CHAPTER 2
FAMILY CRISIS AND THE DEMOGRAPHIC
SITUATION IN RUSSIA:
THE MAIN TENDENCIES AND PERSPECTIVES
Victor M. Medkov
Associate Professor of Sociology, Moscow State University
Russia
This report seeks to analyze the demographic processes in Russia in the
final decade of the twentieth century and at the beginning of the new century and to make projections for change in the next 50 years.
Russia is now in a period of very deep and accelerating depopulation. 1
The character and dynamics of the demographic processes in Russia, especially of fertility, do not depend on the concrete peculiarities of economic
and social development, as much as on global processes that have a universal character. First of all, and in particular, changes in the place and role of
the social institution of the family in society, changes which are referred to
as the institutional crisis of the family, have been brought about by a fundamental restructuring of the whole economic structure of Russian society and
by a transition to an industrial and post-industrial economy. In addition, it is
impossible to negate the fact that the specific character of the transition period Russia has experienced has influenced the demographic processes:
foremost mortality, but also marriage and divorce rates.
Depopulation in Russia began at the beginning of the 1990s after the
potential for demographic growth was exhausted, which potential was latent
in the demographic structure. The population of Russia began to decline at
that time due to a negative natural increase, i.e. the number of deaths exceeding the number of births. According to data of the 2002 census, the resident population of Russia is near 145.2 million, or 1.8 million less than in
1989. 2
However, this data disguises the negative character of population dynamics in Russia. Since 1992, the population of Russia has declined by several hundred thousand every year. In summary, it is an ultra-high natural
diminution. (table 1 & diagram 1). If the total diminution between 1991 and
2005 is -5.5 million, then natural diminution is -11.0 million, and net migration is +5.5 million (See Table 1).
20
Chapter 2 - Medkov
Table 1
Components of de facto Russian Population
Changes. 1990-2005. In 1000 3
Years
Population,
as of 1st
January
Annual change
Total
increase
Natural
increase
Net
migration
Population
as of 31st
December
1990
147665.1
608.6
333.6
275.0
148273.7
1991
148273.7
241.0
104.9
136.1
148514.7
1992
148514.7
47.0
-219.2
266.2
148561.7
1993
148561.7
-205.8
-732.1
526.3
148355.9
1994
148355.9
104.0
-874.0
978.0
148459.9
1995
148459.9
-168.3
-822.0
653.7
148291.6
1996
148291.6
-263.0
-776.5
513.5
148028.6
1997
148028.6
-226.5
-740.6
514.1
147802.1
1998
147802.1
-262.7
-691.5
428.8
147539.4
1999
147539.4
-649.3
-918.8
269.5
146890.1
2000
146890.1
-586.5
-949.1
362.6
146303.6
2001
146303.6
-654.2
-932.7
278.5
145649.4
2002
145649.4
-685.7
-916.5
230.8
144963.7
2003
144963.7
-795.4
-888.5
93.1
144168.2
2004
144168.2
-694.0
-792.9
98.9
143474.2
2005
143474.2
-735.5
-843.0
107,5
142738,7
The character and tendencies of population reproduction in Russia and
the modern demographic situation in the country are largely defined by the
features that characterize the global family crisis and which have occurred
in all advanced countries since the middle of the last century. Low marriage
and fertility rates combined with a high divorce rate clearly contribute to the
population decline, but family breakdown also contributes to a high mortality rate, as intra-family conflicts and disputes destabilize families and negatively affect the health of their members, contributing, at least, to the rising
national disease and death rates.
The present report is devoted to current conditions and the prospects for
fertility, whose ultra-low level is a major factor in the depopulation in Russia. However, this report will also pause briefly to examine the modern
trends and prospects for the mortality, marriage and divorce rates, as well as
changes in the marital and family structure of the population
Marriage in Central Europe
21
Diagram 1.
Components of Population Changes, 1990-2005 4
1000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
In 1000
200
100
natural increase
net migration
0
-100
-200
-300
-400
-500
-600
-700
-800
-900
-1000
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Years
.
Table 2.
Marital Status of Russian Population, 1979-2002.
(per 1000 aged 16 & more) 5
Single
Married
Widowed
Divorced
and separated
Years
Male
1979
233
708
19
39
1989
196
718
25
57
2002
251
626
36
76
Female
1979
158
569
198
74
1989
132
598
182
85
2002
175
526
180
110
The marital-family structure summarizes interaction of the basic demographic processes, reflecting changes not only in the marriage and divorce
rates but also fertility, mortality, and migration rate. The trends in latest data
22
Chapter 2 - Medkov
on family structure of Russia were obtained from the general population
census which was conducted in October, 2002 (table 2).
The census data have reflected those negative processes which took
place in the life of the Russian family at the end of the past and the beginning of present centuries. These data reflect an increase of crisis phenomena
in family life, refusal of an increasing share of men and women to enter into
marriage, and a rising preference for so-called “alternative” forms of home
life. We see here a social problem with rather serious and disturbing consequences.
First of all, one’s attention is drawn to the reduction in the number of
marriage pairs. The 1989 census showed 36 million marriage pairs. In 2002
the number was down by 2 million (34 million). Thus, one tenth part of all
marriage pairs, or about 3 million, were cohabitations (officially not registered marriages). The data on the number of cohabitations was gathered for
the first time; it cannot be compared to numbers in Russia in former years,
except for the sample data of a microcensus of 1994 when the share of cohabitations was 6%. We can safely assume that earlier, i.e. both in 1989 and
in 1979 when the previous general population censuses were carried out, the
number and proportion of cohabitations were less than in 2002.
From the sociological point of view, the presence or absence of official
registration of marriages, their legal registration, is an extremely important
indicator of the condition of the family as a social institution. Growth in the
number of cases observed in the last decade in the proportion of those who
refuse official registration of a marriage, but instead form cohabitations,
testifies (together with other similar phenomena) to an ongoing deep crisis
of family, degradation of the value placed on familism, and the aggravated
levels of public problems and deviant forms of social behavior. The opportunity to live in cohabitation arrangements, without legitimization of marriage, corrodes the public consciousness of the value of a legal marriage and
family as social establishments with unique normative value as a form of
living life together.
The 2002 census showed a further reduction in the number and densities of the married population, and corresponding growth in the number and
proportion of divorced and widowed: for every 1000 in the population aged
16 and older, 210 were never married (1989 – 161); 572 – married (1989 –
653); 114 – widowed (1989 – 110); 94 – dissolved (1989 – 72). These tendencies were shown at practically all ages. Both among men and women the
share married had decreased simultaneously with the increase in the proportion never married, widowed and especially dissolved (table 3 and diagrams
3 and 4). The only exception is the adult females age 65-69 years and 70
years and older where for the intercensal period the share married has grown
by 11 and 41% respectively.
Growth in the proportion of never married men was especially drastic.
In the overall population of men aged 15 years and older, this share has increased by 28.1% in the age of 25-29 years, and increase of 67.3%, in the
age of 30-34 years— 60.0%, in the age of 35-39 years – 47.1%, in the age of
40-44 years – 51.1%, in the age of 45-49 years – 45.9%, in the age of 50-54
years – 53.8% and in the age of 55-59 years – 76.5%.
For women corresponding growth rates were 32.6%, 82.5%, 58.0%,
28.3%, 13.3%, 31.4%, 30.3%. Only in last age groups named above did the
share of never married decrease by 7.1%.
Marriage in Central Europe
23
These dry figures speak better than any words, if not about “flight from
marriage,” about an essential reduction in motivation to enter it. Thus, in
such dynamics of marriage structure of the population over the course of
two centuries, we see the role global factors have played in the crisis of the
family as social institution (addressed in terms of long-term tendencies of
decreasing proportions of married and increasing shares never married and
dissolved, similar to what take place in other advanced countries), and the
specific factors of the Russian case—first of all, unreasoned and hasty reforms, which caused an impoverishment of huge sectors of the population,
growth of economic, social and political instability in the country, and a loss
by many people of a feeling of confidence so necessary for all in looking to
the future.
As a result, too many searched for an escape from the harsh conditions
of the 1990s by refusing the enter into a marriage, or if they already were
married, in its cancellation, in divorce.
The marked tendencies of change in the marriage structure of the Russian population are described above. The patterns are similar to what is observed in other advanced countries, reflecting a deepening global crisis of
the family.
Table 3.
Marital Structure of Russian Population, Censuses 1989 &
2002
(per 1000 population by age and sex)
Male
Single
Population
aged 16 and
older
16-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70 +
Married
Widowed
Divorced and
separated
1989
2002
1989
2002
1989
2002
1989
2002
196
251
718
626
25
36
56
76
964
595
208
105
68
47
37
26
17
12
11
9
968
736
348
168
100
71
54
40
30
24
17
10
30
381
741
821
840
845
847
863
880
878
863
748
15
238
576
708
763
789
802
811
815
811
809
712
0
0
1
2
4
8
16
25
41
65
93
223
0
0
1
3
6
11
18
31
47
86
118
246
1
15
44
69
85
97
97
83
60
42
29
16
1
13
61
107
119
120
118
109
97
72
51
26
24
Chapter 2 - Medkov
Female
Single
Population
aged 16 and
older
16-19
20-24
25-29
30-34
35-39
40-44
45-49
50-54
55-59
60-64
65-69
70 +
Married
Widowed
Divorced and
separated
1989
2002
1989
2002
1989
2002
1989
2002
132
175
598
526
182
180
85
110
856
335
120
69
53
45
35
33
42
57
71
47
910
526
219
109
68
51
46
43
39
32
34
52
134
618
798
822
804
772
737
708
636
532
399
162
73
423
654
706
724
721
698
656
599
520
444
229
1
3
7
13
25
43
84
128
214
318
455
752
0
3
11
22
37
56
86
136
204
324
425
658
4
38
71
93
116
137
141
129
105
90
71
34
3
36
106
152
162
164
163
157
148
116
91
54
Note: The sum in the lines for 1989 is less 1000 since in that year the additional category of persons with “unknown” marriage status was added.
Diagram 2.
Change of percentage married population between 1989 and
2002, %%
150.0
140.0
130.0
120.0
110.0
100.0
90.0
80.0
70.0
60.0
50.0
40.0
The dynamics of family structure in the Russian population also reflect
an increase in crisis phenomena in this major sphere of human life. The
2002 census for the first time in post-war history of domestic statistics fixed
the number and dynamics of households, instead of families as it was in
Marriage in Central Europe
25
prior years. However, having excluded single households, it is possible to
obtain data on families, and accordingly, to reveal dynamics of change in
their structure and sizes. In table 4 the data on the number of families and
their grouping by size are shown according to population censuses of 19592002.
Diagram 3.
Change of Percentage Divorced and Separated Population
between 1989 and 2002, %%
80.0
71.4
70.0
63.4
60.0
49.3
50.0
40.0
55.1
38.6
31.3
23.7
20.0
10.0
0.0
-10.0
-20.0
-30.0
19.7
0.0
62.5
58.8
40.0
39.7
30.0
75.9
61.7
21.6
41.0
21.7
28.2
28.9
15.6
-5.3
16-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49 50-54 55-59 60-64 65-69 70 и
более
-13.3
-25.0
Male
Female
Table 4.
Number of Families and Family Size, Censuses 1959-2000.
Years
of
Census
Number
of
Families
including with membership
‰‰
2
3
4
5 & more
Mean
family
size
Total
1959
28529
267
266
218
249
3.60
1970
32617
265
279
249
206
3.48
1979
36725
316
315
234
135
3.24
1989
40246
342
28
252
126
3.21
2002
40965
355
306
218
121
3.20
Urban
1959
15113
272
293
231
204
3.45
1970
20732
26
315
268
157
3.38
26
Chapter 2 - Medkov
1979
25560
305
339
246
110
3.21
1989
29663
331
296
261
112
3.19
2002
30464
357
322
217
104
3.14
Rural
1959
13416
261
236
203
30
3.75
1970
11885
273
218
216
293
3.73
1979
11165
342
263
207
188
3.35
1989
10583
372
236
228
164
3.28
2002
10501
349
260
222
169
3.35
These tables identify the basic changes which have occurred in the Russian family over the second half of the last century. Attention is first drawn
to the growth in the number of families. For the period from 1959 to 2002,
the number of families grew by 43.6%, including an urban population
growth of 101.6%, and a reduction in the number of families in the agricultural population of 21.7%. Growth in the number of families during this
period outstripped growth of the population, which indicates some growth in
nuptiality, and a process of nuclearization as young families branch off from
their families of origin. Growth in the number of city families has been
caused by the process of urbanization combined with migration of the agricultural population (basically youth) to cities. Virtually as a mirror reflection of the rapid growth of the number of city families was the decrease in
the number of rural families, which was more rapid than the number by
which the agricultural population decreased. The growth in the number of
families in Russia for 1959-2002 (primary factor) and their nuclearization
was accompanied by a moderate reduction in their number, both caused by a
decrease in fertility. The average size of all families has decreased by 0.40
persons, city – by 0.31 persons, and rural – also by 0.40 persons. This draws
attention to the growth in medium-sized rural families during the period
between censuses in 1989 and 2002.
In the opinion of some experts, this small deviation from the former
tendency can be explained by focusing on the first half of the 1990s and the
increasing difficulties during this period in young families’ ability to purchase a dwelling, especially as compared to the traditional free-of-charge
distribution of apartments both in city and in rural villages. The transition in
the housing sphere to the so-called “market attitude” has had the result that
the overwhelming majority of families, especially the young, are not capable
of purchasing an apartment or house. This has slightly slowed down rates of
nuclearization of both urban and rural families. But in the city district
понижательный the effect of the decrease in fertility was higher than the
braking influence on the decrease in the speed of nuclearization. As a result,
the average family size in cities has continued to fall while in the countryside, family size has increased slightly. However this moderate increase in
rural family size—the phenomena that appear to be the primary factors in
determining the average size of family (reduction of fertility and nucleariza-
Marriage in Central Europe
27
tion of families)—have not ceased to operate. The accelerating rate of decrease in fertility in villages is resulting in some slowing in nuclearization.
The second feature of changes of family structure in the Russian population is its primitivization, its transition to a sad monotony dominated by
“одно-единственного,” the statistical family type of simple family and
marriage pair without children. All these features of modern family dynamics (decrease in fertility, nuclearization and primitivization) are expressions
of a crisis of the family as a social institute and occur globally.
The marital and family structure of population migration are a result of
a complex interaction of practically all demographic processes, but all of
these processes are affected by the basic formational processes of nuptiality,
the divorce rate and fertility. Tendencies and prospects of fertility will be
considered in detail below. Here in brief we shall pause to consider tendencies in nuptiality and divorce rate.
Table 5.
Marriages and Crude Marriage Rate in Russia, 1960-2005 6
Crude
Crude
Crude
MarrMarrMarrmarriage
marriage
marriage
Years iages
Years iages
Years iages
rate
rate
rate
(In 1000)
(In 1000)
(In 1000)
(‰)
(‰)
(‰)
1960
1499.6
12.5
1976 1448.7
10.7
1992 1053.7
7.1
1961
1354.5
11.1
1977 1521.4
11.2
1993 1106.7
7.5
1962
1239.0
10.1
1978 1514.6
11.1
1994 1080.6
7.4
1963
1132.4
9.1
1979 1535.5
11.1
1995 1075.2
7.3
1964
1083.1
8.6
1980 1464.6
10.6
1996
866.7
5.9
1965
1097.6
8.7
1981 1472.6
10.6
1997
928.4
6.3
1966
1146.9
9.0
1982 1460.2
10.4
1998
848.7
5.8
1967
1164.8
9.1
1983 1479.1
10.5
1999
911.2
6.3
1968
1168.4
9.1
1984 1367.8
9.6
2000
897.3
6.2
1969
1254.0
9.7
1985 1389.4
9.7
2001 1001.6
7.0
1970
1319.2
10.1
1986 1417.5
9.8
2002 1020.0
7.1
1971
1358.4
10.4
1987 1442.6
9.9
2003 1091.8
7.6
1972
1318.3
10.0
1988 1397.4
9.5
2004
979.7
6.8
1973
1398.5
10.6
1989 1384.3
9.4
2005 1066.4
6.8
1974
1449.3
10.9
1990 1319.9
8.9
1975
1495.8
11.1
1991 1277.2
8.6
Table 5 displays data on the absolute number of marriages and the general factor nuptiality in Russia for the period 1960-2005. Notable here is the
long-term declining trend in nuptiality.
This tendency showed a dramatic drop starting in the 1990s. If in the
period 1960-1980 the primary factor influencing nuptiality was changes in
age-structure associated with changes in fertility, then by the 1990s this factor had decreased so strongly that it was already impossible to explain this
28
Chapter 2 - Medkov
additional rate of decline as resulting simply from demographic waves. During this period the already declining rate of nuptiality declined suddenly
even further, that is the marital behavior of the population changed, the desire to enter into registered marriage and the realization of this desire both
declined markedly.
The reason for this is the social and economic crisis of 1990, and the
gradual transition of the population of Russia to a so-called European type
of nuptiality marked by a higher age average of first marriage and a higher
proportion of so-called final celibacy. A certain role in the dynamics of nuptiality has also been played, probably, by the rising number of unregistered
marriages to which the rapid rise in illegitimate births indirectly testifies. At
present in Russia almost 30 percent of all births occur outside of a registered
marriage.
Since 2001 some increase in the absolute number of marriages and in
the general factor of nuptiality has been observed. However, this increase
should not be perceived as real growth in nuptiality. A generation of people
born in the first half of the 1980s, when there was a rise of number of births,
is now entering the age of maximum nuptiality. The age structures of the
population connected to the dynamics and real growth in fertility were stimulated by measures of social policy accepted at the time, which provided
direct assistance to families having children. It soon (already by 2004) became clear, that the “rise in nuptiality” is actually a phantom.
The dynamics of the parameters of potential nuptiality, which takes into
account the interrelation of male and female nuptiality, in particular, has
been developed by the Russian demographer, A.B. Sinelnikov. These parameters are determined in relation to the maximal number of marriages theoretically possible during a given period (within or close to a population census). This number, in turn, is defined on the basis of the data on number and
age structure of the male and female population, proportions not married,
and a rough parity of age between possible grooms and brides. One valuable
feature of these parameters is that they can provide an initial estimation of
the role of marital behavior in the formation of a statistically observable
level of nuptiality.
The first of these parameters is the potential general factor of nuptiality, equal to the level of the greatest possible number of marriages in the
mid-year population. The second, a degree of realization of additional potential nuptiality is equal to the actual number of marriages divided by the
potential number. This last parameter is free from the influence of demographic structure and can be considered therefore as one of the characteristics of marital behavior; it is more exact than is its contribution to an observable level in the general factor of nuptiality.
Table 6 covers the years close to population censuses 1959, 1970, 1979
and 1989 and shows the values of the parameters of potential nuptiality provided in the 1994 microcensus, designed by A.B. Sinelnikov. By Sinelnikov's calculations, in 1993-1994 it was theoretically possible to conclude
11,241 thousand marriages. The actual number of marriages was equal to
1,094 thousand or only 9.7% of the greatest possible number. As is apparent
from table 6, this value is the smallest for all periods examined. Unfortunately, a direct calculation of the degree of realization of potential nuptiality
for the years close to census of 2002 is impossible, since Rosstat stopped the
publication of data dealing with age at marriage after 1997. It is necessary to
Marriage in Central Europe
29
point out, that Russian demographic statistics have experienced a period of
degradation, and are now equivalent to the level of the XIX century.
Years
Crude marriage
rate, ‰‰
Real
1958-1959
1969-1970
1978-1979
1988-1989
1993-1994
12.4
9.9
11.1
9.5
7.4
Potential
55.4
51.6
62.7
66.2
75.8
Realization of
marriage potential,%%
Table 6.
Realization of Marriage’s Potential between Censuses19581994,%%. 7
22.4
19.2
17.7
14.3
9.7
Change of level of realization
of marriage’s potential between censuses,
%%
Total
Year’s mean
–
-3.2
-1.5
-3.4
-4.6
–
-0.29
-0.17
-0.34
-0.92
The data in table 6 speak about an increasing flight of increasing number of men and women from marriage, that is, about the radical changes of
marital behavior which have no analogues in the past, where fluctuations in
the parameters of nuptiality in many respects are connected to putting off of
the first and repeated marriages due to these or other reasons, more often
extraordinary character.
Thus, as compared to the countries of the West, in Russia people talk no
about “replacement” as some experts believe, of registered, “lawful” marriages with cohabitations, “illegal” marriages. These dynamics of realization
in potential nuptiality, this character of change in marital behavior, demonstrate an increase in our country, as in other advanced countries where this
phenomenon has been advancing for 20-30 years, in the crisis of family as
social institution. If we do not realize that the question is one of crisis in the
evolution of marriage and family, if we are not consoled in a pleasant and
soothing idea that Russia in this respect is simply following the pattern of
the countries of the West and that path is one of “progress,” it is necessary
to recognize, that a continuation of similar dynamics in nuptiality is fraught
with serious consequences. According to a fair comment by В.А. Borissov
and А.B. Sinelnikov, so-called “alternative” forms of family and marriage
“are completely unable to provide either reproduction of the population or
normal education of rising generations.” It is to solve those problems that
humanity actually” invented” this unique social institution—family.
In parallel to the decrease in nuptiality in Russia there is a growth in the
divorce rate, reflecting action in both long-term factors in the crisis of family, and in pragmatic factors connected to a sharp fall in the standard of living of the majority of the population.
The data on dynamics of absolute numbers of divorces and the general
factors of divorce rate in Russia in period 1970- 000 are shown in table 7.
As is apparent from the table, for this entire period there has been a steady
growth both in the absolute number of divorces, and in the general divorce
rate. However inside this dynamic, the divorce rate was non-uniform, reflecting both fluctuations in the numbers of divorces and changes in number
and structure of the population. Fast growth in the divorce rate in 1970 was
30
Chapter 2 - Medkov
replaced by its relative stabilization in 1980 and a new prompt rise in 1990th.
This last rise, most likely, is due to economic reasons, namely the sharp fall
in the standard of living in the first half of that decade. Some stabilization in
the economic situation of the majority of families after 1994 caused a decrease in the divorce rate, but the default of 1998 has caused another new
rise. Besides the effect of the decrease in fertility in increasing the share of
childless and однодетных families in the population, it is probably also, as
is known, one of the factors in the rising divorce rate. In a result, as is apparent from table 8, in 2001 the number of divorces and accordingly the
general factor of divorce rate reached their historical maximum.
Table 7.
Divorce and crude Divorce Rate in Russia1970-2005 8
Years
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
Divorces
Total
Per 1000
396589
3.0
399339
3.1
405010
3.1
418513
3.2
461100
3.5
483825
3.6
533246
3.9
558353
4.1
568495
4.1
593898
4.3
580720
4.2
577507
4.1
557623
4.0
583026
4.1
573705
4.0
573981
4.0
579387
4.0
580106
4.0
Years
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
Divorces
Total
Per 1000
573863
3.9
582500
3.9
559918
3.8
597930
4.0
639248
4.3
663282
4.5
680494
4.6
665904
4.5
562373
3.8
555160
3.8
501654
3.4
532533
3.7
627703
4.3
763493
5.3
853647
5,9
798824
5,5
635835
4,4
604700
4.2
As to death rate, Russia sharply differs from all advanced countries.
Since mid-1960, the paths of Russia and the rest of the world as to the dynamics of death rate have diverged considerably. The decrease in the death
rate and increase in the average duration of a forthcoming life which was
observed during the first half of the last century, interrupted only during
times of high military activity, was replaced with opposite tendencies. The
death rate, both overall and age-specific, began to rise, and life expectancy
to decrease. In particular, for the last forty years of the XX century, the
crude death rate (CDR) more than was doubled from 7.4% in 1960 up to
15% in 2000. Certainly, the aging population played a role in these dynamics of the CDR, but its basic factor was real increase in slope of the death
rate, especially at able-bodied ages. The dynamics of age-specific death
rates in Russia in the 1990s shown on diagram 5.
Marriage in Central Europe
31
Diagram 4.
Crude Marriage Rate & Crude Divorce Rate in
Russia, 1980-2005 9
11
10
9
Per 1000
8
7
6
5
4
Years
Marriages
Divorces
Diagram 5.
Age-Specific Mortality Rate in Russia, 1990-2004
(logarithmic scale) 10
1000,0
lgASMR
100,0
Males
10,0
Females
1,0
Males, 1990
Males, 1994
Males, 2004
Возраст
Females, 1990
Females, 1994
85 +
80-84
75-79
70-74
65-69
60-64
55-59
50-54
45-49
40-44
35-39
30-34
25-29
20-24
15-19
10-14
5-9
1-4
0-1
0,1
Females, 2004
During this period, the only age for which the death rate was reduced, is
for the first year of life after birth. In Russia the infantile death rate has really noticeably decreased, which allows the assertion with some optimism,
that the Russian public health services, despite all attempts of so-called “Re-
2005
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
1985
1984
1983
1982
1981
1980
3
32
Chapter 2 - Medkov
formers” to liquidate achievements of the previous stages of Russian history, all the same vividly and, at least, in that, as to neonatology, overcomes
today's difficulties. However, despite these clear achievements in decreasing
the infantile death rate, on a world background Russia continues to look
extremely backward in this respect (diagram 7 and 8). Besides, even though
Russia has agreed to the standard international definition of live birth in
1993, the working rules of the publication of data on the infantile death rate
have not changed. Just as before, they refer to children born with a weight
of at least 1000 grams and not to any born with weight of at least 500 grams
and more, and there should have been this definition. As a result, the real
level of infantile death rate in Russia is underestimated by approximately1415%.
Diagram 6.
Infant Mortality Rate in Russia, 1990-2004 11
22
Total
Urban
Rural
20
18
16
14
12
10
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
65,0
60,0
55,0
50,0
45,0
40,0
35,0
30,0
25,0
20,0
15,0
10,0
5,0
0,0
16,9
1998
1999
2000
India
Algeria
Viet Nam
Kyrgyzstan
Romania
Uzbekistan
Russia
15,3
Moldavia
Latvia
Belarus
Bulgaria
Hungary
Lithuania
Spain
Slovakia
Inalia
Belgium
United Kingdom
Netherlands
France
Germany
Japan
Denmark
16,5
Sveden
‰
Diagram 7
Infant Mortality Rate. Selected Countries 12
Marriage in Central Europe
33
The dynamics of average life expectancy in our country over the last
century is characterized by strong heterogeneity, change characterized by
periods of growth of this parameter followed by periods of its rather sharp
and deep decline. However, over a period of 70 years, the basic tendency
was a decrease in death rate and a growth in average life expectancy. At the
end of the XIX century, life expectancy was equal to 29.4 years for men and
31.7 years for women, or approximately 10 years lower than in the countries
of the West. In approximately 30 years it rose to 40.4 years for men and
45.3 years for women.
Despite all the tragic elements of domestic history of the last century,
despite two world and civil wars, despite the Stalin reprisals which took
millions of a lives, the average life expectancy of the population of Russia
increased through the end of the decade of the 1960s which is clearly attributed to the general rise in the standard of living of the overwhelming majority of the population and to achievements in the field of medicine and
public health services. The latter have sharply lowered the death rate (especially infantile) from infectious and other acute diseases. As a result, the
average life expectancy of the population of Russia rose to 64.6 years for
men (1963-1964) and 73.6 years for women (1971-1972).
During the next several years until 1980, average life expectancy of the
Russian population slowly but steadily declined due to growth in the death
rate from chronic illnesses and traumas for which domestic medicine apparently was not ready. In 1979-1980, life expectancy was 61.4 years for men
and 73.0 years for women. After 1980, the decrease in average life expectancy of the population of Russia again reversed into growth and in 19851987 it had noticeably grown, having reached 64.9 years for men and 74.6
years for women. Experts attribute this essential, but short growth of average life expectancy to the notorious antialcoholic campaign of 1985, which
caused some decrease in the death rate of able-bodied persons from accidents, and also in part to the response in 1984 to the rise in the death rate
due to blood circulatory illnesses caused by a flu epidemic. The effect of
this campaign was rather short. In 1988 average life expectancy again began
to drop, and this decline was rather deep and long (down to 1994).
Diagram 8.
Life expectancy at Birth in Russia, 1961-2004 13
Chapter 2 - Medkov
74,55
75
74
73
72
71
70
69
68
67
66
65
64
63
62
61
60
59
58
57
72,17
70,13
72,30
71,18
65,23
64,91
65,27
63,98
Male
2004
2002
1998
1996
1994
1992
1990
1988
1985-1986
1983-1984
1981-1982
1979-1980
1977-1978
1975-1976
1973-1974
1971-1972
1969-1970
1967-1968
1965-1966
1963-1964
Both Sexes
2000
58,92 58,89
57,59
1961-1962
Лет
34
Female
In 1994 life expectancy had fallen to 57.6 years for men and 71.2 years
for women. In other words, our country appeared rejected on several decades ago, having dropped out on this criterion from among the advanced
countries. After 1994 growth of average expected life expectancy at a birth
has renewed, however after 1998 it again was replaced by falling.
Average life expectancy at a birth in 1998 was 61.5 years for men and
73.3 years for women, then again fell in 2001 to 59.0 and 72.3 years. Nevertheless, on a measure of average life expectancy at a birth, Russia far lags
behind the most advanced countries. In 2003, among the 177 countries for
which the index of human development (HDI) took account, Russia placed
115th, including 123rd place for men and 95th place for women. The backlog
on this parameter correlates quite closely with the general social and economic backwardness of our country. The sad fact is that life expectancy in
our country continues to decrease; while in the rest of the world it is increasing.
As was mentioned at the beginning of this report, the primary factor in
the depopulation of Russia is ultra low fertility. Calculations by the Russian
demographer В.А Borissov prove that the death rate, despite extreme efforts
to bring it to the level of other advanced countries, defines no more than 2%
of the loss of the Russian population.
Let's consider in this connection the dynamics of fertility in Russia examined over a period of two centuries and its prospects in the next 5 decades. Though the process of the decrease in fertility that began in Russia in
the last quarter of the XIX century, it achieved its greatest intensity in 1960
when conditions allowed for a transition to a new type of reproductive behavior (when the predominance of families with 5 or more children was
replaced with families with 1-2 children).
In Russia fertility not only is one of the lowest in the world, but also
does not exhibit any indications of stabilization, let alone increase. As will
be shown, under the most optimistic forecast of dynamics of fertility depopulation can stop only by 2050.
Let's consider the official data on size of the general factor of fertility in
Russia, having compared them with similar parameters in the countries CIS
Marriage in Central Europe
35
and Baltic since 1987 when in the former USSR after short-term rise of
numbers of born first and second children fertility began to be reduced everywhere (Diagram 9).
However are reduced not only the general factors of fertility. Total factors of fertility (Total Fertility Rate) have everywhere decreased also. In the
majority of the countries of their value is lower than a level of simple reproduction of the population (Diagram 10). Russia on this parameter (1.21 in
2000 1.25 in 2001, and 1.34 now), is at a level of such countries with the
lowest fertility, as Germany, Italy, Greece and Spain which in 1995-2000
the total factor of fertility was equal 1.1-1.3 children on the woman and in
which the standard of living of the population is much higher, than in Russia. So low values of total factor of fertility and in the majority of the countries – former republics USSR. Exception is represented only with the countries of the Central Asia, but also in them process of decrease in fertility
develops prompt rates.
As is apparent from diagram 9, Russia, as well as the majority of the
republics of the former USSR, and nowadays the independent countries CIS
and Baltic, have entered a new millennium with the low level of fertility
which cannot provide.
Diagram 9.
Total Fertility Rate in Eastern Europe, Baltia, and CIS, 19702005 14
7
1970-1975
2000-2005
6
5
4
3
2
1
Ukraine
Uzbekistan
Turkmenistan
Tajikistan
Macedonia
Slovakia
Slovenia
Russia
Serbia&Montenegro
Romania
Poland
Moldova
Latvia
Lithuania
Kyrgyzstan
Hungary
Kazakhstan
Estonia
Georgia
Croatia
Czechia
Bulgaria
Belarus
Bosnia&Herzegovina
Azerbaijan
Albania
Armenia
0
simple replacement of generations. This situation will continue for at least
the next 5 decades, contrary to opinion of some experts, with completely
unjustified enthusiasm, numbers of births meeting some increase, the general and even total factors of the fertility, observable in Russia last 3-4 years.
Actually we deal here with the statistical artifact caused by that the age
of active birth was entered is relative with more numerous generations
which have been born in first half 1980th years. The nearest 10-15 years it is
36
Chapter 2 - Medkov
necessary to expect, that the total factor of fertility will fall below 1. Many
connect are desirable growth of fertility with hopes on gradual, after improvement of an economic situation in the country, growth of a standard of
living of the majority of the population which appeared rejected on a bottom
of poverty and deprivation as a result of reforms of 1990th years. But these
hopes are vain, as communication of a level of fertility and well-being is not
so unequivocal and obvious, as it seems to much. Growth of well-being does
not conduct automatically to rise of fertility. More likely, it will cause revolution in system of social orientations and expectations owing to what practically all gain available will go on aspiration to satisfy with families of the
income the most prestigious needs.
The major factor of ultra low fertility in Russia, as well as in other
countries is a devaluation of values of a marriage, family with several children. The present level of fertility reflects deep, having global character valuable crisis of family as social institute and accordingly absence at family and
persons of need to have several children (and in a limit and in general to
have even one child).
About it persuasively speak the data of statistical and sociological researches of reproductive orientations and attitudes. For example, it agrees to
data Fertility and Family Surveys in Countries of the ECE Region (FFS),
lead in 1997, reproductive orientations are reduced in all European countries, coming nearer to a level of simple reproduction or already get over it.
Thus younger generations show weaker reproductive orientations: the share
of the respondents, preferring to have in family of one-two children or to not
have them at all, increases from more senior generations to younger. Unfortunately, similar researches, at all their importance, are not, strictly speaking, sociological researches of reproductive behavior, being limited, similarly to the mentioned interrogation FFS, number of children only expected all
(Expected ultimate family size).
Originally sociological researches of reproductive behavior of families
are actually carried out only in Russia. Therefore we shall illustrate the thesis that a major factor of ultra-low fertility both in Russia, and in other countries, is devaluation of values of a marriage, family with several children, by
the example of the sociological research which has been lead by us on a
boundary of centuries. The format of the present report does not allow to
stop on results of this research so in detail as they deserve it and as it would
be desirable authors. We are compelled to be limited to only necessary minimum of the data.
The purpose of our research was revealing features of reproductive behavior of city families and factors, his deteminating. The basic method of
interrogation was quota sample. Thus with the main requirement was to
provide raised, in comparison with average on all urban population of the
country, representation two-child and трехдетных families. In total 1269
women and 147 men (14 person a question on a field have not answered)
have been interrogated 1430 person, including. Middle age of the interrogated set appeared equal 34,9 years, including middle age of women – 34,7
years, men – 36,9 years. On number of given birth children the interrogated
families were distributed as follows: the birth of one child took place in
37,7% of the families, two children – in 46,5%, three children – in 12,0%, in
2,4% of families was born 4 and more children, and in 1,7% – births were
not. The average of given birth children appeared according to equal 1,78. It
Marriage in Central Europe
37
corresponds to the principle of selection of families accepted in interrogation on number of children. Thus, as one would expect, the maximal average
of children (1.84) was in full families. Minimal (1.50) – in parent families.
The structure of sample on number of given birth children reflects reproductive orientations inherent in interrogated set and intentions. Special character
of sample has defined also higher in comparison with all urban population
reproductive attitudes. Reproductive orientations, intentions and the expectations, the need generated during socialization for this or that number of
children have the greatest value from positions of forecasting of tendencies
of fertility and development of measures of a family and demographic policy. In this connection the big attention has been given to the analysis of this
party of reproductive behavior of city families. We have applied all arsenal
of modern means of measurement of reproductive attitudes and needs for
children, starting from preferred numbers of children traditionally used in
interrogations (ideal, desirable, expected) and finishing the special technique, allowing to receive more exact and steady estimations of a level of
need for children and degrees of its satisfaction. The ideal number of children was fixed with the help of a question, How many children are the best
way for having in general in family? Desirable: How many children you
would like to have if to create all necessary for this condition? Expected:
How many children you are going to have at all?
Below the brief description of results of the analysis of reproductive
orientations of the families interrogated during research, and also their age
dynamics which can be considered as reflection of intergenerational changes
of these orientations follows.
The very first question arising here, is a question on, whether respondents want to have children more, than is now. It was found out, that the
majority interrogated would not like increases in the size of the family. Positively the corresponding question of the questionnaire was answered with
38.2% of the interrogated, 38.4% have definitely expressed negatively, 0.8%
would like to have less, than is now and 15.9% have no certain opinion on
this account (6,6% have not answered the given question, that also it is possible to interpret as unwillingness to increase number of available children.).
Thus among women the share given the positive answer to a question on
desire to have is more than children, than is now, is equal 40.0%, among
men – 48.9%. Among answered him negatively a picture return (41.7 and
35.0% accordingly). Among married 40.2% increase in number of children
want, among those who in a marriage will not consist, this share is equal
47.9%.
In the important parameter determining desire to have children more,
than the number of given birth children actually is present, is. Among given
birth to one child the share wishing to increase their number is equal 62.7%,
among given birth two children – 26.6%; three and more children – 21.4%.
The share doing not wish to increase number of children naturally varies in
the opposite image: 18,4; 55,2 and 62,1% accordingly.
Dependence of desire to have children it is more, than is now, from age
carries expected and, so to say, natural character: the respondent is more
senior, the this desire (Table 8) is weaker. Unique exception of these monotonous lines – age of 45 years also is more senior, that, maybe, speaks that
the given age group will consist of people which could not satisfy to the full
38
Chapter 2 - Medkov
the need for children which, most likely, has both higher level, and stronger
intensity.
Table 8.
Respondent’s Age & Desire for Having More Children,%
Would you like have more children?
Age
Yes
No
Does not
know
I’d like have less
children
Total
до 24
64.6
17.7
17.7
…
100.0
25-29
55.4
26.2
17.6
0.7
100.0
30-34
39.4
37.2
21.6
1.8
100.0
35-39
33.6
45.2
20.8
.4
100.0
40-44
26.3
59.9
12.1
1.6
100.0
45 &
more
34.6
52.5
12.3
0.6
100.0
Total
26.3
59.9
12.1
1.6
100.0
The data on preferred numbers of children are resulted in table 11. They
testify what even in is artificial to the generated sample reproductive orientations are rather weak. All preferred numbers of children gather in crowds
around of two children that reflects, on the one hand, the general situation of
prevalence meanwhile orientations to two-child family, and with another, –
specificity of sample in which it is artificial the share of two and
трехдетных families is increased.
Table 9.
The Sample Distribution by the Preferred Number of
Children,%
Number of
children
0
Ideal
Wanted
Expected
0.2
…
0.5
1
4.4
4.5
23.3
2
67.2
58.6
60.7
3
22.7
27.2
12.0
4 & more
5.5
9.8
3.5
Total
100.0
100.0
100.0
Base
1407
1405
1320
Mean
2.32
2.48
2.11
The size of preferred numbers of children directly depends on quantity
of already given birth children. Ideal number of children at given birth to
one, two, three and four and more children accordingly equally 2.06, 2.42,
2.66 and 3.00 children. Desirable – accordingly 2.16, 2.55, 2.96 both 4.07
Marriage in Central Europe
39
children. And expected – accordingly 1.49, 2.04, 2.96 and 4.37. Exception is
only the group childless at which as it is well-known, sizes practically all
preferred numbers of children exceed similar indices of respondents with
one child..
In researches of fertility revealing communication of number of available children or orientations to this or that number of children with the income is traditional. Importance of this aspect of the analysis consists not
only that the level of the income received by family characterizes opportunities to satisfy available need for children, but also that the given parameter
acts as the original indicator of the general orientation of the person, its social orientations and accordingly to some extent the need for children. In
this aspect communication between the income and reproductive orientations also was analyzed in our research. Thus orientations to a desirable level of the income have been included in a context of the analysis not only the
actual cumulative income of family, but also a degree of satisfaction him,
and also.
The analysis of communication between the cumulative income of family and preferred numbers of children has revealed rather weak dependence
between them. In modern conditions both real number of children, and
orientations to preferred number of children practically do not depend on
available conditions of a life, being defined by the need generated during
socialization for children. In the investigated set, from her it is artificial the
increased average number of children, higher is observed also, than it would
be in a case of only stochastic sample, a share of persons with need for 3
and more children. Thus the degree of satisfaction of this high need for
children is comparative farther from its full realization, as is reflected and in
preferred numbers of children and on their dynamics.
Let's tell, the desirable number of children shows direct dependence on
size of the cumulative income of family: the share wishing to have three
children in family in group with the cumulative income more than 10 000
rubles a month in one and a half time exceeds similar in group with the income up to 3 000 rubles, the average expected number of children in group
with the highest income on 0.11 is more, than in group with the minimal
income. But the share wishing to have 4 and more children it is less not only
a similar share in the next profitable group 5 001-10 000 rubles (almost
twice!), but also in group with the income up to 3 000 rubles that can speak
smaller need for children. The feedback speaks about it with the income of a
share wishing also to have 4 and more children.
However much more role in determination of preferred numbers of
children plays not in itself the income of family, and orientation to his desirable level and a degree of satisfaction the available income. The analysis has
shown, that there is an appreciable differentiation in sizes of preferred numbers of children between respondents, in a different degree feeling satisfactions the achieved standard of living of family. As an example we shall specify distinctions in sizes of expected number of children between those who
is not satisfied at all with a standard of living of the family (553 persons),
and those who is completely satisfied with him (51 person).
Table 10.
Range of Family’s Living Standard Preferred Number of
40
Chapter 2 - Medkov
Children,%
Range of
satisfaction of
family’s living
standard
Preferred Number of Children
0
1
2
3
4 & more
Mean value
Ideal
Absolute not
satisfied
.2
5.9
65.2
22.5
6.2
2.32
Completely
satisfied
1.9
3.9
64.1
26.2
3.9
2.28
Total
.2
4.5
67.3
22.4
5.6
2.32
Desired
Absolute not
satisfied
…
4.7
59.6
26.5
9.2
2.44
Completely
satisfied
…
4.8
58.1
27.6
9.5
2.48
Total
…
4.6
58.7
26.8
9.9
2.49
Wanted
Absolute not
satisfied
.5
26.9
57.0
12.6
3.1
1.92
Completely
satisfied
2.0
19.4
58.2
14.3
6.1
2.04
Total
.5
23.6
60.4
12.2
3.3
1.97
Appeared, that the average expected number of children among completely unsatisfied with a standard of living of family almost on 0,1 is less,
than among those who, as they said, is satisfied with a standard of living
completely (table 10). In other words, expect to have children on the average the families more satisfied with a standard of living that can serve as the
indicator of that at them in the greater degree family orientations and more
intense intensity of need for children are submitted, than at those who is not
satisfied with the standard of living and aspires to more to achievements,
perceiving children as some kind of a handicap. As a whole the data of our
research do not confirm hopes that growth of well-being of the majority of
the population will lead to growth of fertility.
The big attention in our research has been given to the analysis of influence of shifts in structure of valuable orientations of the person, in particular, growth religious affiliation, on reproductive intentions and real behavior
of city families. Shifts in structure of valuable orientations of a significant
part the population accompanied social and economic transformations of
last decade of the last century, – quite obvious fact. Their basic vector – the
further amplification of out-family orientations, growth of prevalence of
individualistic aspirations on achievement of personal success, first of all in
Marriage in Central Europe
41
material sphere, on career, on the “prestigious” consumption thrust, besides
other, practically all mass media. On the other hand, it is available rather
appreciable growth of number and a share of those who, at least, in words,
recognizes itself as the believer, the religious person. It is possible to assume, that growth of religiousness can interfere in any measure with spontaneous and impetuous expansion of out-family and antifamily orientations as
doctrines of all religions anyhow put family, children on one of the first
places. In these conditions the increase in number is religious affiliated person “last bastion” on a way of the further falling of need for children, reduction of fertility, increase of depopulation can to be considered as original.
Materials of our research speak, that it, in-many, is valid so.
With the help of a special technique the self-estimation religious affiliation, and also the fact of fulfillment of any religious practice has been revealed at the conclusion of a marriage
Appeared, that 71.3% interrogated have estimated themselves as
people, to some extent religious, approximately 27.6% count themselves
absolutely not religious, the others have not answered this question.. However real practice far misses this rather high share religious affiliation.
Shares making and not making at the introduction into a marriage any religious practice were distributed by opposite image (have made those less
than 15% interrogated, but almost 73% did not make any religious practices,
the others have not answered this question). Thus, rather high selfestimation of a degree of religiousness essentially differs from a real involvement into a religious life.
The data of our research confirm, religiousness really acts as the factor
deteminating and higher reproductive intentions, and real practice of reproductive behavior. In particular, among those who counts itself rather religious person, the share doing not wish to have children more, than is now, is
equal 35.6%, and among not religious – 46.8%. And it in spite of the fact
that affiliated person on the average have more children, than non affiliated
person. In particular, the share of the third and fourth births at considering
rather religious almost on 23% is more than itself, than at not religious
(35.7% and 13.0% accordingly).
This tendency proves to be true and in dynamics of preferred numbers
of children. As an example we shall result only given on expected number
of children. If among considering itself rather religious expect to have in
family of 3 and more children of 33.4% among not religious this share is
equal only 13.1%, or in two time it is less!
Average sizes of preferred numbers appeared the following: at considering itself rather religious ideal number of children – 2.44 children, desirable – 2.97 and expected – 2.39; at the same who counts itself in general not
religious, – accordingly 2.31, 2.48 and 1.98.
Depending on the fact of fulfillment of religious practice corresponding
average appeared are equal: at making – 2.37, 2.57 and 2.06; at not making
– 2.31, 2.44 and 1.95. If to compare among themselves representatives of
different faiths the maximal values of listed preferred children are shown by
Moslems: ideal number of children – 2.52, desirable – 2.82 and expected –
2.24.
The direct communication between a self-estimation of religiousness
and preferred numbers of children is available. This communication proves
to be true and at comparison of sizes of a special index of a degree of satis-
42
Chapter 2 - Medkov
faction of need for children. The share completely satisfied the need for
children among considering itself rather religious and made at the introduction into a marriage religious practice of the faith is equal 42.9%, and
among considering itself in general not religious and costing without any
religious practice – 60.1%.
Connection religious affiliation with reproductive behavior proves to be
true also the data on outcomes pregnancies. Specificity of sample, and also a
small number of those who interrupted pregnancy of the first orders with
artificial abortion, do not allow to track in details history pregnancies and
their outcomes on an extent even first three of them. Therefore we are limited here to outcomes only the first pregnancy, comparing among themselves at whom the first pregnancy has ended with a birth of the alive child
(74.3% from all sample), and those who is artificial has interrupted her
(9.3%).
The general number pregnancies all orders in the interrogated set appeared equal 4017. From them of 56.1% have ended with a birth of the alive
child, 34.2% – artificial abortion. In other words, in the interrogated set on 1
birth it is necessary about 0.6 artificial abortions, that antithetically to a that
parity of their number which now exists in all the population of Russia.
Thus at considering themselves rather religious 60.0% from the general
number pregnancies have terminated in a birth of the alive child and 3.8%
have been interrupted by artificial abortion; at considering itself in general
not religious – accordingly 55.5% and 7.0%.
The first pregnancy has ended with a birth of the alive child at 88.5%
considering itself rather religious and made at the introduction into a marriage religious practice of the faith and at 81.7% considering itself in general
not religious and costing without any religious practice. Distinctions in
shares of those who has interrupted the first pregnancy with artificial abortion are more appreciable: accordingly 3.8% and 8.2%.
These distinctions in propensity to adjust number and terms of a birth of
children it is shown and in practice of application of contraception. If among
considering itself rather religious the share ever using or using now means
and methods of contraception and given the answer to a corresponding question is equal 18.4%, among considering itself in general not religious –
81.6%.
Thus, the data of our research can serve for acknowledgement of a hypothesis on a direct communication religious affiliation and reproductive
behavior. On all his aspects considered above people, considering religious
show themselves, big orientation on family and family values, the greater
desire to have children and higher degree of realization of this desire. These
distinctions were showed despite of artificial character of sample in which
the share of families with two and more children has been specially increased. These distinctions, however, are minimal, and it testifies that
process of degradation of family values has captured practically all population, both religious, and not religious. Undoubtedly, however, that the question on communication religious affiliation and reproductive behavior deserves the further studying.
The above mentioned data demonstrates conclusively that the basic way
to solve the problem of depopulation in Russia is to revive a system of social norms that emphasize familism. These data deny the stereotyped belief
of many, that improvement of conditions of a life will result amplification of
Marriage in Central Europe
43
desire to have more children. Economic stimulus are capable only of improving the conditions to satisfy the need for children, but they cannot raise
the need for children, or even to stop or slow down the process of intergenerational easing of this need.
Really, as shown by the data of the sociological research conducted by
authors of the report in 1976-2001, the birth of several children in the absence of corresponding social norms and needs for families of 3-4 children
is a unique handicap. If we compare the respondents testing this need, and at
whom such need is not present then it is easy to see, that frequency of references to obstacles, including, and on financial difficulties, the first in 2-3
times have less, than at the second. Thus really having need for the third
child such circumstances, as name age, a state of health and decrease in
fruitfulness (fecundity), and also family mutual relations.
To told above – the All-Russia research of city families of Russia has
shown one more stroke, that among respondents who consider, that the
monthly income at all does not suffice and constantly it is necessary to borrow money up to pay day, respondents with 3 children is almost 2 times it is
less, than respondents with 1 child and in 3 times with superfluous it is less
than time, than two-child (15.5% against 51.5%). In other words, where
there are more than efforts with children and, probably, more cares, there is
references to difficulties and handicaps. Thus, appeals one-child and twochild to “handicaps” have no attitude to real difficulties, and all these references only reflect an out-family valuable orientations, action of social norms
1-2 childrenness.
From here necessity of the account of original reproductive orientations
and attitudes, including is obvious by development of demographic forecasts.
The basic conclusion which can be taken from the research quoted
above is, that an increase of fertility and overcoming of depopulation and its
consequences in Russia are possible only by implementing an active family
and demographic policy which has for an object the revival and increase in
the social value of families with several children. Without it, the present
social norms of fertility which actually reject such families and lead even to
the complete refusal to have even one child, will only become stronger,
which will accelerate the decrease in fertility and depopulation, both in Russia and in other countries.
1. By depopulation in the strict sense of the word, we mean a decrease in the
population as a consequence of low and super-low fertility at a TFR less than the
simple reproduction level, insufficient to compensate for a very low mortality rate
and very high life expectance. Therefore, depopulation currently has a place only in
countries where population decline happens on a stage of very high life expectancy;
i.e., only in Western Europe and also in a few Eastern European countries. The situation in Russia is different, due to ultra-high mortality, especially prevalent among the
male population. When referring to these countries it is better to define the situation
as expedited depopulation. In connection to this, it is permissible to use the term
depopulation for signifying any reduction, when mortality exceeds fertility. A situation where population drops due to a large negative out-migration has no connection
to depopulation.
2. Now the population of Russia is about 142 million
44
Chapter 2 - Medkov
3. The Demographic Yearbook of Russia. 2005. M., 2005. P. 41. For 2005 –
The current data of Rosstat: http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/B06_00/IssWWW.exe/Stg/
d01/7-00.htm
4. Ibid.
5. Here and further the data of the population census 2002 is cite from official
Internet site of the Federal State Statistics Service (http://wwwperepis2002.ru ).
6. Demographic Yearbook of Russia. 2005. M., 2005. P. 148. For 2005 – The
current data of Rosstat: http://www.gks.ru/bgd/free/B06_00/IssWWW.exe/Stg/d01/
7-00.htm
7. Borissov V.A., Sinelnikov A.B. The Nuptiality and Fertility in Russia: Demographic Analysis. M., 1995. P. 39.
8. See note 6.
9. See note 6.
10. Demographic Yearbook of Russia. 2005. M., 2005. P. 257.
11. Ibid. P. 69-71.
12. Demographic Yearbook of Russia 2001. M., 2001. P. 390-394.
13. Demographic Yearbook of Russia 2005. P 120.
14. Population Division of the Department of Economic and Social Affairs of
the United Nations Secretariat, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision and
World Urbanization Prospects: The 2003 Revision, Table 7-XVI.