INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF ORGANIZATION THEORY AND BEHAVIOR, 17 (3), 275-292
FALL 2014
UNDERSTANDING PARALLEL STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC
ADMINISTRATION
Stefan Mann*
ABSTRACT. This paper addresses the question of the underlying causes for
persistent parallel structures in public administration. Frames like bounded
rationality, the budget-maximizing bureaucrat and the political theory of
hegemony are examined with respect to the possible provision of
explanations for the persistence of parallel administrations. A combination
of content analysis and objective hermeneutics is then applied for a case
study of parallel administration in Switzerland. A model linking the three
approaches is finally developed to show how parallel administration relies on
an equilibrium in the struggle for budget and hegemony between the key
actors and on ignorance among fringe actors.
INTRODUCTION
When organizing or restructuring the administration, governments
attempt to cover each policy field but to avoid overlaps. This warrants
the claim that responsibilities should be clearly distributed, each
policy field being in the hand of one administrative unit (Mintzburg,
1993). But situations occur in which two or more administrative
authorities are concerned with very similar, if not identical tasks in
one region. It is crucial to understand such situations in order to
manage them properly. Only when the underlying causes for the
emergence of parallel structures have been analyzed, will it become
possible to develop strategies how to overcome them.
Prominent cases of parallel administration have occasionally
been reported in in the public administration literature. Often they
center on project support in the European Union, where structures
imposed by the European Commission and national structures were
----------------------* Stefan Mann, Ph.D., is leading the “Socioeconomics” group in the Swiss
Federal Research Station Agroscope. His research interest is in the
interfaces between economic and sociological approaches..
Copyright © 2014 by Pracademics Press
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MANN running in parallel (Gualini, 2004; Marinov, Bahloul, & Slay, 2006),
and where the agricultural administration and general economic
support bodies had set up rather similar project funding opportunities
with separated governance structures (Henrichsmeyer & Witzke,
1994). As, in general, intra-government structures have been more
neglected in federal studies that inter-government structures (Nice,
1987; Dye, 1990; Zimmerman, 2012) few have explored how and
why such parallel structures may exist, although this knowledge
appears to be an essential precondition for avoiding or at least
minimizing parallel structures within the administration in the future.
In studying organizations, it has been shown that it is fruitful to
watch organizations through different frames, be they the
dependency of resources (Johnson, 1995), the institutionalization of
psychic prisons (Morgan, 1997) or shelter of symbols (Bolman &
Deal, 2008). While practitioners are well advised to use as many
frames as possible (Bolman & Deal, 1991), it can help for scientific
insights to focus on few frames with high explanatory power.
Therefore, three different frames are identified by following particular
lines of scientific thought in order to explain the prevalence of parallel
administration, one being dominated by sociology, one by economics
and one by political science. The author first outlines these frames.
In order to test these approaches, the case of project funding in rural
areas through both the agricultural authorities and economic
development authorities is described and historically explained. Then
the author briefly outlines the methodology applied, and finally
compares the plausibility of the three theoretical approaches.
THEORETICAL APPROACHES
While Denhardt (2011) criticizes public organization science as
under-theorized, a lot of the beauty of administration analysis stems
from the fact that it relies on all the social sciences together and is
not restricted to only one discipline. Accordingly, the literature in
social sciences as a whole allows several explanations of why parallel
administration may persist. Its applicability to the realm of public
administration will have to be examined both theoretically and – later
in this paper – empirically. The choice made below is certainly not
final, and there may well be additional theoretical approaches that
contribute to the understanding of parallel administrations.
UNDERSTANDING PARALLEL STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
277
Bounded Rationality
A lot of attention in the sociology of organizations has been
devoted to information issues (March & Simon, 2012). Galbraith
(2012), for example, describes increasing information requirements
as a function of the complexity of organizations. If administrations
have become complex to the degree that most actors do not realize
that double administration occurs, it will be difficult to resolve the
problem due to what social scientists call bounded rationality. This
concept is certainly not restricted to public administration, but has
been widely applied in the field. As early as 1959 Lindblom suspected
that due to the need for quick decisions, many actions would be
characterized much more by “muddling through” than by fully rational
choices. And it is important to note that bounded rationality is not
restricted to single individuals; it may also occur in organizational
settings: “What an individual learns in an organization may not be
unrelated to what is stored in other heads; and the relation between
these two (and other) stores may have a great bearing on how the
organization operates” (Simon, 1991, p. 125).
Choo (1998) has explicitly applied the concept of bounded
rationality to organizations, and identifies two main consequences.
One is that an organization satisfices, i.e. it looks for a course of
action that is satisfactory or good enough rather than seeking the
optimal solution. The other is the tendency to simplify, i.e. to apply
heuristics in order to reduce uncertainty and cope with complexity.
Both phenomena could support both the rise and the maintenance of
parallel structures in public administration. Both are supported by the
willingness to satisfice and to simplify, an official may be satisfied if
the system he/she works in him/herself works properly. The element
of simplification mainly comes into play through reductionism: every
policy field in which the official is not active will simply be ignored, so
that parallel structures have no chance of being discovered.
It is important that not only administration officers, but also
politicians should be able to contribute to the avoidance or
elimination of parallel structures in administration. But what has been
noted about officers can, to a perhaps slightly lesser extent, also be
said about the Members of Parliament. There is a clear tendency
towards specialization by parliamentarians (Andeweg, 1997), which
also leaves much room for reductionism, mostly ignoring a large
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MANN number of policy fields in which parliamentarians are not actively
involved.
The Budget-Maximizing Bureaucrat
While public choice theory dates back to a contribution by Black
(1948), it was not until the 1970s that the application of economic
theory to political markets was extended to public administration.
William A. Niskanen (1971) worked as an administrative officer
himself before he returned to economic research and suggested that
bureaucrats have an incentive to maximize their budget regardless of
whether it is needed for worthy causes. The reputation and the power
of a member of the administration, Niskanen wrote, rise with the
budget they have at hand, and therefore every member of the
administration attempts to depict their need of funds as generously
as possible in order to generate a large budget.
This model of behavior attracted great attention both within and
outside the scientific community, being used in fields as diverse as
evolutionary (Nelson & Winter, 1982) and institutional (Ostrom,
1990) economics. Interestingly, the model remained fairly stable over
the decades, although it became widely accepted that many
bureaucrats would rather maximize the “slack budget” (i.e. the part of
the budget over which they could decide freely) than the total budget
(Gonzalez, Folsom, & Mehay, 1989; Wyckoff, 1990).
While the Niskanen model explains why and how programs on
rural development grow in their budget, it remains unclear whether
we are dealing with one, two or several of these programs in a region.
The Niskanen model alone is therefore not sufficient to explain the
existence of parallel administration. Two additional necessary
conditions have to apply for an explanatory approach: (1) double
administration exists already and (2) the (two) actors in charge are
caught in a Nash equilibrium. In game theory, the Nash equilibrium
(named after John Forbes Nash) is a solution concept of a game in
which no player has anything to gain by changing only his own
strategy unilaterally. If each player has chosen a strategy and no
player can benefit by changing his or her strategy while the other
players keep theirs unchanged, then the current set of strategy
choices and the corresponding payoffs constitute a Nash equilibrium.
This equilibrium could be applicable to actors in public administration
who deal with actors with similar responsibilities, both attempting to
UNDERSTANDING PARALLEL STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
279
maximize their budget. The existence of such an equilibrium in the
administration could then explain why the actors remain still and do
not attempt to bring the budget of the other party under their own
control. . The description of the behavior in interorganizational
networks by O’Toole (1988) may also be applied to describe such
settings: “Exchange and thus cooperation may be impeded if
participants believe they would thereby expose themselves to
unacceptable levels of risk.” Whether justified or not, sheer fear of
being the loser in the process of defining a single organization
funding rural development projects may deter both administrations
from suggesting a single program.
The Political Theory of Hegemony
While Habermas (1981) gained a lot of attention by drawing the
image of a societal consensus achieved by rational discourse, a
number of political scientists developed a strong antithesis to this
claim. Most prominently, Laclau (1981) and Mouffe (1993) suggest
that identity is an important element to be generated by political
struggles, allotting a central societal role to political conflict. The
political is not perceived as an objective order, but rather as the
platform for attempts of societal groups to attain hegemony, so that
hegemony becomes “the central category for a theorization of
politics” (Laclau, 1996, p. 47).
Mouffe (2005) emphasizes that, in order to act politically, people
have to identify with collective identities which offer an upvaluing
image of themselves. The groups forming through these processes
compete against each other. The political theory of hegemony thus
has the merit of providing a rationale for societal division and for
legitimizing conflict.
This theoretical approach has seen most empirical applications in
race-related issues such as in South African apartheid (Norval, 1996).
Its application to the world of public administration is certainly not
self-explanatory, but dates back to Richardson (1989). Although the
administration as a whole may appear as a monolith to some
outsiders, there are very often competing factions within the public
administration organizations. Sometimes they barely follow different
political agendas (Spiegel, 1986), but sometimes they are not so
much divided by their political standpoints as by different cultures.
280
MANN In the literature on federalism, the struggle for the interests of
single administrative organizations has been described nicely: “They
look for allies, both in and out of government, and they look for
governments receptive to their demands. They try to avoid decisionmaking arenas dominated by their opponents and try to exclude
supporters of the opposition” (Nice, 1987, p. 206). For
intragovernment settings, Peddersen (2002) has shown how the
longing for hegemony in public administrations on the local level may
lead to regionalism. From there, it may not need too much fantasy to
imagine the longing for hegemony in an intersectoral setting. Each
division of an administration has its own culture, and it often has a
particular societal group as their traditional clientele as well. It may
therefore prove fruitful to imagine the parallel administration of
programs as a struggle between cultures rather than a struggle for
funds as depicted in the previous section. Each division of the
administration may be careful to keep the close and good
relationship with this clientele through keeping responsibilities. In this
case, the outcome of parallel administration is the result of careful
intra-administration politics about which a lot of narratives exist (King,
1987; Kelly, 2003).
It might even be the case that the established division of work in
which each administration carries out an identical or similar task is
the best possible outcome, as every administration is serving its own
clientele, thus minimizing transaction costs. However, this view
possibly overemphasizes the actors’ cultural determination and their
social peculiarities in the normative debate about administrative
organization.
THE CASE OF RURAL DEVELOPMENT PROJECT FUNDING IN SWITZERLAND
Projects in rural areas in which the agricultural and the nonagricultural sector collaborate to create added value can currently be
supported through co-financing from two different funds, one
governed by economic development authorities, the other by
agricultural authorities. The economic development authority provides
30 million francs per year within Switzerland’s “New Regional Policy”
for funding “Regional Development Projects”. Seven million francs
per year are provided by the Federal Office of Agriculture for “projects
of regional development” in rural areas and with a strong role for
agricultural partners.
UNDERSTANDING PARALLEL STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
281
The New Regional Policy was established at the beginning of the
new millennium to replace a policy of infrastructure investment in
peripheral regions. The economic development administration had
recognized that most basic infrastructural needs had been covered in
recent decades and was looking for tools to encourage
entrepreneurial activities in rural areas. Rather than focusing on the
removal of regional disparities as in the years before, the
administration argued that the prevalent structural change should be
supported and accompanied by seed money, enabling strong rural
regions (Calmy-Rey & Huber-Hotz, 2007). This political program is
considered as a bottom-up approach in European comparisons
(Prange, 2008), fitting into the rather decentralized approach of
Swiss policy in general (Biela, Hennl, & Kaiser, 2012). It went
through Parliament in late 2006 and has been in place since 2008.
Since then all cantons which are either predominantly rural or poor
(or both) get a budget with which they fund rural development
projects in which several partners collaborate. Cantons have to
provide 50 per cent of the funding and also have to comply with the
federal funding rules.
While Switzerland’s economic development administration
started to elaborate its proposal for Parliament in 2003, the
agricultural administration was ready to bring its new agricultural
policy package through the same Parliament. This package mainly
comprised a new direct payment system and did not foresee any
regional policy measures. However, a parliamentarian from the Social
Democratic Party decided that it was not enough to provide general
and ecological payments to farmers working their soil, but that
innovative projects in which farmers collaborate with other sectors
should also be supported. This idea found unambiguous support in all
the committees and in both chambers of Parliament although the
concept of the New Regional Policy was well known yet. While the few
parliamentarians arguing against the initiative stated that the
agricultural administration should not support regional policy for
reasons of clarity, the director of the Federal Office of Agriculture
even argued that integrating this possibility into agricultural law would
provide a better “connection” to regional policy. Like the first
“Regional Development Projects” (REP), the first “Projects of Regional
Development” (PRE) started in 2008.
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MANN There were a few differences in the projects supported by the
agricultural administration compared to the ones supported by the
economic development administration, which are summarized in
Table 1. In most cantons it was not possible to choose as an
applicant depending on which of the two packages they liked better.
Most cantonal administrations found the pragmatic solution to
classify regional projects in which the agricultural partner had the
lead as “Projects for Regional Development”, and the others as
“Regional Development Projects”. However, the legal framework
would have allowed a lot of projects to be classified in both
categories, so that effective double structures were established and
persist to date.
TABLE 1
Differences between PRE and REP
REP
- Support decision by cantonal
authority
- Cantonal administration has to
provide equal financial
resources to those of federal
administration
- No upper limits for project
support
- Agricultural partner has to have
lead
- All cantons eligible
PRE
- Support decisions by cantonal
and federal authority
- Cantonal administration has to
provide 80 per cent of resources
from federal administration
- Different upper limits defined for
mountain, hill and valley region
- No prescriptions for lead partner
- Only rural and/or poor cantons
eligible
The double structure does not only exist at administrative level
itself, where cantonal and federal economic branches collaborate on
the REP while cantonal and federal agricultural offices work together
on PRE. It also exists at consultancy and knowledge transfer level.
Most cantonal administration offices collaborate with either
agricultural consultancy institutes (PRE) or intermunicipal planning
offices (REP), which help applicants considerably in preparing their
files. And at federal level both organizations have hired a partner to
offer information events and prepare written material to support the
application procedure.
UNDERSTANDING PARALLEL STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
283
Nobody claims that the status quo is the fairest and the most
efficient answer to supporting rural projects for regional development.
It is probably unfair that development projects under the lead of an
agricultural partner get different funding conditions than a
comparable project with a non-agricultural partner in the lead. And it
is probably inefficient to entertain two parallel administrative
structures for the objective of bringing innovation to rural areas
through intersectoral collaboration. Nevertheless, the current solution
appears to be rather stable. There are forces in neither the
administration nor in Parliament attempting to integrate or at least
coordinate the two instruments.
METHODOLOGY
The empirical examination of both political instruments was
mostly carried out by oral interviews. It was important that all kinds of
actors should have their say in the evaluation. The coordinators of the
program at federal level, cantonal coordinators in several cantons
(focusing on the ones making intensive use and no use of the
programs), program consultants and the recipients of funding were
therefore visited and interviewed for both programs. The questions
were adapted to the positions of the interview partners, ranging from
the description of single projects through an appraisal of the
organizational structures to the historical issues of program
generation. The interviews were recorded and a majority of them
transcribed.
Two different methods of interview analysis were applied. A
content analysis of the interviews (Mayring, 1988; Krippendorf, 2004)
was sufficient to understand the most important determinants of the
history, objectives and strategy of the two programs. Codes were
chosen that partially emerged from the interviews’ themselves, but
partially were based on the underlying theoretical framework
following a template analysis (Cassel and Simon, 2004). The strict
reliance on the codes, based on the guidelines by Carmines and
Zeller (1979), then guaranteed a high degree of reliability (Neuendorf,
2002).
Content analysis may be sufficient for interview situations in
which merely factual information is to be transmitted. Other methods,
however, are more suitable to understand the structures behind the
words and to find out what has not been said. In order to further
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MANN increase the validity of the interpretation and understand the
underlying motivations of the key actors, some sequences of the
transcripts were evaluated using Objective Hermeneutics (Garz &
Kraimer, 1994; Oevermann, 2000). The ‘objectivity’ of objective
hermeneutics is not related to the claim of uncovering truth, but to
the aim of reconstructing, or uncovering, the objective meaning
structures of a text. This means that what the producers of a text
thought, wished, hoped or meant (i.e. their subjective intentions) is
irrelevant, because science is not apt to understand such intentions.
The only thing that counts in objective hermeneutics is the objective
meaning of a text in a defined language and interaction community.
Mann and Schweiger (2009) have pointed out how this method can
contribute to a thorough understanding of motivations and forces
behind political measures. Group discussions were carried out with
the purpose of disclosing the selected sequences, considering
thoroughly what was said and what was not said in certain
circumstances during the interviews. This approach highlighted some
patterns that would not be obvious from a less detailed analysis.
Partially, this evaluation method counterbalanced the presence of
rather strategic answers by some actors.
In addition to the interview texts, written material relating to the
two programs was also taken into account and analysed. This
included protocols from the relevant parliamentary sessions and
subcommittees, and information material on the programs as issued
by consultancy organizations.
RESULTS
It is always a challenging task to mirror the broad range of results
from qualitative analyses, particularly in the time-consuming case of
the Objective Hermeneutics method. However, one (translated)
sequence from an interview with a key actor in one of the programs
on the federal level is used as a case in point for the scope of the
results.
I.: What do you think about whether the two instruments could
basically be integrated with each other?
R: (.) Well I think from the approach side definitely. Because you
want the same, generating added value through new products,
through new services, through new infrastructures, innovative
UNDERSTANDING PARALLEL STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
285
appro, innovation is certainly always an element for the
Agricultural Projects, too, for us this is also centrally important (..),
and that this has to be on an inter-branch or inter-enterprise
level, is always an element as well which you see increasingly,
also for the tourism projects, and that there are synergies, if you
combine with agriculture and tourism, or so, this is, yes, you can
only win there.
I: Yes.
E: And therefore we have er an great interest, to coordinate this
as well as possible and to know of each other, also to consult. So,
the Grison Canton, for example has (…) our partner, which is the
Office for Tourism and Regional Support, carries out conferences
three times per year with regional development experts.
(.) – one second pause.
The most interesting move in this sequence is the turn between
the respondent’s first and second paragraph. In general, the question
whether the two instruments should be integrated is answered with a
clear yes. However, in the second paragraph, this is not turned into a
political agenda, but as a good argument to exchange information
between the responsible actors. Joint conferences appear to be a
good substitute for joint programs. This leads back to the first
sentence of the reply: The usefulness of an integrated instrument is
admitted, but only from the “approach side”. There also must be a
different side from which an integration would not be a good choice.
Whether this side rather follows the rationale of the budgetmaximizing bureaucrat or rather the hegemony struggle, cannot be
concluded from this sequence.
Another - far briefer – citation is somewhat more revealing in this
respect. When confronted with a working paper on the disadvantages
of parallel administrating rural development, the head of the
Department at the Swiss Ministry of Agriculture stated “I do not think
you would do agriculture a favor if you were to publish that.” This
indicates the high plausibility of applying the political theory of
hegemony approach to parallel administration: the normative scale
on which to decide about good or evil appears to be the utility for
“agriculture”, i.e. all actors in the farming sector. The agricultural
administration, in Switzerland and many other countries, is often
composed of a majority of people with a farming background or at
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MANN least strong agricultural roots. The objective of actors in the
agricultural administration often appears as being to provide specific
support for the agricultural sector (Wulkotte, 2003). The economic
administration, on the other hand, is much more strongly focused on
the economy as a whole, but traditionally from a conservative,
neoliberal viewpoint (Bergsten, 1975). The differentiation between
“us” and “them” (on which the proponents of the theory of political
hegemony dwell) may be a constitutional element of our human
society, and the prevalence of parallel administrations may be just
one of the outcomes of this fact.
The interviews also showed that the assumption of bounded
rationality would be a plausible approach for a large number of
actors, but not for all. At local level it turned out that many actors
responsible for consultancy hardly knew anything about the “other”
program. The higher one looked in the hierarchy of the program
administration, however, the better informed people usually were
about the other rural development program. While there often was
still a poor image of the other program at intermediate level, key
decision makers usually had a pretty clear image about the existence
of both programs. This notion holds both for the administrative and
for the political sphere, where in the debate about PREs the New
Regional Policy with their REPs played a significant role, but where
PREs were eventually termed as complimentary to REPs.
It was more difficult to detect traces of the budget-maximizing
bureaucrat empirically. The application of this approach would imply
that both the agricultural and the economic administration would be
afraid of losing (or reducing) their own budget. At least this was not
what representatives of the administration would emphasize when
arguing about the existence of the two programs.
DISCUSSION
In the empirical work in Switzerland, it showed that more than
one of the theoretical approaches applied at least partly to the
explanation of parallel administrations. All this adds up to what is
described in Figure 1. It is likely that two factors contribute to the
existence and prevalence of parallel administration. One is that an
equilibrium can be created between the administrative bodies in
charge. In their attempt to maximize the cultural hegemony in their
UNDERSTANDING PARALLEL STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
287
FIGURE 1
A Model of Parallel Administration
Central Actor 1
Equilibrium in struggle for hegemony and
funds
Central Actor 2
Veil of ignorance
Fringe
actors 1
Fringe
actors 2
sphere and their budget, it will have proven impossible to cover a
policy field merely on their own. Both administrative units have
therefore attained a state in which they “live and let live”, even if
occasional struggles for power may occur. The other factor is that not
too much attention is drawn towards the double existence of certain
tasks, so that actors on the fringe of the program (and the public as a
whole) will not bother about it. It is always easy to imagine that the
“other” program is dealing with rather different issues compared to
the program in one’s own environment.
This model integrates aspects from all three theoretical
approaches introduced above. The theory of bounded rationality
offers a rather favorable explanation of the phenomenon of parallel
administration. On the other hand, in a well-governed state it would
be evidence of sheer incompetence if this were the whole story: two
administrative organizations in charge of similar programs in the
same region or country should definitely know of each other.
However, on a lower level bounded rationality also contributes to
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MANN explaining parallel administration. Many actors on the fringe and at
the bottom of a program organization, be they recipients or
consultants, do not know too much about related programs because
they don’t have to. If they knew, it could well be that they would argue
to unify funds so that they could benefit from both programs.
Cynics may suspect that the second official cited in the previous
section may in fact mean his personal power when saying agriculture.
This somewhat speculative and unfriendly interpretation weighs in
favor of the model of a budget-maximizing bureaucrat. It is possible
that some cultural unity of the agricultural sector is evoked mainly for
strategic reasons. But as the fate of the agricultural sector will be
markedly correlated with the fate of the agricultural administration,
the difference between the primary objective of attaining hegemony
for the agricultural sector and maximizing its own budget and
influence may be one of degree. Indeed, the applicability of both the
model of the budget-maximizing bureaucrat and of the theory of
political hegemony shows the relatedness between the two
theoretical approaches, although they originate from entirely different
social sciences.
CONCLUSION
Conclusions from this study can be drawn on the political and on
the methodological level. On the political level it has been shown that
society should not wait for the actors in the administration
themselves to resolve cases of double administration. Due to missing
incentives and stable equilibriums, this will rarely happen. Broad
measures of information should therefore be the key factor for
making cases of parallel administration an issue. One strain of future
research should therefore concentrate on examining how this
information should be generated and distributed.
However, the face of parallel structures in the different subsegments of public administration may vary considerably. The case of
rural regional policy may not be too representative, and another strain
of future research should collect much more empirical evidence on
the different motivations and other causes of such phenomena on
the local, regional, national and international level.
On the methodological side the study confirms that public
administration science takes advantage of not focusing on one social
UNDERSTANDING PARALLEL STRUCTURES IN PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
289
science, but using very different frames in its analytical work.
Administrative institutions are dynamic social units, they are heavily
involved in the political process and they are both restricted by
economic constraints and driven by economic incentives. It would be
naïve to believe that administration research could generate a full
understanding of public administration by neglecting one of the social
sciences. It is an opportunity for administrative sciences to
demonstrate how social sciences can become more interlinked.
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