions an authority to hire
musicians. An edition of the articles of war and
laws is in the press, and will be forwarded as soon
as finished. The infantry tactics are adopted for the
army, and a copy will be forwarded to every field
officer and Captain.” 7 The long title of the manual
was: Regulations for the Field Exercises,
Manoeuvres and Conduct of the Infantry and was
written by Smyth himself.
Even though the Congress authorized two key
positions in January, that of Commissary General of
6
5
Smyth to Parker, April 15, 1812. AG Letters Sent.
7
Macomb to Schuyler, May 28, 1812. AG Letters Sent.
Smyth to Parker, April 23, 1812. AG Letters Sent.
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Purchases and Quartermaster General, there was an
extended lag time in acquiring weapons, equipment,
uniforms, and supplies and transporting these
commodities to the new regiments at their various
assembly points. Lieutenant Colonel William H.
Winder could not get blankets for his men and he
complained to Smyth. On April 22, Smyth replied,
“If you can get blankets that are fit for service in the
way you speak of, the plan is good. When you will
be able to get a supply from the public, I can not
say.” 8 In response to complaints received from
Thomas Parker, a frustrated Smyth responded, “I
assure you I have been very urgent to have all your
wants supplied. The fault is with those who should
purchase and forward those supplies.” 9 Clearly,
the War Department expected regimental officers to
improvise when the bureaucracy failed.
In mid June, the War Department gave orders to
move recruits closer to the border. Typical is an
order from Smyth to Lieutenant Colonel Charles
Boerstler of the Fourteenth Infantry. “Be pleased to
bring together your recruits with the least possible
delay, form them into companies of 100 men
including N.C. officers, place them under the
necessary company officers, leave the others on the
recruiting service and putting yourself at the head of
the companies formed march for Carlisle. You will
there meet with the companies that Lieut. Col.
Winder may be able to dispatch from Baltimore and
those which Lieutenant Colonel McFeely may be
enabled to form and with the whole you will march
to Albany.” 10
With the declaration of war, the War Department
moved urgently to complete regiments, often giving
up their heretofore tight control and waiving
previous practices. Smyth wrote to Peter Schuyler
on June 22. “Be pleased to collect one thousand
recruits at Albany, divide them into ten companies,
and assign thereto the proper company officers.
These ten companies will form a regiment
according to the plan of organization now before
Congress and will be commanded by yourself, with
a Lieutenant Colonel and Major to be assigned to
you. You will take your staff; but it will not be
proper to take any other officers who are on duty at
New York under General Bloomfield, without his
approbation. Be pleased to forward to this office, a
list of the officers allotted to this regiment, that they
may be registered accordingly. It is hoped this
order may be executed without injury to the feelings
of any other field officer, or hindering the recruiting
service.” 11 This order is remarkable in that Smyth is
authorizing Schuyler to select his own company
officers. The War Department had yielded its
prerogative of assigning officers for the sake of
speed. Did Schuyler even know that this was to be
the Thirteenth Infantry? This letter reflects the
urgency felt in Washington. The United States was
now at war, yet the armies intended to invade across
the Niagara River and to march on Montreal were
not in place.
By early July, Smyth re-assumed control over the
mobilization process. In a letter to Boerstler on July
9 and referring to the Congressional Act of 26 June,
he wrote: “A new organization of regiments has
been established. You will in a short time be
informed who are the officers of the fourteenth
regiment.” 12
Smyth and Macomb had managed the chaos as the
officer commissioning system and the recruiting
system were put in place and the bugs worked out.
Now they were needed in the field. Macomb
desperately wanted a command, a position denied
him as an engineer. He lobbied hard and on July 6
his promotion to colonel and command of the Third
Artillery was approved. On July 28, Smyth was
promoted to Inspector General with the rank of
brigadier general and was sent to Albany to serve
under Major General Henry Dearborn. His duties at
the War Department were assumed by the Adjutant
General’s Office. Now Brigadier General Thomas
Cushing, the Army Adjutant General, ran the
recruiting campaign.
8
Smyth to Winder, April 22, 1812. AG Letters Sent.
Smyth to Parker, July 3, 1812. AG Letters Sent.
10
Smyth to Boerstler, June 15, 1812. AG Letters Sent.
9
11
12
Smyth to Schuyler, June 22, 1812. AG Letters Sent.
Smyth to Boerstler, July 9, 1812. AG Letters Sent.
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throughout the war and especially during the
campaign season, returns were sporadic at best.
Brig. Gen. Thomas Humphrey Cushing
As recruiting officers were given commands of
companies and regiments and deployed to the
frontiers or to coastal cities, it was time to turn over
recruiting to the regiments. On July 31, 1812, the
Adjutant General Office assigned ten infantry
regiments to General Dearborn. Cushing also
directed these regimental commanders to begin
recruiting their own soldiers. They were to
designate assembly areas and send returns to
Dearborn each week. “Permit me to add that the
interest of the country and honor of the Army,
imperiously call for the utmost exertion of
recruiting officers, and that an expectation of the
most zealous exertions of all the recruiting officers
of your regiment, is cherished with the fullest
confidence.” 13
The War Department still did not know with any
certainty the strength of the army. On September
26, Cushing wrote to Dearborn noting that he had
not yet sent a return of the army, nor have the
regimental commanders sent in their weekly
recruiting returns. “These returns are all important,
and it is impossible that the state of the army should
be known without them.” 14 His letter was in vain;
13
Cushing to various regimental commanders, July 31, 1812.
AG Letters Sent.
14
Cushing to Dearborn, September 26, 1812. AG Letters
Sent.
The systems that put officers and soldiers in place
to begin operations were slow and only partially
successful. However, the support systems were
slower still and even less effective. On September
30, Dearborn wrote to Madison from his training
camp at Greenbush, New York, complaining that
the delays in appointments and in organizing the
bureaucratic departments had contributed to his
inability to invade Lower Canada. “The tedious
delays in the appointment & organization of the
Quarter Master, Commissary of Purchases &
Ordnance & Pay Master Departments – as well as
the deficiency of Major Generals – have had an
unfortunate effect on all our measures. I am averse
to complaining, but I have been so incessantly
engaged in the minute details of those departments
– as well as the usual employments in organizing
the troops & preparing them for service, as to have
rendered my duties perplexing and painful.”
Dearborn went on to recommend an increase in the
number of generals and an increase in a private’s
pay from $5 to $8. 15
On October 7, the President responded to
Dearborn’s complaints, agreeing with each of them
and additionally bemoaning the inefficiencies in
recruiting and deficiencies in the laws governing the
volunteer system and the militia. 16 Clearly,
Madison saw the Congress as the chief impediment
in harnessing the national resources in pursuit of the
war effort.
What was the result of the mobilization effort?
Captain William King, an Assistant Inspector
General, examined William Winder’s Fourteenth
Infantry in October. King found major deficiencies
in arms, equipment, and clothing. The men were
still in their linen summer uniforms and many were
shoeless despite oncoming winter. Perhaps most
15
Dearborn to Madison, September 30, 1812. James Madison
papers, Series 1, reel 14. NARA.
16
Madison to Dearborn, October 7, 1812. James Madison
papers, Series 1, reel 14. NARA.
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telling was his summary of the officers and men.
“The Colonel and Lieutenant Colonel appear to
have taken great pains to acquire a knowledge of
the duties of their stations. The company officers
are almost as ignorant of their duty as when they
entered service. The non-commissioned officers
and privates are generally only tolerably good
recruits.” He went on to summarize, “the regiment
is composed entirely of recruits; they appear to be
almost as ignorant of their duty as if they had never
seen a camp, and scarcely know on which shoulder
to carry the musket. They are mere militia, and if
possible, even worse; and if taken into action in
their present state, will prove more dangerous to
themselves than to their enemy.” 17
It is easy to conclude that the regular army in 1812
was woefully unprepared for offensive operations
and easy to identify the many shortcomings. It is a
little more difficult to evaluate the “system of
systems” to identify the most egregious
deficiencies.
Congress was slow to act, and would not give the
President what he requested. It was as if Congress
deliberated with no sense of urgency. By
withholding confirmation of commissions, valuable
weeks were lost before officers reported to their
recruiting duties. The major change in the
organization of regiments between January and June
also cost the War Department valuable time in
assigning officers to their regiments. This robbed
the army of time to train soldiers and move them to
their assembly areas near the border. The campaign
season begins in late spring, yet van Rensselaer did
not attack until October and Dearborn in November.
Clearly, the logistical systems were broken. Too
many troops had no tents. Blankets were hardly
worth the name. Too much ammunition was of
inferior quality, too many weapons broken. It
would be an unusual soldier indeed who would not
be demoralized under these conditions.
Yet the critical factor, the factor that if it had been
satisfactory would have made up for loss of time
and defective and missing equipment, was itself
deficient. In an army, leadership is the glue that
holds everything together and makes everything
run. The army’s leaders, from ensign to general,
were, on the whole, unsatisfactory. The general
ignorance of their duties meant that those few
officers who knew what to do, were forced to do it
all. From organizing a camp to drilling soldiers in
battalion maneuvers, the vast number of officers
were complete novices. Fortunately, this deficiency
tends to self-correct over time. Officers learn their
duties eventually and senior officers teach and
coach their subordinates. Officers unwilling or
unable to do what it takes, either resign or are
relegated to unimportant duties. Jefferson, in a
letter to William Duane, made a prediction.
But the weakness of our enemy…will make our first
errors innocent & the seed of genius which nature
sows with even hand through every age & country
& which need only soil and season to germinate,
will develop themselves among our military men.
Some of them will become prominent and, seconded
by the native energy of our citizens, will soon, I
hope, to our force, add the benefits of skill. 18
Jefferson, for the most part, was correct in this
assessment. However, it took two long years of
fighting for the regular army to achieve tactical
parity with their foe. Clearly, this was not how the
president and his congressional allies saw the war
unfolding.
Richard V. Barbuto, Ph.D., U.S. Army Command
and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas, is the author of Niagara 1814: America
Invades Canada and other books.
17
King’s report found in “On the manner in which the war has
been conducted.” American State Papers, Military Affairs,
1:491-92.
18
Jefferson to Duane, August 4, 1812.
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The Butcher’s Bill:
Casualties Aboard U.S.S. Constitution After Guerriere and Java
By Commander Tyrone G. Martin, U.S. Navy (Retired)
In the battle reports of the Age of Fighting Sail, we learn some details of the
events reported: the identities of the ships involved and their commanders, and the
outcome. Of the human cost, we learn the number killed and wounded, but little or
nothing of the causes, nature, and care of these wounds. It is a rare piece of good
fortune that two medical day books kept by 27-year-old Surgeon Amos A. Evans,
the supervising Surgeon on board U.S.S. Constitution in 1812 and 1813 have been
preserved and provide us with an almost unique picture of the fortunes of that
famous frigate’s wounded following the battles with Guerriere and Java.1
Constitution vs. Guerriere, 19 August 1812
1
Surgeon Amos A. Evans’ Medical Day Books, 26 March to 27 August 1812 and 27 August 1812 to 5 March
1813, William L. Clements Library, University of Michigan. See
http://quod.lib.umich.edu/c/clementsmss/umich-wcl-M-262eva?view=text and S. T. Kimble, “Amos A. Evans
MD: Father of American Naval Medicine.” Maryland Medical Journal, July 1991, Vol. 40, 587–92.
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Commodore Isaac Hull, portrait by Samuel Waldo after Gilbert Stuart
Constitution and Guerriere came upon one another on the afternoon of 19
August 1812, some 600 miles east of Boston. The code of the day made a fight
certain, but judging by his actions, the American commander, Captain Isaac Hull,
U.S.N., was uncertain how to proceed and closed with his foe very carefully despite
having the favored upwind position. His hesitancy seems to have irked his more
experienced opponent, Captain James Richard Dacres, Jr., R.N., and the latter, after
a period of indecisive maneuvering, turned downwind, a signal for Hull to close in
and get on with it. Hull did, deciding that, with his inexperience and an equally
green crew, his best course would be to get as close as possible so as not to miss
and let fly with double shotted guns to overwhelm the Briton before he could do
significant damage in return. It worked, though not without two collisions. The big
American frigate suffered little material damage while the Englishman lost all his
masts. On the human side, Hull had had seven men killed and eight wounded. The
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heavily constructed American frigate absorbed all her foe could deliver and largely
protected her men from harm. Guerriere, on the other hand, had fifteen killed and
sixty-three wounded.
Surgeon Evans took no note of the dead in his day book. We know from other
sources that Marine Lieutenant William Sharp Bush was shot through the head
while preparing to lead a boarding attempt, and that Seaman Robert Bruce died
when the carronade he was serving went off prematurely as he worked at its
muzzle. How the remaining five were lost has gone unrecorded. Evans’ notes on
the wounded, however, are clear and complete. These unfortunate souls included a
commissioned officer, a warrant officer, five seamen or ordinary seamen, and a
Marine private. Five had been wounded by musket fire, and one each by round
shot, langrage, and splinter. Four had leg wounds, two chest wounds, and one each
had wounds to the head, an arm, and the abdomen. The Surgeon and his two mates,
John Armstrong and Donaldson Yates, had an interesting assortment for their first
exposure to battle casualties.
Senior among the patients was Lieutenant Charles Morris, Hull’s next-senior
officer, who had taken a musket ball in the abdomen as he prepared to succeed
Lieutenant Bush at the head of the boarding party. The ball entered nearly dead
center about an inch-and-a-half above his navel, went clear through him, and came
out near his spine. Evans had warm poultices bandaged over the entry and exit
wounds, and being a believer in the antiphlogistic course of treatment, he bled
Morris and promptly gave him an emetic—which didn’t work. He repeated the
emetic, and then enemas until some “slight foecal discharge” resulted. Cooling
drinks followed, and, amazingly, Morris’ stomach retained everything given him.
His pain, reported the surgeon, was no “more than might be expected from a wound
of the muscle alone.”
A word about antiphlogistic treatment. In 1667, the alchemist and physician
Johann Joachim Becher proposed the phlogiston theory had come to the conclusion
that the reason there was less material to be seen and weighed after burning was
because an invisible, tasteless, and odorless “something” had been formed that
accounted for the difference. This he called “phlogiston.” The idea was extended
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to the medical field in the belief that inflammation, fevers, and other heated
conditions were indicators that a form of combustion was occurring and this
mysterious “something” was present. To remove the unwanted heat, then, one must
bleed or otherwise cause the removal of its likely sources: make the patient throw
up and/or have bowel movements. Such was the basis for Evans’ treatments.
Commodore Charles Morris by Sarah E. Smith after Art Scheffer
Morris survived this traumatic initial treatment well, and just three days later
Evans was noting that “he feels easy & has some appetite & but little fever.” On 24
August, he had no fever and pleased the doctor with “a copious foecal discharge,”
an event he repeated on succeeding days. On 27 August, some small particles of
clothing worked their way out of the frontal wound.
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Sailing Master John Cushing Aylwin, another denizen of the quarterdeck, was
wounded by a musket ball in the shoulder, apparently fired at long range, for it did
not completely penetrate beneath the skin. It was popped out quite easily, the
wound being covered by a “simple cerate,” a waxy preparation that kept its
medicines in contact with it. In three days’ time, he was being advised to be less
active because his coat was causing irritation and inflammation. Thereafter, it
healed steadily without complication.
The greatest challenge faced by Surgeon Evans and his mates was the case of
Seaman Richard Dunn. From the looks of the wound, he had been hit by langrage
just above the ankle, shattering the tibia and shredding a lot of muscle. Amputation
occurred the next morning, the cut coming below the knee. Dunn’s life for more
than the next week was a hell of pain and sleeplessness. At various times he
experienced muscle spasms and stinging pain in the stump. On the night of 23
August, in his restlessness he threw himself out of his cot and crashed to the deck.
Fortunately, nothing more than a loosening of bandages involved the stump. Evans
did what he could for him, dosing him with laudanum and keeping the stump
wrapped in bandages soaked in the stuff. By 28 August, the doctor was noting a
healthy appearance in his handiwork, and that night Dunn finally got some needed
sleep.
Seaman Owen Taylor received a fluky musket ball wound: it entered his back
from the side, traveled laterally, came out of the muscle short of the spine, reentered
muscle again on the other side of the spine, and finally exited behind and below the
other arm. Initially, he suffered much pain and had trouble breathing. Evans cured
the “heat” by bleeding him and giving him cooling drinks. However unreal the
treatment may seem, the next day Taylor was “much relieved” and healing
proceeded without further incident.
David Lewis, another seaman, was hit in the head by something that gave him
a concussion while cutting his scalp and causing a brief bleeding from one ear. No
damage to the cranium could be detected. He also was struck by a musket ball
through the arm. Whether his reaction to the bullet caused him to strike his head or
it was a second event is not known. Surgeon Evans’ initial entry concludes with the
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ominous “Strict antiphlogistic plan to be pursued.” He began with a blood-letting
and a cathartic. Lewis’ recovery proceeded without much difficulty. His headaches
persisted for ten days before the “pain of head is removed.”
It isn’t known where Private Francis Mullin was when a musket ball struck
him in the lower leg, but it apparently passed through without doing any serious
structural damage. Treatment was limited to simple bandaging and no drastic
antiphlogistic action. Looks can be deceptive, however, and Mullin’s wound did
not recover as might have been expected. On 11 September, it was seen that bits of
cloth were working their way to the surface Several days passed before the cloth
was out and the healing process resumed. He finally was returned to duty on 23
September.
Seaman George Reynolds and Ordinary Seaman John Craig both received
contusions. Reynolds had two, one above and one below the knee, caused by a
British shot rebounding from the mainmast into him. While the wounds themselves
apparently were nothing more than scrapes, the shock of the strikes evidently
wrenched his knee, and it was, again, 23 September before he was returned to duty.
Craig’s was but a slight contusion below the knee caused by a passing splinter.
Treated with a simple dressing on the evening of the battle, he needed no further
medical attention. (And he was excluded from the count of wounded by the captain
in his report.)
Constitution returned to Boston on 30 August. Lieutenant Morris was taken
ashore immediately, Surgeon Evans recording that he was “rapidly recovering.”
Seaman Dunn was sent to hospital on the 31 August or 1 September. Everyone else
completed their recovery on board and was present when the ship again went to sea
near the end of October.
It was traditional in the Royal Navy to promote the First Lieutenant of a
victorious frigate one grade. Secretary of the Navy Paul Hamilton, in the euphoria
of the unexpected victory, jumped Charles Morris right past Master Commandant to
Captain. It brought howls of protest from some officers, but the decision stood.
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Morris continued in service until 1856, when he died while serving as Chief of the
Bureau of Ordnance. A sidewheel steamer was named for him in the Civil War.
Sailing Master Aylwin was promoted to Lieutenant and continued in the ship.
He died of a terrible wound received in the battle with HMS Java while serving the
forecastle division officer. His service was commemorated by a galley later in the
War of 1812, World War I and II destroyers, and a more recent frigate.
Seaman Richard Dunn, in keeping with Navy policy at the time, was retained
in service and given a billet at the Boston Navy Yard and a lifetime pension of $6 a
month dating from 24 September 1812. He subsequently was warranted a Gunner,
and is known to have served at the Portsmouth (NH) Navy Yard for more than two
decades. Historians are indebted to him for having recorded the ammunition
Constitution expended in defeating Guerriere.
Seaman Lewis and Private Mullin continued in the ship until after the Java
victory; Seaman Reynolds remained throughout the war. Four years after the war,
Mullin was seeking a pension for his wound. The subsequent activities of Seaman
Taylor and Ordinary Seaman Craig are unknown.
After two months in port refitting, Constitution sailed on her second war
cruise, this time under the command of the very unpopular Commodore William
Bainbridge. He rightly was considered “unlucky,” having been the first U.S. naval
officer to surrender his ship to an enemy (in the Quasi-War with France) and to lose
a frigate (Philadelphia, taken by the Tripolines during the Barbary War after he had
run her aground). Sailing in company with the sloop of war Hornet, Bainbridge
proceeded to the South Atlantic where, offshore while the sloop blockaded a British
counterpart in the Brazilian port of Sao Salvador (Bahia, today), he encountered
HMS Java, near-sister to Guerriere.
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Constitution vs. Java, 29 December 1812
Unlike Isaac Hull, once he recognized his foe as another frigate, Bainbridge
set sail to close, even accepting the leeward position. While the American captain
had never fought a ship duel before, his opponent was one of Britain’s most
experienced frigate captains. Once again, the battle lasted something over two
hours, but this time both sides remained agile and constantly fought for advantage,
the action first seeming to favor one side and then the other until a lucky American
shot carried away the Briton’s jibboom and maimed her maneuverability. From that
point on, the outcome was more and more certainly an American victory.
The tally of the butcher’s bill at battle’s end is a measure of the tenacity with
which the action was fought. Bainbridge had had eight men killed and twenty-eight
wounded; the Briton had twenty-two killed and one hundred two wounded,
according to her senior surviving officer (sources vary). The American wounded
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included two commissioned officers, two petty officers, twenty-one sailors, and
three Marines. While the causes of eight wounds were not recorded, seven were
from burns, five from grape shot, four from round shot, two from musket balls, and
one each from langrage and scrap metal. Twelve were wounded principally in a
leg, eight in the chest, four in an arm, three in the head, and there was one unlocated
in the record.
Surgeon Evans did not have an opportunity to make an entry in his day book
for a week after the battle’s end, by which time one of the wounded had succumbed
to his injuries. While he and his mates were attending to their wounded shipmates,
the ship’s line officers were struggling with organizing the results of their victory.
Beyond immediate efforts to effect repairs of critical equipment and ready the gun
batteries for possible further action, there was the matter of taking possession of the
dismasted Java, making the appropriate disposition of her crew. It was decided the
ship would be scuttled, so the problem became transferring the approximately four
hundred Britons—including over a hundred wounded—to Constitution with only
one ship’s boat operational. This took two days, and as the prisoners were brought
across confinement for the ambulatory was arranged in the hold while space on the
two upper decks was allotted to the wounded. Evans, Armstrong, and Yates, after
their regular ministrations to their own wounded, provided assistance to Java’s
medical men. It was not until after Constitution arrived in Sao Salvador and offloaded both the British wounded and paroled crewmen that life began to return to
normal in the big frigate.
At some point early on, the medical team of a surgeon, two mates, and a
loblolly boy was augmented by three men provided part-time from the crew (“parttime” because they were not excused from their regular watches). Surgeon Evans
assigned them duties as follows: “…Johnson must attend to the cooking &
procuring water for the Sick—Williams must wash all the bandages &c in Barlery
[sic] water & have them ready rolld up. He must also scrape lint & pay a general
attention to the Sick. He must make the poultices. Bowen [the loblolly boy] must
Give all medicines. Stephen Vee must make all drinks & give them[.] He must
also see that every man has Lemonade when he wants it…” The mates appear to
have been on a watch-and-watch schedule of constant attendance on the wounded in
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sickbay and on the berth deck, while Evans held himself on call at any time he was
wanted.
Commodore William Bainbridge as pictured in Benson J. Lossing’s The Pictorial Field-Book of
the War of 1812 (New York: Harper’s, 1868)
William Bainbridge himself headed the list of wounded. In addition to a
slight contusion on one leg, he had been struck deeply in the thigh by what Surgeon
Evans recorded as a musket ball after first suspecting a splinter. The wound was
dressed with warm cataplasms. The wound grew steadily more painful and
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inflamed. On 6 January, Evans palpated the area and thought he could feel what
probably was a metal object. Repeated poultices reduced the inflammation, and the
next day he enlarged the wound and withdrew a piece of copper rod with very
jagged ends. It had come from the railing around the companionway, possibly
struck when Java had managed a single rake from astern. With that, the surgeon
secured the edges of the wound together with adhesive and a tight bandage.
Bainbridge soon complained that it was too tight, and an hour later, after a
cataplasm had replaced the tight bandage, it began bleeding. A blood vessel at the
bottom of the wound was seen to be open and initially failed to respond to efforts to
close it. Evans finally got some flour from the Purser, which resulted in a
successful clotting. Thereafter, recovery continued apace, and on 11 January the
Commodore began exercising the leg—and overdid it. He still was overexerting
himself on 19 January, the last time note was made of his condition.
Lieutenant John Aylwin presented Evans with his most wrenching case. As
Sailing Master four months earlier, Aylwin had received a slight musket ball
wound. On this later occasion, he was struck by a grape shot the size of a tennis
ball weighing about two pounds that tore into him, damaging the clavicle and
scapula, tearing through muscles, and exiting near his spine. Somehow, it missed
heart, lungs, and arteries. Evans could do little but try and make him comfortable
and let nature take its course. The entrance and exit wounds were kept wet with
rags soaked in vinegar and water because poultices were too painful. Cool drinks
like lemonade eased a fever. Laudanum eased the pain a little, and anodynes
(sleeping compounds) let Aylwin sleep occasionally. By January 5, the flesh
around the wounds was dying and falling away—“sloughing.” On January 9, Evans
noted that the wounds had become “dreadfully offensive” and included charcoal in
the wet rags to absorb some of the stench. A notes of hope appeared in the day book
from 10 to 13 January, when the wounds looked much “cleaner” and some small
pieces of bone were extracted. Troublesome were the spasms and twitching Aylwin
was experiencing in the arm, and pains grew worse. Light dressings and laudanum
continued as treatments, along with doses of quinine and wine. The patient began
to experience alternating periods of chills and fever. Several times, Evans ordered
enemas to remove the “phlogiston” without, of course, any positive effect. The
chill and fever cycle grew ever more severe, and he was bathed in vinegar and
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water to ease the latter. On 27 January, Aylwin began having periods of delirium.
During a lucid period, he asked to be moved from sickbay to his own stateroom in
the wardroom, which was done. Most of the next day was spent in a stupor, the
surgeon writing, “Death evidently hurrying approaching…” Aylwin sank slowly
through the evening until 1 A.M. on 29 January, when his wounds suddenly bled
freely and he died.
It had been a month in hell for Aylwin and almost as bad for Evans, whose
final entry in the case reads, “A braver or better man perhaps never lived. To his
friends, the loss is great, to his country, still greater. He died in the Latitude 1615N & the Longitude of 51W…” In this instance, the doctor could not remain
professionally aloof. He bordered the final Aylwin entry in black.
Aylwin was far from the only critical or serious case the battle created for the
American medics. In the period immediately after the battle, seven men would be
the victims of amputations. Which went under the knife first, or who did the deed,
is not recorded. With so many patients to attend to, it is probable that Evans did the
surgery, assisted by one of the mates, while the other did triage and saw to the
needs of the other twenty. The amputees, their losses, and treatments follow.
Senior helmsman of four was Quartermaster Peter Woodbury. All were
casualties when Java managed to get in a stern rake about an hour into the battle.
Woodbury, the only one to survive, had his left thumb shot off rather cleanly with
slight damage to adjacent fingers. His recovery was slow, and his main problem
seems to have been constipation, not infection. He completed his recovery in the
hospital at Boston.
Seaman Peter Brimblecomb, a loader on #1 long gun, had his elbow shattered
by a ball. The amputation was straight-forward, and by 5 January Evans could note
“the stump is nearly healed” but for the separation of the two ligatures. Beyond
bandage changes, his only treatment was regular doses of quinine decocted in red
wine. The “small ligature” came away on 13 January, and that evening his sleep
was disturbed by pain in the wrist he no longer had. The last ligature came away a
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week later as he continued on the decoction. On 7 February, he was considered
totally recovered.
Joseph P. Cheevers, 2nd loader on #5 long gun, who brother was killed
outright in the battle, had an arm shattered near the elbow by a ball. Amputation
was above the elbow, like Seaman Brimblecomb, and like him, by the 5th Surgeon
Evans was satisfied with his healing. Five days later, however, it became evident
that all was not well when the stump seemed to have developed a fungus. It was
wet with laudanum and the sailor received a cathartic. On 11 January, the stump
was discharging what was said to be “healthy pus” freely and Cheevers had a chill
and fever. The fungus was seen to be originating from the bone end on 15 January
and a caustic applied to it, which reduced it but did not knock it out. He began to be
dosed with quinine and wine. For the next week or so, periods of chills and fever
were broken by a day or so when things looked to be on the mend. Cathartics were
given almost daily, along with the quinine and wine. Another series of chills and
fever began on 21 January, and on 24 January he began having periods of delirium.
Blisters behind the neck were added to the other treatments. Inability to keep
anything on his stomach followed the next day, together with a “general stiffness of
the limbs.” His pulse became feeble and his extremities cool. He went into a
stupor which repeated warm brandy toddies with quinine did nothing for. At eight
bells of the afternoon watch on 27 January, he died
One of a clutch of wounded from the main top, Seaman John Clements took a
ball in his right leg that severed his foot and badly lacerated the remaining leg.
Evans took it off below that knee, giving a cathartic and anodynes afterward. Four
days later, it was discovered that the stump had been hemorrhaging and the surgeon
went back in to correct it. By the time he did so, the bleeding had stopped and the
former leak couldn’t be located. All seemed to be well. Two ligatures fell free on 4
January, but Clements was in a lot of pain. Evans thought it might be due to the
fact that he had had to operate without hot water. Quinine and wine, together with a
nourishing diet, was prescribed. On 5 January, the stump began to slough off dead
flesh, and continued to do so until 10 January, by which time the tip of the sawed
bone became visible. The stump “looks bad & discharges foully,” wrote the
surgeon. The very next day, however, it looked better – and continued to do so,
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although Clements continued to have considerable pain. On 27 January, a piece of
tibia exfoliated and burnt alum was applied to the remaining end to preclude the
formation of fungus. By the time Constitution reached port, the stump had healed
everywhere except one persistent spot of the tibia. Clements was sent with a group
of other patients to the hospital. No record has been found of his subsequent
experience.
The one sailor to gain fame from the Guerriere fight was Seaman Daniel
Hogan, who action in nailing an ensign to the foremast during the battle when it
was partly shot away caught the popular imagination. In the later engagement,
Hogan, a member of the #9 long gun crew, was not so lucky. By means not
recorded, his right thumb and forefinger were badly fractured, other fingers hurt,
and the back of the hand “considerably injured.” His left hand also was injured, and
the forefinger thought likely to be amputated. Surgeon Evans worked very hard to
save the right thumb, by bandaging it firmly in a natural position. He succeeded,
but it ended up as a useless appendage. The hands were kept clad in poultices, and,
in keeping with the approved philosophy, Hogan received cathartics regularly. By
the time home port was reached, the left forefinger was gone and the right hand
healing well. Hogan also went to hospital.
The train tackleman on #11 carronnade, Seaman Reuben Sanderline, took a
grape shot at an angle in the upper left chest that exited in his armpit and passed
through his arm, breaking it. There was no hemorrhage, and the doctors thought it
might be possible to save the arm. Time proved them wrong and it was amputated
on 5 January, by which time gangrene had set in. Sanderline worsened rapidly and
died late on 6 January.
Master’s Mate Charles Waldo, in charge of the main top, is the last of the
group there maimed by a very destructive salvo. A grape shot passed through his
leg about six inches above the ankle, breaking both bones. The leg was splinted and
a cataplasm applied. For several days, there was hope it could be saved, but on 8
January it hemorrhaged severely and finally was stopped only by the application of
a tourniquet. Close inspection found the leg had been damaged far more than
realized earlier, and Evans had to take it off above the knee on 9 January.
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Following a particularly rough twenty-four hours that included the usual
antiphlogistical treatment, Waldo stabilized, complaining that he plainly felt the
amputated foot and toes. After a week of profuse discharges from the stump, the
ligatures came away and the flow abated. Waldo managed to get out of bed and sit
for a short time on 23 January, and then the discharges began again, some “rather
offensive.” By mid-February, the stump was healing satisfactorily and Evans found
no cause for further day book entries.
A grape shot struck Seaman Peter Furnace, powder passer on #12 long gun, in
mid calf. It damaged the tibia and came to rest closer to the ankle. The surgeon
operated, cutting the ball out, then placed the leg in splints, dressed it in cataplasms,
and, of course, flushed him out. From there, the familiar downward course
transpired: with no antibiotics or sanitizing drugs. infection set in. Swelling and
inflammation came on, together with spasms, sweats, and chills. The doctor went
through his menu of quinine, wine, opiates, camphor, and ipecac, with regular
bathings of the limb in vinegar and warm water. On 5 February, Evans admitted to
his day book that Furnace “sinks gradually.” The sailor died about midnight on 7
January.
Another grape shot took Seaman William Long in the shoulder, much as
Lieutenant Aylwin had been wounded, but Long’s hit higher up and went straight
through a much shorter distance. Both front and back wounds drained freely, no
fever arose, and the patient kept his appetite. Bone chips began exfoliating early in
February as healing continued steadily. Long was one of those sent to hospital
upon return to Boston.
Seaman James Ward, the train tackleman on #5 carronade, is the last of the
men to suffer amputation. An extensive leg wound caused it to be removed at the
thigh. Quinine and wine, and regular changes of the dressing was the order of
succeeding days—along with cathartics. Recovery proceeded apace until the early
morning of 18 January, when a coughing fit resulted a bleeding stump. A
tourniquet was applied to stop it, successfully. An adhesive dressing was applied.
The subsequent appearance of a fungus was treated with copper acetate. A small
spot remained when the ship reached Boston, and he was sent to hospital.
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Ordinary Thomas Williams, the third of that name to join ship’s company and
sponger on #9 long gun, took a hit that glanced of his third rib and was cut out of
the pectoral muscle. He also had scrapes on his face and wrist perhaps from falling
when he was hit. He was pronounced “better” on 19 January.
Gundeck of U.S.S. Constitution
The casualties from the Java battle gave Evans and his mates a new category
of patient: burn victims. It is unrecorded in any other known contemporary
documentation, but evidently a powder charge exploded in the vicinity of carronade
#4 during the course of the action. Seaman Nicholas Wickstram, 2nd loader, was
burned on hands, face, and shoulder. Treated first with cold water and then coated
with lamp oil, his burns responded well and the surgeon took no further notice of
him after a week. Loader Enos Bateman of the same carronade crew also was
burned, although details are lacking. Given the same treatment as Wickstram, he
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progressed well until a week before the ship’s arrival in Boston, when he came
down with chill and fever. He was among those sent to hospital on 18 February.
Number 4’s captain, Seaman Stephen Webb, was “burnt all over…& had his left
thumb shot off together with an extensive contusion wound of the face.” Cold
water was applied, followed by lamp oil. Webb became the first of the wounded to
succumb on 2 January. It is probable that, in addition to the reported injuries, the
explosion also damaged his respiratory system.
Ordinary Seaman Samuel Brown, 2nd Sponger on #5 carronade also was
“much burnt” on face, chest, and arms, probably by the same explosion. The cold
water and oiled rags treatment was successful in his case. Seaman Duncan
McDonald of #8 carronade had his head and ear burnt by gun powder, while
Seaman William Weeden and Private Anthony Reeves, elsewhere stationed,
suffered burns on feet and legs, and were similarly treated. McDonald and Reeves
responded well and were no longer under Evans’ care by mid-month. Weeden’s
foot took longer to respond, and because it still was ulcerated he went to hospital on
2 March at Boston. Again, none of these accidents involving gun powder are
addressed in the ship’s log or personal journals of participants.
Third sponger Stephen Sheppard of #9 long gun was a unique case. A shot –
round or grape – came through the scupper near his gun, scattering bits of the lead
sheathing before it. Sheppard, in the way, was peppered with “innumerable” lead
particles, from head to foot, with a large piece in a thigh. The medicos applied
simple dressings and poultices, and picked out bits as they appeared. It was at least
two weeks before Sheppard began to get some decent sleep when space was found
for him in a cot (rather than his usual hammock). The thigh wound was very slow
to heal, so Sheppard finally was sent to hospital on 2 March to complete recovery.
Sailors John Brannon, Philip Cook, Abijah Eddy, and James D. Hammond, as
well as Privates Michael Chisley and John Elwell, all received contusions. Brannon
and Chisley, both with slight head wounds, were off the sick list within a week.
Eddy and Hammond took longer. Eddy’s thigh wound was not healed until nearly
the end of January, while Cook’s thigh wound nearly became gangrenous before
treatment with charcoal poultices, pulverized nitre, and decoctions of quinine in
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wine brought it around. He was last seen on 27 February. Private Elwell, who had
contusions to the leg, arm, and chest, required the most attention, with the same
treatment as applied to Seamen Eddy used in his case when the leg wound seemed
headed for gangrene. He was one of the group sent to hospital on 2 March to
complete recovery.
In the aftermath of the battle, after the return to home port, Commodore
Bainbridge took command to the Boston Navy Yard and continued in various
positions until his death in 1833. Seaman Brimblecomb was retained in a position
at the navy yard and received a $6 per month pension. Seaman Brannon remained
in the ship until transferred to USS Congress on 1 June 1815. Seaman Long, who
was rated cook in August 1813, remained with the ship until 14 July 1815, when he
was discharged with a $6 a month pension. Seaman Brown ran at Boston on 14
July 1813, as Private Chesley had done the previous 15 May. Ordinary Seaman
Hogan was promoted to Seaman on 24 June 1813, then reduced to Ordinary
Seaman again the following 5 August. He remained in the ship until 20 February
1815, when he was transferred to the former HMS Cyane as a member of the prize
crew. In World War I, a destroyer (DD-178) was named for him. Private Reeves
was transferred to the Marine Barracks at Boston on 27 March 1813. Master’s
Mate Waldo was promoted to Sailing Master as of 10 March 1813 and placed on
duty at the Boston Navy Yard, where he still was serving when killed in an accident
in 1838. His draughts of the ship, prepared while at the yard, provide researchers
today with valuable information about the ship at war’s end. Quartermaster
Woodbury was discharged on 25 September 1813. He died at Beverly,
Massachusetts, on 24 October 1850.
Both Surgeon’s Mates had been newly commissioned in May 1812, and both
were natives of Ireland. Donaldson Yates (or Yeates), the senior of the two by
thirteen days, stayed in the ship until October 1813, when he was ordered to USS
Rattlesnake. In poor health, he subsequently was allowed sick leave to return to his
residence in Maryland, where he died on 28 October 1815. John D. Armstrong
stayed until December 1815, when he is known to have left the ship. He had been
repeatedly importuning the Secretary of the Navy for duty ashore as, having
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participated in two victories over the Royal Navy, he was sure he would be hanged
if taken prisoner. The last official entry regarding him in 1824 noted he was dead.
Amos Alexander Evans had been in the Navy since 1808 and a Surgeon since
April 1810. He was furloughed ashore in April 1813, and subsequently took up
duties at the Navy Yard, where he also conducted a private practice on the side. In
1814, he was awarded his M.D. degree, with distinction, by Harvard. In 1815, he
acted as Bainbridge’s fleet surgeon in the squadron that officer led to the
Mediterranean as a part of the U.S. response to renewed Algerine depredations
against our merchant ships. In 1816, he married a Boston minister’s daughter.
Evans remained in service until 1824, when he resigned his commission and
returned to his home in Elkton, Maryland, where he remained in private practice
until his death in 1848.
Surgeon Evans was a dedicated doctor. His abilities must be considered
exemplary as he had seen the crew through two battles and had saved all the
wounded in the first and eighteen of twenty-three in the latter with only the most
rudimentary knowledge and limited medications.
It also must be said that a contributing factor was Constitution herself. Her
stout construction largely withstood the worst her enemies could throw at her, even
to being so strong as to minimize the amount of splintering caused by enemy shot,
often alleged to be the principal cause of many horrific wounds. No wonder her
crewmen were so loyal. “Old Ironsides” indeed!
Commander Tyrone Martin served for 26 years as a Surface Warfare Officer in cruisers,
destroyers, and amphibs. His last duty was command of U.S.S. Constitution during the
National Bicentennial of 1976. Since retiring, he has continued his research into the ship's
history, writing six books about her and creating the website http://www.CaptainsClerk.info,
which he is proud to say has been selected for inclusion in the permanent electronic archives of
the Library of Congress.
The U.S.S. Constitution Museum’s website has Surgeon Amos Evans’ Lecture Notebooks. See
http://www.ussconstitutionmuseum.org/proddir/prod/496/31
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Isaac Brock: Remembering and MisRemembering a Canadian Hero: A
Review Essay by Wesley B. Turner, on
Jonathon Riley’s A Matter of Honour. The
Life, Campaigns and Generalship of Isaac
Brock (Montreal: Robin Brass, 2011).
Almost thirty years ago a prominent
Canadian military historian wrote in his
conclusion about the War of 1812, “In a
general history of warfare, the Canadian
War of 1812 would bulk small. Perhaps it
would merit a footnote, a few sentences, a
short paragraph at most...The war produced
no great historical figures, British, Canadian
or American; no great field officers,
Although it is not uncommon to
dismiss this war as unimportant, there is no
theorists or strategists; no new or original
denying that there is almost a library of
1
tactical ideas.” Recently, a prominent
American historian wrote, “The War of 1812
looms small in American memory, forgotten
as insignificant because it apparently ended
as a draw that changed no boundary and no
policy....Canadians primarily remember
what Americans forget, celebrating their
victory as a David over the American
Goliath...And Canadians cultivate their own
patriotic icons, particularly the martyr Isaac
Brock and the plucky Laura Secord.”
books about the war generally or about
particular facets: campaigns, battles, leaders,
politics, peace treaty, and legacies. More
works are being written and published every
year in Canada, the United States, and
Britain. One of the individuals who receive a
great deal of attention in the literature is
Major General Isaac Brock. Anyone who
undertakes to write about Sir Isaac needs to
place him in context and, among other tasks,
2
explain his prominence.
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Brock in Previous War of 1812 Literature
During the War of 1812, five British
had before the War of 1812. Aside from his
biography in the Dictionary of Canadian
Army officers held the principal
Biography (DCB), the most informative
responsibility for the military defence and
source on Prevost is the obscure Some
civil administration of the provinces of
Account of the Public Life of the Late
Lower and Upper Canada. Sir George
Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost,
Prevost was governor-in-chief as well as
Bart. (1823), which was written on behalf of
commander of the forces for British North
the family by his former civil secretary,
America. In Upper Canada, the position of
Lieutenant Colonel E. B. Brenton. There are
chief administrator and commander of the
also two useful, but not readily available,
forces was held successively by Major
Masters theses, one by A. M. J. Hyatt and
General Isaac Brock, Major General Sir
the other by Ira M. Sutherland.3
Roger Hale Sheaffe, Major General Baron
Out of twenty-one published works on
Francis de Rottenburg and, finally,
Brock, fourteen are biographies, four deal
Lieutenant General Gordon Drummond. Of
with some aspect of his life, and three are
the five men, only Brock has entered the
genealogical studies. There are, of course,
popular imagination in Canada as an
published articles and short biographies of
unqualified hero if not its outstanding
him in biographical collections or
military genius of the War of 1812.
encyclopaedias as well as unpublished
The disparity between remembrance
theses. His biographers often depict Brock
of Brock and the four other generals is
as a general without equal on the British
starkly evident in the field of biography
side. This perception is common in writings
because there have been many full-length
on the war except in a few accounts that
studies of his life but none of the others.
criticize his generalship. There are mild
This absence is particularly surprising in the
reservations about Brock in the writings of
case of Prevost in view of the high-level
J. Mackay Hitsman and George Stanley. 4
posts he held and the distinguished career he
Hyatt suggests some revisionism by
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criticizing Brock and praising Prevost. The
says they are the sort of errors that could
latter’s failings, he writes, “are not so
have been made by any brave commander in
numerous nor so glaring as Brock’s...[and]
the heat of battle. 6
the campaign in Upper Canada, despite
Two recent American accounts put
Brock, was always under Prevost’s control.”
Brock in a favourable light. Don Hickey
The implication is that Prevost was forced to
agrees with “Conventional wisdom... [that
restrain the recklessness of Brock. Carol
rates] Brock as the best British general”
Whitfield offers a critical view of Brock
whose determination probably saved Upper
based on his behaviour towards the civil
Canada from abandonment as undefendable.
authorities in Lower Canada before the war,
Alan Taylor sees Brock as “optimistic,
his flawed strategic planning, and his “ill-
active, decisive, and charismatic,” as a
considered” charge up Queenston Heights.
commander who overcame difficulties and
George Sheppard finds fault with Brock in
inspired his men. Taylor is mildly critical of
his political role but reinforces the
Brock’s charge uphill at Queenston, seeing
perception of his military pre-eminence by
this motivated by his “aggressive
referring to him as “a brilliant strategist.” 5In
overconfidence.” 7
his recent account of the Battle of
With the Bicentennial of the War of
Queenston Heights, the late Robert
1812, there is growing interest in all aspects
Malcomson has much favourable to say
of the war, including its legacies. One of the
about Brock, and his explanation of Brock’s
most enduring legacies on both the United
charge up the hill is analytical rather than
States and Canadian sides was the creation
critical. He describes Brock as “possibly the
of heroes and heroines. The earliest of those
best senior officer under Prevost’s
heroic individuals was Major General Isaac
command,” a leader who earned the “respect
Brock, who in some ways was the most
and admiration” of both friend and foe. In
unlikely of heroes. For one thing, he was
the battle, he identifies three “critical” errors
admired by his American foes almost as
committed by Brock that led to his death but
much as by his own people. Even more
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striking is the fact that a British general
outstanding quality as a military leader. The
whose military role lasted less than five
elevation of Brock to the status of a great
months became one of the best known
Canadian hero was, in part, a product of the
heroes who has been revered far and wide.
times, but it was even more a product of his
No person on the British or Canadian side
actions. 8
from the War of 1812 became memorialized
Brock had only one experience of
as immediately and as much as Isaac Brock.
participating in combat before going to the
His combat record during the war appears
distant British colony of Canada where he
unimpressive. As a major general, he
spent 10 years in command posts that
participated in two battles. He won one
involved principally administrative duties. It
almost bloodlessly against a demoralized
was in the last year of his life that he
commander. He died early in a second
achieved immortality as a fighting soldier
battle, and yet he is remembered as its
and leader of Upper Canada. In spite of his
victor, thereby displacing Roger Sheaffe, the
high class origins and military status Brock
general who led the forces to victory over
proved to be a commanding officer who
the American invaders. Other individuals
understood the feeling and needs of the
subsequently received recognition for their
common soldier. He enforced traditional
contributions to Canada’s defence—such as
British army discipline, but he also showed a
Tecumseh, John Norton, Laura Secord,
humanitarian concern for his troops. He led
Lieutenant Colonel De Salaberry, and Sir
the militia (who were essentially civilians)
Gordon Drummond—but none received the
and cooperated easily with native leaders
accolades given to Brock. Indeed, Brock’s
and their followers. He showed remarkable
glorification began among the Upper
insight into the enemy’s intentions and
Canadian population immediately upon his
attitudes, and by swift, decisive action he
death, got stronger during the rest of the war
gained a complete victory over his
years, and has remained strong ever since.
opponent’s stronger forces.
Even Americans at the time recognized his
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Jonathon Riley’s A Matter of Honour
Jonathon Riley’s new book, A Matter
of Honour. The Life, Campaigns and
Generalship of Isaac Brock (Montreal:
Robin Brass, 2011), presents a professional
British military man’s point of view of
Brock. The book is very informative about
Brock’s family background and his home
island of Guernsey, one of the Channel
Islands off the coast of France. Riley
of an alleged duel between Brock and a
bullying captain of the 49th Regiment as
unquestionably occurring despite his
disclaimer elsewhere that it is a “story” for
which “we have no independent
corroboration” (34–35). Indeed, he believes
he has solved the mystery of who the captain
was and in the final chapter he expresses no
doubt that a duel did take place (298).
Several chapters are devoted to the
provides a lot of information about the state
political and military situation in France and
of the British army in late 18th century, and
the West Indies and the European
his treatment is, at times, wide-ranging.
background of the wars of the period. Riley
Sometimes, the language is too technical
provides great detail on the Helder campaign
(130, 135, 203, 205, 210, and 235). Riley
of 1799 and the naval attack on Copenhagen
could have served his readers better by
in 1801. The former was an invasion of the
explaining the meaning of terms such as
North Holland peninsula by British and
“divisional size”, “a spine of government
Russian troops for the purpose of
authority , through embedded officers”,
overthrowing the Batavian Republic,
“interface between the army and the public”,
recently established by the French
“logistic stocks”, “brigades were scarcely
revolutionary government, and replacing it
more than battalion size”, and “economy of
with a government of the Prince of Orange.
force sector.” He gives detailed background
The attack on the Danish capital was
about the regiments in which Brock served.
intended to detach Denmark from the hostile
Riley presents an interesting analysis of the
League of Armed Neutrality (which
code of honour among gentlemen that
included Russia and Sweden) by destroying
underlay duelling, but he treats the account
or neutralizing the Danish fleet. The maps in
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these and later chapters are very useful.
Canada, he held, would open the Upper
Riley provides clear treatment of the
Province to easy conquest by the United
problems of supply to and within Upper
States.
Canada as well as transportation generally in
that period.
Riley also examines the different
The defence of Quebec was a problem
that greatly worried Brock who from 1806–7
was commander of the forces in the
views about defence of the Canadas
Canadas. In 1807, the Leopard and
expressed by Governors-General Lord
Chesapeake crisis threatened to bring on war
Dorchester and Sir James Craig and
between the United States and Britain which
Lieutenant Governor John G. Simcoe. There
would probably have meant an invasion of
is a fairly good treatment of the problem of
Lower Canada. Brock knew that the walls of
providing for the defence of Quebec, the
Quebec were so badly decayed as to be
fortress city that guarded the St. Lawrence
useless for defence and the militia force too
River entrance to the colony as well as its
small and untrained to be of much help to
capital. Traditionally, British commanders in
the regulars. Hence, he refused to send arms
the Canadas believed that the best strategy
or men to Upper Canada, where the threat of
for responding to an invasion from the
invasion was small. In 1812, now in charge
United States was to concentrate forces at
of Upper Canada’s forces and government,
Quebec. Even if the rest of the colony was
Brock saw a different situation calling for
occupied, as long as this fortified city held
different ideas about defence. While he
out, reinforcements from the home country
never denied the importance of Quebec to
could arrive to reconquer the Canadas. This
the overall defence of the Canadas, the
was the view of Dorchester and Craig but
threat of imminent invasion came from
Simcoe believed his colony of Upper
American forces gathering south of Lakes
Canada could be defended effectively by
Erie and Ontario, whereas there was
providing troops and strengthening its
minimal warlike activity across the border
defences. Concentration of force in Lower
from Montreal or Quebec. Brock had
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become familiar with the people and
shaft in Federalist criticism of both the
resources of Upper Canada, which underlay
President and the war in general. The widely
his belief that the colony was worth
unpopular war was stigmatized as politically
defending and that this could be done
motivated by President Madison.) 9 Chapter
provided his government had a clear policy
8 makes a good effort describing Upper
of supporting native allies and improving the
Canada but contains a surprising number of
training of the militia. He was also well
errors. Riley`s chapter 9 is competent
aware of where American sentiment for war
describing the situation in Upper Canada in
was strongest (western regions) and where
1811 although he seems unable to explain
anti-war opposition held sway (New York
Brock’s change of view about how to defend
state and eastward). Brock’s understanding
the Canadas and speculates extensively
of clashing views in the United States
about Brock’s opinions and intentions.
underlay his belief that a vigorous defence
Riley’s explanation seems to be it was due
of the upper province would delay any
to “Brock’s character” (159) and perhaps the
attack against Lower Canada, thus giving
influence of Lieutenant Colonel “Red
Britain time to send more aid. The
George” Macdonell. Riley also speculates
possibility of withdrawing British forces to
that Brock was acting from a sense of
the lower province in the event of American
honour, did not understand Prevost, or,
invasion would give a signal to other parts
perhaps “was working directly against his
of British North America that the home
higher commander” (160).
country might not defend them. In short,
Riley’s account shows weaknesses in
Brock took a wider view than simply the
its treatment of politics in British North
needs of Upper Canada. The author’s
America. For example, he writes: “American
treatment of the American army of the
agents were undoubtedly active among the
period is competent, but there is no
French, and American propaganda did much
explanation of why this chapter is titled “Mr.
to increase division between the two
Madison’s War”. (That nickname was one
nationalities of the Canadas” (108). This
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claim needs to be supported with evidence.
“Even before he learned of Brock’s arrival at
Riley also claims that “Willcocks and his
Fort George, Hull had already had enough”
associates ...spread misinformation about the
(207) Does the author mean arrival at Fort
Militia Act” (146). A doubtful claim and the
Amherstburg?
source cited in n.33 does not support it. In
Chapters 11 to 13 tell of Hull’s
his assessment of the viability of Major
invasion and Brock’s response, ending with
General Van Rensselaer’s invasion at
his capture of Detroit. The reader may have
Queenston, Riley takes no account of the
difficulty following the sequence of events
expectation of Americans that if they
because of the frequent digressions, which
invaded, many Upper Canadians would join
are informative and interesting, but would
them or at least offer no resistance (264).
be less disruptive to the narrative if
Some of Riley’s statements raise
introduced elsewhere, perhaps in
questions about his understanding of Upper
appendices. In chapter 11, Riley digresses
Canada’s geography. For example, he
into the death of Brock’s servant; in chapter
writes, “Brock had been to Amherstburg on
12, he looks at Sheaffe’s situation, the
14 June...then went on to visit the other
British naval force on the Great Lakes,
garrisons on the Niagara frontier...” (183).
Upper Canada’s economy from as far back
Amherstburg clearly was neither a garrison
as 1801, the organization of British army
on the Niagara frontier or even close to it.
administration, the Commissary under
Moreover, there is no evidence that Brock
William Robinson, “modern doctrine...of
went to Amherstburg on 14 June. Similarly,
any logistic plans and systems”, and how
Riley writes, that “the arrival of Brock
feeding the army and medical treatment
himself at Fort George...seemed to dissuade
differ in current times from the early
Hull from making an immediate move on
nineteenth century. A mention of opposition
that place” (185).The reference, “that place”,
at Lachine, Lower Canada, to the militia
would seem to mean to Fort George which
call-up (202) has little if any connection to
Hull never threatened. Similarly, again,
the campaign against Hull and the
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information as well as the reference is
withdrawal from Upper Canada took place
muddled. Part of the 49th Regiment was
on 11 August not the 12 August. Brock in
already at Kingston so that only three
his District Order of 14 August referred to
companies were ordered there from
Majors (not Captains), and there was no
Montreal. The date of the letter containing
mention of Middlesex militia (210). The
this information was 2 August, not 1
island is Grosse, not Grasse, (221) and as
August, and in the citation to Tupper’s
Brock’s little army advanced towards Fort
Correspondence, the page reference should
Detroit, it faced two, not three American
be 109–10, not 139.The author, writing
guns. Riley writes that guns were “loaded
about Hull’s problems, states, “the planned
ball over canister” (227) and cites
attack across the Niagara had been delayed
Richardson. However, that source describes
on account of inadequate resources,” (207)
two guns with no mention of what they were
thus leaving the reader trying to guess which
loaded with.11 Riley writes that at Fort
resources were lacking.
Detroit “in addition [to its garrison] the
The account is also marred by other
armed schooners Adams, Amelia and Selina
mistakes. The vessel seized by the British
and the sloop Contractor were all in the
was named the Cuyahoga, not the
vicinity” (216). His reference is to a letter
Cayahoga. Riley writes that the bridge over
from Matthew Elliott who actually wrote,
the Canard “through negligence had not
“Another very intelligent Gentleman, has
been thrown down” (191) ; however,
given me the following list of Vessels and
Richardson (who was present) writes that
their Tonnages- Brig. Adams — 14 Guns—
Colonel St. George “destroyed” the bridge
about the size of the Old Camden, in the
and the Americans subsequently made
Stocks 4 miles up the River Rouge, repairing
several attempts to repair it but these were
— Schooner Amelia — 70 Tons — at
repulsed. 10 There were 180 fur traders, not
Prisque Isle or Black Rock— do. Selina —
160, with Captain Charles Roberts’s force at
80. at Detroit Wharfe do — Nancy — 90
Mackinac; and the final American
Black Rock or Prisque Isle— Sloop —
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Contractor — 60 Tons — Black Rock or
for rum”(230, 232).13 By themselves, these
Prisque Isle.”12 This information, according
little slips and misspellings may not matter,
to Elliott, dated from October 1811, and
but they are so many as to undermine the
cannot be assumed valid for August 1812.
reliability of the whole account.
Furthermore, vessels at Presque Isle or
Riley’s assessment of William Hull
Black Rock were clearly not in the vicinity
may leave the reader puzzled. He describes
of Detroit. The usually reliable historian,
him as “intelligent” but tending to give way
Reginald Horsman writes about these
to fears (176). The author believes that Hull
vessels: “[Adams ] was the only regular
was “beaten (in his own mind)” a year
naval vessel in the area but she was in dry
before the war began. He writes,”Plainly, the
dock at the River Rouge shipyard, and her
man was terrified” (179), and he quotes
ordnance was deposited at Fort Detroit.
from a letter Hull wrote to William Eustis
Actually, she was not in service in time for
(Secretary of War) in June 1811. Rather than
Hull to use during his campaign. In normal
expressing terror, the letter analyses British
times there were several unarmed merchant
advantages vis-a-vis the American position
vessels,...that operated in Detroit waters, but
in Michigan and recommends the creation of
two had already been captured by the British
“ a naval force on, Lake Erie superior to the
and the others were not in the vicinity.
British,” an eminently sensible suggestion.
Clearly, Hull was entirely without naval
14
support.” Selina, in fact, was at Fort
proclamation” (189) on his invasion of
Michilimackinac. The District General
Upper Canada and it demonstrated
Order that allotted a gill of rum per day to
“firmness and determination.” Alec Gilpin
the troops was dated 15 August, not 14, and
provides a detailed, well documented
there is no evidence in the accounts of
assessment of Hull and writes that the
“heroic rum-drinking” by the British troops
proclamation’s “basic ideas were Hull’s, but
(a gill is one quarter of a pint) nor evidence
the bombastic phraseology was typical of
that the American troops were “the worse
[Colonel Lewis] Cass in his younger days,”
Riley writes that Hull issued “a stern
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an opinion that Stanley shares. 15 What is the
militia under Cass and McArthur.” (231).
reader to make of this statement: “Even
Riley does not explain his surprise at this.
before he learned of Brock’s arrival at Fort
Horsman at least suggests the reason: “To
George, Hull had already had enough”
protect the McArthur-Cass and the Brush
(207)? This seems especially curious
detachments from the Indians, Hull received
because after Hull had withdrawn his forces
permission to include them in the
from Upper Canada, Riley believes he still
surrender.” 18
“had the means and the ability to sustain
In answer to Hull’s proclamation
action” (208). Gilpin points out that Hull
Brock issued his own, which Riley judges,
had good reasons to return to the American
“Poor stuff perhaps” (194). Hitsman
side. The reasons included the continued
explains his opinion that “The proclamation
effectiveness of the British blockade of
issued by Brock...was a poor effort,” while
supplies and the refusal of Ohio militia to
Stanley suggests that to some Upper
cross into Canada. Consequently, Hull’s
Canadians “Brock’s words sounded
“position...was hopeless without outside
dignified and manly, ...But in Western
aid.” 16
Upper Canada...his words were greeted with
Riley is vague about the date that Hull
ordered Captain Nathan Heald to evacuate
Fort Dearborn and provides no explanation
indifference and apathy.” 19 Riley does not
explain the basis for his own judgment.
Chapters 14–15 deal with the situation
for the native attack on the retiring party
on both sides of the Niagara frontier, and the
(211).17 Riley does explain Hull’s surrender
Battle of Queenston Heights. The author
in terms of the large number of terrified
follows closely the account in Robert
civilians, including his own family, crowded
Malcomson’s A Very Brilliant Affair without
into the fort and town as well as Hull’s
improving on that narrative and assessment.
caution, the result of his age (224,231–32).
About two-thirds of the way up the
According to Riley, Hull included in the
escarpment above the village of Queenston
surrender “unbelievably, the detachments of
was a small earthwork, called a redan,
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designed to protect artillery. Riley writes of
on 14 October 1812, mentions the light
a mortar in the redan along with a gun (268).
company being ordered down but does not
No evidence is given for this, and American
mention any instrument being used. Evans,
primary sources mention only a gun there. 20
who was not present at the battle, makes a
Acting Brigade Major Lieutentant Colonel
similar statement in his report of 15 October.
T.Evans, wrote from Fort George on 15
In a letter dated at Brown’s Point, 15
October 1812, and referred to the redan as,
October 1812, the author (identified as
“our heavy one-gun battery”. 21
Lieutenant McLean, York Militia, who was
When Brock arrived in Queenston
present on the battlefield) writes the men
village early on the morning of 13 October,
“were called down by the bugle”.22 In the
accounts about his movements vary. He may
contemporary accounts of Thomas Clark,
or may not have gone up to the redan; if he
John Smith, and Charles Askin, Brock was
did not go there, the artillery men may have
forced to flee from the redan and did not call
been called down or may have been driven
down the men there. In the well known
away by American forces appearing above;
secondary accounts of J.M.Hitsman, Pierre
if Brock went there, he may have been
Berton, George Stanley, Charles P.Stacey
driven down along with his troops. Riley
(in DCB, 5) and Lady Matilda Edgar, Brock
asserts that “a drummer” summoned
was driven down from the redan and there is
Williams’s light company down from the
no mention or drum or bugle. Nor is an
redan (279). The source is unclear and the
instrument mentioned in accounts by
nearest citation ( 280, n.34) reads “Letter
American participants. There is also no
from John Beverley Robinson to unknown
mention of drum or bugle during the
recipient dated 14 October 1812 in Wood,
remainder of the battle in Queenston or on
Select British Documents, i, 40–41.” Those
the Heights.23 The author has Brock rushing
pages are part of Wood’s Introduction and
“up the mountain on foot” and when the
do not provide Robinson’s letter (this letter
American Captain Wool at the “summit” led
is on pp. 610–17). In fact, Robinson, writing
his men down in a charge, Brock “not even
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pausing to remount”, descended (282–3).
against an American force of unknown size
The account is confusing and the source
occupying higher ground. His answer is
cited, J. B. Robinson, was on his way to
“personal honour” (304). This brief chapter
Queenston from Brown’s Point and so was
suffers from several errors. For deeper and
not present as an eye witness to these events.
documented assessments of the subject, the
To add to the uncertainty for the historian,
reader should consult R. Malcomson,
Malcomson wrote in a note to Hitsman’s
Burying General Brock and W. B. Turner,
account, “There is little evidence to support
British Generals in the War of 1812. 26
Hitsman’s statement that he [Brock] was
There are many other significant
present in the redan battery when Wool
errors. Riley writes that the speakers of the
charged it.” 24 Riley’s account is not
assemblies were appointed, but in fact in
clarified by his assertion “The sequence of
both Canadas they were elected by members
events that followed only makes sense,
of the assembly (73). 27 Riley claims that
however, if indeed Brock had been there”
Edward Ellice’s offer to help Isaac Brock
(320, n.36). Shortly after Brock arrived in
with his debt was “a remarkable testimony
Queenston, he “probably sent at least one
of how...[Brock] was regarded among
courier back to Fort George to
people in Upper Canada.” (148) But Ellice
alert...Sheaffe...and another courier to
was a prominent merchant in Montreal and
Chippawa” (280–1) which parallels
London as well as owner of estates in
Malcomson’s account “Brock...had probably
Britain and Lower Canada and had no
dispatched one rider to Fort George...and
connection with Upper Canada.28 Riley
another to Chippawa;” 25
writes that the “hidden purpose” of President
The final chapter deals with Brock’s
Madison’s war message of 1 June 1812 was
funeral, the tributes paid him, the first and
to seize British colonies in North America
second Brock monuments on Queenston
but everyone knew that the United States
Heights and the question of why Brock
planned to attack Canada as a means of
rather than one of his captains led a charge
striking at Britain (168). Brock’s letter of 28
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June to Captain Roberts did not give
Danish batteries, but this proved
“definite orders to take the fort
unnecessary as the battle was won by sea
[Michilimackinac]”, as Riley claims, but to
power alone. His regiment sustained
suspend hostilities and Brock’s letter of 15
casualties while aboard because of Danish
July gave Roberts options (195). Riley
counter fire. Brock and his regiment
writes that in a letter to Prevost, Brock wrote
witnessed a battle but did not participate.
in effect, “Any treaty to end the war must
Riley writes that Walter Butler “served in
include the restoration of ‘an extensive tract
the 8th at this time” (23). He seems to be
of country,’” The citation is to Select British
referring to the years 1780–83. In 1780,
Documents, 1, 596. In this letter of 28
Walter was no longer in the 8th Foot; he was
September 1812, Brock made no mention of
in Butler’s Rangers and was killed in 1781. 29
a treaty or what it must include. He referred
The caption of an illustration mentions
to “their [Indian allies] claim to an extensive
battles including one at Burlington Heights
tract of country” (250).
(40). There was no battle by that name.
There are many minor errors of fact
Riley writes about infantrymen “holding the
and citation that singly may not matter but
ball in the mouth” while loading their
they are so numerous as to undermine the
muskets (57). This is incorrect according to
book’s credibility. Here is a list of most of
two authoritative accounts, viz, D.Graves,
those errors: Riley writes that “at
The Battle of Lundy’s Lane, and
Copenhagen” Brock led his Regiment, the
Malcomson, A Very Brilliant Affair.30 Riley
49th Foot, into battle (1). In fact, the 49th
writes: “Crown lands were allotted to the
was distributed among the ships of Vice-
Church of England” . In the Constitutional
Admiral Horatio Nelson’s squadron and
Act, one-seventh of surveyed lands to be set
Brock, along with some of his men, were on
aside for the support of a Protestant clergy,
board the Ganges, next to Nelson’s flagship
the Church of England was not specified.
Elephant. A component of the British attack
This was done to provide income for the
plan was to land those troops to storm the
Protestant clergy rather than “to counter the
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influence of the Roman Catholic Church as
September not, as Riley says, on 9 October
well as Protestant faiths based in the United
(131). His statement that the Treaty of 1783
States” (72–73). In the United States, Riley
ended native claims south of the Great
writes: “land was to be had for the taking”
Lakes is incorrect (137). The North West
(81). Land was not free there, it had to be
Ordinance was passed in 1787, not in 1788
purchased. Alexander Grant was
as he states (138). Riley refers to “5th and
administrator not lieutenant governor, as
6th Lincolns [militia regiments]”
Riley claims (82). Riley’s statements that
(182).There was no 6th Lincoln. Riley
Robert Nichol lived in Port Dover in 1804
incorrectly refers to “the captured Nancy”
and was into “milling, brewing and
(202). She was a North West Company
distilling” are incorrect (87). Nichol move
schooner taken into service for the war.
there in 1810.Some of the details for
Riley writes that “native warriors” travelled
Provincial Marine and American vessels are
in the boats with Brock’s force, whereas, in
incorrect (100). Royal George had 20 gun
fact, they proceeded to Amherstburg
ports, not 22; Queen Charlotte was a ship
separately (209). 32 Riley writes that Robert
with 20 gun ports, not 16. The Oneida had
Nichol opposed Brock’s plan to attack Hull
18 guns, not 16, and was a brig, not a
(214). Riley’s source is Goodspeed, The
sloop.31 Riley refers to Amherstburg, which
Good Soldier, but this author writes that
was the name of the fort, as the village and
Nichol supported Brock’s plan and this fact
Malden as the fort (119). The correct names
is also supported by other sources. 33 Riley
are given in Hickey’s Don’t Give Up the
writes that Brock specified 4 a.m. for the
Ship! a work that is listed in the
crossing of the Detroit River; in fact, Brock
bibliography. Brock’s seat has not been
specified 3 a.m (222). Riley describes
removed to inside St. Mark’s Church as
“American prisoners being marched through
Riley writes (123). He writes that Congress
the streets of York” (245–46). Prisoners
met on 6 November when in fact it met on
from Detroit were marched along the
the 4th (130). Brock was sworn in 30
Niagara River from Fort Erie to Fort
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George, not through York some 30 miles
a lower level.37 According to Captain
across Lake Ontario. Riley refers to
Holcroft, who was present, there were eight
“Lieutenant Nathan Townson” although he
guns firing at Queenston from the American
was actually Captain (260).34 Riley’s
side of the river. 38 Riley refers to “Captain
account of the history of Queenston contains
Joseph Smith” who, in fact, signed his report
several errors (265). First settlement there
as Ensign and the name on the document
did not begin in the 1770s around “the large
appears to be John (283).39 Riley mentions
stone house of Robert Hamilton,” but in
the 41st Regiment’s fife and drum corps
1780 by farmers-Isaac Dolson, James
although, in fact, the regiment had only a
Secord, Elijah Phelps, and John Chrysler. In
regular band (294). Riley writes that “details
1785, George Field built the first house in
of the inscriptions [on silver plates for the
what is now Queenston and Robert
coffins of Brock and Macdonell] have not
Hamilton established his business there
survived” (295). In fact, the wording of the
1788–89. He settled there in 1790 and built
inscription was printed in the Kingston
his house. 35 Rileys’ account of the troops at
Gazette, 17 November 1812 40 The statue to
Queenston also has errors (267). The light
the horse Alfred was erected in 1976 not in
company, not the grenadier, of the 49th was
1860, as Riley writes (300). Riley designates
commanded by Captain John Williams and
12 October as Brock’s final day instead of
they were on the heights. Captain James
13 October (303).
Dennis commanded the grenadier company,
There is an unusually large amount of
not the light. The 200 militiamen present
speculation often poorly documented: Riley
also included the York militia. 36 Riley writes
claims that Brock was a Freemason
of “twenty-four guns...in position” at
(Regimental Lodge 156) and assumes he
Lewiston (279). This is incorrect according
joined when in 8th Foot and he was a
to the map on p.281. Malcomson writes of
member “of this lodge” in Fort Niagara (24).
two 18-pdrs on Lewiston Heights and on a
He writes that “It is known that Brock was a
map he shows those as well as one mortar at
member.” He does not say who knew this.
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In his reference, he writes,”Information
Canadians and certainly not English-
supplied by various Masonic sources.”41
speaking or French-speaking people in
None is given and the only one listed in the
Lower Canada. While dealing with the
Bibliograpy is J.R.Robertson, The History of
defences of Forts George and Amherstburg
Freemasonry in Canada from its
and the British capture of the Cuyahoga,
Introduction in 1749 (Toronto, 1899). This
Riley mentions the capture off Fort Erie by
work makes no mention of Brock and
the Queen Charlotte of the Commencement,
contains not even a hint that he was a
an American sloop, an event which Riley
member. Later, Riley writes,”as we know,
implies impacted the campaign against Hull
Brock had become a Freemason” (123).
(186).42 Riley does not explain how the
Again, there is no evidence for this claim.
seizure of a small, privately owned
In the period that Riley is referring to, there
American vessel with a cargo of 12 barrels
was serious controversy between the lodges
of salt actually did affect the campaign. In
in Niagara and in York, a conflict not
the skirmishing at the bridge over the
mentioned by the author. If Brock had been
Canard River, Riley assumes that Tecumseh
a Freemason, this conflict would have
led “about fifty native warriors” (193).There
received mention. Riley speculates that “the
is no mention of Tecumseh in the sources
activities of Joseph Willcocks and his like”
cited.43 Given Tecumseh’s prominence, it is
convinced President Madison’s government
likely he would have been mentioned if he
“that the greater part of both the English-
had been present. Riley writes it is “fairly
and French-speaking population of the
reliably reported” that Brock took off his
Canadas would welcome an American
sash and presented it to Tecumseh (237).
invasion” (169). Riley does not explain who
The citation for this reliable report is
were Willcocks’s followers nor prove that
William James’s book published in 1818 but
they had any influence on the Madison
where he obtained the story is unreported.
administration. Willcocks and his few
A scholarly study by Ludwig Kosche does
followers represented a minority of Upper
not support this claim.44 Early on the
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morning of 13 October before riding off to
does not cite a documentary source.
Queenston, Brock put on “a cocked hat”
American troops “no doubt the worse for
(273). There is no evidence for this
rum”(232). Prevost “privately was probably
statement. Ensign John Smith who was at
furious”(237). Riley writes that many
Fort George reported on 18 October that the
militiamen were wearing “cast-off red coats
officers “on the 13th fought in Round Hats
of the 41st Foot” without citation for this
from the General to the Lieutenants.”45
claim (267–68). Evans was not “believed by
Riley writes, “Mythology says that he rode
Roger Sheaffe” (271). Brock “appears to
to Queenston on the horse Alfred” (273).
have ridden up to the redan” (281). “Brock
The citation is to one secondary source,
must have been furious: he knew something
leaving the reader to wonder what and where
of the fisherman’s path” (282). “Ellis was
the mythology is. It is unlikely, but not
an Irishman...he may have been a relative of
impossible, that Brock could have had
Edward Corry, Brock’s opponent” (298).
Alfred with him. 46
Sometimes the speculation is
The book suffers from a persistent
error, namely, Riley’s use of Newark for
undocumented : “Brock was oblivious to all
Niagara. This name was officially adopted
of this” (39). How does he know? Riley
in 1798 and used by contemporary British
speculates why Bock was not being married
and Canadian correspondents, such as
(62). He writes about Irishmen jeering at
Brock, Roger Sheaffe, and William
attackers of Fort Erie (81). What source
Hamilton Merritt. (Most contemporary
documents this? “When the horse arrived at
American officers still used Newark.)
York” (129). No evidence is provided.
Problems with the Bibliography,
Riley writes about a meeting at Elliott’s
Under Library and Archives Canada,
farmhouse and drinks being offered (215).
Riley lists items not in this Archives or
The only source cited makes no mention of
published by it and even includes in this list
these events.47 The story appears in Pierre
Archive of Ontario and a publication in New
Berton’s book who took it from Tupper who
York Public Library Bulletin. Tupper’s book
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is listed as The Life and Correspondence of
Tupper. Examples are pp. 34 n.13; 148,
Sir Isaac Brock, leaving the title incomplete.
notes 3 and 4; 149, n.6; 228, n.29; 243,notes
Riley used the 1845 edition and there is a
6 and 7; 244, n.10; 247, n.15; see p.307;
fuller 1847 edition. Some important works
n.29 p.317; n.7, 318. Many references are
are missing e.g., R. D. Edmunds, Tecumseh
unclear or incomplete, e.g., references to
and the Quest for Indian Leadership
DCB give no volume. On p. 257, n.42 and
(Boston, 1984) and J. Sugden, Tecumseh’s
258, n.44, refer to information in chapter 10
Last Stand (Norman, OK, 1985)—it is cited
but the material is not there. On p.317, notes
in some endnotes but not listed in the
6 and 10 cite the same source differently. On
Bibliography; A.Taylor, The Civil War of
p. 315, n.61 and p. 316, notes 21 and 32, the
1812: American Citizens, British Subjects,
author gives three different titles, places and
Irish Rebels & Indian Allies; C. Whitfield,
dates of publication to what appears to be
The Battle of Queenston Heights; and on
the same book (Richardson’s War of 1812)
French Canada, i.e., F. Ouellet, Lower
The Bibliography lists two of these
Canada 1791–1840: Social Change and
publications. Citations of Cruikshank’s
Nationalism (Toronto, 1980).
Documentary History give no volumes. A
Problems with Endnotes
citation “letter supplied by Professor Ray
For references Riley uses unscholarly
Hobbes” (319, n.46) is not helpful. This
sources, such as, D. B. Read, Life and Times
“letter” is a report written by Ensign J.
of Major-General Sir Isaac Brock, K.B
Smith on October 18, 1812 and found in the
(Toronto, 1894) and a largely fictional
U. S. National Archives, RG59, M588,
account in a book written for children,
7:115.
D.Goodspeed, The Good Soldier. The Story
Conclusion
of Isaac Brock (Toronto, 1964). These
In general, this book adds little that is
sources give no citations for quotations, yet
new to our understanding of the War of
Riley quotes from them instead of from
1812, its leaders, or Brock’s career. It leans
documentary sources such as Wood and
somewhat toward the Great Man view of
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history, which is probably inevitable when
dealing with the career of a military leader
in wartime. The book has far too many
errors and suffers from too many
unsupported claims. All too often, Riley
Dr. Wesley B. Turner’s publications include
The Astonishing General: The Life and
Legacy of Sir Isaac Brock; The War of 1812:
The War That Both Sides Won; Life in Upper
Canada; The War of 1812 in the Niagara
Peninsula; and The War of 1812: The War
for Canada.
uses phrases such as: “The general feeling”
(108), “most respectable authorities” (122),
“as we know” (123), “it was widely
predicted” (130), “fairly reliably reported”
(237), “he is reported to have said” (242), “it
has often been suggested” (264), and
“Mythology says” (273).
To sum up, Riley’s book offers some
new information and an unusual slant but it
suffers severely from errors and inadequate
documentation. Its prose really needs the
sharp eye of a knowledgeable editor and
would benefit from considerable re-writing.
For those familiar with the details of the
War of 1812, this work has only limited
value; for those unfamiliar with the conflict,
the work must be treated with skepticism
and used with caution. There is still plenty
of scope for further research and writing on
Sir Isaac Brock. The definitive study of
Canada’s leading hero from the War of 1812
has yet to be written.
1
G. F. G. Stanley, The War of 1812. Land
Operations (Ottawa: National Museums, 1983),
403
2
A. Taylor, The Civil War of 1812. American
Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels,& Indian
Allies. (New York, 2010), 10.
3
A. M. J. Hyatt, “The Defence of Upper Canada
in 1812.” MA thesis, Carlton University, 1961.
Ira M. Sutherland, “The Civil Administration of
Sir George Prevost 1811-1815: A Study in
Conciliation.” MA thesis, Queen’s University,
1959
4
J. M. Hitsman, The Incredible War of 1812. A
Military History (Updated. Toronto, 1999),41,
68, 85,87 99. Stanley, War of 1812, 79,126-7,
403.
5
C. Whitfield, The Battle of Queenston Heights.
(Occasional Papers in Archaeology and History,
no.11. Ottawa, 1974.10, 18-19, 22-7. G.
Sheppard, G. Plunder, Profit and Paroles: A
Social History of the War of 1812 in Upper
Canada (Montreal, 1994), Chapter 3 and 22-7.
6
R. Malcomson, A Very Brilliant Affair. The
Battle of Queenston Heights, 1812. (Toronto,
2003), 32, 35, 112, 213.
7
D. R. Hickey, Don’t Give Up the Ship! Myths of
the War of 1812. (Toronto, 2006), 144. See also
Epilogue. The Legacy of the War. Taylor, Civil
War, 163 and 188 for quotations; see also 149;
for the contrast with Sheaffe see p. 237.
8
Whitfield, Battle of Queenston Heights. 10,
18-19, 22-7. G. Sheppard, Plunder, Profit and
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 15, No. 1, 2012—Bicentennial Issue
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Paroles: A Social History of the War of 1812 in
Upper Canada (Montreal, 1994), Chapter 3 and
22-7. Creation of heroes and their glorification
was an attribute of the Romantic Age as the
period is sometimes called. See W.B. Turner,
British Generals in the War of 1812: High
Command in the Canadas (Montreal, revised
2011), 82. See also Jacques Barzun, Berlioz and
the Romantic Century (2 vols. Boston, 1950).
9
Hickey Don’t Give Up the Ship, 42, 139, and
The War of 1812. A Forgotten Conflict, (1989),
1, 46-7, 256-7, 301
10
John Richardson’s War of 1812. Ed.
A.C.Casselman (Toronto, 1902), 14, see also 212 and his War of 1812. First Series. Containing a
Full and Detailed Narrative of the Operations of
the Right Division of the Canadian Army.
(1842), 6
11
Richardson, War of 1812. First Series, 30. R.
Horsman, Matthew Elliott: British Indian Agent
(Detroit, 1964)116,writes that the British faced
two 24 pounders “shotted with grape”.
12
E. A. Cruikshank, Documents Relating to the
Invasion of Canada and the Surrender of
Detroit, 1812. (Ottawa, 1912), 4-5. Matthew
Elliott, 64-5, 90. Stanley, War of 1812, 93
13
Richardson, War of 1812. First Series, 30-2
14
Cruikshank, Documents Relating to the
Invasion of Canada, 1-3
15
A. R. Gilpin, The War of 1812 in the Old
Northwest (1958), 73-4. Stanley, War of 1812,
95. Hitsman sees it as “flamboyant”. The
Incredible War, 65. Cass was a colonel of the
Ohio militia and a critic of Hull’s indecision and
caution.
16
Gilpin, The War of 1812, 100-04; see also 99
and 55, 58-61, 83, 112, 117. Hitsman, The
Incredible War, 76.
17
See Gilpin, The War of 1812, 126-8; Stanley,
War of 1812, 111-2
18
Horsman, Matthew Elliott, 118; see also 1167, 121-4 for fuller, documented analysis of
Hull’s decision. F. C. Hamil, Michigan in the War
of 1812 (Lansing, Mich. 1977), 19, provides a
brief, clear explanation.
19
Hitsman, The Incredible War, 68. Stanley,
War of 1812, 104-5
20
See report of Captain Wool, 23 October
1812, in Appendix 15-16 in Solomon Van
Rensselaer, A Narrative of the Affair of
Queenstown: In the War of 1812. (Boston,
1836). Lieutenant Colonel Chrystie to General
Thomas H.Cushing, 22 February 1813, in
E.A.Cruikshank, Documentary History of the
Campaigns upon the Niagara Frontier in 18121814 (9 vols. Welland, 1896-1908) v.3, 101.
Cited as DHC. C.P.Stacey emphasizes a one-gun
battery. Dictionary of Canadian Biography,
(Toronto, 1977-88), 5, 113. Cited as DCB.
21
W. C. H. Wood, ed. Select British Document
of the Canadian War of 1812. (3 vols Toronto,
1920-28), v. 1, 623. Cited as SBD.
22
This is Malcomson's source, A Very Brilliant
Affair, 148.
23
While it is possible the men were called
down by drum, bugle, whistle, gesture or voice,
given the evidence presently available
whatever a historian chooses will be a guess.
See Pierre Berton, The Invasion of Canada,
1812-1813. (Toronto, 1980). Lady Matilda
Edgar, General Brock. (Rev. Toronto, 1926).
Stacey in DCB, 5. Stanley, War of 1812
24
Hitsman, The Incredible War, 328, n.28
25
A Very Brilliant Affair, 151
26
R. Malcomson, Burying General Brock: A
History of Brock’s Monument (1996). Turner,
British Generals in the War of 1812: High
Command in the Canadas
27
The first place to check is the Constitutional
Act of 1791 which does not give a governor or
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 15, No. 1, 2012—Bicentennial Issue
P a g e | 118
lieutenant governor power to appoint
Assembly speakers. Accessible printed sources
are DCB; E. A. Cruikshank, ed. The
Correspondence of Lieut. Governor John Graves
Simcoe. (5 vols. Toronto, 1923-31); Cruikshank,
ed. The Correspondence of the Honourable
Peter Russell. (3 vols. Toronto, 1932-36); and
Journals of the Legislative Assembly of Upper
Canada.
28
See Ellice's biography in DCB, 9. See also W.B.
Turner,The Astonishing General. The Life and
Legacy of Sir Isaac Brock (Toronto, 2011) ,65
29
DCB, v.4, 120-21
30
D. E. Graves, The Battle of Lundy’s Lane on
the Niagara in 1814. (Baltimore, 1993) 24.
Malcomson, A Very Brilliant Affair,101
31
See R. Malcomson, Lords of the Lake. The
Naval War on Lake Ontario, 1812-1814, 19,27,
and Warships of the Great Lakes, 1754-1834
(Rochester, UK, 2003),45,57,65; Lieut. Col.
Pye's Report to Prevost, 7 December 1811 in
SBD, v. 1, 240-44.
32
See C. F. Klinck and J. J. Talman, eds. The
Journal of Major John Norton. 1816. (Toronto,
1970)
33
D. J. Goodspeed, The Good Soldier. The Story
of Isaac Brock (Toronto, 1964), 97. F. B. Tupper,
The Life and Correspondence of Major General
Sir Isaac Brock, K.B. (London, 1847),260. E. A.
Cruikshank, General Hull’s Invasion of Canada
in 1812. (Ottawa, 1908), 277
34
Malcomson, A Very Brilliant Affair, 115
35
A good place to start looking for the history
of Queenston is George A. Seibel, The Niagara
Portage Road. A History of the Portage on the
West Bank of the Niagara River (Niagara Falls,
ON, 1990) which contains a helpful
bibliography.
36
See Malcomson, A Very Brilliant Affair, 13536 and 274.
37
A Very Brilliant Affair, 136; see map on p.
154.
38
DHC, 4, 117-18. Extract of a letter from Fort
George, 14 October 1812.
39
Ensign J. Smith to Colonel Procter, 18
October 1812 in the U. S. National Archives,
RG59, M588, 7:115.
40
Reprinted in Turner, The Astonishing General,
205
41
Riley, 306, n.40
42
W. S. Dudley, ed. The Naval War of 1812. A
Documentary History. 3 vols. (Washington, DC,
1985-2002), 309, Identifies the vessel as a
schooner. See also Documents Relating to the
Invasion of Canada, 186, 232. Gilpin, The War
of 1812, 55, reports the British captured three
other vessels near Detroit, thereby depriving
Hull of their cargoes of supplies which would
certainly harm his ability to defend his position.
43
Riley’s n.40 “See the account in Cass’s
despatch to Hull in Cruikshank, Documents, p.
71, and James Baby’s account to Glegg in ibid.
95.” These accounts were checked. Other
accounts and reports were also checked.
44
L. Kosche, “Relics of Brock: An Investigation,”
Archivaria, 9 (1979-80), 56-68.
45
In his report J. Smith to Procter, 18 October
1812 in U.S. National Archives, RG59, M588,
7:115.
46
Prevost had his horses brought to Upper
Canada. See Colonel R. H. Bruyeres to Noah
Freer, 26 August 1813 in SBD, v.2, 204-05.
47
Riley, n.45. Horsman, Matthew Elliott, 195,
179-80. P. Berton, The Invasion of Canada, 167;
Tupper, Life and Correspondence, 116.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 15, No. 1, 2012—Bicentennial Issue
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News, Notes, and Opportunities
War of 1812 Conference Held at the University of London
Report by Christopher T. George
Although an oft repeated adage goes that the War of 1812 is “The war the Americans think they won, the
Canadians know they won, and the British have forgotten all about,” Great Britain stole a march on its North
American counterparts by hosting the first major conference on the war in this Bicentennial season.
The conference on “The War of 1812: Myth and Memory, History and Historiography” took place at the
Senate House of the University of London in Russell Square on July 12–14. The event was organized by the
Institute for the Study of the Americas, part of the School of Advanced Studies at the University of London,
with the assistance of the National Maritime Museum in Greenwich.
Speakers included such leading authorities on the war as Don Hickey, Andrew Lambert, Alan Taylor,
and John Sugden. They and other scholars from the United States, Canada, and Great Britain, explored the
many facets of this complicated war.
Senate House, University of London.
Keynote talks were given by Donald R. Hickey (Wayne State College, Nebraska) on “The Legacy of
1812: How a Little War Shaped the Transatlantic World”; Alan Taylor (University of California, Davis) on
“Tales of Freedom and Slavery in the War of 1812”; Andrew Lambert (King’s College London): “Sideshow?:
The War of 1812 in British Grand Strategy”; and Cecilia Morgan (University of Toronto): “The War of 1812 in
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 15, No. 1, 2012—Bicentennial Issue
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Upper Canada and its Afterlife: Gender, Commemoration and Memory in Nineteenth and Twentieth Century
Ontario.” The keynotes reflected the wide-ranging nature of the conference which, among other topics, dealt
with war in what is now the southern United States and in the old Northwest, the British giving freedom to
escaped slaves, and various reputations made or lost in the war.
A number of talks addressed the matter of Tecumseh’s Confederacy as a factor in the war in the
Northwest, with the Tecumseh and his Indian allies believing in British promises of forming an Indian “buffer
state” against American expansion into the Michigan and Indiana territories, and the chance to reclaim Indian
lands lost to the Americans. R. David Edmunds (University of Texas at Dallas) spoke on “Tecumseh’s
Confederacy: Who Joined, Who Didn’t, and Why.” He made the point that the Indians who joined with
Tecumseh were often younger braves, not older leaders who remembered the Battle of Fallen Timbers (August
20, 1794) when Indian forces were defeated by the U.S. Army under General “Mad Anthony” Wayne. Dr.
Edmunds stated that the word “Confederacy” makes the loose organization of Indians from various tribes
formed by Tecumseh a more formidable entity than it actually was. He also pointed out that with time by the
time he was killed at the Battle of the Thames (October 1813), Tecumseh felt betrayed by the British.
Lieutenant General George Prevost, the governor-general of Canada, came to a temporary armistice with the
Americans, undermining the work done by General Isaac Brock and Brigadier General Henry Proctor in making
promises to the Indians. Ultimately, the defeat of the British and Indians at the Thames led to the dissolution of
the Confederacy, and the Indians were not the same factor in the remainder of the war.
The way the War of 1812 is remembered was a key theme in several of the presentations. In addition to
the keynote by Cecilia Morgan on how the war has been remembered in Ontario, the impact of naval victories
by the U.S. Navy and Royal Navy were assessed by a number of speakers. As he did in a recent book, The
Challenge: Britain Against America in the Naval War of 1812, British naval authority Andrew Lambert stated
in his keynote that the frigate-to-frigate victories of the frigate U.S.S. Constitution versus Guerriere and Java
rocked the British—such victories had always eluded the French. Albeit though that (a constant refrain then and
now!) Constitution was a “super frigate” of 44 guns whereas Guerriere and Java rated 38 guns each. The same
theme was explored by Martin Salmon (National Maritime Museum, Greenwich) in his talk on “Never before in
the history of the world did an English frigate strike to an American: The impact of American naval victories on
British national consciousness.” Captain Philip Broke’s victory in HMS Shannon over the luckless Chesapeake
on June 1, 1813 helped recapture British naval pride and was widely celebrated as described by Keith Mercer
(Saint Mary’s University, Halifax): “Paradoxes of Patriotism: The British Navy in Nova Scotia during the War
of 1812.” Shannon’s capture of Chesapeake took place serendipitously on the anniversary of the “Glorious First
of June” the great victory of the British Channel Fleet under Admiral Lord Howe over the French commanded
by Vice-Admiral Louis Thomas Villaret de Joyeuse west of the French island of Ushant on June 1, 1794.
Brittney-Anne Bos (PhD student, Queen’s University, Canada) spoke on “Deconstructing the Myth
Behind the Man: Sir Isaac Brock and Monuments to the British Gentleman Hero.” Although Brock is
remembered today as a great Canadian hero, he was first and foremost a British officer and a servant of the
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 15, No. 1, 2012—Bicentennial Issue
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British monarchy. Ms. Bos also pointed out though that the Channel Island of Guernsey claims him as a favorite
son. As has often been said, Brock’s achievements were not extensive and perhaps his reputation was enhanced
by his death at Queenston Heights early in the war. Ms Bos’s talk was part of a panel on “British Strategy in
the Northwest and the Role of Brock” in which Sandy Antal (Independent Scholar, Canada) spoke on “The
Cession of Michigan and British Strategy” and how British aims in Michigan were ultimately frustrated when
Brock and Proctor did not receive the backing of governor Sir George Prevost, revealing a divergence of aims
among the British high command. Other reputations came in for examination during the conference. British
Major General Robert Ross (1766–1814), captor of Washington, D.C., was discussed by John McCavitt
(Visiting Research Fellow, Queen's University Belfast), who spoke on “The historiographical representation of
Major General Robert Ross: an officer, a gentleman -- and a conflagrator.” Alan Gordon (University of Guelph)
talked on “Marshalling Memory: An Historiographical Biography of Brigadier-General Ernest Alexander
Cruikshank.” And H.G. Callaway (Independent Scholar, USA) spoke on influential U.S. Secretary of the
Treasury Alexander J. Dallas and the war in “A.J. Dallas, The War of 1812 and the Law of Nations.”
Not only did the commanders and statesmen of the day come under scrutiny but the handling of the war
by various historians since the war. This correspondent made a presentation on “New Information on the Battle
for Havre de Grace, Maryland, May 3, 1813, and the British Sack of the Town.” In my presentation I questioned
the interpretation by Civil War-era historian Benson J. Lossing, who in his 1860’s visit to Havre de Grace came
to the conclusion that there were two batteries defending the town and not one as the eyewitness testimony and
newspaper reports all appear to say.
Journal of the War of 1812 editor Christopher T. George speaking in an opening session at the University
of London conference. Photograph by Mark McCavitt
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The subject of race featured in a number of presentations. One of the most interesting panels was one on
“Black Participation in the War” chaired by Alan Taylor. Around 3,000-5,000 runaway slaves sought their
freedom with the British during the war, most being transported out to Halifax, Nova Scotia. Some 200 ablebodied fought in British uniform as Colonial Marines, and later received land in Trinidad in “company towns”
from the companies of Colonial Marines where their descendents live today. The session featured talks by
Penny Carballo and Alan Nigel Smith (Independent Scholars, United Kingdom) on “The War of 1812 and the
Black Spartans of Trinidad” and British researcher John McNish Weiss on “Cochrane and his Proclamation:
Liberator or Scaremonger?” Ms. Carballo is a Trinidadian descended from one of the Colonial Marines. I
thought that one of the remarkable things to come out of the panel was that the descendants of these former
American slaves, who able to seek freedom along with their families, still view themselves as “Americans”!
The conference was ably organized by Phillip Buckner of the University of London Institute for the
Americas and his assistant Olga Jimenez. Dr. Buckner expects to publish an anthology of papers presented at
the event. For more information, contact Phillip Buckner at [email protected].
Below: “Philanthropic Moderne.” British cartoon of 1815 on the British burning of Washington D.C. in
August 1814 and Vice Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane’s proclamation encouraging slaves to escape to
British ships to be given their freedom, land in British colonies, or to fight their former masters.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 15, No. 1, 2012—Bicentennial Issue
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National Park Service News Release
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE - July 30, 2012
CONTACT: CINDY CHANCE (410.260.2492) [email protected]
Star-Spangled Banner National Historic Trail
Ready for Visitors
Baltimore, MD - Today, the National Park Service officially launched the Star-Spangled
Banner National Historic Trail with a ceremony in the Fell’s Point neighborhood of
Baltimore, MD. Partners from all nine regions along the trail were recognized for their hard
work to develop the trail in their local areas.
“The launch of the Star Spangled Banner Trail is a key part of our nation’s bicentennial
celebration of the War of 1812,” said U.S. Senator Ben Cardin. “It will provide
Marylanders and visitors with a way to access and appreciate the sites engaged in our
nation’s Second War of Independence. Highlighted by kiosks, wayside signs, and highway
markers, the trail will offer a unique combination of land and water-based sites and give
visitors a unique understanding of Maryland’s role in the war that helped shaped our
nation.”
With help from regional partners, important sites along the trail are now ready for visitors
in southern Maryland, the Upper Bay, Maryland’s Eastern Shore, Prince George’s County,
Anne Arundel County, Baltimore City and Baltimore County, the Commonwealth of
Virginia, and the District of Columbia.
“The launch of the Star-Spangled Banner National Historic Trail is a proud moment for all
Marylanders,” said Congressman John Sarbanes, who authored legislation to create the
trail. “As we commemorate the War of 1812 Bicentennial, the Trail will help bring to life
historic events that unfolded in our own backyard and changed the course of our nation’s
history. I hope it will help visitors, students and others to learn more about our state’s
critical role in the ‘second war of independence’ and how the United States’ victory set the
stage for the spread of democracy around the world.”
Over 100 partners, friends, and tourism professionals showed their support at the trail’s
launch today. NPS Superintendent John Maounis said, “The hard work and dedication of
our partners throughout the region results today in a trail that is open and ready to receive
visitors. Families can tour the trail, visit historic places, ride their bikes or visit by boat. The
NPS Chesapeake Bay Office will continue to work with our partners to offer additional
opportunities for education and recreation.”
“The trail connects the multitude of sites significant to our national heritage,” said Bill
Pencek, Executive Director of the Maryland War of 1812 Bicentennial Commission, and
chair of the trail’s Advisory Council. “The trail is also a vital economic resource, attracting
the “touring traveler” who spends more, takes longer trips, and travels with more people
than typical visitors to Maryland.”
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 15, No. 1, 2012—Bicentennial Issue
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The Maryland State Highway Administration has begun installing highway markers in the
southern Maryland region of the trail. “The State Highway Administration is proud to
partner in support of creating scenic and historic byways and trails throughout Maryland,”
said SHA Deputy Administrator Doug Simmons. They carry residents as well as visitors
along paths that highlight our history, reflect our common heritage and welcome everyone
to explore Maryland again and again.”
New services and materials to help visitors explore the trail include:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
the trail’s history and travel pocket guide
interpretive kiosks at 25 trail locations
highway markers on Maryland roads
the trail’s Junior Ranger program
new mobile application and website
the Virtual Resource Center for educators
illustrated history and travel guide In Full Glory Reflected: Discovering the War of 1812 in
the Chesapeake, a collaboration of the National Park Service, the Maryland Historical
Trust, the Maryland Historical Society, and the Maryland War of 1812 Bicentennial
Commission.
About the Star-Spangled Banner National Historic Trail
The trail commemorates the War of 1812 and its legacy in the Chesapeake region. Over
560 miles of land and water routes in Maryland, Virginia, and the District of Columbia
follow movements of British and American troops during a period of political and social
turmoil that forever changed a young democratic nation. The National Park Service, in
cooperation with state government, local jurisdictions and hundreds of nonprofit
organizations, is working to preserve and develop sites and places along the trail to provide
interpretation of the causes, events, and outcomes of the War and improve water access and
recreation opportunities for visitors and residents.
For more information, visit www.starspangledtrail.net.
Old Glory flying over Tangier Island, Virginia
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 15, No. 1, 2012—Bicentennial Issue
P a g e | 125
Support the War of 1812 Magazine
Issue 18 of our counterpart, The War of 1812 Magazine, is now online at
http://www.napoleon-series.org/military/Warof1812/2012/Issue18/
Here is what this issue includes:
Articles
General Hull’s Campaign along the Detroit by M.B. Walsh
Shots Not Fired on 16 August 1812?
Selected Historical Accounts after the War
Discussion of Compilation Procedures for Maps
Later Development at Historic 1812 Military Sites near Detroit
Sir George Prevost: Defender of Canada in the War of 1812 by John R. Grodzinski
An Important Announcement to War of 1812 Historians and Enthusiasts: LAC Digitization
Reviews: Books, Film, Collectables and Ephemera
Three Unit Histories of the War of 1812 by D.E. Graves
First Volleys: A Selection of New and Reprinted Titles on the War of 1812
Miscellaneous
The Distribution of the Royal Marines on Lakes Ontario and Champlain, August 1814
Whoops! Accident on a Gun Detachment, 1811
The War of 1812 Magazine
John R. Grodzinski, CD, PhD, Editor
[email protected]
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 15, No. 1, 2012—Bicentennial Issue
P a g e | 126
Stamp Announcement 12-44: The War of 1812: USS Constitution
© 2011 USPS
On August 18, 2012, in Boston, Massachusetts, the Postal Service™ will issue The War of 1812: USS
Constitution commemorative stamp (Forever® priced at 45 cents) in one design in a pressure-sensitive adhesive
(PSA) souvenir sheet of 20 stamps (Item 578400). The War of 1812: USS Constititution $9.00 souvenir sheet
may not be split, and the stamps may not be sold individually.
The stamp will go on sale nationwide August 18, 2012.
With this 2012 issuance, the U.S. Postal Service® begins a series commemorating the bicentennial of the War
of 1812, a two-and-a-half year conflict with Great Britain that many Americans viewed as the nation’s “Second
War of Independence.” The first stamp in this series features a painting of the most famous ship of the war,
the USS Constitution, by Michele Felice Corné, circa 1803. Greg Breeding served as art director for the project.
Distribution: Item 578400, The War of 1812: USS Constitution (Forever priced at 45 cents)
Commemorative PSA Souvenir Sheet of 20 Stamps
Stamp distribution offices (SDOs) and stamp distribution centers (SDCs) will receive their standard
automatic distribution quantity for a PSA pane stamp. Distributions are rounded up to the nearest master carton
size of 2,000 panes. The stamp will be issued and sold by the pane ($9.00).
Initial Supply to Post Offices
SDOs/SDCs will make a subsequent automatic distribution to Post Offices of a quantity to cover
approximately 45 days of sales. Distribution quantities for the automatic distribution will be posted, by finance
number and unit ID, on the Asset Management SDC webpage
athttp://blue.usps.gov/purchase/assetmgnt/am_sdchome.htm. SDOs/SDCs must not distribute this
commemorative sheet to Post Offices before August 2, 2012.
The War of 1812: USS Constitution $9.00 souvenir sheet may not be split, and the stamps may not be
sold individually.
Additional Supply
Post Offices requiring additional quantities of Item 578400 must requisition them from their designated
SDO/SDC after the first day of issue using PS Form 17,Stamp Requisition/Stamp Return.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 15, No. 1, 2012—Bicentennial Issue
P a g e | 127
Sales Policy
All Post Offices should maintain a sufficient inventory level of this item until the stamp is officially
withdrawn from sale. If supplies run low, Post Offices must reorder additional quantities using their normal
ordering procedures.
How to Order the First-Day-of-Issue Postmark
Customers have 60 days to obtain the first -day-of-issue postmark by mail. They may purchase new stamps at
their local Post Office™, at The Postal Store®website at www.usps.com/shop, or by calling 800-STAMP-24.
They should affix the stamps to envelopes of their choice, address the envelopes (to themselves or others), and
place them in a larger envelope addressed to:
The War of 1812: USS Constitution Stamp
Postmaster
25 Dorchester Avenue
Boston, MA 02205-9998
After applying the first-day-of-issue postmark, the Postal Service will return the envelopes through the mail.
There is no charge for the postmark. All orders must be postmarked by October 18, 2012.
The War of 1812: USS Constitution Stamp
Postmaster
October 18, 2012
25 Dorchester Avenue
Boston, MA 02205-9998
Black and White Pictorial
The War of 1812: USS Constitution Stamp
Postmaster
October 18, 2012
25 Dorchester Avenue
Boston, MA 02205-9998
Digital Color Pictorial
How to Order First-Day Covers
The Postal Service also offers first-day covers for new stamp issues and Postal Service stationery items postmarked with the official first-day-of-issue cancellation. Each item has an individual catalog number and is
offered in the quarterly USA Philatelic Catalog, online at www.usps.com/shop, or by calling 800-782-6724.
Customers may request a free catalog by calling 800-782-6724 or writing to: U.S. Postal Service
Catalog Request, PO Box 219014, Kansas City, MO 64121-9014.
Philatelic Products
There are ten philatelic products available for this stamp issue:
578461*, First-Day Cover, $0.89.
578462*, Full Pane First Day Cover, $11.50.
578464*, Cancelled Full Pane, $11.50.
578465*, Digital Color Postmark, $1.60.
578484, Uncut Press Sheet, $45.00.
578491*, Ceremony Program, $6.95.
578492*, Stamp Deck Card, $0.95.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 15, No. 1, 2012—Bicentennial Issue
P a g e | 128
578494*, Stamp Deck Card w/DCP
(random stamp), $1.95.
578497*, Panel, Set of 2, $16.95.
578499*, Cancellation Keepsake
(DCP w/Pane), $10.95.
Items with an asterisk (*) will use the 128 barcode from Stamp Fulfillment Services. All other philatelic products will continue to use
barcode series A, with the exception of the Yearbook and the Guide Book.
Issue:
The War of 1812: USS Constitution
Item Number:
578400
Denomination & Type
ofIssue:
First-Class Mail® Forever Commemorative
Format:
Souvenir Sheet of 20 (1 design)
Series:
The War of 1812
Issue Date & City:
August 18, 2012, Boston, MA, 02205
Designer:
Greg Breeding, Charlottesville, VA
Art Director:
Greg Breeding, Charlottesville, VA
Typographer:
Greg Breeding, Charlottesville, VA
Existing Art By:
Michele Felice Corné
Engraver:
Trident
Modeler:
Avery Dennison, Designed and Engineered Solutions
Manufacturing Process:
Gravure
Printer:
Avery Dennison (AVR)
Printed at:
AVR, Clinton, SC
Press Type:
Dia Nippon Kiko (DNK)
Stamps per Pane:
20
Print Quantity:
25 million stamps
Paper Type:
Prephosphored, Type II
Adhesive Type:
Pressure-sensitive
Processed at:
AVR, Clinton, SC
Colors:
Yellow, Magenta, Cyan, Black, 7506 (Tan)
Stamp Orientation:
Horizontal
Image Area (w x h):
1.420 x 1.085 in./36.06 x 27.56 mm
Overall Size (w x h):
1.560 x 1.225 in./39.62 x 31.12 mm
Full Pane Size (w x h):
10.25 x 7.25 in./260.35 x 184.15 mm
Plate Size:
100 stamps per revolution
Plate Numbers:
“V” followed by five (5) single digits
Marginal Markings:
Front:
Header: “THE WAR OF 1812”
• Verso text
Back:
Header: “THE WAR OF 1812”
• © 2011 USPS • USPS logo
• Plate position diagram • Barcode (578400) in lower left corner of pane • Promotional text • The War of 1812 verso text • Portrait of
President James Madison and verso text
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For information on U.S.S. Constitution, visit
The Captain’s Clerk
A Library of Congress online historical collection at
http://www.captainsclerk.info/
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 15, No. 1, 2012—Bicentennial Issue
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2012 Star-Spangled Banner Commemorative Coin
The 2012 Star-Spangled Banner Commemorative Coins celebrate the bicentennial writing of America’s national
anthem by Francis Scott Key. The $5 gold coins and silver dollars bear designs emblematic of the War of 1812,
with representations depicting a naval battle scene from the War of 1812, the Star-Spangled Banner anthem,
Lady Liberty waving a 15-star, 15-stripe Star-Spangled Banner flag and a waving modern American flag.
Prices will rise across the board by $5. While the increases will be felt less for the gold commemoratives with
prices already hovering in the $500 range, they are more noticeable for the silver commemoratives as they
represent hikes of more than 10%.
Introductory
Price
Price
Adjustments
Regular
Price
Proof $5 Coin
$505.00
+$5
+$510.00
Uncirculated $5 Coin
$495.00
+$5
+$500.00
Two-Coin Proof Set (Proof $5 Gold and Proof $1
Silver)
$555.00
+$5
+$560.00
Proof Silver Dollar
$49.95
+$5
$54.95
Uncirculated Silver Dollar
$44.95
+$5
$49.95
Star-Spangled Banner Commemorative Coin
Each commemorative may be purchased directly from the U.S. Mint on its website (http://catalog.usmint.gov/)
or through its toll free number 1-800-USA-MINT (872-6468).
Surcharges of $35 for each gold coin and $10 for each silver dollar sold will be given to the Maryland War of
1812 Bicentennial Commission to support the bicentennial activities, educational outreach, and preservation and
improvements to the War of 1812 sites and related structures.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 15, No. 1, 2012—Bicentennial Issue
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New Canadian $2 coin commemorates defeat of U.S. vessel
Circulating commemorative marks naval clash during War of 1812
By Jeff Starck, Coin World , June 30, 2012
The War of 1812 was a fundamental turning point in Canada’s history, a struggle from which some of Canada’s
earliest unifying moments emerged.
The war — in which the foe was the United States — is now being marked on a circulating commemorative $2
coin, the first such commemorative featuring the RCM’s new alloy and security features that debuted earlier
this spring on the denomination.
The Royal Canadian Mint on June 18, as part of the government of Canada’s broader celebration of the
bicentennial of Canadian military efforts in the war, began releasing up to 5 million $2 coins celebrating the
victory of HMS Shannon over the USS Chesapeake, and its escort of the American war prize into Halifax
Harbor.
The multi-ply plated steel ringed-bimetallic coin is the first salvo in a commemorative circulation coin program
also honoring four key persons in the struggle on 25-cent coins.
In June 1813, Captain Philip Broke, Commander of the HMS Shannon, was eager to secure a victory for the
British Navy, which had suffered a series of defeats at the hands of the United States. As the Shannon
challenged the USS Chesapeake off the New England coast, both ships met with guns at the ready. The battle
lasted only 11 minutes, but the decisive victory helped to bolster the confidence of the British Navy, especially
at the sight of the captured Chesapeake being escorted into Halifax harbour by a triumphant Shannon.
The historic naval battle in June 1813 resulted in the death of 23 Shannon crewmen. Graves of fallen crewmen
are marked in the Royal Navy Burying Ground and at the Old Burial Ground, administered by St. Paul’s Church
in Halifax. HMS Shannon’s bell is currently on display in Halifax at the Maritime Museum of the Atlantic.
Key historical figures in Canada’s successful fight in the War of 1812 will also be honored on four new 25-cent
circulation coins to be released later in 2012 and 2013. The coins will honor Gen. Sir Isaac Brock, Shawnee war
chief Tecumseh, Charles de Salaberry and Laura Secord.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 15, No. 1, 2012—Bicentennial Issue
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The RCM will unveil those designs in conjunction with their official issue dates throughout 2012 and 2013.
Designs of new $2 coin
The reverse of the new $2 coin now entering circulation was designed by Nova Scotian artist Bonnie Ross, who
has designed several other Canadian coins with nautical themes. The reverse of the $2 shows HMS Shannon
leaving Halifax Harbor to do battle on the Atlantic, against a scene of early 19th century Halifax Harbor on the
left side, with Citadel Hill visible in the distance. On the far right, a tall ship rests in the well-defended harbor.
The starboard-side, detailed image of HMS Shannon dominates the brass-plated center of the coin. Most of its
sails are fully unfurled and filled by a steady westerly wind, its jib boom and bowsprit pointed out to sea.
Engraved at the base of the outer ring is the original figurehead from HMS Shannon’s bow. The rest of the ring
features the legend the WAR OF / LA GUERRE DE / 1812, HMS SHANNON and the initials of the artist.
The coin also sports security features that were added when the denomination was overhauled earlier this year.
The coin includes the two laser-engraved maple leaves at the bottom of the reverse, a virtual image of two
maple leaves at the top of the reverse, and the words CANADA – 2 DOLLARS on its edge.
The obverse features the effigy of Queen Elizabeth II by Susanna Blunt, as well as Canada’s official
commemorative symbol for the 200th anniversary of the War of 1812 (a script “1812” superimposed over a
maple leaf).
In addition to releasing the coins into circulation, the RCM offers five-coin packs at face value ($10) with a
maximum order of three packs, but only to Canadian residents. Visitors to RCM boutiques in Ottawa, Winnipeg
or Vancouver may also acquire the new coins at face value. For more information, visit the RCM’s website,
www.mint.ca.
Dr. Don Hickey’s War of 1812 Mailing List
Professor Don Hickey, author of the War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict and Don't Give Up the
Ship! Myths of the War of 1812, among other works, has a War of 1812 email list that is
available to War of 1812 scholars and other interested parties. If you would like to be on the
email list, contact Dr. Hickey at [email protected]
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 15, No. 1, 2012—Bicentennial Issue
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Special War of 1812 Issue of the Maryland Historical Magazine
A special War of 1812 issue of the Maryland Historical Magazine has been published. “The
War of 1812 in the Maryland Historical Magazine” comprises mostly reprints of classic articles
on the war that have appeared in the magazine over the years. If you would like a copy, send
$10.00 to: Patricia Dockman Anderson, Director of Publications & Library Services, Maryland
Historical Society, 201 West Monument Street, Baltimore, MD 21201.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 15, No. 1, 2012—Bicentennial Issue
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16th National War of 1812 Symposium
In Full Glory Reflected:
The Beginning of the War of 1812
Maryland Historical Society, 201 West Monument Street
Baltimore, MD 21201
Saturday, October 6, 2012, 10:00 AM - 5:00 PM
Including an opportunity to tour the new MdHS exhibit
“In Full Glory Reflected: Maryland During the War of 1812”
http://www.mdhs.org
Speakers:
• Faye Kert, Canadian maritime historian, on “International Maritime Law, Art and War: A Legacy
of 1812”.
•
Jerry Crimmins on “Leadership: The Fall of Detroit and Chicago, and the Successful American
Defense of Fort Wayne and Fort Harrison”
•
Charles P. Neimeyer, Ph.D., Director, USMC History, on “‘Shall I Board Her?’: Boarding
Parties, Bladensburg Races and the U.S. Marines in the War of 1812”
•
David Taylor, co-author of The War of 1812 and the Rise of the U.S. Navy, on “Three Profiles:
The Navy Going into the War of 1812”
•
William Connery on “Baltimore Privateers in 1812: The City’s ‘Navy’ Takes on the British Navy”
•
Glenn F. Williams on “The U.S. Army on the Eve of the War of 1812”
Price of registration and lunch for the day is $50.00 per person with checks made out to the War of
1812 Consortium, Inc., and sent to Charles P. Ives III, 802 Kingston Road, Baltimore, MD 21212.
Payment is due by Friday, September 28, 2012. In writing for tickets, please specify at which
speaker’s roundtable you would like to be seated as well as any special dietary needs, if applicable.
The Sixteenth National War of 1812 Symposium
is co-sponsored by the Council on America’s Military Past (CAMP-USA)
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 15, No. 1, 2012—Bicentennial Issue
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Upcoming in the Fall 2012 Bicentennial Issue of the
Journal of the War of 1812—
Commander Tyrone G. Martin, U.S.N. (Retired), “Constitution vs. Guerriere,
19 August 1812: Unexpected Victory” and “Constitution vs. Java, 29 December
1812: Bitter Victory.” (Tentative titles)
Harvey Strum "Saving Mr. Tompkins War--From Reluctant Warriors to
Warhawks: The 1814-1815 Elections in New York State"
Christopher T. George, “‘Light Horse Harry’ Lee and the War of 1812”
Plus Reviews of the Following Books—
1812: War and the Passions of Patriotism
by Nicole Eustace (University of Pennsylvania Press)
187 Things You Should Know About the War of 1812
by Donald R. Hickey (Maryland Historical Society)
The War of 1812 and the Rise of the U.S. Navy
by Mark Collins Jenkins and David Taylor (National Geographic)
In Full Glory Reflected: Discovering the War of 1812 in the Chesapeake
by Ralph E. Eshelman and Burton K. Kummerow (Johns Hopkins University Press)
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 15, No. 1, 2012—Bicentennial Issue