Geopolitical Futures
Keeping the future in focus
https://geopoliticalfutures.com
Germany Warns of the Danger of War
Oct. 11, 2016 With lower stakes, the U.S. and Russia might take riskier actions.
By George Friedman
German Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier said on Oct. 8 that the situation between the
U.S. and Russia today is more dangerous than it was during the Cold War. As he put it, “It’s a
fallacy to think that this is like the Cold War. The current times are different and more
dangerous.” Since most of us think of the Cold War as by far the most dangerous time we have
known, Steinmeier’s view is startling. It is important to understand what he is saying, not simply
because he is the foreign minister of an important country, but because he is a smart man.
In the interview, Steinmeier discussed the Russian intervention in Syria, the standoff with the
United States and the frozen but still dangerous confrontation over Ukraine. When we look at
these two confrontations between the United States and Russia (Germany doesn’t have the
military strength to affect this balance) either situation could result in a direct confrontation of
U.S. and Russian forces.
On paper, the United States remains committed to the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s regime, while the
Russians are protecting it. There is now combat in Aleppo, the largest city in Syria. Russian and
Assad regime forces seem to be trying to take control of the city. The United States sees Aleppo
as a bastion of anti-Assad forces and doesn’t want to see it fall. The U.S. has the option to try to
block the Russian and Assad advance. Russia has to decide whether to stand and fight or
withdraw. Neither side is confident it knows the other’s intentions, but both believe that Aleppo
is a critical if not decisive battle. The chances of intentional conflict are real, as is the possibility
of an unintended clash escalating.
At the same time, Syria is not essential to the national security of Russia or the United States. It
is not without importance, but a defeat or capitulation there will not change the balance of
power between them at all. It would of course affect psychological and political perception, but
in the long run, perception ultimately comes down to substantial military and economic power.
1/4
Geopolitical Futures
Keeping the future in focus
https://geopoliticalfutures.com
The United States can afford to back off. The Russians will find it more difficult, but can contrive
reasons for slowing or halting the attacks.
In Ukraine, the issue is fundamental to Russia and secondary to the United States. Therefore, it
is far more dangerous than Syria. For Russia, a Ukraine dominated by a third power, with forces
deployed in Ukraine, represents a fundamental threat to its national security. For the United
States, it is a secondary issue that can rise to a primary one. As I have written, the foundation of
U.S. foreign policy since World War I was preventing any single power from dominating Europe
and Russia, as their combined strength in technology and resources would threaten American
interests. Therefore, Russia returning to its prior position, with the potential to dominate the
European Peninsula, would rise to a primary issue. If Russia invaded Ukraine and used it as a
base to threaten its former satellite states, this would begin escalating to a primary level. But
that is several steps from happening, and if it did, it would still not constitute a direct threat to
the entire European Peninsula.
The Cold War focused on the center of Germany, and the possibility of a Soviet seizure of
Western Europe did not appear far-fetched. Since the U.S. was defending Western Europe at a
distance, its conventional forces facing the Soviets appeared to be inferior. Therefore, part of
U.S. strategy, at least officially, was the use of nuclear weapons, both strategically and on the
battlefield, to stop a Soviet offensive. That meant that should the Soviets have chosen to
undertake an offensive, or if they detected a U.S. offensive, they had to go nuclear at the
earliest possible moment. In fact, the question of the defense of Europe devolved into who
would win a nuclear exchange, since it would be that exchange that would determine the future
of Western Europe, and in fact dwarf the entire issue in a general cataclysm.
This is what kept the Cold War from turning into a shooting war. The Soviets and the Americans,
along with their allies or subordinates in Europe, saw themselves in an existential crisis. I
strongly believe that without the existence of nuclear weapons, the Soviets, encircled by the
American alliance structure, would have sought to break out. A thrust to the west would have
reduced the pressure on them and tilted the global balance of power. All war is a risk, but so is
not resorting to war. I don’t think a war could have been prevented.
It didn’t happen because of nuclear weapons. Each side understood the geopolitical issue
primary to the other. The Soviets and Americans had equal stakes in the battle. Neither would
lose without resorting to every weapon they had – including nuclear. Neither could be certain,
but each had to assume this. Where a war would have been worth risking on a conventional
level, the high probability that it would almost immediately escalate into a nuclear war changed
all calculations. Both sides understood that there was nothing to gain that was worth risking
that.
The deterrence against conventional war in Europe, as opposed to proxy wars elsewhere such as
Vietnam or Afghanistan, was nuclear war. Wars that did not involve primary and overwhelming
2/4
Geopolitical Futures
Keeping the future in focus
https://geopoliticalfutures.com
interests did not involve the risk of nuclear war. There was no military target worth a nuclear
strike in either country, nor would either country risk immolation over Vietnam or Afghanistan.
Therefore, these wars could take place.
I think this is Steinmeier’s point. The confluence of extremely critical fears and interests
paradoxically reduced the chance of conflict, because it increased the chance of nuclear war.
Today, none of the friction points between the United States and Russia are of primary interest
to both countries. Syria is at best secondary to both, and Ukraine really matters only to Russia.
This cannot result in nuclear war, and therefore, each side will take greater risks than they
would have in Central Europe during the Cold War.
Therefore, the situation is more dangerous now precisely because the stakes are lower. In
lowering the stakes, the risks decline and the possibility of serious conflict between U.S. and
Russian forces rises. That direct clash did not occur during the Cold War, at least not on any
significant scale. That means that the risk of nuclear war is diminished, but the risk of direct
conflict is higher. This would not be proxy wars, but direct war. In the far reaches it could even
escalate to nuclear war. The probability of immediate recourse to nuclear weapons no longer
contains crises at the early points. Undisciplined crises are the most dangerous.
Steinmeier’s observation seems valid. The mystery, of course, is what he is planning to do about
that. Steinmeier is the foreign minister of Germany, again the center of Europe. Germany would
face the crisis of alliance obligations to the U.S., which it doesn’t want to fulfill. Having made the
declaration, it would seem reasonable that Germany would try to defuse the U.S.-Russian
confrontation. An agreement on Ukraine is possible, and it is doubtful that the Russians or
Americans have a real stake in Syria. Is Germany announcing that it is shifting its role in global
politics to a more active role, albeit mediation? These crises raise the question of what Germany
will do. That is a question with an ominous past. But if the German foreign minister is speaking
for Germany, then this is exactly where his logic would lead him.
Get insights like this directly in your inbox!
3/4
Geopolitical Futures
Keeping the future in focus
https://geopoliticalfutures.com
Sign up today for our popular, free email newsletter.
Each week, you will receive a free article on the underlying significance
of major events around us. Plus, you’ll get a free 30-day trial of some of
our exclusive paid content just for signing up!
hbspt.cta.load(2632125, '047f722a-c97b-4b88-94be-892cd60af724', {});
4/4
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)