LEFT BEHIND?
REASSESSING THE BALKAN QUEST
FOR EU INTEGRATION
IN TE
GRA
P O L I CY B RIE F
TION
Horia CIURTIN
no. 2
LEFT BEHIND? REASSESSING THE BALKAN QUEST FOR EU
INTEGRATION
Author:
Horia CIURTIN
Bucharest, February 2017
Policy Briefs Series, No. 2
European Institute of Romania
7-9, Regina Elisabeta Blvd., Bucharest, Romania
Telephone: (4021) 314 26 96; Fax: (4021) 314 26 66
E-mail: [email protected]; Website: www.ier.ro
Coordinator Policy Briefs Series:
Bogdan Mureșan
Graphic Design, Layout & Cover: Monica Dumitrescu
© European Institute of Romania, 2017
The opinions presented belong to the author and do not represent an official position of the institution.
Abstract: At the fringes of the European Union, but entirely engulfed by it, the Balkan countries have
set upon their quest for integration ever since the late ‘90s. During their lasting interaction, the partners
have engaged in an often-inconsistent negotiation framework that moved from the idea of “sharing
everything but institutions” to a more cautious approach, dominated by (im)patience and mutual
demands that did not generate any tangible outcome. For these reasons, the present enquiry re-traces
the conceptual assumptions of EU enlargement towards the Balkans (and its geopolitical imperatives),
showing the reasons why this tale appears as one of “unconsummated romance”. Analysing how the
re-emergence of power politics modified the EU itself (and its self-understanding), our paper
emphasizes the metamorphosis of such a relationship, while offering some distinct hermeneutics. In
the end, a way out of this inertia is presented, pleading for a more flexible calibration of the EU policy
towards the Balkans.
Keywords: European integration, Western Balkans, Enlargement Policy, Geopolitics.
About the author: Mr. Horia Ciurtin is a legal adviser in the field of international investment law
and international arbitration; Managing Editor of the EFILA Blog which appears under the auspices
of the European Federation for Investment Law and Arbitration (Brussels), as well as Editor at VERSO
Journal (Bucharest and Cluj-Napoca, Romania), one of the leading cultural journals from Romania.
He is also an Expert for New Strategy Center (Bucharest), a prominent Romanian think-tank in the
field of strategy and international relations.
Bachelor of Laws (2011), Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania. Master of Laws in
“European and National Business Law” (2012), Babes-Bolyai University, Cluj-Napoca, Romania, as
valedictorian. Author of more than twenty articles in the cultural press, as well as of numerous studies
and policy papers in domestic and international academic journals, in the field of international law,
constitutional law and legal philosophy.
LEFT BEHIND? REASSESSING THE BALKAN QUEST FOR EU
INTEGRATION
The integration of the Balkans into the European Union will complete the unification
of the continent, and we have held out this prospect to them. Although there is still a
long way to go, the Balkans belong to Europe. (Romano Prodi)1
I. Introduction: The Dilemma of (Balkan) Sovereignty in a Postmodern World
The Balkan dilemma of our age still appears as one of (tragic) history, misconceived politics
and unavoidable human frailness. One cannot stop wonder what really went wrong. The Yugoslavian
breakdown served – or should have served – as a reminder that Fukuyama’s end of history2 is not just
around the corner and that the postmodern condition does not exclude war and brutal strife. On the
contrary, the entire decade was dominated in the Balkans by the troubling problem of sovereignty. A
notion that the European Union seemed to have softened and diluted into a new form of conducting
politics. Beyond the nation-state and beyond classical sovereignty.
However, as Carl Schmitt’s enduring legacy proved, a state of exception3 rapidly instilled
throughout the Balkans after the demise of the bipolar world order. As in any turbulent situation, the
old question of (hard) politics became unavoidable: who is the sovereign? And here, at the fringes of
Europe, the question came together with a complicated corollary: sovereign over what? The matter of
exclusive territorial sovereignty appeared especially problematic in a political landscape of colliding
polities, divided along ethnic and religious fault lines.
Thus, as the structures that kept the Balkans under a modern state paradigm began to unravel,
they left behind a fractured area determined by largely pre-modern categories. Such (re)nascent
political bodies seemed to be able to interact in no other way than mutual exclusion. The status of the
Balkans turned to a mode that has been experienced in Europe only before the Westphalian Peace. 4
And this is something that the European Union could not grasp conceptually: how could any
community – after the end of history – go back not just one step (to modernity), but rather two steps
(to premodernity)?
* This paper is dedicated to Dr. Jovan Ćirić and to the researchers of the Institute of Comparative Law (Institut za uporedno
pravo), Belgrade, whose legal-theoretical and political inputs have served me faithfully in understanding the state of the
Balkans. In addition, I am highly indebted to Cosmin Ioniță – Director of Research Programs from New Strategy Center
(Bucharest) – for truly showing me the Balkans as they are, in their glory and in their plight. And for showing me how
impatience can be a geopolitically deconstructive factor. Only such informed opinions could lead me ‘astray’ from the
perspective naturally gained in the EU academic circles and grasp the idea that, as always, the Balkan reality cannot be
simply dismissed in pre-fabricated categories. We need better conceptual (and historical) tools to understand this part of
Europe and, more than ever, academic ‘boots on the ground’.
Romano Prodi, “A Wider Europe - A Proximity Policy as the key to stability”, speech delivered at the Sixth ECSA-World
Conference “Peace, Security and Stability International Dialogue and the Role of the EU”, Brussels, 5-6 December 2002,
SPEECH/02/619.
2
For more details upon his vision of a silent and “unabashed victory of economic and political liberalism”, see Francis
Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, The Free Press – Macmillan, New York, 1992.
3
Carl Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago
& London, 2005.
4
In the description of Leo Gross, Westphalia marked the moment when Europe opted for “a new system characterized by
the coexistence of a multiplicity of states, each sovereign within its territory, equal to one another, and free from any
external earthly authority” – see Leo Gross, “The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948”, 42 American Journal of International
Law (1948), p. 28-29.
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Such a linear perspective of history and the aporia of political irreversibility blocked any
veritable understanding of the Balkan situation, dismissing it as a simple (but gruesome) irrational
quarrel at the borders of a “lesser” Europe. And thus, at the end of the 20th century, when the EU
seemed to surpass the very notion of classical sovereignty and turn to a post-Westphalian manner of
conducting international relations, the Balkans shifted to power politics. Still anchored in realpolitik,
former Yugoslavian polities found themselves engaged in a premodern struggle, fighting to attain a
(hard) modern status: sovereignty.
II. A (Now) Forgotten Convergence: Enlargement and Geopolitics
This situation was not only unpalatable for the European Union, but also unmanageable with
the soft power instruments that it possessed. As Mark Almond pertinently once noted, “buffeted by the
high tide of history, the Twelve [EU members] continued according to routines better suited to calmer
waters.”5 Geopolitics, war and ethnic cleansing returned with a vengeance at a time when European
diplomats assured each other that they were building “an ever closer union among the peoples of
Europe”.6 For these reasons, the cold bite of ever-present historical reality placed the European Union
in the position to re-consider the usefulness of geopolitics and to assume a larger role in attaining (and
maintaining) stability in its near neighbourhood.
Not necessarily peace, not exactly the rule of law, not specifically a “space of freedom”, the
initial European designs for the Western Balkans rather aimed for stability and security. Two
geopolitical objectives configured by interests and not values. And that was the point when the
strategic identity of EU emerged on the world scene: not as an enforcer, but as a conflict-resolution
leader and a post-conflict developer. Its approach resembled the “carrot” (as an incentive for the future
behaviour) rather than the “stick” (as a sanction for past acts).
Thus, the geopolitical stance of the European Union was configured to attract contiguous states
into its orbit: first aiming for stability-security, afterwards promising limited and asymmetric
interaction. In the distant horizon, the final reward: membership into the bloc itself. For these reasons,
enlargement was deployed as the most efficient European geopolitical instrument.
The future – but still tangible – accession to the Union became a veritable driver for change,
even if sometimes only in a Potemkin-village manner.7 In essence, even if not moved by the best – and
honest – of intentions, the leaders of Balkan countries fell under the unbearable public pressure to
place their nations on the EU orbit. Willingly or not, their power itself became constrained by the
capacity to maintain that steady course. What others could only achieve by the might of their armed
forces and classical coercion, the EU managed to obtain by the promise of integration into its
prosperous commonwealth, via the principle of conditionality. At least for a while.8
Mark Almond, Europe’s Backyard War: The War in the Balkans, Heinemann, London, 1994, p. 243.
See Treaty on European Union (Maastricht text), July 29, 1992.
7
The Potemkin village is a very illustrative metaphor in the Balkan countries’ quest for EU accession. Just as prince
Potemkin built an entire village (composed only of facades and not veritable buildings) in order to impress his sovereign,
so did the Balkan leaders erect normative constructions in order to convince EU officials of their presumably solid
commitment.
8
In this sense, Jakub Grygiel recently noted that “expanding the union eastward wouldn’t require force or political coercion;
it would simply take patience, since non-member states would soon recognize the upsides of membership and join as soon
as they could. And for many years, this logic held, as central and Eastern European countries raced to join the union after
the collapse of the Soviet Union” – see Jakub Grygiel, “The Return of Europe’s Nation-States: The Upside to the EU’s
Crisis”, Foreign Affairs, Volume 95, Number 5, p. 96.
5
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In the Balkans, the prime example of Greece was advertised. Emerging after years of (partial)
international isolation and political dictatorship, the Hellenic republic joined the bloc in 1981 and –
under the watch of Brussels – soon managed to economically transform and improve its governance,
being placed on a fast track to normalization and prosperity. The further examples of Slovenia (joining
in 2004) and Romania, Bulgaria (joining in 2007) only bolstered the Union’s appeal to disgruntled
Balkan constituencies. And, thus, accession continued to represent as the only desirable (and
conceivable) horizon for this “semi-periphery” of Europe.9 The strategic use of enlargement as a tool
to stabilize the neighbourhood and shape it into the bloc’s own image served its purpose. It did not
require much effort either. The prize was there, up for the grabs, if only the Balkan states managed to
rise up to the Union’s requirements. The responsibility for failure rested entirely on them.10
III. Sharing Everything but Institutions: An Engagement, not a Wedding
This manner of interaction soon resembled a strange pre-marital arrangement.11 The (Balkan)
bride was – from time to time – convinced of the (European) groom’s serious intentions, while never
committing to anyone, but to the states on the Balkan “rim”. The “heartland” dragged on without a
date for any geopolitical “wedding”. This winding – but essentially unchanged – “engagement”
continued for more than 15 years, jumping from summit to summit, from diplomatic declaration to
diplomatic declaration.
After the ethnic breakdown of the Kosovo crisis and the use of the NATO military “stick” upon
Serbia, the European Union’s rather ambiguous promises crystallized in a new mechanism: the
Stabilisation and Accession Process (hereafter, SAP). While being envisioned already in 1999, it was
officially launched in 2000 as a complement to the EU’s Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe
(replaced in 2008 by the Regional Cooperation Council).12 These two instruments fulfilled different
functions, in a quest to enhance the development of such states both on an intra-Balkan basis and on
their path to EU accession.
Thus, while the Stability Pact was designed as a framework for regional cooperation (with
multiple stakeholders), the SAP was meant to provide a political and (strongly) legal basis for a series
of (parallel) bilateral relations between the EU and the prospecting Balkan states. The SAP openly
affirmed its core objectives for this troubled area, aiming for nothing less than “to stabilise the region,
establish a free trade area, and to deliver European integration”.13 With it, the Balkans now had a road
map to EU accession at hand.
For a more nuanced explanation of the semi-peripheral nature of the Balkans, see Marina Blagojević, Knowledge
Production at the Semi-periphery: A Gender Perspective, Beograd, 2009, pp. 33 et seq.; Marina Blagojević-Hughson and
Mirjana Bobić, “Understanding the population change from semi-peripheral perspective: Advancement of theory”, Zbornik
Matice srpske za društvene nauke [Matica Srpska Journal of Social Sciences], 2014, (148), p. 533 et seq.
10
As Branislav Radeljić noted, “It can be argued that the EU has heavily relied on enlargement as its most celebrated
foreign policy tool to penetrate the post-Yugoslav space. While in some cases such an approach has produced significant
results, in others it has often been stuck between the EU’s conditionality clauses and the applicants’ willingness to comply”
– see Branislav Radeljić, “Europe and the Post-Yugoslav Space: From Intervention to Integration”, in Branislav Radeljić
(ed.)., Europe and the Post-Yugoslav Space, Ashgate, Burlington, 2013, p. 3.
11
The author of the “marital” analogy of EU-Balkan relations is Cosmin Ioniță, Director of Research Programs from New
Strategy Center (Bucharest), who devised it for the purposes of our presentation in Belgrade. It immediately turned out to
be a great success, as nothing seems to stir geopolitical waters more than a marital analogy.
12
Sofia Sebastian, “The Stabilisation and Association Process: are EU inducements failing in the Western Balkans”,
Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE), Working Paper 53 (February 2008),
Madrid.
13
Adam Fagan, Europe’s Balkan Dilemma: Paths to Civil Society or State-Building?, I.B. Tauris, London & New York,
2010, p. 32.
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The wedding was on the horizon, if all conditions were going to be fulfilled. And in the
meantime, a convenient engagement was devised. One that allowed for gradual co-habitation and
quasi-matrimonial regime. Integration without immediate membership. This was mainly obtained by
the swift deployment of comprehensive agreements (the so-called Stabilisation and Association
Agreements, SAAs), which were convergent in standards and norms, but separated on a bilateral basis.
The SAAs were envisioned to lead to a gradual opening of the internal market and visa liberalisation
toward the Balkans, while – at the same time – these countries immersed their legal systems into the
acquis communautaire, aligning themselves to its more-than-complex equilibrium.14
Figure 1 - EU Association Dynamics (author’s own illustration)
Or so the idea went in theory. The remaining Balkan countries were to benefit from almost
everything that the EU had to offer and to “share everything but institutions” with the Union, as
Romano Prodi famously framed the concept.15 However, almost two decades later, only one of the
countries (Croatia) managed to join the bloc, while the others are still in a “geopolitical limbo”. What
happened since 1999 that might have influenced the process in such a discomforting manner? How did
the EU official narrative change during the period? Or – even more troubling – did anything change at
all? Stagnation seems to be the proper descriptor for the reality of the area.
As some researchers observed, the SAP was built on the assumption that “the perspective of European integration was
the most important driving force of overall development in the region” – see Ylber Sela and Lirim Shabani, “The European
Union Politics in the Western Balkans”, The Western Balkans Policy Review, Volume 1, Issue 2 (2011), p. 28. Thus, in a
circular fashion, the EU deployed its mechanisms envisioned to generate change, considering that the perspective of joining
the bloc already was the main driver for change.
15
Romano Prodi, “A Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the key to stability”, cit. supra.
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IV. A Tale of Unconsummated Romance: From Zagreb to Paris (and Beyond)
In order to shed some light on these questions, a brief historical enquiry must be provided,
analysing a few relevant EU-Balkan summits and the European institutions’ formal commitments (or
rhetorical declarations) to the “neighbourhood”. Thus, a first enthusiastic starting point was the Zagreb
summit of November 2000. It came just after Serbia changed its leadership and the uncomfortable
(last) strongman of the Balkans was ousted from power. For the European politicians, it appeared as if
Slobodan Milošević was the only impediment to any future geopolitical wedding, “at a time when
democracy is about to carry the day throughout this region”.16 With the trouble-maker of the Balkans
gone, all was heading here – like in the rest of the world – to the end of history.
The final joint declaration emphatically proclaimed that “the way is now open to all the
countries of the region to move closer to the European Union as part of the stabilization and association
process. The European Union […] reaffirms the European perspective of the countries participating in
the stabilization and association process and their status as potential candidates for membership”.17
The road to membership seemed to be unbarred and open for the Balkan states.
A couple of years later, at the Thessaloniki summit of 2003, a new agenda was launched for
interacting with the Balkan states.18 Innovative and ambitious, the Thessaloniki plan was designed to
give more weight to the SAP and to present a rigorous set of conditions that need to be fulfilled in
order to obtain membership. However, the summit declaration clearly stated that “[t]he EU reiterates
its unequivocal support to the European perspective of the Western Balkan countries. The future of the
Balkans is within the European Union”.19
The same year, the first European Security Strategy (proposed by Javier Solana) also noted –
as part of the Union’s geopolitical concerns and challenges – that an unavoidable mission for the bloc
is to consolidate the Balkan area where the incentive of EU membership “offers both a strategic
objective and an incentive for reform.”20 The privileged nature of this relation between the Union and
its Balkan partners was emphasised once more starting with 2005 when the Enlargement Strategy
started to deal almost exclusively with the thorny issue of their accession the bloc.21
Fast-forward to August 2014, when the story tends to become more interesting, although
paradoxical. At that moment, the president of European Commission José Barroso launched the
“Berlin process” and unequivocally stated in his official capacity that “[w]e want to see the Western
Balkan countries ultimately join the European Union. This is in our joint political, economic and geostrategic interest. This is the right way to defend the long-term prosperity of all the citizens in our
See
Zagreb
Summit,
Final
Declaration,
24
November
2000,
available
online
at
http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/bridges/bosnia/ZagrebSummit24Nov2000.pdf (accessed December 2016).
17
Ibidem.
18
For more details, see Erwan Fouéré, “Thessaloniki ten years on: Injecting momentum into the enlargement process for
the Western Balkans”, Centre for European Policy Studies, CEPS Commentary, 16 May 2013, available online at
https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Fou%C3%A9r%C3%A9%20%20Thessaloniki.pdf (accessed December 2016).
19
Declaration, EU-Western Balkans Summit, C/03/163, Thessaloniki, 21 June 2003, 10229/03 (Presse 163) (our emphasis
in the original text).
20
A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003, p. 8 – available online at
https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf (accessed December 2016). The larger context showed
that the aim of the EU is “to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the European Union and on the borders
of the Mediterranean with whom we can enjoy close and cooperative relations. The importance of this is best illustrated in
the Balkans. […] The credibility of our foreign policy depends on the consolidation of our achievements there. The
European perspective offers both a strategic objective and an incentive for reform.”
21
For the full text, please see the Communication from the European Commission, 2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper,
Brussels, 9 November 2005, COM (2005) 561, available online at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0561&from=EN (accessed December 2016).
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European family and also to defend European stability”.22 The proposed wedding seemed not only one
based on affection and shared principles, but also one which was to satisfy the best interests of both
partners. One would be admitted to the prosperous European family, while the other would be spared
of dealing with conflict and failing polities on its doorstep. A win-win situation, even though
asymmetrical.
However, the confusing part about chief-commissioner Barroso’s speech is that it came only a
month after the newly elected president of the Commission (although not yet in office) presented his
“political guidelines” for the next five years. Without any hint of sentimentalism – nor even any
diplomatic neutral parlance – Jean-Claude Juncker plainly announced in July that “The EU needs to
take a break from enlargement so that we can consolidate what has been achieved among the 28. This
is why, under my Presidency of the Commission, ongoing negotiations will continue, and notably the
Western Balkans will need to keep a European perspective, but no further enlargement will take place
over the next five years.”23
Plans for the wedding seemed to be blocked. As did the worn-out enthusiasm of both partners.
Thus, 2014 marked a point when end-of-term president of the Commission encouraged Balkan
countries and expressing his vision of their ultimate membership within the bloc, while the presidentelect shared his agenda of completely halting any further enlargement during his mandate. In this way,
although the prospect of negotiations was kept on the table, no true commitment could be made until
– at least – 2019. Even if all the requirements would be fulfilled, no wedding-party was on the horizon.
These mixed signals left the Balkans in a state of complete confusion. The subsequent summits
in Vienna (2015)24 and Paris (2016) remained mere rhetorical exercises. The Union’s half-mouthed
promises and “mutual” deference declarations seemed to fall on different – if not deaf – ears. The
Balkan countries have themselves been transformed by the endless travail of integration without
accession, not really knowing what to expect from the Union and what results will their (admittedly
insufficient) efforts lead to. Patience only allowed this geopolitical “romance” to remain
unconsummated so far.
V. Taking the Balkans for Granted: EU’s Three (Tactical) Errors
Under these circumstances, it seems that most – if not all – of the remaining six Balkan polities
are growing impatient and are looking for other options. For them, the EU appears to be absorbed by
its internal challenges and by its troubled Eastern flank. Even if this is not entirely accurate, such a
perception of the bloc already generates a loss “of transformative leverage” in the region.25 When
feeling left behind, there are few instruments to elicit change into a community which cannot discern
what benefits it will gain by submitting to the strict conditionality. 26 A condition for what, if not
(tangible) membership?
Remarks by President Barroso following the Western Balkans Summit, Press conference, Berlin, 28 August 2014,
available online at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-574_en.htm (accessed December 2016) (our emphasis
in the original text).
23
Jean-Claude Juncker, A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and Democratic Change - Political
Guidelines for the next European Commission, Opening Statement in the European Parliament Plenary Session, Strasbourg,
15 July 2014, available online at https://ec.europa.eu/priorities/sites/beta-political/files/juncker-political-guidelinesspeech_en_0.pdf (accessed December 2016).
24
Although acknowledging the “grand plan” proposed in the Connectivity Agenda.
25
Marko Kmezić, Florian Bieber et al., “Western Balkans and the EU: Beyond the Autopilot Mode”, Balkans in Europe
Policy Advisory Group, BiEPAG Policy Brief, September 2015.
26
As Alexandra Stiglmayer pertinently noted in 2015, “instead of working intensively on bringing the countries of the
region into shape, the EU has turned the pre-accession process – the steps taken before the start of official accession
22
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Therefore, a series of EU tactical errors need to be emphasised. The Union’s approach on a
couple of central issues is not viable anymore. But – taking the time and effort to admit the impasse –
it can be corrected without sacrificing any fundamental principles. However, ignoring such problems
and their (partially EU-based) causes may only pave the way for centrifugal factors to completely
disrupt any attempt of the region to integrate.
Figure 2 – EU Enlargement (author’s own illustration)
First Error: Fulfil Requirements First, Membership (Maybe) Later. The most constant
European position in regard to the Balkan states has been that all the reforms must be finished and
then, perhaps, “we shall see”. However, in many instances the situation turned out to be more than
delicate. For illustrative purposes, a couple of intriguing EU positions can be remembered: (a) asking
Serbia something as painful as the “normalisation” of its relations with Kosovo (that is, simply put,
admitting the secession of its symbolic “martyr territory”) after the EU itself tolerated – or even
supported – the region’s quest for self-determination; (b) allowing Greece to block any prospect of
Macedonia due to their protracted and frivolous name-dispute; (c) criticising the Bosnian federal
government for the little progress in reforms made, while knowing all-too-well the impossible postDayton system (for which the EU is partially responsible); (d) or considering that Kosovo is – from
time to time – on the verge of political collapse after allowing (and recognising) its independence as a
non-viable entity.
In all these cases, the EU did not appear (for the Western Balkans countries) to understand how
far things can go and if they really should go at all in that direction. At times, it was inappropriate to
ask for radical transformations – some even pertaining to altering the very fabric of society – while not
negotiations – into a drawn-out obstacle course overburdened by conditions.” – see the response provided by her to the
Carnegie Europe enquiry, “Is the EU Sleeping on the Western Balkans?”, May 13, 2015, available online at
http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/?fa=60069 (accessed December 2016).
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really considering to grant them the possibility of becoming mere “candidate” countries.27 Demanding
and setting deadlines might have worked in different environments throughout prior enlargement
waves, but on the (Balkan) fringes of Europe, constituencies also need more elaborate incentive
schemes. Or, at least, a clear accession timetable.
At the same time, the latest (internal) evolutions of the Union seem discouraging for Balkan
countries when confronted with the burden placed on them by the same entity. Some states do not even
know what to reform to. The EU itself is changing in unexpected ways, being in search of a new
organizational identity. The rise of Eurosceptic and nationalistic attitudes, against the backdrop of an
economic crisis that changed its structure, and now the Brexit vote in the UK brings the fear of
dissolution on the horizon. The troubled Balkan countries who have already experienced the
breakdown of their own (multi-national) Yugoslav federation know all too well how a spark is
sometimes sufficient to set the entire construction afire.
In addition, the EU conditionality of strict reforms appears paradoxical when some of the bloc’s
own member states are in a worse political and rule-of-law situation than Balkan constituencies. Thus,
it seems a weak position to ask Serbia or Montenegro to become perfect and immaculate regimes,
while Hungary and Poland manage to go through with defying Brussels. Or asking other Balkan
countries to legally and transparently solve all remaining border disputes before accession, while two
member states (Croatia and Slovenia) are involved in a scandalous arbitration (brokered by none other
than the European Commission) that went derelict and ended brutally without any settlement. 28 Or
asking them to uproot nationalism while Marine le Pen is surging in French polls, Austria was on the
brink of having a hard-line nationalist as president.
Second Error: Not Delivering (Visible) Enough. The Balkans are an area which is very
sensitive to “symbolic” gestures of good-will. Of course, the fundamental issue remains to deliver in
a coherent and systematic manner, but this needs to be supplemented with tangible offerings that
remind the constituencies who the true “benefactor” is and remains. Public perception is a fundamental
issue in maintaining the Balkans in the Union’s orbit, one that cannot be simply educated by invoking
cryptic acronyms such as IPA-II or CARDS. If the EU does not manage to maintain grassroots support
for its project in the region, it cannot fulfil its own geopolitical interests. The loyalty of Balkan political
elites is neither sufficient, nor reliable in a grand game with so many variables.
At the same time, when talking about the “substantive” part of financial and logistical support,
it seems – for many observers – that the EU is not living up to its potential. While it brings infusions
of cash in areas that are on the brink of collapse (such as Kosovo or Bosnia) keeping them afloat, aid
is needed – and in far larger quantities – to polities that are doing better. The EU must increasingly
deliver to those that have themselves delivered more, on a “more for more” principle.
If the sentiment of feeling “left behind” increases in all Balkan polities, national actors might
find it necessary to reconsider their options. And such options are not in the EU’s best interest. They
might resort to increasing authoritarianism (such as in Macedonia), to a new nationalist momentum to
consolidate the power-base or even to pushing the Union’s hand in the migration crisis. In this last
sense, the Balkans have come to the position in which they provide (security) for the EU. They have
In this sense, the prime examples of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo are very relevant. Both are still only “potential
candidates” – with Bosnia a little bit ahead in the process – even though they are (more or less) “creations” of the EU as
political bodies.
28
For a detailed analysis, please see the four-part commentary of Arman Sarvarian and Rudy Baker hosted by the online
platform of the European Journal of International Law – first part available at http://www.ejiltalk.org/arbitration-betweencroatia-and-slovenia-leaks-wiretaps-scandal/ (accessed December 2016). Also see Patricia Živković, “Severe Breaches of
Duty of Confidentiality and Impartiality in the Dispute between Croatia and Slovenia: Is Arbitration Immune to Such
Violations?”, Kluwer Arbitration Blog, July 29, 2015, available at http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2015/07/29/severebreaches-of-duty-of-confidentiality-and-impartiality-in-a-dispute-between-croatia-and-slovenia-is-arbitration-immune-tosuch-violations/ (accessed December 2016).
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become the gate-keepers of migration and have gained some additional leverage in negotiations. Thus,
the EU needs to deliver before such situations occur, on its own terms and on its own (softened)
conditions.
Third Error: Losing Sight of the Competition. However, the approach that poses the highest
geopolitical risk is that of the EU acting in the Balkans as if it were alone. Centuries of turbulent history
transformed this semi-periphery of Europe into a strategic chessboard for great powers. The region has
always been a space of contestation and confrontation, one that occasionally turns out an uncontainable
powder keg. The EU rather sees the Balkans in its comfort zone, entirely surrounded by its member
states. On the other hand, exactly this position is what makes the Union vulnerable to any upheaval in
the region, be it violent or not. The dangers of contagion, asymmetric warfare or geo-economic
subversion are increasing since other powers are entering the region.
From traditional actors (such as Russia and Turkey) to postmodern newcomers (such as China
and Gulf states), all seem to contest EU’s privileged position and to find different types of incentives
that attract one Balkan polity or another into their orbit. While Turkey tries to rather reassert its
influence in predominantly Muslim entities (such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo or Albania) by
using its Neo-Ottomanist ideology and existing cultural ties29, the Gulf states bring on strong financial
incentives and cash support, building up a strong Salafi-based interpretation of Islam in a region with
no (consistent) record in radicalisation.30
On the other hand, when considering the global players that entered the Balkans, a grave
misrepresentation would be to closely watch only Russia. Indeed, it is a contender for the EU (a major
one), but its role here is limited to that of a “tactical spoiler”.31 Intervening with precise, surgical moves
in one place or another that seems to definitely lean westwards (such as Montenegro, Macedonia or
Serbia), Russia only acts to hinder the EU’s plans and not to build an alternative governance paradigm.
Such a disrupting geopolitical mechanism certainly must be vigorously blocked, but Russia’s true
reach should not be overestimated.32
What really must sound a warning signal is the gradual Chinese build-up in the region. Selfstyled as “benign hegemon”, this actor entered the Balkans with an alternative integration paradigm.
Its mega-regional format (the 16+1 framework) brings together all Balkan countries33, the Visegrád
states (Hungary, Poland, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) and the Baltic states, proposing an open
and coherent space for trading with China and for receiving consistent influx of investments. The Asian
player presents its offer as mere business, without any political or social requirements. 34 Such
“neutral” cash – with no (visible) strings attached – seem like a good deal after the unending demands
for change spurring from the EU. After all, in theory, the Chinese are in the Balkans only to spend
their budget surplus and not to call for uncomfortable transformations. Such a well-calibrated approach
seems to work extremely efficient in all the disgruntled Balkan polities (both within the EU and outside
it).
Ronald H. Linden and Yasemin İrepoğlu, “Turkey and the Balkans: New Forms of Political Community?”, Turkish
Studies 14, No. 2 (2013).
30
Mieczysław P. Boduszyński, “The Gulf and the Balkans: Islam, Investment, and Influence”, Gulf State Analytics Monthly
Monitor (January 2015), pp. 5-8.
31
Francisco de Borja Lasheras, Vessela Tcherneva and Fredrik Wesslau, “Return to Instability: How Migration and Great
Power Politics Threaten the Western Balkans”, European Council on Foreign Relations, ECFR Policy Brief, March 2016,
p. 6.
32
Dimitar Bechev, “Russia in the Balkans: How should the EU respond?”, European Policy Center, Policy Brief, 12
October 2015.
33
With the obvious exception of Kosovo and that of Greece which benefits from different bilateral relations.
34
Loïc Poulain, “China’s New Balkan Strategy”, Central Europe Watch 1, No. 2 (August 2011).
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Not only recalcitrant strongmen as Milorad Dodik from Republica Srpska35 or near bankrupt
populists such as Alexis Tsipras are now seeking Chinese investment, but also leaders from Bucharest,
Belgrade or Zagreb. Whether the EU likes it or not, China is the new grand player in the Balkans. One
that comes with a complete package, but (apparently) asks nothing in return. Unlike the Russian
tactical spoiler, China represents a strategic developer with a plan for the future. And it has been
already set in motion. On the long-term, such a presence can seriously erode the Union’s leverage in
the region, leaving it with no available incentive (or sanction) to re-shape the Balkans.
VI. Beyond Inertia: Some (Imperfect) Solutions for Balkan Troubles
For all the aforementioned reasons, the European Union simply cannot afford to take the
Balkans for granted anymore. Since 2000 and the initial enthusiasm, the Balkans have changed and
the European Union has changed. The entire world has changed and new radical processes are
developing. The “end of history” is over. And the “geopolitical romance” cannot continue on the same
basis, as if nothing had happened in the meanwhile. To do so would only be to indulge into a charade
with no tangible outcome. Or to an outcome that resembles a black hole.36
However, once the impasse is acknowledged and the inertia is dismantled, the spark can be
kept aflame and – if needed – efficiently re-ignited. It takes two to tango, but one has to make the first
step. Thus, as the partner holding the higher ground, the Union itself needs to (partially) reconsider its
approach and reach out to its Balkan partners.
In this sense, the minimal strategic transformations that the EU needs to perform upon its
interaction with the Balkans pertain to (a) diluting the asymmetry (of power) in the accession
negotiations, as well as in simple diplomatic contacts, (b) changing the idea that the Balkans are
punished for not meeting ambiguous criteria and allowing these states to see a clear roadmap for the
future, (c) reducing the region’s perception of being “left behind” and of endlessly lingering in a notyet-ready limbo.
Therefore, as a first tactical reset, the Union should aim at outsourcing the political burden. It
should proceed with a (partial) decentralisation of the Balkan-project by involving more its member
states from the region. Both Greece and Romania possess democratic transition experience and the
capacity and resources to engage their Balkan neighbours on behalf of the EU, assuming part of
Brussels-led efforts. Such a move would allow the interaction between EU and the Balkans to be
mediated through local proxies, reducing the status asymmetry in negotiations and the prospect of
being pushed over unbearable national “red lines” by an actor that does not understand the regional
troubles. Moreover, this approach would also reduce the tension with other global players which would
be satisfied by any retreat of the EU, even if merely apparent.
Another necessary step is to rethink the landmarks for accession. The world in which we live
today is not the same as it was back in 1993 in Copenhagen or in 2003 in Thessaloniki. It is a turbulent
world in which Crimea has been militarily annexed, with civil war raging in Ukraine and millions of
migrants awaiting at the borders of Europe. This is why the EU could ask – and should ask – only for
a reduced set of fundamental demands to be fulfilled. And such criteria need to be formulated in such
a way that will not put the Union in the awkward position of demanding others what itself cannot
manage internally. The clearer and the simpler requirements are – trimmed down to the basics – the
sooner will the Balkans find their way to Europe.
Maja Garaca Djurdjevic, “Bosnian Serb Leader Hunts for Cash in China”, Balkan Insight, November 4, 2016.
Eran Frankel, “The EU and the Western Balkans: Do They Share a Future?”, Barcelona Centre for International Affairs,
notes internacionals CIDOB no. 145 (March 2016).
35
36
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As a dynamic approach, the Union also needs to increase and re-prioritize aid to areas that are
actually doing better (such as Serbia, Montenegro, and maybe Macedonia). These states are walking a
thin line and require additional support to maintain their European path, being very susceptible to
looking for other options. Without being in dire necessity and entirely dependent on foreign aid (such
as Kosovo or Bosnia) they really have to be reassured of their membership prospects. And – in the
meanwhile – they need a financial preview of what new members receive.
From another perspective, the EU should push forward the regional card. The multilateral
framework for investment and trade (such as the existing CEFTA) can be amended by allowing
member states to become parties. Thus, two overlapping integrations would emerge and give an
unconditional (although mediated) access to the internal market for all Balkan countries, irrespective
of their negotiation status. In this manner, the CEFTA could expand to regulate even other areas and
become a veritable “safety-net” in case of not acceding – or not fast enough – to the EU.
In the end, it must be acknowledged that sometimes being within the EU works better in
modelling reluctant actors, as the “transformative leverage” is more efficient inward than upon the
Union’s outer periphery. Unmistakably, the Balkans will turn out to be more European if allowed to
join the bloc – on a fast-track – rather than be kept waiting at the gates. As Europe is different, the
world is different and the Balkans have irredeemably transformed, the quest for integration must find
a new momentum. And the Union – this complex, but fragile neo-medieval empire – should let it be
known that no one shall be left behind. At least, no one in the Balkans.
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Selected Bibliography
I.
Volumes, Articles, Policy Papers, Reports
1. Almond, Mark, Europe’s Backyard War: The War in the Balkans, Heinemann, London, 1994.
2. Bechev, Dimitar, “Russia in the Balkans: How should the EU respond?”, European Policy
Center, Policy Brief, 12 October 2015.
3. Blagojević, Marina, Knowledge Production at the Semi-periphery: A Gender Perspective,
Beograd, 2009.
4. Blagojević-Hughson, Marina, Bobić, Mirjana “Understanding the population change from
semi-peripheral perspective: Advancement of theory”, Zbornik Matice srpske za društvene
nauke [Matica Srpska Journal of Social Sciences], 2014, (148).
5. Boduszyński, Mieczysław P., “The Gulf and the Balkans: Islam, Investment, and Influence”,
Gulf State Analytics Monthly Monitor (January 2015).
6. De Borja Lasheras, Francesco, Tcherneva, Vessela, Wesslau, Fredrik, “Return to Instability:
How Migration and Great Power Politics Threaten the Western Balkans”, European Council
on Foreign Relations, ECFR Policy Brief, March 2016.
7. Fagan, Adam, Europe’s Balkan Dilemma: Paths to Civil Society or State-Building?, I.B.
Tauris, London & New York, 2010.
8. Fouéré, Erwan, “Thessaloniki ten years on: Injecting momentum into the enlargement
process for the Western Balkans”, Centre for European Policy Studies, CEPS Commentary,
16 May 2013, available online at
https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/Fou%C3%A9r%C3%A9%20%20Thessaloniki.pdf
(accessed December 2016).
9. Frankel, Eran, “The EU and the Western Balkans: Do They Share a Future?”, Barcelona Centre
for International Affairs, notes internacionals CIDOB no. 145 (March 2016).
10. Fukuyama, Francis, The End of History and the Last Man, The Free Press – Macmillan, New
York, 1992.
11. Gross, Leo, “The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948”, 42 American Journal of International Law
(1948).
12. Grygiel, Jakub, “The Return of Europe’s Nation-States: The Upside to the EU’s Crisis”,
Foreign Affairs, Volume 95, Number 5.
13. Kmezić, Marko, Bieber, Florian et al., “Western Balkans and the EU: Beyond the Autopilot
Mode”, Balkans in Europe Policy Advisory Group, BiEPAG Policy Brief, September 2015.
14. Linden, Ronald H., İrepoğlu, Yasemin, “Turkey and the Balkans: New Forms of Political
Community?”, Turkish Studies 14, No. 2 (2013).
15. Poulain, Loïc, “China’s New Balkan Strategy”, Central Europe Watch 1, No. 2 (August 2011).
16. Prodi, Romano, “A Wider Europe – A Proximity Policy as the key to stability”, speech
delivered at the Sixth ECSA-World Conference ‘Peace, Security and Stability International
Dialogue and the Role of the EU’, Brussels, 5-6 December 2002, SPEECH/02/619.
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17. Radeljić, Branislav, “Europe and the Post-Yugoslav Space: From Intervention to Integration”,
in Branislav Radeljić (ed.)., Europe and the Post-Yugoslav Space, Ashgate, Burlington, 2013.
18. Schmitt, Carl, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty, The
University of Chicago Press, Chicago & London, 2005.
19. Sebastian, Sofia, “The Stabilisation and Association Process: are EU inducements failing in
the Western Balkans”, Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior
(FRIDE), Working Paper 53 (February 2008), Madrid.
20. Sela, Ylber, Shabani, Lirim, “The European Union Politics in the Western Balkans”, The
Western Balkans Policy Review, Volume 1, Issue 2 (2011).
21. Živković, Patricia, “Severe Breaches of Duty of Confidentiality and Impartiality in the Dispute
between Croatia and Slovenia: Is Arbitration Immune to Such Violations?”, Kluwer Arbitration
Blog, July 29, 2015, available at http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/2015/07/29/severebreaches-of-duty-of-confidentiality-and-impartiality-in-a-dispute-between-croatia-andslovenia-is-arbitration-immune-to-such-violations/ (accessed December 2016).
II.
Official Declarations, Press Releases, Communications
22. Zagreb Summit, Final Declaration, 24 November 2000, available
http://www.esiweb.org/pdf/bridges/bosnia/ZagrebSummit24Nov2000.pdf
December 2016).
online at
(accessed
23. Declaration, EU-Western Balkans Summit, C/03/163, Thessaloniki, 21 June 2003, 10229/03
(Presse 163).
24. A Secure Europe in a Better World. European Security Strategy, Brussels, 12 December 2003,
p. 8 – available online at https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf
(accessed December 2016).
25. Communication from the European Commission, 2005 Enlargement Strategy Paper, Brussels,
9 November 2005, COM (2005) 561, available online at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legalcontent/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52005DC0561&from=EN (accessed December 2016).
26. Western Balkans Summit, Press conference, Berlin, 28 August 2014, available online at
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-14-574_en.htm (accessed December 2016).
27. Jean-Claude Juncker, A New Start for Europe: My Agenda for Jobs, Growth, Fairness and
Democratic Change – Political Guidelines for the next European Commission, Opening
Statement in the European Parliament Plenary Session, Strasbourg, 15 July 2014, available
online
at
http://www.eesc.europa.eu/resources/docs/jean-claude-juncker---politicalguidelines.pdf (accessed December 2016).
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