The Siege of Cuzco
Author(s): Thomas Flickema
Source: Revista de Historia de América, No. 92 (Jul. - Dec., 1981), pp. 17-47
Published by: Pan American Institute of Geography and History
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20139433
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THE SIEGE OF CUZCO
In 1536 the Incas of Peru unleashed the most formidable revolt they
would ever mount against their Spanish conquerors, a revolt that took
the form of the siege of Cuzco. Less than four years had passed since
one hundred sixty-eight Spaniards commanded by Francisco Pizarro had
seized the Inca Emperor Atahualpa. After the execution of Atahualpa
in mid-1533, Pizarro's search for a docile member of the Inca royal
family to serve as a puppet finally led the Spanish leader to elevate
Manco to the Inca throne early in 1534. A member of the minor branch
of the Inca royal family and barely eighteen years of age at the time,
Manco had secretly decided to revolt. Unless he cast off his role as a
supplicant, he would remain a powerless and abused tool in the hands
of his Spanish masters.
Chroniclers and modern historians have devoted considerable attention
to the siege of Cuzco, but they failed to explain why the one hundred
ninety-six Spaniards there survived a year of fighting against an Inca
force that numbered at least one hundred thousand men. Providing de
scription and analysis, at best these accounts furnish only sporadic infor
mation about the factors that influenced the outcome of the siege.1
1 For the most significant treatments of the siege of Cuzco by chroniclers see:
Antonio de Herrera, Historia general de los hechos de los castellanos en las islas y
tierra firme del mar oc?ano (D?cadas). Notes by Miguel G?mez del Campillo. Ma
drid, 1934-1957. Vol. XI, pp. 186-224; Garcilaso de la Vega, Obras completas. Ed.
by Carmelo S?enz de Santa Mar?a, S. J. Madrid, 1960. Vol. Ill, pp. 120-136; Cris
t?bal de Molina (the Almagrist), Cosas acaescidas en el Per? in Cr?nica* peruanas
de inferas ind?gena. Ed. by Francisco Es te ve Barba. Madrid, 1968. pp. 87-90; Anon
ymous, Relaci?n del sitio de Cusco. Ed. by Horacio H. Urteaga. Lima, 1934; Diego
de Castro Titu Cus?, Relaci?n de la conquista del Per?. Lima, 1973. Pp. 75,-87; Fray
Mart?n de Mur?a, Historia general del Per?, origen y descendencia de las Incas. In
troduction by Manuel Ballesteros-Gaibrois. Madrid, 19-62-1964. Vol. L, pp. 196^210;
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l'homas Flichem?
R. H. A. N?m. 92
Nevertheless, the testimony of the participants in the siege, especially
their statements in unpublished manuscripts in the Archivo de Indias,
supply abundant material explaining why they held off the far larger
Francisco L?pez de Gomarra, Historia general de las Indias, Ed. by Pilar Guidelalde.
Barcelona, 1954. Vol. I, pp. 223-227.
For the nineteenth and twentieth century historians see: William H. Prescott,
History of the Conquest of Peru. Philadelphia, 1892. Vol. II, pp. 48-80; Sir Arthur
Helps, The Spanish Conquest in America. New York, 1904. Vol. IV, pp. 20-31; Phi
lip Ainsworth Means, Fall of the Inca Empire. New York, 1964. Pp. 60-62; F. A.
Kirkpatrickc, The Spanish Conquistadores. Cleveland, 1962. Pp. 181-187; George Kub
ler, tcA Peruvian Chief of State: Manco Inca, (1515-1545)". The Hispanic Amer
ican Historical Review, XXIV, no. 2. (May, 1944), pp. 25 3-276; Nathan Wachtel,
The Vision of the Vanquished. New York, 1977. Pp. 170-172; Felipe de la Barra,
El indio peruano en las etapas de la conquista. Lima, 1948. Pp. 83-105; Hector Lo
pez Mart?nez, Rebeliones de mestizos y otros' temas quinientistas. Lima, 1972. Pp.
87-88; Juan Jos? Vega, Manco Inca, el gran rebelde. Lima^ n.d.; Luis A. Pardo, El
imperio de VUcambamba: el reinado de los cuatro ?ltimos Incas. Lima, 1972; John
Hemming, The Conquest of the Incas. New York, 1970. Pp. 111-116, 189-220; Lie
selotte and Theo Engle, Twilight of Ancient Peru: The Glory and Decline of the
Inca Empire. Trans, by Alisa Jaffe. New York, 1969. Pp. 13-15.
Herrera, by far the most influential of the chroniclers writing on the siege of
Cuzco, sensed the importance of the horsemen, but ignored other possible factors
except that of Divine Favor on behalf of the Spanish. Herrera also began the tale,
which has been repeatedly re-told up to the present, that the Incas made extensive
use of Spanish arms. Garcilaso de la Vega, by leaving the impression that Manco
enjqyed widespread support among the Indians and by spending most of his treatment
of the siege discussing how the Virgin Mary and Santiago appeared to save the Spanish
from defeat in numerous instances, certainly points to the conclusion that only these
supernatural interventions spared the Spanish. Father Mur?a, if in a somewhat con
fused manner, did recognize that many Indians, including members of the Inca royal
family, did not support Manco. Yet in the last analysis Mur?a, like Garcilaso, leaves
the impression that Santiago and the Virgin Marfy spared the Spanish. Titu Cusi,
the son of Manco who heard secondary accounts of the siege, also accepts the fact
that God favored the Spanish, but points to mistakes by his father as well. The cleric
Crist?bal de Molina ignores all factors other than Divine Favor, although he does
not list the occurrence of any supernatural events during the fighting. In contrast
to Molina stands the Relaci?n del sitio del Cusco. The anonymous author of this
work claimed to have been in the siege, and the detail of his account suggests this
may have been the case. At the very least he received his information directly from
the Men of Cuzco. Nonetheless, his third person account leaves much unexplained
from an analjytical point of view. Horsemen and the maintenance of a food supply
are obviously important. Still, the real purpose of this account of the siege is to
praise Hernando Pizarr? in an unabashed fashion. Sagacious, brave and blessed with
almost all the estimable qualities, Hernando Pizarro so dominates nearly every aspect
of this account that he emerges as the real reason behind the survival of the Men of
Cuzco/
Among the modern authors, William H. Prescott's coverage has introduced more
readers to the siege than any other account. Although principally offering the reader
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.tnlio-lliciembre de 19S1
The ^iege of Cuzco
Inca force. However, a description of the salient features of the siege
is necessary to prepare the ground for the analytical section.2
I
Manco escaped from captivity in Cuzco, the former Inca capital, in
mid-April, 1536. Francisco Pizarro's half-brother, Hernando, the Spanish
leader of Cuzco, had granted Manco permission to leave on the unders
tanding that the Inca leader would soon return with priceless treasures
buried in the Yucay Valley. Yet once in the rugged valley, which lay
only fifteen miles north of Cuzco, Manco immediately began assembling
his Inca followers for an attack on Cuzco. From the very onset, the Incas
resolved to throw almost all of their manpower against Cuzco. The
reasons for this decision are not known directly, but some rather obvious
a narrative, Prescott does point to the use of Spanish arms by the Incas. And while
he doubts their effectiveness in Inca hands, he also believes the Spanish enjoyed only
a small advantage in weaponry over the Incas anyway. Thus, even though Prescott
intimates horsemen were important, he fails to explain why the far more numerous
Indians failed to crush the Spanish. Still, Prescott's account at least has suggestive
qualities almost entirely lacking in the narratives of Sir Arthur Helps, Philip Ainsworth
Means, F. A. Kirkpatrick, and the Engles. George Kubier, however, did break some
new ground among the authors writing in English when he asserted that the Incas
largely failed because of a lack of training and discipline among the Inca fighting
men. Writing thirty years later, Nathan Wachtel is in essential agreement with
Kubier. In the meantime, however, John Hemming's masterful work appeared with
the best treatment of the siege in English. And yet while Hemming elsewhere in his
book (pp. 111-116) gives a perceptive evaluation of Spanish and Inca methods cf
warfare, he does not apply it to the siege. To be sure the reader can detect the
importance of the horsemen, the questionable Inca leadership, and the unprofessional
nature of the Inca army. Still, other important factors are ignored. Furthermore,
Hemming believes that Manco received much support from all the Indians of Peru.
The pattern in the Spanish-speaking world followed a similar development. Like
Prescott, Luis A. Pardo and Felipe de la Barra pointed to the vital importance of
horsemen, though also arguing that the Incas used Spanish weapons on a large scale.
Pardo, nonetheless, recognized that Indian support of Manco was very limited. Juan
Jos? Vega, who has written by far the best treatment of the siege in Spanish, recog
nizes that Manco's support was restricted. He also criticizes Manco's leadership and
adds that although the Incas used Spanish arms, they did not utilize them effectively.
2 Since the descriptive section presents material commonly known to students of
the siege, footnotes are used only when a statement relies upon a specific source. In
this descriptive section, and in the analytical one that follows, all statements are those
of the participants in the siege, unless otherwise indicated.
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Thomas F?ichem?
R. H. A. N?m. 92
and compelling considerations must have shaped Inca thinking. As the
Inca capital, Cuzco retained a politico-military symbolism which de
manded reconquest. The city also appeared to be vulnerable in its deep
inland isolation, separated by hundreds of miles of precipitous peaks and
valleys from the Spanish coastal headquarters at Lima. And despite the
importance of Cuzco to the Spaniards, who called it the "great city"
and at first thought of making it their capital, few of them lived there.
A massive onslaught would certainly crush them and regain the whole
Inca heartland.
Hernando Pizarro responded to the Inca buildup with two strikes
into the Yucay Valley, each time sending out from sixty to seventy
horsemen (los de a caballo) and roughly half that number of Spanish
footmen (peones). But the Spaniards failed either to capture Manco or
to disrupt the Inca buildup. In each instance Manco fled into the adja
cent mountains, while his men took refuge on the steep sides of the
Yucay Valley. ^ ^
By the end of the second strike the Incas had already begun to move
out of Yucay and into the high hills and deep ravines which surround
Cuzco on all sides except to the southwest. As a matter of fact, the
second Spanish strike force fought its way back from the Yucay Valley
under such intense Inca attacks that horsemen from Cuzco had to come
to the rescue. Even before this episode the two sides began to fight daily
skirmishes around Cuzco; almost without exception the Incas forced the
Spanish to flee back to the protection of Cuzco. With these Inca suc
cesses, to say nothing of their constantly increasing numbers and confi
dence, the Spanish situation began to seem precarious. Years later, Pedro
Pizarro still vividly recalled that Manco's supporters assembled in such
vast numbers that during the day they seemed to form a "pa?o negro
que los ten?a tapados todos media legua alrededor de esta ciudad del
Cuzco". By night, he added, the Incas campf ires were so numerous "que
no parec?a sino un cielo muy sereno lleno de estrellas". The deafening
clamor the Incas raised, a psychological tactic they employed to unnerve
the Spanish by beating drums, playing musical instruments, and shout
ing, only added to the threatening atmosphere, "porque era tanto el
ruido que los indios hac?an que si no era de muy cansados no hab?a poder
dormir". The entire Spanish population of Cuzco consisted of one hun
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Julio-Diciembre de 1981
The Siege of Cuzco
dred ninety-six men, augmented by a handful of African slaves and
perhaps five hundred friendly Indian warriors (amigos de guerra). Man
co, in contrast, had a force estimated at the very least at one hundred
thousand men poised to attack Cuzco by May 5, 1536.3
3 Pizarro, Relaci?n, 202, 210. The present author's research has established that
one hundred nintey-six Spaniards participated in the siege of Cuzco. See the two tax
lists (one for gold and one for silver) in AGI, Contadur?a 1824. Both tax lists run
from mid-March to mid-April, 15 37, ending just before the Almagrist force terminated
the siege of Cuzco by capturing the city. Other information on the Men of Cuzco
comes from the testimony of these men in the AGI divisions of Justicia, Patronato,
and Lima.
Thus the estimates chroniclers gave of the numbers of the Men of Cuzco are
quite accurate. Garcilaso de la Vega (Obras, III, 123) places two hundred Spaniards
in the siege. The anonymous author of the Relaci?n de los sucesos del Per? con mo
tivo de las luchas de los Pizarros y los Almagros. .. (in Colecci?n de documentos in?
ditos para la historia de Chile (CLIHC). Ed by. Jose Toribio Medina. Santiago de
Chile, 1882-1902. Vol. IV, p. 391) suggests that one hundred ninety men were in
the siege. The same figure is offered by Pedro de Cieza de Le?n (La cr?nica del Per?.
Madrid, 1962. p. 456) Molina (Cosas ac oes cid as, 88) puts the figures at one hundred
fifty.
Estimates varied even more among the actual participants in the siege. The no
toriously unreliable Don Alonso Enr?quez de Guzman at various times mentions one
hundred fifty, two hundred, and two hundred forty Spaniards in the siege. (Ubro
de la vida y costumbres de don Alonso Enr?quez de Guzman. Ed. by Hayward Ken
iston. Madrid, 1960. Pp. 150, 155; CDIHC, V. 327). Other estimates are one hun
dred sixty men (Bernab? Pic?n), 160-170 (Juan de Espinosa), and one hundred
eighty (Pedro Alonso Carrasco and Diego de Peralta). These four men gave their
estimates in AGI, Patronato 140, no. 4, Pedro Pizarro (Relaccwn, 200) the number
of his companions as just under 200.
Naturally the estimates of Inca numbers vary far more. Herrera (Historia general,
IV, 205), Cieza de Le?n (Cr?nica, 289), and Garcilaso (Obras, III, 122) accept
the figure of two hundred thousand. Titu Cusi (Relaci?n, 79), speaks of four
hundred thousand. Whether chronicler or participant, the anonymous author of Rp
laci?n del sitio (P. 14) says the Incas numbered one hundred thousand rrindios de gue
rra" and eighty thousand ^indios de servicio".
The participants in the siege have the following estimates of Inca numbers:
50,000 ? Don Alonso Enr?quez (Vida, 150)
70,000 ? Juan de Espinosa (AGI, Patronato 141, no. 2)
80,000 ? Gabriel de Rojas (AGI, Justicia, 422, no. 1)
100,000 ? Juan de Hojeda (AGI, Patronato 90, no. 1, ramo 11), Don Alonso
Enr?quez (Vida, 15 3-154)'"", Alonso de Mesa (AGI, Patronato 126,
ramo 20), Pedro Gallego (Gobernantes del Per?, cartas y papeles, si
glo xvi: documentos del Archivo de Indias. Ed. by Roberto Levillier.
Madrid, 1921-1926. Vol. II, pp. 87-88).
200,000?Don Alonso Enr?quez (CDHIC, V, 3 27) **, Diego M?ndez (AGI,
Justicia 422, no. 1), Mart?n de Salas (his own probanza, AGI, Lima
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Thomas Flichema
R. H. A. N?m. 92
On that day the first rays of the sun rising over the Andes sent the
whole Inca force crashing down on Cuzco. At the tvery onset the Indians
seized the undefended fortress of Sacsahuam?n. This massive structure,
dominating Cuzco from atop a high bluff, looked down into the very
heart of the city, providing an ideal platform for the Inca attack. The
steepness of the approach ruled out the use of horsemen in a direct at
tack and rendered the efforts of the vastly outnumbered footmen futile.
From this apparently impregnable salient the Incas launched a series of
rapid and devasting attacks at the center of the city, entering the un
fortified city at the same time from all other directions as well. Although
the buildings were made of stone, the Incas hurled hot stones and shot
incendiary arrows that quickly set fire to the thatched roofs and wooden
beams. The flames, fed by a strong breeze, rapidly reached inferno pro
portions, consuming the city and creating smoke so thick the Spanish
had difficulty breathing. Soon Inca warriors began hurling large stones
down at the Spanish from the high walls of the now burnt out buildings.
The missiles from above aggravated the already severe problems the
Spanish confronted in the streets, whose narrowness permitted no more
than two horsemen to operate side by side, while also enabling the Incas
to dig holes and build barricades that sharply reduced the effectiveness
of the horsemen.
These tactics, coupled with the Incas' overwhelming numerical
superiority, drove the Spanish into a small area in the middlel of Cuzco.
As Lope S?nchez admitted, the Spanish now fought desperately by
night and by day for an entire week just to hold event this highly re
stricted area.4 At one point, a torrent of Inca arrows and stones forced
118), Diego Rodriguez de Figueroa (AGI, Patronato 93, no. 8, ramo
3), Lope S?nchez (AGI, Lima 118, the probanza of Mart?n de Salas),
Mancio Sierra de Legu?zamo {Gobernantes del Per?, II, 137), Pedro
Pizarro (Relaci?n, 202), Ant?n Domingo (AGI, Patronato 93, no.
9, ramo 6)
2 50,000?. Lucas Mart?nez Vegasso (AGI, Patronato 93, no. 9, ramo 6)
3 00,000 ? Juan de Espinosa'*, Bernab? Pic?n, Diego de Peralta (all in AGI, Pa
tronato 114, ramo 2), Rodrigo de Herrera (AGI, Justicia 1052, no.
8, ramo 4), Lope S?nchez-*, (AGI, Patronato 107, ramo 2).
* second estimate by same man.
::"* third estimate by same man.
4 AGI, Patronato 107, ramo 2.
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Julio-Diciembre de 1981
The Siege of Cuzco
S?nchez and his companions to abandon their zone of defense for the
temporary protection of two adjoining Inca palaces.
By the end of the week, nevertheless, the Spanish had devised several
tactics that enabled them, during the second week of fighting, to drive
the Incas back toward the outskirts of the city. Most importantly, Her
nando Pizarro abandoned the policy of rushing almost all of his horse
men into battle at the same time. Instead he now divided them into
three groups, each under the command of an outstanding captain, almost
always holding one or two of the groups in reserve. This decision helped
the Spanish regain a considerable degree of the initiative, for while two
of the detachments of horsemen held defensive positions, the third group
would plunge into the fray when needed. Concomitantly, Spanish, In
dian and African footmen began to dismantle barricades, fill holes, and
pull down agricultural terraces. These changes gave the horsemen greater
mobility and freedom of action, permitting the Spaniards to enlarge
the sector of the city under their control.
Still the Spanish faced a grave situation. Soon the regrouped Incas
would renew their attacks from Sacsahuam?n. For this reason, Hernan
do Pizarro decided in favor of an immediate attack unon the fortress.
Since the steep bluff and fortifications ruled out a direct frontal assautetl,
Pizarro chose to attack the side of the fort facing away from the city,
and for that purpose he selected his half-brother, Juan Pizarro, to lead
a force of fifty or so horsemen and twenty peones, plus a little less than
one hundred amigos de guerra.
Surprise explains the initial success of this attack. Striking at dawn,
when most of the Incas had not yet come down from their nocturnal
retreats in the hills around Cuzco, the Spanish burst out of the city
through the defenses of the surprised and undermanned Indians. Then,
by dashing up Carmenga Hill, Juan Pizarro's force decoyed the Incas
into believing that they were fleeing to distant Lima. But after they
had fought their way for about three miles in that direction, they sud
denly veered sharply to their right and rode rapidly through a series
of high hills and deep ravines until they reached the part of Sacsahua
m?n facing away from Cuzco. Francisco Negral, in the laconic style
so typical of the conquistador, described the whole process by saying,
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Thomas Plichema
R. H. A. N?m. 92
cte rompi? por los dichos indios gan?ndoles hasta llegar a la fuerza de
la fortaleza.. ."5
The Spanish now had to capture the massive gray stone fortress
which the chronicler Garcilaso de la Vega hailed as the "obra mayor"
of his mother's Inca ancestors.6 Facing onto a level field, the three mas
sive walls of the structure rose as terraces, one after the other, until the
last and highest wall reached a height of nearly sixty feet above
the ground. Each wall consisted of huge boulders (one of which still
remains, weighing three hundred sixty-one metric tons and rising twenty
nine feet tall). Numerous salient points in each of the four hundred
foot long walls exposed attackers to bombardment from three direc
tions. Furthermore, entrance could be gained through the walls only
by way of small doors blocked by boulders and large rocks. Three
fortified towers rising from the level area behind the third (or highest)
wall presented an equal challenge to the attackers. The central tower,
the largest one, reached a height of four or five stories and rested on a
base with a seventy-five foot diameter. The two adjoining towers almost
matched the central tower in size. Huge numbers of Incas (estimated
at from thirty thousand to sixty thousand) manned the walls and
towers.
The Spaniards, responding characteristically, twice tried to storm
the first (or low?er) wall, only to be driven off by a deluge of stones
and arrows. After the second rebuff, Juan Pizarro decided to attack
during the night, a time when the Incas were "so?olientes y medio dor
midos", in the words of Pedro Pizarro.7 Consequently, the Spanish made
camp and pretended to have abandoned the attack until the next morn
ing. But soon after midnight they struck. Pedro del Barco, who led
the attack, later explained that "entramos once a doce" through a door
in the lower wall by pushing aside through rocks and boulders so that
the other attackers could squeeze through.8 The Incas, who rarely disi
played a zeal for night fighting, responded in such a confused manner
that the Spaniards quickly penetrated the second and third walls as
well.
5 AGI, Patronato 93, no. 8, ramo 3.
6 Obras, II, 284.
7 Relaci?n, 204.
8 Barco's probanza in AGI, Lima 204.
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Julio-Diciembre de 1981
The Siege of Cuzco
The attack on the three towers, however, soon ran into severe dif
ficulties. In fact, the Incas threw such a barrage of stones from the
towers that the Spaniards not only abandoned their attack, but had to
flee to the protection of the third wall. In the fighting a large stone
dropped from one of the towers struck the head of Juan Pizarro, who
was helmetless because of an earlier wound. Mortally wounded, Juan
Pizarro was carried down to Cuzco, where he died after a week.
Stunned by the loss of their leader and the ferocity of the Inca
(attack, the Spanish waited for Hernando Pizarro to come up from
Cuzco. He arrived around dawn, just in time to direct his men against
a fierce Inca counterattack from outside Sacsahuam?n. In savage en
gagements that lasted through that day and the next, the Spanish and
Incas fought in and around the fortress. Along with a host of other
attackers, Manco threw five thousand of his best troops into the battle,
but the Spanish repulsed this force and all other relief columns. Al
though the Incas still held the towers, by the second day many of the
defenders began to flee. Short of arrows, stones, and water, and without
hope for reinforcements, some Inca warriors even jumped from the
tops of the tall towers, often to their death.
By this time the Spanish had begun using newly-constructed scaling
ladders against the towers. Juan de Espinosa related that this phase of
the fighting cost the Spaniards "mucho riesgo y trabajo", especially in
the form of numerous falls and frequent wounds.9 Still, the end was
near, and as the Spanish attack persisted against the weakening Inca
opposition, the towers finally fell. In each instance the Spaniards killed
all the Incas still inside, slaughtering some one thousand five hundred
in the central tower alone. l
The fall of Sacsahuam?n in mid-May, 1536 marked a significant
change in the fighting. From now on the Spanish efforts became more
aggressive, while those of the Incas became more defensive and inter
mittent. Fighting continued around Cuzco for several more weeks, but
the Spaniards inflicted a series of defeats upon their opponents which
left them no choice but to retreat to defensive positions at least three
or four miles from Cuzco. Indeed, although the fighting would persist
into early March of 1537, the Spanish agreed that the overall intensity
9 AGI, Patronato 140, no. 4.
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Thomas Flichema
R. H. A. N?m. 92
of the conflict diminished significantly after May of 1536. The Incas
attacked Cuzco regularly, but only with the appearance of each full
moon; after being repulsed they would then pull far back to regroup
and to carry out religious observances.
The first three of these lunar attacks, the ones the Incas mounted in
June, July, and August of 1536, displayed greater intensity than any
of the subsequent ones. Both the June and July attacks involved large
numbers of Incas and set off fighting that lasted for as much as three
weeks. Of the two, the July attack presented the most serious threat,
for on the eve of this action, Hernando Pizarro and fifty men had car
ried out still another futile strike into the Yucay Valley and had just
barely managed to return in time to help repulse the Incas. The August
attacks, in contrast, fell far short of the two earlier ones both in numbers
and intensity. By this time the Spanish had not only destroyed most of
the Inca fortifications around Cuzco, but had also begun to adopt the
tactic of killing Inca women, which deprived the Inca warriors of their
logistical support teams and had many other easily imaginable demoral
izing effects. Also, by this time many of Manco's farmer warriors had
returned home to plant their fields before the advent of the Andean
winter rains. As a matter of fact, by early September this depletion
forced Manco and the core of his army to retreat to Ollantaytambo, a
spot in the Yucay Valley situated some forty miles from Cuzco. There
Main co awaited the return of his warriors from their fields, as well as
the news of the fate of sixty thousand men he had sent to attack Lima.
The interlude after the August attack brought each side some bad
news. The Spanish learned that the Incas had decimated several columns
sent in their relief from Lima. Employing ambushes in narrow mountain
passes, the Incas had killed some two hundred Spaniards, almost all of
those sent. However, Manco also received news during the same time that
the Spanish in Lima had routed the Inca attack on that city. Forced
to attack across level terrain and to expose themselves to the devastating
attacks of the horsemen, the Incas also suffered immensely because the
highlanders were not adapted to the coastal climate. As if these factors
were not enough, the Spanish killed all the prominent Inca captains
early in the fighting. On top of all the rest, the coastal Indians had
failed to support the Incas.
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Julio-Diciembre de 1981
The Siege of Cuzco
Around Cuzco in the meantime, Hernando Pizarro took advantage
of the lull in the fighting to send out groups of men to gather food
and break up the token forces Manco left in the vicinity of the city.
At first these groups went only 12 to 15 miles from Cuzco, but in the
view of the small Inca opposition to these endeavors, two contingents
of Spaniards went perhaps one hundred miles from Cuzco in the direc
tion of Collao (present Bolivia). One of these contingents brought back
two hundred Inca captives. Hernando Pizarro promptly had the right
hand of each of the captives cut off and then released the mutilated
victims to rejoin their horrified compatriots.
Emboldened by the Spanish successes, Hernando Pizarro decided to
attack Ollantaytambo, but he thereby led his men into an almost disas
trous trap. Taking all of his best horsemen (about 60), 30 select peones,
and as many as four thousand Indian allies, Pizarro ran into difficulties
from the start. Detachments sent to capture Inca sentinels failed to
accomplish their mission. The element of surprise gone, the Spanish had
to fight five or six battles as they proceeded down the narrow Yucay
Valley.
At Ollantaytambo the valley temporarily broadens out to almost a
mile in width. As the Spanish finally fought their way into this area,
the turbulent waters of the Yucay River flowed on their left. Just
beyond and above the river, rising as steps up the steep valley walls,
loomed "muchos andenes muy altos y muy agros y fuertes", in the words
of Pedro Pizarro,10 From these terraces Inca slingers bombarded the
Spanish with large stones. To the right of the Spaniards lay the village
of Ollantaytambo, nestled at the foot of a steep hill and defended by a
high wall from which archers shot at the Spanish. Just beyond the vil
lage the Spanish encountered the great fortress of Ollantaytambo, a
huge edifice carved into the living stone of a massive hillside. Many of
the Spaniards in the siege stated that Ollantaytambo ranged as the
strongest of all the Inca fortresses, stronger even than Sacsahuam?n.
Following their invariable tactic in such a case, the Spanish twice
assaulted the entrance of the fortress. These efforts failed, for not only
did huge boulders block the entrance, but the Incas hurled such quan
tities of stones, arrows and rocks from r?bovc that the Spanish had to
10 Relaci?n, 209.
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Thomas Flichema
R. H. A. N?m. 92
retreat with the loss of one horsemen. At the same time the Incas routed
Spanish footmen sent to take the heights above the fortress. As the
Spanish pulled back, the Incas came down from their fortified positions
and carried the attack to their adversaries. The Incas inundated the
Spanish with water as well as with numbers of men, for as the Incas
pressed the mass attack, they also released water into irrigation canals,
quickly flooding the small area before the fortress to such an extent
that the Spanish horsemen were in water up to their stirrups.
Hernando Pizarro decided to fight until nightfall and then to flee
under the cover of darkness. The night came none too soon in the opin
ion of Francisco de Villacast?n:
Por la parte de abajo los dichos espa?oles estaban cercados del r?o y por la de
arriba les tira muchas piedras y grandes y peque?as y flechas y por ser el valle
angosto reciben mucho da?o e estubiera muy a punto de perderse. . X1
The plan to flee did not fool the Indians, who attacked the retreating
Spanish ferociously until they got past the second ford in the river.
Finally free of the Incas, the Spanish slept that night in an abandoned
village and arrived back in Cuzco the next day.
After the Ollantaytambo debacle, the Spanish faced more monthly
attacks on Cuzco, but none of these Inca efforts really threatened the
city. By early March of 1537, the Incas seem to have abandoned entirely
their design of taking Cuzco. In part, this situation came about because
the Incas could no longer raise the number of warriors that they had
done early in the siege. Moreover, by early March of 1537, the military
situation in Cuzco had changed dramatically with the advent of ad
ditional Spanish contingents. Alonso de Alvarado and four hundred men
were approaching Cuzco from the northwest, having fought their way
to within one hundred miles of Cuzco. At the same time, Diego de Al
magro and over four hundred veterans of Indian fighting had returned
from their unsuccessful Chilean expedition to within a few days march
of Cuzco. Unable to defeat the Spaniards in Cuzco alone, Manco and
his advisors must have realized they stood no chance against the three
combined Spanish forces. Consequently, they played their final card, a
11 AGI, Patronato 126, ramo 20.
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Julio-Dic?embr? de 1981
The Siege of Cuzco
futile effort to take advantage of rivalries between the supporters of
Diego de Almagro and Hernando Pizarro. Soon these rival factions in fact
did fight for control of Cuzco, but against the Incas they presented a
united front. Manco and a handful of supporters fled deep into the
lower hills of the eastern Andes, forever abandoning any hopes of cap
turing Cuzco, which fell to Almagro and his Men of Chile on April
16, 1537, almost a year to the day after Manco had left Cuzco to or
ganize his revolt.
The Incas had failed. The Men of Cuzco, as they came to be called,
had survived. But the ciyt itself, as Bishop Valverde had first seen it
at its peak in 1533, had been destroyed. Returning in Cuzco in 1539,
after an absence of four years, Valverde wrote that if he had not known
the city before, he would not have recognized it. "Agora", he continued,
"la mayor parte de la cibdad est? toda derribada y quemada".12
II
By March of 1537 the Spaniards and Incas had fought to a stalemate.
Although not achieving a clear victory, the Men of Cuzco had nonethe
less gained the time necessary for helps to arrive from the outside. How
did this stalemate come about? More specifically, why did the Incas
fail to crush the defenders of Cuzco?
Given the religious temper of that day, one is hardly surprised that
chroininclers pointed to Divine Interventions as the key factor in the
Spaniards' survival. Thus, Santiago appears in various chronicles dressed
in resplendent attire and riding a white horse, brandishing his sword to
drive off the Incas as they were about to vanquish the Men of Cuzco.
Similarly, although through pacific means, the Virgin Mary (with the
baby Jesus in her arms) appeared to render decisive aid to the Christians.
Finally, chroniclers record that fires the Incas set on the roof of the
building the Spanish used as a church always extinguished themselves,
another sign of Divine Intervention on behalf of the Spanish.13
12 Quoted in Rub?n Vargas Ugarte, S. J., Historia de la iglesia en el Per?. Lima,
Vol. I, p. 169.
13 Garcilaso de la Vega, Obras, III, 123-126; Cieza de Le?n, Cr?nica, 456; Titu
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R. H. A. N?m. 92
None of the Men of Cuzco, including two of the priests who later
testified about the siege, ever mentioned any of these miracles. In a typ
ical statement Juan de Hojeda stated that, "s?lo Dios milagrosamente
los guarda de tanta multitud de yndios". Statements such as these reflec
ted a deep religious faith and the belief that God had favored them, but
not that the Men of Cuzco actually witnessed direct Divine Interven
tions in the fighting over Cuzco.14
The Men of Cuzco did realize, however, that the Incas' initial attack
on Cuzco represented their best opportunity to overwhelm them. Inca
numbers ran at full tide. Their morale, buoyed by their success in the
preliminary fighting and further bolstered by the knowledge that the
Men of Cuzco stood alone, reached a fever pitch. Conditions in Cuzco,
especially the Inca control of Sacsahuam?n, favored their system of
warfare. The narrow streets of the city, so easily barricaded and pitted
against the horsemen, further increased the Spanish vulnerability.
The fall of Sacsahuam?n sharply reversed the situation. Now the In
cas had to cross relatively level areas to attack the city, a circumstance
which exposed them to the horsemens' lethal strikes, especially since the
Men of Cuzco quickly detected the lunar pattern of the Inca attacks.
Significantly, the Incas never again entered Cuzco on anything approach
ing a significant scale after the Spanish captured Sacsahuam?n and
garrisoned it with some fifty footment (including a few with crossbows
and muskets) and Indian allies.
Captain Pedro del Barco, a seasoned veteran of more than a decade of
fighting Indians, stated that Spanish domination of the fortress doom
ed all subsequent Inca attacks for they would no longer "entraban por
aquella parte". For this reason, Diego M?ndez proclaimed Sacsahuam?n
the "llave desta ciudad y este ciudad de todo el reino".15
Their most vulnerable flank secured, the Spanish set up their defen
ses on the city's outskirts. There, in the open country, beyond the re
Cus?, Relaci?n, 81; Mur?a, Historia general, 1, 199; Graphie H is for y of Per il According
to Guarnan Poma. Ed. by Luis Bustios G?lvez. N.p., N.d., Vol. I, figures 160 and 161.
14 Juan de Hojeda, AGI, Patronato 90, no. 1, ramo 11; Padres Rodrigo de Bravo
and Francisco de C?ceres, AGI, Patronato 93, no. 8, ramo 4; Francisco de Villacast?n,
AGI, Patronato 126, ramo 20; Pizarro, Relaci?n, 202.
15 Pizarro, Relaci?n, 205; Pedro del Barco and Diego M?ndez in AGI, Justicia
422, no. 1; Relaci?n del sitio, 24; Don Alonso Enr?quez, Vida, 152-153.
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Jiiiio-Diciembf-e de 1981
The Siege of Cuzco
strictive circumstances of the urban center, the Men of Cuzco could
use their most effective weapon, the horse, to far greater advantage.
"Siempre se ten?an por orden de enviar seis de a caballo o ocho a correr
el campo", Pedro Pizarro recalled. According to Pedro del Barco, these
patrols fought as well as gathered intelligence, "saliendo de noche y
d?a..., a correr el campo y hazer da?o a los enemigos".16
The failure of the Incas to confine the Spanish horsemen to Cuzco
had several highly significant results. Most immediately, the Men of
Cuzco maintained control of the springs and streams around the city,
thereby maintaining a water supply fully adequate to their needs. The
Spanish could also dismantle Inca barricades and other Inca defensive
positions, further weakening Inca attacks upon the city. Finally, the
Spanish enjoyed the freedom in the intervals between the lunar attacks
to range far from Cuzco to gather food, as well as to attack the enemy.
Initially, the Spanish stayed within ten or so miles of Cuzco, gathering
food Manco could not destroy because he needed it to feed to his own
troops. By the end of the third lunar attack, however, the Spanish ran
ged much further afield in search of food. Indeed at one point, as we
have seen, Hernando Pizarro led a force over one hundred miles from
Cuzco, bringing back many "ovejas", as the Spanish called llamas and
alpacas at this time. In short, the Incas failed to deprive the Men of
Cuzco of food and water.17
In these and other ways, horsemen played the key role in defending
Cuzco, in spite of L?pez Martinez's assertion that by this time the Incas
knew a "mil formas" to neutralize the horse. Pedro de Cieza de Le?n,
the most perceptive of the contemporary observers, correctly labeled the
horse as the "fortaleza" of the Spaniards. A number of participants in
the siege pointed out that the Indians lived in great fear of the horse.
Not surprisingly, the price of a horse during the siege ranged from one
thousand pesos (the cost of a substantial residence) to almost three
times that amount.18
16 Pedro del Barco, AGI, Lima 204, his own probanza; Pizarro, Relaci?n, 209.
17 Pedro del Barco and Gabriel de Rojas, AGI, Justicia 422, no. 1; Pedro del Bar
co, AG?, Lima 204, his own probanza; Alonso de Mesa and Francisco de Villacast?n,
AGI, Patronato 126', ramo 20; Pizarro, Relaci?n, 31-32; Relaci?n del sitio, 26, 28-32.
18 L?pez Mart?nez, Rebeliones de mestizos, 87-88; Pizarro, Relaci?n, 203; Pedro
de Cieza de Le?n, La guerra de Quito. Ed. by Manuel Serrano y Sanz. Madrid, 1909.
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R. H. A. N?m. 92
Only during the initial attack on Cuzco and during the fighting at
Ollantaytambo did the Incas gain some success againsts the horsemen. In
more open settings the horse proved irresistible, and when there was any
room for maneuver at all, even rugged terrain, agricultural terraces, or
holes failed to turn the tide. On the contrary, horsemen dominated the
fighting to such an extent that the only successful Inca tactic was to
flee repeatedly into spots too difficult for the horsemen to follow. Since
the Spanish lacked any truly effective missiles, the Incas were safe if
they escaped hand-to-hand combat. But this was difficult to do with
horsemen, in contrast to the peones, and for this reason the horse was the
principal conveyance that enabled the Spanish to carry out their super
iority in the weapons of hand-to-hand combat.19
Casualties furnish another way of gauging Inca ineffectiveness against
the horsemen. The testimony of the Men of Cuzco in this matter reveal
that perhaps as few as nine, but no more thant sixteen horsemen died in
the siege. And while the Incas killed more horses than horsemen, they
did not deplete the supply of the former either. At the most, thirty
horses died in the siege. The Men of Cuzco complained of high prices
for horses, but not of a shortage of the animals.20
The Incas failed not only to destroy the men on horseback, but they
also failed to kill many other Spaniards. If we ignore the inflated esti
mates of the chronicler Garcilaso de la Vega and rely instead on the
P. 47; Don Alonso Enr?quez, Vida, 151; Diego Rodr?guez de Figueroa, AGI, Patro
nato 93, no. 8, ramo 3; Diego de Narv?ez, AGI, Lima 204, his own probanza; Lope
S?nchez, AGI, Lima 118, his own probanza; Padre Rodrigo de Bravo, AGI, Patronato
93, no. 8, ramo 4.
10 Alonso de Mesa, Francisco de Villacast?n, and Pedro Alonso Carrasco in AGI,
Patronato 126, ramo 20; Mart?n de Salas, AGI, Lima 204, his own probanza; Relaci?n
del sitio, 11, 28-31; Pizarro, Relaci?n, 204-206; Pedro Barco, AGI, Lima 204, his
own pobranza.
20 Shortly before the initial attack on Cuzco, Sim?n Su?rez and a disputed number
of fellow horsemen died in an ambush outside of Cuzco. Including Su?rez (the only
one of this group that we know by name), from three to ten horsemen died in this
ambush (Pizarro, Relaci?n, 208; Relaci?n del sitio, 9; Alonso de Mesa and Francisco
de Villacast?n, AGI, Patronato 126, ramo 20). We can also identify the following
horsemen killed during the siege: Juan Pizarro (killed while fighting on foot), Fran
cisco Mejia, and Juan Clemente. These men are not the horsemen (unnamed) killed
at Ollantaytambo or the two horsemen killed during the initial attack (Relaci?n del
sitio, 10, 15 and Pedro del Barco, AGI, Lima 204, his own probanza). Thus, depend
ing on the number killed in the Su?rez incident, a total of from nine to sixteen
horsemen died during the siege.
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The Siege of Cuzco
testimony of Men of Cuzco, we find that the total Spanish losses ( in
cluding horsemen) did not exceed twenty men at the most.21
The loss of so few men raises a new the question of the effectiveness
of Inca warfare against combatants armed in the European manner.
Anthropologist George Kubier argues that "the siege of Cuzco remains
a remarkable operation.. . during which Indian strategy, tactics, and
material equipment were greatly improved". Kubier goes on to point
out that the Incas used efficient communications, as well as improved
weapons and tactics, such as "staked pits, retarding fortifications, and
ambitious flanking movements. . ."12
In reality, the Incas seem to have clung almost entirely to their tra
ditional mode of warfare. Except at Sacsahuam?n and Ollantaytambo,
fortifications (the others being of a much smaller scale) proved ineffec
tive and can hardly be classified as innovations anyhow. Besides, as we
have seen, Sacsahuam?n fell quickly. Likewise, horsemen rapidly disrup
21 Garcilaso de la Vega (Obras, III, 124) states that thirty Spanish had already
died by the eleventh or twelfth dajy of the siege. Don Alonso Enr?quez (Vida, 150,
151 and AGI, Patronato 90, no. 1, ramo 11) offers his usual inconsistency, speaking
in one instance of the "many" Spanish that died, while in another instance saying
that only three or four died. The evidence indicated that from nine to sixteen horsemen
died. In addition to these men, we also know that Pedro Mart?n de Moguer, Diego
Hern?ndez (el sillero), Alonso S?nchez, Antonio Becerril, and a page of Hernando
Pizarro, were also killed. Moreover, although positive evidence is lacking, Alonso D?az
and Crist?bal de Cerme?o probably died in the siege also. Consequently, a total of
from sixteen to twentjy-three Spaniards died in the siege, a figure reasonably close
to the estimate of from fifteen to twenty given by Diego de Baz?n (AGI, Patronato
90, no. 1, ramo 11).
The previously mentioned lists in Contadur?a 1824 provide an additional way of
approaching the problem of Spanish losses. From these lists and other sources, we find
that one hundred fifty-three of the Men of Cuzco definitely did survive the siege. At
the very most, then, onljy forty-three could have been killed during the fighting. Yet
some of these forty-three men could have survived without having left a record. In
fact, thirteen of the forty-three men were still alive after April 1, 15 37, at a time
when the fighting had stopped completely. Moreover, thirteen more men were still
alive in the-midlel of March, 1537, when the fighting was infrequent at best. Thus,
twenty-six of the forty-three might well have survived the siege, which would mean
that seventeen of the Men of Cuzco had died.
Furthermore, Becerril, Mejia, and Su?rez and his companions, and Pedro Martin
de Moguer, had died before the initial Inca attack on Cuzco under circumstances
(ambush and isolation) that the Men of Cuzco almost always successfully avoided
once the Incas actually attacked Cuzco. Thus, only about one-half the Spaniards killed
may have died after the main Inca thrust began.
22 Kubier, "A Peruvian Chief of State", 262.
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'Thomas Fl?chema
R. II. A. N?m. 92
ted all flanking movements. As for the use of staked pits, only the often
unreliable Don Alonso Enr?quez de Guzman reported their existence.
Other Men of Cuzco did speak of deep holes. Mart?n de Salas related
that Diego M?ndez and his horse fell into such a hole, and had to be
rescued by companions from Indians wielding battleaxes. Yet in these
and other incidents, haste caused the Spanish to fall prey to these deep
holes. Ordinarily they could spot these holes, which were difficult to
camouflage at any rate in the sparse groundcover of the altiplano, by
noting where the Indian paths skirted them. The Men of Cuzco expressed
more annoyance at the small holes the enemy dug. Since these holes were
just large enough to catch a horses's hoof, they were more difficult to
detect. In the last analysis, though, holes of any size were usaully a hind
rance that only temporarily deterred the horsemen. Invariably com
rades rushed up to rescue the fallen rider, as happened in the case of Die
go M?ndez.23
Some authors have placed great stress on the use of ayllo (or ayllu),
the weapons made of three cords tied together at one end and with a
stone tied to each of the three free ends. Don Alonso Enr?quez de Guz
man and the anonymous chronicler author of Relaci?n de los sucesos
argue that these weapons were very effective in snaring Spanish horse
men and their mounts, as well as footmen, and often rendered them
helpless until someone came up to cut off the tough cords. Still, the
ayllo must have been no more than a hindrance, for the Men of Cuzco
gave them only passing mention at the most and certainly far less than
accorded to other Inca weapons.24
Following the chronicler Herrera, many authors have asserted the
Incas used Spanish arms on a significant scale, including horses, lances,
23 Means (Fall of the Inca Empire, 61), Wachtel (Visi?n, 171), Vega ( Manco
Inca, 52), and Don Alson Enr?quez (Vida, 52) mention the use of staked pits. The
most readily available references of the Men of Cuzco to the smaller holes can be
found in Pizarro, Relaci?n, 205-26, Relaci?n del sitio, 15, 59, and Mart?n de Salas,
in his probanza in AGI, Lima 118.
24 Don Alonso Enr?quez, Vida, 151; Herrera, Historia general, XI, 205; Relaci?n
de los sucesos, 392; Hemming, Conquest of the Incas, 195; Kubler, "A Peruvian Chief
of State", 264. Prescott (Conquest of Peru,, II, 61) confuses the ayllo with the lasso.
This weapon, more commonly known as the boleadora, was really a weapon of the
plains that appeared only infrequently in the Andes. See Mario Alberto Salas, Las ar
mas de la Conquista. Buenos Aires, 1950. Pp. 81-84.
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Julio-Diciembre de 1981
The Siege of Cuzco
shields, and helmets, the Men of Cuzco always pointed to such instances
as rarities; they signified nothing even approaching a change in the tra
ditional pattern of Inca warfare. Nor do we have a single recorded ins
tance in which Spanish weapons killed or wounded Men of Cuzco. The
Inca pattern parallels the Indian response to the new Spanish system
throughout the New World. The use of Spanish late medieval weapons
on more than a severely limited scale by an advanced neolithic people
required a technological and cultural revolution that defied accomplish
ment in just a few years.25
In fact the Men of Cuzco's declarations reveal that the Incas relied
entirely upon their traditional weapons. Diego Rodriguez de Figueroa,
for example, describes an attack in which the Incas came with bows and
arrows, lances, stones, hatchets, and warclubs. His list squares almost
exactly with the classic definition of Inca weapons given by Francisco
de Jerez, which was based on his observations of the Inca army at Caja
marca on November 16, 1532.26
The Incas did possess a seemingly formidable arsenal of weapons.27
Porras (warclubs) came in a variety of lengths, reaching an apogee in
25 Herrera (Historia general, XI, 210), Pardo (El imperio de Vilcabamba, 84-85,
87), Vega (Manco Inca, 137-U9, 145), Hemming (Cchufuest of the Incas, 215), and
Prescott (Conquest of Peru, II, 65-64) state the Incas used Spanish weapons. Prescott,
however, points out the Incas lacked adequate training to use them effectively. Hem
ming records the Incas using Spanish weapons only at Ollantaytambo and obviously
feels they had little if any influence on the fighting.
26 Diego Rodriguez de Figueroa, AGI, Patronato 93, no. 8, ramo 3; Francisco
de Jerez, Verdadera relaci?n de la conquista del Per? y provincia del Cuzco llamada
la Nueva Castilla. Ed. by Enrique de Vedia. Madrid, 1947. P. 334. For other descrip
tions of Inca arms by chroniclers see Gonzalo Fern?ndez de Oviedo, Historia general
y natural de las Indias. Ed. by Juan P?rez de Tudela. Madrid, 1959. Vol. V, pp. 59
60, 93, and Titu Cusi, Relaci?n, 82-83. See also Joseph Bram, An Analysis of Inca
Militarism. New York, 1941. Bram's work adds nothing to the contributions of the
chroniclers.
27 The following sources describe Inca weapons: Salas, Las armas, 29-40, 75-1 (K),
191, 195; Jerez, Verdadera relaci?n, 334; Oviedo, Historia, V, 59-60, 93; Luis E.
Valc?rcel, Historia del Per? Antiguo. Lima, 1964. Vol. I, pp. 611, 613, 616, 623;
Felipe de la Barra, Comprobaciones del arte militar incaico y caracter?sticas principales.
Lima, 1968. Pp. 3 50-3 51; Estado Mayor Central del Ej?rcito, Servicio Hist?rico Mi
litar, Acci?n de Espa?a en Per? 1509-1554. Madrid, 1949. Pp. 85-87; Hemming, Con
quest of the Incas, 115-117, 192-193; Relaci?n del sitio, 11-77 passim; Garcilaso de la
Vega, Obras Completas, I, 503-504; Pizarro, Relaci?n, 202-211; Francisco de Villa
cast?n, AGI, Patronato 126, ramo 20; Don Alonso Enr?quez de Guzm?n, Vida, 151;
Titu Cusi, Relaci?n, 82-83; Herrera, Historia general, XI, 206.
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Thomas Flichem?
R. H. A. Num. 92
the rompecabezas. The end of the long, wooden handle of this weapon
held a ball of copper containing five or six protruding points, each as
thick as a finger. This weapon, which took both hands to swing, could
easily smash an unprotected skull. Hachas (battleaxes) served a similar
purpose. Their cutting blades of copper, bronze, or stone meant the wea
pons did more damage by its downward thrust than by its cut. Lances
carried tips of copper or bronze, although most had wooden points. The
Incas also used large darts with wooden or animal bone tips, and often
propelled these weapons with a hand thrower. Bows and arrows also made
up an important part of the Inca arsenal.
Stones, although the simplest Andean weapons, rounded out the array
of Inca war implements. Certainly the Spanish complained far more of
rocks and stones than they did of any other weapons, except possibly
the bow and arrow. They pointed in particular to the honderos, the In
ca warriors who hurled a stone the size of an egg from a doubled piece
of wool or fiber that they twirled over their head. The tremendous
velocity and accuracy of the honderos amazed Don Alonso Enr?quez de
Guzman, who reported seeing a stone hurled over a distance of thirty
yards break an old sword in two. Rocks, dropped or thrown by hand
from directly above, also presented problems for the Spanish. Pedro Pi
zarro reported that the Incas temporarily stopped the attack on the
towers of Sacsahuam?n by dropping so many rocks that they literally
covered the ground.
Still, the few Spanish deaths suggest that these weapons were not
highly effective against the Men of Cuzco, particularly in view of the
large Inca numerical edge. To understand that phenomenon, we must turn
to the armor, weapons, and tactics that the Spanish used.28
A popular misconception holds that the Spanish fought the Indians
encased in heavy armor from head to foot (de punta en blanco). Con
trary to this misconception, the Spanish throughout the New World
soon discarded heavy armor in favor of other forms of protection. Like
their fellow conquistadores, the Men of Cuzco wore body armor of
thick cotton that was "three fingers" thick and often covered by a
28 For Spanish armor see: Salas, Las armas, 187-192, 199-221, 237-257; Albert T.
Calvert, Spanish Arms and Armor. London and New York, 1907; Relaci?n del sitio,
21, 76, 114, 123, 125; Pizarro, Relaci?n, 204; Harold L. Peterson, Arms and Armor
in Colonial America, 1526-1783. New York, 1956. Pp. 103-125.
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The Siege of Cuzco
thick hide. A few also wore coats of mail, but even this armor was
usually covered by cotton or hides. Especially the cotton armor, which
was of Indian origins, was less cumbersome to transport, easier to put
on, and cheaper than the heavy armor. Nor did these two forms of
armor cause the wearer to suffer so much from heat, chafing, and
excessive weight. Above all, even a direct hit by an arrow at close range
rarely caused more than a superficial wound.
The Men of Cuzco protected their heads with a variety of steel
helmets, but the morri?n saw the most frequent usage. Often stuffed
with cotton, this helmet had a relatively narrow brim that swept up to
points in the front and back. Rarely did they wear a visor, which tended
to be hot and dusty and impeded the vision. However, the Spaniards
fighting in the siege did add earflaps of cotton and hide to protect them
selves against the honderos. Shields completed the defensive attire of the
Spanish. Footmen carried escudos, wooden shields that were about two
feet in diameter. In contrast, the horsemen's adarga, while about three
feet in diameter, was lighter, because it was made of one or two hides
stretched over a wooden frame.
Curiously, the Men of Cuzco never mentioned the type of armor
worn by the horses. Undoubtedly they followed the normal pattern of
covering all of the horse except for the face and legs with cotton armor.
Possible indirect evidence to support this conjecture comes from one
incident in which Inca bowmen fired their arrows only at the faces of
the horses, although without success.29
Indeed, Inca weapons such as the bow and arrow did not fare well
against the Spaniards' defensive apparatus.80 To be sure, arrows caused
innumerable wounds. An arrow penetrated through Captain Gabriel
de Rojas' nose into the roof of his mouth. Garc?a Martin lost an eye to
an arrow. Still, the Men of Cuzco recalled these two wounds as the most
horrible they suffered from arrows. Far more frequent are accounts of
the Spaniards fighting with five or six arrows in them, a sure sign that
the cotton armor rendered the damage superficial, especially when one
finds the wounded men fighting with full vigor the next day.
29 Relaci?n del sitio, 11, 29-30.
30 The paragraph on the ineffectiveness of Inca weapons is based on the following
sources: Francisco de Villacast?n, AGI, Patronato 126, ramo 20; Relaci?n del sitio,
11, 23, 32-34, 40, 49-51; Pizarro, Relaci?n, 203; Acci?n de Espa?a, 141-143.
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R. H. A. N?m. 92
Even Rojas and Mart?n survived, although struck in the face. As a
matter of fact, the Men of Cuzco did not record one instance in which
an arrow killed a Spaniard during the siege.
Likewise, stones and rocks also plagued the Spanish, but did not take
a deadly toll. Honderos, while inflicting many wounds upon the Spanish,
did not take a life by themselves. Rocks dropped from above did kill
Juan Pizarro and his page. Nevertheless, stones and rocks presented the
greatest danger because they could leave a man temporarily defenseless,
and thereby vulnerable to the blugeoning of Inca battleaxes and war
clubs. Juan Pizarro, to cite one example, had to be rescued when left
defenseless after being struck in the jaw by a stone or rock. It was this
wound that prevented him from wearing a helmet at Sacsahuam?n and
thus led to his death there. Similarly, a stone left Pedro del Barco un
conscious, although he too was taken to safety by other horsemen.
All-in-all, though, the use of stones and rocks suffered from several
major limitations. Since the Spanish usually took precautions against
one of their number becoming isolated from the rest, other men of Cuz
co or friendly Indians generally were at hand to provide aid. Besides,
rocks had to be thrown from above and at close range to be effective,
circumstances the Incas found difficult to duplicate outside of the
initial attack on Cuzco and during the fighting at Sacsahuam?n and
Ollantaytambo. If the Incas could trap the Spanish in steep defiles that
permitted attacks from above and at close range, while also leaving
the horses no chance to maneuver, the results could be devastating. To
a large extent, this explains why the Incas were able to devastate th?
relief columns Francisco Pizarro sent from Lima toward Cuzco. But
the Men of Cuzco realized this danger, and for precisely this reason they
rejected the suggestion made during the siege that they abandon Cuzco
in favor of a dash through the mountains to the sea. The situation had
to be extremely favorable, in other words, for rocks to be effective, and
the Men of Cuzco sought to avoid these situations. Also, the use of rocks
probably was hindered by the problem of munitions renewal if the
fighting persisted for long in any one location, as was the case at Sao
sahuam?n. '
Even the hachas and porras proved to be relatively ineffective. Steel
helmets and cotton body armor provided adequate protection in most
cases because the copper, bronze, and stone heads on these weapons
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The Siege of Cuzco
depended heavily upon impact to do their damage. Since this was the
case, their effective use depended upon hand-to-hand combat in which
the Incas could overwhelm the Spanish and bludgeon them to death.
In general, then, the Incas' lack of effective long-range missiles
forced them into hand-to-hand combat. Yet their weapons for this close
fighting could be effective only if they could be used in strict conjunc
tion with the Incas' large numerical superiority. This approach worked
to some extent only during the initial attack on Cuzco and at Ollan
taytambo. Otherwise the Spanish avoided such unfavorable situations
by charging dense Indian concentrations in order to break them up and
to send the Incas fleeing.81
Since the purpose of the horsements' charge was to disrupt and dis
organize the Indians, they used the same basic tactic as that followed by
Bernai D?az del Castillo and his companions at Tlaxcala in 1519. Conse
quently, the horsemen charged at a fast but controlled speed, aiming
their lances at the faces of the Indians. During this initial stage of the
attack, the horsemens' purpose was to disperse and not to kill. A charge
at full speed might not give the Incas sufficient time to flee and the
Spanish could find themselves surrounded by an involuntary mass of
Inca warriors. Along the same line, if the horsemen lanced an Inca in
the body, he would have to stop to extract the lance at the least and
quite possibly would have to contend with the struck Inca, and perhaps
with his colleagues, for control of the lance. In either case the momen
tum of the horsemens' charge would be broken before the Incas' had
been set fleeing, a circumstance that would have permitted the Indians
to use their numbers and weapons more effectively. But once the Indians
began to scatter individually or in small groups, the horsemen lanced
them in circumstances that largely negated the influence of sheer num
bers.
Although highly effective, the tactic of charging the Indians did
raise some dangers. In a few instances, a combination of large Inca
numbers, adequate discipline, and rough terrain forced the horsemen to
31 For the Spanish tactic of charging see: Bernai D?az de Castillo, Historia ver
dadera de la conquista de la Nueva Espa?a. Introduction and notes by Joaqu?n Ra
m?rez Cabanas. Fourth Edition. Mexico, 1966. P. 103; Salas, Las Armas, 188; Relaci?n
del sitio, 9-10, 30, 33.
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Thomas Flichema
R. H. A. N?m. 92
retreat. Such a combination of factors forced Gonzalo Pizarro and his
horsemen to abandon an attack at Xaquiaguana. In fact, the retreating
Spanish had to fight off Indians who came so close that they grabbed
at the horses' tails. Even more of a danger were the Inca efforts to take
advantage of Spanish aggressiveness by luring them into ambushes in
terrain too difficult for the horses to operate efficiently. One group of
horsemen fell into just such a position. They chased a small group of
Incas into rough countryside and suddenly found themselves confronting
twenty thousand Incas.32
On the whole, however, the Men of Cuzco managed to extract them
selves from these situations with only minimal damage. The landscape
around Cuzco, while frequently rough, lacked the narrow mountain
passes that could be sealed off at both ends. For this reason the Men of
Cuzco avoided the fate of the relief columns sent out from Lima or the
near annihilation of Hernando de Soto's force at Vilcaconga in 1533.
Not only did the more open country around Cuzco permit retreats
but the horsemen always retreated in good order. In both instances men
tioned in the previous paragraph, the horsemen retreated in close for
mation. From time to time they stopped to drive back the attacking
Incas. Frequently other groups of horsemen had time to come to the
rescue of their compatriots. Furthermore, as the siege wore on, the
horsemen became adept at detecting and avoiding ambushes.83
The greatest danger came when one, or even several, horsemen be
came so involved in lancing fleeing Indians that they separated themselves
from the rest of their group. In such circumstances a sizeable-group of
Incas could surround and overwhelm the opponent. This danger appear
ed even on patrols on the outskirts of Cuzco. Pedro Pizarro recalled
the time when he left his companions behind while he rushed off to
attack a group of Incas. His horse tripped in a small hole and fell,
throwing Pizarro to the ground. Fighting on foot against Incas with
lances and stones, Pizarro managed to hold off the Indians just long
enough to be rescued by other horsemen. Still, the Incas clubbed to death
three Spaniards in three separate incidents at the start of the siege. In
60.
32 Pizarro, Relaci?n, 208; Relaci?n del sitio, passim and especially pp. 11, 36 and
33 Pizarro, Relaci?n, 189-190.
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The Siege of Cuzco
each case the horsemen had become isolated from the larger force. As
in the case of ambushes, nevertheless, the Spanish soon learned not to
stray too far from their fellow countrymen.34
Discipline and order while charging, therefore, help to explain the
success of this tactic. Several other factors are also involved. For one
thing, the Incas never overcame their inordinate fear of the horse.
Perhaps this was because they never found a weapon that could stop
the horse. Like the other Indians at comparable stages of the conquest,
except for the Araucanians, the Incas never learned to use the lance as
a pike. At the same time, the presence of Inca leaders at the head of their
men in distintictive garb enabled the Spanish to strike at the very heart
of the Indians' leadership. Once the Spanish had scattered or killed these
leaders, the rest of the Indians fled as well. This tactic accentuated still
another Inca problem, their traditional pattern of letting each of their
contingents fight on their own, with little effort to coordinate actions.
This was a grave defect, since the speed of the horse allowed the Spanish
to take the initiative in most cases. Nor was the Inca army around
Cuzco of a high quality. In just a little over half a decade, the ranks
of Inca fighting men had been decimated by disease, the civil war be
tween Atahualpa and Hu?scar, and the splintering of the imperial organ
ization. Some Inca units were of high quality, such as Manco's elite
personal guard of five thousand men. The Men of Cuzco also noted that
the troops defending the Chinchasuyo quarter fought well. But untrain
ed or ill-trained men made up the rest of the Inca army. Time after
time they retreated so hastily that they left other units completely
exposed to Spanish attack, The Spanish deliberately encouraged this
tendency by defeating the best Inca troops so ?s to send the rest into
a demoralized flight. The Men of Cuzco did not have to face an Inca
army that matched its imperial predecessors.35
m Pizarro, Relaci?n, 206; Relaci?n del sitio, 10, 11, 15, 29-30.
35 Pizarro, Relaci?n, 207, 209; Relaci?n del sitio, 11, 13, 14, 19, 22-24, 28-30,
32i-33, 60, 62; Salas, Las armas, 3 8; Acci?n de Espa?a, 8 5. Hemming, (Conquest of
the Incas, 205) states that the majority of the Inca warriors were "ordinary Indian
farmers" and that most had "received only the rudimentarjy arms drill that was part
of the upbringing of every Inca subject. Only part of this rabble was militarily ef
fective. .." Wachtel (Vision, 171) says the Inca army was "somewhat makeshift,
lacking in training. .."
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R. H. A. N?m. 92
In contrast, the discipline of the Spaniards stood out, a reflection
not only of their small numbers and desperate situation, but also of the
fact that a large proportion of the Men of Cuzco were battle-proven
veterans of Indian warfare. Thirty-one of the Spaniards had been
fighting the Incas since 1531, thirty-eight more since 1532, and four
others since 1533. And of the Men of Cuzco who came to Per? in 1534
or 1535, at least eighteen had a minimum of five years of previous ex
perience in the New World before coming to Peru. These ninety or so
men provided the vital co(re. In addition, there were several participants,
such as the three Pizarro brothers, Pedro del Barco, Pedro de Cand?a,
Mart?n de Florencia, Alonso de Mesa, Hern?n Ponce de Le?n, Gabriel
de Rojas, Alonso de Toro, and Juan de Valdivieso, who had the reputation
of being among the very finest fighting men in all of Peru.
The Spanish also held a superiority in weaponry. Later chroniclers,
often followed by modern historians, have asserted that the arquebuse,
and to a lesser extent, artillery and the crossbow played an important
role in the defense of Cuzco. Just the opposite is the case. All three
weapons were too slow to load and fire to be effective against large
numbers of Indians. Even if the men using these weapons fired them
in sequence, horsemen would still have been needed to provide protec
tion. The Spanish could ill-afford to use their horsemen in this way
when the tactic of charging the Incas proved to be so much more ef
fective. The Men of Cuzco did have one artillery piece, probably a small
one of the falconet variety. Four men also had an arquebuse (two of
whom were the only known artillerymen) and two others had cross
bows. Yet we do not have one report from the Men of Cuzco of these
weapons being fired, even for psychological purpose. The crossbows and
arquebuses were put in Sacsahuam?n after the Spanish took it. But
none of these weapons blended with the mobile warfare the Men of
Cuzco had to wage against large numbers of Indians.86
36 Salas, Las armas, 207-218; Peterson, Arms and Armor, 8-21; Vega, Manco Inca,
55; Molina, Coses acaescidas, 89; Hemming, Conquest of the Incas, 191; Means, Fall
of the Inca Empire, 61; Pizarro, Relaci?n, 203-205; Relaci?n del sitio, 13-14, 18-19,
32; Don Alonso Enr?quez, CDIHC, V, 327; Lope S?nchez in Los Mercedarios, IV,
95-97; Herrera, Historia general, XI, 222; Pedro del Barco, AGI, Lima 204, his own
probanza; Pedro Alonso Carrasco, AGI, Patronato 236, ramo 20. Gonzalo de Morales
and Gonzalo de los Nidos were cross-bowmen, however, Nidos actually fought as a
42
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The Siege of Cuzco
Instead the Spanish used weapons of steel to hold off the Incas. Gi
ven the importance of charging the Incas, lances wielded by horsemen
stood out as the most deadly weapons. The lanza jineta the horsemen
used was light, from ten to twelve feet long ordinarily, and contained
several lethal steel tips. The horsemen used the sword only from neces
sity. But even then the double-edged sword or the rapier, which had
a cutting edge at this time, also gave the Spanish the decided edge in
arms.87 '
Inca armor offered scant protection against these weapons, even
against the dagger. Pedro Pizarro spoke of Inca helmets "de unas ca?as
muy tejidas y tan fuertes que ninguna piedra ni golpe que en ellos les
diese las podr?a hacer da?o. . ." Still, just as many Incas wore helmets
of cotton that did not protect against steel cutting edges. More impor
tantly, the Spanish killed principally by stiking at the body, where their
weapons easily penetrated the Inca cotton armor. Even Inca shields, which
were usually made of hides strung over a wooden frame, did little to hold
off the Spanish. The shields were effective against Indian weapons, notes
Mario Alberto Salas, "pero no alcanzaron a contener la violencia ni el
filo de las armas hisp?nicas".88
In addition, the Spanish enjoyed the advantage of the horse's speed.
Consequently, they held the initiative in most circumstances, choosing
where they wanted to fight and the degree of involvement. Above all,
the horse enabled the Men of Cuzco to recover from what might have
been grave mistakes. After the second lunar attack, for instance, Her
nando Pizarro led fifty horsemen to Calca, hoping to break up an Inca
force there, and perhaps even to seize Manco. Once at Calca, the Spanish
learned not only that Manco had fled into the mountains, but that dur
ing the previous night the main body of the Inca troops had gone by
another route to attack Cuzco. Even though Pizarro and his men had
to spend another day fighting their way back to Cuzco, they still man
horseman. Alonso Garc?a Zamarilla and Rodrigo de Herrera were musketeers, but
Herrera, like Nidos, fought as a horseman. Pedro de Cand?a could have fought as
an artillerjvman or musketeer, while Florencia could function in both of those capa
cities as well as cross-bowman.
a7 Salas, Las armas, 187-190; Peterson, Arms and Armor. 69-74, 91-93.
88 Pizarro, Relaci?n, 197; Salas, Las armas, 99; Oviedo. Historia. V, 59; Barra,
Comprobaciones, 3 51; Jerez, Verdadera relaci?n, 3 34; Bernab? Cebo, Obras. Ed by.
Francisco Mateos. Madrid, 1964. Vol. II, p. 254.
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Thomas Flichema
R. H. A. Num. 92
aged to arrive just as the Inca footmen reached the city, and for this
reason were able to help defend the city during the third lunar at
tack.39
Even the Inca numerical advantage turns out to have been less im
pressive than often imagined. The figure of at least one hundred thou
sand men represents Inca strength at full tide during the initial attack
on Cuzco. Several factors combined to reduce Inca numbers drastically
as the siege wore on. To begin with, the Spanish killed many of their
opponents. Paulo, a brother of Manco, later told the Spanish they had
killed fifty thousand Incas in the siege. The Men of Cuzco for their
part reported that so many hundred had been killed in one battle and
so many in another, paying little attention to the overall total. The
Spanish also noted that many Incas deserted, and more especially that
few who left in August to plant their fields ever returned. Outside of
Ollantaytambo, the Incas seem to have been unable to muster more than
thirty thousand men after the lunar attack of August, 1536.40
Nor could Manco replenish manpower by tapping the resources of
the whole empire. We have already seen that the coastal Indians around
Lima failed to support the attack on that city. Manco, in fact, could
count on the support of only the heart of the Inca Empire around Cuz
co. The other Indian groups, conquered people often resentful of Inca
heavy rule, seemed undisturbed by the prospect of the Incas and Spa
niards destroying each other over Cuzco. Some of them even hoped for
a Spanish victory, believing they would fare better with the Spanish
thant with the Incas, The point is not that huge numbers of Indians
joined the Spanish, for that did not take place, but that the vast majority
remained neutral. To depict Manco, then, as the leader of all of the
Andean Indians against the Spanish, as do the chronicler Garcilaso de la
Vega and a number of twentieth century authors after him, is to con
fuse dream and historical reality.41
89 Relaci?n del sitio, 2628 and 59-60 (which carries a similar situation toward
the end of the siege).
40 Pedro de Cieza de Le?n, La guerra de Salinas, in Colecci?n de documentos in?
ditos para la historia de Espa?a. Madrid, 1824-189S Vol. LXVIII, p. 107: Relaci?n del
sitio, 59-63; Don Alonso Enr?quez, Vida, 15 3-154.
41 Garcilaso de la Vega, Obras Completas, III, 122; Pardo, El imperio de VHcabam
da, 174; Vega, Manco Inca, xii, 25-27, 31-33, 43.
44
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Julio-Diciembre de 1981
The Siege of Cuzco
Even Manco's Quechua core suffered a steady decline un morale, as
well as in numbers. Except under the highly favorable circumstances of
Ollantaytambo, the Spanish inflicted one bloody defeat after another
upon the Incas. Spanish terroristic practices also undermined Inca mor
ale, such as killing Inca women and cutting off the right hands of two
hundred prisoners early in the siege and four hundred more later. Nor
did the Spanish hesitate to use other forms of torture. Juan de Aguirre
saw Incas subjected to attacks by dogs who "mord?an en sus carnes", and
spoke of torture by fire. Diego de Baz?n succinctly summarized the
whole matter by stating that "haz?an en ellos todas las crueldades que
pod?an, ans? cortando los brazos como hechando les los perros. . .42
Meanwhile, the Spanish picked up a modest number of Indian amigos
de guerra, an increase from about five hundred at the start of the siege
to some four thousand at the end. Because of rivalries within the Inca
royal family, three prominent nobles (including two of Manco's bro
thers) came over to the Spanish, along with their followers. The Indian
allies provided vital support in a number of ways. Protected by horse
men, they brought food to Cuzco; they also acted as spies, and even
helped to rescue individual Spaniards on several occasions. In some ins
tances the Indian allies also fought, along with the Spanish peones, in
support of the horsemen.43
42 Juan de Aguirre, Diego de Baz?n and Francisco Rom?n,, AGI, Patronato 90,
no. 1, ramo 11; Don Alonso Enr?quez, Vida, 153-154; Relaci?n del sitio, 61-63.
43 Licenciado Francisco de Prado, Hern?n Ponce de Le?n, Juan de Hojeda and
Francisco Rom?n (A Man of Chile), all in AGI, Patronato 90, no. 1, ramo 11; Lope
S?nchez, in Los Mer cedar ios en el Per? en el siglo xvr. Ed. by V?ctor M. Barriaga.
Rome and Arequipa, 1933, 1939-1954. Vol. IV, p. 97; Pizarro, Relaci?n, 203-207, pas
sim; Waldemar de Espinoza de Soriano, "Los se?or?os ?tnicos de Chachapoyas y la
alianza Hispano-Chacha". Revista Hist?rica, XXX (1967), 224-283; Wachtel, Vision,
171-172; Titu Cusi, Relaci?n, 81, 84; Vega, Mdnco Inca, 43-45, 57r60 Relaci?n del
sitio, 25, 32, 39, 60; Herrera, Historia general, XI, 207. As incredible as it may
seem, Hern?n Ponce de Le?n and Licenciado Francisco del Prado reported thai Her
nando Pizarro extracted tribute payments in gold during the siege from the Spaniards'
Indian allies. Vega seems to believe that most of the Spaniards' Indian allies came
from Nicaragua as slavies, with almost all the rest coming as slaves also, although in
lesser numbers, from Panama, Guatemala and Mexico. While the Men of Cuzco did
have slaves from those regions (with a preponderance from Nicaragua in all likelihood)
the Spaniards clearly indicated that the "indios amigos de guerra" were Peruvian In
dians. Vega, (Manco Inca, 45) asserts that the Spaniards' African slaves were nume
rous (although the exact or even an approximate number is not specified) and fought
45
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Thomas Flichema
R. H. A. N?m. 92
The part leadership played in determining the outcome of the siege
is difficult to measure. Almost all accounts of the siege praise the lea
dership of Hernando Pizarro effusively; criticism is almost non-existent.44
Hernando Pizarro did commit some serious mistakes, however, starting
with the decisi?n to let Manco leave Cuzco, soon after Pizarro filed to
garrison Sacsahuam?n on the eve of the initial Inca attack and then later
led his men into the defeat of Ollantaytambo. Moreover, his arrogance,
cupidity, and petty vindictiveness in his dealings with his own men
meant that Spanish unity and morale owed little to his leadership. Sig
nificantly, few of the Men of Cuzco took up arms to oppose the Al
magrist seizure of Cuzco in April, 1537. Still, given the circumstances
prevailing during the siege, Pizarro did provide effective leadership
on the whole. His bravery as a fighting man and dominating personality
did command the grudging respect of his men. Additionally, Pizarro's
flair for the calculated risk led to the capture of Sacsahuam?n and the
successful expeditions into the countryside that not only gathered val
uable intelligence and broke up Inca formations, but also brought am
ple supplies of food into the city.
On the whole, then, Hernando Pizarro utilized the advantages he
enjoyed fairly effectively, including the steady and reliable second level
leadership of Gabriel de Rojas and Hern?n Ponce de Le?n. Just below
these two men ranked Gonzalo Pizarro, appearing now as a captain for
the first time and emerging as a dashing leader. On the third level Fran
cisco de Villacast?n, Diego M?ndez, and especially Pedro del Barco pro
vided solid leadership for the footmen.
On the other side, the leadership of Manco has been under attack
from the time of Titu Cusi (Manco's son) in the sixteenth century to
Luis A. Pardo, Juan Jos? Vega, and John Hemming in the twentieth
century. Basically, these critics assert that Manco should have directed
Inca operations around Cuzco in person, especially during the initial
attack, thereby providing added inspiration and direction to the Inca
efforts. One must doubt that Manco's presence would have helped in
on a significant scale. While the precise number of African slaves is not known, the
testimonjy of the Men of Cuzco implies that they were only a handful. At any rate,
they served as auxilaries and not once appear as men of arms.
44 See especially: the Relaci?n del sitio; Prescott, Conquest of Peru, IT, 52; and
Etelps, The Spanish Conquest in America, IV, 20-31.
46
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Julio-Diciembre de 1981
The Siege of Cuzco
any way. If Manco had been near Cuzco, the Spanish would have made
every effort to capture him, as they always tried to capture Indian lea
ders in the Indies as a way to decapitate the opposition. And, given the
Incan military problems, Manco might well have been captured. At
the very least, Spanish efforts to capture Manco would have so harassed
him that he could have hardly provided effective leadership, let alone
serve as an inspiration for his men. Critics have also charged that Manco
should have launched the initial attack on Cuzco sooner, before the
Spanish had returned from the Yucay Valley. Yet, Hemming is no
doubt correct in playing down this question, for contemporary accounts
reveal that the Incas, whose only hope lay with numbers, were not ready
to attack until they did.45
Behind these and other criticisms of Manco's leadership lies the as
sumption that the Incas could not have defeated the Spanish with more
effective leadership. While one cannot categorically deny such an as
sumption, especially in the view of the limited information we have on
Inca strategy or on the qualities of the young Inca leader, several con
siderations cast serious doubt upon this assumption. For one thing, no
other Inca leader in the Indies was any more successful under similar
circumstances. Besides, this line of reasoning ignores the disadvantages
of the Incas, ranging from weaponry to the level of support, factors
Manco could not have changed in a short period of time.
Thomas Flicke via
40 Herrera, Historia general, XI, 208; Relaci?n de los sucesos, 393; Helps, The
Spanish Conquest hi America, IV, 20-31; Prescott, The Conquest of Peru, IT, 48-80;
Pardo, El imperio de VUcabamba, 171; Hemming, Conquest of the Incas, 191, 202
204; Titu Cusi, Relaci?n, 80-81; Pizarro, Relaci?n, 206-207, 210.
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