Some Conventional Orthodoxies in the Study of Agrarian
Change
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Bates, Robert H. 1984. Some Conventional Orthodoxies in the
Study of Agrarian Change. World Politics 36, no. 02:
234–254.
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SOME CONVENTIONAL
ORTHODOXIES IN THE STUDY OF
AGRARIAN CHANGE
By ROBERT H. BATES
INTRODUCTION
THE
purposeof thispaper is to presenta criticalreviewof two
major approaches to the analysisof agrarian societies,and to do so
in light of evidence taken from the literatureon Africa. The African
data provoke considerable skepticismconcerningthe validityof these
contemporary
orthodoxiesand supportthe followingthreemajor counterarguments.
i. The very traitsthat have caused these societiesto be classifiedas
"precapitalist"-e.g., the existenceof common land rights;theavoidance
of marketexchanges; the turningto subsistenceproduction,reciprocity,
and such social institutionsas the familysystemforeconomic supportare themselvesarguably productsof the encounterof agrarian societies
with agents of capitalism.'
2. Agrarianinstitutions
representcompromisesand adaptations;equally
as often,they representimpositionsfromabove by more powerfulexternal agents. In either case, they cannot representinstitutionalized
expressionsof agrarianvalues; subjectivist,value-basedaccountsof these
institutionsare thereforefalse.
3. Not only are the currentorthodoxiesoverlyculturallydetermined;
theyare also overlyeconomic. Many of the distinctivetraitsof agrarian
societies,I argue, resultfromtheeffortsof thestateto securedomination
and control over rural populations. Insofar as the institutionsand behaviors exhibitedby agrarian societiesdefinea peasantry,in short,it is
the state that creates peasants.
THE
DOMINANT
ORTHODOXIES
Among the most prominentof the currentapproaches,two stand out:
the "natural economy" and "peasant economy" models of rural society.
I By capitalismI mean an economic systemin which thereexists:(i) marketexchange
of both productsand factorsof production;(2) in particular,privatemarketsforlabor; and
(3) economic accumulation,thus securingthe reproductionand expansionof the means of
production.
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235
STUDY OF AGRARIAN CHANGE
THE
MYTH
OF THE NATURAL
ECONOMY
The criticalelementsof the modelof thenaturaleconomyare presentedin Table I.
TABLE 1
SCHEMATIC
INITIAL
PRESENTATION
OF THE MODEL
OF A NATURAL
ECONOMY
CONDITIONS
1. Agrarianeconomy
2. Productionforuse ratherthanexchange
3. Insignificance
of markets
INSTITUTIONAL
CHARACTERISTICS
1. Communal land rights
a. Use rightsaccordedto producersif,and only if,producer is a memberof the community
b. Rightsto land revertto communitywhen use rights
are no longerexercised
2. Importanceof the primarycommunityand, in particular,
the village
SOCIAL
VALUES
1. Self-sufficiency
2. Status
3. Equality
PATTERNS
OF CHANGE
1. Initial oppositionto "commoditization"
in the face of markets
2. Social disintegration
3. Radicalizationunder the impactof capitalism
IMPLICATIONS
The preferenceof agrariansocietiesfor communalformsof
economicorganization
Initial conditions.According to the model of the natural economy,
"primitive"agrarian societiesproduce not for exchange but for use; as
a consequence, "market exchanges are usually peripheral[and] all importantoutput and factorflows are carried on via reciprocityand redistribution."2In the absence of markets,resourcesare not allocated in
accord with their value in exchange; rather,the patternsof allocation
are determinedby social relationships.As Dalton states,"There is no
separateeconomic systemto be analyzed independentlyof social organization."3
2George Dalton, "Traditional Productionin PrimitiveAfricanEconomies" in Dalton,
ed., Tribal and PeasantEconomies(Garden City,N.Y.: Natural HistoryPress, i967), 75.
3George Dalton, "Subsistenceand Peasant Economies in Africa,"ibid., I57.
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WORLD POLITICS
236
Nowhere is the determininginfluenceof
Institutionalcharacteristics.
social organizationover theallocationofeconomicresourcesmoreclearly
seen than in the area of propertyrights.In precapitalistsocieties,according to Marx, "an isolated individual could no more own land than
he could speak."4 The acquisition of propertyis thus a social act; it
requires membershipin a community.
Particularlycritical is membershipin the village. Along with kinbased organizations,the village is viewed as the centralsocial institution
of agrarian societies.5
The two themes of communal restrictionson landed propertyand
the pervasive significanceof villages are oftenfused. They combine in
the discussionof the corporatevillage. In the words of Eric Wolf, such
villages "maintain a measure of communal jurisdictionover land ...
restricttheirmembership,maintain a religioussystem,enforcemechanisms which ensure the redistributionor destructionof surplus wealth,
and uphold barriersagainst the ... outside."6Although the initialwritings of Wolf make it clear thatthe corporatevillage is but one of many
formsof rural settlement,the analysisof thesevillages dominated much
of the subsequent literatureon agrarian society.7
Social values. The social institutionsof rural society,this literature
contends, facilitatethe attainmentof basic cultural values. One such
value is a sense of membership. Another is equality. A third is an
outgrowthof the firsttwo: the value placed on guaranteesof subsistence.
All members of societypossess an equal right to sufficientincome to
guarantee their survival. "It is the absence of the threatof individual
starvationwhich makes primitivesociety,in a sense,more human than
market economy,and at the same time less economic."8
Patternsof change. The initial condition of the natural economy is
said to be the absence of markets.But, accordingto thismodel, markets
inevitablypenetrateinto even the most isolated communities;and this
alteration in the initial conditions generates characteristicpatternsof
change.
4Karl Marx, "PrecapitalistEconomic Formations,"in Karl Marx and FriedrichEngels,
Pre-Capitalist
Socio-EconomicFormations:
A Collection(London: Lawrence & Wishart,I979),
98.
5See, forexample, the discussionin JamesC. Scott,"Protestand Profanation:Agrarian
Revolt and the Little Tradition," Theoryand Society4 (Summer 1977), 2I3.
6 Wolf, "Closed Corporate Peasant Communities in Mesoamerica and Central Java,"
Southwestern
Journal
ofAnthropology
I3 (SpringI957),
6.
7A primeillustration
would be JoelS. Migdal,Peasants,Politics,and Revolutions
(Princeton:
Princeton
University
Press,I974).
8 Karl Polanyi,quoted in JamesC. Scott,The Moral EconomyofthePeasant(New Haven
and London: Yale UniversityPress, I976), 5.
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STUDY OF AGRARIAN CHANGE
237
One response is to resistthe market; Robert Redfieldmaintainsthat
these societiesattemptto keep the market "at arm's length."9With the
inevitable triumph of the market, however, a second response arises:
social disintegration.Eric Wolf statesthat "capitalism cut throughthe
integumentof custom, severing people from their accustomed social
matrix in order to transformthem into economic actors,independent
of prior social commitmentsto kin and neighbors."IoA third response
is rural radicalism. Agrarian protestis considered radical in the sense
thatit assertsthe entitlementof all people to subsistence,the validityof
communal propertyas a means of securing this entitlement,and the
rejectionof the privatemarket.
It is preciselythe factthatpeasantsand artisanshave one footin the
precapitalist
economythatexplainswhy theyhave providedthe mass
impetusforso many"forwardlooking"movements.
Their oppositionto
basedas itis on a utopianimageofan earlierera,is as tenacious,
capitalism,
if not moreso, as the oppositionof a proletariat
whichhas bothfeetin
thenew society."
Policy implications.An importantimplicationof this theoryis that
ruraldwellerswill subscribeto collectiveformsof economicorganization
thatrejectprivateproperty,and therebyforestallthe emergenceof economic inequality and exploitation.Goran Hyden notes that the promotion of cooperativesocietiesin Africa derives in part fromthe convictionof political leaders that African rural societyis communitarian
by preference.12
THE PEASANT ECONOMY
A second model of agrarian societythatis frequentlyapplied to rural
Africa is the model of the peasant economy. Its distinctivefeaturesare
summarized in Table 2.
Initialconditions.Peasant economies are held to be precapitalistin the
sense that, in peasant societies,labor is not separated from the means
of production. Nonetheless, peasant societies representa more "advanced" form of agrarian societythan do natural economies. Peasant
economies do not stand isolated and self-sufficient;
rather,they reside
withinstate systemsand withineconomies thatcontain cities,industry,
and manufacturing.They are linked to these other sectors through
relationsof political dominationand economic exchange.
9 Redfield,PeasantSocietyand Culture(Chicago: Universityof Chicago Press, I956), 46.
-oWolf,Peasant Warsof the TwentiethCentury(New York: Harper & Row, i969), 279.
II Scott (fn. 5), 23 I -
Hyden,Efficiency
versusDistribution
in East AfricanCo-operatives
(Nairobi: East African
LiteratureBureau, I973), 4.
12
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238
WORLD POLITICS
TABLE 2
SCHEMATIC
INITIAL
PRESENTATION
OF THE MODEL
OF A PEASANT ECONOMY
CONDITIONS
of urbanindustry
and
1. Post-agrarian
economy;importance
manufacturing
and factors
of
2. Fullyelaborated
marketsbothforproducts
production
3. Production
forexchangeas wellas foruse
INSTITUTIONAL
CHARACTERISTICS
1. Privaterightsin land
ofinequality
2. Prevalence
a. Statecoercion
b. Class formation
in themarkets
forproducts
and labor
3. Limitedparticipation
BEHAVIORAL
CHARACTERISTICS
1. Subsistence
ethic
2. Rejectionofpureprofit
maximization
PATTERNS
OF CHANGE
on the
1. Creationof thepeasantmode:impactofcapitalism
naturaleconomy
2. Conflicts
betweenpeasantmodeand capitalism
ofpeasanteconomies
Institutional
characteristics.
Nearlyall discussions
In the cultural
emphasizethat peasantsocietiesare "part-societies."
sphere,peasantsare bearersof the "little"tradition;theydefinetheir
ritualsin responseto the "great"traditionof the ritualcentersof the
In thepoliticalsphere,theyare part,butnotgovernors,
largersociety.'3
of thesystem.Not onlyare peasantspolitically
subordinate
to thestate,
buttheyalso are politically
dominatedbyotherclasses,whichare often
ruralclasses:in thecontextof a marketeconomyand withthehelp of
statepower,certainelementsoftheruralsocietyare able to accumulate
This patternofinequalityis so imporlarge-scaleprivatelandholdings.
tantthatWelchasks:"Without... landlords,
couldtherebe peasants?"'4
In theeconomicsphere,peasantsare "part"societiesin thesensethat
theyparticipatein marketsand are reliantupon themto fulfilltheir
subsistence
needs butonlypartially.
Limitedmarketparticipation
exists
wherethereis a tendencyto consumelargeproportions
of one's own
'3Redfield (fn. 9), 46.
'
Claude Welch, "Peasants as a Focus in AfricanStudies,"AfricanStudiesReview20 (No.
3, I977),
2.
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STUDY OF AGRARIAN CHANGE
239
productionand to relyprimarilyupon family,as opposed to hired,
labor.'5
Behavioral
characteristics.
Peasantsare heldtoexhibitcharacteristically
"precapitalist"
or "non-market"
formsofbehavior.As production
units,
peasanthouseholdsdiffer
fromprofit-maximizing
firmsin thattheyare
to guaranteetheir
drivenby the need to securesufficient
subsistence
survivaland theirreproduction.
As a consequence,
theywill,ifnecessary,
to coverthe requirements
of domestic
engagein internalexploitation
consumption.
Theywillworklongerhours,cultivate
thelandstheyhold
moreintensively,
or surrender
greaterrevenuesforlands theywishto
buy than purelycommercial considerationswould justify.'6
Patterns
ofchange.The originsof peasanteconomy,it is held,lie in
the impactof marketforcesupon the naturaleconomy.Under the
ofthemarket,
housestimulation
property
rights
becomeindividualistic;
holdsare no longerself-sufficient,
butbecomedependent
on themarket;
and "self-sufficient
communities
foundedlargelyupon kinshiptiesare
'turnedoutwards,'as it were,and made dependent... upon external
structures
and forces."'7
In thethirdworld,theprimary
agencyforthis
Postcontendsthat"thecolonial
expansionofthemarketis imperialism.
powers... greatlyextendedthe marketprinciple,to the pointwhere
theimpersonalforcesof theworldmarketdominatedthelivesof millions.... It would appear,then,thatmanyof the conditionsforthe
existenceof a peasantry
weresuddenlycreated,butfromoutside."'8
The subsequenttrajectory
ofchangein peasantsocietiesis said to be
betweencapitalism
largelycharacterized
byprotracted
periodsofconflict
and the peasantmode of production.Some scholars,such as Hyden,
findthatpeasantsretardthegrowthof capitalismbytheirtendencyto
forsubsistence
avoidmarkets
and bytheirpreference
production.'9
Others,
such as Williams, contend that peasants resistthe growthof capitalism
but nonethelessfail,for theyare inherentlya "transitionalclass, which
will inevitablybe displaced by the technical superiorityof capitalist
production."20
sEric R. Wolf, "Types of Latin AmericanPeasantry:A PreliminaryDiscussion,"American Anthropologist
57 (June I955), 454.
6 A. V. Chayanov, Daniel Thorner,Basile Kerblay,and R.E.F.
Smith,eds., The Theory
of Peasant Economy(Homewood, Ill.: Richard D. Irwin for the American Economic Association,i966).
' Ken Post," 'Peasantization'and Rural PoliticalMovementsin WesternAfrica,"
Archives
Europe'ennes
de Sociologie I3 (No. 2, I972), 225-26.
8Ibid., 233. See also Wolf (fn. io).
9 Goran Hyden, Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania (Berkeleyand Los Angeles: Universityof
CaliforniaPress, i980).
Gavin Williams, "The World Bank and the Peasant Problem,"in JudithHeyer, Pepe
20
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WORLD POLITICS
240
THE MODELS REVIEWED IN LIGHT OF THE AFRICAN EXPERIENCE
As outlinedabove, the foregoingrepresenttwo of the dominantmodels
of rural society.What is devastatingis how poorlythesemodels perform
when applied to the Africandata.
INITIAL CONDITIONS
To an Africanist,one of themoststrikingdeficienciesin thesetheories
is posited in their initial conditions:a world of subsistenceproduction
in which thereare no markets,no buying,no trading.This assumption,
it should be stressed,cannot be dismissed as a mere romanticovertone
in the arguments;rather,it provides an essentialunderpinning.Movements away fromthese initialconditionsprecipitatethe change froma
egalitarian,isolated natural societyto a marketsubsistence-oriented,
dependent,class-riven,peasant societythatis inextricablytied to centers
of wealth and power. The initialconditionsalso help to account forthe
growth and behavior of political forces:outrage at the loss of a "state
of virtue" provides a demand for agrarian revolution,and the moral
values that are threatenedthroughthe spread of capitalismprovide the
revolutionaryideology.
If the initialconditionsof the model of the natural economy were to
hold anywhere,one would expectthemto hold in Africa.And yet,time
and time gain, historicalresearch reaffirmsthat in precolonial Africa
therewas trade,therewas commerce,and therewas the widespread use
of money in exchange economies. Jack Goody, who best summarizes
these findings,is worth quoting at length:
economicsis hardlyapplicabletoprecolonial
The conceptofnon-monetary
Africa,exceptpossiblyforcertainhuntinggroupsofminimalimportance.
tradelongbefore
Africawas involvedin a vastnetworkof wide-ranging
the Portuguesecame on the scene.For East Africawe have a late firstcentury
Sea, to thetradealong
sailors'guide,thePeriplusoftheErythrean
thecoast.Long beforetheEuropeansarrivedthereweretraderoutesfrom
Madagascarup theEast Africancoast,throughtheRed Sea and intothe
Mediterranean,
along the PersianGulf to India, South-eastAsia, and
theChinese
had reachedEastAfrica,
Indonesia.By thetimethePortuguese
ofthegun-carrying
had alreadybeenactivethere;beforethedevelopment
oftheIndian
commerce
sailingshipon theAtlanticseaboard,themaritime
area. Indeed,the
Ocean made westernEurope seeman underdeveloped
and the Indian Ocean had
tradebetweenEthiopia,the Mediterranean,
in the Arabianpeninsula,including
muchto do withthe developments
theriseof Muhammed.
Roberts,and Gavin Williams, eds., Rural Developmentin TropicalAfrica(New York: St.
Martin'sPress,198I).
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STUDY OF AGRARIANCHANGE
241
In West Africathemedievalempiresof theNigerbendwerebuiltup
on thetradewhichbroughtsalt,cloth,and beads southfromtheSahara
acrossto West Africaand took gold and ivoryand slavesback to the
Barbarycoastand fromthereintomedievalEurope.21
From the pointof view of mercantile
economy,partsof Africawere
similarto westernEurope of thesame period.Metalcoinagewas in use
consistedofgold,brass,
on theEast Africancoast.In thewest,currencies
and salt,butmoreespeciallycowrieshellswhich,comingas theydid from
the MaldiveIslandsoffthesouthof Ceylon,filledmostof thenecessary
attributes
of money.22
Isolation, subsistence,and lack of involvementin an exchange economy were not commonlyfound in the "primitive"economies of Africa.
a
Where theywere, these traitscharacterizedso small and insignificant
group of Africansocietiesthatit would be nonsensicalto base a general
theoryof social change upon them.23
TRANSITION ARGUMENTS
The reigning orthodoxies in the study of agrarian economies are
definednot onlyin termsof theirinitialconditions;theyare also defined
in termsof their dynamics i.e., assertionsare made concerningtheir
characteristicpatterns of change. Agrarian societies are portrayedas
locked in conflictwith a powerfulalternative:the capitalisteconomy,
where privatepropertyexists,where everythingcan be boughtand sold,
and where people are driven to maximize profitsby the imperativeof
market competition.In the face of the encroachmentof the capitalist
economy,rural dwellersare said to attemptto keep the marketat arm's
length and to resistcommoditization.In light of the expectationsgenerated by these arguments,it is thereforedisconcertingto find that in
Africa the roles of the supposed antagonistsare sometimesthe reverse
of what these models would lead us to expect.
Buyingand selling.Despite mythsto the contrary,indigenouspeoples
throughoutmuch of Africa turnedquickly,vigorously,and skillfullyto
productionfor colonial markets.The rapid and astonishinggrowth of
the cocoa industryin West Africa has been told by Hill and Berry;
within one generation,Ghana became the world's leading producer of
cocoa; it did so on the initiativeof indigenous agrarian interests.24
Ho2 Jack Goody, "Economy and Feudalism in Africa,"The EconomicHistoryReview 23
(December i969), 394-95.
22Ibid., 395.
There is evidence that extensivetrade existed in precolonial Africa for agricultural
products as well. See William 0. Jones,"AgriculturalTrade Within Tropical Africa:
Historical Background,"in RobertH. Bates and Michael Lofchie,eds.,Agricultural
Developmentin TropicalAfrica:Issuesof Public Policy (New York: Praeger,i980), 10-45.
Polly Hill, Studiesin Rural Capitalismin WestAfrica(London: Cambridge University
23
24
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242
WORLD POLITICS
gendornhas shownhow in Northern
Nigeriaindigenousentrepreneurs
forexporttocolonial
ofgroundnuts
organizedthelarge-scale
production
in Nigeriaand
markets.25
Similarhistories
existforpalmoil production
groundnutproductionin Senegal.26
GiovanniArrighinotesthatin the
Rhodesiaschangewas not limitedto the sphereof exchangebut was
also introducedin themethodsof production:"Africanswereequally
in responseto marketopportunipromptin investingand innovating
ties."27 The peasants acquired wagons, carts,maize mills, pumps, ox-
drawnploughsand otherequipment;theyradically
alteredtheirfarming
cattleand the fencingand
system;and theyinvestedin higher-grade
dips required for theirsurvival.28
Property
rights.
Changewentevendeeper:itextendedtothedefinition
of property
formedbytheorthodox
rights.In lightof theexpectations
treatment
of agrarianchange,thestunningironyof thematteris that
itwas oftenthegovernments
ofthecolonialpowers theprimary
agents
of capitalism who advocated"communal"propertyrights,whereas
membersof theindigenousagrariansocietieschampionedthecause of
privateownership.
In orderto avoid confusionon thematterof property
rights,let me
outlinedin Table i. By communalland rights,I
recallthe definition
mean a systemwherein
i. Use rights
areaccordeda producer
if,and onlyif,thatproducer
is
a memberofthecommunity.
In otherwords,
(a) Community
membership
is a sufficient
condition
forrights
to land:no memberofthecommunity
cango without
land.
(b) Community
membership
is a necessary
condition
forrights
to land:landcannotbe alienatedoutsideofthecommunity.
2. The community
holdsrevisionary
rightsin land. That is, when
individuals
no longerusetheland,rights
toitrevert
tothecommunity.
The landcan thenbe reallocated
to otherusers.
Press, I970);
Sara Berry,Cocoa, Customand Socio-EconomicChangein Rural Western
Nigeria
(London:OxfordUniversity
Press,I975).
25 JanS. Hogendorn,"Economic Initiative
and AfricanCash Farming,"in PeterDuignan
and Lewis H. Gann, eds., Colonialismin Africa,1870-1960 (London: Cambridge University
Press,I975), 283-328.
26 Donal Cruise O'Brien, The Mourides
ofSenegal(Oxford:Clarendon Press, I971); G. K.
Helleiner, PeasantAgriculture,
and EconomicGrowthin Nigeria (Homewood,
Government,
Ill.: Richard D. Irwin, i966).
27 Arrighi,"Labor Supplies in Historical Perspective:A Study of Proletarianization
of
the AfricanPeasantryin Rhodesia," in Giovanni Arrighiand JohnS. Saul, Essayson the
PoliticalEconomyofAfrica(Nairobi: East AfricanPublishingHouse, I973), I85.
28 See also the cases describedin Robin Palmer and Neil Parsons,eds., The RootsofRural
Povertyin Centraland SouthernAfrica(Berkeleyand Los Angeles: Universityof California
Press,I977).
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STUDY OF AGRARIAN CHANGE
243
Under a systemof privatepropertyrights,membershipin the communityis no longer sufficientto guarantee access to land; nor is it a
necessarycondition.Thus, land can be alienated to personsoutside the
community.Moreover, land that is not in use does not revertto the
community;it can be held for purposes of speculation,transferredto
otherprivateindividuals,or bequeathed to personsof theowner's choosing. It is a consequence of thissystem,of course,thateven in thepresence
of abundant land, people may starvefor want of access to it; a primary
attractionof a communal systemof land rightsis that under similar
circumstancessuch deaths would not occur.
Conflicts between capitalist governmentscommitted to communal
rightsand spokesmen for agrarian societiescommittedto private land
rights broke out in both West and East Africa. In I9I2, the British
colonial governmentappointed the West AfricanLands Committee to
investigateland laws in BritishWest Africa. The Committee's report
called for the reinforcementof "pure native tenure." It stressed that
"legislation should have as its aim the checking of the progress of
individual tenure and the strengtheningof native custom," which, it
held, "did not recognize the concept of individual tenure and forbade
the ... sale of ... communityland."29In these recommendations,the
Committee was vigorouslyopposed by local interests.One expert on
local practices,Sir BrandfordGriffith,noted that in opposing private
ownershipand a freemarketin land, the governmentwas in factflying
in the face of "local custom." Grier commentsthat
So definite
and so commona practicewas thesale ofland ... bytheend
ofthenineteenth
century
thatGriffith
(whoseassociationwiththecolony
Governori886Sir WilliamBrandford
Griffith,
datedback to his father,
I895) could say thathe "neverhad occasionto considerthequestion."30
In West Africa, then, the putative agency of capitalistexpansionthe governmentof the colonial power-actively promoted communal
rights,while members of the agrarian societies demanded the unrestrictedrightto purchase and to alienate land. In East Africa,a similar
"reversal" obtained. In opposition to the penetrationof privatemarket
forcesinto the rural sector,forexample,the postwargovernorof Kenya,
Sir Philip Mitchell,argued thatsoil degradation,environmentalspoilage,
29 BeverlyGrier, "Underdevelopment,
Modes of Production,and the State in Colonial
Ghana," The AfricanStudiesReview 24 (March i981), 35. For an excellentdiscussionof the
issue of propertyrights,see also JohnCohen, "Land Tenure and Rural Development in
Africa,"in Bates and Lofchie (fn. 23).
3? Grier (fn. 29), 33.
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244
WORLD POLITICS
and avariciousexploitation
of land inevitably
followedthecreationof
privateproperty.
What was needed,he maintained,was "the proper
controlof the community.
Each Native Land Unit,or a portionof a
unit,was to be regardedas an 'estateof thecommunity';
each occupier
of land was to be a 'tenantof thetribe'."3'
The indigenouspeopleopposedtheland policyofthegovernment
of
Kenya.As long ago as 1912, a KenyaDistrictOfficerhad investigated
local tenurialpracticesamongtheKikuyuand had foundthatland was
held by familieswho occupiedit unconditionally-that
is, not at the
pleasureof any highercommunalauthority.
He had also foundthat
manyof thesefamilyestateshad been purchased.Land was in fact
not
boughtand sold bothwithinand betweentribes.32It is therefore
surprising
thatthe Kikuyuopposedthe government's
policyand demandedindividualregistration
of land holdingsand the enforcement
of privaterightsto land. The urgencywithwhichtheypressedtheir
demandswas ofcourseintensified
bytheinsecurity
theyfeltin theface
of theuncompensated
seizureof landsbythecolonialists.
the transition
Characteristically,
argumentsof the orthodoxmodels
of agrarianchangehave made the assumptionthatruraldwellersare
of
assaultedby capitalism.They counterpoise
thecommunalattributes
thesesocietiesagainsttheforcesof capitalismthatpromoteprivateinterests.They make allowancefor some membersof rural societyto
demandprivateproperty
rights:ruralelites,forexample,are expected
to seek a regimeof privatepropertyrightsin orderto defendtheir
economicprivileges.
But it couldneverbe thecase underthesetheories
thatagentsofcapitalismwouldseektoestablishcommunalrightswhile
themembersofagrariansocietiesseekprivateones.And yet,as we have
on Africadocumentsat leasttwo instancesof this
seen,the literature
"reversal."
Our attentionis thusdeflectedfromthe economistorthodoxies.
In
thediscordantsetof factssuggeststhatgovernments
particular,
mayact
in waysthatdifferfromwhatone would expect,giventheirsocieties'
"stageofdevelopment";
an independent
setofpolitical
theymayconfront
imperatives.
Ideology.
In thecase oftheBritish,
thereexisteda genuineconviction
thatprecapitalist
societieswere communitarian;
thatWesternman,in
thepersonageof theimperialist,
was introducing
forcesthatpromoted
self-interested
were
behavior;and that,becauseindigenousinstitutions
3 Quoted in M.P.K. Sorrenson,Land Reformin KikuyuCountry(Nairobi: Oxford UniversityPress, i967), 56.
3-2Ibid,20-2I.
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STUDY OF AGRARIAN CHANGE
245
scarceand inherently
valuable,theyshouldbe protected
bygovernment.
In his discussionof Norman Humphrey,an influential
figurein the
postwardevelopment
of Kenyanland policy,Sorrensonnotes:
Humphrey-and
indeeda goodmanyotherofficials-doubted
themoral
rightofEuropeansto impose... a system
[ofeconomic
individualism]
on Africans,
thusdestroying
thesupposed
communal
oftribaltraspirit
dition.Humphrey
wantedto establish
a seriesof locational,
divisional,
and district
councilsto managelandalongcommunal
lines... and he
hopedthiswouldlead to a 'reawakening
of [theindividual's]
senseof
dutytohisfellows
andhislandandtheinstilling
ofa desiretoabandon
thosefalsevaluesthathavebeena majorproduct
ofhissuddencontact
withour civilization.'33
Humphreywas, of course,echoingthesentiments
of farmorepowerfulfiguresin theBritishcolonialregime:Lugard,Cameron,Perham,
and Hailey,to mentionbuta few.34
Tactical calculationsmade in the courseof securing
Empowerment.
The colonialgovpoliticaldominationin Africawerealso important.
ernments
sought,and needed,politicalalliesthroughwhomtheycould
securecontroloverAfrica'slargelyagrarianpopulation.
A primereason
forinsistingon communalland rights,it would appear,was thata
systemof communalrightsempoweredlocallybased confederates:
it
gave controlover the allocationof the key resourcein an agrarian
economyto thosewho wouldgoverntheagrarianpopulationon behalf
of thecolonialistpowers-the tribalchiefs.
In theBritishcase,thepolicyofgoverning
"traditional
rulers"
through
was knownas "indirectrule."C. K. Meek clearlyarticulates
the link
betweenindirectrule and the formation
of property
rights;at thebeginningofhissemi-official
treatise,
LandLaw andCustom
intheColonies,
he states:
The authority
of chiefs,
sub-chiefs
and headsof clansand families
is
boundup withtheland.The grant,
therefore,
toindividuals
ofabsolute
ofownership
wouldtendtodisrupt
thenativepolicy,
rights
andso,too,
wouldtheindiscriminate
saleoftriballandsbychiefs.35
So compellingis thisthesisthatMeek returnsto it towardthe end
of his work,contendingthat"thereis a politicaldangerin allowing
33Ibid.,58.
34See, for example, Lord Hailey, An AfricanSurvey:Revised,1956 (London: Oxford
UniversityPress, I957); FrederickD. Lugard, The Dual Mandatein BritishTropicalAfrica
(London: F. Cass, i965); and Margery Freda Perham, Native Administration
in Nigeria
(London:OxfordUniversity
Press,I937).
35Meek, Land Law and Customin the Colonies(London: Oxford UniversityPress, I949),
IO.
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246
WORLD POLITICS
individualsto becomeownersof 'freeholds,'
withoutowingany allegianceto thelocal NativeAuthorities."
He concludes,"If 'indirectrule'
ofBritishpolicy,itwouldappear
is tocontinueto be a cardinalprinciple
shouldremaintheulto be essentialthatthe local NativeAuthorities
timate'owners'of as muchland as possible...."36
The bestsystem,
fromMeek'spointofview,wasoneinwhichpolitical
for
loyaltyto an agentof the colonialpowerservedas a prerequisite
access to land. RobertL. Tignor,in examiningthe operationof this
system,findsit to operateroughlyas one would expect.Friendsand
familiesbecame
relativesof thechiefsecuredland; indeed,thechiefly
therichestland ownersin thedistricts
studied,whilepoliticalenemies
ofthechiefslostrightsto land.Tignoralso notesthatthemorevaluable
thecontroloverland-i.e., thescarcertheland in relationto thepopulation-the greaterthe powerwhichthe Britishpolicyof customary
land rightsconferredto the chiefs.The Ibo and Kikuyuchiefs,for
areas,provedfar
example,who ruledin denselypopulatedagricultural
moreeffective
as "modernizing
agents"oftheBritishthandid thechiefs
of the Kamba or Masai, who livedin areas wherepopulationwas far
less denseand land therefore
moreabundant.37
relatively
ruraldwellersfavorprivatepropCounter-factual
observations-that
favorcommunalpropertyertyrightswhile capitalistgovernments
have thus drivenus to a departurefromorthodoxtheoriesof rural
change.We have moved insteadto an approachin whichkey rural
thiscase,property
law-are interpreted
as politicaloutinstitutions-in
comes.As a corollaryto thisapproach,it mightbe assumedthatthe
situation
wouldrepresent
institutions
thatwereadoptedinanyparticular
the outcomeof politicalbargaining.Viewed in thislight,thereis no
particularreasonto expectone or anotherformof agrarianinstitution
toemergeas a consequenceofsocialchange.The outcomewoulddepend
on theconfiguration
of power.
is supportedbytheliterature.
In someareasofAfrica,
This inference
and
boththe colonialpowers
the nativechiefswerenotablyweak. In
forcesweresmalland chiefly
theoccupying
powers
Zambia,forinstance,
had been based largelyupon warfareand slaveraiding,bothof which
wereabandonedfollowingtheimperialoccupation.It was also truein
Kenya;notonlyweretheBritishforcessmallin number,butacephalous
36Ibid., I93.
37Tignor, "Colonial
Chiefs in ChieflessSocieties,"Journalof ModernAfricanStudies 9
See also Marshall Clough, Chiefsand Politicians:Local Politicsand Social Change
in Kiambu, Kenya, 918-rq936, Ph.D. diss.(Stanford
University,
I978).
(I97I),
350.
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STUDY OF AGRARIAN CHANGE
247
societieswere the rule-the institutionof chieftaincywas nonexistent.
From the point of view of the colonial administrationin both places,
the resultwas a need for power. In the case of Kenya, the responseof
the Britishwas the virtualcreationof chiefsand tribalauthorities,and
the assignmentof the power to regulatethe allocation of "native" lands
to these native authorities.In the case of Zambia, the Britishforbade
any registeringof individual titlesof land ownership,and created tribal
rightsin land; land allocation became the responsibilityof the chiefs.
As Gluckman states,governmentpolicy promotedtribalism.38
Where therewas a need to createrural power, then,the colonial state
promoted the establishmentof communal propertyrightsas part of its
effortto elaborate systemsof rural political control over an agrarian
population. Where the colonial authoritypossessed decisive power and
was not reliant upon the creationof rural elites,the situationwas different.In essence,it was no longer purelypolitical; commercialconsiderationscould be decisive.For example, if an industriallabor forcewas
needed, the agrarian society could be "proletarianized,"as it was in
some regions of southern Africa. Where food or export crops were
desired, the rural population could be leftin place as a free peasantry
and agrariansociety,a collectionof smallholdersworkingvirtuallywithin
a regime of private property.
In other regions, where rural elites did exist, the outcome of the
bargaining between the colonial power and the indigenous agrarian
societyoftenreflectedthe compositionand preferencesof the latter.In
Ghana, forinstance,indigenouscommercialelitesprofitedfromthe use
of land. Exports of rubber,timber,and palm oil had long flourishedin
the territory,and the local political leaders themselveswere deeply
involved in commerce and trade. The colonial power, in securing the
termsof the political settlementby which to govern the territory,
had
to concede the rightsof theseruralelites to exerciseunrestrictedcontrol
over their property.In Uganda, by contrast,the rural elite was not
commercialized,and land was not exploited to secure pecuniaryprofits
fromagriculture.Rather,the elite was almost purelypoliticaland consisted of the chiefs and their administrators.In order to secure allies
withinthe ruralsector,then,the imperialistshad to accommodatethemselves to this structureof power. The result was yet another form of
propertysettlement:the virtual"Junkerization"of landed relations.In
returnfor their collaboration with the Britishoccupying powers, the
38Max Gluckman, "Foreword" to W. Watson, Tribal Cohesionin a Money Economy
(Manchester:ManchesterUniversityPress forthe Rhodes-LivingstoneInstitute,I958), x-xi.
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248
WORLD POLITICS
chiefswere givenfreeholders'
rightsto the bestlandsin Uganda; the
peasantsvirtually
becameserfs.When cash cropproduction
began,the
chiefsreapedvasteconomicbenefits
throughtheappropriation
of labor
dues and other"feudal"services.39
The argumentthatAfricanindigenoussocietiesembodiedcollective
property
rightsand thatit was the influenceof capitalismthatled to
in landis an overlyeconomist
theformation
ofprivaterights
one.Rather,
theformof property
law was shapedbythedesireof thecolonialstate
forpoliticaldomination
of an agrarianpopulationand bythenatureof
the politicalaccommodations
it had to make in orderto secureits
hegemony.
Finances.Statesthat are drivenby the need for dominationthus
tocreateruralcentersofpower.In shaping
developland rightsin efforts
theirpoliciestowardruralproperty,
theirbehavioris also influenced
by
of the influenceof
financialimperatives.
One of the bestillustrations
fiscalconsiderations
comes fromZambia. As is well known,Zambia
ofcopper.The copperdeposits,firstlocated
dependson theproduction
earlyin the20thcentury,
gavebirthtoone oftheworld'sleadingcopper
industries;by I930, the minesof what was thenNorthernRhodesia
in thissmallterritory,
employed30,000 people.As thelargestindustry
and bya vastmeasurethemostprofitable,
thecopperindustry
constituted
themajorelementin thecolonialgovernment's
taxbase.
Whencopperpricesrose,boththegovernment
and theminingcomBut thecosts
paniesprospered;whencopperpricesfell,bothsuffered.
imposedbylowerpriceswereborneunequally:whileboththegovernof the
mentand thefirmsexperienced
decreasingrevenues,theefforts
firmsto lowertheircostswhenincomedeclinedimposedincreasedcosts
upon thegovernment.
The mineswere capitalistenterprises.
When pricesfell,theymaximinimizedtheirlosses)bycurtailing
mizedtheirprofits
(or,equivalently,
labor.Whileit was costtheiruse of thevariablefactorof production:
minimizingon thepartof companiesto releaselaborat timesof lower
laborthreatened
to add to thecostsofgovernment.
prices,unemployed
foodand shelter;
Thesecostsmighttaketheformofthestate'sproviding
or theymighttake theformof policeprotection
in thefaceof threats
posed by massesof unemployedworkers.Even thoughboththegovernment
and theminingcompaniesderivedtheirrevenuesfrommining,
need foradditionalfundsincreasedjust when
then,the government's
revenuesbecamemostscarce.
39Henry W. West,Land Policyin Buganda (London: Cambridge UniversityPress, I972).
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STUDY OF AGRARIAN CHANGE
249
This fiscaldilemma was, in a sense, created by capitalism.Since the
means of productionwere in privatehands, productiondecisions were
made solely with a view to private,as opposed to social, consequences.
In addition, the state's revenues were subject to cyclical shocks originating from the capitalist economies. L. H. Gann quotes the Chief
Secretaryof NorthernRhodesia at the time of the most cataclysmicof
theseshocks-the depressionof the I930s:
The wealthof thecountryis in themineralswhichit does not own ...
and directrevenuefromthissourceis at presentnegligible.... The fact
... thatthecompaniesare notearningtaxableprofits
does notdiminish
theserviceswhichtheGovernment
is compelledto supplyto themining
areas.40
To deal with this dilemma, the state advocated an ironical solution:
the developmentof communal formsof rightsto landed property.The
governmentcreateda formofcitizenshipin whichrightswere dependent
not only on national membership,but also on membershipin a subnationality,a tribe.Access to land became a functionof tribalaffiliation.
Land could be acquired in a rural communityby affiliatingwith its
political officialsand by establishingmembershipin a kin group that
belonged to thatpolitical community.To retainrural land rights,then,
urban dwellers had to be "tribalized." Rural lands could not be sold;
theywere retained as "tribal trusts."The reason for these policies was
clear: at timesof fiscalstress,the governmentwanted to be able to avoid
the costs of large-scale unemployment.It wanted the disbanded urban
labor force to reincorporateitselfinto the rural economy quickly and
peacefully.The costs of guaranteeingsubsistencewere thus to be borne
by the rural community.4I
Thus, the origins of communal land rightslay at least as much in
capitalismand in the fiscalproblemsit created for the stateas theydid
in the inherentcultural traditionsof the rural population.42
40Gann, A Historyof NorthernRhodesia(London: Chatto & Windus, i964),
253.
Excellentdiscussionsare included in Elena L. Berger,Labour, Race and ColonialRule:
The Copperbeltfrom
1924 to Independence
(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1974); CharlesPerrings,
Black Mineworkersin CentralAfrica (New York: Africana Publishing Company, I979);
A. L. Epstein,Politicsin an UrbanAfricanCommunity
(Manchester:ManchesterUniversity
Press for the Rhodes-LivingstoneInstitute,I958); and Helmuth Heisler, Urbanizationand
the Government
of Migration(New York: St. Martin'sPress, I974).
42 For additionalarguments,
see Claude Meillassoux,Maidens,Meal and Money:Capitalism
and theDomesticCommunity(London: Cambridge UniversityPress, i98i); Harold Wolpe,
"Capitalism and Cheap Labour Power in South Africa,"Economyand SocietyI (No. 4,
4-
1972),
425-56;
and Palmerand Parsons(fn.28). I differfromtheseapproachesin my
acknowledgementof the divergenceof interestsbetweenthe stateand privateenterprises,
and in myconvictionthatthestatewas setupon solvingitsown fiscalproblemby controlling
the formationof land laws.
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250
WORLD POLITICS
ANOTHER INSTITUTION: THE VILLAGE
Thus far I have employed the Africandata to criticizeseveral major
components of the currentlyorthodox theoriesof agrarian changetheirstatementof initial conditions;theirspecificationof characteristic
trajectoriesof change; and theiranalysis of a key agrarian institution,
propertyrights.The Africanexperienceprovokesa skepticalreappraisal
namely,the
of argumentspertainingto a second major ruralinstitution,
village.
In Africa, village dwelling was often not the basic form of rural
settlement;many people preferredto live in isolatedhomesteads.Where
villages were formed,it was oftenat the behestof states.Many of these
stateswere profoundlycapitalist.
At the time of the establishmentof the Pax Britannica in northeasternRhodesia, forexample,people generallyresidedin familyhomesteads. In the late i9th century,however, the British South African
Company (B.S.A.C.)-the creationof thatmost dedicated proponentof
capitalistexpansion, Cecil JohnRhodes-determined that the region's
rural population properlybelonged in villages. George Kay notes that
"throughoutthe whole of north-easternZambia ruthlessregroupingfor
carriedout."43 He quotes
administrativeconveniencewas systematically
...
resistedand were sent
own
records
fromthe B.S.A.C.'s
that"many
to prison before the order was finallyobeyed."44In this area, then, it
was the administratorswho soughtto formthe villages.That the agents
of one of the most dedicated embodimentsof capitalismwere the proponents of villagization adds an ironic note to our reappraisal of the
orthodoxposition.45
Even today it would appear that village dwelling is preferredby the
governmentsratherthan by the rural people. Tanzania is a notable case
in point. In the name of "development,"the governmentof Tanzania
has sought to group rural dwellers into communitieslarge enough for
it to provide dispensaries,clinics, schools, water supplies, agricultural
and otherservices;itthereby
hopesto strengthen
inputs,marketingfacilities,
the productive forces of the country'sagrarian society.46It is notable
thatthe statelegitimatedits reconstruction
of ruralsocietyby propound43 Kay,SocialAspects
in Zambia (Lusaka: InstituteforSocial Research,
of VillageRegrouping
Universityof Zambia, i967), II.
44Ibid.,I O.
45 In the case of Kenya, Sorrensonnotes: "The Kikuyu did not live in villages,but in
dispersed households. ... During the Mau Mau Emergencythe Kikuyu, the Embu and
some of the Meru populationwere concentratedin 732 villages...." Sorrenson(fn.30), 3.
46 The best studiesare Michaela Von Freyhold,Ujamaa Villagesin Tanzania (New York
and London: MonthlyReview Press,I979); Dean E. McHenry,Jr.Tanzania's Ujamaa Villages
(Berkeley:Instituteof InternationalStudies, I979); and Hyden (fn. i9).
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STUDY OF AGRARIAN CHANGE
251
ing a theoryof African agrarian historyin which "colonialism [had]
encouraged individualisticsocial attitudes,"47
whereas prior to colonialism, Africans had lived cooperativelyin socially integrated,mutually
supportive,"village communities."Tanzanian scholars have not hesitated to question the validityof these claims.48
In evaluating the presumptionthat village-livingis the natural form
of agrarian settlementin Africa,we should be disposed toward caution.
In some areas, villages appear not to have been the preferredmode of
habitation.In other cases, where theywere preferred,it was the states
that preferredthem. Some of these states were socialist,as in the case
of Tanzania; in the case of the late British South Africa Company,
however, the authoritieswere rampantlycapitalist.49
A
BEHAVIORAL
CHARACTERISTIC:
THE
PREFERENCE
FOR SUBSISTENCE
The threeelementsof initialconditions,institutionaltraits,and characteristicpatterns of change help to define the orthodox models of
agrarian society.So, too, does a fourthelement: the psychologicaltraits
of rural dwellers. Of these traits,the one that is centralto the conventional models is the preferencefor subsistenceproduction.
In contradistinction
to the conventionalorthodoxies,I argue thatthe
reversionto subsistencecan be viewed as a rationalresponseto prevailing
conditionsin the political and economic environmentof the rural producers. The actions of the states that controlthe markets in effortsto
extractresourcesfromrural populationsconstitutean importantsource
of these conditions.
Many of Africa's export crops are cash crops,pure and simple; they
have no directuse in consumptionand are grownpurelyforthe market.
Recently,the volume of agriculturalexportsfromAfrica has declined,
creatingshortagesof foreignexchange; this decline has been taken by
Hyden and othersas evidence of the disruptivepower of a precapitalist
peasantry.50
But I would argue that it should be viewed in a different
light.
In Africa as a whole, over 8o percentof the population is engaged
in agriculture,and over 50 percent of the gross domestic product is
derived fromagriculturalproduction.Most Africanstatesthereforerely
47Ibid.,
98.
48
See, for example, Samuel S. Mushi, "Modernization by Traditionalization:Ujamaa
Principles
Revisited,"
Taamuli I (No. 2, MarchI971).
49 For further
evidence concerning"stateorigins"of village communitiesand a brilliant
expositionof thisargument,see Samuel L. Popkin, The RationalPeasant(Berkeleyand Los
Angeles: Unversityof CaliforniaPress, I979).
5?
Hyden(fn.i9).
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252
WORLD POLITICS
on agriculturefor financialresources.One way in which the industry
can be taxedis byregulating
themarketforexportcrops.In manycases,
the government
is the sole legal buyerof thesecrops.By purchasing
themat an administratively
setpricein thedomesticmarketand selling
accuthemat pricesprevailingin the worldmarket,thegovernment
betweenthedomesticand
mulatesrevenuegeneratedbythedifference
ofcashcropsareheavily
worldmarketprices.In thisway,theproducers
taxed.5'
One implicationof such governmental
fiscalpoliciesis thatthe rewardsforparticipating
in themarketplaceare loweredformanyfarmloweredin comparison
withthereturns
attained
ers; theyare certainly
by producingcropsthatcan be consumedon thefarmor sold outside
of officialmarketing
channels.52
A government's
use of marketcontrolsto levyresourcesfromagrifor
culturethuslowersthereturns
farmers
can expectfromproduction
thisfact
themarket,bothin absoluteand relativeterms.In and ofitself;
wouldaccountforthepeasants'turning
awayfromcashcropproduction.
no needtoposittheexistence
ofan antimarket
peasant
Thereis therefore
mentality.
Indeed, such an imputationwould be wrong:withdrawal
fromexchangeis the appropriatemarketresponseto the economic
markets.
manyagricultural
conditionsthatat presentcharacterize
THE MARKET ORIGINS OF POLITICAL BONDAGE
notonlyin securing
Governments
are interested
publicrevenuesfrom
in securingforeignexchange.
exportmarkets;theyare also interested
One conseToward thisend, theytendto overvaluetheircurrencies.
of
productsforthebenefit
quenceis thetaxationof exportagricultural
thosewho seek imports:the industrialists
(who seek cheap importsof
their
plantand capitalequipment)and the elites(who seek to gratify
tastesforimportedproductsmore cheaply).Anotherconsequenceof
an
overvaluationis the generationof politicalpower by establishing
excessdemandforforeignexchange.At theartificially
peggedpriceof
thedomesticcurrency,
themarketcannotallocateforeign
exchange;the
demandforit exceedsthe supply.Those in chargeof the foreignexbecomeenormously
powerfulbecausethey
change"market"therefore
controltheallocationsof a scarceand valuableresource.
thebeneficiaries
In thissystem,
are thosein theCentralBankor those
whomakeappointments
oftheforeign
exchange
toit.Theyaremembers
5 See RobertH. Bates,Marketsand Statesin TropicalAfrica(Berkeleyand Los Angeles:
Universityof CaliforniaPress, i98i).
52 See, forexample,the data containedin Government
of Uganda, Ministryof Agriculture
and Forestry,"Pricing Policy and AgriculturalProduction,"(Entebbe: Ministryof Agricultureand Forestry,August I978).
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STUDY OF AGRARIAN CHANGE
253
allocationcommitteesand of thecommitteesthatallocate importlicenses,
or persons who designate the appointees to these committees.Those
who receive importlicenses also stand to benefit.
The losers in this systemare those who are not located in positions
of access to this scarce resource and who nonethelessmust purchase
importedgoods. Typically,thereare no peasant farmersin the Central
Bank or on the committeethat allocates foreignexchange or import
licenses.Yet the farmersrelyon imports.Farm implementssuch as hoes,
cutlasses,sprayers,pesticides,ox ploughs and othertools,sacks and bags,
milling machines, and so forthoften have to be imported.Moreover,
many consumergoods, such as shirts,shoes,blankets,soap, and batteries
are imported,or are manufacturedwith importedequipment. But, in
thisadministratively
structuredmarket,thefarmersmust,in effect,bribe
their superiors to secure needed imports;theymust pay the premium
exacted by the excess demand for foreigncurrenciesand imports to
satisfythose who have sufficientpolitical power to secure privileged
access to foreignexchange or to the importsit can buy.
Overvaluation thus lowers the price of exports,increasesthe costs of
farming,and raises consumer prices for farmers.And it does so while
involvingthe farmersin a systemof regulatedforeignexchange markets
in which theyare subjectto politicaland economicdominationbypersons
with influencein the national capital.
An analysis that is based on the political manipulation of markets
thus reveals three featuresof the conventionalmodels of precapitalist
societies.One is the withdrawal frommarkets;another-a virtualcorollary-is the preferencefor subsistence;and the third is the powerlessnessof peasants. Rather than posit these characteristics
as threeseparate traits,I regard them as joint consequences of the way in which
marketshave been manipulatedby statesto extractresourcesfromagrarian societies. The approach is more powerful than the conventional
orthodoxies.53
CONCLUSION
In this paper I have summarized two of the dominant models of
agrarian change and reviewed them in light of evidence drawn from
rural Africa. The traditionalapproaches require initial conditionsthat
53 CatherineCoquery-Vidrovitch,
in writingabout precolonialAfricansocieties,defined
the Africanmode of productionas one in which statesdid not directlycontrolproducers
(e.g., throughenserfmentor slavery),but controlledand manipulated trade in order to
accumulate resources from them. Her analysis is at least as applicable, in my view, to
contemporary
Africaas itwas to theprecolonialperiod,and verylikelymoreso. See CoqueryVidrovitch,"Recherchessur un mode de productionAfricain,"Le PetiseeI44 (i969), 6i-78.
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254
WORLD POLITICS
attributing
Theyare overlysubjectivist,
have rarelyexistedhistorically.
in which
to preferences
undercircumstances
theexistence
ofinstitutions
have clearlybeenimposed.Moreover,theyare overly
theseinstitutions
economic,in thattheyplace too strongan emphasison the impactof
themarketon agrariansocietiesand too littleon the impactof states.
thisessay,an approachhas provedfruitful
Time and again throughout
thatlooksat theeffect
uponruralsocietyofthedemandforpowerand
resourceson the partof statesunderconditionsin whichpeople and
in agriculture.
wealthare concentrated
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