Report 3: EU ENLARGED, SCHENGEN IMPLEMENTED, WHAT NEXT?
POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES
Cristina Ilinca, Vladimir Pasti, Bogdan Sgarcitu
I. SCHENGEN – FEAR OF A NEW “IRON CURTAIN”?
The enlargement of the European Union in the first decade of the 21st century is a consistent
one. There is more likely that this enlargement to comprise twelve countries in two steps: ten
plus two. This enlargement will imply a new division of the continent between the new united
Europe and the states that remain outside of it. The borders of the new European Union are
likely to remain unchanged for decades to follow. Even if a new enlargement process starts,
the achievement of it will take at least a decade.
At this point there is no foreseeable prospect of enlargement with some countries of Western
Balkans (Macedonia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania) and with countries in Eastern Europe
(Republic of Moldova, Belarus, Ukraine and Russia). There is a separate debate about
Croatia and Serbia and Montenegro (the new name of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia).
In the 1990s, two walls, which had been dividing Europe for several decades, ceased to
exist. One of those was the boundary between the socialist bloc and Western Europe and
another, mentioned far less often, was the strictly guarded border between the USSR and
Moscow’s satellite countries. The disappearance of these two frontiers resulted in virtually
new migratory movements in Europe. Namely, citizens of the EU candidate countries (with
the exception of Bulgarian and Romanian citizens which got this right in April 2001 –
Bulgarians and in January 2002 - Romanians) obtained the right to visa-free entry to the EU.
At the same time, inhabitants of countries such as Russia, Ukraine, Belarus or Moldova
have, until recently, been able to travel to Central Europe without major difficulty. There are
mainly two reasons for this situation: 1) it was part of a policy of good relationships with
neighbouring countries pursued by the governments of Central European countries and 2)
there was a form of protection of the minorities countries in Central Europe have in the
region.
Prospective eastward shift of the EU and Schengen borders will lead to the elimination of
visa-free travel between the candidate and the bordering non-candidate countries, thus, to
the disappearance of the area of free flow of persons. Therefore, an unquestionable
achievement – the freedom of travel between Eastern and Central Europe – may become a
thing of the past. This is likely to have consequences of political, economic, social and
cultural nature for all countries involved.
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A measure of protection for the minorities was issuing citizenship for people in neighbouring
countries of Eastern Europe. For instance, Romania issued citizenship to citizens of Moldova
by a simple procedure until last year. The procedure was suspended at this time due to new
European Union requirements. This creates a division among Romanian nationals in
Republic of Moldova. Few will have the right of free movement in the Schengen space as
Romanian citizens and majority of them will not have this right since doesn’t get the “right”
citizenship.
The stricter control of a new EU border will particularly affect borderland regions existing now
between the candidate and non-candidate countries. Romania has such borders with
Republic of Moldova, Ukraine and Serbia. At present the trans-border movements and
activities related to them are a structural element of those regions. Interregional co-operation
between local authorities from neighbouring countries is usually the case. To some extent,
activities of inhabitants of borderland regions are based on travel between two given
countries. Schengen will make this activities drastically reduced.
Grounded in the long-term co-operation between citizens of the two countries, social reality
of such regions comprises variety of relationships mixed in terms of ethnic belonging, culture,
language and religion. All that phenomena are conditioned by intensive trans-border
movements of inhabitants of the region. Thus, the restriction imposed on these flows will
have an impact on political, economic, social and cultural reality of borderland regions. For
these regions, this will involve the consequences of a particularly high importance when
compared to the other regions of countries involved. That’s why is important to outline a
regional policy as part of a broader European policy regarding the border issues.
This debate of a new European and regional policy will be particular interesting for Romania
since the Eastern Schengen border seems to settle in the mid and long term on River Prut, at
the border between Romania and Republic of Moldova. In fact, Romania will have In
Republic of Moldova live about 3.5 million Romanians that are concerned about this. The
“iron curtain” fear may seem for the moment less important now for the Romanian population
in Moldova comparing with the issues population is struggling for with the communist regime
on the streets of Kishinev. But, in perspective the reality of a new ‘Iron curtain’ separating
again the Romanian nationals living in Republic of Moldova of Romania and Europe is a
perspective that could provide fears for Romanian ethnics from Moldova.
2
The role of the new European policy regarding the border is very important. It should be very
carefully when outline this policy that has to accomplish two different (and sometimes
antagonistic) roles. Firstly, it should be strictly enough to protect the member states of the
Schengen space from violations of borders from the outside, with all the negative aspects
that these violations bring. Secondly, this policy should be flexible enough not to discriminate
people and not to create negative effects on the border communities and economic
environment.
II. INTEGRATION OF NEW MIGRANTS INTO SOCIETY
II.1. Legal and institutional framework, legal provisions
Romania has remained primarily a country of transit for asylum seekers and migrants
traveling on to countries farther north and west. Its asylum system is based on a 1996 law
that implemented Romania's 1991 accession to the UN Refugee Convention. According to
the refugee law, the Decision Commission, an inter-ministerial body comprised of
representatives of the ministries of interior, foreign affairs and labor and welfare is
responsible for interviewing asylum seekers and deciding their asylum claims, a
responsibility that it has delegated to the Refugee Office of the General Directorate of the
Border Police, Aliens, Migration Issues, and Passports.
Rejected asylum seekers wishing to appeal their cases must file with a local court within ten
days of their negative decision. If the appeal is denied, a second appeal with a higher court is
possible if the applicant files within five days.
Romanian asylum policies and institutions in line with EU standards, providing safeguards
against forcible expulsions (see for more details Report 1 and Annex 1).
The national legal act that regulates asylum is Government Ordinance (GO) No 102/2000
concerning the status and regime of the refugees entered into force on 1 November
2000, and was passed by Law No 323/2001, with the following amendments. Concepts,
such as “manifestly unfounded applications”, “third safe country”, a fundamental
concept of the Dublin Convention, “countries where, in general, there is no serious risk
of persecution”, “accelerated procedures” have been introduced.
The ordinary procedure - two judicial appeals are provided: the first appeal and the second
appeal, both having suspensive effect. The first appeal must be submitted within 10 days
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from receiving proof of notification or, alternatively, the document stating that the applicant
can no longer be found at his/her last declared residence.
The second appeal must be submitted within 5 days, from delivery for those present at the
hearing or from notification for those not present. This decision is final and irrevocable. For
both procedures the term for submission of the appeal is 2 days from notification;
Considering this legal act, two Orders of the minister of interior concerning both the list of
the safe third countries and the list of the countries where, in general, there is no serious risk
of persecution, were adopted and published.
Asylum application must be submitted as soon as an applicant has entered the territory of
Romania, at the state border control point, or, in the case of aliens who have the right to stay
in Romania, as soon as the events that make him/her seek protection have occurred;
The unaccompanied minors who have been granted refugee status or a subsidiary form of
protection to enjoy the protection of the Romanian State under the same conditions as the
Romanian minors who are in difficulty.
Within the border procedure the asylum seeker shall remain in the transit area at the state
border control point until the decision approving his/her entry to Romania is received, or, until
the decision to reject the refugee status application becomes final and irrevocable.
The applicant cannot be retained in the transit area for more than 20 days. Upon expiry of
the limit of 20 days and if the application has not be given a final and irrevocable decision
he/she shall be automatically allowed entry into the territory.
If the court decision is to reject an application, the alien shall be compelled to leave Romania
within 15 days from the notification.
The refugee legislation in place grants to the refugees and asylum seekers the eligibility for
social assistance, accommodation and legal assistance.
A special attention has been given to the development of the necessary infrastructure in the
asylum and refugee field. Several buildings were taken in the administration of the Ministry of
Interior in order to be rehabilitated as reception and accommodation centers for asylum
seekers. Thus, in Bucharest two such centers with a total capacity of 750 places have been
already established and 3 new centers are in the process of rehabilitation and rearranging as
reception and accommodation centers, one in Bucharest, which is going to ensure spaces for
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accommodation of unaccompanied minors, one in the Eastern part of Romania, in the city of
Galati, and one in the western part of Romania, in the city of Timisoara.
Steps have been taken in order to take over one building in the city of Radauti (NorthEastern part of the country), with the view to rehabilitate and rearrange it as a reception and
accommodation center for asylum seekers.
The programs run by governmental institutions such the National Office for Refugees - the
central authority responsible for the implementation of Romania’s policies in the field of
refugees - and the Romanian Committee for Migration Issues,
as well as the other
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institutions dealing with the refugees issues and the refugees oriented NGO’s such ARCA,
Romanian Forum for Refugees and Migrants2 etc. are mainly oriented towards facilitating the
integration of refugees in the Romanian society, giving them financial support, legal and
humanitarian assistance, information, involving them in various activities.
II.2. Migrants into Romania: figures and facts
There are two categories of migrants into Romania: those who search for a home in
Romania (politically refugees from Iraq, Bangladesh, Congo etc. or economically refugees
from other countries)3 and those who are just transiting Romania in their way to the Western
countries. The number of the later will presumably grow as Romania will be near to be
admitted into the EU.
According to the U.S. Committee for Refugees World Refugee Survey 2001 –
Romania, at the end of 2000, Romania hosted about 2,100 refugees and asylum
seekers in need of protection. Asylum seekers submitted 1,366 asylum applications in
2000, about 18 percent less than in 1999. The largest number of asylum seekers came
from Afghanistan (282), Iraq (250), Bangladesh (226), and Pakistan (225).
1
See for more details Report 1, chapter I, I.2.1.-I.2.5, chapter III and Annex 1, 6, 7.
According to the Romanian Forum for Refugees and Migrants (ARCA- FRRM), non - governmental and nonpolitical organization, one of the main partners of implementation of the United Nations High Commission for
Refugees Program, 992 persons were assisted in Romania during the year 2001, from which: 461 refugees, 276
asylum seekers, 36 persons under conditioned humanitarian protection, 211 Romanian citizens that have been
repatriated or originating from mixed families and 8 migrants. 592 of these persons were men and 400 women.
3
Information about the migrants into Romania is gathered from the General Inspectorate of Border Police, from
National Office of Refugees (ONR) and from an NGO called ARCA (the Romanian Forum for Refugees and
Migrants).
2
5
During the year, Romanian authorities issued 1,503 first-instance decisions, granting
refugee status in 85 cases, a 6 percent approval rate, and humanitarian status in 86
cases. The authorities denied 1,271 asylum applications.
During the first six months of 2000 alone, 5,300 Romanians sought asylum in other
European countries.
The total figures showing asylum seekers for the last decade are rather low: 11658
applicants for asylum in 10 years, out of wich 8567 were rejected (see annex 6 for details)
and even in the case of increasing number of migrants by their relatively low rates they
cannot constitute a security problem or economical threat for Romania and/or Schengen
states. Integration of admitted 3-4 000 asylum seekers in ten years into a country having 23
million inhabitants is really not a problem.
On the other hand the Romanian Border Police and the Romanian Police have proved the
capacity – both institutional and practical – to handle the migrants issues (see Annex 6),
enforcing its control to the borders in the last period.
Table 1: Crossing border statistics for 2002
Crossing border point
number of Romanian citizens
refused to leave country
traveling to Schengen
Hungary
187 592
28 449
Yugoslavia
12 469
2 775
Bulgaria
8 790
1 384
International airports
39 959
947
Source: Romanian Border Police, February 2002
In the first period after cancellation of Schengen visa demand for Romanian citizens
(01.01.2002– 10.02.2002), the Romanian Border Police has stopped to enter Romania 7 287
foreign citizens, with 25% more than in the similar period of the last year, and has
stopped to leave the country 416 foreign citizens and 33 555 Romanian citizens, the figure
beeing also 25% higher comparative to the similar period of the last year. (Source: Romanian
Border Police, February 2002).
In the last years, Romania had an increasing number of migrants, both from Western
countries and from far East (Chinese and Arabs), settling businesses in Romania. Many of
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the eastern people having commercial or business activity in Romania has integrated into
Romanian society by marriage with Romanian persons, establishing business and personal
relationship with Romanian partners and/or demanding Romanian citizenship. Anyway, that
category is not representing in any way a problem nor for Romania, neither for Schengen.
Minor inconvenience is brought by the economically refugees from poorer countries,
demanding asylum in Romania, because of the poor potential of many of them in finding jobs
and subsequently incomes for living. They are provided a minimum amount of money for
living and housing, but those are hardly enough to cover every day expenses in a weak
economical environment. The unemployment rate of 9 % makes difficult even for natives to
find a job. A greater difficulty will have in finding one a newcomer, having little knowing of the
language and often no qualification.
However, this problem is rather significant as a humanitarian problem, by its small extent the
phenomenon having no signification in terms of risks or difficulties in absorption of the
newcomers.
II.3. Roma population
Romania was in the last years subject of the international criticism for the treatment of the
Roma minority. Both Human Rights Watch and UNHCR reported that Roma faced
widespread discrimination in education, employment, and housing and that the authorities
failed to investigate and prosecute harassment of Roma.
Discrimination and intolerance to some extent, but rather poor economic situation to a
greater extent led many Roma to seek asylum abroad. In 2000, Romanian Roma flocked in
record numbers to Ireland, which registered 2,384 Romanian asylum seekers (statistics
doesn’t show the percent of Roma among them) the second largest group of asylum seekers
in Ireland during the year. Romania and Ireland signed an agreement in order to facilitate the
return of rejected Romanian asylum seekers to Romania.
The recent obligations introduced by the Romanian part for any Romanian attempting to
leave the country (a certain amount of money, up to 100 Euro/day for Schengen States,
return ticket, hotel or similar reservation, medical insurance etc.) will have a direct
consequence in decrease of the traffic of poor people, including many Roma ethnics.
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III MIGRATION FLOWS
Two types of migration flows were considered: (1) One way migration, which consists in
people emigrating from Romania, on the one hand, and repatriated and asylum seekers, on
the other; (2) Circular migration, which consists in people going abroad to work and coming
back to their families to spend their savings (the “out” component), and foreigners coming for
business and work to Romania (the “in” component).
III.1. Emigration
Apparently, the emigration flow of Romanians was initially dominated by ethnic motivation
and, in the second part of the decade, by economic reasons. The real fact is that economic
motivation was, by far, the main motivation of any type of emigration, the ethnic and the nonethnic criteria being a reflex of the acceptance rules of the destination country. Emigration
flows in the last decade are presented in the table below.
Table 2
1989
1990
1991
1992
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Total
41363
96929
44160
31152
25675
21526
19445
17536
12594
14753
Germans
14598
60072
15567
8852
2906
2315
1273
775
390
374
Hungarians
10099
11040
7494
3523
3608
2105
1459
1217
696
788
Romanians
14745
23888
19307
18104
18706
16767
16883
15202
11283
13438
Source: The National Institute for Statistics, 2002
The flow of emigrants had a peak in 1990 as a direct consequence of the December
Revolution, but very soon afterwards it came back to values comparable to the communist
era, and then decreased below these values. The main cause of the peak in 1990 was the
massive emigration of Germans, stimulated by the German regulations of the time. Starting
with 1994, the ethnic migration was replaced by the domination of Romanians, migrating to
better work and living areas, mainly in UE and North America (USA and Canada). The
emigration of Germans decreased mainly because of the decrease of the German population
while the emigration of ethnic Hungarians decreased mainly because of the new travel
facilities. As statistics shows, the emigration of ethnic Hungarians was replaced by an
increased traffic across the Hungarian border.
In 2000, the ethnic motivated emigration represents only about 10% of the total emigration,
while the economic motivated emigration – ethnic Romanians emigration – represents over
90% of the total emigration.
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It is clear from the presented data, that the emigrations flows depend to a larger extend of
the immigration conditions in the destination country than any emigration policy Romanian
authorities can device.
The destination country depends rather of the immigration conditions and policies of
developed countries than of Romanians preferences. In 1990, the main destination country
was Germany, which accepted 66.121 emigrants. In 1994 only one tenth of this number
emigrated to Germany and, in 2000, there were only 2200 emigrants from Romania to
Germany, most of them ethnic Romanians (86%). In 1995, the main destination country for
Romanian emigrants was still Germany, with almost 35% of all emigrants, followed by far by
Hungary (10%), Austria, Canada, USA and Italy with almost similar numbers (about 2200
each). Five years later, in 2000, the number of emigrants to Germany decreased four times,
from 9010 in 1995 to 2216 in 2000, and Germany was no more the first destination country
for Romanian emigrants, nor was Hungary the second. In 2000, about 40% of Romanian
emigrants headed towards North America (USA and Canada, in almost equal numbers),
while emigration towards Austria declined almost ten times (from 2276 in 1995 to 270 in
2000) and to Hungary decreased from 2509 in 1995 to only 881 in 2000.
Such sudden and major changes in the direction and volume of migration flows from
Romania prove that the key for shaping these flows is the immigration policies of the
recipient countries.
Fig.1. Migration by ethnic groups 1989-2000
70000
60000
50000
40000
30000
20000
10000
0
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
Romanians
1994
1995
Germans
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Hungarians
Source: The National Institute for Statistics, 2002
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III.2. REPATRIATED – the ethnic Romanians from the Republic of Moldava case
Asylum seekers are treated above in this report so, here, we will focus on the repatriated
people. There is a small, almost insignificant, from a statistical point of view, number of
repatriated people from the UE and other developed countries. Their number did not exceed
3500 during 1990-1994. However, a new phenomenon started in 1997, when the number of
repatriated Romanians from Moldova increased dramatically (see table 3).
Table 3. Repatriated
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
Total
5507
6265
8432
11287
10467
12442
Hungary
256
117
396
394
235
178
Republic of Moldova
1171
1752
4092
8109
8359
10365
Source: The National Institute for Statistics, 2002
It is the result of the political and economical developments in Republic of Moldova that
generated such a flow and the Romanian policy is to accept as many ethnic Romanians
repatriated from Moldova as possible. However, the numbers are small and no real problems
are emerging from this small-scale population transfer.
Although the repatriated Moldavians are not usual asylum seekers or refugees, they
represent the larger category of migrants to be integrated into Romanian society. Contrary to
the regular refugees, the repatriated benefit out of their knowledge of the language and from
having similar habits with the majority they seek to integrate in. The repatriated ethnic
Romanian from Moldova are not so many to become a problem for absorption into a
population of 23 million Romanian, even if the number of repatriation seekers will increase.
It is hardly presumable that all 3.5 million members of Romanian minority in Moldova or even
a significant part of them will ask for repatriation as result of internal political changes or as
result of translating EU border to Romanian border. Even if the Romanian policy is to accept
as many repatriates from Moldova as possible, their migration on large scale will be limited
by the economic difficulty in finding jobs and income sources in a country having a relative
high rate of unemployment (about 9%). For this reason it is presumable that the migrational
flow from Moldova will not be significantly increasing in the next future and will select mainly
people having properties in Romania, businesses or those high educated and skilled, more
capable to compete for jobs.
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III.3. Circular migration
In this paper, we call “circular migration” the temporary economic migration of Romanians in
search of a job in other countries. It is a significant phenomenon – Romanian workers, mainly
men, are migrating temporary to more developed countries in the west (mainly in EU, where
Germany is the first target, but also in Israel, Turkey and other countries) for short or medium
term jobs, and then coming back with most of their revenues to be spent in Romania.
The volume of “circular migration” is extremely volatile, depending entirely of the labor
market in the destination countries. The Romanian authority in the field is working on the
bases of bilateral governmental agreements and is providing mostly temporary unskilled or
low skill jobs for Romanian workers. For example, in the first quarter of this year, this
governmental authority provided around 8.000 work contracts in three European countries
(Germany – 6906, Swiss – 19, Spain – 961) out of which 7880 were seasonal jobs, and only
120 were jobs for a period longer than 18 months.
These figures will account for about 50.000 Romanian workers abroad during the whole year.
At least twice this amount is working on an illegal basis in EU and other countries, especially
Israel and Turkey.
An overall estimation of 150.000 Romanian workers abroad is unofficial and ignores workers
in border countries, such as Yugoslavia and Hungary.
No matter how high the estimation is, it is much lower than the potential emigration of
working force in more developed countries. A survey, carried out by the CURS Institute in
November 2001 resulted in much bigger figures.
Table 4. Workers abroad
NO
YES
Have you ever traveled abroad?
74%
25%
Have you ever worked abroad?
94%
5%
Did somebody else from your household worked ever abroad?
88%
12%
Do you have relatives living abroad?
82%
17%
Source: CURS, Nov. 2001
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The survey proves that something between 5% and 12% of Romanian population ever
worked abroad, meaning about 1 million persons in at least ten years, which accounts for our
estimation of about 150.000 persons/year.
The survey also tried to identify the intentions for future temporary migration.
Table 5. Traveling objectives
NO
YES
Tourism
78%
18%
Temporary work abroad
80%
16%
Education abroad
91%
6%
Emigrate and live abroad
91%
6%
Source: CURS, 2001
It resulted that most Romanians (but not that many – 18%) are interested mostly in tourism
and about 1/6 is willing to work abroad. Emigrating and living abroad is a secondary option
and only 6% of the population is really willing to leave Romania for a better country.
16% of the population willing to work abroad means about 1.5 million potential Romanian
workers abroad, which means that the existing working population abroad represents only
about 10% of the potential population for better jobs. The high misbalance between the
potential and the reality proves that job policies in the destination countries are more
important than any measures that may be taken at the Romanian level.
IV. OPPOSITION TO CHANGES BROUGHT BY SCHENGEN IN THE
BORDER/LOCAL COMMUNITIES
We contacted the local authorities from a relevant border community in Bihor County and its
capital, Oradea, at the border with Hungary. From our interviews there is no such thing as
opposition to changes in the perspective of implementation of the Schengen agreement. It is
true, Bihor county is at the border with Hungary, so this border would not be influenced by
the Schengen agreement neither when Hungary will enter into the European Union and
Romania will not, nor when both countries are outside EU (this situation) or part of it
(probably in 2007-2009).
There are some fears among those Romanians at the border with Republic of Moldova,
Ukraine and Serbia.
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There could be some opposition to change in the communities at the border with Serbia
where the Romanians were traditionally involved in border traffic. As a whole,
for the
majority of those who were interviewed, all leaving in the border region and some of them
involved in border traffic, the perception is that Schengen agreement brings more security
and more benefits than inconveniences.
V. IMPLICATIONS ON THE BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH
NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES AND THE EU – NON EU
This point of the report has three separate debates. There is one in the case of the bilateral
relations with neighboring countries that will be in the European Union when Romania will not
(Hungary will be in the EU when Romania will not), one when both countries are or are not
parts of the EU (e.g. Romania and Moldova until Romania will be part of the EU and Moldova
will not and Romania and Hungary when both will be part of the European Union) and one in
the case of bilateral relations with neighboring countries when Romania will be in the
Schengen agreement and other countries will not.
From these situations the problematic ones are those with the countries that will remain
outside Schengen agreement while Romania will be in. In this respect, of great importance
will be the relations between Romania and Republic of Moldova. Thus, the Romanian part
has no problem in implementing EU policy. The political relations with Republic of Moldova,
as well as other countries, are those established by bilateral agreements.
Regarding the border traffic with the Republic of Moldova, two documents have been signed
and are now in force:
The Agreement between the Government of Romania and the Government of the
Republic of Moldova regarding the mutual travels of their citizens, signed in Kishinev,
on 29 June 2001;
The Protocol between the General Inspectorate of the Border Police within the
Romanian Ministry of Interior and the Department of the Border Guards of the
Republic of Moldova, regarding the mutual travels of their citizens, concluded in
Albita, on 27 September 2001.
Since the summer of 2001 when in power in Kishinev came the Communist Party relations
between Romania and Republic of Moldova deteriorated. Romania was accused of
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interference in Moldova’s sovereignty and the situation worsens since the beginning of the
popular meetings against the communists on the streets of Kishinev, on January 9, 2002.
The Romanian Defense Attaché was declared persona non grata by Kishinev authorities.
In the specific situation of today drawing the border of Schengen agreement on Prut River
couldn’t worsen the relationship between Romania and Republic of Moldova. Is in Moldova’s
policy to decrease interactions with Romania despite the interests of many of the citizens of
the republic. Speaking about long term interest of both countries it is presumable that the
settling of the future EU border on the Prut River will have a direct influence in the traffic
between the two countries, including border traffic, that will enter in the regime of European
border by the time of Romanian accession to EU. Thus, from a political point of view, the
Schengen implementation and consequently the movement of the eastern border on the
Moldavian border is not a problem. The political relationship between Romania and the
Republic of Moldova is unlike to be affected by the implementation of Schengen policies. As
far as concerns Romania, the authorities have repeatedly affirmed their determination in
applying EU policy in all fields, including border regime. The concrete measures for securing
the eastern Romanian borders with Republic of Moldova and Ukraine have already been
taken. Securing eastern border is a matter of a greater importance for Romania even for the
purpose of its own internal security since a lot of the criminal activities come from this
direction.
In present Schengen agreement is not the one that could decline the bilateral relations of
Romania with Republic of Moldova but the government in power in Kishinev. The Schengen
agreement could be a barrier for freely movement of the Moldavian citizens but the two
governments could work out of this situation by future agreements and common policies, in
accord with European standards.
On the contrary, the relations with Hungary could be strengthened by the implementation of
the agreement in both countries. Moreover, the affiliations of both countries to the European
Union will definitely help the bilateral relations. From this point of view, as far as movement of
people is implied, Schengen agreement is a very good thing.
Taking into account the both situations discussed above, we can conclude that Schengen
agreement has a role in shaping the bilateral relations of Romania. The positive or negative
effects are more a question of bilateral agreement on implementation.
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VI. MIGRATION VIS-A-VIS SECURITY
VI.1. Overview
There are two major migrational flows: towards EU and from EU to Romania, each of them
having a positive component and also an potential risk for the internal security, both for
Romania and for Schengen countries.
The flow of migrational transit from Romania towards EU countries is formed by Romanian
citizens and foreign citizens:
a. people from abroad transiting Romania towards Schengen area. There are two
categories: 1) refugees (political or economic); 2) smugglers and people involved in
trafficking (of people, drugs etc.). These are usually stopped to the border and/or
subject of control to the border or inside the country if they have managed to enter
Romania.
b. Romanians that migrate towards Schengen area:
1. legal migrants (temporarily migration: searching for short or long term jobs,
going to studies, visiting family or friends, and long term or definitive
migration of those Romanians who try to obtain the citizenship of a
Western state). They are no particular threat or subject of concern, being
part of concluded agreements and of a new life style developing in the
European area.
2. illegal migrants (smuggling people, prostitutes, sexual victims - kidnapped
or deceived persons for practicing prostitution -, victims of familial or extrafamilial constringes, obliged to rob, beg or to practice prostitution. Illegal
smugglers of drugs, arms etc.). They are people involved in criminal
activity, using illegal methods to access the EU countries. Some of them
are subject of convictions inside Romania or Schengen states and
forbidden to enter the Schengen states, avoiding border and/or Police
control. As far as they are rather individuals than part of international crime
networks they can be stopped through careful border control to the border
crossing points and/or through joint police actions.
3. semi-legal migrants (those who leave with a legal declared purpose –
tourism, family reunification, work - but with undeclared purpose to find a
job in the West – usually on the black market of jobs, or to perform illegal
activities such as described bellow at point 2).
In terms of legal/illegal migration the illegal migration – though a serious threat - can be often
more easily addressed, prevent and contained and most efforts are directed to reduce this
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dimension of the emigrational aspect. But a real treat occurs from the undergrounds of the
legal migration that is used to cover illegal activities, in both sides of emigrational process.
VI.2. Migration from Romania towards EU
Migration from Romania towards EU involving security threats is related to the phenomena
of smuggling people, trafficking and to the illegal activity on the territory of the Schengen
stats. If the first issue can be reduced by strengthening border control, the last aspects are
new and delicate. People migrating towards Schengen state with purpose of illegal activity
(begging, rubbing, prostitution or exploitation in women and children – sexual or others
forms) may often travel as legal migrants (tourists, contracts of work, family unification etc.),
and they cannot be legally stopped to cross border, if they respect the legal regulations. Nor
Romanian part, neither Schengen stats can use guilty premises for stopping these people
enter any state inside Schengen area. Only a tied collaboration between police forces,
border police from Romania and Schengen state and special created international bodies
can successfully address the phenomenon. Though, for the moment this is a problem to be
studied and solved in the future, jointly by EU and non-EU members.
VI.3. Migration from Schengen area towards Romania
Migration from Schengen area towards Romania has two dimensions: a good one and a
bad one:
• the good part is the official migration from EU to Romania, that will benefit from the
opportunities that Romania creates and will create. It is not only about tourism, but also new
jobs or opportunities for business: European civil servants, specialists in various economic
fields, investors, Western managers involved in Romanian business or in multinational
companies in Romania.
• the unofficial migration – covered under business or tourist purposes, but related to the
criminal activities could bring real menace for the security of the country.
Migration from EU stats towards Romania involving threats to the internal security is
related to the organized crime activities (such money laundering, drugs transit and even
production of synthetic drugs – already discovered in some Romanian counties).
Some categories of occasionally migration are also deleterious, even they are not a threat to
the national security. Such migrational aspects are sexual tourism – and especially children
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targeted sex, because of the little protection on vagabonds children running form homes or
state institutions -, pornography production, poaching, illegal adoptions.
The predicable export of criminal activity from EU towards ex-communist countries will
benefit out of the weakness of the institutions (Police, the Judiciary) and/or the lack of
legislation in the countries neighboring the Schengen area. Parts of the criminal activities in
Schengen area now are expected to move towards the neighboring Schengen countries.
Protection and facilities offered by the ex-communist countries to foreign investors and the
poor control of their activities will lead to the increase of the number of illegal activities
transferred towards the countries outside the European Union. This won’t diminish the
negative effects of their activities for the European Union. Due to the benefits expected from
richer society EU will remain, among favorites market of drug dealers and prostitution
suppliers. (The drug issue, for instance, could not be solved, but amplified by the possibility
of opening up of new production centers in the Central and Eastern countries, under the
cover of chemical industry business.)
The great extent of the poorness of the people, the unemployment and the discrepancies
between the incomes of those in the CEE countries and those in the West will be factors that
will favor the implication of local people in local and cross border criminal activities, because
of the possibility of high and fairly stable revenues.
In spite of the willingness and the commitment of the candidate countries to achieve EU
standards, to set and improve institutional capacity to tackle migrational issues, it seems
clear that countries isolated on the former iron curtain are not able to fight international crime.
It is also true that the western states, including EU members, haven’t succeed yet and are
not even close to eliminate the organized crime. (The existence and the activity of Italian
criminal networks, for instance, is an undeniable proof.) Unlike the western countries, that
have a continuity in fighting against organized criminality, former communist countries – now
candidates to the EU integration -, have the hindrance of the institutional weakness due to
system changes they were subject of and of the late settling of the institutions fighting with
international crime. On contrary, the local criminal networks were much faster and effective in
organizing and strengthening their position. Especially the new eastern prostitution networks
have proved successful in avoiding both the police in their countries as well as the
neighboring countries and western police.
Though local police are strengthening, they are training their officers and have common
actions jointly with western similar institutions, they are not yet, and they will hardly become
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efficient in fighting cross border organized crime. The reason is that they have to fight
double: with the organized crime from inside their countries and with the international crime,
for which not even the much more experienced in direct fight western police haven’t find
solutions.
The cross border criminal activity has diversified and grows in the new conditions. The
eastern countries, initially used for drugs are becoming markets and presumable future
producers. In twelve years the number of those who are drug consumers increased
constantly from virtually none to some tens of thousands. The danger is that the younger
generation is more inclined to use drugs. About 20% of the high school students tried at least
once soft drugs.
The eastern countries have become already important providers of women and children for
prostitution in both eastern and in western countries.
VI.4. Other threats
A different kind of threat for Romania’s security is the ‘brain drain’ phenomenon – the
absorption of the young and highly qualified work force, especially IT specialists, to the
developed EU countries. The present technological and IT gap between Romania – as well
as others former communist countries and western developed countries will probably
maintain, in spite of PHARE and other European programs aimed to provide equipment and
logistics, if the specialists will continue to be attract by a more promising offer. Measures
already taken by the Romanian government to stop young specialist leaving Romania are a
good start, but they cannot solve the problem, because of the difference of income and GDP
per capita between Romania and EU countries and the promise of highly revenues for
working in a developed economy constitute an irresistible attraction to young specialists.
VII. SHAPING THE EUROPEAN MIGRATION POLICY
The ultimate objective of this study is to make a reasonable estimation of the potential
migration flows that Romania can generate in the EU as a result, on the one hand, of the
Schengen implementation and, on the other hand, of Romania’s integration in EU. And, most
important, what forms these flows will take and what will be the policies for shaping it. Will
European Union have to face, in the next years, a bulk of 1-2 million Romanians wandering
all over Western Europe in search of a job and a place to live? Will they represent a
supplementary pressure on the existing social work programs, labor markets and everyday
life of the EU?
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Romania has a significant potential migratory population. The migration flows that this
population will generate is economic motivated and, most probable, will take two specific
forms.
First, a larger group of temporary workers, semi-skilled or with a lower qualification trying to
find a job in constructions, agriculture, services. Such a flow already exists. Its traditional
destination countries are Germany, Austria and Italy, in Europe. The evolution of its volume
in the future depends of EU immigration policies and the existing demand on the labor
market. It can be beneficial for both sides. In Romania, these workers will generate a flow of
extra money to the Romanian economy, and will contribute to the decrease of the
unemployment rate in the country. They will also have a positive impact in promoting cultural
changes etc. For EU they might mean one way to answer to possible working force
shortages in some industries and activities.
The real problem with this flow is to keep its volume related to the existing job opportunities.
The main objective of the migration policy in respect with this migration potential is to
structure an amorphous supply of working force according to the characteristics of the
demand: volume, qualifications, areas, etc. The migration policy should focus then on two
directions. First, to institutionalize this flow as much as possible, via recruiting agencies,
working permits, etc. Second, to improve communication about job opportunities, working
conditions, labor market demand, etc. in order to avoid a chaotic search of jobs.
A second migration flow, involving much lower numbers, will consist in very high qualified
and young working force. They will be specialists in IT, computers and electronics, medicine
etc. This people are not in search of a temporary job, but of a permanent one and most
probably they will look for residence in EU most developed countries.
The starting point of their migration is studying in the EU, so the policy towards these
potential immigrants should start by a consistent policy in educational grants and support for
young Romanians.
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