About the Great War Society
The Great War Society, incorporated in 1986, is committed to the study of the First World War and
subsequent world events associated with that cataclysm and their importance for our lives today. The journal
of the society, Relevance, is published quarterly. Annual seminars are held at various locations throughout
the country, bringing together members, guests, and renowned scholars to discuss the events of the Great War
in more depth. Information about our seminars and special events like our annual Armistice-Veterans Day
commemorative will be available on the website, announced in Relevance and distributed in mailings.
The Great War Society is a California nonprofit corporation and is exempt from income taxes under section
501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. Contributions to the society are deductible to donors on their
federal and state income tax returns. Also deductible are $30.00 of annual membership dues.
Board of Directors:
A Message from Our President
Dana Lombardy, President
NEW VISION - NEW MISSION - NEW RESOLVE
After months of encouraging discussions, we are working to
merge The Great War Society with the Western Front AssociationUSA Branch. Why we are doing this, and what it will mean to you
is explained in my letter that appears on pages 24-25 (center
spread). The quick summary is this: A merger will enable us to do
more without increasing dues and without changing our chapter
meetings or our November 11 annual event. The main reason to do
the merger now is so that we are reorganized and ready for the
100th anniversary of World War I, which begins in 2014.
Diane B. Rooney,
Director of Marketing
Thomas F. Olson, Secretary
Robert C. Denison, Treasurer
Salvatore Compagno,
President Emeritus
East Bay Chapter Chairman
Jack P. Creighton,
Director at Large
Robert J. Rudolph,
San Francisco Chap. Chairman
Herbert P. Stickel,
Director at Large
The Relevance Back Issues PDF Project
We received enough pre-orders to commit to scanning the back issues
of our quarterly journal Relevance. This means that all of the back
issues will be available electronically as PDFs by this fall. Plus, we are
compiling an index of these 70-plus issues that should help researchers.
When it is finished, the index will be downloadable for free from our
Website. The index will also be provided on the CD along with all
of the back issues of Relevance.
Robert H. Warwick,
Membership Chairman
George E. Young, Jr.,
Director at Large
Communicate with Us Through:
Email: [email protected]
Website:
www.the-great-war-society.org
Annual Seminar Again in Kansas City
This is your last chance to sign up for our annual seminar that will be
held again at the World War I Museum and Memorial in Kansas
City on September 10-11, 2010. Note that the Seminar will be on
only two days, Friday and Saturday. Unlike previous years, there
will be no talks on Sunday. This is a world-class museum, and this
year's program is terrific.
(See page 48 for details.)
Dana Lombardy, President The Great War Society
2
Mail: Inquiries, Membership and
Submittals for Relevance:
The Great War Society
P.O. Box 18585
Stanford, CA 94309
Annual Membership:
$49 - Receive Printed Version of
Relevance (four issues)
$39 - Quarterly Online Download
of Relevance (four issues)
Payments accepted online at our website
In This Issue
Michael E. Hanlon, Editor
Kimball Worcester, Assistant Editor
Tony Langley, Contributing Editor
Contents
2
5
About The Great War Society and This Issue
Our organization, membership, directors, president's message, and introduction
The Great War and the Birth of American Air Power
Jeffery S. Underwood, PhD
Introduction to our special issue by the historian of the National Museum of the United States Air Force
9
Billy Mitchell and the Great War, Reconsidered
Professor James J. Cooke
A Mitchell biographer takes another look; major sidebar on Air Service pioneer MG Mason Patrick
22
Postscript: Mitchell Postwar
From Assistant Editor and "Flying Circus" Columnist Kimball Worcester
The Sinking of the Dreadnought SMS Ostfriesland and the famous court martial
23
24
26
List of Eleven -- Notable Ship Sinkings During the War
Tracking the Intense Naval War
Centerpiece -- An Important Letter From Great War Society President Dana Lombardy
Trivia Challenge -- Fictional Characters Who Served in the War
From fiction, film, stage, and television
27
32
From Boelcke's Dicta and the SPAD XIII to the Raptor
Editor Michael Hanlon and Major David M. Skalicky, First Fighter Wing, USAF
Part I of an interview with a current F-22 Raptor pilot
Learning to Fly in the AEF: Part I
Lt. William Muir Russel, 95th Aero Squadron
Eloquent letters from a Doughboy aviator who was killed in action during the Great War
41
The U.S. Air Force Honors Its Heritage
Editor Michael Hanlon and Major David M. Skalicky, First Fighter Wing, USAF
Part II of an interview with a current F-22 Raptor pilot
43
Reviews -- Literature, Films, and New Media
James O'Donnell, Len Shurtleff, and Editor Michael Hanlon
General Maxime Weygand, Intelligence and the Arab Revolt, and Naval Aviation
45
48
Visiting the Battlefields -- The U.S. St. Mihiel Cemetery
Bobby O. Bell, Superintendent
2010 Joint National Seminar -- September 10 - 11, National World War I Museum, Kansas City, MO
COPYRIGHT©2010 The Great War Society
3
Editor's Message:
As the editorial team was assembling
this issue of Relevance, which is
dedicated to the birth of American
airpower, I began channelling one of
my predecessors as editor of the
journal, the late R.D. "Dick"
Layman. He kept telling me that our
issue is pretty heavy on fighter
operations. Overly so, from his point
of view.
I was very happy with the great
articles we had received (of course,
you can judge for yourself on that
matter), but the voice of Dick
Layman kept asking me what about
reconnaissance and bombing
operations, the birth of naval air, the
vast training program centered at
Issodun, and the technological
learning curve for American
aviators? For Dick, these are much
more important issues that the
achievements of the various fighter
aces--the Red Baron, Albert Ball,
Rickenbacker, etc., etc., that are the
focus of much of the popular
writings about Great War aviation.
As we were putting this issue to bed-at some point you need to go into
production with what you have--I
needed to make peace with my old
friend to move onward. An
agreement was struck. Dick was
going to stop haunting me, and I am
going to find more articles for future
issues of Relevance. This will start
with our Fall 2010 issue. To honor
Dick Layman, though, I have
included a review I wrote in 1996 of
his finest work, Naval Aviation in
the First World War, in our book
review section.
MH
Aircrew and Breuget-14 from the
96th Aero Squadron, U.S.A.S.
This is the reconnaissance aircraft
that verified bomb damage for the
squadron. The 96th Squadron flew
bombing missions during the St.
Mihiel and Meuse-Argonne
Offensives in the Brueget-14,
considered the finest French bomber
of the war.
Our cover image Two Down to
Glory by William S. Phillips depicts
an action of October 22, 1918 when
Lt. Reed Chambers of the 94th Aero
Squadron shot down two Fokker DVII to become an ace. From the
collection of the Air National Guard.
USAF Photo
4
The Great War and the Birth of American Air Power
Jeffery S. Underwood, PhD
National Museum of the United States Air Force Historian
55 airplanes, none suitable for combat, to an
effective fighting force. Moreover, the
wartime experience had a great influence on
the development of American air power.
After the Armistice, Army Air Service
aviators returned from France with deeply
ingrained beliefs about the proper usage of
air power, and their basic concepts still guide
today's U.S. Air Force.
Brigadier General William "Billy" Mitchell,
who commanded the Army Air Service
combat forces in the American
Expeditionary Forces (AEF), played a
critical role in formulating how American
military aviators perceive air power. Best
remembered for his unceasing quest for an
independent air force during the interwar
years and the for sinking of the captured
German battleship Ostfriesland, Mitchell's
influence reached far beyond the formation
of the independent U.S. Air Force in 1947.
1975 U.S. Poster Linking the Modern Air Force
and the World War I Air Service
Dogfights between biplanes and triplanes
swirling over the trenches consume the
general understanding of American military
air power during World War I, and the
names of Rickenbacker, Luke, and a few
other fighter pilots often come to mind.
Students of air power also note that
American industry failed to live up to the
promise of American-built airplanes
darkening the skies over the Western Front
and that the U.S. Army Air Service dropped
only 138 tons of bombs during the war.
Military aviation historians, however, agree
that the Army's air arm underwent an
amazing growth from a tiny force with just
The actual extent of America’s air participation
in World War I is worth noting. The number of
personnel engaged overseas rose from a
negligible quantity in 1917 to a substantial
figure by 11 November 1918: 6,861 Air Service
officers and 51,229 men. Forty-five squadrons
were serving with the various field armies, and
to these units at the time of the armistice were
assigned 767 pilots and 740 airplanes. The
combat record of the Air Service, AEF, included
781 enemy craft shot ’down, 150 bombing raids,
and a total weight of 275,000 pounds of bombs
dropped. In addition to this record, American
flyers performed thousands of individual
missions in close support of infantry, on
reconnaissance, and for adjustment of artillery
fire.
USAF Document
5
Ministry in London. Mitchell sent American
aircrews to support the IAF, but the war
ended before many arrived. After the war,
American airmen viewed the IAF as an
example of the need to separate an air arm
from the control of ground commanders to
take full advantage of air power.
Foremost, Mitchell's leadership in France
during 1918 established the offensive
strategy practiced by today's Air Force.
Mitchell went to Europe as a military
observer just before America entered the
war, and Maj. Gen. Hugh M. Trenchard, the
commander of the Royal Air Force (RAF),
influenced him. Nicknamed "Boom" because
of his booming voice, Trenchard demanded
that his aircrews always take the offensive
and drive the German air force from the sky.
He expected RAF "pursuit," or fighter, pilots
to strike as deeply into enemy territory as
possible and attack the German fighters at
every opportunity. To free the fighters for
offensive sorties, Trenchard would send the
RAF's slow, vulnerable reconnaissance
aircraft across enemy lines without fighter
escorts. Gunners had to fend off enemy
fighters with their machine guns, but the
reconnaissance aircrews suffered terrible
losses. The French adopted this offensive
strategy too, but the Germans tended to take
a defensive stance and intercept Allied
aircraft after they crossed the front lines. In
addition to attacking the German air force at
every opportunity, Mitchell also adopted the
RAF's strategy of using fighters and bombers
for low-level attacks on enemy ground
forces, a very dangerous proposition for the
aircrews.
Influential Maj. Gen. Hugh Trenchard, RAF
Throughout the war, Allied and American
airmen chafed under the control of ground
commanders who understandably demanded
close control over the aircraft in their areas
of responsibility. Not only did they crave upto-date reconnaissance information and
photographs, they also wanted to keep every
bit of firepower available for the direct
support of their soldiers. Unable to see
immediate results from air attacks against
enemy troops or supply lines far behind the
front lines, they had little reason to support
any reduction of close air support. Airmen,
however, recognized that tying aircraft to a
geographically limited area wasted air
power's greatest advantage, its flexibility.
In France, Mitchell learned the importance of
having a single commander for air forces.
During 1918, the RAF formed the
Independent Air Force (IAF) under the
command of General Trenchard to conduct
long-range night bombing raids on German
strategic targets. Instead of reporting to the
British ground commander in France,
Trenchard reported directly to the Air
6
In July 1918, the Allies launched the AisneMarne offensive to take back the territory
captured by the Germans during their spring
offensive. Inexperienced and few in
numbers, Mitchell's American airmen joined
the fight, and the veteran German fliers made
them pay dearly. Nevertheless, Mitchell
persisted in his demands to take the
offensive. Keeping the fighters going after
the German air force, he sent formations of
three American reconnaissance aircraft into
enemy territory without fighter escort. The
gunners defended their formation with
coordinated machine gun fire. Although the
veteran German pilots took a heavy toll, the
Americans quickly became seasoned
veterans.
They correctly argued that air power is most
successful when consolidated into a single
striking force under a single air commander.
Rather than spread it thin across a wide area,
a single air commander applies air forces to
win overwhelming superiority over the
enemy at specific targets. By disrupting the
movement of troops and supplies to the
battlefield, either through the strategic
destruction an enemy's ability to produce
military supplies or the interdiction of supply
routes, air power greatly influences the
ground battle. For American military
aviators, combat experience in 1918
validated the concept of placing a single air
commander in control of all air assets to
support the overall military goal. Today's
U.S. Air Force incorporates this concept as
the Joint Force Air Component Commander
(JFACC), who is responsible for planning
and conducting air warfare in a given
operation or conflict. Chosen by AEF
commander General John J. Pershing to lead
the Air Service combat forces in France,
Mitchell directed three separate air
campaigns that would look very familiar to a
modern JFACC.
By September 1918, Pershing's AEF had
grown strong enough to launch its own
offensive against the German forces holding
the St. Mihiel Salient. To support Pershing's
ground campaign, Mitchell was given
command of more than 1,500 American,
British, and French aircraft. Mitchell,
essentially the JFACC in modern
terminology, attacked the German air force
The Lineage of the United States Air Force
Aeronautical Division, US Signal Corps
1 August 1907 - 18 July 1914
Air Corps*
2 July 1926 - 18 September 1947
●
●
●
Aviation Section, US Signal Corps
18 July 1914 - 20 May 1918
●
●
Division of Military Aeronautics
20 May 1918 - 24 May 1918
●
Air Service
24 May 1918 - 2 July 1926
* The Air Corps became a subordinate element of
the Army Air Forces on 20 June 1941, and it
continued to exist as a combat arm of the Army
until 1947.
●
From the Air Force Historical Studies Office
Army Air Forces
20 June 1941 - 18 September 1947
United States Air Force
18 September 1947
7
On 26 September 1918 Allied and American
forces attacked the Germans along the entire
Western Front, and the AEF attacked along a
24-mile sector between the Meuse River and
the western edge of the Argonne Forest. The
AEF's objective of the Meuse-Argonne
Campaign was to cut the railroad line
between Metz and Mézières. Mitchell
effectively used the experience he gained
during the previous two campaigns. As the
single air commander, he massed his air
power to win air superiority over the
battlefield. Mitchell successfully marshaled
as many as 200 bombers and 100 fighters for
a single raid, and the outnumbered German
fighters simply could not stop the American
aerial onslaught. Reconnaissance aircraft
operated with little opposition from German
fighters, and most of their losses came from
ground fire. Meanwhile, the large formations
of American-built DH 4 and French-built
Breguet daylight bombers struck German
ground troops effectively. Their gunners
provided mutual protection against attack,
and when they attracted German fighters,
large formations of American fighters were
there to destroy the enemy fighter force. For
example, when German fighters attacked a
formation of three bomber squadrons on 4
October, American fighters came to their aid
and shot down 11 enemy aircraft.
with overwhelming superiority and quickly
established aerial superiority over the St.
Mihiel Salient. Then, he turned his forces on
the retreating German ground forces. Despite
poor weather conditions that hampered air
operations, Mitchell's airmen contributed
significantly to the success of the overall
campaign. Captain Edward "Eddie" V.
Rickenbacker demonstrated the aggressive
nature of the Air Service on 25 September
1918, when he single-handedly attacked a
superior number of German aircraft,
shooting down two. For that action,
Rickenbacker received the Medal of Honor
in 1931.
Lt. Frank Luke, 27th Aero Squadron
Medal of Honor Recipient, Namesake of Luke AFB
The U.S. Army Air Service made only a
short appearance during World War I, but
when the Armistice been signed, the
fundamental concepts about how to conduct
successful aerial operations had been
engrained in the minds of American military
aviators. The doctrines of placing all air
forces under a single commander and of
attaining air superiority with an overwhelming
offensive force to achieve the overall military
goal remain central to the U.S. Air Force.
Lts. Alan Winslow (L) & Douglas Campbell (C),
94th Aero Squadron with Their Commanding Officer
Downed First Enemy Aircraft by U.S. Air Service
8
Billy Mitchell and the Great War, Reconsidered
James J. Cooke, Professor of History Emeritus, University of Mississippi
America's involvement in the Great War
lasted from April 1917 to November 1918,
and from that conflict a number of soldiers
emerged with lasting reputations, leaving
their mark on American history. John J.
Pershing, George C. Marshall, Charles P.
Summerall, and William "Billy" Mitchell
emerged as pages rather than footnotes in
American history. Forever associated with
the rise of American airpower, Billy Mitchell
captured the imagination of the American
public with his dramatic courts martial in
1925. Known as a prophet, a man who
predicted the power of air warfare and fought
for an independent Air Service, Mitchell was
born in Milwaukee in December 1879. His
father was Senator John Landum Mitchell,
who was often cold and aloof toward his son
William. Billy Mitchell was a good student
at the many boarding schools he attended,
and when the war with Spain broke out in
1898 he defied his senator-father, who had
opposed the conflict, and joined the military.
Our contributor James J. Cooke, Professor
Emeritus of History at the University of
Mississippi, is not only a prolific military
historian, he is a retired Brigadier General in the
Mississippi National Guard and saw active
service as recently as Operation Desert Storm.
In 2002, he published a biography Billy
Mitchell with Lynne Rienner Publishers. At our
request he has rethought Mitchell's contributions
to the birth of American airpower and presents
some his fresh thinking in this article.
9
After the war Mitchell served in Cuba and
then in the Philippines, making a very good
impression on his superiors. His service as a
Signal officer in the Alaskan wilderness and
in San Francisco after the 1906 earthquake
and fire marked him as an officer on the rise.
Ordered to Washington to serve on the
General Staff, he slowly became interested in
the new section of the Signal Corps - the
aviation section - and he took private flying
lessons in 1916.
than Billy Mitchell because he was a flyer,
fluent in French, as well as a bon vivant who
enjoyed Paris life. But all was not dinners at
Maxim's or strolls along the Champs
Elysees. Mitchell threw himself into his
work and went to the front, actually flying
with the French over the front. Within two
months Mitchell was well aware of all
aspects of the air war and was ready to be
General Pershing's righthand air advisor. The
British and French experience on the
Western Front showed that the air arm was
vital to ground success. Mitchell observed
this and adopted what his European hosts
showed him, passing it on to General
Pershing when he arrived with his small staff
in June 1917.
Mitchell in the Alaskan Wilderness
As an officer serving on the General Staff,
Billy Mitchell could see the conflict in
Europe from a special vantage point, and he
felt that eventually the United States would
be drawn into the war despite President
Wilson's promise that the country would not
be involved. He was correct in his
assumptions, and a month before the U.S.
declared war on Germany on 6 April 1917
Mitchell was dispatched to Paris as an
observer with special emphasis on the
development of the air arms of the British
and the French. There was no better choice
10
On 20 April 1917 Mitchell left Paris for
French headquarters at Chalons and began
his work. Billy Mitchell had always been a
very literate officer, and he began to keep a
detailed diary of his learning experiences. It
is from this diary that one can see the
evolution of Mitchell's thoughts, which
would eventually have a great impact on the
development of the U.S. Air Service in
France and American Airpower in the 20th
Century. When Pershing began his 19161917 punitive expedition in Mexico he had
one Aero Squadron and was impressed with
the observation potential of the air arm, if it
could be called that. When the U.S. went to
war there was not one serviceable Aero
Squadron which could be deployed to
France. Mitchell realized that everything
would have to be built from the ground up. It
was a daunting task, and in the first days
Mitchell spent a great deal of time dealing
with air observation by aircraft and by
balloons. He understood that his role there
was not just to learn about tactics, and he
studied the logistics and the maintenance of
the Air Service. On 23 April he observed that
the pilot, the aircraft, and the ground crew
functioned as one team. Each French pilot
kept his own mechanics, and they in turn
made the aircraft their personal machine,
boasting that their pilot, their aircraft, and
their crew was the best. This was morale and
unit cohesion at its best, and it was never lost
on Mitchell. The pilots and the crews had a
certain élan, a romantic view of themselves,
and this certainly appealed to Billy Mitchell.
Another area that came as a revelation to
Billy Mitchell was the use of battlefield air
photography. Mitchell's evaluation was very
orthodox, seeing the value of immediate
intelligence for the ground combat
commanders. After visiting a French
bombardment squadron, he commented in
his diary that the squadron officers believed
that they could hit deep targets, and that, "…
there would be nothing left of Germany in a
short time." Not yet ready to accept the
concept of strategic bombing, Mitchell
remained skeptical and restricted his view of
bombardment as a part of the immediate
battlefield. Of course, his views would
change dramatically after the Great War. He
grasped very quickly the value of the balloon
in observation of the enemy and in directing
indirect artillery fire. With real time
communications, artillery could rapidly shift
fires from one target to the next. His service
as a signal officer, and his hands-on experiences in the Alaskan wilderness laying telegraph
cable and during the post-1906 San Francisco
earthquake recovery served him well.
On 17 June Mitchell visited General Hugh
Trenchard, at Royal Flying Corps
headquarters and had a lengthy discussion
with the general. Two areas which Mitchell
later commented on were bombardment, a
subject which he had fully explored with the
11
French, and the principle of mass. Long
recognized as one of the principles of war,
mass was applied to ground combat
operations - to bring as much force as
possible at a single point. Mitchell came
away from the meeting convinced that
airpower was best used in mass to first
dominate the air and then deliver a massive
blow against the enemy both in close combat
and against enemy supply lines, ammunition
and supply dumps, and rail links. This would
stay with Billy Mitchell, and in September
1918 he massed 1485 aircraft in support of
the St. Mihiel campaign.
Mitchell met with General Pershing and
briefed him on what he had learned from his
meetings with the French and the British,
and what he had to say was staggering
indeed. The U.S. had an infant Air Service,
but now was faced with a massive, really
unexpected, expansion - the creation of
command and control structure for
bombardment, pursuit, observation, and
balloon units. These newly created
squadrons and companies called for trained
pilots, ground crews, a logistical system to
support every aspect of air operations. Of
paramount importance for Mitchell was
Pershing's support for this expansion, and
Mitchell got it when Black Jack Pershing
agreed that there should be an Air Service
that was separate from the Signal Corps.
This was a high point for Mitchell, who was
promoted to Lieutenant Colonel and served
as Pershing's Air Service chief. Coming out
of this was an aviation board with Mitchell
as the major experienced officer, and its
recommendations were accepted by
Pershing. General Pershing began to contract
for aircraft, coordinate training needs, and
establish the main AEF Air Service training
area at Issoudun, France.
build the American Air Service. He then
discussed his view of the air war, a position
which he would never abandon. He divided
the air arm into two distinct operational
forces - the tactical and the strategic. They
would be from the Air Service but operate in
two different spheres. The tactical was
obvious, its mission clear - to support the
ground battle with observation and pursuit
planes and balloons. The strategic force
would range deep into the enemy's rear area
striking those areas supporting German
fighting forces. Mitchell's vision, however,
extended the strategic force's power by
hitting the enemy homeland. Bridges, rail
yards, and supply centers would be worthy
targets, and strategic air had to operate in
mass. Mitchell told Harbord that he believed
a strategic bombing campaign might well
have a greater influence on the course of war
than any other use of airpower. This was
basically Mitchell the theoretical, but it
would become vintage Mitchell in the 1920s
and 1930s. In 1917 and 1918 Colonel Billy
Mitchell had too much to do to press for any
sort of strategic or deep strike campaign
On 3 September 1917 Pershing appointed
William L. Kenly, an old line army officer as
chief of the AEF's Air Service, which proved
to be an unwise move. To sooth Mitchell's
feelings he promoted him to the rank of full
colonel before the age of 40! But there could
be no question as to who was the real
aviation expert and who was not. Mitchell
was given command of the air in the Zone of
Advance as Pershing's real warfighter. He
never stopped preaching a gospel of mass
and aggressive action in the air. To Mitchell
the air arm should never be passive but
should be in the air to attack and destroy
enemy observation aircraft and then
command the air over the front by defeating
the German pursuit aircraft. Mitchell
breathed aggressiveness and offensive
operations into the Air Service.
Mitchell had processed a vast amount of
material in a very short period of time, and
his mind was racing in all directions. In a
memo to General James Guthrie Harbord,
General Pershing's excellent lieutenant,
Mitchell outlined what needed to be done to
Mitchell and His Gunner with His Spad-XVI
12
against the German homeland. His ideas,
however, would surface again, especially in
1921 when he met Giulio Douhet who had
just published his landmark book Il Dominio
dell' Aria [Command of the Air]. The value
of strategic air warfare became gospel for
Mitchell, but the seeds of his concepts were
planted in 1917 and 1918.
divisions, and air liaison officers would be a
part of divisional, corps, and army level
units.
But, all was not rancor and dispute. Under
Mitchell's guidance a large air depot was
established at Colombey-les-Belles, less than
100 miles from the front. The depot began
stockpiling repair parts and the serious
training of those all-important ground crews.
There was much to be done in a very short
period of time. Training at Issoudun showed
promise, but there appeared to be confusion
in the ranks of the Air Service. Pershing,
who was under great pressure to get the
Americans into the fight, became displeased
with what seemed to be a lack of
coordination, command, and control in the
Air Service. Word of Black Jack's
displeasure reached Mitchell, and he
believed that a change in the position of
chief of the Air Service should see him as the
new commander with the star of a brigadier
general.
Pershing had decided to move his
headquarters from Paris to Chaumont, and
Mitchell moved his staff and headquarters as
well. On 18 August he formally requested
suitable quarters for 20 officers and about
100 enlisted men. What he found was the
Chateau de Chamarandes, which was a mile
from Chaumont. There he established a
meteorological station to support air activities.
Billy Mitchell was never one to hide his
talents or to use (some would argue overuse)
his fine staff, but, despite his good
experiences with the French and British air
arms, his relationship with Pershing's staff
soured. One main problem was his
deteriorating relationship with General
Kenly over the direction of the Air Service.
Frankly, Kenly had little feel or knowledge
of the air war, having come from the
artillery. Pershing knew of Kenly's
evenhanded approach to command and his
ability to organize units under his command.
What Kenly could not deal with was
Mitchell's personality and Mitchell's drive.
Kenly was also vehemently opposed to
Mitchell's call for the Air Service to be an
independent arm within the AEF. Mitchell
would have been wise to point out that the
Air Service would be a part of the Pershing
orthodoxy of the rifleman as the key to
victory and that AEF divisions would be part
of a combined arms team. Billy Mitchell did
indeed recognize the importance of assigning
an aero squadron and a balloon unit to the
Mitchell was devastated when Pershing
announced that Benjamin Foulois would be
the new chief of the AEF's Air Service.
Foulois was an old airman who served with
Black Jack during the Mexico operation,
1916-1917, and Pershing had been impressed
with the potential of the 1st Aero Squadron,
especially in the area of observation to
support ground combat operations. It did not
hurt that Foulois, who trained under Orville
Wright in 1909 and earned his army pilot's
wings in 1912, was a solid team player and
supported the Pershing orthodoxy. The
selection of Foulois greatly upset Mitchell,
who reacted very badly. There would be bad
blood between the two airmen. Mitchell was
assigned to command the newly formed I
Corps' aviation. Despite his grave
13
disappointment at not getting the position as
chief, Mitchell worked hard to build the air
arm of the corps. His newly trained aero
squadrons began flying close to the front in
what was known as a "quiet sector" where
there was little combat action. Mitchell did
have a realistic view of what the mission of
the AEF was. He wrote, "The Air Service of
an army is one of its offensive arms. Alone it
can not bring about a decision. It therefore
helps the other arms in their appointed
mission."
There is complexity in dealing with Mitchell
in the Great War. On one hand he was
consistent in building an air arm from the
ground up into a viable fighting force, while
on the other his personality grated on other
high-ranking, influential officers and
interfered with his mission. His open
hostility toward Foulois was obvious and
alienated key officers like Generals Hugh
Drum (operations) and Dennis Nolan
(intelligence). Meanwhile, Mitchell's ideas
were forming into an air doctrine. He
instilled in his subordinates the principle of
mass and immediate and aggressive counterair operations - in other words, gaining air
superiority over the German air arm.
Mitchell was simply too valuable to relieve
and send home.
Other problems began to surface with the Air
Service. Foulois had great difficulty in
coordinating air issues between the Zone of
Advance and the Line of Communications.
Supplies were slow in moving to the front,
there was confusion at higher commands,
and there was a great deal of lost time when
Foulois succeeded Kenly. It did not help that
when the great German offensives began in
early 1918 Washington slowed down the
transportation of Air Service personnel to
Rival Benjamin Foulois with Wilbur Wright
14
France in favor of infantry and machine gun
units. Pershing was becoming greatly
distressed over the confusion in the Air
Service and decided that a very firm hand
was needed to bring order out of what now
appeared to be a chaotic situation. On 29
May 1918 Pershing appointed Brigadier
General Mason Patrick to become the chief
of the American Air Service. Patrick's
appointment came as a surprise to everyone
because he had no experience with air
operations and had never flown in an
aircraft. Patrick had been a classmate of
Pershing at West Point and spent his career
as an engineering officer. Patrick kept
Foulois on as his assistant. Shortly afterward,
on 3 June Congress passed an Air Service act
which created the service as a branch of the
army rather than air as a component of the
Army Signal Corps. Mitchell and his airmen
could now wear the distinctive insignia of
the Air Service, and those officers on duty
with the Air Service were transferred to the
service with no massive bureaucratic paperwork. For Billy Mitchell this was another step
in creating an independent air force.
Mason Patrick came to the Air Service with
a reputation of being an excellent, nononsense officer, and he had the full support
of Black Jack Pershing. [See Prof. Cooke's
profile of Patrick on page 16.] He was quick
to see that Mitchell was a first-rate officer
with a quick mind and an organizational
ability. While the Mitchell-Foulois feud
continued, Patrick looked to Billy Mitchell
for complicated combat tasks. By 25 July
Mitchell had devised an Air Service
command and control chart which would be
used until the end of the war. One of the
critical areas settled was a coherent chain of
command, who reported to whom, who
issued orders, and what was contained within
Air Service assets. Mitchell's 25 July
organization tied together the observation,
pursuit, and bombardment squadrons with
the air depots and the ancillary units such as
air photography and air intelligence
companies. The balloon companies, so vital
to observation and artillery, came under the
organization. As the U.S. Air Service took
shape, Mitchell was able to move more and
more air squadrons to the Toul area for
practical experience. When Foulois was
moved to chief of the Air Service, 1st U.S.
Army, Mitchell became 1st Air Brigade
commander. He was the under watchful eyes
of Patrick and the 1st Army commander,
Hunter Liggett. Despite the work Mitchell
had accomplished to give form and structure
to the Air Service he would not be promoted
to the rank of brigadier general.
Patrick's leadership abilities came into play,
and he was content to leave direction of
training, coordination with the French and
British, and logistics with Foulois and actual
combat operations to Mitchell. By the
summer of 1918, the press, then under
Pershing's strict censorship policies, was
looking for stories for their newspapers.
They hit on the Air Service as a source of
"human interest" stories. The "intrepid
airmen" became knights of the air with
flowing white scarfs, the idols of French
womanhood, the daring warrior above the
mud and blood of the trenches. Mitchell,
who by now sported a British- style walking
stick and a beautifully tailored uniform, was
pictured as the boyish bon vivant, the stuff
that national heroes were made of. Of course,
the press exaggerated the picture and
reported none of dangers or miseries of the
airmen who had no parachutes, who could be
roasted alive in a flaming plane, or suffered
the serious intestinal distress from the castor
oil that lubricated temperamental engines
and blew back into the cockpit. Billy
Mitchell loved it and did nothing to dissuade
the press from idolizing his "dashing knight."
The Mitchell-Foulois feud had grown into a
festering sore for the AEF, and something
had to be done because the AEF was
planning for its first major offensive
operation in September 1918. On 25 August
General Foulois asked to step down from his
post and that Mitchell be appointed as the
chief of the Air Service at 1st Army
headquarters. This operation against the St.
Mihiel Salient had to be successful if the
American army could ever hope to be seen
as the equal to the British and French. On 10
August Pershing issued the order to begin
planning for the offensive. No American
general had ever faced the daunting task of
planning for an attack that used aircraft,
tanks, wire communication, and it was
planning that Billy Mitchell could do well.
15
There is not question of Col. Mitchell's
extraordinary personal magnetism and of his
rather unusual ability, but. . .ge blows in, puts
everything in a stew, and the [us]to straighten it
out and get things running again.
Capt. Philip Roosevelt, First Pursuit Group
Major General Mason Mathews Patrick
General Mason Patrick was one of the most influential figures in the development of American air power, and he and
his contributions are often overlooked. It was Patrick's steady hand and his determination that brought about the
establishment of the United States Army Air Corps in July 1926. He was not given to flashy speeches nor did he have
the personality to attract the press or adulation of the public. Patrick was an unlikely airman who became one of the
fathers of the modern U.S. Air Force.
Patrick was born in West Virginia in December 1863. His father was a surgeon
with the Confederate Army. In 1882 Patrick entered West Point, graduating as
an engineer officer in 1886. One of his classmates and friends was John J.
Pershing, and their friendship would have a great effect on the course of
Patrick's military career. From 1892 to 1895 Patrick taught engineering at his
alma mater, and from 1897 to 1901 he was involved with improvements along
the Mississippi river. In 1916 Patrick served under Pershing during the Mexico
campaign, and when Pershing went to France in 1917 he saw to it that Patrick
served in the AEF as Chief Engineer, Line of Communication. What was very
clear was that Brigadier General Patrick was a First-rate organizer and an
excellent manager of the men serving under him. Those two traits plus his
loyalty to Pershing made him a prime candidate for further assignment and
promotion. One of the areas of the AEF that cried out for a man of Patrick's
abilities was the U.S. Air Service, where rivalries and personalities caused
tension and confusion. If the AEF was to become a modern, respected fighting force the problems with the Air Service
had to be dealt with. In 1917 Patrick was in charge of training the AEF's engineers, and he wrote in his diary, "My job
is staggering me," but he successfully completed this task, and this was not lost on Pershing, who knew that
something had to be with the Air Service.
Patrick inherited a mess because the two top airpower advocates, Benjamin Foulois and Billy Mitchell, were at odds
with each other. What Patrick eventually did was to allow Mitchell to oversee the tactical operations of the Air
Service and to make Foulois assistant chief of staff of the Air Service under Patrick. Patrick saw in Mitchell a very
good combat leader who had a fine staff that could plan operations in detail. Mason Patrick also ran interference for
the emerging Air Service with Pershing, who never really liked distinctive insignia on aircraft or on pilots' uniforms,
and Black Jack certainly did not like the cavalier attitudes that airmen had regarding regulation uniforms. Being an
old soldier with much time with troops, Patrick recognized that morale and unit cohesion were vital to the building of
such a new combat force, and he tended to overlook the casual dress of his men except when they were off duty and
in the local cafes and bars, where he wanted them in proper uniform. Patrick's approach paid off during the St.
Mihiel operation when Mitchell was able to put 1481 aircraft into the fight. The Air Service also served the AEF well
during the Meuse-Argonne offensive despite very bad weather conditions.
In 1919 Patrick returned to the United States as an engineer officer. He turned over the direction of the Air Service to
Major General Charles T. Menoher. Menoher had been a very successful commander of the 42nd "Rainbow" Division
from 1917 to 1918, but he had no experience with aviation, and very quickly his relationship with Billy Mitchell, his
director of military aeronautics and his operations officer, soured and became an open conflict. Pershing, now Chief
of Staff of the Army, faced an old problem--how to bring order out of chaos and establish some stability in the air
arm. He brought back Patrick as the Chief of the Air Service in 1921.
Patrick recognized very quickly that someone without wings on his chest could never be totally respected by airmen
who had flown into mortal combat over the front during the Great War. At age 58 Patrick went to Bolling Field and
earned his pilot's wings. During his tenure as chief he established research and experimental facilities at Wright Field,
Ohio and a large training facility near San Antonio, Texas. Patrick served on numerous boards and was a constant
visitor to Capitol Hill, arguing for the Air Service. His thoughts evolved, and he became a champion of an
independent Air Service. While one associates this with Billy Mitchell, it was actually Patrick, with his calm manner
and judicious words, who had more of an impact on those who could actually effect change. In 1926 he saw a
reorganization for the Air Service, which became the Air Corps. Perhaps the most personally distressing event of his
tenure was the famed court martial of Billy Mitchell in 1925. From the official transcripts of the trial one sees Patrick
trying to put the best possible light on Mitchell's actions, but to no avail, as Mitchell was found guilty.
16
Mitchell had preached the gospel of mass
since his arrival in France in early 1917, and
the St. Mihiel operation presented the
occasion to prove the validity of mass. On 15
August he approached the French, asking for
seven observation squadrons, nine pursuit
squadrons, five bombardment squadrons, and
five balloon companies. The Royal Air Force
also agreed to make aircraft available for the
operation. When Mitchell looked at his troop
list he could count 1481 aircraft assigned to
fourteen airfields close to the salient. Thirty
thousand men were ready for the fight. The
pressure on Mitchell's staff, coordinated by
Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Dewitt Milling,
was great because no fighting force can be
effective if not served by a strong and
responsive logistics system. To support the
air effort there had to be fuel, ammunition,
repair parts, and replacement planes at each
of the fourteen air fields. There had to be
enough qualified ground crewmen available
to repair aircraft. To achieve mass there had
to be enough food and billets to house every
airman involved in the St. Mihiel operations.
A number of observation aircraft had to be
used for air reconnaissance and photographic
missions over the whole of the St. Mihiel
sector. Before the fight began, allied aircraft
had to win the counter-reconnaissance battle,
actually blinding the German defenders as to
American intent. In other words, Mitchell
intended to have air supremacy over the St.
Mihiel Salient with pursuit squadrons
sweeping the air of German planes, opening
the way for the observation squadrons to do
their work. Mitchell's intent was quite clear.
One of Mitchell's strong points was his
ability to write, and his orders for the Air
Service were clear, coherent, and left very
little room for interpretation by subordinates.
By 20 August Mitchell's plan for the St.
Mihiel offensive was complete and ready for
presentation to the 1st Army staff. He
divided the Air Service mission into four
distinct phases: preparation, night preceding
the attack, day of the attack, and
exploitation. The preparation phase focused
on the necessity of keeping German aircraft
from any sort of reconnaissance of the
ground forces in staging areas close to the
line of departure. On the other hand, Allied
air observation had to gain the most
complete picture of enemy dispositions,
"…without arousing the suspicions of the
enemy." For so young an Air Service this
was a daunting task. The second phase was
less demanding because it would be an allout attack by British and American
bombardment squadrons against "strategical
objectives: airdromes, stations, railroad
crossings, bridges, ammunition dumps
[confirmed by photos], and a general attack
by French and American air against
personnel, of camps, enemy cantonments and
airdromes."
17
The day of the attack phase saw pursuit
squadrons flying first against German air and
then providing protection for the bombers
that would hit enemy airdromes and bomb
enemy infantry being sent to the front to
support the defense. Any German
counterattack formations had to be broken up
by bombs and by strafing, and then certain
squadrons would provide close air support
for the tanks under Colonel George S.
Patton. (During the 1930s Patton and
Mitchell would become good friends.) The
exploitation phase of the air operation aimed
at moving airfields closer to the area of
operations. During this phase, which was
predicated on the infantry achieving its
objectives, air would then seek out columns
of retreating enemy ground troops and
destroy them by bombardment and by
aware of the dangers the weather posed. One
veteran of the 135th Aero Squadron recalled
that after a briefing in a Red Cross hut he
thought that, "This meant just one thing, we
would have to perform our duties in dirty
flying weather." There were tense moments
when the heavily weighted bombardment
planes taxied on the sodden dirt runways, but
almost all of them lifted off . A few aircraft
sunk into the mud with propellers tearing up
huge clods of dirt. In just 17 months the
American Air Service had gone from one
strafing. Mitchell added, "… high explosive
bombardment by English aviation will be
specially detailed to destroy railway
crossings and important bridges located in
the zone far from the battlefield." This plan
could be a template for the great air
operations of World War II and beyond, and
it showed Mitchell to be a serious student of
the battlefield. Mitchell had his detractors at
1st Army and at AEF headquarters, but no
one, and certainly not Pershing, could find
fault with this well written, well coordinated,
and well prepared operations plan. While
fuel and repair parts poured into the
airdromes and air crews checked and
rechecked Aircraft, all Mitchell, Pershing
and the corps and divisional commanders
could wish or pray for was fair flying
weather for the first day of the St. Mihiel
operation.
Mitchell had an excellent staff, and, with his
intent being clear, they prepared Battle Order
Number 1, which was finished on 11
September. The order was detailed and
reflected Mitchell's aggressiveness and his
determination to achieve mass and air
supremacy. From their headquarters at Lignyen-Barrois they waited for the dawn of 12
September and the beginning of the first
great American offensive of the war. During
the night of 11-12 September rain fell in
torrents, and at dawn the American artillery
signaled the operation upon which General
Pershing had staked so much.
Air Service Insignia, 1918
obsolete aero squadron to a point where it
could launch aircraft from four countries in a
mass attack. On 12 and 13 September, as
Mitchell wrote in his after action report, the
Air Service achieved first, tactical surprise,
and second, air supremacy. By 14 September
the Germans realized the Allied effort and
counterattacked, mainly against air
observation planes and balloons. The
Germans had planned to evacuate the St.
Mihiel Salient and had to cover the
withdrawal as well as possible to save as
many troops and supplies as they could.
Mitchell's pilots, ground crews, and support
troops were ready for action, and despite the
heavy rains and wind gusts American,
British, French, and some Italian squadrons
took to the air. Ground crews and mechanics
had been busy since 4 A.M. preparing the
planes for action, and the pilots were all
In his after-action report Mitchell pointed out
a serious defect that would continue to
plague air-ground operations during the next
world war. Liaison between air and ground
18
did not go as well as it should have because
of the weather and the turmoil of intense
ground combat. Often it was difficult for a
pilot to see where American units were.
Ground commanders, while primarily
concerned with taking their objectives, failed
to lay out panels and markers. Major Lewis
Brereton, in his own report, decried the lack
of liaison between air and ground artillery.
On the other hand, Major John Pagelow's
critique of the effectiveness of the balloon
companies was very positive because the
balloonists had direct and immediate
communication with artillery. In the years
after the war Mitchell returned to the theme
of the difficulties in air-ground liaison.
Mitchell's analysis of the St. Mihiel
operation was direct and to the point, and
Pershing agreed. In October 1918 Billy
Mitchell was promoted to the rank of
brigadier general.
There was euphoria over the St. Mihiel
operation, but that could not last because
Pershing was planning the next great
offensive of the war into the MeuseArgonne. Much has been written about the
problems facing the AEF with this attack and
the severe difficulties faced by the American
divisions that crossed the Line of Departure
on 26 September. For Mitchell, the Air
Service had to begin operations, as it had
done at St. Mihiel, by winning the
reconnaissance-counter-reconnaissance
battle and by establishing American air
superiority. On 24 September Mitchell was
in possession of captured German air
reconnaissance photographs that shocked
him. Those photographs taken from a
downed German observation-photographic
aircraft showed not only his headquarters but
Pershing's as well. The enemy was not about
to repeat their early weak air activities as
they had done at St. Mihiel. He had also
come to the conclusion that there had to be
better air observation because of the nature
of the battlefield and of well-prepared
German defenses in the Meuse-Argonne.
After St. Mihiel, Mitchell's stock was very
high. Pershing had decided to promote Billy
Mitchell, and Black Jack recommended that
Mitchell be decorated with the Distinguished
Service Cross for his work. Mitchell had to
prepare for the Meuse-Argonne Offensive,
and put his staff to work for the operation.
Plans were finalized for the missions for the
pursuit, observation, and bombardment
squadrons and groups. Balloon companies
were allocated to the attacking divisions. The
staff had to prepare new air fields, find
billets for the troops, stockpile repair parts,
and move vast quantities of oils and fuel to
the new locations. Transportation over bad
roads became a nightmare. The intelligence
sections at AEF and at 1st Army
headquarters continually requested air
observation and air photographic missions,
but the weather consisting of low clouds and
heavy rains made such missions nearly
impossible. There were continual
confrontations between General Dennis
Nolan, Pershing's brilliant intelligence (G2)
officer, and General Hugh Drum of the
Operations (G3) section, with Mitchell.
19
The basic mission of the Air Service
remained the same as it was at St. Mihiel,
albeit on a smaller scale. Mitchell basically
supported Pershing's orthodoxy of the
infantry as the final arbiter in battle, and he
continually pushed for air operations that
reflected his intent to maintain air supremacy
and mass. On 9 October the bombardment
squadrons dropped eighty-one tons of
ordnance on German troop concentrations
and on supply lines. The air that day was
filled with aircraft, but officers such as Hugh
Drum recorded that the massive air attack
never happened, and later claimed that the
heavy bombardment never occurred. The
records of the Air Service show clearly that
it did (with the loss of only one
bombardment plane). The strain of continual
flying began to show on Mitchell's pilots,
and he decided to rotate pilots off of the line
to rest for a few days. There were howls of
complaint against Mitchell, but General
Mason Patrick stepped into the controversy,
stating the initial idea was his and that
Mitchell was correct in getting pilots some
rest for a few days.
would be short. General Theodore Dickman,
army commander, and Brigadier General
Malin Craig, Third Army chief of staff,
raised serious objections to Mitchell's
appointment. To make matters worse for
Mitchell, Major General Charles T. Menoher
who commanded the 42nd "Rainbow"
Division, was sent back to Washington to
become the Chief of the Air Service, and
Menoher, a traditional artilleryman and very
successful infantry commander, disliked
Mitchell.
In mid-October Pershing gave up his
command of 1st Army and created 2nd
Army, elevating himself to the rank of
general of the Armies. Brigadier General
Billy Mitchell became the chief of the Air
Service for the army group; Mason Patrick
remained overall chief of the AEF's Air
Service. These changes came at a critical
time because there were serious difficulties
in obtaining replacement aircraft and repair
parts, experienced ground crews were in
short supply, and most of the newly trained
pilots were very green. A crisis was in the
making for the air arm when the guns fell
silent on 11 November 1918. Mitchell's stock
was never higher than at the end of war,
especially among the members of the Air
Service, but his image among other officers
was one of a self-serving, self-promoting
maverick officer who had the protection of
Pershing and Patrick.
Pershing was in the process of forming the
U.S. Third Army to occupy a sector in
Germany on the west side of the Rhine
River, and he selected Mitchell to head up
the air section of that army. Mitchell went to
Coblentz and selected a residence and a
headquarters, but his time with Third Army
1919 - Billy Mitchell Triumphant
20
Billy Mitchell was ordered back to
Washington in early 1919, and during his
trip he conferred with General Hugh
Trenchard in England. This meeting
reinforced a growing feeling that the Air
Service should become an independent
service. From that point on, Billy Mitchell
would become the leading exponent of a
separate U.S. Air Force, a position opposed
by Pershing, Menoher, and most other
members of the officer corps. Mitchell
should be known for more than just his
met Douhet in 1921 his views were
solidified. During the war Mitchell talked
about the value of carrying the war, by air, to
the enemies' homeland, but the aircraft did
not have the ability to deliver large amount
of ordnance on German targets.
advocacy of an air force, however. His
thoughts and his command were
evolutionary and fitted in well with
Pershing's orthodoxy, "the cult of the rifle."
His structure of the AEF's Air Service and,
more important, his operations orders
showed that the air arm supported the ground
attack with observation, pursuit,
bombardment, and balloon. It was necessary
that even before infantry crossed the line of
departure the air had to sweep the skies of
German aircraft and establish air superiority,
denying the enemy the critical ability to
observe the movements and concentrations
of the infantry. Before the attack American
observation aircraft had to see enemy
dispositions and provide vital intelligence for
the staffs planning an offensive operation.
During the attack pursuit planes strafed
troops, and bombardment aircraft hit troop
concentrations and lines of supplies,
including bridges and railroads.
Mitchell had a dramatic impact on airpower
thinkers long after he left the national scene.
He believed firmly in the principle of mass.
To Mitchell's mind the air arm could not be
committed to combat in small numbers. Air
superiority meant not only defeating the
Germans, but also meeting them with
massive numbers of aircraft, numbers which
the enemy could never match. Billy Mitchell
was never one to overlook the skill of enemy
airmen (and later this included the Japanese
airmen) or the technology of their planes. It
became a matter of overcoming the enemy
with larger numbers. As his thoughts evolved
Mitchell also posited that bombardment had
to be protected on their missions by pursuit
or fighter planes. What he saw was an
integrated air arm, and while he encouraged
the press to write glowing stories about the
"gallant knights of the air," the fighter pilots
had many missions.
Mitchell also established for future Air
Service actions the complex relationship
between the air warriors and the ground
staff. Without the staff planners, the ground
crews, and the air logistic personnel the air
war could not be successful. While Mitchell
was not comfortable with the day-to-day
processes of ordering and stockpiling fuel
and repair parts, he was quick to recognize
the necessity of the ground and air interface.
His selection of staff officers was excellent
because he recognized talent and allowed the
staff to function with a minimum of
interference. His efforts would be felt in the
U.S. air arm for generations to come.
There is no question that Billy Mitchell had a
quick, supple mind and was eager to explore
new, often controversial, air matters.
Mitchell emerged from the Great War as an
advocate of strategic bombardment. When he
There is no doubt that Billy Mitchell was a
controversial figure both during the war and
in postwar years, especially in 1925 with his
courts-martial. But Billy Mitchell fixed on
the Air Service his concepts, which he put
into practical action on the Western Front.
His contributions deeply influenced the air
war fighters of the next great global conflict
and eventually the creation of the United
States Air Force in 1947. He emerged from
the Great War as a premier advocate of
American air power, and because of that he
deserves his rightful place in our history.
21
Postscript: Mitchell Postwar by Aviation Editor Kimball Worcester
The Sinking of the Dreadnought SMS Ostfriesland
The early rivalry between the U.S. Air Service and the Navy in the immediate post-Great War years was one of the
very public and controversial projects of the irrepressible Billy Mitchell. His strategic thinking, truly reflecting the
potential for airpower in the 20th century, was yet another irritant he inflicted on the older, established military
services.
Mitchell's tenacity in proving his belief in air power to the public and the U.S. government took shape in 1921 with
the staged sinking by aerial bombing of the illustrious battleship SMS Ostfriesland, a tough veteran of the Battle of
Jutland that survived the engagement in 1916. She was a noble foe indeed, enduring 18 hits from British guns and
striking a mine on her way home after Jutland. In the war's aftermath she was sent to the U.S. to be destroyed. Her
ultimate fate was to serve Mitchell's purpose in proving the superiority of aerial rather than naval coastal defense.
The U.S. Navy, predictably, disagreed strongly with Mitchell's
stance, and in due course something of a "bomb-off" contest was
staged in the summer of 1921 in the Atlantic some 50 miles out to
sea from the Chesapeake Bay. The contest was set up with
"rules" and conditions that were intended to weigh the outcome
heavily in favor of the Navy over Mitchell's bombers. Mitchell,
not surprisingly, persisted with his Handley Page O/400s and the
new Martin MB-2 biplanes, and did indeed sink the Ostfriesland.
The Navy unsportingly derided the value of the successful
demonstration and claimed that Mitchell had violated the rules.
The entire squabble would appear childish were it not for its real
importance in highlighting this necessary progress in military
efficacy.
Osfriesland Under Bombardment
The Court Martial
Billy Mitchell spent his postwar days proselytizing for an independent air force run by knowledgeable aviatorwarriors. His words and deeds were implicitly, and eventually explicity, critical of his superiors in the Army and War
Department. He also waged an ongoing doctrinal guerilla war with the U.S. Navy especially after his public relations
victory resulting from the sinking of the Osfriesland.In 1925 it came to a head. Rebecca Maksel summarized the
events nicely in Air & Space Magazine (July 1, 2009):
The popular Colonel Mitchell was fac[ed] a court-martial for his
controversial remarks to the press on September 5, blasting two military
disasters: a bungled flight during which three Navy seaplanes failed to make
it from the West Coast to Hawaii; and the crash of the Navy airship USS
Shenandoah while flying over the Midwest on an ill-advised public relations
tour. “These incidents are the direct result of the incompetency, criminal
negligence and almost treasonable administration of the national defense by
the Navy and War Departments,” Mitchell stated. “The bodies of my former
companions in the air molder under the soil in America, and Asia, Europe
and Africa, many, yes a great many, sent there directly by official stupidity.”
Within days, the War Department charged Mitchell with violating eight
specifications of the Ninety-sixth Article of War, which covered “all conduct
of a nature to bring discredit upon the military service.” After more than seven weeks of testimony and 99 witnesses,
he was found guilty of all charges and was sentenced to a suspension from rank, command, and duty, with forfeiture
of all pay for five years. Mitchell resigned his commission and died in 1936. He received many posthumous honors
for his visionary work.
Charges Read
22
List of Eleven: Notable Ship Sinkings During the War
1. SS Königin Luise
German auxiliary minelayer, scuttled after damage by enemy fire 5 August 1914. First ship lost
due to enemy action in WWI.
2. HMS Aboukir, Hogue, and Cressy
U-9 sank three British armoured cruisers on 22 September 1914, causing a heightened awareness
within the Royal Navy of the submarine threat.
3. FS Bouvet, HMS Irresistible, and HMS Ocean
Sinking of three Allied battleships in the Dardanelles assault of 18 March 1915 led to the
disastrous Gallipoli land campaign.
4. RMS Lusitania
British liner lost to German submarine 7 May 1915. Deaths of 128 American passengers (out of
1195 killed) contributed to growing sentiment for U.S. entering the war on the Allied side.
5. HMS Indefatigable, Invincible, and Queen Mary
Three British battlecruisers sunk at Jutland 31 May 1916. Loss highlighted design flaws and
raised doubts about viability of the battlecruiser class.
6. HMS Hampshire
Transporting Lord Kitchener on a diplomatic mission to Russia, Hampshire struck a mine on
5 June 1916 off Mainland, Orkney.
7. HMHS Britannic
The Titanic's sistership converted into a hospital ship struck a mine off the Greek island of Kea
on 21 November 1916, and sank with the loss of 30 lives.
8. USS Jacob Jones
American destroyer, sunk by U-53 on, 6 December 1917. Best-known U.S. warship lost in
action in WWI.
9. SMS Szent István
Austrian dreadnought torpedoed by two Italian motor boats 10 June 1918. Only battleship
sinking filmed during the war. (Background image)
10. HMHS Llandovery Castle
Canadian hospital ship torpedoed off southern Ireland on 27 June 1918 with the loss of 234
lives. Follow-up killings by crew of U-86 led to war crimes prosecutions.
11. HMS Britannia
On 9 November 1918, the Britannia, a pre-dreadnought, was on a voyage to Gibraltar when
she was torpedoed off Cape Trafalgar by the German submarine U-50. Last major warship
sunk during WWI.
23
July 2010
AN IMPORTANT LETTER FROM DANA LOMBARDY
PRESIDENT OF THE GREAT WAR SOCIETY
After considerable review, the board of directors of TGWS is currently working with the Western Front
Association - USA Branch to merge our two organizations. With the centennial years rapidly approaching
(2014-2019), merging our two organizations makes sense on several levels, and we hope to accomplish this
grand alliance by the end of 2010.
What will be the effects of a merger?
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Our local chapter meetings and the annual November 11 commemoration meeting will continue as
before without change. The differences everyone will eventually see are an improved publication and
more robust Website with additional features.
This will be accomplished with no planned increase in dues.
Combining the two boards of directors will allow for many opinions to be considered on all important
issues, such as centennial events. Why should The Great War Society and Western Front Association USA merge?
Right now, our two groups maintain two Websites, print and distribute two publications, and operate
two similar budgets to maintain two organizations that basically study the First World War in much the
same way.
A merger will help us better achieve our mutual goals of spreading awareness of World War I and will
educate people about this incredible period of history.
The Great War Society and Western Front Association - USA already join together to sponsor an
annual seminar. Merging into one group would enable us to:
Operate more efficiently and more quickly. A new, combined board of directors would require only one
vote to decide on meetings, centennial celebrations, and other projects.
Combine our dues to allow us to publish an improved publication, as well as provide money for
advertising to attract new members and increase awareness of World War I.
Pool our human resources. Both groups have some very talented people who have ideas and contacts
essential to the upcoming centennial years, and they could accomplish much more if united under
one organization.
24
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Present a stronger image to other groups and individuals. We can stop explaining how our two groups
are different (very little) and which one we recommend joining or working with (both!).
Accomplish far more with one strong, well-organized organization than with two small, struggling
groups.
We will need a new name. The one item that is probably the most sensitive is that we must have a new name
for our combined group. The following has been suggested:
First World War Association
With the subtitle:
Studying the Western Front & All Aspects of the Great War
There are people in both organizations who are not happy with the idea of a name change. We are sensitive to
their objections. However, a name that more clearly explains exactly who we are and what we study is essential,
especially during the centennial period when nearly every major news media will recognize and publicize
important 100th-anniversary events.
Our combined organization will appear in Web search engines as the group with the most information,
resources, publications, and guidelines to help people learn more about this vital period of history that still has
impact and relevance today.
The opportunity presented by the centennial of World War I is tremendous. We must be ready for this chance
to increase awareness of the war and related events. That requires joining our two small groups together in
order to participate in the centennial years as a stronger, merged organization that has a better possibility to
accomplish our mutual goals.
You can support these plans simply by renewing your dues at the end of the year. (Renewal reminders and
forms will be sent at the appropriate time.)
Respectfully,
Dana Lombardy
President, The Great War Society
25
The Great War Society Trivia Challenge
The War Month-by-Month
1. In January 1917 British Intelligence intercepted this
diplomatic communiqué that would alarm the United States.
2. The longest battle of World War I would commence
here in February1916.
3. March 1915 marked a failed naval assault at this body
of water that in-turn led to an ill-fated land campaign.
4. This secret treaty, concluded in April 1915 resulted in
Italy entering the war on the side of the Entente.
5. U.S. troops were sent to plug a gap in Allied line at
this French city in late May 1918.
6. The British 1917 campaign in Flanders opened with this
successful mining operation in June.
7. Considered the most successful Russian operation of the
war--despite over 1,000,000 Russian casualties--this July
1916 offensive bears the name of its principal commander.
Name him.
8. The "Black Day of the German Army" occurred in
August 1918 during which battle.
11. This November 1915 defeat of an Anglo-Indian
force near Baghdad set the stage for an even more
disastrous defeat at Kut.
9. This new weapon saw its first battle action near the
village of Flers on the Somme battlefield in September
1916. Name this weapon.
12. Admiral Graf Maximilian von Spee lost his
fleet, and his own life, in this December 1914
naval action in the south Atlantic.
10. The last of the Central Powers entered the war
in October 1915. Name this nation.
Bonus Challenge:
June 28th:
Name two momentous events on this date
five years apart.
40
26
From Boelcke's Dicta and the SPAD XIII to the Raptor
Part I of an Interview With F-22 Raptor Demonstration Pilot Major David M. Skalicky,
Conducted by Relevance editor Michael Hanlon in May 2010 with the help of First
Fighter Wing Historian Brian Laslie.
Major David M. Skalicky of the First Fighter Wing and His F-22 Raptor
Introduction: Today at Langley AFB,
Virginia, the 1st Fighter Wing of the U.S.
Air Force operates and maintains the F-22A
Raptor and F-15 Eagle. The wing is
organized into two "groups": an Operations
Group and a Maintenance Group. Of three
fighter squadrons in the Operations Group,
the two that fly the state-of-the-art F-22 Raptor,
both distinguished themselves in the Great War:
the 27th Fighter Squadron (FS), now known as
the Fightin' Eagles, and the 94th FS, now
known as the Hat-in-the-Ring Gang.
For readers not familiar with the F-22 Raptor, it
is considered a "fifth generation fighter" utilizing
stealth technologies, and is able to cruise in the
range of Mach 2 without afterburners. Acquisition
of the Raptor has been halted at 187.
27
The Wing is a direct descendent of the famed
1st Pursuit Group from the war with both
Raptor squadrons sharing that lineage. In
World War I, when it was originally known
as the 1st Pursuit Organization and Training
Center, the Wing scored the first aerial
victories of the U.S. Air Service in France by
Lts. Alan Winslow (over an Albatros D.V)
and Douglas Campbell (Pfalz D.III) from the
94th Aero Squadron. By the time the war
ended, the unit's name changed to the 1st
Pursuit Group and it had earned 202
confirmed kills. Its roster of pilots included
Medal of Honor recipients Frank Luke and
Eddie Rickenbacker.
MH: The German aviator Oswald Boelcke
developed a set of rules for fighter pilots
known as Dicta Boelcke. Richthofen, for
instance, swore by them. Are they still valid?
Are there new rules for 21st-century fighter
pilots?
Major Skalicky flies the Raptor
demonstration missions for the Wing and
generously offered his help with this
interview.
DS: F-22 tactics are written in classified
manuals known as TTP (tactics, techniques,
and procedures). They provide general and
specific guidance for how to effectively
employ the aircraft in a wide variety of
scenarios. While I can't discuss any Raptorspecific details in this forum, I can comment
on Boelcke's principles in general. Most of
Boelcke's principles are still valid in modern
aerial combat. Let's step through them:
1: Try to secure advantages before attacking.
If possible keep the sun behind you.
Insignia of the 1st Fighter Wing - Inherited from the
1st Pursuit Group, AEF, the five crosses represent
the original squadrons of the group and the five
stripes, the five campaigns they waged in World
War I.
Victory or Death
Absolutely! For the Raptor, stealth helps
secure the advantage of surprise before
attacking. Putting the sun at your back can
make it hard for an enemy to find you with
his eyes or infrared sensors.
MH: Major Skalicky, we would like to
compare the air combat practices and
experiences of the early U.S. Air Service to
that of the U.S. Air Force in the 21st century.
2: Always carry through an attack when you
started it.
DS: Sure, let's go.
At close range, in general, I'd say that's true.
Aborting an attack at close range can
potentially leave you defensive to the
enemy's weapons. Most attacks now days
[sic], however, start at very long range with
beyond-visual-range (BVR) weapons. You
may start an attack on an enemy who appears
to be making a run at your territory but abort
it if he turns around or doesn't show hostile
intent (defector).
MH: To start off, describing the contrasts
between the flying aircraft of the WWI
period, like the Nieuport 28 and SPAD XIII,
and the Raptor would be fun for our readers.
DS: The contrast between the F-22 and the
Nieuport or Spad is enormous. Commonality
exists only in that they have a pilot, wings,
and a gun as every fighter should. The
mental and physical demands on the pilot are
also very different.
3: Fire only at close range and only when
your opponent is properly in your sights.
28
Caveat: The gun was the only aerial weapon
when Boelcke was flying. Shot range
depends on an infinite number of variables;
the type of adversary, his capabilities, your
weapons available, number of follow-on
enemies, proximity to friendly forces, etc.
Only taking valid missiles and/or gun shots,
however, is universally a good idea.
8: For the Squadron: Attack on principle in
groups of four or six. When the fight breaks
up into a series of single combats take care
that several do not go for one opponent.
To me, this addresses the concept of
proportionality. Proportionality is a key
concept for an aerial mission commander to
consider. In Richthofen's era, a single
attacker was proportional and effective
against a single enemy. Today a single
attacker may be effective against one, two, or
ten enemies, depending on the type of
adversary and capabilities of the weapons
system. A mission commander must consider
that sending four attackers against a single
enemy is probably not an efficient use of his
resources. He must also consider that
dividing his forces into "raging singletons"
may reduce their mutual support for one
another and decrease survivability and
effectiveness. An updated wording may be
"commit forces in a proportional manner to
the threat posed by your opponent."
4: Always keep your eye on your opponent
and never let yourself be deceived by ruses.
There isn't a single fighter pilot alive today
that hasn't heard, "…can't fight what you
can't see" and "…lose sight, lose the fight".
They remain as true today as they were back
then. Stealth gives the Raptor a huge
advantage in this area.
5: In any form of attack it is essential to
assail your opponent from behind.
Agreed, the most stable gun shot is from the
opponent's six o'clock. However, modern
aerial weapons mean it is not always
essential you attack from behind your
opponent.
6: If your opponent dives on you, do not try
to evade his onslaught but fly to meet him.
In a visual engagement, absolutely! Meet
him head on and may the best man win.
Turning to run will most likely leave you
defensive from a diving opponent with more
energy.
7: When over the enemy's line never forget
your own line of retreat.
Always leave yourself an out. Getting
outflanked or putting yourself into a situation
where your only option is to continue
attacking in one direction makes you very
predictable and an easier target.
Hauptmann Oswald Boelcke
Ace and Air Combat Commander
29
First Theoretician of Fighter Tactics
mounted displays throughout their 35+ years
of service. The F-22, however, far surpasses
the F-15, F-16, and F-18 in performance due
to its stealth, speed, sensors, and agility.
Make no mistake-fourth-generation weapons
systems are lethal. Ask a fourth-generation
pilot and he will quickly tell you how
powerful his radar is or how lethal his helmetmounted cuing system and missiles are. They
are. They're very effective against a
conventional enemy that you stand toe-to-toe
with in the ring and start boxing straight-on.
MH: Let's now try to explore how
technology has changed things.
Our readers would certainly like to hear from
a pilot how the F-22 is unique in the history
of aviation. For instance, I imagine most of
the pilots have upgraded from F-15s and F16s. How is the F-22 superior to those
aircraft?
DS: The F-22 represents a gigantic leap in
fighter technology. It's the world's first fifthgeneration fighter, meaning it combines the
capabilities of stealth, super-cruise (ability to
cruise while supersonic), supermaneuverability, and integrated avionics.
This makes it the most technologically
advanced fighter aircraft the world has ever
seen.
Using that same analogy, imagine you're in
the same boxing ring; only this time, imagine
you're invisible. You move much faster than
your opponent with far less effort and see his
punches coming before he even throws them.
You're now in the position to outthink your
opponent and fight him when and where you
choose on your terms. The F-22 allows the
fifth-generation fighter pilot to outthink and
outmaneuver his opponent rather than simply
rely on outgunning him. That's the key
difference between the fourth- and fifthgeneration fighter aircraft.
I have approximately 950 hrs in the F-15C,
400 hrs in the F-22, and have flown hundreds
of simulated aerial combat missions in both
aircraft. Fourth-generation fighters like the F15, F-16, and F-18 are great weapons
systems that have been continually upgraded
with new weapons, radars, and helmet-
Instrument Display of a
World War I Fighter
30
Leading American Ace and
Commander 94th Aero Squadron
Captain Eddie Rickenbacker
MH: You have told me that it is unlikely that
any of the current pilots have flown replicas
of WWI aircraft. However, most of them
must have flown "Piper Cub" style planes. It
would be very interesting for non-aviators if
we could hear how different the art of flying
is for those types of aircraft and the Raptor.
Also, I imagine that there are many similar
things. Maybe there are just timeless lessons
that the guys on the Western Front learned
that new pilots still need to know today to fly
well and survive in combat. Sorry I can't be
clearer about this.
advance. However, a light civilian aircraft
travelling 150kts or less only needs to think a
few miles out in front of his aircraft versus a
jet travelling 500kts or more who must think
20-30 miles out in front. Each aircraft simply
provides the pilot with a different/unique set
of challenges to overcome. Certainly the
basic challenge of flight is taken for granted
now far more than in the early days of WWI
aviation. From time to time we should pause
and remind ourselves that challenge still
exists and will forever be common among all
aircraft.
DS: In addition to my 10+ years of military
aviation service, I also have approximately
100hrs of civilian flight time in Piper,
Cessna, and Beechcraft aircraft
(Unfortunately, none of it in WWI replica
aircraft, though I'd jump at the chance). The
thing I have always said about flying highperformance jet aircraft compared to the
simplest of small planes is that the
challenges are very different. It's not that one
is significantly more difficult than the other
and certainly the inherent risks associated
with flying are in both. A Raptor can climb
or dive to a given altitude very rapidly if
required, whereas a light civilian aircraft
needs to plan his climb or descent well in
In Part II of our interview with Major
Skalicky we will discuss how the units of the
current day USAF First Fighter Wing honors
its World War I origins.
31
Learning to Fly in the AEF: Part I
From the Letters of Lt. William Muir Russel, 95th Aero Squadron
A Contribution from TGWS Member John Wheat
Lt. Russel (Insert) and a Nieuport 28 with the Insignia of His Operational Unit,
the 95th Aero Squadron. He Would Meet His Death in a Similar Aircraft.
My cousin William Muir Russel has always been a family legend. Sadly, he was the prototype
Great War aviator, being killed after only a few weeks of front-line service. But he left us
something lasting from his experiences. At Cornell University, Class of 1917, William had been a
journalism major. His collected letters show he had a fine eye for detail and the ability to capture
the feelings of an aspiring aviator. Here Lt. William Muir Russel, 95th Aero Squadron, tells
how he learned the skills chasse or pursuit pilot.
26 April 1917 -- Detroit, Michigan
1 May 1917 -- Memphis, Tennessee
[My] certificate of enlistment, dated May 10,
1917, states that William M. Russel was
enlisted as Sergeant, Aviation Section,
Signal Corps, Enlisted Reserve Corps of the
Army of the United States on the 26th day of
April, 1917, for the period of four years.
[Reported] at the field yesterday at seven
o'clock, which meant rising at 5:15 in the
morning, a hasty breakfast, and a long ride.
Dressed in our overalls, we were at once set
to strenuous mental and manual labor; taking
instruction by lecture, and tearing down and
32
as you get nearer the ground. I should say
that, barring such accidents to an aeroplane
as might happen to an automobile, a
locomotive, or even a carriage, from a
concealed defect, or the breaking of a part, a
fellow is safe when flying at a height of more
than one thousand feet; between one
thousand and five hundred feet, he is
reasonably safe; at less than five hundred
feet, there are elements of danger. You
cannot rest even in a straight course as with
an automobile. Each little puff of wind
swings you to the right or to the left. The
early morning flight, however, is very
different. The air usually is perfectly quiet,
and you glide along like a bird. My
instruction last week consisted practically of
straight flying, with occasional turns. The
early part of this week, I spent in making left
hand turns in the form of a circle or square.
assembling aeroplanes. The work is entirely
new to me, and has to be done rapidly, but it
is amazing how much one can learn by
practical experience even without
instruction. At twelve o'clock, a bugle
sounds, which informs us that we can check
in our tools and rush to a small cafeteria
across from the field and stand up to a
delicious luncheon of ham and egg
sandwiches and a bottle of coca cola. I then
crawl into one of the hangars and have a rest - that is, if I rush my sandwich.
Another bugle at one o'clock, and we return
to the assembling and repair department.
Work then continues until four o'clock, when
we are summoned for muster and inspection.
At 4:30, we have drill for half an hour; then
two or three times a week, a lecture on
aerodynamics, after which we scoot for town
and get a good bath and a better dinner.
[Shortly after this letter the field near
Memphis was deemed unsafe and the entire
unit transferred to Illinois. After much
upheaval, Lt. Russel's training resumes:]
22 June 1917 -- Fourth Aerial Squadron,
Ashburn, Illinois
The last week has been so perfect, and so
much has been accomplished, that I feel as if
I had a new lease of life, and am more
enthusiastic about flying than ever. The sun
has shone all week, and, as a result, the
ground has thoroughly dried out. Last
Monday, I made only one flight, but on each
of the remaining days, I have made two.
With this long consecutive run, I have at last
got some confidence in myself, and yet, at
the same time, I feel how little I really know.
The flying in mid-air above an altitude of
two thousand feet is comparatively simple.
The quicker action and decision is required
33
On Wednesday, I began on right hand turns,
which are very different from the left hand
ones. This is due to the revolving of the
propeller, the tendency being not only to turn
your machine to the left, but also to upset it
laterally to the left. This must be prevented
by giving it right rudder and right aileron
more than left, thus holding your machine in
a stable position. Seven machines have been
somewhat damaged this week on account of
too steep a descent before landing. The
ground is still somewhat soft, and the front
wheels stick in the mud, which throws the
tail up in the air, and causes the machine to
stand on its nose, and smash the propeller.
Ordinarily, it is not very serious, but rather a
nuisance, as it puts the machine out of
commission for some time. Aeroplanes now
are plentiful. We have forty-eight for the use
of seventy-three students. One of our most
advanced men, who was already
recommended for his commission, has been
indefinitely suspended for looping the loop
with a passenger. In the first place, it is
strictly against the rules for a student to loop
the loop without permission of the
commanding officer, and secondly, it is
forbidden except for an instructor ever to
loop with a passenger.
to the eye under four inches of water. Shortly
after my flight Monday, all flying was
stopped on account of a nasty accident to one
of the solo men, who escaped miraculously
from a wreck in a tail spin. This is a form of
accident which a novice aviator must always
guard against. It is usually the result of
carelessness or a moment's forgetfulness.
From the minute you first begin instruction,
you are warned about it, and told how to
keep out of it. A "tail spin," as it is called, is
caused from losing headway. It results from
two factors-failing to nose the machine down
on the turns, and failing to keep the direction
of the wind clearly in mind. On making a
turn, if you do not nose the machine towards
the ground, you necessarily lose such
headway that the plane becomes
uncontrollable. The nose will drop on
account of the weight of the motor, throwing
the tail into the air. If the wind is coming
from a side direction, it will strike the plane,
whirling the tail, and tend to spin it around
the nose as an axis. Your 'only chance to
gain control is to head to the ground with the
motor off and the rudder held against the
wind until you gain sufficient headway to get
control once more of the machine.
Proper Attire for U.S. Aviators, 1917-18
29 June 1917 -- Fourth Aerial Squadron,
Ashburn, Illinois
Monday was the only day I could make a
flight. The rest of the time the rain has
beaten down, and the field is practically lost
34
If you are at an altitude of over five hundred
feet, your safety is assured, otherwise a
wreck is imminent. This boy kept his head
remarkably well, and never ceased fighting
to gain control. When they got him out of the
wreckage with only a couple of minor cuts
on his face and a bad shaking up, they went
over every part of his machine. It was badly
smashed, but the controls were all in good
condition. He fell about two hundred feet,
and in that small space of time he had
removed his glass goggles, unfastened his
safety belt, throttled the motor, and shut off
the spark-the four things he should have
done. As I said, after this accident, all flying
was called off for the rest of that day, and for
the remainder of the week, it has poured rain.
5:30; supper at 5:45; retreat at seven o'clock,
and the ending of a perfect day at ten o'clock,
when lights are out. When we are
comfortably settled with beds and blankets,
and the mess hall is finished, all will be well,
and it will be as good and healthy a life as
one can wish for. This will give you a notion
of what my first military existence is. It is
rumored that we are the last reserves in this
corps, and that we will be transferred into the
regulars when we receive our commissions.
Another rather unfortunate experience of a
different kind has come to one of the boys, a
nice fellow, this week. He entered just about
the time I did, and it has been evident that
flying did not appeal to him. All the time he
struggled to overcome his aversion to the
new sensations, but somehow, they were so
unnatural to him that he failed to master his
feelings. Wednesday, he went with tears in
his eyes to headquarters, and after a long talk
with the Captain, was released from the
Aviation Corps. He was a brave enough
fellow, and wanted to continue. This is the
second case we have bad. It seems that one's
feelings are not controllable. You are either
fascinated or dread it.
Rumors are rife again that we are about to
move to Rantoul, Illinois. No further word
has been given out, but I think there is little
doubt but that we will go within the next two
or three weeks. If we do go there, we will
have a taste of real army life, because it is an
established army post, and we will live in
barracks under strict military discipline. The
flying field [with the capacity to support 72
aircraft], near a village of about a thousand
people, is practically finished. The ground is
well drained, and the hangars and barracks, I
understand, are already constructed.
Chanute Field, 1917
13 July 1917 -- Chanute Field, Rantoul,
Illinois
Our days here will be as thoroughly occupied
as before, and to a greater advantage. At
present the order is reveille at six O'clock,
breakfast at 6:30, roll call at 7:15, and work
until lunch, 11:30; at one o'clock, another
roll call, and work, lectures, and flying until
35
You may be interested in our methods of
training. you are set directly to flying after
the first day, when you ascend for a ride to
accustom yourself to the new sensations.
This is called the "joy ride." From then on,
unless there is some natural defect or
personal characteristic which prevents, the
controls are given over to you, and you drive
the machine under the guidance and aid of
another set of controls operated from the rear
seat. On becoming more proficient, you are
put in the rear seat, and later you are sent up
alone to do solo work. After twenty hours of
solo work, you are allowed to undertake your
flying tests for a commission. Then you are
sent to France or England to have another
month of instruction on high-powered
machines. 1 am just about to be turned loose;
that is, to begin solo work. If we have good
flying weather, it will require about five
weeks more training in this country.
15 July 1917 -- Chanute Field, Rantoul,
Illinois
without more experience, he would lose his
confidence and have an accident at a critical
moment. This has been evident during the
last few days. Many of the boys became
impatient, and induced their instructors to
turn them loose for solo work. Friday, we
bad four accidents, none of them serious, but
the machines were wrecked and the boys
pretty well bruised up-all due to ignorance
and inexperience in the pinches. Then
Saturday, one of my room-mates in Chicago
was sure be could make a good landing. The
controls were turned over to him by the
instructor, and when he came down he was
sailing against the wind at an air speed of
about seventy miles an hour-that is, going at
the rate of fifty miles against a wind of
twenty. In flying, you calculate your speed
with the air and not the ground, as it is the
pressure against the wings which does the
lifting. So when he rounded the last turn to
alight in the field, the twenty miles wind
pressure was taken away, because he was
then flying with the wind, and not against it,
and the air speed was reduced to not more
than forty miles an hour, which is below the
necessary minimum. The machine went into
a tail spin at an altitude of about 200 feet,
and crashed to the ground. Both occupants
were taken from the plane and given up for
dead. On examination, however, to our great
joy, they were found to be badly cut and
their noses broken and faces disfigured, but
luckily without permanent serious injuries,
although the machine was a total wreck.
Our day's work is well laid out for us, and we
have little time for recreation. We rise at
5:45 in the morning, have a good setting-up
exercise, and a fair breakfast, then we are set
directly to work with the machine crew. Six
fellows have charge of the upkeep of two
machines. When your turn to make a flight
comes, an orderly notifies you, and you take
half an hour in the air. At eleven and twelve
o'clock you report for classes in
aerodynamics and practical electricity. Noon
mess is usually a light meal. In the afternoon,
we have military drill, class in meteorology,
and the remaining time in the motor room
where we tear down and assemble motors.
The evening is usually spent in study,
preparing for the final examinations by
which our commissions will be ranked to a
certain extent.
23 July 1917-- Chanute Field, Rantoul,
Illinois
But the purpose of coming here, namely,
flying, has been well met. The weather has
been ideal, and great progress has been
made. I have had a thirty minute flight every
day. The training has been slow on account
of frequent removals, but at last I am getting
to the end of my preliminary instruction. For
the past few days I have been working on
landings, which is the final step. Next, solo
work, or flying alone, begins in preparation for
the Reserve Military Aviator tests. If these are
passed, my commission follows automatically.
The work becomes more fascinating each
day, and as instruction continues, you realize
that flying is a science with something more
always to learn. A person can easily learn
enough in one week to fly in the air, but
36
I wish I could explain some of the ways of
getting into a tail spin, but am too young in
the art yet, and it is difficult for me to
describe it. Even with a perfect machine, it is
only one of many dangerous situations which
may come at any minute. A flyer must know
how to avoid them if possible, and to
counteract them if necessary.
feet from the ground, he would take the
control and make the landings. I would then
ascend, and we would do the same thing over
and over again. The purpose of this is to
practice your spirals so that you will enter
the field from the right side and always
against the wind.
26 July 1917 -- Chanute Field, Rantoul,
Illinois
Again, we have had bard luck. Another
serious accident happened Saturday, but the
two occupants escaped miraculously well.
Evans Baxter, my former room-mate at
Chicago, and his instructor were the
unfortunates.
I have at last had an aeroplane put under my
supervision, for which I am wholly
responsible, and which is also my own
instruction machine. This puts an incentive
up to you for careful work, as your neck
depends upon your own diligence.
More good news was the coming of ten new
Curtis planes yesterday. This will give us a
chance for more instruction, which, however,
is progressing rapidly now. I have reached
the step where I am making landings. This is
a difficult part of flying, and to a
considerable extent, the phase by which you
are judged. It is no easy thing for me yet, but
I am sure I will soon get the knack of it. My
instructor said yesterday that my air work
was tip-top, and that I was coming on with
the landings. Tuesday and Wednesday, I
practiced gliding into the field from an
altitude of two thousand feet. That was easy,
but when we got about one hundred and fifty
The men who volunteered for the Aviation
Section of the Signal Corps passed through
this country's first mass flight training
program. . .The pilots were awed by the
technology their aircraft represented, and
they secretly wondered about its capacity to
kill them. Their experiences with their
aircraft would be paralleled by the
experiences of those who followed.
Air Chronicles, April 1988
The Curtiss, JN-4 "Jenny"
Principal U.S. Air Trainer
During World War I
37
1 August 1917 -- Chanute Field, Rantoul,
Illinois
Mr. Pond is a very conservative instructor.
He has a method of teaching which is
different from the others, and I am becoming
convinced that he is right, although at first, I
envied some of the other boys their more
daring teachers. The common way of
instructing is to give four or five lessons in
air work, right and left turns, and straight
flying; then start immediately upon landings,
and having accomplished this, turn you
loose. In this course, you seem to be making
very rapid progress. Mr. Pond, on the other
hand, gives you twenty-five or thirty lessons
in air work. He claims that landings then
come naturally to you. You are judged in
your progress, however, by the other
students, according to the number of lessons
you have had in landings, and when you say
you have had none, they think you are not
getting ahead. I felt this way until I had a
long talk with Mr. Pond, and have reasoned
out the matter. Up to now, I have had twentytwo lessons in the air on right and left turns,
and in gliding. He says that my work has
been good, and that he would start me on
landings this morning. If I catch on all right,
I have great hopes of doing solo work by the
end of next week if we have good weather. I
am looking forward to it with delight.
The last few days have been exceptionally
busy and terribly hot. My flight today is last
on the list, and my machine is running like a
bird, so that I have a few minutes for a
breathing spell and retreat from the burning
sun. Monday morning, when I began
instruction, we had a very poor machine, and
the air was rough. I have told you accidents
usually occur if you lose headway near the
ground, either on the first turn in ascending,
or the last turn in descending. The
predicament we were in Monday was a
perfect setting for such trouble. In climbing
from the field with a motor which was not
working too well, we could not get enough
altitude, and had to take the first turn when
only seventy-five feet in the air. Mr. Pond,
my instructor, was watchful, as he always is,
and grasped the situation and took the
controls from me, and dropped into the field
with the wind, something that is never done
except in emergencies. We landed all right,
but be refused to go up again until the
machine was fixed. I worked on it for more
than two hours-changed the propeller and
some other minor things-and then called Mr.
Pond. He then tried it alone, but found it
unsatisfactory, and condemned it, This put
me to work for the day. It meant that the
entire motor had to be removed from the
fuselage, and another set in. Allen Wardle
and I tackled the job, and we have since been
working and sweating steadily-Monday night
until eight o'clock, and last night until nine.
This morning, we tried her out, and found
her satisfactory. She will turn over thirteen
hundred and twenty-five revolutions a
minute- twenty-five more than the mark.
This, of course, is on the ground. In the air,
she will turn over about one hundred better.
5 August 1917 -- Chanute Field, Rantoul,
Illinois
I have come to the conclusion that making a
landing is the trick of flying. Last week, I
would willingly have taken up a machine
alone, with the expectation of having a
pleasant trip and an easy finish, but this
week, I would not touch one. My first
lessons in landing, I am frank to say, scared
me considerably. My instructions were to sit
back with my hands off the control and
watch every move. Next, I was to handle the
38
controls myself. I rose from the ground,
circled the field, and endeavored to drop in
from the same side from which I left, so as to
be continually against the wind. The
sensation of having the ground rushing by
you, as well as rapidly approaching you,
tends to make you somewhat dizzy at first. I
brought her down within about fifty feet of
the ground, and then gave up. Mr. Pond
landed her that time. Then I made another
attempt. This time, it was not a good landing,
but I felt a little more at ease. It becomes
more and more natural, and at last a mere
incident of the flying. The trick lies in
attempting to judge your altitude and the
length of the glide in order to land at a
certain spot. I am catching on and if good
weather continues, have great hopes of
soloing by the end of next week. It remains
for me to judge my distances better and
perfect the touch on the earth. My landings,
as yet, are rather erratic.
This is the difficult part of landing, because
you become nervous, and the natural
tendency is to level off too high from the
ground. The steep glide should be held until
you are very close to ground-then you level
out and bold her in the air as long as possible
until she settles to the earth. In the few days
while I was in my slump, on getting near to
the ground would get nervous and level off
about ten feet from earth, and then, when I
lost 'speed, I would drop to ground with a
bump.
In its enormous aviation training effort the
Army eventually established ground schools
at 8 universities, 27 primary schools in the
States, and 16 advanced schools in Europe.
Friday, I broke the wing-skid blew the right
tire in a careless landing. I pan-caked and
was lifted back into the air from the heavy
bump. The wind got under my left wing, and
threw me over on right side, and broke the
tire and skid. It was not very serious, but
caused half an hour's delay, and deprived of
that much practice. Yesterday, however, I
was determined to make good. I beaded the
list, and got benefit of the still early morning
air. My first landing poor, and my instructor
had to help me with it. The next three,
however, were beauties. I did them all alone,
I set the machine on the ground like a basket
of eggs. Without another word said, Mr.
Pond stepped out of the front seat, lifted the
tail around so as to point the nose of machine
to the wind, and said, "Go ahead, Russel,
let's you take her up alone." Never before
had I missed company so much, but my
chance had come at last, so I gave her all the
throttle, and started. Taking her off the
ground was simple enough, and the air work
was even more so, and I felt no worry except
for the lack of companionship.
11 August 1917 -- Chanute Field, Rantoul,
Illinois
At last I am a regular aviator! I realized it
with surprise and some nervousness.
Wednesday (8 August), I was placed in the
back seat and told to continue my instruction
in making landings. Every one I made was
poor. The slump stayed with me until Friday.
I "pan-caked" as they call it, every time. At a
height of about two hundred feet, you
throttle down your motor. This tips the front
part of the machine down, and causes you to
glide. Once in a gliding position, it is
necessary to hold the front end up, or she
will dive too rapidly. You continue your
glide earthward until you get within about
thirty feet of the ground, when you steepen
your glide in order to obtain more speed.
39
but here I was, about three hundred feet high,
and no way to bring her down except to do it
myself. My involuntary prayer was, "Why
did you let Mr. Pond lie to me, Oh Lord, and
tell me I could do it?" I reached the point I
thought was right, cut off the motor, clinched
my hands on the wheel, and started for the
ground at about fifty miles an hour. The next
thing I remember, I was rolling along the
ground, and bad made the best landing
possible. Mr. Pond came up and said, "Very
good. Try it again." This time it was more
simple, and there was less nervousness in the
atmosphere, and I finished with equal
success; then I tried it two or three times
more, and found that I was getting some
confidence in myself. A little more
experience, and less self-doubt (it seems that
I never thought enough of myself), and I will
be all right. After the first solo flight, I felt as
if I had some right to wear an aviator's
uniform.
Lt. Russel, the Day He Soloed
At first, it seemed awful to be alone in the
wide, wide sky. I thought of the Ancient
Mariner, which I used to hate so in the
Detroit University School because I had to
study it: "So lonesome 'twas that God
Himself scarce seemed there to be." When I
approached the spot where I had to start my
glide for the ground, the nervousness
returned. Before, when I was in this
situation, I would merely throw up my
hands, and Mr. Pond would bring her down;
In the next issue of Relevance, we follow Lt.
Russel's transit to France, advanced training,
and service as a combat pilot with the 95th
Aero Squadron of the First Pursuit Group.
Trivia Challenge Answers
1 - January: The Zimmerman
Telegram
5 - May: Château-Thierry
9 - September: Tanks
6 - June: The Battle of Messines
10 - October: Bulgaria
7 - July: Alexii Brusilov
11 - November: The Battle of
Ctesiphon
2 - February: Verdun
3 - March: The Dardanelles
8 - August: The Battle of Amiens
4 - April: The Treaty of London
12 -December: The Battle of the
Falklands
Bonus Question: The assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and the signing of the Versailles Treaty
were five years apart to the day.
40
The U.S. Air Force Honors Its Heritage
Part II of an Interview With F-22 Raptor Demonstration Pilot Major David M. Skalicky,
Conducted by Relevance editor Michael Hanlon in May 2010 with the help of First
Fighter Wing Historian Brian Laslie.
The simple act of gathering a squadron
together in that manner is a tradition dating
back to the earliest days of the First World
War. "Roll call", as it's referred to, remains
today an important ritual for pilots to pass on
flying experience and share in the squadron's
traditions.
MH: Are there any squadron traditions that
are traceable back to World War I? Toasts,
orientation rituals for new pilots, display of
the insignia of the squadron, etc. Do they
have "Hat in the Ring" or comparable
patches on their flight suits?
DS: Honoring tradition is central to
becoming a fighter pilot. One of the most
widely known traditions occurs on Friday
afternoons. Once the squadron has finished
flying operations for the week, all the pilots
will congregate in the squadron "Heritage
Room" to share stories and lessons learned
over a few beverages. Songs are sung, toasts
are made, and Friday patches with call signs
and the squadron's original insignia are worn.
MH: Do you have photos and artifacts from
the period as part of the unit collection?
DS: As soon as you walk in one of the F-22
squadrons here at Langley, you're greeted by
our past. Whether it's the replica parked in
front of the 94FS or the pictures of Frank
Luke in the 27FS, historical pictures and
artifacts are all around.
Entrance to Squadron Heritage Rooms at the First Fighter Wing
41
MH: Are any of the WWI aviators
particularly honored. For instance,
Rickenbacker since he was the leading U.S.
ace of the war? DS: The 27FS honors Frank
Luke as an ace and first pilot to receive the
Medal of Honor. In fact, the 27FS Heritage
Room is nicknamed the Frank Luke Lounge.
The 94FS honors Eddie Rickenbacker as the
war's leading U.S. ace and Medal of Honor
winner. Pictures, biographical data, and
recounts of their aerial victories line the
walls of both squadrons.
27th Squadron Historic Scarf Display
Hallway WWI Photo Display
In general, a new lieutenant is required to
learn the history of the squadron and its
leading historical members before attending
his first roll call. If a senior squadron
member asks a new lieutenant a question
about squadron history and he's not prepared
with the correct answer, the lieutenant will
be reminded of his duty to learn the
squadron's history before being accepted as a
member. [Note: this is a tradition and no
hazing is involved.]
Nieuport 28 at First Fighter Wing
MH: Thanks to you Major Skalicky and to
your mates at the First Fighter Wing, on
behalf of The Great War Society for your
contributions here to our journal, and for
your service to America.
42
Reviews: Literature, Films, New Media
Polly Moh's Groundbreaking Study
Military Intelligence and the Arab Revolt: The First Modern
Intelligence War
Reviewed by Len Shurtleff
This work examines the development and exploitation of intelligence in formulating Britain's
strategy for supporting the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire. In addition to a radical reexamination of T. E. Lawrence as an intelligence officer and guerrilla leader, the author looks
at how modern intelligence techniques such as human, signals, and image intelligence were used in
the Middle East with greater efficacy than elsewhere during the First World War. Most
important, this study shows how Britain's intelligence community influenced the conduct of the
campaign in The Hejaz, Palestine, and Syria.
The expertise and skill of the small group of Arab specialists -- the Arab Bureau --- at British
headquarters Cairo was crucial to the success of the war in the Middle East. . Indeed this small
multi-disciplinary group of British Arabists more or less directed the campaign. At first, British
civilian and military leaders in London and Delhi resisted calls for supporting the Arab
independence movement led by Emir Feisal. They feared copycat insurrections in British colonies
and already had plans with France divide up the Ottoman Empire. However, frustration with
mounting casualties and lack of progress on the gelid Western Front, coupled with recognition that the Arabs would not countenance
foreign forces on their territory, led London to accept proposals to fund a guerrilla war.
At it turned out, the military results were near spectacular. The Arab irregular army led by Feisal and supported by British funds,
arms and intelligence effectively formed the right flank guard for Sir Edmund Allenby's advance on Jerusalem and Damascus.
Unfortunately, we are still sorting out the political ramifications of the British-Arab victory of 1918.
Military Intelligence and the Arab Revolt: The First Modern Intelligence War, Polly A. Mohs, Routledge Studies in Intelligence
Series, 2008, ISBN 978-0415493314
From the Archives, A Valuable Perennial from R.D. Layman
Naval Aviation in the First World War: Its Impact and Influence
Reviewed in 1996 by Current Editor Michael Hanlon,
One predecessor of mine as Relevance editor, the late R.D. Layman, made a singular contribution
to the Great War's historical literature with his 1996 work: Naval Aviation in the First World War:
Its Impact and Influence. Under a barrage of well-aimed facts, the misconceptions that World War
I aero-naval warfare was merely experimental in nature, minimal in scope, fully-embraced by neither admirals nor admiralties, and generally inconsequential are smashed in this concisely written
book. Most important are Mr. Layman's case studies of the successes and missed opportunities of
naval aviation in its most significant role of the war -- strategic reconnaissance. These included the
defense of the Suez Canal, anti-U-boat operations, the Dardanelles/Gallipoli campaign, and, of
course, the Battle of Jutland. Two further commendations are due to the author and his editors for
covering all theaters of operations equally well (they do not disproportionately focus on the North
Sea and Atlantic) and for the tremendous selection of photographs supporting the text. If you have
any interest in the air, naval, or aero-naval aspects of the war, I judge this an essential addition
to your library.
The volume contains a scattering of unobtrusive, pithy introductions to subjects like aerial combat,
how operations differ over land and sea, airship design, and other topics on which much cluttered
43
thinking has been published. These mini-essays serve to clear one's head of both extraneous details and romantic "aviators as knights"
nonsense. The chapter on "Defending the Sea Lanes", for instance, gets to the nub of the tactical usefulness of aircraft in antisubmarine warfare: "The submarine of 1914-18 was for all practical purposes simply a submersible torpedo-boat...At average
submerged cruising speed of 4kts, the craft could travel scarcely more than sixty nautical miles before having to surface to
recharge...Thus it was by forcing them to submerge, not by sinking them, that aircraft contributed most significantly to helping to
defeat the U-boats." Another lesson was of personal interest to me. In six years in the U.S. Air Force, much of it with the now defunct
Strategic Air Command, this reviewer never heard as succinct a summary and critique of air power theory as is provided in Chapter
Seven of this book. Additionally, during his award-winning career as an aero-naval historian, Mr. Layman collected an inspired
library of fascinating details, anecdotes, and surprising statistics. Here are two favorites:
●
●
Admiral Dewey of Manila was one of the earliest boosters of naval-air power.
In April 1917, Zeppelin L23 intercepted the Norwegian schooner Royal off the Danish coast, determined she was carrying
contraband, put a prize crew aboard and sailed the ship back to Germany. (Consider what this must have involved!)
Naval Aviation in the First World War: Its Impact and Influence, R.D. Layman, Naval Institute Press, 1996. ISBN 9781557506177
Barnett Singer's Study of a Key General
Maxime Weygand: A Biography of the French General in Two
World Wars
Reviewed by James E. O'Donnell
Maxime Weygand was a pivotal figure for France in World War II, but also an influential participant in World War I and the
interwar years as well. This is the reason that Barnett Singer, a Canadian professor of history, decided to write about the general,
who lived for almost a century (1867-1965) during one of the most dramatic periods in French history. Interestingly, Weygand was
not even a Frenchman, but the product of an illegitimate liaison between a Belgian officer and an Austrian noblewoman. He attended
military academy in France, however, and was adopted as a compatriot due to his often demonstrated ability in the military
profession.
Singer's book is almost unique in that only one other book in English about Weygand, written by
Philip Bankwitz, an Englishman, has been published (in 1967). However, that book is not a
biography but concentrates on Weygand's relations with French politics of the 1930s during the
buildup to the Second World War. Singer covers Weygand's entire life, which was filled with a
variety of periods of personal growth and trial, from the idyllic peacetime before World War I to
the carnage of the Western Front, to the challenging interwar years, and finally as a general forced
to fight a war with an unprepared army and its aftermath, the often vilified Vichy collaborationist
regime of 1940.
Weygand owed his rise to prominence through his relationship with Marshal Ferdinand Foch in
World War I. As his chief of staff, Weygand was the man who made policy and strategy happen,
resulting in an Allied victory. During the interwar years, Weygand was also a prolific writer on
a variety of topics, including military manuals, politics, and grand strategy. He proved himself an
able administrator time and again in a variety of assignments before World War II. The coming of
the next war found him as commander-in-chief of the French Army before and during the
armistice negotiations with Nazi Germany, acquitting himself well and keeping France's interests
in the forefront. As the first governor-general of Vichy French North Africa, he walked the
tightrope between collaboration and outright resistance to German demands. Not surprisingly, he was cashiered and kept under
house arrest by Germany for the rest of the war in late 1941. Had he been available, the Allies would have no doubt used him to head
up the conversion of North Africa to Free France after the Torch invasion of November, 1942 (instead of General Giraud).
As a by-the-way, the famous "letters of transit" referred to in the iconic film Casablanca were declared to have been "signed by
General Weygand." The movie dialogue was changed later to "General de Gaulle" as a wartime propaganda measure, but obviously
nonsensical since de Gaulle would have been arrested on sight in Vichy North Africa and he had no authority whatsoever. Singer
concludes his book with Weygand's difficulties after the liberation as a collaborationist during Vichy and his eventual exoneration
and veneration as a patriot operating effectively in a period of French history that is still misunderstood today.
Maxime Weygand: A Biography of the French General in Two World Wars, Barnett Singer, McFarland & Co., 2008, ISBN:
978-0786435715
44
Visiting the Battlefields
The United States St. Mihiel Cemetery
Bobby O. Bell, Superintendent
The Author by Lt. Walker Beale's Sculpture, American Eagle Sundial. St. Michael Mosaic
The World War I St. Mihiel American
Cemetery and Memorial in France, 40.5
acres in extent, contains the graves of 4,153
of U.S. military dead. The majority of these
died in the September 1918 offensive that
resulted in the reduction of the St. Mihiel
salient that threatened Paris. The cemetery
was first established as a temporary cemetery
by the American Graves Registration Service
following the offensive in 1918. After the
war, the other temporary cemeteries in the
area were discontinued and the military Dead
of the region whose next-of-kin requested
burial overseas were moved to the St. Mihiel
cemetery for permanent interment. It is the
third largest of the eight permanent World
War I American military cemetery
memorials in Europe. The cemetery grounds
are exceptionally beautiful and is noted for
the impressive works of art enhancing the
grounds and its strong connection with the
birth of the United States Air Force.
The St. Mihiel Offensive
The St. Mihiel Offensive was the first
operation of the United States First Army in
the Great War. On 30 August, the U.S. First
Army commanded by General John J.
Pershing took over the St. Mihiel sector.
After a series of conferences, the Allies
agreed that the St. Mihiel attack should be
limited to a reduction of the salient,
following which the U.S. First Army would
undertake a larger scale offensive on the
front between the Meuse River and the
Argonne Forest. With the attack at St. Mihiel
scheduled for 12 September, this would
require winning an extraordinarily swift
victory there, then concentrating an
enormous force to launch a still greater
operation 40 miles away, within just two
weeks.
45
At 0500 hours, 12 September 1918,
following a four-hour bombardment by
heavy artillery, the U.S. I and IV Corps
composed of nine U.S. divisions, began the
main assault against the southern face of the
salient, while the French II Colonial Corps
made a holding attack to the south and
around the tip of the salient. A secondary
assault by the U.S. V Corps was made three
hours later against the western face of the
salient. Reports were soon received that the
enemy was retreating. That evening, the
order was issued for U.S. troops to press
forward with all possible speed. By the dawn
of 13 September, units of the U.S. IV and V
Corps met in the center of the salient, cutting
off the retreating enemy. By 16 September,
the entire salient had been eliminated. The
entire reduction of the salient was completed
in just four days by which time some of the
divisions involved had already been
withdrawn to prepare for the Meuse-Argonne
battle.
14 day bombers). The French, Italian, and
British provided the remaining 60% of
aircraft and crews (SPAD XIII & XVI
fighters, Breguet observation, Breguet/
Renault bombers, Caproni Ca 450
bombers, DH4 and DH9 day bombers, and
Handley Page night bombers. The French
and Italians were under Pershing's direct
control, whereas the British retained command
of their aircraft, using them against tactical
targets in support of the operation.
Bad weather, however, halted Mitchell's
ambitious plans for an aerial offensive by
flights of several hundred aircraft. Instead,
fighter and bomber aircraft flew at extremely
low altitudes (not exceeding 50 meters in
most cases). By the third day of the
offensive, the American First Army had
captured 15000 enemy troops at the cost of
7000 casualties, captured over 250 heavy
guns and over 200 square miles of battered
French territory had been liberated.
Air Operations at St. Mihiel
Throughout these operations, the attacking
forces were supported by the largest
concentration of Allied aircraft ever
assembled. During the Battle of the Saint
Mihiel Salient, Col Billy Mitchell
commanded U.S. and Allied Air Corps
consisting of 1481 aircraft (not all were in
service) which was the largest air force ever
assembled for a single operation. It consisted
of 366 observation aircraft, 323 day
bombers, 91 night bombers, and 701
pursuits. Also on hand were 15 U.S. and 6
French balloon companies. Of the total,
Americans would provide about 40% of the
aircrews and aircraft (288 SPAD XIII
Pursuits, 144 Salmson observation, 54 de
Havilland DH-4 and 18ea Breguet 14
observation aircraft, 36 DH-4 and 18 Breguet
46
The Battle of the St, Mihiel Salient became a
signature note for Col Billy Mitchell in his
long, and ultimately successful, crusade to
create a powerful independent air force. It
also established the Air Force tradition that
whatever the odds and whatever the
opposition, no mission would ever be turned
back. In 1946 a grateful U.S. Congress
promoted Billy Mitchell to the rank of Major
General and voted to posthumously award
the Medal of Honor to Billy Mitchell in
recognition of his prophesies (such as the
bombing of Pearl Harbor by the Japanese
more than 20 years prior to the actual event
taking place) and his numerous proven ideas
of air power being adopted by the Army Air
Force. The Medal was presented to Billy
Mitchell's son John in 1948 by Gen Carl
Spaatz, chief of staff of the newly
established independent U.S. Air Force.
Notable Burials at St. Mihiel
featured in many publications about the
AEF. The unique statue of doughboy Lt.
Walker Beale of the 78th division has an
interesting tale behind it. His mother, Mrs.
Harriet Beale, wanted a monument created in
the memory of her son, who had been killed
in the war in France. She had purchased a
small plot of land in the village where he had
fallen and had gotten permission from the
village council to erect a monument there.
She asked family friend Paul Manship to
create a young man in uniform, standing in
front of a cross. A contract to have the work
carved in limestone had already been signed
when General Pershing happened to visit
Manship's studio about another matter, an
urn that Manship was making for the St.
Mihiel Cemetery grounds. Pershing asked
about the statue of the soldier and, when told
of Mrs. Beale's plan, informed Manship that
private monuments to the war dead were
absolutely forbidden. Things seemed to be at
an impasse until Manship discovered that the
General knew Mrs. Beale, who was a
daughter of the Republican Senator from
Maine, James G. Blaine. A solution was
found to erect the Beale Monument at the St.
Mihiel American Cemetery, where it still
stands, a handsome image of a young
American who died fighting in Europe.
Lt. Hunter Wickersham of the 89th Division,
author of the poem "The Raindrops on My
Old Tin Hat" is the sole Medal of honor
recipient interred at St. Mihiel Among the
numerous aviators buried there are three
namesakes of U.S. Air Force installations:
2nd Lt. Samuel R. Keesler, Jr. 24th Aero Sq.
(Kessler Air Force Base in Biloxi.
Mississippi), 1st Lt. John J. Goodfellow, Jr.
24th Aero Sq, (Goodfellow AFB, Texas),
and 2nd Lt. Franklin B. Bellows, 50th Aero
Sq., (Bellows AF Station, Hawaii). Billy
Mitchell's brother John who died in service
in May 1918 is also buried at the cemetery.
The best known member of U.S. Air Service
to die at during the offensive is not buried at
St. Mihiel. The American ace of aces at the
time, Lt. David E. Putnam, credited with 13
victories, was shot down and killed the first
day of the offensive. A veteran of the
Lafayette Flying Corps, Putnam is buried at
Lafayette Memorial at du Parc de Garches
outside Paris
Notable Works of Art. (See top photo.)
The American eagle sundial and mosaic of
Archangel Michael at the cemetery are
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Friday, September 10, 2010
Our Program
Saturday, September 11, 2010
Morning Session:
Morning Session:
MIKE HANLON
The War by Summer 1918
JOHN SNOW
The AEF
MIKE KNAPP
The British Army
GERALD TORRENCE
African-Americans in the AEF and French Army
Break
TIM COOK
The Canadian Army
Lunch
Registration form and full
program can be downloaded Break
online at:
http://www.wfausa.org/new/pdf/2010seminar.pdf
STEPHEN MCGEORGE
Host Nation Support of the AEF
Lunch
Afternoon Session:
Afternoon Session:
RANDY GAULKE
The German Army
FRANCOISE BONNELL
Women on the Home Front
JACK TUNSTALL
The Austro-Hungarian Army
ROBYNNE DEXTER
Women Overseas
Break
Break
BOB DOUGHTY
The French Army
JOLIE VELAZQUEZ
American Nurses in World War I
Dinner with Speakers: DOUG FISHER & HAL CHASE
OCS for Black Officers at Fort Des Moines
Dinner with Speaker: DIANE ROONEY
Paris November 1918
●
●
Post-Seminar Trip to Historic Fort Des Moines
Doug Fisher and Joann Buckley are making arrangements for a post-seminar trip to historic Fort Des Moines. Museum
Director Joe Nolte will open the museum especially for our group. He will share details of the Fort's proud tradition as a
cavalry post, its transformations into the U.S. Army's first officer candidate class for African American men in 1917, and
then the training facility for the first Women's Army Auxiliary Corps (WAAC's) in 1942. Group members will drive
individually from Kansas City in time to meet at the museum for a buffet lunch at 12:30 pm on Sunday, Sept. 13. A group
dinner is also planned and discounted rooms are available for Sunday night under the Fort Des Moines Museum rate at
the Radisson Hotel, 6800 Fleur Drive, 515-285-7777. For those flying home from Kansas City on Monday, the drive from
Des Moines back to the Kansas City airport takes three hours. For additional information or to register, contact Joann
Buckley at [email protected]. Cost of the lunch, museum and program is $20 per person
Tours of the National WWI Museum
Please note: If you wish you to visit the museum thoroughly, you should plan on arriving early enough on Thursday or
leaving late enough on Sunday. Time has not been set aside for that in the Friday and Saturday schedule.
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