CHAPTER t
The Cold War in Asia
TadashiAruga
Professor
Hitotsubashi
Universiry
l. Europ€ and Asia
The Cold War beganand endedin Europe.
TheColdWar is a lermmostsuilablelo describ.
the characleflsl|cs
of Luropean(EuropeanAdantic) internationalrelalionsof somefotty
yearsihat took shale soonafler the end of World
War II. How suitableit is as a conc€ptfor Asian
(Asia-Pacific)intemationalrelaiionsis another
matter,In Europeanint€mationalrclations. there
wasa slmmelryof the rwo blocs.the wesrem
bloc led b) the UrutedStaresandlhe communisl
bloc led by the SovierUnion The conflrcrand
rivalry of rhosetwo blocsdominaled,nrernationalissuesin Europe,and theseconnicts
remained"cold." sparingEuropefrom war for
morc than fony years.Thus the Cold War era in
Europe,which we may considercontinuedFom
1947to 1989,wasa periodof longpeace.'
During the Cold War era, the situationin
Asia was quite different ftom Europe,and it still
is. Although the conflict and rivalry betweenthe
two superpowers
spreadinto Asia, this rivalry
wasnot asdominantas rn Europe.In A,ia. there
was no 5olidU S orSo\rer bloc.Therewas nu
oniryamongthe U.S.alliesin Asia.They werea
groupof counmesued only wrrh
heterogeneous
lhe UnitedSlalesrluoughb'laleralarrangemenrs
[Jnlrkelhe Ame can alhesIn Europe.rhich
were blessedwith stableliberaldemocratic
r€gimes,most of the Americanallies in Asia
mainlained
aurhoriranan
regrmes.Moreove,.
someof America:Asianallie\.suchas Japan.
SonthKorea,the Phillipines,did nor ger along
well wifi eachotherbecause
ol rhe memoryol
Japanere
impe'iali.m.The SovierUniondid nor
dominatelhe conmunirl counhegtn Asia a. rr
did in EasternEurope.Unlike in Europe,the
largesr.mosrpopulou.counLr)In rheregion.rhe
People.Republicor China.\oon becamea granr
in the Communist world- Rivalries b€twe€nthe
SovielUoionandthePeoples Republicof Chioa
soondereloped.and the rwo leq1ercommunrsl
counrries
in Ara, NorthKoreaandfonnerNonh
Vietnam. were therefore able to maintain more
independ€nce
thantheirEuropeancourterpafls.
There were two cold wars in Asia. The
U.S.-Chinese
coid war as well as the Asia!
dirnensionof the U.S.-SovietCold War. lf th€
rerm cold $ar' canbe apphedro a hosrilepo\ er
strugglebe|sefn po*ers sirh simrlaiideologres.
we may say therewas a rhird cold war in A(,ia.
lhe Sino-Sovret
cold war rhich develooped
b,
the l9?0s.
The most populouscountsyin Asia, China
expeflenced
a large.scale
re!olutronary
c'vil
$ d r b e l s e e nt h eN a r i o n a l i sr el p r m ea n dr h e
C.mmunisl lorces.and severa]orhercounrries
s e r e c o n f r o n t e sd r r h a r m e dr e v o l u r o n d r r
movementsftom time to time. ln addition, rhere
s e r e r $ o h o r "q a r s r n s h r c h l L S m r l r r a r r
forceswere directlyinvolved,the KoreanWar
and the VietnamWar. In contrasrwrrh Europ.
where no country experiencedan intemal amed
conflict(excepting
Gree.e),Asiawasbesetwith
suchconflicts.and two full-fledgedwars were
foughl with the United Statesas a major
panicipanlThe ColdWar in Asiais a misnomer
unle.sir mean\\imll) lharlhe UniredSrares
and
the Soviet Union were engagedin a power
strugglein Asia but avoided,as in Europe.a
directmilitrry engagemenl.
Since most of Americas Europeanallies
10
had a liberal democraticregime, the Uniied
Statescould certainlyclaim rharits role in the
Cold War in furope wa<the delen.eol lrberal
democraticvalues.In Asia, manyof America\
allie\ appearedto represenrreaclronar)torces.
trhile her adveFafle.often seemedlo reprecenl
forces of national libention and progress.Thus
the United Statesoften seemedto be a defendq
ol corruprandconserva(i\e
regimesrarherthanchampionof lib€rat democmcy.The criticism of
the AmericanpostureIn Asiawa\ \ery strong
among the Japaneseleft and liberals who were
palifl(r( and po'ed a. lairhlul delendersot rhe
War-renouncingConstitution.They were
opposedto lhe U.S.-JapanSecurityTreary
systemand foughtbitterly againstthe securiry
fieaty revision of 1960,which appearedto make
Japana more activemilitary partnerof the
United States.The Cold War in Asia divided
the Japanesebetween rhe pro-American
c o n . e r v a r i v ea. n d r h e a n t i - A m e . a n l e l r .
Oppositionto the U.S.-JapanSecurily Treaty
s y s t e ma n d A m e r i L a \ A . r a n p o l r c y w a '
panicularlysuoogin Okinawa.slxch renl.llned
underU.S.militaryconrol.
The stalusof Okinawa as a lerritory
adnurustered
by the UnhedSlaFswa. unrqu(
Therewa. no equivaienr
'n Europe.the statusol
Okinawa was a symbol of the hegemonic
positionofthe UnitedStatesin the Pacific.Even
wheoofficralwa\hingron.onrdered
rhe I.9S.
presencein Europe lo b€ tempomry,ir iotended
to make the Pacific an "American lale. lt \vas
Washingron
s po(rqar plan lo conFolfie lormel
Japanesemandatesas straiegic trust terribries.
OUnaqa.too.wa: considered
asa possibletrurl
tenitory. When ihe Pacific War ended,the U.S.
m i l i t a r y$ a s c o n , i d e r i nrBe r a r n r nOgk r n a w a
permanenrl'for milirarypurposesThe I nired
Statesseparated
the administrarion
of Okinawa
ftom that of mainlandJapanftom the beginning,
firmly keprtherdandsunderthemiluaryconEol.
and ried to foster Okinawansep.ratismfor a
shile. AlrhoughrheUniledSrarec
pmcficall)lon
ioterestin makingOkinawaa U.S.trusttenirory
by 1951,Ariicle Threeof the SanFrancisco
PeaceTrear) reflecledAmenca, earler inlere,r
in trust€eship.
2. The Comlng of the U.S.-Soviel Cotd wrr
in Asia
rheCold war wasnol a realwa.I,it
Because
cannotbe exactly determinedwhen it startedand
when it ended.The questionof ils beginningand
endingdatesis closelyrelatedto the question
of ils definition.As a matterof fact, the state
oI cold war sas declareb
dy rnternarional
J o u r n a l ' s mn. o r b y r h e l $ o s u p e r p o $ e r s .
Allhoughmorr hirrorian(agreelharthe Cold
War begansoon after World War U and had
defin,lelybegunb) theDmeofthe rnnouncemenl
oi lhe TrumanDocrrinein March 1q47,rherl
opinionsvary with regardto its end. Every time
therewas a certaindegreeof d6tentebetweenthe
two superpowers,it was said $ar the Cold War
war over It was saidin 1C55,shen an EasG
West summit was held ten yearsafter the end of
WorldWar II: In lg6t. when$e panialnucleat
test-bantreaty was signed;and in 1972.when
RichardNixon visited bod Beijing and Moscow
and agreedwith Soviet leaderl,€onid Brezhnev
to developU.S.-Sovietrelations.I once wrote
thatthe Cold War was over in 1972.Eachtime
d6tentedeterioratedlater. In 1989, however,the
cornmunisr
regimesin moslof lhe EasrEuropean
countriescoliapsedand the Berlin Wall come
down Peoplebeganro ra) rhartheCold Wd had
cometo an end at last-It may b€ said rharrhe fall
of lhe \tdll. rhes)mbolof Cold War srabilrr).
')mbohcall)markedrheend of rheCold WaJ
and openeda new hopeful, but turbulent,6ra for
Europe.Even if somesuspected
the Cold War
hadnotendedin lq8q. 't cenainlyendedin I0Sl
whenthe Communistparty was disbandedin the
SovietUnionandsubsequently
lhe SovielUnion
ilselfwasdissolved.
Insreadof mered6!ente.a grearnructural
(hangelool placelhrs rime.Formerl].lbe Cold
War was deflned in terrnsof mutuat perc€ptions
of U.S.-Sovietrelations.ProfessorYonosuke
Naga'.for Incrance.
definedthe Cold War as
a h o s r i l er e l a r i o n ( h i p
i n w h i c hb o r h s i d e r
rhe impossibilirjof a negotiared
recognized
settlementof their conflicts and attemptedto
defend iheir respectiveintereststhrough
unilateral
dcrion..If rhisdefinirionic adopred.
fie end ol fte Cold War 'hould be daredearly.
perhapsin 1955.If we set the end of the Cold
War in l9ll9, we rDr
terms of the sEucturE
the rivalry berwea t
democratic bloc and
communisiblock r
slructureof intemaa
was sometimesvcrtr
relaxedinevenh€|G
fundnrnentalcordiria
Sucha siructur€crit
The b€gionio! .
difficuh for rhe Uoir
Union to reacbagrca
well as Europeani|l
problemsrelaringio a
6rd the occupatiooF|l
of their disagr€€rEd, I
becameinevil.blc. L
e/asable lo ignor€ Sor
occupationpolicy tfr
potentialally ld tbi5 r
!o Asia. Bul lh€ Urlitre againstComrflru/hile. Alrhough rlr li
Union eslablisb€d
riu
w€re able to agacaI
.esp€ctjvemili!.ry a
Whena civil sr ir
ihe Nationalist !or{
forces, WashingrooDoctrioe ro aid tb. fu
pursueda policy of i
Nationalisbjusr ro plCongress.
h was in .esp.d
Truman had to cr* a
home with his fama
poticy to conbio Sovi
saw no oecessityfr r
He rather resisrcdl
fiamework of the Co!
war. The Unired StG
dle ChineseComtrri
war. Even if ir w6 F
costly for the Unirld
adminislrationdid ..
policy ro dive( to Cl
which were ne€d€dir
TheColdWalinAsia
War in l9li9, we mustdefinerhe Cold War in
terms of the structureof intermtional relatioDs:
the rivalry betweenthe U.S.led Westemliberal
democraticbloc and the Soviet-ledEasterr
communirb
l l o c I w h r c hs h a p e dr h e b a r r c
structureof internationalrelations.The rivalry
was somerimesvery intense.sometimesmore
relaxedjnevertheless,
il alwaysexisledas the
Iirndamenhlcodition of intemadonal
relations.
SLrch
a srructure
e\istedIn hurope.bul not in
The beginningof rhe Cold War madeir
difficult for lhe United Sraresand rhe Sovier
Union to reachagreementon Asiao issuesas
sell as turopeanrssues.
Tbe) dr.a8,eed
ove,
problemsreladngto rhe administralionof Korea
andthe occupationpolicy towardJapan.Because
of rheirdrsagreement.
rhecrealrondf r$o Korea
becameInerrrableln Japan.
the UorredSrarc5
wasablero ignoreSovreropposruon
ard reorienr
occupation
policy rowardrebuildingJapanas a
Flenrial ally. ln lhir sense.lhe Cold Waj .pread
to Asia. But the Unired Sbres did noi &aw rhe
Uneagarn\lCommunrst
expansron
in A\ra,or,
while.Althorghthe UnitedStatesandthe Sovier
Union established
rival regimesin Korea.they
wereable to agreear leastto withdrawtherl
tespecri\e
milirar)forcesfrom rhepenrnsDta
Whena ctvil war devetopedIn Cbrnaberwee,l
the Nationalist govemmentand fte Connunisr
forces, Washingrondid not invoke the Truman
Doclnnero ald the rormer Innead.Warhrngton
pursueda policy of giving minimumaid to rhe
Nationalistsjust ro placaterhe pro-Nationalisrsin
Congress.
ll was rn respecr
lo Luroperhal Han) S
Trumanhadlo creaLe
a Cold Waj armosphere
al
homesirh hi( famousaddresslo tauncha ne\,
policy to conrainSovierexpansion.
In Asia, he
saw no necess' lor a dramalrcpotic) chanSe
He rather resisredpressurero apply rhe
ftamework of ihe Cold War to rhe Chinesecivil
war. The Un'redSbteJ$outd not rr) lo prerenl
lheChinese
Conmunrsbhom wrnnrng
$e cr!il
war.Evenil il \ra( possrble.
rt $ould be \er.)
costly for the United Stares,and rhe Truman
administratron
drd nor consrder a <ensrbt<
polic) to diverrto Chindercessi!eresourcej
whichwereneededin morevrta y impo anl
Europe.When rhe Narronatistsseemeddoomed,
Trumanand his Secreraryof SrareDeanAcheson
only hopedthat rhe Communists.the ncw
maslersof China, would pursue a policy
independenr
fromtheSovietUnion.
q \ A c h e s o n. t a t e dr n J a n u a r )t o :
Americasdefensiveperimete.in rh€pacificrdr
from the Alerrians to rhe philippi.es, rhrougo
Japanand Okinawa.BecaLise
of her indusrrial
and milirary poreniial,Japanwas rhe mosr
imporrrnra,serfor the Un ed Stale.In Asia.
Ot'ndwa$as also very jmponant.because
il
offered srategic basesfor ihe U.S. militarr.
OnceOkinawahad beeneye{tas a futureU.S.
outpostto keepposrwarJapanon a leash.But rhe
rslandchain becamea keystonein the defensive
perimeteragainstthe Communistcountdesnr
Asia. NeitherSouthKoreanor Taiwan,on the
other hand,was includedwithin rhe perimeter.It
was unclearwhetherrhe Uniled Stateswoold
defend South Korea if it was attackedby
communistfbrces.As for Taiwan,in Janutuy
1950Trumandeclar€dthe Uniled Stareswould
not rn@rvene
if rhe islandwa5 anackedby the
ChineseCommunisrs.
hopingrheChinesewoutd
pursuean indepeMentpolicy. The rhemeof the
famousAchesonspeechin which he meniioned
the defensiveperimelerwas U.S. respecifor
Asiannationalism.It was a message
to Beijing
that,if Beijingwasnot goingro atignirsetfwith
Moscow,Warhingronwould nor take a hosril€
attitudetowardBeijing. But Beijing concluded
an alliancewi|h Moscowin February1950.
Washingtont hope for a more or tess neulral
Chinawas lost, at leastfor the tirne being.
3. The Uniled Stalresand the Kor€a War
Tbe Cold War era roughlycorespondsro
the Pax Americana.It was rhe ageduring which
the UnitedStaresplayedihe role of the gtobat
policenan. The Sovier Union played the role of
policemanonly within its own bloc. It usedits
militaryforcesto crushrebellionsin Hungaryin
1955and in Czechoslovakia
in 1968.Unril rhc
SovietUnionintervenedin 1979in Afganisteur,
which ir considered
wiihin its sphere,its forces
h a dn " r e n g a g e dr n a p r o r r a L r esda r . l s
military forcesweremore activein the Cold We
world First rheyfought a limi|ed bur tu ,fledged
12
war in Koreaftom 1950through1953.In 1954
the unlteclStateswas on ttre vergeof another
war in IndochrnaIl did nol acluallyfighrrhdl
time, bur ll yearslater it involved itself in a
long.bitlerwarin Vietnam.
Because
the Sovieidiplomalicarchivesare
in lhe Uoces<of beingopenedto hrsronans.
rhe
degreeof Sovietinvolvemenr
in the decisionto
insrjgate
a war jn Koreamay soonbe [no$n
Probabl)lhe rnrrrauvero male wal agarhl lhe
Southcamefrom Pyong-yang.
But Moscowwas
cenarnl)consulFi andapproredde plan II the
N o r r h K o r e r n \ w e r e \ u c c e \ \ [ u l ,l | w o u l d
enhanceSo!ierpre$igein Asra If dey farled.
wouldnor affecrrhe riral inrereltro[ $e Sovret
Union.Both North Koreaandtbe SovietUnion
gambledon a qurcl mrliraryconque{ ol Sourh
Korea Srncelhe Nonh Korean,aimedto crea(
a fail a€complibeforethe United Sratescould
rhe) couldnol
beginan) effe.d!e counFractron.
wairroolong.The UniledStateswasplanninelo
.uen8lhen
irs militaryposiuonrn EastA.rd rl
had concludeda mutualsecurityassistance
agreementwith South Koreai it was to begin
peaceEeatywirh Japanro
negol,ang a sepalate
male the larteran Americanall): and rt had
begunimproving military basesin Okinawa.But
rhe united slates did nol yet appearpreparedro
lale speedymilharyaclionin Korea.Therelore
J u n e l q 5 0 m a y h a v e ' e e m e dr o t h e N o f l h
Koreanslo be a goodtime to begina war.
The conceptof a defensiveperimeterwas a
productof the military thinking that anticipateda
thirdworldsar whosemainthealresould be
Europe. Thus official washington was
c o n f r o n r e$di l h a n e s s i r u a t i o n
i l h a dn o l
anticipated.
But washingtonquickly responded
to rheourbrealof sar in Korea.BerauseNorth
Korcabegan$e $ar wrlh an all-outoflensrve.
was a clear caseof military aggression.The
UnitedStares
couidnot remaininaclivein lh.
faceof suchan act of overl aggression.
lts
inactionwould weakenU.S. prestigein Asia.
panicularl)in Japanandlhe Philippiner.
The
failure of the United Statesto act promptly in the
fa.e of communr(r
ae!ressron
aparnst
its own
client statemight affect the confidenceof
WestemEuropennationsin the United States.
Thus the Trumanadministration
actedquickly.
Thankslo lhe absenceof a Soviel representative
In rheI N. Secuflt)Councrl.
U.S.forcu.es
were
r b l e I o d c l u n d e rr h e b a n n e ro f I h e U n i r e d
Nalionsin accordance
with a resolutionof the
SecurityCouncil.
As an onhodox was berwe€nregular armed
io'ce..'he Koreawd wa' rhekrndof connicl
the t nrredSlareshad becomeaccustomed
lo
lighunein ther$o worldwarsThu'US tarce\
were.oon ablero rum lhe l|de of war again('
North Korea.When U.S. forcesse€medto be
ablero pacrlythe nodhempan of fie peninsula.
rheChinesedrm) rnassirel'Intevened.
ad U.S.
fbrceswere forced lo retreatto the soulhemedge
of the peninsula.But the U.S. sidewas ableto
retumean o(lensr\ero slabrhrelhe ftont Iine
a-round
rhe l8rh p r-llelby rhe springof la5l.
The new featureof the KoreanWar in lhe
Amencanelperiencewas rts narureas a hmrled
war. Even when U.S. lroopswere forcedto
retreatio the southemedge of the peninsula,
\rashingron
did nor\ anrro extendthesar iolo
Chineseterrilory. It did not want to get involved
in a large-scalewar in Asia againsta secondary
enemyandweakenits posi!ionin Europeagainst
ils primary adversary.rhe SovietUnion.
The outbreak of lhe Korean War changed
U.S.polrcyro$ardTarwanThe UniredSrates
senrfie 7rh flerr ro rheTaiwanSrrairto prevent
altackfrom the conlinenlThe acuonwascalled
''neutralization
of the strartso as not to unduly
anlagonizethe PeoplehRepublic.When Chinese
troops intervenedin the Korean War, the
People'sRepublicbecamean enemyof the
LmEd Skles. I1lelacrlharrheUru|€dStatesand
"hot
war rn
rhe PeoplesRepublicfougbta
Koreawas the most importantdeterminantof the
natureof the Sino-Americancold war. It became
out of the questionfor washington to recognize
t at
l h e B e i j r n er e g i m e I. r q a s s i g n i f i c a t rt h
Chinese,not Soviet,forcesenGredthe war when
North Korea was about to fall under U.S.
nnhrar)conrol. washingronunderstood
thar$e
SovietUnionwouldnol employits own military
force!.only tholeo[ irs pro\ie! Io achieveils
expansionisl
aimsin EastAsia. In Washington's
view,Chinawasa Sovietjuniorpannertbatwas
sillng lo playa moreactiverolethantheSoviel
in Asia.
Unionin communistmilitaryexpansion
Th€ Uoired Srai.. b
toward fie Peoplcl I
b€€nengagedwid' U.s
Kor€a,thantowad tb
The outbrc.t d
delay tlle peaces.ttb
more urge
rar a{
bave Japanas . p-t
San Francisco Fc..! a
S€ ember1951.i I
to end tl|e Prcific Ya
the peacesettlcd
American ally Thc I
dlost of Japsns fdl
generouspqce. 8i i
perce. Becauseot I
situation. oo ChiE I
tbe conference,aod i
its Easl Europes .t
Th€ Korean Wrr irr
U.S. military ro rEl
trely in territoiy d
Tbus the peacetEit
rhe righr to admioit
Uniled Statcsdid r
sovereignly ovcr Oli
Sratesinrendodto I
Cold War. it b.cSrar€stoddq
Americar ofhci- d
Stateswould rfir
|l
fuiure in spite of tb I
,nicle of the p€.c. a
eanled 1o administa
shile placatingJapG
t.'
The Unired Sa.ts
The Vietnad k
the KoreanWar. lt a
circumstancesand di[!
War in Europestabiliz
BerlinWall in I96lrelations,which hadtt
Cubanmissilecri.ir
reducedin 1963.wb
ban treaty was sip.d
SovietUnionandCt!.
the end of rhe Cold
Sovietrelationsbad Y
13
The United Statesbecameeven more hosrilc
losardlhe People,Republtc.
shosearm) had
beenengaged
wilh U.S.forcesin fiercebattlesin
Korea,thantowardthe SovielUnion.
The outbreakof the KoreanWar did noi
delay the peacesetdementwiih Japan.Ir became
more urgentthanever for the uniGd statesto
haveJapanas a pannerin EastAsia. Thus the
San FrancrscoPeaceConlererce\,!a. calledix
Seprember
lqsl. tl wasnol srmplyan occdsion
!o end the Pacific War formally. The purposeof
$a! lo makeJapanan
lhe peaceserrlemenr
Americanall) Ihe I nited Srare\perruaded
moslof Japans formerenenxesro grantJapangenerous
peace.Bur ir $a\ not a comprehensiri
p e a c e B e c a u . eo f r h e ( u l d - a n d h o t - w a r
situation,no Chinesegovemmentwas invited to
theconference,
dndneilherrheSovretI nronnol
its ta\r Europeanallres$gnedlhe peacelreat).
The KoreanWar srrengrhened
lhe desireol the
U.S. military to maintainbasesit could use a
freely in territory under its own administrarion.
fius lhe peacetrearygranledLheljnired Srarer
lhe right to adminislerOkinawa.akhoughthe
Uniled S(atesdid not deny Japan'sresidual
soverei8ltyover Okinawa.Becausethe United
Statesintended10 makeJapana partnerin the
C o l d W a r ,i r b e r a m eu n s r s et o r r h e I n e d
Statesto detachOkinawa liom her p€rrnanentlv.
Ame.ican officials suggestedthal the United
Staieswould reiurn the islandsto Japanin some
tuturein spiteof the provisionof the Okinawa
articleof the peacetreaty . The United Stares
wantedto administerihe islandsindefinitely
whileplacatingJapanese
irfedentisrn
Chind$r. moreopenlyhosl'leto lhe Unired
Slales.I S. leadetsheeanro srnpleour Chinaas
themajormenaceto be contained
in EastAsiain
1963.
In themid-1960s.
Americans
did not havea
.enseoi cricrscornparable
to that whrchhad
prevailedat the outbreakof the KoreanWar
'ince rherewa. no longe' a mnnolirhic
Communistbloc. Everyonehad assumeda
So\ierdeci.ronwas behindrhe \oflh Korea,'
anack,but no one believedthat Nonh Vietnam
was an agentof the Soviel Union. In view of
Chinas advocacyof anti-American
.evolutions
lbr nalional
liberarion.
ir wd\ moreplau\ibleto
a r g u et h a t r h e N o r t hV i e r n a m e saen d r h e i r
sourhern
alhes$ere underChtnese
rnfluenc€
Bul lhr\ wasnor convrncingbecause
of rhe Ler,
l i m i r e dC h r n e s a
e r d t o N o r r h\ i e l n a ma n d
because
of Vietnamshistoricanimosilytoward
China. North Vietnamseemedreally ro be an
independent
actor.Thus officially. Washington
was able to emphasizeonly North Vielnamese
ageression
roqardSouthVieham. Bur thir wa,
norso appeaienl
either .incerle war rn Vrelnar..
was a guerillawar. Therewas no dramatic
In\a.ronof rhe Sourhby reguldrViernamese
troops.Most of the North Vieinamesesoldiers
sneakedinto SouthVieham underthe guiseof
SouthVietnamese
NationalLiberaiionfi ghters.
The Llniied Slatespublic and the Congress
supported
milira') rnrol\emenrin Vrernamar
fi^l desprrerhe lack ol a sen'eol 'eriousrhreal
^ r o f o \ e , l a g g r e s . i okno m N o r t hV r e t n a n , .
be.cdu,e
Ameri\an.hudh€fn accu(romed
b) lhal
time lo the useof Americanmilitary forcesto
conhin communi(e\pan<ronin \ario ( panr of
4. Th€ Un cd Statesand the Vietnam War
rheworld Be.auseof the absence
cf a 1engeof
The VietnamWar wasquitedifferentfiom
seriousthreal,however,lheycouldnot suppona
r h e K o r e d nw a r . I r d € \ e l . p e d' n d ' . s r m r l a r ldrge-\(dle
$ai in Vielnamfor lone.panrcularlr
crrcum(lan(es
anddrl,eredIn narureThe Cold a war fouehrwirh a largearm) ofdafted )ourh\
war In Eur^penrbrli/ed akerrheerecronol rhc Be.ausea guedllawar was not rhekind of war
B e r l r nW a l l I n I q 6 l . I e n , r o n isn U S S o \ r e r r h eU n i r e dS r a r ec\ o u l df i g h rs i r h { t i l l . r h r
relations.which had reacheda pent during the ( n i l e d S l a r e !$ a \ u n a b l er o $ r n r h e s a r
Cubanmissilecrisis of 1962,were greally Alrhouph
rheUn ed Srare\
hadaronerimemorc
reducedin 1963.when the partial nucleartest than500.000\oldrer,rn SourhVietndm.ir farled
ban trearywas signedby the UniredStates.ihe I n i ' . p a . ' f ) r n Bm i ' . i o n A m e r c r n .h e g a nr o
SovietUnion ,nd GreatB.itain.Many spokeof
questionthe moralandpracticalbasisof lhe
t h e e n do l r h eC o l d W a r M e a n $ h r l eS, r n o - Vietnam War. To cope with the rise of a
Sovietrelationshad visibly deleriorated.
Since vigorousantiwarmovemenland the declineof
domestic support for ihe war, the NixoD
adfixnrstrafion
fouodrt necessary
lo subsranfiallr
reducesU.S. forces in Vietnam well before the
armisticeagreementwas finally signedin
January1973.The armisticewasrcallya victory
for the North Vietnamese.They succe€ded
in
absorbing
SouthVietnamin litde morelhantwo
years.Bul theirvicrorylumedout to be dn empr,
one.They wem on to wagea war in Cambodia10
inrralld govemmenr
of theirchoice Meanwhilr.
rheylet man' Viemamese
leare the caunr) as
"boat
people." Engagedin war perpetuallyand
rsolared
from lhe sorld rexceprlor the Soviel
Union), the Vietnameseremainedmired in a
p o \ e r r , r h a r c o n t r a s t e sd h a r p l yw i r h l h e
prosperitythe ASEAN nauonsacbjevedin rhe
1980s.Vietnamesevictory was the last hurrah
for revolulions of national liberation. After
Vietnam,suchrevolutionslost their charmfor
sastedsizable
$e Third World. The Americatrs
resourcesin the Vietnam War, but the
Vrernamese
lost muchmore lor a v n victory
This was lhe tragic irony of the Vielnam War.
Juslai lhe outbreakof lhe KoreanWar had
triggeredthe militarizatiorof U.S. foreign
policy, failure in Vietnam led to a degreeof
RichardNixon and Henry
demilitarization.
Kissinger begana new policy toward lhe
Conmunist World. which emphasiz€dthe useof
crearivediplomac)as its instrum€nrDrring the
Vietnam War, the United Soles did not call on
Japanlo male an actire militarycontriburionro
the Vietnam War, uoderstandingthe latter's
limirations.
Bul ir neededmore
\'onsrirurional
acti\e polrrcal .uppon from Japanfor r!. tasl
Asian poticy. Partly to secureJapanas a
permanenlally, the Johnsonadministration
promisedJapanthat the t nrtedSlatesqoutd
return Okinawa to Japanin the near future.
Nixon's decisionto disengagegraduallyfrom
V r e r n a mf a c i l i r a l e dt h e e a r l ) r e r e r s i o no f
OLrna$r.Ihusther$o hor" uarsIn Asrdhad
considerableimpact upon the politi€al fate of
O l , ' n a w aT h e r e \ e r . i o n ,h o $ e \ e r ,d i d n o r
complerely
sansb LheOhnaqanswho wr'hedro
seeU.S. basesmuchreducedin the islands.
Nevertheless,it tamed the anti-American
movementin both OkinawaandJapanproper.
1972 A Grral Turning Poinl in Asi.Pacific International RcLtions
In 1972, Nixon s new policy toward the
Communist World marked a dramatic
de\elopmenr.
Hr{ vrsrtro Chrnasrgnaled
theend
o{ the U.S.-Chinese
cold war. Hrs summnwrth
Brezhne!openeda neu phaseof U.S.-Sovier
d6tente.The impa€t of Nixon s new poli€y was
lrnntedin Europe.for wesr Europeancountnes
had achieved!he[ o$n detenlewirh the Soviet
Union and other EastEurcpeanneighbors.Its
impacrsas muchgreaF in E.sr Asia.for SioaAmericanantagonirmhasbern a very imponant
factor in EastAsian intemationalrelations.
T h e s u d d e na n n o u n c e m e nolf w h a l
appealedro be Sino-Americanrapprochemenr
withoutany prior noticeor consultatjon
in l9?1
was a shock to Japanand other Arnerican allies
In EastAsia But the Chineseleadership
wa!
interestedin blrilding up relationswith Japanas
well as the United Statesto improve the
diplomaticpositionof rheircounlry.qhich was
in a cold sar $ith $e SovierUnion.Because
of
the Sino-American rapproachement,Japan felt
free to seek to establish formal diplomatic
relation with the People'sRepublicof China,
severingits diplomatic relationshipwith the
Nationalist regime in Taiwan. Wilh the
establishmentof diplomatic relations in
Seprembe'
1o72.rhepenodin wtuchtheU S.JapanSecu||lyTrearyhad beenincompatible
with Sino-Japanese
friendshipwas over. This
changealsomellowedthe conflictsin Japanese
domesri.polincs.The only rernainingcold war
in East Asia appearedto be the Siro-Soviet cold
wa, lndochrnaafrerde VrehamWar beramea
theaterof this Sino-Sovietconflict. in which the
Soviet Union cameto supportVietnamese
expansionismwhile China was vigorously
opposedto it.
5.
6. Th€ lmpact of th€ End of the European
Cold War on Asis
Taling advanrdge
of rherelucknceof postIn Third world
VrctIIamUnxedSrarelinrervene
countries.the Soviel Union tried actively to
e x r e n dr t J i n u e n c e' n l h e T h i r d w o r l d ,
involvingitself in conflictsin Tbird World
countries.Sucha policy seemedto extendfte
Sovietsphere.Bur ir I
nnancial burd€nat4
led the Soviersioto
war.The Sovieterp.
which reachediri cnh
rntervention,provol
iDcreaseits defensca
countermeasur€s
ir ti
Soviel relationsfcll ir
''new
cold war. itr I
The United Srricr
destabilizingrhe Sor
th€ variouscouotaic
SovielUnion, whid
revolutionary forcca I
rcgimes.
Meanrvhile,coi
place in the dorncli
policy of the Peopl
develop trade rcl.ti
capiblisl nationsad I
&Destic economy.Tl
Soviet Union, oo ll
stagnaniin rbe | 9?l
economiesof iddrt
r€coverliom dE twoa
grys in technololi.d
betweentb. Wca d
visible. Thc .r& a
leadersbip to rlia t
Gorbachev Rcvol
developmentof *lia
demisenot only of tb
Soviet Union irselt
This developrE
llie structureof inrr!
Its impact on intaroti
was considerable,bl
comparedwith the gG
all, lhe presenceof |h
lessimportantin Eii,
Sovier rivalry ws odt
of iniernationalreldir
the cold war femolq
EastAsian intematia
reorlenlationof So
peacefuldirecrioo &
the SovietChinescco
counfrieswhich inl|.d
t5
Sovietsphere.
But ir alsoincreased
thecounrryb the Soviet Union is still uncerlain.Whatevcr
linancralbu'denand.In rheca5eof At8hanr$an. happenr.
ho$e\er.ir will nnrshalehasrAsraiu
led the Sovielsinto a prolongedanri-guerilla profoundlyasit will shakeEurope.
war lhe So\iere\pansronisr
dnveot rhe to70..
Changesin EasternEuropeand rhe Sovier
which rcachedits culminarionin the Afghanistan Uniondid not bring sinilar changesamongthe
rnte.vention,
provokedthe United Sraresio
cormunirls|ales
In A{u OnlyMongolia.
$hrch
iocreaseits defenseexpendituresagain and rake had beena client staleof the SovietUnion,
countermeasure\
in rhe lhrrd world. Ihus u s experienced
a democraricrevolurionwhich
Soviel relationsfell into a stateone mighl term a
encled
the
one-pany
conrol of rhe Communists.
''nes
cold sal in rhetrrsrhalrot the t980s. China was affected by the fever of democracy,
T h e U n r t e d S t a l e . p u r s u e da p o t i c ) o f
bur it managedro maintain the authoritarian
desrabilizingthe Sovier-supponed
regimesin
regine of ihe Coffnunist Pany by suppressing
lbe !ariou( counrries.
tradrngplacess h rhr
r h ed e m o ( r a r ia. c r v i s t sA l l h o u g ht h e W e s r
SovrerUnion whrch had previoust)hetped imposedm'ld econonuc
sanclrons
uponChina
revolutionaryforcesdesrabilizeU.S.-supported a f t e rr h eT r a n a n m em
n a s s a c r leh, e C h i n e s (
regimes,
leadership
continuedthe policy of developinga
Meanwhile,considerablechangewas raking narket economy.and receotly has confiro|ed its
place in the domestic and foreign economic commitment
to thepolicy.
policy of lhe Peoples Republic. It began ro
One-partyrule has survivedalso in Norrh
develop trade relations vigorously with the Korea and Vietnam. However, this does not
capitalist nationsand build up a market-oriented meanthar$e endot theCold waj did nol atfect
domesticeconomy.The plannedeconon) ot lh.
North Korea and Vietnam.The SovierUnion,
Soviet Union. on rhe other hand. was rarher later Russia.and East Europeancountries
stagnantin the 1970sand 1980s.When rhc developed
rela||on\wirh SourhKorea,andthe
economiesof industrialdemocraciesbeganto
PeoplesRepublic.
loo. beganto tradewith rhe
rccoverfrom therwo oil shocksofthe 1970s,fie
South Koreans,Spuned by th€sedevelopinenb,
gapsjo technological
and producrivecapabilitj poliricall)rsolared
andeconomically
stagnant
betweenthe West and rhe Soviet Union b€came Nonh Koreabeganro aremprto 'mpro!e its
v i s i b l e T h e r u d ea w a k e n r nogt l h e S o v r e l relationswirh rhe Unired Sta@sand Japan.lt
leadership
l o l h i s t a c r b r o u g h rt o r r h t h e becamemoreseriousaboutdeveloping
dralogue
C o r b a c h e vR e v o l u r i o n .r h e u n e x p e c t e d wiih the republicin the south.Viernam,which
developmentof which finally resulredin rhe had beeninvolvedio a war in Cambodiawith
dennseooronl) ol theSovierblocburalsoo, fie
Soviet aid, beganto pursuea more peaceful
SovietUnion itself.
policy in Cambodiaand a policy of economic
Thrsdevelopmenl
tundamenrally
chantsed developn€ntat home.The poveny of war,wearf
the structureof inremalional
reldtioh in Lurope Vietnam has contrastedsharply with rhe
Ils impacton inlematronai
relaLions
In EasrAsra prosperous
ASEAN countries
in rhepastdecade.
was considerable.
but very limired in scope I n r e c e n yr e a r , .V i e l n a mh a sr m p r o v e di r r
comparedwirh lhe grearchangein Europe.After
relationswith ASEAN countriesand Japanand
all, the presenceof the Soviet Union was much expressedirs hope lo esiablishdiplomatic
lessimporlanrIn L3slAciarhnnin EuropeI S
relationswith rhe UniGd Srates.Thus tensions
Sovierrivalr) ws or y pan of rhe wholepicrure have be€nreducedin both the Korean peninsula
of inremarional
relationsrn Fa!l Asia.Theendol
the Cold War removedrhis sourceof rensionin
Sincethe Unired Staresno longerregatds
EastAsian intemationalrelarions.corbachev's the Russiannavy as a menacein the Pa€ifi!,
reorientationof Soviet foreign policy in a
Wa:hingronhds lo.r Inlereslrn \ecuflngthe
peacefuldirection also b.ought forth the end of
m'lrtar} bd\e. !n rhe Pfirhpprne.
ar a highpnce
lbe Sovier-Chrnese
cold war The rurureot lh(
wd'hrnglondppearqro rhinl rr can afford a
countrieswhich inhericd the var.iousportions of
parridlmilitarywrrhdraqdlfrom Asia.In thrs
16
situation.Washingtonhad betterconsiderscajing
dowr the U.S.militarypresence
in Okinawa.As
theFrlipino. weremoreinclinedl. end the t .5.
milita4 pre\enlealterthe endof rheCold \\ dr.
the passingof the Cold War era has certainly
strengthened
the desireof the p€oplein Okinawa
to reducethe sizeof the U.S.military facilities
whichstill oc€upymuchoftheir land.
The end of the Cotd War did not bring to
Easl Asia sucha victory of liberal democratic
rdealsas turope wrtnessed.
Evenamon! rh(
nor-communiststates,liberal demo€racydoes
not yet prevail. On lhe other hand.the end of the
Cold War has not producedin East Asia su€ha
stateof profound confusionas now exists in
Yugocla!ia
or suchpolili\alinsrabilrry
as noL
lhrcatensRussia-Thus the intemational scenein
EasrAsraseemsto be morelereneLhanftar of
Europe. But Europe has a framework of
c o o p e r a r i oinn l h c f o r m so f t h e L u r o p e a n
commuruty
md NAIO. whichdeveloped
duflne
tbe Cold War era. The importanceof NATO is
declining.bui the EC will remain as the core
srahift7rng
forcein posrCold War tu'ope \onc o m m u n i s lc o u n r r i e si n E a s r A r i a d r d
not develop a solid generalframeworkof
cooperationwhich can serve as the core
stabilizing force. Besides,countriesin East Asia
do nol sharea commonpoliri.rl and cullural
tradition. Although there are somepromising
&velopmenls.suchas APEC.ir i( moredifficulr
to institutionalizecooperative
relationsin Easr
A.ia Thereforerr rs imponantfor ldpanandfie
Uniled Statesto maintaincooperative
relations
a. lhe coresrabiliTjng
forcein posr-Cold
War
Ersl Asia.Howerer,lhe end of lhe Cold War
deprived U.S.-Japaoese
relatjons of a lid on
e c o n o m i cf r i c r i o n .G i \ e n r h e i n c r e a s i n g l t
Inuard-lookrng
tendenc)of IheAmencanpubliL
i r i r ' o m e q h a dr o u b t f u\l h e r h e lrh e U n i r e d
Staleswill havemuch intereslin forminga
c o o p e r art e
r framesor\ [or Asia-Pacific
intemational relations in the future. The end of
the Cold War also removeda strategiclink
from U.S.-Chinese
relations.Togetherwith
theTiananmenincideni, the end of the Cold War
wealened['S intereslin closerelarions
wirh
China.Having improvedrelationswith Russia
China. too, considersftiendly relations with the
UniledSraterles5importanrWhile lherearr
movemenrs[or closerrelaronshrpsamong
nationsin the Asia-Pacificrcgion. therearc also
c e n t r ' t u ! a lt o r c e s a f f e c t i n f o n c e c l o s e r
relarionshrps
amonglhern Alfiough lherei! noL
no acutecrisis in East Asia, thereare clouds
shich ma\e the luturerhapeol Asia Pacific
intemationalrelationsunceltain.
Nore In rhrspaper.lJ|e
Cold !!ar betweenU.Sled weslembloc and Sovietled communistblo€
is capitalized.When the tern is used io sucb a
'U,S.-Chinese
contextas the
cold war' or the
'Sino-Soviet
cold war,' it is written in small
letten.
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