tA
f er 7 Years In Honduras . . .
SALVADORAN
REFUGEES
RETURN
HOME
AReport by the
CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEE CENTER
Washington, D.C.
January 1988
302838437
After Seven Years in Honduras...
Salvadoran Refugees Return Home
Prepared by the
Central American R ef ugee Center
Washington, D.C.
January, 1988
The Central American Ref ugee Center is a member of the Central
American Refugee National Network ( CARNET).
Cover Photo Credit :
Adam K ufeld
Central American Refugee Center (
CARECEN )
3112 Mt . Pleasant St ., N .W .
Washington , D .C . 20010
(
202 ) 328-9799
This report can be purchased from CARECEN
for $8 .50 plus $1.50 postage and handling .
"Af ter Seven Years in Honduras, Salvadoran R ef ugees Return Home "
was investigated and written by three staffpersons of the Central
American Refugee Center.
It documents the background, current
circumstances and prospects of the repatriation of communities of
Salvadoran refugees a t the Mesa Grande camp in Honduras.
The Central American Refugee Center (CARECEN) is a non -profit
human rights organization in Washington, D.C., founded by refugees f o r
the purpose of obtaining recognition and realization of the rights of
refugees.
CARECEN also has offices in New York, Los Angeles, Houston,
and San Francisco.
CARECEN is a member of the Central American
Refugee National Network (CARNET).
This report is based on a series of interviews with officials of
the United Nations , the Salvadoran civilian government and military ,
international agencies, Salvadoran development and relief agencies,
international and Salvadoran churches, as well as extensive interviews
with the refugees a t Mesa Grande and the displaced of El Salvador.
CARECEN maintains a permanent representative in El Salvador who
monitors the human rights situation and current conditions f o r those
displaced by the war .
Reproduction of this report is permitted with proper attribution
t o the Central American Refugee Center.
CONTENTS
Introduction
^
The R ef ugees ' Proposal t o Return Home
Section One:
Lif e As A Refugee:
A Precarious Existence
6
Individual Repatriation
10
Abuses of Refugees Who Repatriate Individually
12
Deteriorating Conditions in Mesa Grande
15
The Refugees' Proposal f o r Voluntary Repatriation
I7
Section Two:
Responses to the Repatriation Appeal
The Salvadoran Government:
A Failure t o Respond
22
22
The Role of the UNHCR
26
The Churches:
28
Playing a Crucial Role
Humanitarian Agencies : A Need f o r Resources
30
The ICM:
31
An Agency Without a Role
Section Three:
Section Four:
A Return Despite the Risk
The Repatriation
The Week of Negotiations:
Backs Down
32
36
The Government
Crossing The Border
.-
5
41
51
Section Five: The Aftermath: Communities of Peace
Or Targets for Persecution?
56
Section Six:
65
Conclusion
Appendix One:
The Going Home Campaign
73
Appendix Two:
A Chronology of Abuses Against
the Repopulations
74
\.--
Appendix Three:
Appendix Four:
R e f u g e e Repatriates in Prison
L e t t e r s f r o m the U.S. Congress t o
President D u a r t e
78
81 .
INTRODUCTION
"We are no longer r ef ugees. We are Salvadorans !"
-- a repatriating r ef ugee at the Salvadoran border
October 10, 1987
At 6 :0 0 a.m. on the morning of October 10, 19 8 7, 4313 Salvadoran
r ef ugees aboard more than 100 buses and trucks left the Mesa Grande
camp in Honduras on their
trip home to El Salvador .
During the day
they successful
ly crossed the border at El Poy and repeatedly passed
through military
roadblocks on the journey back to homes they had fled
as long as seven years ago. For support and security they could rely
only on their
rights as refugees and civilians
under international
law, as well as the presence of humanitarian organizations and the
international press.
For the nine months preceding the actual repatriation, the refugees
had negotiated with the government of El Salvador and the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) for permission to
return and for security measures.
Because conditions in the Honduran
refuge0 camps were deteriorating while the Salvadoran civil
war
dragged on, the refugees had been l
ed to take the unprecedented step
of returning to El Salvador even as the violence continued.
Throughout the year the Salvadoran government refused to consider
the repatriation of communities of refugees. Military
officials , in
opposing the move, charged that the refugees' return was intended to
create civilian
support f or insurgent f orces.
reasons to oppose the move.
the conflictive
The military
The repopulation of abandoned villages
the creation o f f r e e-fire zones in
which any presence can be characterized as a guerrilla
unit
and thus a
target.
n
I order to secure permission to return to their
zones, the refugees had appealed t o humanitarian
support .
organizations
for
places of origin . Specifically ,
they wished to repopulate five villages
Cuscatlan and Chalatenango , a
ll
with
suppor t , they woul
d be able to
establish non-combat zones in their
Salvador .
homes in these
They believed that by returning as intact communities
strong national and international
in the departments of Cabanas,
war -ravaged areas of northern El
Sinc e the refugees' initial
appeal in January, 1987, a
number o f organizations have contributed with funding and moral
support for the repatriation.
Thus, under intense international
pressure and faced with no alternative , the Salvadoran government
ultimately
capitulated at the eleventh hour and allowed the move t o
take place .
The refugees' repatriation, the largest in the history o f Central
America , in unprecedented.
conflict , challenges
Their move, in the midst of the ongoing
the conventional wisdom, which holds that
refugees must wait until
dangers subside b e f o r e repatriating.
But
Salvadoran refugees have been confronted with an increasingly
difficult
in
zones of northern El Salvador contravenes the
military 's policy in these areas:
military
had other
and untenable situation in Honduras, and a series o f events
have led many t o f ear f or their
security there. Consequently , the
refugees faced either an increasingly precarious position in the camps
or a search for individual
asylum in third countries ( an unlikely
prospect third countries ' reluctance to accept refugees) or a return
home. Given the alternatives , their most promising option seemed t o
return to their
abandoned villages
in conflictive zones of El Salvador
and to struggle for their rights as civilians .
At this writing ,a
l
of the ex-r ef ugees have reached their
former
homes; they have begun to erect temporar y shelters and clear roads
First steps towards rebuilding their lives have now
long overgrown.
been taken.
However, several alarming security breaches have already
occurred, including
the kiling
of a resident of an intended
repopulation sites (Arcatao, Department of Chalatenango ) at the hands
of the Salvadoran Army . The situation for these civilians
is tenuous
and the future remains certain.
Even so, the repatriation was successfully accomplished, and
thousands of refugees have reclaimed their
nationals living
in their
own country.
several dimensions of their move.
rights as Salvadoran
This report wil
examine
Why did the refugees choose to
repatriate after seven years of life in a refugee camp?
organize the repatriation t o make it successful?
they currently face ?
How did they
What are the dangers
What roles can the former refugees, now living
in war zones without any political
power or material resources, play
in shaping the future of the country?
n
I the f irst section of this
return home wil
report, the refugees' proposal to
be analyzed in a historical context of conditions
in
Mesa Grande and the pressures that led the refugees to repatriate.
The second section wil
discuss the responses o f the various actors in
repatriation issue, with a focus on the changing positions of the
government of El Salvador, the Armed Forces of Honduras and the UNHCR
in the f ace of the r ef ugees' determination to return.
section wil
within
The third
review the protection issues for returning refugees
the current human rights context in El Salvador .
The actual
events of the repatriation move, as reported by international
observers on the scene, wil
fifth section wil
be summarized in the fourth section.
The
look at the aftermath of the refugees' return in
the five repopulated communities
conclusion, the report wil
and their
prospects for survival .
n
I
address the issues o f continuing
protection and assistance for the repopulation projects, and the
significance
of the events of October 10, 1987 in the context o f civil
war and the regional e f f o r t for peace in Central America .
in a r ef ugee camp or a return t o conflictive zones in an attempt to
assert their
neutrality as civilians .
Af ter years of waiting for
peace, this last alternative became the most workable ,provided that
the refugees could return as a community , together with international
observers and support , to the communities that they had once fled.
L i f e As A R e f uge e:
A Precarious Existence .
Refugees began streaming out of El Salvador in 1979,when brutal
state repression of mass organizations
into a full
scale civil
and opposition groups erupted
war . The northern provinces were particularly
affected, and the inhabitants
of these zones began pouring over the
border into Honduras seeking safety. They settled into the
communities they found there, such as La Estancia, Guarita , La Virtud,
and Colomoncagua . There they were received by the Honduran people,
who allowed them to settle and stay. Although Honduras is not a
signatory to the International
Protocols regarding refugees, more than
100,
0 0 0 refugees from El Salvador , Guatemala and Nicaragua have
entered the country and remained for years.
As the dimensions of the
exodus from El Salvador grew, however, the government of Honduras and
the UNHCR established four basic principles
regarding the refugee
issue:
1) that Honduras would accept refugees seeking asylum;
2 ) that Honduras would not forcibly repatriate the refugees
recognizing the continuing violence in countries of origin ;
3) that the refugees would not be permitted to work;
4 ) that the refugees would be allowed to stay only in zones
SECTION I
THE REFUGEES' PROPOSAL TO RETURN HOME
n
I 1979,after decades of repression and military
vador .
erupted in El Sal
rule ,civil
war
Today,nearly eight years later, the violence
continues . n
I the interim, more than 6 0/ 0 0 0 civilians
have been
killed , over 500,0 0 0 people have been displaced by the war and remain
inside the country, and over one million
Salvadorans have fled to
other Central American nations . North America and Europe.*
Of those
who have left El Salvador , approximately 2 0,000 have lived in refugee
camps in Honduras, not far from the Salvador an border.
The largest of
the camps is Mesa Grande, where 1
1,5 0 0 refugees have been living ;many
have been there for as long as seven years.
Since January , 1987 the refugees have made known to the
governments of El Salvador and Honduras and to the UNHCR their
determination t o return home despite the continuing civil war ,
economic and political
chaos, and increasing violence . Their decision
to repatriate presents a unique and complex situation : the refugees
are returning not because the war is ending but rather because it is
continuin g. As the war continues indefinitely , Salvadorans in
Honduras have been given a choice between a long-term sentence t o life
Segundo Montes, El Salvador 1987: Salvadorenos Refuqiados en los
Estados Unidos , University of Central America , San Salvador, 1987.
lp.l
designated by the Honduran government.
In spite of this agreement, during 1980 the Honduran Army joined
the Armed Forces of El Salvador in "hammer -and-anvil" operations and
massacred more than 6 0 0 Salvadorans fleeing scorched-earth operations
and trying to cross the Rio Sumpul into Honduras.
Of those killed a t
the Rio Sumpul, sixty died on the Honduran side of the border.
In
March of the following year, the border crossing massacre was repeated
at the Rio Lempa near the Salvadoran village of Santa Marta in the
Department of Cabanas; another sixty civilians were killed .
Since
that time, the UNHCR has supervised the treatment of refugees in
Honduras, and in October of 1981 monitored their relocation f r o m the
communities along the border to the Mesa Grande camp.
Because of atrocities like the massacre a t the Rio Sumpul and Rio
Lempa, relations between the refugees from El Salvador and the
Honduran government have always been tense.
The refugees, themselves ,
opposed the move t o Mesa Grande f r o m the Honduran villages where they
had originally settled, realistically fearing the collapse of their
fragile new community structures and deterioration of their living
standards.
But the Honduran government insisted, saying on the one
hand that the move would enhance the security of the refugees, and on
the other, that the move was necessary in order t o prevent the r e f u g e e
community f r o m harboring guerrillas on "R and R " (rest and relaxation )
f r o m El Salvador.
Since the f ormation of the camps, the refugees have been under
the of f icial protection of the UNHCR, which coordinates with the
Honduran National Commission f o r Refugees ( CONARE).
Despite UNHCR
protection, however, the r ef ugee community a t Mesa Grande has s u f f e r e d
continuing security problems .
In addition t o the massacres a t the
border, more than thirty refugees along with f o u r relief workers were
killed between November 1981 and April 1982 by Honduran troops.
During the intervening years, r e f u g e e s arriving a t the camp f r o m the
Department of Chalatenango in El Salvador routinely reported
difficulties crossing the border or gaining access t o the camp.
Many
were captured by Honduran troops during the attempt, and in the past
year, several people have been killed or simply disappeared in border
crossings.*
Since the camp was established, the situation a t Mesa Grande has
steadily deteriorated.
Over the years, the r e f u g e e s have felt
mounting pressure t o repatriate individually, even as the Armed Forces
of El Salvador began systematically bombing and burning their places
of origin in the Departments of Chalatenango and Cuscatlan.
At the
same time the Honduran military cordon around the camp itself
tightened, international observers were discouraged f r o m visiting the
refugees, and food shortages became chronic.
By 1984, the r e f u g e e s
had begun t o f e a r that soon they would no longer be tolerated by
Honduran authorities.
Tutela Legal, Archdiocese of San Salvador, February, 1987.
In April, 1983, Honduran Army Col. Abraham Garcia Turcios,
Coordinator of the National Commission of Refugees of Honduras,
announced t o the Honduran press that the 2 2,0 0 0 Salvadoran refugees
would be relocated f o r a second time t o a site further f r o m the
border, probably in the western provinces of Yoro and Olancho in
Honduras.
The Army Colonel noted the probable "reluctance " of the
refugees t o move, but cited "security reasons" as reqiring it.
Both
the UNHCR and the U.S. Embassy in Honduras endorsed the relocation
plan.
For the next one and a half years the refugees and
international agencies opposed the relocation , claiming that it was
unnecessary and would cause undue hardship f o r the refugees.
The
relocation was effectively forestalled.*
In September 1984, the Honduran National Security Council, in view
of the unsuccessful attempt t o relocate the refugees f u r t h e r f r o m the
border, declared its intention to repatriate Salvadoran refugees.
The
Security Council declared that if the refugees would not return
voluntarily, they would be forced t o return.
The government of El
Salvador announced its willingness t o cooperate in receiving the
refugees.
The UNHCR, in clearly speaking o u t against any involuntary
repatriation, succeeded in defusing the Honduran government's attempt
t o forcibly repatriate the refugees.
f u r t h e r discussions of the issue.
However, the UNHCR encouraged
As a result of those discussions, a
See Renato Camarda, Forced To Move: Salvadoran R ef ugees in
Honduras, Solidarity Publications , San Francisco, 1985.
Tripartite Commission, composed of the governments of Honduras and El
Salvador and the UNHCR, was formed to establish principles
repatriation, if it did occur .
and oversee
The Tripartite Commission first met
in April , 1986.
Individual
Repatriation
With the formation of the Tripartite Commission, a small , yet
constant flow of official voluntary repatriations to El Salvador from
Honduras began. n
I August , 19 8 6 the UNHCR sent their first permanent
representative, Roberto Rodriguez, to El Salvador at the invitation of
the Salvadoran government . His mission was to strengthen the
politically
tenuous reception program of repatriating refugees.
As in
their missions in other countries, UNHCR's role would consist of
operational facilitation ,protection of personal security and
assistance for integration of repatriates.
As the refugee reception program developed, a
l individual
repatriates were accompanied t o the border by representatives of the
UNHCR in Honduras. After clearing Immigration and Customs in both
Honduras and El Salvador, the refugee was taken to an Army facility
where he or she was interrogated,processed and released t o government
officials in the area. Each returning refugee was informed of
government assistance programs through the National Commission for Aid
t o the Displaced of El Salvador ( CONADES).
Only three percent of the
refugees chose to accept the assistance, and stated their fear of
government monitoring and surveillance through the CONADES program.
"Assisted" repatriates were then registered with CONADES and recieved
some benefits in foodsupplies ,housing materials , or resettlement
programs.
The unassisted cases of repatriates, 9 7 percent of the total of
individual
returnees, went their separate ways. According to UNHCR
I
records, more than 7 8 0 persons returned to El Salvador in 1985. n
1986, approximately 8 7 0 went back, and in 1987, a total of 8 5 0 people
were reported to have repatriated before the large -scale Mesa Grande
repatriation. n
I March 1987, the UNHCR began meeting returning
refugees on the Salvadoran side of the border,and records kept since
then show that only about 20 percent of the individual
returned to their places of origin .
repatriates
Ongoing violence prevented the
remaining 8 0 percent from doing so. They therefore joined the ranks
of the displaced living
Paz.
in La Libertad, San Salvador, Sonsonate and La
But whether they were assisted or unassisted,and whatever their
destination , a
l returning refugees were interrogated and processed by
the Salvadoran military . Those returning from Mesa Grande were met by
the UNHCR and taken to the headquarters of the Fourth Brigade of the
Armed Forces of El Salvador where they were interrogated. Initialy
,
repatriates spent one or more days n
i the Fourth Brigade for
interrogation and "processing."
The presence of the UNHCR at the
border in El Salvador subsequently reduced this time , in most cases to
period of hours rather than days.*
Interview with UNHCR official , June, 1987.
Abuses of Ref u gees Who Repatriate Individually
Because of the ongoing war in El Salvador, however, and
increasingly f requent reports of abuse of individual refugees by the
Armed Forces, concern arose about this type of repatriation.
It is
well -known that individual returnees a r e regarded with suspicion by
the Army because of their previous residence in zones where guerrillas
have been active.
Further, the High Command of the Salvadoran Armed
Forces has long regarded the refugee camps as a training ground f o r
guerrillas, a n allegation which the refugees, the UNHCR, and the
international agencies working in the camps all vehemently deny.
At
least one Army Colonel in the High Command viewed suspiciously the
refugees' desire t o r e t u r n home as a desire t o o f f e r civilian support
t o the guerrillas.*
The refugees, in fact, daim their right t o
neutrality a ^s civilians .**
The problem of the capture, mistreatment and imprisonment of
refugees who individually repatriate have been documented by
international human rights organizations.
Twenty-six cases of r e f u g e e
Interview with Col. Zepeda, Intelligence Section, High Command of
the Armed Forces of El Salvador. June, 1987.
** One r e f u g e e, a member of the Mesa Grande Repopulation Committee,
summed up the r e f u g e e s' motivations:
We wish t o r e t u r n t o our places of origin, t o rebuild our homes
and replant o u r fields. We a r e tired of living f r o m charity. We
want t o teach o u r children how t o work the land. We want t o
breathe f resh air. We want f r e e d o m.
repatriates incarcerated f or politica l crimes a t Mariona and D-opango
prisons in the capital have been identif ied s o f a r by hununan rights
workers ( f o r details of these cases, see Appendix III).
Dozens of
others have been captured, detained, interrogated and subsequently
released.
Although these prisoners do not represent a large
percentage of the refugees who have voluntarily returned t o El
Salvador from Honduras, the circumstances of their detention became
cause f o r increasing concern.
The majority of interrogations
conducted by security forces focused primarily on
activities .
particular types of
Repatriates were asked about their activities a t Mesa
Grande, about a possible guerrilla presence there, and about their
activities before seeking refuge in Honduras.
Many testified that
they found themselves under suspicion simply because they had once
fled their country.
The prisoners reported both physical and
psychological t o r t u r e during their interrogations and imprisonment.
They had variously been severely beaten, denied sleep, denied water,
interrogated f o r days, drugged, suspended in the air and beaten,
drenched with water, forced t o stand f o r entire days and nights, and
tied and blindfolded f o r extended periods of time.
Many were
threatened with death or with t h e capture and execution of family
members .
All were forced t o sign extrajudicial confessions that they
were not permitted t o read.*
Series of interviews by human rights workers with twenty-six
political prisoners in Mariona Prison, San Salvador.
The testimonies of the imprisoned repatriates, as well as the
contents of their files/*
show that many were detained based on
accusations of their activities a t Mesa Grande.
This implies that any
refugee may be subject t o a r r e s t simply because they had once fled
their country or f o r having lived a t the camp.
These captures and
abuses have given the refugees in Honduras good cause t o f e a r that
they, too, might be captured, detained, t o r t u r e d, and imprisoned
should they decide t o r e t u r n as individual repatriates without
international protection.
The r e f u g e e s' proposal f o r repatriation as
community to their places of origin was formulated t o give added
security and protect against the individual and arbitrary captures of
the repatriates.**
Currently, all of the imprisoned repatriates have
been released, though in some cases their detention exceeded t w o
years.
The UNHCR representative in San Salvador has intervened with
the civilian and military authorities regarding the matter and, a f t e r
protracted negotiations, succeeded in obtaining the release of all but
eight of the repatriates.
The remaining eight were released along
with more than 4 7 0 other political prisoners in November under El
Salvador's amnesty program (decree # 8 0 5).
Interview with UNHCR representative, San Salvador, July, 1987.
** One f i f t y-six y e a r-old man living in Santa Marta, Department of
Cabanas told that his s o n had been captured on t w o occasions by the
Armed Forces since he individually r e p a t r i a t e d f r o m Mesa Grande. The
older man said, "There will be more security when people [Mesa Grande
r e f u g e e s] r e t u r n in a g r o u p. H e r e , a s we live now , people can be
Onsite
picked o f f one a t a time and no one knows a b o u t it."
interview, July, 1987.
Deteriorating Conditions In Mesa Grande R ef ugee Camp
But meanwhile, security conditions f or the thousands of r e f u g e e s
who remain in Honduras have deteriorated.
In October 1985, Robert
Gersony of the Refugee Bureau of the U.S. State Department went t o
Honduras to determine what steps were necessary t o insure that the
Honduran Army could be certain that no guerrillas were living in the
r e f u g e e camps.
In his report, he recommended increased military and
administrative control of the camps by the government of Honduras.
Since Gersony's report was issued, there have been increasing
indications that the Honduran government has been considering various
plans t o control the camps more directly.
disturbing f o r security reasons.
This possibility is
While the UNHCR acknowledges the
right of the Honduran government t o intervene in the administration of
the refugee camps, it also recognizes that the Honduran Army, security
f o r c e s and paramilitary groups a r e a major t h r e a t t o Salvadoran
refugees in Honduras.
The UNHCR emphatically denounced the August 29 ,
1985 attack by the Honduran Armed Forces on the refugee camp a t
Colomoncagua, during which three persons
( including a n i n f a n t)
were
killed, sixty people were wounded or beaten and ten were abducted.
Although a n attack of such a scale has not been repeated, the r e f u g e e s
say tha t the Honduran military encirclement o f the camps is a source
of continuing insecurity and tension.*
See also, Honduras: A Crisis On The Border , Lawyers Committee f or
International Human Rights. New York: January, 1985.
Since the camp 's f ormation, the Armed Forces of Honduras have
maintained a constant presence immediately outside the Mesa Grande
camp. However their presence inside the camp has increased in recent
months.
Moreover, in June 1987 the government of Honduras and the
UNHCR signed a "Memorandum of Understanding."*
Significantly/ the
agreement turns over t o the Honduran government responsibility f o r the
determination of r e f u g e e s t a t u s and hands -on operation o f the r e f u g e e
reception station on the Honduran-Salvadoran border, both politically
explosive responsibilities .
In addition, the government of Honduras
was t o assume control of both the health and educational facilities
inside the camps.
Previously, medical care had been provided by
international humanitarian organizations, such as the French medical
agency. Doctors Without Borders, and the educational system had been
organized by the r e f u g e e s themselves, and administered by Caritas of
Santa Rosa de Copan, Honduras, using a curriculum of human
development.
The refugees have strongly criticized the UNHCR f o r what they f e e l
is an abdication of responsibility by the UNHCR t o the Honduran
government.
Given their difficult history with the Honduran
authorities, the r ef ugees justifiably f e a r the "Honduranization" of
the camps .
The growing presence of Honduran authorities represents a
*" Memorandum de Entendimiento Entre El Govierno de Honduras y El
Alto Comisionado de las Naciones Unidas para los refugiados para la
regulacion del tratamiento a los refugiados," June 3, 1987. According
t o the agreement, the government would assume de f a c to control o f the
i n f r a s t r u c t u r e of the camps, budgeting and expenditures, any
productive o r commercial activity inside the camps, camp personnel,
medical assistance programs and the educational s y s t e m.
threat to the r ef ugees' own internal social structures , as well as to
their physical security.
At the same time , the captures and abuses of
those who have repatriated individually
are also a source of fear.
Accordingly , at Mesa Grande many have decided that their
only
alternative is repatriation as .an intact community .
The Refugees* Proposal For Voluntary Repatriation As A Community
Historically , large-scale refugee repatriations in the different
trouble spots of the world have occurred only after the violence
subsided in the refugees' country.
Immediate prospects for an end t o
the war in El Salvador look bleak. During the past three years, there
have been periodic .attempts at a negotiated solution t o the armed
conflict :
bilateral talks between the government and the Farabundo
Marti Front for National Liberation/Democratic Revolutionary Front
( FMLN/ FDR), the multilateral
Contadora Initiative
negotiated by
countries in the region,and the recent Central American Peace Plan
signed in Esquipulas , Guatemala by the five Central American
presidents on August 7, 1987. Although the latter has created a
regional framework for a negotiated solution, the levels of violence
in El Salvador have actually risen in the past six months . t
I is
widely recognized that the Duarte government and its primary ally , the
Reagan administration, are deeply resistant t o political
negotiations
that lead t o power-sharing with the opposition and prefer to pursue a
military victory, whatever its cost.
faith and flexibility
Despite protestations o f good
from the Duarte government , neither the
government nor the military have shown the political wil
t o achieve a
negotiated settlement and an end to the war .
By a
l estimates, the war promises to grind on. The Salvadoran
0 0 0 men under arms and bolstered by $ 3 2 4.3 milion
government , with 5 4,
in war -related aid f rom the U.S.,*
is well -f ortif ied but unable to
defeat the committed insurgent forces, estimated t o number around
7,
0 0 0 combatants .
Given the current pressure from the Honduran authorities and the
likelihood of protracted civil
war in El Salvador , the refugees at
Mesa Grande recognized their
extremely difficult
position and felt
their best alternative was repatriation as a community to a country
that is still
at war .
On January 10, 1987, the refugees at Mesa Grande presented a
statement to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
document included a list
return to the villages
The
of more than 4,
500 people who wished to
they originally
fled. I
t included the names of
their destinations and a set of conditions for return to El Salvador
as intact communities .
The eight conditions for their return were:
1) that they be allowed to return to their places of origin ;
2) that they be allowed to work freely;
3) that there be no forcible recruitment of their young men;
*" Bankrolling Failure : U.S. Policy in El Salvador and the Urgent
Need for Reform," Arms Control and Foreign Policy Caucus Report,
November, 1987. pp. 5, 13.
4) that there be no Armed Forces or Civil Defense posts in
their
villages ;
5) that there be no bombings or strafings ;
6 ) that they have freedom of movement;
7) that national and internationa l agencies be allowed free access
to the repopulations and that delivery of program assistance
not be restricted;
8) that they be allowed freedom of expression.
n
I the January petition and in a later elaboration of their
pl
an,
*
the refugees set their case for repatriation. They presented a brief
history of their
fl
ight from the brutal counterinsurgency operations
of the Armed Forces of El Salvador . The refugees insisted on their
rights as Salvadorans to live in their
own country and explained their
determination to return as communities to their places of origin .
They pointed out that many were widowed and orphaned by the war , and
that neither they nor the older people would be able to subsist
without the care of the community . They also explained tha t they
wished to return to their
places of origin because only there might
they enjoy access to land.
familiar
They added tha t only there they are
with the terrain, water sources, crop suitability
and know
how to make a living .
On March 2 8, 1987, the refugee Committee for Repopulation submitted
an elaborated plan for repatriation to the UNHCR, the Salvadoran
Catholic Church and Salvadoran authorities .
In their written plans , the r ef ugees described in detail the return
of the first f o u r thousand people .
areas;
This group would resettle five
Santa Marta in Cabanas, Copapayo in Cuscatlan, and San Antonio
Los Ranches, Las Vueltas and Arcatao in Chalatenango.
In the
document, the Committee f o r Repopulation asked that UNHCR officials,
representatives of the Archdiocese of San Salvador, international
humanitarian agencies, the non-governmental Commission f o r Human
Rights of El Salvador ( CDHES), the National Coordinator f o r
Repopulations ( CNR), and the diplomatic corps be present a t the border
t o meet the refugees.
The refugees' plan went on t o describe each
individual settlement and the needs that the returning refugees would
have f o r assistance:
financial resources t o purchase land, build
homes , plant , and replace the physical infrastructure of their
communities .
The document ended with a declaration and a n appeal:
We, the Salvadoran r e f u g e e s a t Mesa Grande, recognizing
the interest of the Salvadoran and Honduran governments and
of the UNHCR in promoting our r e t u r n t o our country, t o
which end they have formed the Tripartite Commission, and
aware of the limits of this Commission with respect t o
assuring us of work and subsistence in our country, make the
following declaration:
Our repopulation project is the only means to defend
our aspiration t o r e t u r n t o our country and t o g u a r a n t e e
that we will not become public charges, nor will we fall
once again into the circumstances th a t caused our flight t o
Honduras in the years 1980-1981.
We believe that no government on Earth can consider
itself democratic if more than 15,0 0 0 of its citizens a r e
concentrated in r e f u g e e camps outside the country.
For this reason, the Salvadoran government has a n
obligation t o s t u dy our project with us and give us a
response that satisfies our demands based upon the eight
minimum conditions contained in the project f o r repatriation
and r e t u r n t o our places of origin.
In addition t o this document, the refugees strongly appealed f or
international support from the religious community in face-fco -face
meetings and in letters.
SECTION II
RESPONSES TO THE REPATRIATION APPEAL
The Salvadoran Government:
A Failure t o Respond
Although the government of El Salvador has signed the United
Nations Geneva Convention and the R ef ugee Protocols, the treaty does
not specifically address the issues of repatriation and the standards
f o r treatment of repatriated refugees.
However, the Central American
Peace Plan, signed August 7, 1987 by the five Central American
Presidents, specifically sets the standard f o r treatment of refugees
and repatriat ion.
Section VIII of the document reads:
The Governments of Central America commit themselves t o
urgently attend t o the movement of those persons who have been
displaced or forced into r e f u g e by the regional crisis . The
Governments commit their protection and assistance t o the
displaced and the refugees, particularly in the areas of
health, education, employment and security, particularly in
facilitating the repatriation^ resettlement or relocation of
such persons as long a s it is voluntarily requested by the
individual.
It should be emphasized that the r e f u g e e s' plans f o r the
repatriation as a community t o their places of origin fall completely
within the guidelines specified by the Central American Peace Plan and
signed by Salvadoran President Jose Napoleon Duarte.
Up until the f i r s t week of October, nine months a f t e r the refugees'
f i r s t appeal, the Salvadoran government had y e t t o reply t o the
refugees and had f ailed to enter into serious negotiations with them.
Salvadoran government representatives had, on t w o occasions,
I June, the Salvadoran
visited the refugee camps of Mesa Grande. n
Ambassador to Honduras spoke with refugee representatives of the
. ^
Committee for Repopulation in Mesa Grande;however, the Ambassador
clearly indicated that his was a fact-finding mission and that he was
not authorized to respond to or negotiate with the refugees. An
August visit
to the camps by a Salvadoran inter -ministerial
commission
headed by a CONADES official to deal with migration concerns followed
similiar
line
as the Ambassador 's visit . During both meetings, the
refugees made clear that if the government did not respond to their
plan for repatriation by late August , they would repatriate
autonomously during the first week of October.
No reply from the Salvadoran government or the UNHCR would be
f orthcoming in August and in fact, the authorities did not take
seriously the refugees' deadline nor their
home.
determination t o return
The Tripartite Commission, formed by the Salvadoran and
Honduran governments and the UNHCR, finally
met on August 2 7 - 2 8 after
several postponements t o consider the repatriation issue generally and
not to debate any specific proposal.
I
n that meeting, the members of
the Tripartite Commission agreed to facilitate
repatriations that were
"orderly and gradual ," a definition that apparently excluded the
refugees' intended repatriation as a community .
Both the Salvadoran
government and the UNHCR maintained that the Tripartite Commission,
which did not include a representative of the refugees,
was the only appropriate f orum in which to discuss major repatriation
issues. Further , according to reports, the Salvadoran government
withdrew from scheduled Tripartite talks set for
inexplicably
September in Santa Rosa de Copan, Honduras, further delaying the
official response.
No future date was scheduled.
According t o Ministry
o f Interior
officials
and military
officers,
the unofficial position of the Salvadoran government was t o allow an
orderly and gradual repatriation of refugees in keeping with the
"controlled " individual
month. t
I
repatriations of approximately 120 people per
is worth pointing
out, however, that at such a pace, it
would take over eight years t o phase out the Mesa Grande camp, alone .
The children
initialy
born there would be reaching young adulthood
without ever having lived a normal life outside the camp.
The Salvadoran Armed Forces High Command, while
formally
acknowledging that the repatriation question is a decision o f the
civilian
government , has retained veto power over the final
destination o f the repatriating refugees.
According t o an informed
source, a Salvadoran general has characterized the repopulation sites
as "a strategic FMLN chain from the mountains t o the capital " and
other Army colonels have indicated that they wil
numbers o f civilians
f r e e-fire zones.
prevent large
from returning t o areas which they now consider
The military
claims that the repopulation of the
scarcely populated areas that the refugees abandoned would interfere
with their
counterinsurgency strategy.
While the Salvadoran government hedged n
i providing an of ficial
response to the refugees' proposal, the Air
unofficial
Force provided an
one, when on September 1, beginning
, six
at 7:0 0 a.m.
planes and six helicopters bombed .and strafed the village
Marta, Department of Cabanas for three hours.*
in the village
presence.
of Santa
Paratroopers landed
and combed the area without detecting guerrilla
The village , one of the five repopulation sites proposed by
the refugees, was extensively damaged by the bombing; one civilian
killed
and six others were injured during the attack.
killed , Victorino Escobar, 5 5, and his injured family
repatriated from Mesa Grande in 1985.
observers living
was
The civilian
members a
ll
had
Informed international
in El Salvador bel
ieve that the unprovoked attack on
Santa Marta was a military
e f f o r t t o intimidate
and dissuade refugees
from repopulating .
For its part, the FMLN/FDR expressed support for repatriation and
repopulation, and recognized the demands of the refugees and the
displaced in the recent FMLN/FDR 18-point proposal to humanize the
conflict .
discredit
But the military
has used the FMLN statements o f support to
the refugee project and to further harass, intimidate
malign the formerly displaced civilians
and
who have repopulated towns in
northern Chalatenango , such as Arcatao and San Jose Las Flores.
Radio report. National Public Radio, Washington , D.C. Sep. 2 6, 1 9 8 7
The Role of the UNHCR
For its part, the UNHCR considers repatriation t o be the ideal
solution t o the problem of r e f u g e e s.
However, the UNHCR considers the
following qualif ications t o be basic guidelines f o r repatriation
according t o its principles :
1) the voluntary n a t u r e of the decision t o repatriate;
2 ) the f r e e choice of a place t o r e t u r n;
3) adequate security conditions f or the integration of the
ex-r ef ugee, who must not be subject t o discrimination as a
consequence of his or her former s t a t u s;
4) cooperation between the host country o f origin with respect
t o migration and transportation;
5) material assistance f o r reintegration;
6) availability of information regarding conditions in the home
country and the opportunity f o r r e f u g e e s t o visit sites chosen
f o r r e t u r n; and,
7) cooperation of international relief organizations in financing,
providing technical assistance and observing the conditions
of f ered the repatriates.
Given the political and military climate in El Salvador and
Honduras, the r e f u g e e s looked t o the UNHCR as guarantors of the
r e f u g e e s' right t o r e p a t r i a t e and f o r p r o t e c t i o n during and a f t e r the
move.
Consequently, the UNHCR f o u n d itself in a difficult position.
Mandated by the community o f nations t o be the p r o t e c t o r of r e f u g e e s,
UNHCR's first obligation should be to defend the internationally
recognized rights of refugees.
n
I the absence of Salvadoran government support for a "community "
repatriation and in recognition of strong military
opposition to the
refugees' plan, the UNHCR was reluctant to endorse the repatriation.
UNHCR officials , in meetings with the refugees, actively promoted a
more gradual, individual
repatriation to which the Salvadoran
government would more likely agree. Without securing an agreement
from the two governments involved, the UNHCR refused t o commit its
resources t o the refugees' repatriation plans and thus drew heavy
criticism from them.
The international community , through the UNHCR,has an interest in
the l
arge-scale voluntary repatriation of Salvadoran refugees, in
safety and with dignity , and the community of nations recognizes and
respects the right
original
community .
of the individual
t o belong to his or her own
I
t is this right that the refugees wished to
reclaim, and it was therefore the responsibility of UNHCR
representatives to accompany and protect them during a dangerous
journey home.
The refugees pointed out that it is not the obligation
o f the UNHCR to protect the political and militar y concerns of
governments . Established governments may represent themselves .
UNHCR was specifically
The
created t o protect the interests of r e f ugees .
recognizing that their interests may conflict with those of the
country they fled. The UNHCR, however, was apparently trying to
balance the political and military
objectives of the governments
involved against the concerns of the refugees, which, understandably,
provoked what the refugees expressed as a loss of faith in UNHCR .
The Churches:
Playing A Crucial Role
Historically, the Catholic Church of El Salvador has provided
services and care t o the over 500,0 0 0 internally displaced people in
El Salvador.
Church of ficials have also played a central role in
advocating refugees' rights in El Salvador, as well as in the United
S t a t e s.
Archbishop Rivera Damas was instrumental in the development
of Tenancingo, the first repopulation project in El Salvador, and has
expressed s u p p o r t f o r voluntary repatriat ion and repopulafcion.
He has
assigned pastoral personnel t o other repopulated communities, such as
El Barillo and San Jose Las Flores, and he has channeled significant
amounts of material aid t o these projects.
The r e f u g e e s a t Mesa Grande petitioned the Catholic Church, and in
particular Archbishop Rivera Damas , t o intercede and negotiate their
r e t u r n with the Salvadoran military.
They specifically requested
moral, political and material support, as well as personal
accompaniment, f r o m the Archbishop and f r o m the greater religious
community in El Salvador and abroad.
The Archbishop named the Social
Secretariat of the Archdiocese as his personal representative, and the
Secretariat subsequently sent three delegations t o Mesa Grande in
order t o consult with the r e f u g e e s.
In September, 1987, the Archdiocese and other churches and agencies
formalized a coordinating body t o coordinate assistance f or the
repatriation and subsequent repopulation.
The coordinating body
included the Social Secretariat of the Archdiocese of San Salvador,
the Lutheran Church of El Salvador and the National Coordinator f o r
Repopulations (CNR) which coordinated three earlier repopulations.
Coordinating committee members expressed their firm commitment t o
support the refugees' stated desire t o repatriate as a n intact
community and t o repopulate their places of origin.
The commit tee
f u r t h e r indicated their on-going commitment t o promote human
development and self -sufficiency.
Reverend Doctor Medardo Gomez, the Lutheran Bishop of El Salvador
has prominently voiced his support f o r the refugees' repatriation as a
community and promised the backing of the Lutheran Church of El
Salvador.
The visible backing of Gomez, who made a pastoral visit t o
Mesa Grande on September 8-10, gave f u r t h e r credence t o the viability
o f the repatriation project.
Days a f t e r his visit t o Mesa Grande,
Gomez received a series of phone calls threatening his life because of
his o u t s p o k e n support of refugees.
Earlier , in 1983, because o f his
commitment t o the poor and denouncements of repression. Reverend Gomez
had been arrested, t o r t u r e d and held as a political prisoner by the
security forces.
Despite grave personal danger, Gomez has pledged t o
continue his advocacy of the rights of the unprotected, including
r e f u g e e s.
Reverend Carlos Sanchez, Executive Secretary of the Baptist
Association of El Salvador, has also strongly advocated f o r the rights
o f the r e f u g e e s t o r e t u r n as a community t o their homes .
He wrote in
June, 1987, letter t o the international community:
The refugees of Mesa Grande have turned t o the religious
community and asked us t o accompany them in this Exodus t o their
"promised land." As church leaders we f e e l committed t o accompany
these refugees in their struggle t o reclaim their homeland.
Humanitarian Agencies :
A Tremendous Need f o r Resources
As the repatriation project has developed, non-governmental
organizations ( NGO 's) assumed a number of important tasks.
International NGO 's operating in El Salvador, along with an ecumenical
coalition and international support networks, were asked t o assist in
planning the repatriation/repopulation and respond t o the requests of
the refugees, themselves.
The NGO's would also help t o obtain the
financial resources and the personnel necessary f o r the repatriation.
Finally , these organizations would serve as a communication mechanism
between the r e f ugee communities and the international NGO network.
Organizations representing the internally displaced were also expected
t o play a significant role .
The CNR has enjoyed notable successes
during 1986 and 1987 in repopulating sites a t San Jose Las Flores, El
Barillo, and Panchimilama .
The practical and developmental expertise
of the CNR in these movements is well recognized, and its
participation is crucial.
The ICM:
An Agency Without A Role
n
I pushing f or the "controlled " repatriation of refugees, the
government of El Salvador looked to the cooperation and assistance of
the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration ( ICM).
ICM works
closely with the UNHCR in many countries around the world,but in El
Salvador its participation
The integrity
in this
undertaking was cause for concern.
of the organization and its neutrality
have been
compromised over the last f e w years because of the character of its
involvement with refugee programs .*
Since 1984, ICM has implemented a controversial "reception" project
for refugees forcibly
returned to El Salvador from the United States.
Human rights organizations have charged that ICM has allowed its
program, which is funded by the U.S. Department of State, to be used
in the United States t o justify continued deportations to a war zone,
in violation
of both international
law and humanitarian
principles .
Nevertheless, ICM officials have been eager to participate in refugee
resettlement projects and show no hesitation to work closely with the
Salvadoran government .
The refugees, themselves, have voiced their
opposition t o participation
program.
of ICM in any repatriation / repopulation
n
I any event, ICM's participation would be limited t o local
projects with those f e w refugees who request official assistance.
Dr. Bea Edwards, "ICM Reports on El Salvador : Disinf ormation and
" Central American Refugee Center report, Washington, D.C.
Deportation,
1987.
ISECTION
I
I
ARETURN DESPITE THE RISKS
Recent media and human rights organizations
unanimously
speak nearly
of the deterioration of human rights in El Salvador in the
past six months .
The urban areas have felt the violence most vividly
by the recent targeting of highly
death squad-style kiling
visible
public
figures , such as the
of Herbert Anaya , president o f the Human
Rights Commission ( non-governmental ), and others *
death threats, including
and a series of
one against Archbishop Rivera Damas.
However, in the rural areas in the months before the refugee
repatriation, the Army launched a major, prolonged military
operation
known as "Operation Concordia " which emptied the barracks sending
40,
0 0 0 troops into the field .
The Departments of Chalatenango ,
Cabanas and Cuscatlan ( the areas o f the intended repopulations ) were
among the areas targeted.
n
I the month o f May/ 1987, the most recent
report from Tutela Legal, the human rights
documents the kiling
violence . * *
office of the Archdiocese ,
o f 9 7 persons during the poli tical
The Army sweeps and "search and destroy" missions
On December 9 , 1987 a representative of the governmental Human
Rights Commission, Joaquin Cardenas, was assassinated. Weeks earlier /
two unidentified campesino youths were tortured and murdered and their
bodies dumped outside the capital as a warning to the returning
leaders o f the FDR.
** n
I a typical case in May, 1987 near Sensuntepeque, Department o f
Cabanas, three uniformed soldiers carrying M- 16's came t o the hous e of
campesino family and accused the family members o f belonging t o the
guerrillas . Despite their denials , the grandfather , age 6 3, and
grandson, age 15,
generated a wave of civilian
arrests,disappearances and killings . n
I
egation, an official of the
an interview with an international del
International
Committee o f the Red Cross reported that , on the
average, twenty persons are captured per day by the Armed Forces.
Through letters and the arrival of new refugees, the refugees a t
Mesa Grande were kept informed of the situation in El Salvador and
were well aware of the risks involved in the large -scale
repatriation.
They remained firm in their
decision to return despite
increasing numbers of human rights abuses by the security f o r c e s and
civil
defense operatives.
returnees and incidents
Precisely because of the past captures of
such as the bombing o f Santa Marta, the
refugees were committed to the repatriation as a community because
greater numbers afforded greater protection. * *
were taken outside the house, shot and killed . A third man, age 5 8,
who tried t o intervene, was likewise killed . The house was then
robbed.
As Appendix
I I I catalogues, the repression of repatriated r ef ugees
**
continues. The voluntary repatriation of the 4313 Mesa Grande
refugees in no way jeopardi zes the right t o asylum and protection of
the refugees who choose t o remain n
i Honduras,believing that
conditions are not secure enough to return. Nor does the return of
the Mesa Grande refugees annul the right t o asylum of Salvadoran
refugees in other countries . The UNHCR recognizes that they live under
different circumstances , and may not have the option of organizing t o
create the security conditions that make for s a f e return.
outcome of the undertaking , in asserting their
Whatever the f inal
right
t o return to their
provided the Tripartite
issue.
country, the refugees at Mesa Grande
Commission with a solution t o the refugee
Typically , refugees are described as the victims
people whose only choice was to flee their
of
organizations such as the United Nations and the
generosity of their
host country.
express opinions about their
support .
As war victims
charges dependent upon the good wil
they become public
intergovernmental
country.
of war ;
Conventionally , they are not t o
treatment nor make demands for material
There is a widespread perception, particularly
in the United
States, that refugees are defenseless and ignorant people, unable t o
assert their
rights or express their
NGO's and international
demands .
But representatives o f
observers who have had the opportunity t o
e
visit
the refugees at Mesa Grande uniformly report that they have
found the opposite to be true .
At Mesa Grande and in displaced communities
Salvadorans a f f e c t e d by the war are a politically
in El Salvador, the
knowledgeable
community , well -aware of the circumstances that have transformed them
into refugees, and are aware a s well of their
their
potential.
future prospects and
The Salvadorans at the camp simply
role as war victims .
tired of their
Accordingly , they made a proposal in their
l
interest, to secure once again the basic rights t o which a
beings are entitled .
own
human
They were not deluded about the conditions t o
which they would return nor about the dangers that they would face on
the way.
They simply wanted t o go home.
As they wrote t o President Napoleon
Duarte in February, 1987:
Af ter six years as r ef ugees, we continue t o live in these
conditions: without f reedom of movement, without freedom to work
and support ourselves. We a r e peasants. We a r e not accustomed t o
living on charity. And s o we want t o r e t u r n t o o u r own lands t o
work and to support ourselves.
Section IV
THE REPATRIATION
As the repatriation date approached,
the r e f u g e e s had gained
considerable national and international s u p p o r t. More than a dozen
international delegations visited the r ef ugee camps in Honduras.
Each
group reported t h a t the r e f u g e e s* commitment t o r e t u r n in October,
with or without official support or permission, remained f i r m.
In El
Salvador, Archbishop Rivera Damas met with the formalized support
network of the Lutheran Church, the Social Secretariat of the
Archdiocese, and Catholic Relief Services t o o f f e r his qualified
support.
The Archbishop estimated that he was 8 0% s u r e t h a t the
repatriation would take place without undue problems , and that in any
event, he would be prepared t o mediate difficulties with the
authorities.
repatriation.
Other groups as well publicly support ed the
A spokesperson f o r the Salvadoran Christian Base
Communities said, "We welcome o u r r e f u g e e brothers t h a t a r e
repatriating and we a r e committed to receive them and o f f e r what
little we h a v e."
The Base Communities also severely criticized the
government and the UNHCR f o r their lack of s u p p o r t f o r the
repatriation.
In addition, labor unions, displaced communities and
others joined in paid ads declaring their s u p p o r t f o r the returning
r e f u g e e s and promised t o be p r e s e n t a t the border t o receive the
r e f u g e e s.
As word of the impending repatriation trickled through
institutional
circles internationally
- - there had been no press
coverage thus far -- many o f the organizations
that had protested the
forced repatriation or relocation of the Mesa Grande refugees t w o
years earlier
again stood behind the refugees in the
repatriation/ repopulation move.
windfall
The Salvadoran newspapers recieved a
in the last days of September as nearly one dozen
organizations
paid to place advertisements expressing support for the
repatriation.
The hundreds of endorsers ranged from U.S. bishops and
religious
leaders to union leaders, academics , European support
groups , and refugee organizations
in the U.S.
The demands of the endorsers followed the initiative
refugees in their
original
call
t o the international
of the
communi ty.
Representative of the ads was the appeal of the Central American
Refugee National Network ( CARNET), the organization representing the
estimated 7 0 0,
0 0 0 Central American refugees in the United States,
which called on President Duarte t o:*
respect the voluntary
and the right
not oblige
repatriation of refugee communities
to work in the places of origin ;
the returnees to participate in the
counterinsurgency plan of United To Reconstruct,
the civil
defense or Armed Forces, and not t o place
El Mundo^ San Salvador, October 13, 1987.
military
posts in the vicinity
of the repopulated
communities ;
halt the captures and intimidation
of the residents of
these communities and o f the members o f CRIPDES and the
CNR;
ivery of
respect the freedom o f movement, commerce, del
medicine , food and other supplies ; and
permit national and international
humanitarian
organizations
t o transport food and t o work in the repopulated communities
without harassment.
From Washington, 5 4 Senators and Congressmen signed a letter t o
President Duarte supporting the refugee repatriation and requesting of
Duarte "t o do a
l
in your power t o assist the refugees' e f f o r t s t o
repatriate and repopulate free f rom a
l
harassment."*
military
intervention or
The signers of the letter from Congress asked a
delegation o f U.S. religious
leaders**, whose departure date was timed
t o coincide with the repatriation, to deliver the letter personally t o
President Duarte.
The delegation was never able t o present the letter
from Congress to President Duarte.
Despite valid
passport visas, they
were denied entry t o El Salvador by Salvadoran immigration
authorities .
S e e Appendix IV for text o f letter, dated September 2 3, 1987.
* * The delegation, organized by the Going Home Campaign, included
t z and representatives of the National
Lutheran Bishop Gustav Schul
Council of Churches and other denominations . S e e Appendix I f or
further information on the Going Home Campaign.
Though the return date was never of ficially announced f o r security
reasons, the r ef ugees had set the f i r s t weekend in October as the date
t o move the f i r s t of five groups scheduled f o r repatriation.
By the
end of September, international support groups had sent $2 5,0 0 0 f o r
the repatriation, and the CNR had already tenatively contracted buses
and trucks to transport the refugees.
For the first time on September 17, realizing the imminence of the
refugees' r e t u r n, representatives of the Salvadoran government and the
UNHCR met with the Repopulation Committee t o inform them that their
plan was unacceptable.
The government and UNHCR officials then
outlined the government-approved plan :
refugees would be allowed t o
repatriate in groups of 100 persons per day in order t o facilitate
documentation with immigration authorities; the UNHCR would provide
limited logistical support (transport, f o o d, temporary shelter) f o r
the most vulnerable ( children, pregnant women and elderly); the
refugees would not have t o undergo military interrogation; and finally
the refugees would not necessarily be allowed t o return t o their
homes .
However, in the r e f u g e e s' view, the government/ UNHCR plan
failed t o meet nearly all of the r e f u g e e s' conditions which they
regarded indispensable f o r a s a f e r e t u r n.
Despite a wide disparity in
viewpoints, all three parties agreed t o continue the talks on
September 2 4 in Mesa Grande.
However, without notifying the r e f u g e e s,
the goverment representatives failed t o appear f o r the scheduled
meeting.
The r e f u g e e s criticized the government f o r negotiating in bad f a i t h
and denounced the government/UNHCR plan in a September 2 5 paid ad in
the Salvadoran newspaper El Mundo.
In the ad, a f t e r reiterating their
earlier demands t o r e t u r n as a community t o their places of origin
without military harrassment, the r ef ugees rejected the
government/ UNHCR plan and heavily criticized the UNHCR 's role.
The ad
read, "[The UNHCR ] cannot give us protection, they say, because the
Government has not r equ e s t e d it; b u t, we ask ourselves, is it UNHCR 's
role t o protect the Government or the refugees?
and [the UNHCR ] has n o t responded."
We ask f o r protection
The r e f u g e e s concluded their
September 25th statement by calling f o r international support and
p r e s s u r e on the government to fulfill its agreement t o assist r e f u g e e s
as specified in the Central American Peace Plan.
The ad read,
"As communities of 4 5 0 0 persons, we have decided t o leave by
f o o t, f r o m Mesa Grande t o the border, since the UNHCR is not
carrying o u t its role of protection as it should. This is the
decision of the Salvadoran r e f u g e e population in Mesa Grande and
we will n o t back down."
The language of the ad hinted a t what had, by then, become a
confirmed reality in the camps:
would move as a single group.
t h a t all of the nearly 4 5 0 0 r e f u g e e s
Discarding the earlier plans t o
repatriate in f i v e groups, the r e f u g e e s concluded that the
government's intransigence would make five separate repopulations more
difficult.
The r e f u g e e s reasoned t h a t the arguments f o r large-scale,
as opposed t o individual, repatriation -- security and coordination of
logistics -- a r e also t r u e f o r one large repatriation r a t h e r than f i v e
smaller ones.
decision.
The mood o f the moment was also a f a c t o r in the
The progress of the Cent ral American Peace Plan and t h e
announcement of the third dialogue, set f o r the same date as the
repatriation ( October 3-4 ), had brought hope - - and the international
press - - t o El Salvador , a situation not likely
to be repeated.
The
f irst date s e t f or repatriation was postponed by the refugees,
however, at the request of Archbishop Rivera who feared that the
massive repatriation might
endanger
the national dialogue if an
emergency with the refugees developed. Rivera suggested that if the
refugees were intent
following week.
upon returning , they should wait until
the
The new date set by the refugees, October 10,
happened t o be the first anniversary of the earthquake that devastated
San Salvador the previous year .
I
n exchange for a delay, Rivera
offered to speak to the government in favor of the repatriation.
Further , the Archbishop asked Father Octavio Cruz and Bishop Ricardo
Urioste,the Vicar
General of the Archdiocese, to prepare a letter t o
the refugees in which the Church confirmed in writing its role viz a
viz the repatriation.
The letter, in part, read as follows:
The Church from the beginning expressed its disposition
t o work with the refugees in the repatriation;.. the Church
is participating in support, above a
ll , of the follow -through of
projects and pastoral attention in the different settlements.
The Week of Ne gotiations:
The Government Backs Down
According t o an official close to the repatriation negotiations ,
the Salvadoran government did "everything possible t o stop the
repatriation."
Another
source revealed that the Salvadoran government
had requested on October 5 that the Honduran government prevent the
refugees from leaving the camps .
r e f u s e d the Salvadoran request.
CONARE, stated publicly
The Honduran government , however,
Colonel Abraham Turcios,head o f
that , in the event that the r ef ugees decided
to repatriate, the Honduran government would not prevent them
f r o m doing s o.
However, Turcios explicitly revealed that Honduran
troops would be present f or the entire journey on Honduran territory,
t o "accompany" the r e f u g e e s, a s s u r e their "protection" and prevent
incidents of provocation.*
Turcios ignored the f a c t that Honduran
troops (as well as the Salvadoran) were the t h r e a t t h a t the refugees
f e a r e d most and that the r ef ugees had specifically asked f o r demilitarization of both sides of the border during the move.
In the
weeks preceding the repatriation, the Honduran Army did little t o
dispel this f e a r. A series of incidents, in f a c t, r e i n f o r c e d the
refugees' insecurity with respect t o the intentions of the Honduran
military.**
SEPTEMBER 2 4 : At 9 :0 0 a .m. a Honduran soldier fired a t and threatened
r e f u g e e s inside the camp.
SEPTEMBER 2 5: From 9:0 0 a.m. t o 9 :3 0 a .m. two Honduran military
helicopters buzzed the camp.
OCTOBER 1: At 9 :4 5 a.m. a Honduran military patrol f i r e d into the camp
a t a g r o u p of r e f u g e e s and also shot over the r o o f s of the communal
houses.
OCTOBER 5:
A Honduran soldier, apparently drunk, without provocation
Interview by member of Going Home delegation, October 5, 1987.
** A grave incident , which took place a f t e r the repatriation,
evidenced the continuing harassment by the Honduran Army. On October
30, t w o r e f u g e e s, Manuel Recinos Alvarenga and Jose Hernandez Garcia,
were s h o t a t and captured by troops of the Honduran Army Battalion
XII. They w e r e working in a field adjacent t o the Mesa Grande camp
under the escort of the Battalion. According t o a r e p o r t of a n
international agency working in the camps, the t w o w e r e severely
beaten, and accused of being guerrillas. The guards t h r e a t e n e d t o
kill them and t o poke their e y e s o u t; f o r eight h o u r s one s u f f e r e d the
"water t reatment": drops of w a t e r, approximately one per second, fell
onto his back as the r ef ugees lay on a stone f l o o r. "It was
unbearable," described Recinos. Even the UNHCR officials w e r e
insulted and ridiculed a s th e y petitioned f o r the r e f u g e e s' release.
A f t e r being held f o r 2 6 h o u r s, the authorities finally released them
t o UNHCR .
f ired into the camp.
Salvadoran government of ficials
also officially
asked the UNHCR to
prevent the refugee move. n
I a communique to the main headquarters of
UNHCR in Geneva, the government notified the UNHCR that it opposed the
repatriation plan under the given circumstances . The UNHCR declined
to interfere openly with the repatriation, but sent a cable to
President Duarte in San Salvador asking the government to describe
what it regarded as the proper role for the UNHCR during the refugees'
return. The UNHCR representatives, under the pressure of the
Salvadoran government (and perhaps from the U.S. government as well )
to stop the repatriation, also realized that their institution
could
be embarassed if the refugees were to embark on foot, without UNHCR
cooperation. *
n
I attempting to strike a balance, on October 6 the UNHCR
representative in Honduras made public their
intention to provide 4 0 -
50 buses and trucks for the repatriation, sufficient to carry only
children , the elderly , the sick and pregnant,which were estimated to
be only half of the group. The others, according t o the UNHCR's
statement , would be expected to walk the 3 5 kilometers t o the border,
On October 6, the Going Home delegation headed by Lutheran Bishop
Gustav Schultz met with the UNHCR representative in Honduras. The
delegation informed the representative that support groups organized
l logistical
by the GOING HOME campaign were prepared to assume a
support (transportation, food, emergency housing) in the event that
the UNHCR failed to do so.
approximately a two day journey.
In a n interview with the Going Home
delegation, the UNHCR representative plainly admitted that his
reluctance to do more stemmed f r o m a f e a r of offending the Salvadoran
government.
The UNHCR 's half -o f f e r was received with criticism f r o m
both the Salvadoran government and the refugees and, f r o m a practical
standpoint, stood to cause a logistical nightmare, fraught with
security concerns during the refugees' two -day trek through Honduran
territory.
The UNHCR 's position resulted f r o m, on the one hand,
pressure by the government of El Salvador in opposition t o the
repatriation and, on the other hand, pressure f r o m the refugees t o
fulfill the Commissioner 's mandate.
In this case, the UNHCR 's
struggle f o r a middle ground led t o a compromise that was not
acceptable to either party.
Their vacillation was predictable .
Meanwhile, Honduran Col. Turcios informed the Going Home delegation
that Honduran military officers had reassessed their decision t o
"accompany" the refugees in view of the potentially negative press
attention portraying armed Honduran troops surrounding the defenseless
refugees.
According t o Turcios, the Honduran Army would maintain a
low profile, and not i n t e r f e r e in the repatriation.
The Going Home delegation also met with the Salvadoran Ambassador
t o Honduras, who insisted that any repatriation must be "orderly and
gradual" and that the refugees' plan could prove disorganized and
chaotic.
The Ambassador frankly asked the delegation t o meet with the
refugees and t o encourage them t o postpone their repatriation.
Nearly
begging the delegation, the Ambassador appealed, "Give us t e n days, or
seven days , or even three days time ."
Bishop Schultz spoke f o r the
group when he replied that the mission of the Going Home delegation
was not to negotiate or attempt t o influence the r ef ugees, but only t o
accompany them in the capacity that the refugees had specifically
requested.
On October 7, in El Salvador, a special interministerial commission
appointed by the Salvadoran government met t o discuss the repatriation
under the framework of the Central American Peace Plan.
The
governmental agencies participating in the commission were: the Vice Ministry of the Interior, the Chancellor of the Republic and the
Treasury Police ( represented by General Reynaldo Golcher).
Also
participating was Monsignor Rosa Chavez, Auxiliary Bishop of San
Salvador.*
Given the heavy governmental representation on the
commission, it was not surprising that the eight agreements reached
reflected a hostile position towards the returning refugees.
The
agreements were:
that the refugees could r e t u r n only with government
authorization;
that repatriation would take place in a manner, a t a time
The participation of Monsignor Rosa Chavez in the governmental
commission caught many Church officials who had been involved in the
repatriation o f f guard. As a signal of disassociation with Rosa
Chavez' position, the Archdiocesan delegation that l e f t f o r Mesa
Grande on October 8 intentionally conducted their meetings with the
Mesa Grande refugees independently f r o m meetings between the refugees
and government officials.
and t o sites t o be determined only by the government;
that an emergency meeting of the Tripartitie Commission
would be convoked f or October 14 ( f o u r days a f t e r the
refugees' plan f o r repatriation was scheduled t o take
place );
that internationals wishing t o accompany the refugees would
not be allowed t o enter the country t o "foment violence ;"
that the Church would not accompany the refugees if they
returned without government permission;
that under no circumstances would refugees be allowed t o
enter San Salvador.
On the evening of October 7, President Duarte gave a press
conference carried by national television in which he stated the
commission's position that no internationals would be allowed into the
country t o "promote violence ."
Duarte also stated that refugees would
not be allowed into the country unless they carried valid
identification papers, which f e w of the Mesa Grande refugees
possessed, and that the papers would be cross -referenced with
government records to establish their authenticity.
Refugees would
not be allowed t o repopulate their places of origin unless their
I.D .'s indicated their places of origin.
In conclusion, Duarte
expressed doubt that all of the returnees were Salvadorans, suggesting
that non -Salvadorans, posing as refugees, were taking advantage of the
situation t o immigrate t o El Salvador.
On October 9, the government delegation journeyed t o Mesa Grande,
Honduras and met with the refugees.
According t o the ref ugees, the
government delegation expressed surprise a t the "news " that 4500
refugees intended to return on October 10. The government officials
inf ormed the refugees of the commission's decision not to permit the
Saturday repatriation. Further/ they t old the refugee Repopulation
Committee that they should await a "gradual and orderly" repatriation
plan t o be described a t the October 14th meeting of the Tripartite
Commission.
The refugees refused t o comply with these directives.
They reminded the government that this return had been planned f o r
months with the government's full knowledge and had already been
postponed once a t the express request of Mons . Rivera Damas .
In
addition, the refugees said they had already packed and prepared f o r
the trip.
After hours of negotiations, which included the government
criticism of the UNHCR f o r manipulation of the refugees and f o r
withholding information, the government acceded t o the refugees'
repatriation plans f o r October 10.
The authorities would not,
however, allow the refugees t o return to their places of origin,
because these areas had not been "cleaned up " ( a n apparent reference
t o a guerrilla presence).
Instead, the refugees would be transported
t o two "Haciendas," Valle Verde and Popayan in the Department of
Cuscatlan, where the government would implement a resettlement
project.*
The government spokesperson added that the authorities
A government-sponsored refugee resettlement of two "haciendas " was
would call upon the Church, the ICM and other institutions
to
cooperate in the venture.
n
I response,the r ef ugees characterized the resettlement "haciendas "
as government -run "concentration camps " and refused their
voluntary
participation . The refugees recognized the government 's attempt to
"showcase" a resettlement and meanwhile suppress their legitimate
demands for food, shelter and land.
institutions
In the "haciendas " government
and agencies under contract with the government would
control a
l aspects of life; production, housing, transportation ,
social activities and community affairs. I
n a
l likelihood , the
military
would establish a permanent post in the "hacienda," or the
refugees would be forced to field a civil defense unit . Freedom of
mobility
would be a prerogative restricted by the authorities , not
unlike the passbook laws for black South Africans .
expression and political
Liberty, free
independence would be at the whim of the same
government they had fled only a f ew years before. After languishing
behind barbed-wire fences in Honduran refugee camps for as long as
seven years, the refugees were, understandably, unwilling
to move to
government -controlled "haciendas" - - an exchange of what they viewed
also discussed during the first meeting on October 7 of the
interministerial commission for refugees. The commission expressed
interest in Catholic Church participation in the resettlement
projects,particularly in view of the financial resources available t o
the Church. Monsignor Rosa Chavez, present at the meeting, declined t o
commit Church involvement t o any government project for the refugees.
Because of past repression and corruption in El Salvador, the Catholic
Church, as well as many other respected development and relief
organizations have refused involvement in government assistance
projects towards the displaced.
as one set of prison walls f o r another.
Officials of the UNHCR concurred.
Despite their preference f o r a
negotiated, orderly repatriation with government participation, the
UNHCR office in Geneva sent a cable to the Salvadoran government
stating that the UNHCR could not collaborate with a government plan to
relocate the refugees in El Salvador against their will .
The UNHCR
would withdraw from the plan entirely, according t o the cable, if the
government and the refugees did not reach a n agreement on the
destination of their return.*
Earlier in the day, the support committee of churches and agencies
in El Salvador also reiterated their support of the refugees' decision
and affirmed that the Church planned to be present t o receive the
refugees a t the border, regardless of the date and the government's
position.
Giving the refugees another boost, the World Council of
Churches sent a telegram publicly supporting the refugees' plan to
return on October 10.
On October 9, a t Mesa Grande more than 2 0 0 0 refugees assembled f o r
7 :0 0 a .m. dialogue with the government delegation, despite less than
12-hours notice.**
In addressing the assembly, the government
An UNHCR cable from Geneva t o their field representatives directed
UNHCR of ficials t o "assist Saivadorans returning t o their places of
origin in El Salvador" ( emphasis added).
**
According t o reports, within one and a half hours a f t e r the
representative notif ied the ref ugees of the official position that the
repatriation would be allowed, but that a r e t u r n t o their places of
origin would be prohibited.
Only those f r o m Santa Marta would be
allowed to r e t u r n home; others would be taken t o the two "haciendas ."
The government f u r t h e r warned that following the government-assisted
repatriation, the Tripartite Commission would be dissolved.
Those
who would not return under the government plan , threatened the
government spokesperson, would not be able t o r e t u r n t o El Salvador in
the f u t u r e.
According t o Independent observers, the response of the assembly
was overwhelming.
After a vote, the refugees completely rejected the
of f icial position and challenged the government with slogans such as
"When you forced us t o flee with bombs, you did not force us o u t in a n
orderly fashion" ("Cuando nos sacaran a bombazos ^ no nos sacaron
ordenados").
The Salvadoran delegation, speaking f o r the government,
replied that their position was final.
Events proved them t o be
wrong.
Even af ter the appeals by the churches, the UNHCR ,**
and support
conclusion of the meeting, the great majority of the 1
1,0 0 0
refugees in Mesa Grande were made aware of the discussion and the
scheduled meeting the next day. Without loudspeakers, megaphones or
telephones, communication in the camps relied solely on a word -o f mouth network.
/•
** According t o reports, the High Commissioner Jean -Pierre Hocke
personally t elephoned Honduran President Jose Azcona and Salvadoran
President Jose Napoleon Duarte t o encourage them t o allow the
repatriation t o take place .
groups in El Salvador, the government did not relent until
9:3 0 p.m.
on the night before the scheduled repatriation . The Salvadoran Vice Minister f or the Interior ,stil
in the refugee camps, acceded to the
demands of the refugee Committee for Repopulation that the government
allow the refugees to return to their homes and not to the government
"haciendas ."
The government then officially
gave the green light
to
the UNHCR to play an operational role in the move.* But, the refugees
had already started packing. They were not waiting for government
permission.
Crossing The Border
After loading available
vehicles with their
first 4 0 buses and trucks filled
few possessions, the
with 917 refugees and 13 observers
pulled away from Mesa Grande at 4 :00 a.m. on October 10.
Waiting for
them at the border were representatives of the Catholic , Lutheran and
other churches , as well as human rights organizations , organizations
of the displaced and the national and international press.
Also
present were officials of the Salvadoran Ministry of the Interior , the
U.S. Embassy and 4 0 additional
Immigration agents.
n
I the background
The UNHCR in Honduras and in El Salvador contracted at least 150
buses and trucks for both sides of the border. Also in preparation
16
for the trip ,Monsignor Rosa Chavez signed a letter identifying 1
nationals and internationals as church - related workers authorized to
assist with the repatriation. The evident preparedness of the
churches, the UNHCR, and the refugees for such a massive logistical
undertaking belied the government 's claim that the repatriation was a
spontaneous, unplanned endeavour.
the Salvadoran Army troops were stationed, carrying M-16's, a n ominous
reminder of the danger the refugees had fled, as well as the
uncertainty t o which they returned.
When the first buses reached the border crossing a t 10:00 a .m.,
applause and shouts of "viva !" greeted the refugees.
As the f i r s t
refugee stepped o f f the bus, the press descended and the process
began.
Each refugee was interviewed by a n Salvadoran immigration
officer who filled in a 23-question form.
basic:
Most of the questions were
name, address, place of origin, educational level, property
owned, crops farmed and religion .
Two of the last questions, however,
bewildered and frightened many of the refugees.
"#21. Would you be willing t o r e t u r n t o your place of origin even
in the midst of subversive violence ?
# 2 2. What do you recommend t o end the violence and achieve peace ?"
According to observers, many refugees r e f u s e d t o or did not know how
t o answer the questions, yet the interviewer wrote down something t o
fill the blank .
Others responded t o question # 2 2 with "peace " or
"dialogue", while others asked f o r God's intervention.
One woman said
that Duarte should renounce his position.
The questions were hardly innocuous.
A representative of the
Ministry of Interior revealed that the questionnaire had been prepared
by the Fourth Infantry Brigade of Paraiso, Chalatenango as a
requirement f o r all r e f u g e e s who wished t o repatriate.
With the
government's established practice of controlling the civilian
population through inf ormants and spies, the questionnaires would
serve as an available base of information on each refugee, his /her
family and political leanings.
When the last of the buses destined f o r Santa Marta passed through
Immigration, the UNHCR officials ordered the buses to depart.
The
refugees protested strenuously, arguing that they had reached a n
agreement with the government during the late night negotiations that
all 4000-plus refugees would pass the border and journey in a single
caravan to the capital to celebrate mass in the National Cathedral.
As a result, the first of many disputes ensued.
An observer, who
enjoyed close relations with the UNHCR, commented on UNHCR 's attitude
throughout the repatriation:
[The UNHCR officials! were logistical monsters a t the border who
didn't take into account anything except 'pick 'em up and move 'em
out.' They stepped on everyone's toes in the process . Every caravan
brought back horror stories of UNHCR manipulation of the entire
process . ... On the other hand, they did succeed in moving 4 ,313
people t o their places of origin.
This dispute, like many of the others that followed, revealed
fundamental differences between the UNHCR and the refugees about
security issues.
The refugees had asked to go t o the capital in
order t o pray, to be welcomed by family members and supporters, t o
tell the world that they had triumphed, and most importantly, to ask
in a public way, f o r support and protection.
For them, such a n action
was one more form of guaranteeing their security in the f u t u r e.*
The CARECEN representative interviewed one refugee who explained
However, the government was anxious to avoid any ref ugee demonstration
in the capital that the government could not control, and flatly
rejected the refugees' request.
UNHCR officials were under
instructions f r o m their head offices and under pressure f r o m the
government t o assist refugees only to their places of origin.
Each of the caravans had t o pass through several military
checkpoints in El Salvador despite the government's promise of
unhindered passage to their places of origin.
The most severe
violation occurred in the town of Suchitoto where the Copapayo caravan
was stranded f o r two days.
While waiting f o r launches to carry them
across Lake Suchitlan, the refugees were housed in the Suchitoto
church a t the invitation of the local priest.
For the duration of
their s t a y, the military encircled the church preventing the entry or
departure of any of the refugees or their families.
In response,
members of the Christian Committee of the Displaced of El Salvador
( CRIPDES) held a "sit -in" a t the Cathedral in San Salvador t o call f o r
lifting of the military cordon.
When the boats finally arrived, the
refugees were permitted t o continue their journey to Copapayo and
CRIPDES withdrew f r o m the Cathedral.
why they wanted to journey t o the capital :
Before going t o our homes, we want t o go t o San Salvador t o
celebrate a mass giving thanks t o our Divine Saviour of the World,
who permits our r e t u r n. We also want t o visit the tomb of o u r
beloved Archbishop Mons. Oscar Arnulfo Romero, who died f o r
denouncing the atrocities that we s u f f e r e d and s o frequently
shared with us the f e a r s that we lived in Chalatenango. Many of
us made a promise in o u r prayers, t h a t the f i r s t thing we would do
would be t o visit the tomb of Mons . Romero and the church of our
Divine Saviour.
Within a week, all of the ref ugees had returned to their homes
without major mishap, given the dangers involved.
However, throughout
their journey they were subjected t o intimidation and harassment from
the Armed Forces and civilian authorities.
Largely as a result of
Army intimidation, the refugees from San Antonio Los Ranches and from
Arcatao chose to remain together and settled in two nearby villages
Guarjila and Guarjilita .
The refugees' arrival home, a f t e r many years in exile and a
traumatizing journey, was a moment of powerful and conflicting
emotions.
One clergywoman who accompanied those returning t o Santa
Marta related the following account:
... When we arrived in Santa Marta, it was all jungle . You had t o
clean back the growth, throw away the stones to be able t o sleep
on the ground. Some went t o look f o r. firewood, others to grind
corn t o prepare our first hot food in three days. In seven years
of abandonment, everything had disappeared, but shortly people
went t o the places where water tanks were hidden, t o dig up buried
grinding stones. And in a f e w hours, life began t o organize
itself . ... And the first shelters? They went t o the widows of
the war.
SECTION V
THE AFTERMATH:
COMMUNITIES OF PEACE OR TARGETS FOR PERSECUTION?
The Social Secretariat of the Archdiocese has reported that in each
of the five repopulation sites the refugees have been working hard t o
repair roads, clean brush, erect provisional shelters and plant
vegetable gardens .*
n
I each site, the new residents have chosen a
central council and appointed teams for each area of work.
Salvadoran and international
The
agencies serving as the support committee
have ensured that adequate food, tools and materials have been sent t o
the repopulation sites and that there is a continual
international
presence in each site.
The Salvadoran military
did not wait long t o remind the returnees
that they considered the repopulation sites "oases for terrorists," a s
General Golcher of the Treasury Police had characterized them in June ,
1987.
The political
nature o f the immigration interrogation, the
constant presence o f armed troops at the border and at roadblocks, and
continuing delays in providing documentation served to intimidate
and
control the ex-refugee population.
The Salvadoran Armed Forces did not limit
themselves only to subtle
Memorandum, "Report f rom the Salvadoran Churches. R e :
Repopulation by R e p a t r i a t e s of Mesa Grande," Circular No . 2, J a n u a r y
7, 1988.
control tactics however.
Col. Benjamin Canjura, commander of the
First Military Detachment of Chalatenango, boarded one bus during the
repatriation and, in a widely reported incident, warned the refugees
to go home and tend t o their work b u t "if you colloborate with the
terrorists, you 'll have problems with us ."*
Canjura 's threat was acted on only days later.
On October 2 6 ,
Francisco Rivera, a schoolteacher, was pulled o u t of his h o u s e on the
outskirts of Arcatao, one of the intended repopulation sites, and shot
t o death.
His body was found the next day.
Residents of the town
attributed the killing t o Canjura's First Military Detachment.
Tutela
Legal, the Archidiocese Human Rights Office, confirmed the incident.
Though Rivera was a resident of the town and not a repatriated
r e f u g e e, the Army attack on a respected leader in a community close t o
the repopulation sites spread f e a r among the returnees.
Rivera's killing was part of a campaign designed t o intimidate and
even terrorize the ex-refugees,
whether such incidents a r e attempts ,
t o "control" the civilian population, displace them f r o m their homes
or f o r c e them t o flee again t o Honduras again is unclear, but many of
the incidents violate not only international rules of war and the
government's own agreement with the r e f u g e e s, but also the Central
American Peace Plan ( see Appendix II f o r a chronological account of
Marjorie Miller , "4 0 0 0 Returning t o Salvador A f t e r Years in
Honduras Camp," Miami Herald, October 12, 1987. p. 1-A.
the violations of the repopulations as documented by CARECEN and other
orga niza ti ons).
The Archdiocese has denounced the military 's r ef usal to allow
passage of supplies
t o the repopulation sites,a clear violation o f
the Geneva Convention.*
communities , a high civilian
n
I reference t o the problem of access t o the
official in the Ministry of Interior
revealed,
The problem is outside our control. It is a military problem.
Our workers have also had problems and been detained f o r f o u r
hours by the military. We can't intervene in these decisions.
Even Archbishop Rivera Damas was turned back on October 17 a t a
military roadblock in Chalatenango and prevented f rom entering
Guarjila on a pastoral mission.
Besides denying access t o the
Archbishop, the military routinely prohibits the passage of Church
vehicles carrying f o o d, building materials, and medicines .
In
addition, international observers carrying letters of endorsement f r o m
the Archbishop have been r e f u s e d e n t r y t o the areas.
Critically , the Salvadoran government has failed t o extend even
provisional identification documents to the vasty majority o f the 4313
I I, Article
The Geneva Convention o f 1949, Protocol
14, reads:
Starvation of civilians as a method of combat is
prohibited. It is t h e r e f o r e prohibited t o attack, destroy,
remove or render useless, objects indispensable t o the
survival of the civilian population.
refugees.*
Most of the refugees lost their papers in flight ;
regardless,after seven years their
documents would have expired,
anyway. I
n El Salvador, travel within the country is impossible
without an identification card. On every highway, military
roadblocks
are posted where soldiers demand to see a "cedula " ( Salvadoran
identification card with picture, birth registration and number ) from
every traveler .
To be without a "cedula " is not only a civil
El Salvador , it is regarded as proof of being a guerrilla
crime in
(guerrillas
are unable to renew their "cedula ," hence those without "cedulas " are
considered guerrillas ).
As a result of being denied identification
papers, then, the refugees have returned t o become illegal
in their
own country, and are at risk for arbitrary capture, detention,
imprisonment and execution.
The refugees crossed the border with no type of identification .
However, during the negotiations in Mesa Grande, the Salvadoran Vice Minister of the Interior
promised the refugees that , upon their
arrival at their places of origin , special government teams would
grant documentation through extraordinary procedures.
To date, this
has not occurred despite the fact that the UNHCR has offered t o assist
the authorities and has drawn up an elaborate plan for documentation.
* * According to the Salvadoran Ministry of the Interior , as of January
14, 1988 only 3 5 0 persons, or about 8% o f the total, have received at
least one of the following types of documentation: birth certificate,
"cedula," or other provisional identification . According to the
refugee communities , as of January 14, 1988 only 195 documents in
total have been extended. I
n two communities , Guarjila and
Guarjilita , no documents have been extended.
Under the plan, seven dif f erent types of documentation problems have
been identified and
U.S. $ 8 7 9 8.0 0 have been budgeted bt the UNHCR for
Officials of the Ministry
the e f f o r t.
and the UNHCR,
of the Interior
accompanied by members of the Armed Forces in plain clothes, have
visited each site for census interviews.
The presence of military
personnel in the visits have created fear among the returnees who
recognize the surveillance
function of the visits and the census.
n
I
the current situation o f "statelessness" for the r eturnees, the Church
has stepped in to provide each r ef ugee with an identity document from
the Office of Tutela Legal that states that the individual
is under
This , however, is inadequate.
the protection of the Church.
n
I some
respects, the Church "cedul
a," or any provisional document , woul
d mark
the individual
as a Mesa Grande refugee, which is already grounds for
official suspicion.
Representatives o f Americas Watch and CARECEN
have documented that the mayors of Arcatao, San Jose Las Flores and
Las Vueltas have been instructed by the military
as ."
"cedul
These instructions
responsibility
are highly
o f the local municipality
irregular
not t o issue new
for it is the
t o register births ,
marriages, deaths and issue identity documents .
Concurrent with the military
ation sites,
harassment of the repopul
the authorities have attempted t o offer "olive branches " known a s
Military -Civic Actions .
In the most conspicuous incident , which
occurred in early November, several truckloads of soldiers
( approximately 100 troops) entered the repopulated village
and held a dance that Sunday night .
o f Guarjila
Despite exhortations from
soldiers , the community residents r e f u s e d to join in.
The following
day, the military insisted on distributing f oodstuf fs t o individual
f amilies despite a request f rom the community t o store the goods in
the community warehouse which would be distributed fairly along with
other donated goods.
donation.
Only a f e w people decided t o accept the Army's
To complement the Military-Civic Action, the Army brought a
medical technician who distributed medicine and some soldiers hung a
"pinata " f o r the children.
Also present were Col. Canjura of the
First Military Detachment and a U.S. military advisor in combat
uniform.
Representatives of the Salvadoran Armed Forces Press Office
photographed and video -taped the orchestrated af fair; photographs of
the Military-Civic Action were later printed in a Salvadoran
newspaper.*
Most of the population was reluctant t o receive the
assistance despite the great need in the community.
commented, "They killed my son.
f o o d]."
One woman
I am not going o u t there [ t o receive
On the - third day of the operation, the soldiers went house t o
house among the provisional shelters of the repatriates, encouraging
t h e people to accept the government's assistance.
A rumor quickly
circulated t h a t those who r e f u s e d would be considered subversives.
In
addition, soldiers asked many questions a b o u t the repopulation,
designed t o identify the members of the coordinating committee of the
repopulation.
One international observer who was present in Guarjila
reported that the soldiers treated the people harshly, addressing them
with obscenities and threatening them with guns. At the end of the
Army's three-day encampment in Guarjila, the new residents informed
La Prensa Grafica . 15 November, 1987.
the military
that the government 's material assistance would be
unnecessary as the repatriates were obtaining
organizations .
aid f rom church
The residents did, however, accept off ers to improve
the access road to the repopulation site.
The Military -Civic Action, which was also planned for San Jose Las
Flores and Arcatao, fits into a larger plan for government cooptation
o f the repopulations.
The Ministry o f the Interior has formulated,
without refugee participation , a plan for infrastructure development
o f the repopulated villages .
activities , including
The project proposal outlines
eleven
development of a potable water system and
construction of housing, a school, and a health center .
A copy o f the
plan was submitted t o the Archdiocese , and it is assumed that the plan
wil
be used t o s ol
icit
funds from other sources such as the UNHCR,
the U.S. Government and the Government of Italy .*
Upon learning o f the government 's plans for assistance, returned
refugees first expressed surprise , considering, as they said,**
"the government never did anything for us b e f o r e, not even to visit
us
once n
i seven years in Honduras ." However, the refugees have not been
persuaded by what one observer characterized as "wolves in sheeps '
The Government of Italy has already committed t o donate $ 2 5 milion
t o the Salvadoran government f o r repatriation projects. "Interview,"
R e f uge e s , Public Information Service of the UNHCR, Geneva. December,
1987. p. 16.
**
Interview conducted by SHARE representative in El Salvador.
*
clothing ."
Government assistance, whether in the form of Military -
Civic Actions or full
-blown "development " projects, is intended to
control the returning refugees after earlier government attempts t o
stop the repatriation failed .
The assistance can be seen as the
"beans" half of the "beans and bullets " formula for official counter insurgency programs in the countryside. As developed by the U.S
forces in South Vietnam during the South East Asian War and practiced
in Guatemala, El Salvador and other countries, control of territory is
two -pronged strategy: heavy military
sweeps, in conjunction with
bombing raids and an informant network, eliminate
the guerrilla
presence in an area, and subsequently government -controlled social
programs are used to consolidate government authority among the
population. Residents of areas targetted for "beans and bullets "
programs report suspicions that government assistance is used t o
determine an individual 's political
sympathies . If a family accepts
the assistance, they say, pressure is applied to join civil defense
patrols or participate in an informant network. If assistance is
refused, the Army assumes allegiance
with the insurgents .
The r eturnees, thus far, have resisted any direct government
assistance at the repopulation sites, and approximately 9 7% of the
refugees who earlier repatriated individually
refused government
offers for assistance through CONADES, the government agency for the
displaced. The refugees also refused government participation in the
repatriation of communities and have now delicately declined help from
the Military -Civic Action program. t
I appears likely
refugees wil
that the
continue t o resist any government attempts at assistance
f or f e a r of the dangerous conditions that may be attached.
To guarantee their independence/ the five repopulation communities
have presented their o>wn development proposals t o the coordinating
support committee in San Salvador.
Each community has submitted
detailed plans f o r housing reconstruction, agricultural s t a r t-up
loans, reconstruction of the churches and schools, and livestock
purchases.
The Going Home campaign has pledged t o raise $500,0 0 0 t o
support the repopulations.
SECTION VI
CONCLUSIONS
As part of a public relations campaign t o present a democratic face
t o the world, the Salvadoran government has heralded the a f a i t compli
of the voluntary repatriation of 4313 Salvadoran refugees f r o m camps
in Honduras as evidence of the improved human rights situation in the
country.
Government officials point t o the event as a sign of the
democratization steps which are called f o r in the Central American
Peace Plan, particularly Section VIII which treats the issue of
refugees and the displaced.
On October 15, five days a f t e r the
repatriation which the government had vigorously opposed. Acting
Salvadoran President Rudolf o Antonio Castillo Claramount declared in a
press conference that the "doors were opened" f o r all refugees who
choose t o r e t u r n t o their country.*
The following week the Ministry
of Culture and Communications hurriedly released a slick documentary
Statements made by President Napoleon Duarte during a trip t o the
United States most graphically illustrat e this point . On October 15,
1987 President Duarte addressed a luncheon crowd a t the National Press
Club in Washington, D.C. and described the recent strides in
"perfecting democracy" in El Salvador. He cited as evidence that "we
have received 5 0 0 0 Salvadorans f r o m Honduras and will receive more
f r o m the [r e f u g e e] camps." Duarte's statement in Washington a week
a f t e r the repatriation took place , stood in sharp contrast t o a
statement he had made t o a Salvadoran audience one week earlier. On
Salvadoran television, Duarte characterized the r e f u g e e repatriat ion
as a n illegal move and threatened t o s t o p the scheduled massive
repatriation.
entitled "The Greatest Repatriation in Latin America ."
The 15 minute
documentary was shown seven times on national television between
October 21-2 4 and was f e a t u r e d in f ull page ads in the national
newspapers with a headline "Welcome Brothers of the Land That Gave Y o u
Birth."
The r e -writing of history by the government stands in sharp
contrast t o their opposition t o the repatriation a t e v e r y s t e p.
When
it became clear that the r ef ugees were returning despite government
opposition and threats t o prevent the move forcibly, and that there
existed signficant national and international support f o r the
repatriation, the government attempted t o construe the r e t u r n e e
movement as political manipulation and its supporters as meddling
foreigners intent on fomenting violence.
In reality, the single most
important factor in the successful repatriation was the determination
of the r e f u g e e s who, as a n organized, politically -a w a r e community,
persisted in their e f f o r t s t o r e t u r n t o El Salvador.
A r e p o r t of the
Salvadoran Catholic Church w r i t t e n a f t e r the repatriation concludes:*
The repatriation/ repopulation is
without precedent in history. This
r e f u g e e s and in no sense can it be
will on the part of the Salvadoran
certainly a n incident
is the triumph o f the
considered a n act of good
government.
If it had not been f o r their determination, their untiring
labor, their sense of organization, their broad vision of their
own conditions as persons, this would instead be a moment that
they would be living as humiliated human beings in r e f u g e e
camps. Or, perhaps, they already would have renounced their
Undated Memo, "La Repatriacion:
The Archdiocese of San Salvador.
Una Aspiracion de los Refugiados,"
citi zenship as Salvadorans or simply disappeared as people, the
product of a social -political conflict and an unjust society.
Despite the deception,indecision and outright
with the UNHCR during the actual
the government and the difficulties
crossing, a
l
opposition from the
objectives were largely met.
of the refugees' initial
However events demonstrated that the initial
of the
conditions
refugees, such as the return of intact communities , the de militari zation of the border area, an international
right
to return to their
presence, and the
places o f origin , were well -conceived
precautions in order to guarantee a safe return to a country s
t
i
l
war .
Though the UNHCR ultimately
fulfilled
its obligation
them, the refugees were justified in not relying solely
to defend their
t o their
interests.
Their insistence on their
the repatriation.
t
I
is important
t o protect
on the UNHCR
rights to return
was indispensable
places of orign as intact communities
at
to
to recall that under the initial
UNHCR plan for repatriation, i
t would have taken between seven and
nine years to depopulate the refugee camps , even assuming no new
arrivals .
The October 10th repatriation was a victory for the refugees who
u
l timately overcame both the dangers and the obstacles posed by the
government opposition.
the struggle
The refugees asserted themselves as agents in
to claim their
combatants in a civil
war .
rights as Salvadoran nationals and nonHowever, the repatriation and repopulation
movement represents a larger triumph as well.
movement - - the return of civilians
to their
The repopulafcion
homes in conflict zones - -
can be s e e n as a new factor in the countryside, altering the
landscape of the eight-year -old civil war .
With a renewed civilian
presence in the area, the aerial bombing, as well as the "search and
destroy" missions of the Salvadoran ground troops, cannot operate a t
the earlier levels of indiscriminate targeting without a great cost t o
civilian lives.*
On a deeper level, the repopulation movement poses a democratic
challenge t o the Salvadoran government's only project in the rural
areas:
its "beans and bullets " system of control.
In the past
eighteen months, eight abandoned villages in conflict zones have been
repopulated despite attacks by the government against these
communities **
and the movement promises to grow.
The repopulation
movement, by its very nature, provides an answer t o civilian
displacement .
The government, wedded t o its counterinsurgency
policies , is unable t o address the problem.
Unlike the government
"haciendas," the repopulation movement is a n independent movement
arising out of the needs and interests of those displaced by war .
The
repopulations a r e necessarily decentralized and flexible, responding
t o individual situations and local conditions.
The repopulations a r e
As an example , in November, 1987 in the village of El Zapotal,
Department o f Chalatenango , which lies a f e w kilome ters from the
repopulation village of Las Vueltas, a 12 year -old girl was killed by
military fire intended for a guerrilla , who was also killed . The
incident was reported by international observers in the area.
** In addition t o the repopulations f r om the Mesa Grande
repatriation, San Jose Las Flores was repopulated in June, 1986, El
Barillo in July o f th e same y e a r, and Panchimilama in J a n u a r y, 1 9 8 7.
not a project controlled f r o m the outside, as would be the government
"haciendas " of fered t o the refugees, but are popular, with the goals
popularly identif ied and pursued, and leaders popularly elected on a
systematic basis .
The actions of the Salvadoran military in the field
--which include a repressive counterinsurgency plan -- have created a
movement of repopulation which is necessarily independent of and
counter t o the Salvadoran government's plans f o r full control of the
countryside.*
It remains t o be seen whether the government, and in particular the
military officials, have retreated f r o m their earlier opposition t o
repopulation sites in conflict zones, or if the real battle is still
t o be f o u g h t, this time on terms established by the Army.
In October,
1987 when subjected t o strong international pressure, the government
capitulated and allowed the refugees t o r e t u r n.
On a daily basis,
however, in the isolated villages of the Departments of Chalatenango,
Cabanas and Cuscatlan, the military exercises blanket authority over
the civilian population, using tactics of its choosing, f a r f r o m the
scrutiny of international observers and press.
Military harassment of the repopulation sites documented earlier
( and in Appendix II) clearly characterizes the "welcome " extended by
the Armed Forces t o the returning r e f u g e e s.
The unrelenting
For a more thorough discussion of the significance of the
repopulation/ s e e CARECEN r e p o r t "Depopulation and Repopulation: The
Movement Back," available f r o m the Central American R e f u g e e Center,
Washingt on, D.C.
repression o f t w o other nearby independent repopulation projects - - El
Barillo
civilians
and San Jose Las Flores -- are other examples of the price
must pay to live in their
homes in conflictive zones.
n
I
September, one of the directors of El Barrillo , Jose Angel Lopez
Portillo , 3 3, was detained by soldiers and has since disappeared.
is presumed dead.
Barillo
He
More recently, according to the CNR, the area of El
was hit by 4 0 rockets in an aerial attack on January 4 , though
no injuries were reported.
I
n San Jose Las Flores, which recently
celebrated the first anniversary of its repopulation, community
leaders reported forty civilians
have been captured by government
security forces since June , 1986.
Unfortunately, the residents of the
five new repopulation areas can probably expect the same treatment .
Salvadoran military
authorities , who view the returning refugees
either as objects of manipulation
itself, wil
face additional
by the guerrillas , or a s the enemy
repatriation moves.
Given the success o f
the first massive repatriation, 3 0 0 0 more refugees of Mesa Grande are
reportedly discussing a second move.
n
I response, the government is
accelerating its own plans for refugee resettlement, in government controlled areas, in government -implemented projects where
international
returnees.
scrutiny wil
not moderate their
With this eventuality in mind, the refugees have refused
government assistance or implementation
wil
likely
treatment of the
o f repopulation projects and
continue t o do s o.
After nearly a decade o f generalized violence in El Salvador , one
must ask what concrete steps might lead t o peace in El Salvador.
Communities of refugees returning to their villages farms to rebuild
their lives are clearly a step towards peace. If the Salvadoran
government is truly interested in peace, and not simply pacification,
if the government is truly interested n
i complying with the spirit
of
the Central American Peace Plan and not simply the letter of the Plan,
it should take immediate actions to halt the harassment of the
repopulations , withdraw the roadblocks that prohibit the entry of food
and materials , and speed up the process of documentation.
The refugees, in risking such a return, have demonstrated their
resolve to determine their
own future . These four thousand refugees
have acted out aspirations which are shared by more than one million
displaced and exil
ed Salvadorans: to return t o their homes and
occupations .
n
I order for this repatriation t o signify more than an
isolated incident , it is the obligation
of the institutional
guarantors of the rights of refugees and the human rights of
civilians , namely the UNHCR, the Special Representative t o El Salvador
o f the U.N. Commission for Human Rights, and other national and
international human rights organizations in the country,*
to act
forcefully t o protect the rights of the residents of the repopulated
communities .
These organizations need t o intensify their
vigilance
and exert pressure on the Salvadoran government to halt the
A delegation of ambassadors and other representatives of European
countries and the European Economic Communty visited one o f the
repopulation sites. Las Vueltas , on December 9,which gave a clear
sign o f the international concern for the well -being of the
repopulation communities .
intimidation and harassment of these communities.
The rights of the
refugees and the displaced t o repatriate, t o r e t u r n t o their homes, t o
have the same official personal documents as other nationals, t o be
f r e e f r o m surveillance, attack or f o r c e d recruitment, a r e founded on
legal principles regarding r e f u g e e repatriation and human rights must
be assertively defended.**
* * Regarding the attacks on the repopulation areas, for example , the
Geneva Convention o f 1 9 4 9 ( Protocol
I I, Article 13) reads
The civilian population as such, as well as individual
civilians , shall not be the object o f attack. Acts o f threats o f
violence , the primary purpose o f which is to spread terror among
the civilian population, a r e prohibited.
APPENDIX I
THE GOING HOME CAMPAIGN
In the United States, as a response t o the r ef ugees' appeal t o
the international community, several religious leaders have
inaugurated a national, coordinated support ef f o r t: "Going Home " - An
Interfaith Campaign in Support of Salvadoran Refugees Returning f r o m
Exile in Mesa Grande.
All who wish t o be active participants in the
repatriation a r e asked t o sponsor the Going Home Interfaith Campaign.
Individuals or organizations may sponsor a family with $1000, the
estimated cost of repatriation per family.
Organizations a r e also
asked t o help organize and/ or join a delegation of accompaniment.
The
presence of U.S. citizens in the repopulated communities lend crucial
moral support t o the refugees, as well a s provide security.
participate in the Going Home Campaign, please write or call :
To
Box 7 7,
Cardinal Station, Catholic University, Washington, D.C. 2 0 0 6 4; ( 2 0 2 )
6 3 5-5552.
APPENDIX II
THE AFTERMATH OF THE MESA GRANDE REPATRIATION;
INCIDENTS OF OFFICIAL ABUSE OF THE REPOPULATIONS
The following is a chronology of incidents of harassment and rights
violations against the repopulation communities of Santa Marta,
Department of Cabanas, Copapayo, Department of Cuscatlan, and Las
Vueltas, Guarjila, and Guarjilita, Department of Chalatenanago.
All
of the cases were reported t o Salvadoran human rights agencies by
international observers living in the repopulation communities.
OCTOBER 9: The day before the repatriation took place , Evelio Alas , 4 0,
resident of Las Vueltas and ex-r e f u g e e f r o m Mesa Grande was captured
near the First Military Detachment in Chalatenango as he attempted t o
obtain personal documentation. He was later released.
OCTOBER 16; Near Guarjila, Arcatao and San Antonio Los Ranch es, large
military operations invaded the a r e a, accompanied by 2 0 minutes of h e a v y
machine -gun f i r e f r o m a helicopter and f r o m the ground causing panic in
the community.
NOVEMBER 1: The military established a cordon around Las Vueltas f o r the
day, entering houses and threatening residents with captures.
NOVEMBER 5: The Belloso Batallion, one of the U.S.-trained elite h u n t e r
units, shot repeatedly over the town of Las Vueltas a t 10:0 0 a .m.
NOVEMBER 8: Two residents of Las Vueltas, both ex-r e f u g e e s f r o m Mesa
Grande, were captured a s they tried t o get identification papers in the
nearby town. They were later released.
NOVEMBER 10-11: For two days, heavy bombing occurred between Las Vueltas
and San Jose Las Flores, a distance of about eight kilometers, with a
large number of planes flying low o v e r Guarjila.
NOVEMBER 12: Heavy f ighting broke o u t near Arcatao and San Antonio Los
Ranch es. More than 1 0 0 0 soldiers occupied Arcatao and a n unidentified
man, woman and child were captured. The man was taken away by
helicopter, and the woman and child w e r e released.
NOVEMBER 12: In Santa Marta, soldiers entered the village and demanded
t o see certain residents, asking f or them by name, and threatening other
residents. The named residents were working in the fields when the
soldiers came .
NOVEMBER 13: The Salvadoran Air Force bombed and machine -gunned the
village of Los Dubon, a village near Arcatao. Two civilians were
wounded, Miguel Roble, 12, and Serefino Orellano Miranda , 2 3, and a third
young boy, Faustino Orellano Miranda, was killed . All three were working
in a bean field when they were struck. Los Dubon is a village close t o
the repopulation sites in the Department of Chalatenango.
NOVEMBER 19-21: Troops f r o m the Second Military Detachment of
Sensuntepeque patrolled the area around and within the village of Santa
Marta, Department of Cabanas, repopulation site. On November 2 0, the
soliders distributed f o o d and household items in a Military -Civic
Action. The troops remained in the village f o r two days. On November 19
and 2 2 military aircraft made repeated low sweeps over the village .
NOVEMBER 2 6: Soldiers f r o m the First Military Detachment in Chalatenango
captured and detained temporarily Pedro Castro, 2 7, a resident o f the
repopulated community of Guarjila. Castro was interrogated by the
soldiers on the whereabouts of leaders of the community. A f t e r pressure
f r o m other residents, he was released.
DECEMBER 1: Pedro Pablo Mendez, 54, and his wife Amparo Cruz, both
residents of the repopulation village of Santa Marta, were detained in
the public market of Sensuntepeque by troops of the Second Military
Detachment. Mendez was interrogated and severely beaten. He was ordered
t o r e p o r t every two weeks t o the military headquarters t o inform on the
activities within Santa Marta. He was released the same day and returned
t o Santa Marta. The following day he was hospitalized in San Salvador
f o r internal injuries. Including a broken rib.
DECEMBER 3 : Two international churchworkers were detained a t a roadblock
outside of Guarjila by soldiers of the First Military Detachment in
Chalatenango. They were taken t o the Army base in Chalatenango and
detained behind bars f o r several hours before being released the same
day.
DECEMBER 4: Juan Jose Laines, 2 2, a n ex-r e f u g e e f r o m Mesa Grande and a
resident of a tiny settlement near Santa Marta, was captured in
Sensuntepeque by troops of the Second Military Detachment was taken t o
the Army barracks in Sensuntepeque. He was held f o r several days b e f o r e
being released under the custody of the International Committee of the
Red Cross.
DECEMBER 5: Several bombs landed in the immediate vicinity of Guarjila
which disrupted and halted a religious service of the repopulated
community.
DECEMBER 7: Crescendo Tobia Diaz, 4 7, a resident of the repopulated
village of Guarjila, journeyed with his wife by bus t o San Salvador. In
visiting relatives, they separated in the capital, however, Tobia Diaz
disappeared without notice. His wife sought the aid of human rights
groups but no information regarding Tobia Diaz has s u r f a c e d.
DECEMBER 8: Troops on patrol f r o m the Military Detachment of
Chalatenango fired repeatedly near the communities of Guarjila and
Guarjilita.
DECEMBER 14: Soldiers of the Military Detachment of Chalatenango
patrolled the a r e a o f Guarjila and Guarjilita firing their machine -guns
near the communities which lasted thirty minutes.
DECEMBER 2 0 : An Army helicopter swooped low over the area of Guarjila
and Guarjilita and s t r a f e d with machine -gun f i r e in the vicinity of the
community.
DECEMBER 2 0: Relatives of residents of Guarjila and Guarjilita were
denied passage t o visit their family members a t a military blockade.
DECEMBER 2 2 ; A truck loaded with construction materials, f o o d and toys
f o r the children headed f o r Las Vueltas was denied passage by Col.
Canjura, commander of the Military Detachment of Chalatenango.
DECEMBER 2 3: International delegations visit ing the community o f
Copapayo were denied entry a t a military roadblock.
DECEMBER 31: Troops f r o m the Military Detachment of Chalatenago fired
mortars which passed directly over the repopulated communities of
Guarjila and Guarjilita.
JANUARY 3: The same truckload of materials destined f o r Las Vueltas was
denied passage a second time .
JANUARY 3-5: During a military operation in the immediate vicinity of
Las Vueltas, soldiers f i r e d s h o t s endangering the lives of the residents
of Las Vueltas. No injuries were reported.
JANUAR Y 5: Mortar f i r e f r o m soldiers f r o m the Military Detachment of
Chalatenango passed directly over the repopulated communities of Guarjila
and Guarjilita.
JANUARY 6: A team of lawyers contracted by UNHCR t o assist in the
documentation e f f o r t were temporarily detained a t a military roadblock
and denied entry t o Copapayo.
JANUARY 6: A truckload of construction materials f o r housing was t u r n e d
back a t the military roadblock outside of Copapayo.
JANUARY 6: An agricultural technician assigned t o Copapayo was denied
passage a t a military roadblock.
JANUARY 7: An international delegation of Jesuit priests, headed by
Father Richard Howard, was prevented f r o m journeying t o Copapayo a t t h e
military roadblock.
ock outside of Santa Marta,
JANUARY 16 : The military set up a roadbl
Department of Cabanas, to restrict the entry of food,materials and
visitors. Previousl
y, Santa Marta had been the only of the five recent
repopulations to not have restricted access by the military .
JANUARY 2 3 : Margarito Rivas, 6 6 , and his son Manual Rivas, 2 5, refugee
repatriates living in Las Vueltas , El Salvador, were captured by Honduran
troops in the Honduran border village of Guarita .
The military
roadblocks had restricted the entry of food and materials to Las Vueltas
so the t w o men had entered Honduras to make food purchases. Both men
carried provisional identification provided by the Salvadoran
Archdiocese.
APPENDIX
I I I
REFUGEE REPATRIATES IN PRISON IN EL SALVADOR
January, 1 9 8 8
1
. CATALINO PINEDA HERNANDEZ, 4 9, from Arcatao, Chalatenango . Lived
a t Mesa Grande f rom 1982 t o 1984. Captured August 13, 1986. Released
through the intercession of the UNHCR in November 1986. Since his
release, he has fled the country.
2. JOSE PEDRO CASTRO MENJIVAR, 2 2, from Arcatao, Chalatenango . Lived
in La Virtud and Mesa Grande f rom 1979 to 1 9 8 4. Captured on July 2 7,
1 9 8 6. Released from Mariona Prison in November 1 9 8 6 through the e f f o r t s
of the UNHCR. Currently living in San Salvador , but has requested t o
leave the country.
Victoria ,
3. JOSE DOMINGO MEMBRENO HERNANDEZ, 3 4, from Vila
Sensutepeque, Cabanas . Lived in La Virtud and Mesa Grande from 19801984. Captured on September 14, 1985 and remanded to Mariona Prison.
Released in November 1 9 8 6 through the e f f o r t s o f the (JNHCR . Currently
living in a Church -run camp for the displaced inside El Salvador .
4. MIGUEL ANGEL TREJOS DEL CID, early 2 0's, from San Fernando,
Morazan. Lived at the Buenos Aires camp n
i Honduras for several months
in 1985 and voluntarily repatriated in November, 1 9 8 5. Captured in
November o f that year and remanded t o Mariona Prison. Later released.
5. MARCOS GUARDADO RAMOS, 2 7, f r o m Arcatao, Chalatenango. Lived in
La Majada and Mesa Grande, Honduras f r o m 1980 t o November 1 9 8 4. Captured
a t the immigration checkpoint a t El Poy on January 6, 1985 and remanded
t o Mariona Prison. Released in February, 1987.
6 . JOSE IGNACIO MORALES, 2 9, from San Antonio La Cruz,
Chalatenango . Lived in La Vitud and Mesa Grande from 1980 to November
1 9 8 4. Captured a t the border on January 6, 1 9 8 5 and remanded to Mariona
Prison. Released January 1987.
7 . MANUEL de JESUS SIBRIAN , 21, f rom San Jose Las Flores,
Chalatenango . Lived in Honduras from 1980 t o December 1983. Captured on
June 7, 1986 and remanded t o Mariona Prison. Later released.
8. JOSE RAMIRO ALAS CARTAGENA, 18, from C. Jicaro Las Vueltas ,
Chalatenango . Lived at Mesa Grande from December 1 9 8 4 to December 1 9 8 5.
Captured on September 14, 1986 and sent t o Mariona Prison. Later
released.
9. FRANCISCO MENJIVAR, 2 4, fron San Antonio La Cruz, Chalatenango .
Lived a t Mesa Grande from August , 1 9 8 4 until approximately May, 1 9 8 5.
Captured on January 2 5, 1 9 8 6 and remanded t o Mariona Prison. Released in
November, 1987 in general amnesty.
10. MARCELINO PEREIRA SAENZ, 2 3, f r o m Meanguera, Morazan. Lived a t
the Buenos Aires camp in Honduras f rom approximately February 1985 t o
November, 1985. Detained a t the border on November 14, 1985 and remanded
t o Mariona Prison. Released in November, 1987 in general amnesty.
1
1. LUIS RAMIREZS ALAS, 4 6, f rom Las Vueltas, Chalatenango. Lived
a t Mesa Grande f r o m October, 1981 t o February 21, 1984. Captured May 2 3,
1984 by the Artillery Brigade of San Juan Opico and remanded t o Mariona
Prison. Later released.
12. BENEDICTO SERRANO ALAS, 18, f r o m Arcatao, Chalatenango. Lived
in La Virtud and Mesa Grande f r o m March 1980 to November 7, 1984.
Voluntarily repatriated t o El Salvador. Captured October 6, 1986 and
remanded t o Mariona Prison. Released in November, 1987 in general
amnesty.
13. JOSE RAMOS LOPEZ, 21, f r o m Arcatao, Chalatenango. Lived a t Mesa
Grande f r o m 1982 t o 1985. Captured on September 2 5, 1986 f r o m his home
in Apopa a f t e r repatriation and remanded t o Mariona Prison. Released in
November, 1987 in general amnesty.
14. JUAN SANTOS AYALA, 21, f r o m Arcatao, Chalatenango. Lived a n
undetermined amount of time a t Mesa Grande. Captured f r o m Apopa a f t e r
repatriation and remanded t o Mariona Prison. Released in November, 1987
in general amnesty.
15. MIGUEL ANGEL ROSAS, 2 3, f r o m Arcatao, Chalatenango. Lived a t
Mesa Grande f r o m September 1983 t o September 1984. Captured in April
1986 and remanded t o Mariona Prison. Released in November, 1987 in
general amnesty.
16. EVELIO RODRIGUEZS LOPEZ, 23, f r o m Canton La Joya Grande, Apopa .
Fled his residence in November, 1981 and lived a t Mesa Grande f o r three
months . In November, 1985 returned t o Mesa Grande and lived there f o r
six months b e f o r e repatriation on January 19, 1986. Captured nine days
later near Apopa and remanded t o Mariona Prison. Later released.
17. JOSE GONZLA PALMA MOLINA, 4 0, f r o m Las Vueltas, Chalatenango.
Lived in Honduras since 1980 and a t Mesa Grande f r o m 1981 until March 14,
1 9 8 4. Captured on September 30, 1 9 8 4 during a military operat ion in
Chalatenango and remanded t o Mariona Prison. Later released.
18. JOSE JULIO MEMBRENO ALVARANEGA, 21, f r o m Villa Victoria ,
Cabanas. Lived a t La Virtud f r o m 1980 t o 1981 when he voluntarily
repatriated rather than be relocated t o Mesa Grande. Captured on March
31, 1986 and remanded t o Marional Prison. L a t e r released.
19. MANUEL ANTONIO MENJIVAR LOPEZ, 19, f r o m Las Vueltas,
Chalatenango. Lived a t La Virtud and Mesa Grande f r o m 1 9 8 0 t o December,
1985. Captured on October 3, 1986 and remanded t o Mariona Prison.
Released in November, 1987 in general amnesty.
2 0. ULISES WALBERTO MENJIVAR LOPEZS,brother o f Manuel Antonio , 17,
from Las Vueltas , Chalatenango . Lived a t La Virtud and Mesa Grande from
1980 to July , 1986. Captured October 3, 1986 and remanded to Mariona
Prison. Later released.
21. JOSE PEDRO MENJIVAR GUARDADO, age unknown, from San Jose Las
Flores, Chalatenango . Lived a t Mesa Grande from 1982 to November 1 9 8 4.
Captured December 1986 and remanded to Mariona Prison. Later released.
2 2. MODESTO RIVERA VALERA, 18, from Nueva Trinidad , Chalatenango .
Lived at Mesa Grande periodically between April 1980 and 1986. Captured
July 2 2, 1986 and remanded t o Mariona Prison. Later released.
2 3. ROSA RIVERA VALERA, brother of Modesto (above). From Nueva
Trinidad , Chalatenango . Fled to Mesa Grande in April , 1980 with family .
Repatriated in mid - 1986. Captured by Sierpe batallion July 2 2, 1 9 8 6 and
remanded to Ilopango Prison. Later released.
2 4. JUAN RAMON TOVAR, 2 9, from San Antonio Los Ranches,
Chalatenango . Lived at Mesa Grande from 1983 t o December, 1 9 8 5.
Captured December 31, 1985 from his home in Chalatenango . Arrived at
Mariona in January 1986 after severe mistreatment . Later released.
2 5. MARIA MARTA ORELLANA CASTRO, 2 0, from Arcatao, Chalatenango .
Lived at Mesa Grande from May 1 9 8 5 to March 1986. Captured near
Chalatenango (City ) on April 12, 1986. Remanded t o Ilopango prison.
Remained there one year . Later released. No further information
available .
2 6 . MARIA ELBA ALAS MEJIA, 18, from Las Minas, Chalatenango . Lived
at Mesa Grande from 1981 (Exact date unknown) t o summer 1 9 8 6 ( exact date
unknown). Captured October, 1986. Remanded t o Ilopango prison after
severe mistreatment. Later released. No futher information available .
-
-
APPENDIX
IV
ie tat
Congress of tf e ®nitr
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December 18, 1987
Dear President
Duarte :
As Members of Congress and supporters of the Guatemala Peace Accord ,
we commend the government of El Salvador for its efforts on behalf of
peace and urge the government to further comply with the provisions of
the peace plan . While recognizing that your government was the first
nation to offer a general amnesty , we are nonetheless very concerned
about the human rights situation in El Salvador .
We were pleased to learn that 4,500 refugees from Mesa Grande ,
Honduras have been permitted to repatriate after seven years in the camp .
However , we are troubled by reports of military threats to the
repatriated communities , including incidents of bombing , strafing with
machine guns , and arbitrary detention of civilians by the armed forces .
Moreover , it has come to our attention that displaced people and
repatriated refugees have not been granted proper documentation and yet
they face intimidation and arbitrary arrest if they do not carry
identification papers . While acknowledging that preparing papers for
some people is difficult because municipal records have been destroyed ,
we believe there should be an effective mechanism through which refugees
and repatriates can be properly documented . This is especially important
in light of the upcoming municipal elections in March , 1988 .
Further , we are concerned about reports that international
humanitarian aid organi zations and church representatives , attempting to
deliver food and supplies , are severely restricted in their access to the
repatriates . We were especially disturbed to learn that on October 16 ,
1987 , Archbishop Rivera y Damas attempted a pastoral visit to the
community of Guarjila , but was denied entry by military personnel at a
military roadblock .
We respectfully request that you take action to ensure the safety of
repatriated refugees , assist them in obtaining proper identification
papers , and permit access to them by church representatives and
humanitarian groups .
We look forward to hearing from you on these issues of importance to
us as well as so many Salvadoran refugees . We wish you , your family , and
the people of El Salvador a joyous holiday season and hope that the new
year will bring peace to your country .
si
CHESTER
G . ATKINS
BENJAMIN
^
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L. CARDIN
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NANCY
PELOSI
Chester G . A t k i' ns
Ben j ami n L . Ca r d i n
Thomas M . Fonl i e t t a
Ted W e i s s
Richard H. Lehman
'iancy " e lo s i
San Gejdenson
-Hckey Leiand
Anthony C . 3ei 1enson
'lik e Lowry
Joesnh 0 . Kennedy
Jim Ba t e s
Barbara Boxer
Henry A . ' Jaxman
Me l Levine
"a t ric i a Schroeder
Gus Savacie
Char les A . Hayes
',' i n i a n d a y
Frank ''IcC lo s k e v
D a v i d R. .'lagle
James H , Bi lbray
Barney Frank
Rona ld V . Oel luns
Kenneth J . Gray
Edolphus Towns
John Conyers Jr .
••I'ill
' ian J . Huahes
Matthew G . Martinez
A lbert G . 3ustamante
Floyd
John L e w i s
' JiTI iam D . Ford
Ni c h o l a s ' lavroules
Frank J . Guarini
Gera ld 3 . Kle c z k a
Rona ld D . Cot ernan
Charles E . Schumer
5 111 Richardson
Har ley 0 . Staaners Jr .
G1 enn r'!. Anderson
Garv
Georne '^ i n e r
P e te r ;-!. K o s t^ayer
Oon Edwards
Aunustus F . Ha w k i n s
Joseph E » Brennan
Ben 'Hahthorse
Da v i d E . Skanos
C a r d i s s Co l 1 i n s
D a v i d E . Bom' or
Howard L . Ser-nan
Georne E . Brown Jr .
John Kerry
Robert Garcia
Constance A . '•;ore"n a
Edward F . Feiqhan
Howard '.•Jo t ne
Jim ''oody
Dan Gl i c knan
Sander " 1 . Lev i n
Georoe '•?. Crockett Jr . Kweisi
' le rvyn '•!. Dyma lly
James J . Howard
3 111 Green
Estaban Edward Torres
Sruce A . '-lorrison
^onnan Y . ''' i n e t a
f a lter Fauntroy
'-lary Rose Oakar
James L . Oberstar
Robert T . ''atsui
Peter ' L Rodino
Morris K . Udan
Richard J . Durbin
'•1aior R . Owens
' l i k e Es py
S i lv i o 0 . Conte
Edward J . 'Sarkey
James J . Flo r i o
V i e Fa z i o
3a 1e C . Ki t dee
3ruce F . Vento
James K . Scheuer
Joe "ioak1ey
Gerry E . Studds
Steohen J . So la r z
Fortney i1 . Stark
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H . Fla k e
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Canpben
Louise '!. S laughter
Congre^ of t & e Sm'teb S>£ ate ^
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September 2 3 , 1987
Dear President Duarte:
A s iae3±>e r s o f the United S t a t e s Congress , we are committed t o the
p r o spe c t s f or p e a c e in El Salvador and Central America. In
p a r t i c u l a r, w e a r e deeply concerned about respect for human
rights and refugee rights.
Recently, we have been made aware o f the expressed d e s i r e o f
4 ,5 0 0 Saivadoran refugees in Honduran refugee camps to
repatriate and join other displaced Salvadorans who are
repopulating their original communities .
They have specifically requested that the following points , among
others, be respected:
1.
non-presence o f armed forces in the repatriated/ repopulated
s i t e s; .
2.
freedom o f movement ;
3.
presence o f international humanitarian
and
aid organizations.
We understand that the refugees enjoy the strong support o f the
Archdiocese o f San Salvador , and the Lutheran Church o f El
Sal
vador , as well as prominent international aid organizations in
El Salvador and the broad interfaith community in the United
S t a t e s, including numerous national and local Catholic ,
Protestant, and Jewish organizations.
W e r e spe c t f u l ly recruest _.that you do all in your power to a s s i s t
-' the r e f uge e s ' e f f o r t s to. r e p a t r i a t e and repopulate f r e e from a l l
m i l i t a ry intervention or harassment.
We further hope that you
facilit a t e the ongoing access by
ll
wi
national and international humanitarian aid organizations to the
r e f u g e e s once they have been repatriated so that they can rebuild
their l i v e s w ith hope and peace.
We ask this o f you , especially in light o f the recent Central
American P e a c e Plan, o f which you a r e a signator. We firmly
b e l i e v e that respecting the r e f u g e e s and the church bodies
seeking t o support then constitutes a concrete step to reinforce
the Cent ral American Peace Plan, and provides a valuable
opportunity to contribute t o the peace process and democracy in
El Salvador.
We look f orward to hearing from you on this important matter
concerning the s a f e t y and well being o f - these refugees.
Signed,
Nancy Pelosi
Jim Cooper
Richard H . Lshman
Don Edwards
Kenneth J . Gray
Thomas M . Fogl i e t t a
Barbara Boxer
Joseph P . Kennedy
Louise Mclntosh Slaughter
A lan Cranston
Peter W . Rodino
Austin J. Murphy
Patricia Schroeder
W .G . (3111) Hefner
Joseoh E . Brennan
V i e Fazio
Hike Esoy
G ary L. Ackerman
Gerry Sikorski
Ted W e i s s
Robert Garcia -
Mickey Let and
David E. Bonior
Leon E . Panetta
Bruce A . Morrison
Wayne Owens
Howard Wo lpe
Sam Gejdenson
Richard J . Durbin
Lawrence J . Smith
Frank McCloskey
Esteban Edward Torres
Joe Moakt ey
Mervyn M . Dymally
Ronald
Robert J . Mrazek
Peter A . De f a z i o
Thomas C . Sawyer
Morris K . Udall
George '•li ller
Howard L . Berman
Bi ll Richardson
Robert G . Torn' ceTI i
.'-Ji lliam D . Ford
Ti mothy J . Penny
Paul E .
Jim Moody
Matthew G . Martinez
Edward R . Roybal
Jim Bates
Mike Lowry
Edward F . Feighan
V . Delln
ur s
Kan j orski
John Lew i s
Anthony C . Bei lenson