Journal of Contemporary China
ISSN: 1067-0564 (Print) 1469-9400 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cjcc20
China and South Africa: Emerging Powers in an
Uncomfortable Embrace
Alison Bradley
To cite this article: Alison Bradley (2016): China and South Africa: Emerging
Powers in an Uncomfortable Embrace, Journal of Contemporary China, DOI:
10.1080/10670564.2016.1184900
To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2016.1184900
Published online: 22 Jun 2016.
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Download by: [University of Stellenbosch]
Date: 22 July 2016, At: 01:23
Journal of Contemporary China, 2016
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2016.1184900
China and South Africa: Emerging Powers in an Uncomfortable
Embrace
Alison Bradley
James Bradley Peace Foundation, USA
Downloaded by [University of Stellenbosch] at 01:23 22 July 2016
ABSTRACT
In 18 years of China–South Africa relations, the two countries have evolved
from minimal contact to deep economic engagement fraught with
ideological and political uncertainty. The bilateral relationship is increasingly
institutionalized on the global and regional level, yet also dogged by domestic
criticism among a growing bloc of South Africans who are concerned by what
they perceive as neo-colonial influence and an erosion of their democratic
ideals. While South African President Jacob Zuma has publicly labeled the
bilateral relationship ‘unsustainable’, a recent government document calls
the Communist Party of China ‘a guiding lodestar of our own struggle’. This
article asks whether South Africa’s leadership has the strength to stand up
to an increasingly confident and assertive foreign power on its own soil.
In 18 years of Chinese–South African relations, the two countries have evolved from minimal contact
to deep economic engagement, fraught with ideological and political uncertainty. As South Africa
has projected itself onto the international scene and sought a position as the leading power on the
African continent, China has worked to cement a strategic partnership with the ‘Rainbow Nation’ based
on investment opportunity, shared goals in promoting South–South relations, and a mutual desire to
reform the international order. Torn between competing ideologies and identities, the ruling African
National Congress (ANC) party has vacillated between its goal of eroding previous North–South divisions
and reforming the international order vs. a strong desire to be viewed as a responsible middle power
in the international community. While the government remains eager for investment from China, its
largest trading partner, a growing bloc of liberally minded South Africans are concerned by what they
perceive as neo-colonial influence and an erosion of the post-apartheid country’s democratic ideals,
described by South Africa’s first post-apartheid president, Nelson Mandela, in 1993 as ‘the light that
guides our foreign affairs’.1 This ambivalence has led to a robust economic relationship, increasingly
institutionalized on the global and regional level, yet one that is fraught with ideological inconsistency
and uncertainty. While South Africa’s leaders have publicly questioned the sustainability of the bilateral
relationship, a 2015 ANC National General Council (NGC) discussion document framed China as South
Africa’s most important strategic ally, calling the Chinese economy ‘a new dawn of hope for further
possibilities of a new world order’.2
CONTACT Alison Bradley [email protected]
Nelson Mandela, ‘South Africa’s future foreign policy’, Foreign Affairs, (November/December 1993), available at: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-africa/1993-12-01/south-africas-future-foreign-policy (accessed 15 November 2014).
2
‘ANC’s National General Council (NGC) 2015 discussion document’, African National Congress, available at: http://www.anc.org.za/
docs/umrabulo/2015/ngc_disc_docsy.pdf (accessed 14 October 2015).
1
© 2016 Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
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2 A. Bradley
China and South Africa formally established diplomatic relations on 1 January 1998 in the wake of
the peaceful transfer of Hong Kong back to the PRC.3 In the early years of the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa, the Communist Party of China (CPC) provided financial and military training to
the ANC, which has held power since South Africa held its first democratic elections in 1994. Despite
the ANC’s alignment with the Soviet Union during the Sino–Soviet split, diplomats from both countries regularly invoke a historical alliance as a symbol of the ideological ties shared by the two ruling
parties.4 However, in its international behavior the ANC appears torn between its revolutionary past,
and its desire to be welcomed by the very industrialized nations that previously classified the party as
a terrorist organization.
Since 1998, China–South African relations have passed through three different stages: the relationship began as a limited partnership defined by a recognition of common interests; then evolved to a
maturation of strategic economic and political ties; and finally settled on its current ‘comprehensive
strategic partnership’ that has developed into a strong trade relationship and heightened the nations’
common interests. In 2000, Chinese President Jiang Zemin and then South African President Thabo
Mbeki signed the ‘Pretoria Declaration’ on partnership relations, which evoked a long history of aligned
principles, and pledged that the two nations would cooperate in the promotion of a new Sino–African
relationship ‘on the basis of equality and mutual benefit, by supporting the African continent in its
efforts to seek peace, stability and development and by promoting the interests of Africa through
multilateral fora’. The declaration also pledged to abide by the five principles of Sino–African relations,
declared at the Headquarters of the Organization of African Unity in 1996: sincere friendship; equality
and sovereignty; common development on the basis of mutual benefit; increased consultation and
cooperation in international affairs; and cooperation in the establishment of a new international political and economic order.5
Writing in Foreign Affairs magazine in 1993, Nelson Mandela stated ‘the primary motivation of the
ANC’s foreign economic policies as a whole will be to place South Africa on the path of rapid economic
development’.6 At the start of the century, Chinese–South African investment ties began to deepen
and expand, and in 2004 the relationship was defined as a ‘strategic partnership of equality, mutual
benefit and common development’.7 Consistent with the ANC government’s global strategy of foreign
economic engagement, investment became the main driver of the bilateral relationship, and in 2009
China became South Africa’s largest trading partner and export destination.8
A third political stage was reached in 2010 when China established a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ with South Africa, the first time it had done so with a developing country.9 In August 2010,
South African President Jacob Zuma and President Hu Jintao signed the ‘Beijing Declaration on the
Establishment of a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership between the PRC and the RSA’, calling for
practical cooperation in nearly 30 fields, including culture, education, media, health and tourism.10 Zuma
was accompanied by 13 cabinet ministers and more than 350 business executives and entrepreneurs,
‘Relations with South Africa’, China.org.cn, available at: http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/wenjiabaoafrica/171412.htm
(accessed 8 April 2016).
4
Hopewell Radebe, ‘South Africa welcomes Chinese military assistance’, Business Day Live, (31 July 2013), available at: http://www.
bdlive.co.za/national/2013/07/31/south-africa-welcomes-chinese-military-assistance (accessed 20 November 2014).
5
‘Full text of declaration on partnership between China and South Africa’, People’s Daily, (25 April 2000), available at: http://english.
peopledaily.com.cn/english/200004/25/eng20000425_39697.html (accessed 22 November 2014).
6
Mandela, ‘South Africa’s future foreign policy’.
7
‘China–South African relations on fast track’, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of South Africa, available at:
http://www.chinese-embassy.org.za/eng/zngx/gk/t942572.htm (accessed 19 November 2014).
8
Wenping He. ‘When BRIC becomes BRICS: the tightening relations between South Africa and China’, East Asia Forum, (3 March 2011),
available at: http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/03/03/when-bric-becomes-brics-the-tightening-relations-between-south-africaand-china (accessed 31 October 2014).
9
Yong Wang, ‘South Africa’s role in the BRICS and the G-20: China’s view’, South African Institute of International Affairs, (December
2012), available at: http://www.saiia.org.za/occasional-papers/south-africas-role-in-the-brics-and-the-g-20-chinas-view (accessed
10 November 2014).
10
‘China–South African relations on fast track’, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of South Africa.
3
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Journal of Contemporary China 3
at the time the largest delegation to ever have accompanied him on a foreign tour. The visit resulted
in over a dozen ‘cooperative documents’ being signed in the areas of solar power, iron ore, finance and
telecommunications.11
Shortly after the establishment of the ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’, South Africa was formally
invited to join Russia, India, Brazil and China in the BRIC group, an association of emerging powers formally established in 2009.12 In 2001, Goldman Sachs Asset Management Chairman Jim O’Neill coined
the BRIC term to describe Brazil, Russia, India and China, the four countries with the potential to rival
the US in economic output by 2020.13 Since South Africa’s accession to the BRICS, the two nations have
become more closely aligned economically and politically, with increasing levels of bilateral trade and
alignment on international affairs.
The unequal trade relationship, long a source of instability in the relationship, continued into 2014,
with South Africa recording a trade deficit of US$6.64 billion with China.14 The South African business
community continues to decry the ratio of raw materials exported to China in return for manufactured goods, however ANC officials state that their aim is to ‘ultimately attain a more equitable and
mutual trade balance that will be beneficial for further development’ of both nations.15 In addition to
the unequal trade balance there are significant ideological and political differences between the two
nations, and an element of the South African public, specifically those who value democratic ideals,
appear to be disenchanted by a close alignment with China. Only 45% of South Africans view China
positively, according to the Pew Global Attitudes Project, and there are increasing reports of social and
political tensions.16 To respond to this internal criticism, President Thabo Mbeki has labeled China’s
interests as ‘neo-colonial’ in 2006, and in 2012, Zuma postured that the relationship is ‘unsustainable’.17
However, these condemnations have more often been tempered by the pragmatic reality that South
Africa needs Chinese investment and resources to drive its economic growth. ANC officials, inspired
by China’s success in lifting its population out of poverty, regularly invoke China as a model for development, however China’s investment appears to have had minimal positive impact on unemployment
or economic growth.18
With its complex ethnic and political diversity, South Africa also sends a mixed picture of what
kind of power it is. While it is a significant player on the African continent with the most advanced and
diversified economy, it remains a small economy at the global level with limited influence in global
affairs. Chinese business leaders are also concerned by South Africa’s stubborn 25% unemployment
11
‘China, South Africa upgrade relations to “comprehensive strategic partnership”’, Consulate General of the People’s Republic of
South Africa in Cape Town, (August 2010), available at: http://capetown.china-consulate.org/eng/xwdt/t726883.htm (accessed
12 November 2014).
12
‘About BRICS’, BRICS, available at: http://brics5.co.za/about-brics/ (accessed 8 April 2016).
13
Mike Cohen and Ilya Arkhipov, ‘BRICS nations plan new bank to bypass World Bank, IMF’, Bloomberg News, (26 March 2013), available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-03-25/brics-nations-plan-new-bank-to-bypass-world-bank-imf (accessed
18 November 2014).
14
‘Media remarks by the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Ms Maite Nkoana-Mashabane, following bilateral consultations with Mr Wang Yi, Minister of Foreign Affairs of The People’s Republic of China’, Department of International Relations
and Cooperation, Republic of South Africa, (14 April 2015), available at: http://www.dfa.gov.za/docs/speeches/2015/mash0414.
htm (accessed 10 October 2015).
15
Faeeza Ballim, ‘South Africa and China in awkward embrace’, The Mail & Guardian, (20 July 2012), available at: http://mg.co.za/
article/2012–07-19-south-africa-and-china-in-awkward-embrace (accessed 23 November 2014);
Media remarks by the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Ms Maite Nkoana-Mashabane.
16
‘Global opposition to US surveillance and drones, but limited harm to America’s image’, Pew Research Center, (14 July 2014), available
at: http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/global-opposition-to-u-s-surveillance-and-drones-but-limited-harm-to-americas-image/ (accessed 10 October 2015).
17
Austine Odo, ‘Africa: beware of China–Africa economic ties, Mbeki Warns’, All Africa, (18 December 2006), available at: http://allafrica.
com/stories/200612181314.html (accessed 22 November 2014).
18
Ballim, ‘South Africa and China in awkward embrace’; Rhys Jenkins and Lawrence Edwards, The Impact of Chinese Import
Penetration on the South African Manufacturing Sector (Southern Africa Labour and Development Research Unit), available at:
https://www.uea.ac.uk/documents/439774/0/Edwards+Jenjkins+SALDRU.pdf/82f05bfc-bf8b-4af1-b843-bb522695c6d6 (accessed
20 February 2016).
4 A. Bradley
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rate, the inadequate skills and infrastructure, the influence of strong trade unions, the appearance of
a worsening social order, and the unstable security situation.19
China has actively courted South Africa as both a regional and international player, and has sought
cooperation on international peace, climate change and the reform of international institutions. At an
international level, the rhetoric from both countries is about maintaining strong South–South cooperation and challenging the Western-dominated international order. On a regional level, South Africa
and China share investment and strategic interests in sub-Saharan Africa, and they coordinate through
regional partnerships and investment. While the bilateral economic relationship has expanded through
trade and investment, it is not yet clear whether the two nations will achieve the goals that both countries espouse on a global and regional level, as there have been no tangible achievements that reflect
the two nations’ stated desire to reform the international order.
Below is an overview of China–South African relations in the bilateral, multilateral and regional
arenas, and an analysis of the various levels of cooperation.
Bilateral Relations
South Africa and China have developed a remarkable level of economic interdependence, however
the bilateral relationship is increasingly fraught with political challenges that threaten to overshadow
economic gains. Significant investment, in addition to growing yet largely symbolic military and cultural
engagement, show that the ANC government is increasingly hitching its fortunes to the economic
potential of China’s rise, citing China’s economic development as ‘a leading example of the triumph of
humanity over adversity’.20
In 2009, South Africa become China’s largest trading partner in Africa, accounting for one-quarter of
China’s trade with African countries, with bilateral trade reaching US$16.06 billion, a 56% increase on
the previous year.21 By 2014, bilateral trade had reached US$24.16 billion, with South African exports
to China totaling R94bn; and imports from China totaling R167bn.22 From 1996 to 2011, bilateral trade
grew from 1.3% of total South African trade to more than 13%.23 Chinese scholars stress that Chinese–
South African trade is based on the ‘comparative advantage’ of each country, and that China’s domestic labor supply and manufacturing capacity complements South Africa’s rich mineral resources and
well-developed mining economy.24
China has become a major investor in South Africa’s key industries, like mining and financial services. Between 2006 and 2011, more than 60% of all Chinese imports were mineral products, and in
2012 China imported US$200 million worth of textiles and related raw materials from South Africa,
an increase of 46.5% from 2011.25 In January 2013, the China Development Bank made its first direct
investment in South Africa’s mining sector with a US$650 million loan for an acquisition of a 45% stake
in Wesizwe Platinum’s Bakubung mine by a Chinese consortium headed by mining giant Jinchuan.26
Jinchuan has partnered with local investors and has pledged to make use of domestic expertise rather
than import its workers from China, a positive response to criticism that Chinese investments are purely
mercantilist and exploitative.27
19
Wang, ‘South Africa’s role in the BRICS and the G-20’.
‘ANC’s National General Council (NGC) 2015 discussion document’, African National Congress.
21
He, ‘When BRIC becomes BRICS’; Wang, ‘South Africa’s role in the BRICS and the G-20’.
22
‘Media remarks by the Minister of International Relations and Cooperation, Ms Maite Nkoana-Mashabane’.
23
Franz Crul, China and SA on their Way to Sustainable Trade Relations (Stellenbosch: Tralac, May 2013), available at: http://www.
tralac.org/files/2013/05/S13IP022013-Crul-China-and-SA-on-their-way-to-sustainable-trade-relations-20130529-fin.pdf (accessed
15 October 2015).
24
Wang, ‘South Africa’s role in the BRICS and the G-20’.
25
Crul, China and SA on their Way to Sustainable Trade Relations; Jing Yao, ‘South Africa is gateway to a vast continent’, China
Daily, (26 November 2013), available at: http://africa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2013-11/26/content_17130940.htm (accessed
22 November 2014).
26
Salem Fakir, ‘Old allies building new relations BRIC by BRIC’, The South African Civil Society Information Service, (15 March 2013),
available at: http://sacsis.org.za/site/article/1603 (accessed 15 November 2014).
27
‘China goes platinum in SA’, Reuters, (1 February 2013), available at: http://www.moneyweb.co.za/moneyweb-mining/china-goes-platinum-in-sa (accessed 18 November 2014).
20
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Journal of Contemporary China 5
During a 2011 visit to China by South African Vice President Kgalema Motlanthe, the China
Development Bank and the Development Bank of South Africa signed a US$2.5 billion agreement, as
well as a Memorandum of Understanding on geological exploration and mineral resources. Motlanthe
stated ‘the South African government is willing to remove any unnecessary obstacles to improve the
investment environment … for Chinese investors in South Africa’.28 This statement is indicative of the
priority that the South African government places on Chinese investment, and the core of the critique
that Chinese investment comes at the expense of local production. A study on the impact of Chinese
investment on South African manufacturing shows that it has negatively impacted labor-intensive
industries, and that the impact on employment overshadows the gains from lower producer price
inflation and higher rates of investment.29 In fact, Chinese investment appears to have had a limited
impact on South Africa’s overall economy thus far and has not reduced the 25% unemployment rate.
China and South Africa have also inked a number of investment deals in South Africa’s financial
sector, which are not only noteworthy in the bilateral relationship, but also for China’s investment in
sub-Saharan Africa. In 2008, the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China (ICBC) acquired a 20% share
in the Standard Bank Group, making it China’s largest direct investment in Africa. The banks have since
cooperated on numerous transactions in multiple countries and sectors, and the partnership was a
positive signal that China was willing to invest more in the South African economy.30 The joint partnership has established Standard Bank as a leader in Africa–Asia commerce, advising China on 30% of its
African merger & acquisition activities in 2009.31 For example, in October 2013 the two banks signed a
US$108-million debt-financing package with power producer Triumph Kenya for the construction of
a heavy fuel oil plant outside of Nairobi. Standard Bank contributed US$28 million, and ICBC provided
the majority of the funding.32 Similarly, in August 2013, South Africa’s Nedbank and the Bank of China
signed an agreement to increase investment between China and Africa.33
South Africa has also invested heavily in China since 1994, including capital investment and technology transfers. South African energy firm SASOL, for example, has established a coal-to-fuel technology
transfer, and begun collaboration with the Chinese coal company Shenhua.34 In November 2013, the
South African central bank announced that it would invest approximately US$1.5 billion, equivalent to
3% of its foreign reserves, in Chinese bonds. Marking the first time that an African central bank will be
granted an investment quota for the Chinese onshore market, this investment is a tangible realization
of the confidence that South African policymakers place in the Chinese economy.35
The military relationship has intensified, although it remains largely symbolic. In 2008, the SAS
Spienkop visited Shanghai, marking the first time that a South African warship had visited China. In
2009, the South African Naval Forces sent a delegation to the 60th anniversary of the founding of the
‘China looking to enhance ties with South Africa’, 2point6billion.com, (3 October 2011), available at: http://www.2point6billion.
com/news/2011/10/03/china-looking-to-enhance-ties-with-south-africa-10252.html (accessed 20 November 2014).
Jenkins and Edwards, The Impact of Chinese Import Penetration on the South African Manufacturing Sector.
30
‘Cooperation between ICBC and Standard Bank of South Africa enters its prime’, ICBC, (25 May 2009), available at: http://www.
icbc.com.cn/icbc/icbc%20news/cooperation%20between%20icbc%20and%20standard%20bank%20of%20south%20africa%20
enters%20its%20prime.htm (accessed 20 November 2014).
31
Crul, China and SA on their Way to Sustainable Trade Relations.
32
Leandi Kolver. ‘Standard Bank, ICBC provides $108 m for Kenya power project’, Engineering News, (17 October 2013), available at:
http://www.engineeringnews.co.za/article/standard-bank-icbc-provides-108 m-for-kenya-power-project-2013-10-17 (accessed
15 October 2015).
33
‘SA, China to grow Africa business flows’, SouthAfrica.info, (7 August 2013), available at: http://www.southafrica.info/africa/nedbank-070813.htm#.UpoML0SE66w (accessed 18 November 2014).
34
‘Strategising China–South Africa relations’, Africa Institute of South Africa, (26 March 2013), available at: http://www.polity.org.za/
article/strategising-chinasouth-africa-relations-2013-03-26 (accessed 20 November 2014).
35
‘Address by Daniel Mminele, Deputy Governor of the South African Reserve Bank, at the Standard Bank 5th African Central Bank
Reserves Management Conference’, South African Reserve Bank, (5 November 2013), available at: http://www.resbank.co.za/
Lists/Speeches/Attachments/392/Address%20by%20Daniel%20Mminele%20-%20Standard%20Bank%20African%20Central%20
Bank%20Conference.pdf (accessed 21 November 2014).
28
29
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6 A. Bradley
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy, and in 2011, a PLA missile frigate paid a goodwill visit to South
Africa.36 The South African National Defense Forces (SANDF) have called for Chinese military training
and expertise, and a military attaché, Senior Colonel Xu Jianwei, has been stationed in South Africa,
however, military relations remain limited and largely a goodwill mechanism.37 China also has access
to South African ports, which is advantageous for its trade with the region. However, this created controversy when South African dockworkers refused a shipment of weapons bound for Zimbabwe during
the 2008 election crisis, after the arms sales generated a large international outcry.38
Politically, the ANC and the CPC have built close ties, and leaders from the two nations meet frequently. The China–South Africa Bi-National Commission was established in 2000, and five committees
have been set up to address diplomatic affairs, trade, education, science and technology, and defense.
A Strategic Dialogue, established in 2008, has met five times. China also set up a Parliamentary Regular
Exchange Mechanism in 2011, making South Africa the only African country that has established one
with China’s National People’s Congress.39 Controversially, the ANC has been accused of accepting
donations for their election campaigns from China, with various reports since 1994 also linking funding
from the governments of Nigeria, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Libya and Taiwan.40
The ANC has declined to confirm whether it has received foreign funding sources, however this raises
significant concern over the dilution of its foreign policy interests and its ability to act independently
of its funders.
The blocking of the Dalai Lama’s visits to South Africa has been a lightning rod in perceptions of
China’s outside influence in South Africa’s internal affairs. The Dalai Lama visited South Africa and met
with then President Nelson Mandela in 1996, however he was denied a visa in 2009 under the pretense
that it would distract the government from its preparations for the FIFA World Cup games in 2010.
Archbishop Desmond Tutu called the decision ‘disgraceful’ and accused the authorities of bowing to
pressure from China. The issue flared up again in 2011 when a decision was delayed on whether to grant
the Dalai Lama a visa to attend Tutu’s 80th birthday.41 South Africans with strong liberal democratic
ideals, including Desmond Tutu and members of the Democratic Alliance Party, are increasingly pushing
back against what is perceived as coercion from China, its most lucrative trade partner, whereas the
South African government did little to dispel the accusation of bending to political pressure. ‘The reason
why the Dalai Lama wants to be here is to make a big global political statement about the “secession”
of Tibet from China and he wants to make it on the free soil of South Africa’, said then Finance Minister
Trevor Manuel. ‘We should not allow him to raise global issues that will impact on the standing of South
Africa.’42 This demonstrates the high degree of influence that China has assumed over South Africa’s
domestic politics, and sends a worrying signal over whether the ANC is willing to stand up to China on
the international stage or whether it prioritizes investment over political sovereignty. Tutu was particularly virulent in his criticism, saying the government’s action was reminiscent of the apartheid regime.43
‘China PLA Navy celebrates 60th anniversary’, MarineBuzz.com, available at: http://www.marinebuzz.com/2009/04/23/china-pla-navy-celebrates-60th-anniversary/ (accessed 8 April 2016); ‘Chinese Navy escort task group visits Cape Town’, Defence Web,
available at: http://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=35123:chinese-navy-escort-task-group-visits-cape-town&catid=51:Sea&Itemid=106 (accessed 8 April 2016).
37
Radebe, ‘South Africa welcomes Chinese military assistance’.
38
‘China denies weapons shipped to Zimbabwe’, The Mail & Guardian, (21 May 2008), available at: http://mg.co.za/article/2008-0521-china-denies-weapons-shipped-to-zimbabwe (accessed 21 November 2014).
39
‘China–South African relations on fast track’, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of South Africa.
40
James Myburgh, ‘Is the ANC selling out our sovereignty?’, Politics Web, (24 March 2009), available at: http://www.politicsweb.co.za/
politicsweb/view/politicsweb/en/page71619?oid=122532&sn=Detail (accessed 15 November 2014).
41
‘Dalai Lama visit to SA hangs in the balance’, The Mail & Guardian, (28 September 2011), available at: http://mg.co.za/article/201109-28-dalai-lama-visit-to-sa-hangs-in-the-balance (accessed 16 November 2014).
42
‘South African minister: refusing visa to Dalai Lama “a matter between states”’, Xinhua News Agency, (27 March 2009), available at:
http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2009-03/27/content_11085970.htm (accessed 16 November 2014).
43
Christine Petré, ‘South Africa’s Janus-faced foreign policy’, Think Africa Press, (June 2011), available at: http://thinkafricapress.com/
south-africa/janus-faced-foreign-policy (accessed 15 November 2014).
36
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Journal of Contemporary China 7
Culturally, there is increasing people-to-people exchange and engagement, however this stems
from a virtually nonexistent base during the apartheid years. Among all African countries, South Africa
ranks first in its number of sister provinces and cities with China, Confucius institutes, Chinese tourists and Chinese students.44 2014 witnessed a drop in the number of Chinese tourists to South Africa
because of controversial new visa restrictions, however in 2015 there was a 2.2% upturn in the number of Chinese visitors to South Africa.45 China has also become South Africa’s fourth biggest tourism
destination, with more than 130,000 South Africans traveling to China in 2013, up 55.9% from 2011.46
In 2012, there were 6,500 Chinese students studying in South Africa.47 In a joint communiqué signed
during President Xi Jinping’s March 2013 visit to South Africa, the two nations designated that 2014
would be the ‘Year of South Africa’ in China, and 2015 the ‘Year of China’ in South Africa.48 Largely a
symbolic gesture, these designations have been marked by promotional events and festivities in order
to deepen cultural exchange.
Bilaterally, the two countries have achieved a remarkable degree of engagement in 17 years of
relations. The economic potential of China’s influence, and the faltering South African economy, has
resulted in the two governments welcoming bilateral trade with open arms. However, South Africa
needs to increasingly assert its own national economic interests when receiving investment from China
to avoid a new form of colonialism. The Standard Bank deal and China’s willingness to hire locally are
both positive signs of a more equitable economic relationship, however the ANC has only displayed a
halting willingness to stand up to China in the political relationship. In the face of domestic criticism
and global scrutiny, South Africa will need to keenly assert itself to place the bilateral relationship on
a sustainable path, and the ANC needs to act in the interests of its domestic needs, rather than bend
to the interests of foreign powers.
Global Relations
On the global stage, the two nations have aligned their goals and rhetoric in order to increase the power
of emerging nations and to promote South–South cooperation. South Africa has earned the reputation as a ‘middle power facilitator’, by engaging in multilateral institutions, championing the rights of
the developing world, and advocating sustainable development.49 Chinese scholars claim that China
prioritizes South Africa as a leading player on the African continent, as it carries heavy weight in the
broader African economy, accounting for approximately 24% of Africa’s GDP. Also of high priority for
China’s foreign policy are South Africa’s views on nations’ sovereign rights, its willingness to challenge
the Western-dominated international order, and its wish to enhance multilateralism.50 South Africa
participates in various multilateral forums with China, including the G20, the BRICS, FOCAC and BASIC;
and its multilateral behavior is increasingly aligned with China’s and other developing nations. For
example, in the 2015 NGC discussion document, the ANC lays out a markedly anti-Western, pro-Chinese
roadmap for its international relations, defending both China and Russia against the ‘wrath of US-led
Western imperialism’ and accusing the United States of a ‘cold war’ mentality.51
44
‘Speech at the National Assembly of South Africa, Wu Bangguo’, Parliament of the Republic of South Africa, (May 2011), available
at: http://www.parliament.gov.za/live/contentpopup.php?Item_ID=1519&Category_ID (accessed 18 November 2014).
45
‘Decline in BRICS tourism a cause for visa regulation rethink’, Democratic Alliance of South Africa, (26 March 2015), available at:
https://www.da.org.za/2015/03/decline-in-brics-tourism-a-cause-for-visa-regulation-rethink/ (accessed 10 October 2015).
46
‘Tourism’, South African Government, available at: http://www.gov.za/about-sa/tourism (accessed 10 October 2015).
47
‘China–South African relations on fast track’, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Republic of South Africa.
48
‘Joint Communique between the Republic of South Africa and the People’s Republic of China’, Brics5.co.za, (26 March 2013), available
at: http://www.brics5.co.za/joint-communique-between-the-republic-of-south-africa-and-the-peoples-republic-of-china-pretoria26-march-2013 (accessed 22 November 2014).
49
Haibin Niu, ‘A Chinese perspective on South Africa as an emerging power: global, regional and bilateral implications’, Centre for
Chinese Studies at Stellenbosch University, (April 2011), available at: http://www.ccs.org.za/?p=4866 (accessed 22 November 2014).
50
Wang, ‘South Africa’s role in the BRICS and the G-20’.
51
‘ANC’s National General Council (NGC) 2015 discussion document’, African National Congress.
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8 A. Bradley
In December 2010, South African diplomats described President Hu Jintao’s invitation to join the
BRICS as an ‘early Christmas present’.52 Media and analysts have interpreted China’s invitation as a
geopolitical move driven by China’s view of South Africa as the entry point for the African continent
with a strong international reputation and ‘irreplaceable unique advantages’.53 With a population of
53 million and an economy 3.5% of China’s, South Africa appears to have been brought into the BRICS
mechanism for ideological and geopolitical reasons rather than as a global player on an equal economic
footing with its peers.54 From the start, China used the BRICS forum to call for South–South solidarity
and reform of the international and political order in order to diminish Western nations’ hold on global
economic and political governance. The desire to strengthen South–South relations through economic
engagement therefore fits neatly into this construct.
In 2012, the BRICS bloc represented 43% of the world’s population, approximately a fifth of global
gross domestic product (GDP), estimated at US$13.7 trillion, as well as combined foreign reserves
estimated at US$4.4 trillion. In 2012, the BRICS countries accounted for approximately 11% of global
annual foreign direct investment (FDI) flows (US$465 billion) and 17% of world trade.55 The five nations
therefore have substantial economic heft, however critics point to a number of divisions and weaknesses in the group’s political, ideological and even economic priorities, and argue that South Africa
has not displayed the continental sway or dominance that justified its accession. O’Neill even claims
that South Africa’s inclusion has weakened BRICS’ power, through factionalism in the ANC and its lack
of economic clout on the global stage. Nigeria, on the other hand, has a larger GDP and is counted as
one of the ‘Next 11’ emerging economies identified by Goldman Sachs as having promising outlooks.56
At the time of South Africa’s joining BRICS, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi said that China believes South
Africa’s accession would promote the development of the alliance and enhance cooperation among
emerging nations.57 The strengths that South Africa brings to the BRICS can be classified as follows.
The African Agenda: South Africa is a strong player in the broader African economy, accounting
for 24% of Africa’s GDP. China’s invitation for South Africa to join BRICS can therefore be viewed as a
formal acknowledgment that it views South Africa as playing a leading role in Africa’s economic development, and as a strong advocate in multilateral forums such as the United Nations, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The two countries have also enhanced their coordination
over regional investment and trade deals. South Africa holds strong leverage within the Southern
African Development Community (SADC), and China is increasingly utilizing this inter-governmental
organization to facilitate trade and investment, as discussed in further detail below. Africa currently
hosts six of the ten fastest growing economies in the world, and the BRICS countries are increasingly
engaging economically on the continent. According to Standard Bank, BRICS–Africa trade is projected
to reach US$530 billion in 2015.58 Trade facilitation is therefore a fundamental driver of South Africa’s
inclusion in the BRICS.
The Political Agenda: A key pillar of South Africa’s foreign policy is the strengthening of the muscle
of the South in global affairs, and an integration of developing nations’ priorities into the Westerndominated international order. South African diplomats advocate multilateral cooperation among
developing countries, as well as the strengthening of the role of the United Nations and the need to
respond to global challenges of poverty, insecurity and underdevelopment.59
Sven Grimm, ‘South Africa: BRICS member and development partner in Africa’, The China Monitor, Centre for Chinese Studies
at Stellenbosch University, (2013), pp. 38–44, available at: http://www.ccs.org.za/wp-content/uploads/2013/03/China_Monitor_
BRICS_Special-Edition_March-2013_Website.pdf (accessed 20 November 2014).
53
Sanusha Naidu, ‘South Africa joins BRIC with China’s support’, East Asia Forum, (1 April 2011), available at: http://www.eastasiaforum.
org/2011/04/01/south-africa-joins-bric-with-china-s-support (accessed 18 November 2014).
54
‘Main key indicators’, Statistics South Africa, available at: http://www.statssa.gov.za/?page_id=593 (accessed 19 November 2014).
55
Grimm, ‘South Africa’, pp. 38–44.
56
Sharda Naidoo, ‘South Africa’s presence “drags down Brics”’, The Mail & Guardian, (23 March 2012), available at: http://mg.co.za/
article/2012-03-23-sa-presence-drags-down-brics (accessed 17 November 2014).
57
He, ‘When BRIC becomes BRICS’.
58
Grimm, ‘South Africa’, pp. 38–44.
59
Mandela, ‘South Africa’s future foreign policy’.
52
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Journal of Contemporary China 9
The Economic Agenda: By some estimates, BRICS nations may be larger than the combined economies of the G-/7 states by 2050, and member states hold a common desire to wield a larger influence in
economic institutions.60 South Africa’s entry into BRICS may have been partly motivated by a desire to
form a ‘share coalition’ within the IMF. After the 2010 IMF voting reform, the total share of the four BRICs
countries rose to 14.132, which falls short of the threshold necessary to challenge the United States’
veto as a coalition.61 The BRICS’ frustration with its minimal influence in both the World Bank and the
IMF has therefore resulted in plans to set up a New Development Bank (NDB) to finance infrastructure
and to boost trade between the nations. Conceived at the BRICS forum in 2012, the rationale for the
NDB is to challenge the predominance of the World Bank and the IMF and to present an alternative to
Bretton-Woods institutions.62 South African International Relations Minister Maite Nkoana-Mashabane
announced the plans by saying ‘we need to change the way business is conducted in the international
financial institutions. They need to be reformed’.63 The 2015 establishment of the NDB is the strongest
signal yet that the BRICS nations wish to challenge the Western-led institutional order. South Africa is
also facing internal criticism over whether it can fully represent the African agenda in the BRICS mechanism, or whether it is only serving its own economic interests through its participation in the forum,
which strikes at the claim Mandela made in 1993 that South Africa would never ‘pursue its own interests
at the expense of the subcontinent’.64
South Africa’s voting patterns in the United Nations shows that it stands with China and Russia,
rather than the United States, which it closely aligned with during the apartheid era. During the period
1994–2008, South Africa voted in accordance with the following four goals, which it touted as the
pillars of its foreign policy: the promotion of human rights and democracy; disarmament and related
non-proliferation issues; the consolidation of the African Agenda within the context of North–South
relations; and reform of the UN and the promotion of equitable global governance.65 In 1994, the ANC
government declared that it would undertake steps to ‘canonize human rights in our international
relations’.66 Since 2006, however, South Africa has voted more consistently with China than with the
US on all issues, including human rights. In the 2006 UN General Assembly Session 61, for example,
South Africa voted with China 95.6% of the time, but only 8.6% of the time with the United States. In
2008, this divide increased, with South Africa aligning with China 96.7% of the time, but only 3.7% of
the time with the United States.67 During its first tenure on the UN Security Council from 2007 to 2008,
South Africa also controversially opposed the UN condemnation of human rights abuses in Myanmar
and Zimbabwe; further sanctions against Iran over its nuclear program; and the inclusion of the issue of
climate change on the Security Council agenda. All votes were cast in tandem with Russia and China.68
South Africa’s voting record has generated sharp criticism domestically, with Tutu describing the votes
as ‘a betrayal of our noble past’.69
If the desired long-term political goal of South Africa’s global strategy is to be viewed as a leading
emerging nation in a shifting balance of power, it will need to temper its advocacy for the developing
Harsh V. Pant, ‘The BRICS fallacy’, The Washington Quarterly, (Summer 2013), pp. 91–105.
Quota and Voting Shares Before and After Implementation of Reforms Agreed in 2008 and 2010 (The International Monetary
Fund, 2011), available at: https://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2011/pdfs/quota_tbl.pdf(accessed 21 November 2014).
62
‘Go-ahead for BRICS development bank’, SouthAfrica.info, (27 March 2013), available at: http://www.southafrica.info/global/brics/
bank-270313.htm#.UpoZeESE66x (accessed 19 November 2014).
63
Cohen and Arkhipov, ‘BRICS nations plan new bank to bypass World Bank, IMF’.
64
Mandela, ‘South Africa’s future foreign policy’.
65
Suzanne Elizabeth Graham, South Africa’s Voting Behaviour in the United Nations, 1994–2008, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
University of Johannesburg, 2013, available at: https://ujdigispace.uj.ac.za/bitstream/handle/10210/8294/Graham.pdf?sequence=1
(accessed 23 November 2014).
66
‘Address by Deputy Minister Fransman at a reception hosted by the Human Rights Watch on the theme: South Africa at the African
Union—The future of African integration and South Africa’s Foreign Policy’, Department of International Relations and Cooperation,
The Republic of South Africa, (2012), available at: http://www.dirco.gov.za/docs/speeches/2012/frans1017.html (accessed 24
November 2014).
67
United Nations Research Guide (United Nations), available at: http://research.un.org/en/docs/sc (accessed 12 October 2015).
68
Olivier Serrao, South Africa in the UN Security Council 2011–2012 (Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, June 2011), available at: http://library.
fes.de/pdf-files/iez/08166.pdf (accessed 22 November 2014).
69
Petré, ‘South Africa’s Janus-faced foreign policy’.
60
61
10 A. Bradley
world, with a more principled adherence to Mandela’s call for human rights as ‘the light that guides
our foreign affairs’.70 While South Africa aligns with the other BRICS nations in their views of sovereign
rights and territorial integrity, thus far the political agenda of the BRICS nations cannot be classified
as substantive, as there have been no tangible outcomes resulting from this unified posturing. If the
current achievements are reflective of the geopolitical power of the BRICS, it is unlikely the association
will produce many concrete results, and the alliance will remain more symbolic than substantive.
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Regional Relations
Nelson Mandela wrote, ‘South Africa cannot escape its African destiny. If we do not devote our energies
to this continent, we too could fall victim to the forces that have brought ruin to its various parts’.71 Since
the ANC took power, South Africa has worked strenuously to portray itself as the ‘gateway to Africa’,
linking its own development to the stability and development of Africa as a whole. In the regional
relationship, China has chosen to coordinate on tactical decisions regarding regional affairs.72 As China
has increased its trade with Africa, South Africa has taken note of the assistance, economic activities
and trade model that Beijing is advancing on the African continent and directly engaged through
multilateral and regional institutions, including the Southern African Development Community (SADC),
FOCAC and the African Union (AU).
Overall, South Africa has worked productively with China on facilitating its investment and strategic
priorities on the African continent, and yet it has remained wary of China’s influence becoming neo-colonial or exploitative. South Africa is currently chair of the African Union Commission and co-chair with
China of FOCAC, which provides it with a unique opportunity to assert its African agenda and influence
China–Africa relations.73 This dual leadership role will provide a delicate balancing act for the South
African government in the coming years. If South Africa answers the call to become a leader on the
African continent, there is the potential of strengthening Sino–South African relations and appeasing
criticism of China’s interests and behavior in Africa, but it could also serve as a major de-stabilizer for
bilateral and regional relations if handled poorly.
South Africa offers a gateway into the SADC market and furthers Beijing’s corporate interests in the
region. With 15 member states that all have diplomatic relations with the PRC (besides Swaziland), a
combined population of 277 million, and a 2010 GDP of about US$575.5 billion, the SADC region is
attracting Chinese investment in roads, rail lines, municipal buildings and sports stadiums in exchange
for natural resources, particularly oil.74 As the dominant economy within the SADC and the principal
financier, providing 20% of the funds for the organization, South Africa holds leverage in persuading
other members to integrate their trade policies and therefore further facilitate regional investment for
other BRICS members, including China.75 BRICS investment in the SADC region is of such priority that
it has led one analyst to predict ‘the “S” in BRICS could ultimately stand for SADC’.76 In February 2011,
it was estimated that Chinese Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and infrastructure projects in SADC
totaled US$8.2 billion, including US$4.1 billion in non-financial investments. In addition, China is also
cooperating in the region in education, culture, agriculture, technology and youth exchange programs.
South Africa and China are currently serving as co-chairs for FOCAC, a forum on Sino–African relations
that was initiated in 2000 in order to facilitate investment and spur economic growth in the continent.
70
Mandela, ‘South Africa’s future foreign policy’.
Ibid.
72
Naidu, ‘South Africa joins BRIC with China’s support’.
73
‘China, South Africa upgrade relations to “comprehensive strategic partnership”’, Consulate General of the People’s Republic of
South Africa in Cape Town.
74
‘SADC objectives’, Southern African Development Community, available at: http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/sadc-objectiv
(accessed 25 November 2014).
75
Mmanaledi Mataboge and Andisiwe Makinana, ‘South Africa’s moneyed diplomacy’, The Mail & Guardian, (30 May 2013), available
at: http://mg.co.za/article/2013-05-30-00-south-africas-moneyed-diplomacy (accessed 23 November 2014).
76
‘MARTYN DAVIES: BRICS can grow to embrace SADC region’, Business Day Live, (14 April 2011), available at: http://www.bdlive.
co.za/articles/2011/04/14/martyn-davies-brics-can-grow-to-embrace-sadc-region (accessed 22 November 2014).
71
Journal of Contemporary China 11
South Africa has previously taken an active role in setting the agenda of FOCAC, and coordinating the
policies of member states.77
In one of the starkest examples of China’s interests in Africa, the Chinese government funded the construction of the Addis Ababa headquarters of the AU. Built by the China State Construction Engineering
Corporation and completed in 2012, this 50,000 square meter conference center marks China’s largest
aid project to Africa since the construction of the Zambia–Tanzania railway in the 1970s.78 South Africa
is currently one of the principal funders of the African Union, contributing approximately 15% of its
annual budget.79 However, in 2012 China pledged US$95 million in aid for the African Union over the
next three years.80 As the two nations scramble for influence on the African continent, the parity in
funding will likely tilt the influence in China’s favor, and undermine South Africa’s influence within the AU.
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Conclusion
China–South African ties have expanded at a rapid pace since the formal establishment of relations in
1998. South Africa’s economy has become heavily intertwined with and dependent on China’s economic
rise, and the relationship is increasingly underwritten by financial interdependence and participation in
the international arena. China has welcomed South Africa onto the international stage and embraced
its desire to punch above its weight and act as a significant global player. The rhetoric between the
two nations’ leaders is largely positive, however there are worrying signs of political and economic
strife at both the political and grassroots level. Much of this ambivalence can be attributed to South
Africa’s own identity crisis—is it a beacon of light for human rights, or a nation beholden to its ruling
party’s revolutionary past? Can South Africa stand as a global leader and a poster-child of democratic
success within the G20, while also forgoing some of its founding foreign policy principles set forth by
Nelson Mandela? As South Africa seeks to build its newfound democracy and recover its population
from decades of oppression at the hands of its apartheid rulers, will it have the strength to stand up to
an increasingly confident and assertive foreign power on its own soil? The current forecast is mixed—
there are strains and calls of dissent within liberal strands of society, however few tangible signs that
the leadership is willing to challenge its largest trade partner in return for a more equitable relationship.
On a bilateral level, China appears to recognize the need to invest more heavily in the South African
economy and to utilize its domestic labor and industries. The desire to balance the trade relationship
is perhaps the most significant beacon of hope for the bilateral relationship. However, if South Africa
proves unwilling to stand up to Chinese influence in the political arena, these economic gains will count
for little. Of strong concern is the accusation that the ANC receives political funding from the CPC—
South African sovereignty will be severely curtailed if it is beholden to any political donor, let alone
an authoritarian economic giant. On the global stage, South Africa is equivocal in its priorities and it is
unlikely that China views South Africa as strong leverage in its multilateral agenda. South Africa would
thus be better served by adhering to its democratic ideals, as espoused by Nelson Mandela in 1993. It
is unclear, however, how smoothly South Africa and China will be able to coordinate on a regional level.
Both nations have significant interest in the African continent, and only time will tell if the two regional
powers can coexist. With South Africa holding the chairs for both AU and FOCAC, the next few years
will prove crucial in determining the balance of power on the African continent. As these two nations
head towards their twentieth anniversary, it is South Africa’s mandate to assert its interests and define
its goals. Only then will the potential and limits of the China–South Africa relationship be fully realized.
77
Chris Alden, ‘FOCAC’s present and its South African future’, South African Institute for International Affairs, (25 July 2012), available
at: http://www.saiia.org.za/opinion-analysis/focacs-present-and-its-south-african-future (accessed 21 November 2014).
78
Linyan Wang, ‘New headquarters shows partnership entering era of hope: Ethiopia PM’, China Daily, (30 January 2012), available
at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2012-01/30/content_14502354.htm (accessed 18 November 2014).
79
Mataboge and Makinana, ‘South Africa’s moneyed diplomacy’.
80
‘China to give $95 m to African Union’, China Daily, (29 January 2012), available at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/201201/29/content_14499858.htm (accessed 27 November 2014).
12 A. Bradley
Acknowledgements
The author would like to thank Professor David Shambaugh of the George Washington University for his valuable advice,
counsel and input on this article.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
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Notes on contributor
Alison Bradley is a seasoned communications professional focused on international public affairs.
Alison’s experience includes directing a public diplomacy campaign to enhance bilateral relations
between China and the United States. She has organized and led over 15 delegations to China for
former US Senators and House Members, as well as senior editors and columnists. She holds a Master’s
degree from the George Washington University; and a Bachelor’s Degree from New York University.
Alison has lived in seven countries on four continents. This article was written when Alison Bradley was
completing her Masters in International Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs of George
Washington University.