Nations and Nationalism 2 (l), 1996, 67-87.
0 ASEN
1996
Economic integration and the politics
of independence
HUDSON MEADWELL AND PIERRE MARTIN
McGill University, 855 Sherbrooke West, Montreal, Quebec, H3A 2T7,
Canada, Universite‘ de Montre‘al, C.P. 6128, Succursale centre-ville, Montreal,
Quebec, H3C 357, Canada
ABSTRACT. Are nationalism and international economic integration irreconcilable?
This paper explores the theoretical connections between these two phenomena and
develops a framework to assess the implications of international economic integration
for nationalist movements in the developed West. We focus upon the structural
context of nationalism in democratic societies, emphasising the impact of changes in
the international political economy and the influence of domestic institutions.
Although the demand for secession may not stem from economic calculations, the
expected costs and benefits of independence are constraints to nationalist mobilisation
and are conditioned by the structure of the international political economy. We
identify three ideal types of international structures and discuss how the strategies and
prospects of nationalist movements are shaped within each of them. We find that a
structure of ‘institutionalised interdependence’ is most conducive to nationalist
mobilisation in a liberal democratic context, but the impact of economic integration
depends largely upon conditions defined by domestic institutional structures.
Nationalism and international economic integration are two of the
dominant forces of the 1990s, but they have long been considered
irreconcilable both in the theory and in the practice of international political
economy. Are they necessarily pulling in opposite directions? Some authors,
such as Eric Hobsbawm (1990), have claimed that interdependence and
economic integration would eventually lead to the decline of nationalism.
For students of international political economy, support for free trade by
nationalists also can be somewhat puzzling. For example, Robert Gilpin
(1987: 14) writes that ‘economic nationalists in both advanced and less
developed countries believe that the world market economy operates to the
disadvantage of the [national] economy and domestic welfare’.* I The vigour
* Earlier versions of this article were presented at the Annual Meeting of the American
Political Science Association, New York, September 1994, and at seminars at McGill Univerity
and the Universite de Montreal. The authors wish to thank the Fonds FCAR (Quebec) and the
Social Science and Humanities Research Council of Canada for financial support, and the
following individuals for comments and suggestions: Andre Blais, Mark Brawley, Yitzhak
Brudny, Michael Lusztig, Liliana Riga and the referees of the journal.
68
Hudson Meadwell and Pierre Martin
of some nationalist movements in the developed West at a time of
unprecedented economic integration challenges these observations. ‘Freetrade nationalism’ is clearly no longer an anomaly. Nationalist leaders have
become strong advocates of trade integration at the multilateral and
continental levels. More importantly for our purposes, this support for free
trade has been part of a strategy of political mobilisation by nationalist
leaders seeking greater autonomy or outright independence.
In this article, we explore some of the features of this form of nationalist
politics in the developed West. Our first goal is to consider its relationship
to political mobilisation and entrepreneurship in nationalist movements.
Second, we explore the relationship between this type of nationalist
mobilisation and international economic contexts. Finally, we discuss its
implications for the incidence of secession. Since Quebec appears to be the
most likely candidate for a democratic transition to independence within the
developed West, it will be the fulcrum for our discussion, although we also
bring in the cases of Scotland and Catalonia to underscore the general
argument about Quebec. We must emphasise that we are not concerned
with developing a detailed comparative analysis, which is outside the scope
of this article.
The article is organised accordingly. The first section summarises the
model of nationalist mobilisation which provides the basis for our understanding of international economic constraints. We argue that, although the
demand for secession may not stem primarily from economic calculations,
the expected costs of a transition to independence and the expected future
costs and benefits of becoming a smaller country are constraints on
nationalist mobilisation in democratic societies. These constraints are
shaped, in turn, by the structure of the international political economy. In
sections two to four, we identify three ideal types of international economic
structures and attempt to show how the strategies and prospects of
nationalist movements are shaped within free trade regimes. In the fifth
section, we consider the interaction between trade integration and another
key determinant of nationalist mobilisation: domestic institutional structures. Some institutional designs, we argue, allow nationalist political
entrepreneurs to take advantage more fully of opportunities in the
international economy than other institutional principles. Thus, we conclude, it is only through a specification of these principles that we can
establish the linkage between international economic structures and the
strength of nationalist movements.
Nationalism, free trade and the international system
This article is concerned with the conditions that make nationalist mobilisation for independence possible. The first and foremost condition for
nationalist mobilisation is the presence of a firmly entrenched sense of
Economic integration and independence
69
collective identity (Anderson 1991). Identity formation and institution
building are mutually reinforcing dimensions of processes of mobilisation
that together produce groups with high carrying capacities. Also crucial for
nationalist mobilisation is the presence of social or governmental institutions around which this sense of collective identity can be nurtured and
strengthened. These factors are the ‘enabling conditions’ which remove
some obstacles to collective action in the mobilisation of nationalist
movements (Meadwell 1994, 1993).
These enabling conditions need not be a product of economic rationality.
However, mobilisation can be affected, at the margins, by the economic
cost-benefit calculations of individuals.* In short, although the impetus for
nationalism and the demand for independence rarely stem from purely
economic calculations, a significant part of the mobilisable members of a
group are sensitive to cost. This position is supported by empirical studies
of Quebec’s public opinion, which show that cost-benefit expectations have
a significant effect on support for sovereignty (Blais and Nadeau 1992; Blais
et al. 1995; Martin 1994).3 We take this finding one step further and argue
that, since part of this cost is associated with the repositioning of the
seceding state in the international trade system, the structure of international trade should affect the strategy of nationalist leaders. The key
dimensions of nationalist mobilisation discussed in the analysis of the
models of international economic structure to follow are thus the ‘constraining conditions’ linked with the issue of the viability of the seceding
state through the process of transition to independence.
Nationalism is often conventionally connected to mercantilism and selfsufficiency as the economic base of national units and, implicit in this
position, is the notion that a sovereign political unit needs to be economically viable in order to survive and prosper in a competitive world. When
trade enters the picture, however, self-sufficiency may not be a necessary
condition for viability. Viability depends upon notions such as institutional
completeness (Meadwell 1989) or the carrying capacity of national groups
(Gellner 1983). Here we focus on the impact of the international economic
structure on two types of constraints confronting nationalist movements
seeking to achieve independence: the short-term costs of transition to
independence and the long-term prospects for economic viability of the
would-be independent state. Regardless of the potential cultural or
economic benefits of political sovereignty, private economic agents have to
be mobilised, or even converted, by nationalist leaders. In the process of
mobilising these agents, perceived transition costs and uncertainty over
long-term viability can be major impediments. Much of the uncertainty
surrounding the issues of transition costs and long-term viability, we argue,
is related to the international context of secession.
This leads us to ask two basic questions about the linkage between the
trade environment of secessionist movements and the logic of interstate
relations. First, what is the impact of international structures on the
70
Hudson Meadwell and Pierre Martin
expected short-term costs of transition to independence? Second, what is the
impact of structural features on the optimal or minimal size of sovereign
political units, on which the long-term viability of the seceding state
depends? In other words, what is the impact of international structures on
the prospects of maintaining economic interdependence while cutting
existing ties of political dependence?
We consider three types of structure, or three ‘idealised’ worlds, which
correspond roughly to successive stages in the evolution of the world
political economy. The first is a system of territorial states in which national
units are both politically and economically subordinated to an imperial
centre. This situation is close to a model of Realpolitik, in which relative
autarky may be a security asset. Following Richard Rosecrance (1986), we
call this a system of ‘territorial states’. Second, we introduce trade
interdependence while maintaining the underlying anarchical logic of the
previous model. For simplicity, we call this system of rival trading states
‘mercantilism’. Third, we account for the increasing presence of multilateral
institutions at the global or regional level by examining the impact of a
structure characterised by liberal trade regimes. We call this last system
‘institutionalised interdependence’.
We highlight the structural conditions affecting both the process of
transition and the costs and benefits associated with the size of states.
Under the first and second models, both the optimal size and the potential
costs of transition are larger than under the third model. This difference
matters for the political economy of independence. Economic integration
and liberal regimes, we argue, reduce the cost of transition to independence
by increasing the economic viability of small states; therefore, it makes sense
for nationalist leaders to participate in enhancing the institutions that make
their economic environment less subject to political uncertainty. In short, it
makes sense for nationalists to be free traders.
These idealised descriptions of three different types of trading worlds
serve to highlight the distinctiveness of institutionalised interdependence an important element of the opportunity structures of nationalists in the
developed West. We are careful, however, about the conclusions we draw
from our comparisons across these worlds. For the most part, we limit
ourselves to inferences about the size of states that might be generated by
the structures specified by these description^,^ and the implications for
transition costs and economic viability.
Our comparisons across these worlds therefore are not focused on the
incidence of secession per se. This is a much more difficult causal inference
to make, and whatever the facilitating conditions for secession introduced
by institutionalised interdependence, it remains the case that there has been
no secession in the developed West. This may be because the effects of its
combination of free trade and international regimes have not had time to
germinate fully and to take deep root, and in the future we may observe
that the era of institutionalised interdependence reorders this part of the
Economic integration and independence
71
state system. This has not yet occurred and rather than speculate about the
future, we are left to consider some of the implications.
The difficulties in comparing across these trading worlds are connected to
three issues. The first issue is that there is likely a good deal of covariation
between these international economic structures and their constituent states,
domestic political regimes and economies. The first trading environment, for
example, is likely to be composed of patrimonial states, weakly industrialised economies and exclusionary political regimes; the second by states with
increasing infrastructural power (Mann 1984), industrialising economies and
greater political inclusion; the third trading environment, institutionalised
interdependence, by liberal democracies (distinguished by some differences
in institutional designs) and industrial capitalism. Comparing across these
systems and assessing their trade environments so as to establish the effects
of these trading structures on secession, as if this held constant regimes,
states and economies, is not possible.
Second, we are examining international economic structures here and
have left politico-military opportunities and constraints in the background,
despite their importance. This focus helps bring into view certain
phenomena but, at the same time, limits the conclusions we can draw about
secession because a full explanation across time and place could not depend
exclusively on international economic structures. The Habsburg empire, for
example, was full of fervent nationalists, but reluctant separatists, who
preferred imperial inclusion and sought federal reform within the empire,
rather than going it alone as a small state in the late nineteenth century, for
reasons of military security (Sked 1981: 184ff.; Klima 1993: 239-40).
The final issue arises within the trading environment that will occupy
most of our attention. Institutionalised interdependence is constituted by
liberal capitalism. At the same time, however, liberal regimes and capitalist
economies may have effects on the politics of nationalism and the incidence
of secession that run counter to those potential facilitating effects of
institutionalised interdependence. Thus in the last section of the article we
will be led to a discussion of why the nationalist movement in Quebec is the
only one in the developed West that appears poised to initiate a transition
to independence. What we want to sketch there is an argument that
accounts for the distinctiveness of Quebec while preserving a broader
argument that applies more generally to the developed West.
Territorial states, imperialism, and the costs of autarky
From the logic of self-sufficiency inherent in the relations amongst territorial
states, it follows that the basis of relations between sovereign states must be
conquest rather than trade. Conquest, in this ‘idealised’ world of power
politics, is the privileged mechanism of wealth generation, which means that
economic efficiency per se may be forgone, to some extent, for the sake of
72
Hudson Meadwell and Pierre Martin
power acqui~ition.~
The international system that would thus be generated
would be characterised by a predominance of large states and imperial
powers. Large states, or large areas controlled by a single state, under these
assumptions, would be an optimal form of political organisation. The larger
the area under the political control of a state, the more viable the state’s
economic base without trade. If the mode of interaction amongst states is
territorial conquest, states would tend to be large, if only because a minimal
size is required to garner the resources for survival in an anarchical
environment. This leads to a few basic propositions.
First, beyond some threshold, because of the political costs of domestic
control, states have to decentralise political management (Dudley 1992).
This limit to the territorial extension of states in such a system suggests a
tendency towards empire formation, rather than the incorporation of
conquered territory within a unitary state. But empires can be an unstable
political form, subject to fission (Doyle 1986; Gilpin 1981). Yet under the
restrictive conditions of autarky and Realpolitik, the creation of a smaller
state by this tendency towards fission may be extremely costly, both because
of transition costs and for reasons linked with the reduced long-term
viability of the smaller unit. Note that, in an ‘idealised’ territorial-states
model, trade between competing units is negligible. Wealth generation
depends upon conquest and efficient use of national resources, subject to the
demands of maintaining an external defense against predators and to rentseeking by private and public agents.
Second, in such a system, if large states are to benefit from the
advantages of size, given the constraints of autarky, we would expect
internal barriers to trade to be dismantled. The lopsided structure of
bilateral trade between peripheral regions (or subordinate states) and the
political and the economic core on which they depend, however, gives a
strong instrument of leverage to the latter (Hirschman 1945). In the short
term, severance of these asymmetrical links of interdependence can make
the costs of transition prohibitive for the smaller unit. In the long term,
economic viability depends on self-sufficiency, which can be understood as a
function of economic size and scope. Thus, unless relative autarky is a
credible option, imperial domination might be preferred by some economic
agents in peripheral regions because their set of feasible alternatives is
structurally limited (Spechler 1989).
From the point of view of nationalist or secessionist movements, it
follows that the economic constraints of this system may push the societal
cost of independence too high to allow for mobilisation. Mobilisation for
independence only becomes possible if autarky (or a high degree of
protectionism) is, at least for a dominant class of political actors, a credible
option. If relative autarky is a credible option, there may be enough support
amongst protectionist interests to overcome the cost of cutting links of
interdependence with the imperial core. Indeed, in an international system
dominated by the logic of territorial states, independence seekers are
Economic integration and independence
73
practically forced to reject free trade and embrace protection. This logic was
followed, for example, by the American Founding Fathers in the years
following the Declaration of Independence. In his Report on Manufactures,
Alexander Hamilton made clear that political rupture with Britain meant
that the gains from trade could not be maintained securely across the
Atlantic, but had to be forced upon the disparate states to ensure their longterm viability.
Interdependence, mercantilism and obstacles to secession
Introducing a limited degree of trade interdependence into this system of
Realpolitik yields a system of mercantilism. Although territorial conquest is
less primordial as a means of wealth generation in this system, relative
economic size and scope remain primordial elements in defining the
structure. This system is different from the previous system, but it is not yet
the system of institutionalised interdependence that we will describe shortly.
The introduction of trade does not eliminate rent-seeking, either by state
agents who use tariffs to generate revenues or private agents who demand
tariffs for protection. This system should also be more subject to trade wars
than the system of institutionalised interdependence. Still, bringing trade
into the picture, we argue, has consequences for the political economy of
secession.
Consider the peripheral region of an empire in the territorial state
system. The benefits of free trade are available to this region only through
inclusion in an imperial trade area, if states or empires eliminate internal
barriers to trade - that is, they do not trade with others but, instead,
conquer them and trade within their thus-expanded boundaries. And if a
subunit wants to gain independence, it must be large enough to be viable
economically as well as militarily. Now consider this subunit in a system of
trading states: the region does not have to be a part of the empire to benefit
from trade; nor does it have to be as large to sustain independence. In the
absence of strong institutions to regulate trade, however, small states are
vulnerable to trade wars and to optimal tariff-setting by larger states, and
the economic costs of transition to independence may be prohibitive for
risk-averse private or state actors (assuming that the latter are accountable
to the former). This has interesting implications for the politics of secession.
The fact that trade interdependence can accommodate smaller political
units enhances the long-term viability of the potential seceding state. This
economic viability, however, is contingent upon the political underpinnings
of an open international economy. In a mercantilist world, the vulnerability
of smaller states to trade wars and their limited bargaining power vis-h-vis
larger states adds some amount of uncertainty to the long-term economic
prospects of the would-be smaller state.6 The presence of a free-trading
hegemon, of course, would make it possible for trade-dependent small states
74
Hudson Meadwell and Pierre Martin
to benefit from the relative stability of a hegemonic trading order (Lake
1988). In the long run, therefore, small size need not be an unsurmountable
obstacle to viable independence. The problem lies in the cost of transition.
The stability of a mercantilist trading system largely depends upon ad hoc
agreements between specific states rather than uniform rules and norms.
The cost of transition is thus linked with the difficulty inherent in the
bargaining of a new trading order with existing and prospective trading
partners. These partners, of course, include the former central state, whose
short-term reaction to secession may not be guided solely by economic
rationality. Thus, even if the overall economic advantages of secession can
be demonstrated, uncertainty about lost market opportunities in the future
trading order is likely to lead economic agents who benefit from access to
external markets, in other regions of the larger country or abroad, to defend
the territorial status quo.’ For exporters, the larger size of the existing state
offers some cover against the political uncertainties of access to external
markets, an assurance which may be reduced after independence. Political
union also makes economic sense for import-sensitive producers whose
markets in other regions of the country depend upon the existing state’s
trade barriers. Moreover, if the region’s industries outperform those in the
rest of the larger country, but are not competitive with foreign firms, one
could expect industrial elites to oppose independence while favouring
protectionism. The trade orientation of Catalan nationalists from the
nineteenth century to the end of the Franco regime reflects this dilemma.
Spain’s high tariffs insured Catalonia’s industry a dominant place in the
domestic market. Secession would have at once jeopardised this dominant
market position and confronted Catalan firms with more advanced
European competitors (Keating 1991).
In short, although trade interdependence makes small states more viable
in the long run, a poorly institutionalised structure makes it difficult for a
nationalist movement to find allies amongst either exporters or importsensitive producers. Thus, when trade interdependence rests primarily on ad
hoc trade agreements in a ‘mercantilist’ world, the long-term prospects of
the would-be smaller state may not necessarily be worse than under the
political status quo, but the costs of transition to independence can be
potentially high. In addition, the capacity of the central state to deny
market access to the seceding state may be a strong economic disincentive
for nationalist mobilisation. Thus, if nationalist mobilisation is to take place
in a mercantilist world, it is most likely to be associated with protectionism.
Free trade, institutions and nationalist movements
We turn now to the politics of secession in a system where economic
interdependence is accompanied by relatively stable international regimes.
Our central claim can be stated plainly: freer trade in a tight institutional
Economic integration and independence
75
setting lowers the barriers to exit for groups contemplating secession. The
first reason is that an economically open international system, as the
previous section emphasised, can support smaller-sized units. But this is not
sufficient, as the uncertainty inherent in asymmetrical trade interdependence
in the aftermath of secession is a sizable obstacle to nationalist mobilisation.
The key change between a mercantilist system and one of institutionalised
liberal trade is that the risks of an open-trade strategy of inclusion in the
world economy are drastically reduced in the latter.
Nationalists, it follows, need not be protectionists. Indeed, a strategy of
institution building at both the international and sub-state levels would be a
sensible means of managing the potential costs of transition to independence
in an open international economy. It is possible to imagine a nationalist
version of John Ruggie’s ‘embedded liberalism’, in which nationalists are
free traders internationally and support the consolidation of the social and
civic institutions around which they wish to mobilise a majority of their
political community (Ruggie 1982). The reasoning that we follow here is
twofold.
On the one hand, economic integration under institutionalised regimes
gives firms in this community some degree of autonomy vis-a-vis the central
state. As international regimes consolidate, the role of the central state as a
guarantor of market access for local trading firms tends to be reduced and
economic ties with other regions of the larger country become, relatively
speaking, less essential. International economic integration, in other words,
reinforces tendencies toward economic regionalism, even in the absence of a
significant nationalist movement for independence (Keating 1992).
On the other hand, if they wish to promote political sovereignty or
regional autonomy, nationalist leaders have an interest in balancing
economic integration with the consolidation of institutions of political
representation and social policy at the substate level. Institutions or policies
aimed at managing the social consequences of trade have two distinct
advantages for nationalist movements. First, they allow the smaller political
unit to confront the inherent social risks of open markets. Here the logic is
the same as it is for small open economies, whose governments have relied
upon internal social programmes to pool the risks inherent in an open trade
strategy (Bates et al. 1991). Second, they contribute to refocus networks of
solidarity and identity from the larger political entity to the distinct national
group. This is consistent with Ernest Gellner’s contention that, in industrial
societies, states play a crucial role in nation-building through the control of
identity-shaping institutions (Gellner 1983).
In short, well-established international liberal regimes that leave room for
the local management of social policies lower the barriers to exit for
nationalist movements. At the same time, however, the management of
social and economic policies at the level of the national group rather than at
the central-state level gives nationalist political entrepreneurs some of the
means to shape the most basic elements of nationalist mobilisation: identity
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Hudson Meadwell and Pierre Martin
formation and social solidarity. Thus the conjunction of a well-established
liberal international trade regime and the proper domestic institutional
setting has two main effects. It has the potential of enlarging the size of the
mobilisable public by contributing to efforts to refocus collective identification; it also lowers the barriers to independence constituted by the costs of
repositioning the new state in the trading order.
Notice that we have not said that individuals necessarily want to scale
these barriers, even if lowered. Nor have we said that lower barriers make it
individually rational to support secession for purely economic reasons, or
that these are the only kinds of barriers to secession. And we have not
denied that some persons may want to climb these barriers, no matter how
high they are. Finally, we have not said that all nationalists are free traders.
Our claim would nevertheless suggest that free-trade nationalism is much
more likely to be successful under a liberal trading regime, where firms face
less political uncertainty, than under a closed or mercantilist trading system,
in which high political uncertainty tends to inflate the anticipated costs of
change to the territorial status quo. Concretely, this means that, under these
conditions, nationalist leaders have an incentive to endorse international
economic integration rather than resist it.
Clearly, then, we emphasise the importance of international regimes. The
strategy of independence through international trade is attractive in periods
of relatively stable openness in the international economy. Self-sufficiency
thus has become a less necessary nationalist strategy as economic interdependence has become more institutionalised and less volatile in the postwar period. Indeed, in liberal democratic political systems, one could easily
argue that it has become an impossible strategy. Regional economies can
now base economic viability on participation in multilateral or continental
economic regimes. Such regimes can provide some assurance against the
political vagaries of trade interdependence, thus substituting for the relative
security hitherto provided to regionally based firms by larger domestic
structures. Economic agents should therefore be less averse to the risks of
independence under the more predictable conditions of an institutionalised
international trading environment.
There would seem to be both indirect and direct evidence to support this
line of argument. First, there is indirect evidence in the support given to the
institutionalisation of trade by existing small states. Small northern
European countries, for example, have eagerly sought institutional arrangements to regulate their economic interactions in the post-war period (and
even before). Peter Katzenstein writes that, for these countries:
The pursuit of economic liberalism is not based on disinterested notions of aggregate
welfare but is rooted firmly in the awareness that their political autonomy and
economic welfare are best served by diffusing dependence in a wider market rather
than concentrating it on particular states. . . . It is overstating the point only a little
to argue that for the small European states international liberalization is ersatz
patriotism. (1986: 44)
Economic integration and independence
77
As the viability of small countries can be ensured by supranational
institutions, one should not be surprised therefore that their governments
played an active role in consolidating these institutions. For nationalist
movements, which project themselves as small states in a future environment
dominated by their existing intrastate trade linkages, regional or multilateral
institutions to enhance and regulate commerce play the same role. We find
direct evidence of our argument that free trade and nationalism can go hand
in hand under institutionalised interdependence in three of the most
important nationalist movements in the developed West.
Quebec nationalism and North American free trade
In Quebec, the US-Canada Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and the North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) have been used by nationalists
to mobilise support for independence. Indeed, the two main political parties
in Quebec have supported free trade as a part of their respective nationalist
agendas. This bipartisan consensus explains the higher level of public
support for free trade in Quebec compared with other regions of Canada,
which cannot be accounted for by conventional theories of trade politics
(Martin 1995b).
For the Quebec Liberal Party, under former premier Robert Bourassa,
free trade was seen as a way to increase the relative autonomy of Quebec
economic agents vis-ci-vis the central government.' The pro-sovereignty Parti
Quebecois shares this rationale in its support of free trade. In addition,
however, it has consistently presented the FTA, NAFTA and the GATT as
means of reinforcing links of trade interdependence within a clearly defined
institutional framework that would help in easing the transition to
independence and ensuring the economic viability of a sovereign Quebec. In
addition, continental integration is seen as a counterweight to the potential
refusal on the part of Canada to maintain existing ties of economic
interdependence.'
Given the preoccupation of the sovereigntists with the institutional
structure of the trading environment of an independent Quebec, it is not
surprising that the FTA and the NAFTA have become central parts of the
debate over sovereignty. Legal and political interpretations differ on
whether a newly independent Quebec could easily become party to Canada's
commercial treaties, and it would be beyond the scope of this article to
make a definite judgement." From a strictly legal point of view, the
insertion of a sovereign Quebec in the institutional framework of international trade would 'cause certain problems, but none that would be really
insurmountable' (Bernier 1992: 66). Customary international law gives some
support to the notion that a seceding state could become, more or less as a
matter of course, a party to existing treaties binding the predecessor state,
under the general principle known as Pacta sunt servanda." Politics,
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Hudson Meadwell and Pierre Martin
however, is likely to matter more than abstract and somewhat untested
principles.’2
Although, from the strict perspective of international law, the succession
of the Quebec state within GATT and NAFTA would not pose major
problems, much would depend on the political reaction of Canada itself.
Indeed, Canada could refuse Quebec’s offer of economic cooperation in the
aftermath of a unilateral declaration of independence, but would thus
expose its own economy to significant losses. Although some polls indicate
that English Canadian public opinion may be willing to ‘punish’ Quebeckers
economically if they choose secessi~n,’~
most of the polls published since
1990 suggest that a majority would favour some form of economic
association with a sovereign Quebec.I4 Moreover, opinion on this issue is
very sensitive to cost (Martin 1995a), and public support for military
intervention to stop Quebec’s accession to sovereignty is marginal. l 5
In sum, although the issue of continuation of economic regimes after
secession remains highly political, the mobilising rhetoric of Quebec
nationalist leaders clearly relies upon a world view that matches our third
model. On the one hand, for Quebec nationalists, the strength of
international regimes is a guarantor of political stability in a period of
transition to independence otherwise fraught with uncertainty. On the other
hand, the rhetoric of nationalist leaders makes their project contingent on a
‘liberal-institutionalist’ world view.I6 In the Quebec case, the presence of
international institutions to manage trade relations in a liberal world is a
distinct advantage for the mobilisation of cost-sensitive nationalists. Thus
‘free-trade nationalism’ in this case does not appear to be a paradoxical
strategy.
Free-trade nationalism in Scotland and Catalonia
In these two European cases, the level of intensity of the nationalist demand
for a sovereign state does not quite compare to what we can observe in
Quebec, particularly in Catalonia, where in the 1992 Catalan elections
Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya, the political equivalent of the Scottish
National Party or the Parti Quebecois, received only 10 per cent of the vote
- but some parallels can be drawn nevertheless. In Scotland, the European
Community (EC, now the European Union, EU), has lately been perceived
as an institutional counterweight to the English state and as a possible
alternative to the British market (Levy 1990). This case is interesting
because Scottish nationalists were initially reluctant to endorse the entry of
the United Kingdom in the European Community (Kirby and Taylor 1975).
This view of Europe as a counterweight to the British market has even led
the Scottish National Party to centre recent election campaigns around the
theme of ‘Independence in Europe’.” This strategy has prompted discussions similar to those taking place in Quebec about the possibility of
Economic integration and independence
79
accession to EC membership (Macartney 1990). Public opinion polls have
revealed that perception of this issue by the public has had an effect upon
nationalist politics. Indeed, support for an independent Scotland tends to be
stronger when the country is projected to be a member of the Community,
reflecting concern about access to larger markets (McCrone 1990). It must
be noted, however, that recent opinion polls show that support for
independence in Scotland (35 per cent) is not as far apart from Quebec as
before.
In Spain, polls have shown that support for regional parties is closely
related to attitudes toward European integration (Lancaster and Lewis-Beck
1989). There was also strong support in Catalonia for EC membership at
the time of Spanish accession, because nationalists saw it as a means to
secure access to a larger market (Clavera 1990). In both Scotland and
Catalonia, nationalist parties have abandoned earlier commitments to
protectionism. The comparison of these two European cases with Quebec
reveals that the efficacy of free-trade nationalism is tied to the domestic
institutional context.
This summary survey of three nationalist movements suggests that the
evolution of the structure of the international political economy towards
institutionalised interdependence does have consequences for nationalist
mobilisation in a liberal democratic context. This observation is consistent
with our initial model of nationalist mobilisation, which posits that the
overall ‘demand’ for independence depends upon the choices of private
actors who may be sensitive to the potential economic costs of secession,
which can be reduced by the structural features of institutionalised
interdependence. This sensitivity to economic costs may not hold for all
individuals, but it is enough that nationalist politics is changed as a
consequence. The presence of free-trade nationalists should nonetheless set
in motion political conflict between nationalists who are not free traders,
free traders who are not nationalists and free traders who have other
national goals.
Free-trade nationalists who seek political independence must be able to
build a coalition out of this motley of positions. They must convince
other nationalists that independence is preferable to autonomy that stops
short of independence, and that freer trade is conducive to independence.
They must convince non-nationalists (who may be unmoved by the
benefits free trade provides to nationalism) of the benefits of free trade,
and hope that they are indifferent to nationalism. And they may not be
able to do both simultaneously, hence we speculate that free-trade
nationalism for independence, if it is to ‘work’, must presuppose
nationalism in the political community. Indeed our argument suggests a
sequential strategy of political mobilisation that should begin by building
national sentiment where it is absent or weak. This suggests strong
limitations to nationalist mobilisation, even in a context where perceived
transition costs are greatly reduced.
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Hudson Meadwell and Pierre Martin
Aside from its potentially enabling effects on mobilisation, then,
institutionalised interdependence could also work to weaken the likelihood
of secession. This possibility creates an obvious dilemma for nationalist
leaders; it can arise when actors do not have to support secession to gain
freer trade. Within institutionalised interdependence, for example, freer
trade is already supplied through the participation of the broader state in
trade agreements and international regimes. This is the dilemma that
nationalist political entrepreneurs who support secession confront when
they take up the strategy of free-trade nationalism. They must be able to
establish or take advantage of a motivational set within their constituency
such that independence is valued for reasons other than access to freer and
institutionalised international trade.
For these leaders, the effects of institutionalised interdependence work
at the margins, by making accession to political independence more
feasible. These effects not only have to be favourable, they must also be
marginal. In fact, if the potential constituency does not have sufficiently
compelling reasons to be predisposed to vote in favour of independence,
the benefits of institutionalised interdependence, which are available in the
status quo, cannot provide the main impetus for independence. Independence may be rationally preferred, however, when a region is excluded
from the benefits of institutionalised interdependence. In these circumstances, independence might make these benefits available if the new state
can gain access to these benefits. Yet this cannot be the case under our
description of this trading world because we assumed that central states in
liberal democracies would not explicitly exclude regions from the benefits
of the trading regime. Thus the dilemma for nationalist leaders arises from
the fact that their constituency is not excluded from institutionalised
interdependence.
Alternatively, independence may be preferred when three conditions are
met: the distributive consequences of inclusion in a liberal trading regime
are negative in a given region; these consequences are assumed to be caused
by distortions in domestic political arrangements; and independence holds
out a reasonable prospect that these distortions can be removed. In such a
case, interest in independence lies in the possibility of removing distortions
to the market. This explanation of territorial reordering of the state system
seems unrealistic, however, for it does not give causal priority, or even that
much causal weight, to the essential principles of nationalism - the existence
of a distinct national identity and the demand for national self-determination. In short, in line with our theoretical argument, economic integration
could contribute to territorial reordering if we assume individuals to be
purely rational economic actors (as do Alesina and Spolaore 1995) but this
scenario of ‘independence without nationalism’ appears unlikely in the real
world.
Economic integration and independence
81
Nationalist mobilisation and its limits
We therefore turn to a consideration of some of the limitations of our
argument about the relationship between institutionalised interdependence
and the politics of independence in the developed West. Interdependence
and international regimes are features of the environment of all independence movements in the developed West, yet Quebec is the only case that
seems poised to initiate a transition to independence. Despite the presence
of free..trade nationalists in Scotland and Catalonia, neither of these
movements has been able to mobilise as much support for independence as
the movement in Quebec. The distinctive institutional profile of Quebec
accounts for the differences among these cases.
In its origins, the Canadian state was both consociational and federal.
The strength of the independence option in Quebec is rooted in the
institutional characteristics of federalism, accompanied by a breakdown of
Canadian consociationalism.l 8 From Confederation until the 1950s, consociational arrangements preserved a somewhat illiberal society and politics
in Quebec and the constitutional expression of consociation was federal.
The opening-up of Quebec, marked in 1959 by the death of Maurice
Duplessis (premier of Quebec from 1936 to 1939, and from 1944 to 1959)
conditioned the politics of independence in three relevant ways. First,
Quebec indipendantistes had to mobilise support without the institutional or
symbolic resources of the church. Second, they had to build a coalition in a
society that was modernising economically and, third, they had to confront
a competing autonomist political programme, which could also claim to be
nationalist. In addition, Quebec indipendantistes could build on the
continuing effects of consociational power-sharing and the institutional
arrangements of federalism. Consociation had preserved the boundaries of
the group and this provided a resource for mobilisation in the first stages of
organisation. Federalism provided direct political mechanisms that could be
built into a strategy of mobilisation. Consociation and its breakdown thus
resulted in the fact that Quebec politics in the last thirty-five years has been
structured around the national question.
Liberalism and capitalist development change the dynamic of nationalist
mobilisation in fundamental ways. Simply put, most Quebeckers are, like
others in the developed West, reasonably satisfied with capitalism and the
individual opportunities it provides. The statist approach to modernisation
at the provincial level, characteristic of most Quebec governments since
1960, took this into account. In Quebec, the social and economic
modernisation of the provincial state opened new opportunities for
individuals in the hitherto economically marginalised Francophone majority. This allowed the nationalist movement to move away from the
traditionalist discourse of the old ‘French Canadian’ nationalism, centred
upon the institutional capacity of the Catholic church.
Nationalism, understood as the principle that nation and state should be
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congruent, supplied a substitute for the symbolic resources of Catholicism.
Indeed, in Quebec provincial politics, even the federalists appropriated the
nationalist goal of maximising the powers of the provincial state, but within
the boundaries of Canadian federalism. Thus, in linking their strategy and
discourse to provincial institutions, the indkpendantistes took advantage of
the formal characteristics of federalism, which made it possible for Quebec’s
society to refocus its collective identity from French Canada to Quebec (see
Dumont 1993). This reformulation of collective identity within the institutions of federalism has remained compatible with capitalism, liberalism and
nationalism.
The combination of consociation and federation in the institutional
design of the Canadian state has meant that nationalist political entrepreneurs in Quebec have been able to entrench nationalism and to translate it
into support for independence. By contrast, in Scotland, the Scottish
National Party, while it has come to use as a mobilising force the idea of an
independent Scotland in the European Community (after earlier resistance
to integration largely on economic grounds), cannot build on the same
institutional capacity as the movement in Quebec. The institutional
infrastructure that Scotland maintained after the Act of Union (1707),
although substantial, illustrates how the lack of an elected local legislature
distinct from the national legislature constitutes a major obstacle to
nationalist mobilisation. It is only very recently, moreover, that the
hegemony of the SNP within nationalist politics has been challenged by the
Convention in Scotland and then only partially. The institutional problems
of a nationalist movement rooted in a political party without a local
legislature may come eventually to produce a different sort of movement
organised more directly round the issue of democratic representation than
around the notion of the Scottish nation.
The Catalan case draws attention to a different feature of Quebec: its
distinctive pattern of political liberalisation in the post-war period. The
availability of liberal capitalism through continued participation in the
Canadian federation was never in doubt in this period of political and
economic liberalisation. In Quebec, political liberalisation was primarily
centred around the institutions of the provincial government. By contrast, in
Catalonia, the question of political liberalisation and the national question
had to be bargained simultaneously. By supporting Spanish liberal democracy
in the relatively centralised territorial form in which it was bargained, Catalan
political elites, to an important extent, have bought into the territorial status
quo. Further, the moment of constitutional transformation in the postFranco period was so dramatic and far-reaching that, in the Quebec context,
it is more comparable to the formation of the Canadian dominion in 1867
than to the consequences of Quebec’s Quiet Revolution in the 1950s and
1960s. Thus the power-sharing arrangements that local elites have achieved in
Catalonia, which have provided an important degree of institutional capacity,
are set within a different constitutional context than in Quebec.
Economic integration and independence
83
In short, other nationalist movements in the developed West do not share
the institutional characteristics that have contributed to make Quebec a
candidate for secession. The capacity to protect and develop group
infrastructure in the liberal, capitalist context of the developed West is a
fundamental foundation for nationalism. The combination of federation
and consociation has allowed Quebec to move rather far along the path to
independence, farther indeed than other cases in the developed West. Yet, at
this stage, it also remains true that even these facilitating institutional
principles have not produced a secessionist movement strong enough to
make independence a certainty. In advanced liberal societies, the defense of
the primordial bases of corporate groups does not, in and by itself, have a
determinant effect on nationalist politics. Why?
Here, too, lies an enduring problem of nationalist mobilisation. Nationalist politicians must convince their supporters that they can only fulfil their
national goals if they constitute a sovereign state. But if the agents in the
potential constituency were thoroughgoing nationalists, they should not be
affected at the margin by the issues of transition costs and economic
viability. When they are affected at the margin, so that changes in the
international economy have potential effects on mobilisation, they are not
unconditional nationalists; liberalism and capitalism have already wrought
their effects. Institutionalised interdependence, through its constituent
elements of liberal politics and capitalist economies, has already had effects
on the corporate boundaries and carrying capacities of groups.
Conclusion
Economic integration and nationalism are likely to be with us for some
time. In this article we have considered their relationship in one particular
class of cases: movements for independence or national self-determination in
the developed West. No doubt, this theoretical analysis needs more
development in at least three directions. The first, clearly, is more detailed
empirical research, which would adapt parts of the argument to contexts
other than the developed West. But this should depend on a second thrust:
a more thorough theoretical and methodological argument to link system
(international political-economic structures) and unit (domestic institutions)
levels of analysis.
Third, more attention could be given to the effects of particular
international economic integration structures on the state institutions that
constitute the focus of civic solidarity, such as the welfare state, education,
manpower and industrial policies. Does free trade mean a weakening of
these institutions at the substate level, to the benefit of central-state control?
Or does a more competitive market economy favour the emergence of
smaller, more cohesive, political units, built around tighter networks of
social solidarity? These are issues of both normative and analytical
84
Hudson Meadwell and Pierre Martin
importance in the study of the linkages between international economic
integration and nationalism.
Notes
1 See also the discussion of economic nationalism in Mayall (1990) and the discussion of
nineteenth-century attitudes about the relationship of the size of nations and protectionism in
Szporluk (1988).
2 The classic example of a political activity which cannot be fully explained by rational choice
is why citizens in democracies bother to vote in elections. Rational choice can, however, predict
at the margins that people will vote more or less under certain objective conditions (Grofman
1993).
3 Although polls and survey results are sensitive to context and wording of questions, the
relationship between cost-benefit expectations and political support for sovereignty still holds.
Indeed the sensitivity of polling results to the description of the option (sovereignty versus
sovereignty-association, for example) is quite consistent with the importance of cost-benefit
calculations.
4 On the political and economic determinants of the size of nations, see: Alesina and Spolaore
(1995), Anderson (1986), Dudley (1992), Friedman (1977), Wittman (1991).
5 The threat of predation, however, can lead central states to develop more efficient
mechanisms of resource accumulation and extraction (Tilly 1975; Herbst 1990).
6 This statement refers to the structural analysis of the impact of relative size in the structure
of international trade found in the neorealist literature. For example, John Conybeare (1987)
argues that larger states can benefit from optimal tariffs, which makes smaller states more
vulnerable in bilateral bargaining situations.
7 As Fernandez and Rodrik (1991) argue, whenever political change or policy innovations
involve uncertain costs and benefits, potential losers are more likely to mobilise in defense of
the status quo than potential gainers are to rally for reform.
8 The present leader of the Quebec Liberal Party, Daniel Johnson, has retreated from this
autonomist platform, however, toning down considerably the constitutional demands of his
party. For the post-Bourassa Liberal Party, arguably, support for NAFTA is less a function of
autonomist politics and reflects more strictly the party’s close ties to the business community.
9 The most articulate defender of this position has been Jacques Parizeau. Quebec’s minister
of finance from 1976 to 1984 and leader of the Parti Quebkcois since 1988. In 1987, he argued
that ‘Once a free trade area in North America has been set up, no premier of other provinces
could come to Quebec in the midst of a referendum campaign and say, “If you vote this way,
no commercial deal with us.” I suppose we’d say, “It really doesn’t matter, old boy” ’ (Parizeau
1987). In recent political debates on Quebec sovereignty, the question of Quebec’s status within
NAFTA has surfaced again. For Parizeau, the NAFTA and the GATT would prevent Canada
from inflicting economic reprisals against Quebec. He emphasises that Quebec would not
necessarily need to negotiate with Canada prior to sovereignty and would be viable even
without an elaborate economic association with the rest of Canada: ‘Let’s not fool ourselves’.
Parizeau argues, ‘there will be no vast negotiation . . . We have to put ourselves in a position
where we are not vulnerable’ (The Globe and Mail, Toronto, 20 May, 1994: Al).
10 For differing perspectives, see Ritchie et al. (1991); Quebec, Assemblk nationale, 1992.
1 I Note that the principle that obligations bind only the parties that contracted them, Res inter
alios acta, mitigates this principle (Udokang 1972: 157-9; Brossard 1976).
12 For a thorough prospective analysis of the issues involved in the event of a favourable vote
for sovereignty in a Quebec referendum, see Young 1995.
13 In December 1994, 56 per cent of Canadians outside Quebec said no and 39 per cent said
yes to this question: ‘If Quebec were becoming independent, do you think Canada and Quebec
Economic integration and independence
85
should enter into an economic association, or should there be no formal economic union
between the two if Quebec chooses independence? (Angus Reid 1994).
14 Of thirteen polls published between 1990 and 1995, nine show a majority in support of
association, three show a majority against, and one is a tie. In February 1995, 58 per cent of
Canadians outside Quebec said yes and 36 per cent said no to this question: ‘If, at the next
referendum, Quebeckers vote FOR sovereignty, should Canada maintain an economic
association with Quebec, yes or no?’ (Le Groupe Leger & Leger, Inc. 1995). In another poll, 61
per cent agreed that ‘Canada should maintain an economic association with a sovereign
Quebec’ (Societe Radio-Canada 1995).
15 In 1992, only 22 per cent in English Canada approved of military intervention to solve
disputes with a sovereign Quebec (Angus Reid 1992: 15).
16 The following remarks by Bloc Quebecois leader, Lucien Bouchard, during a spring 1994
visit to Vancouver show how the liberal logic of absolute gains underpins the political
calculations of Quebec sovereignty: ‘It will be in the power of the English-speaking provinces to
hurt Quebec. But at the same time they will hurt themselves. How far will they go to hurt
Quebec if at the same time they inflict the same blow on themselves?’ (Vancouver Sun, 3 May
1994: Al-A2).
17 We are not necessarily equating support for independence with support for the SNP.
18 There are debates as to whether Canada has ever corresponded to Lijphart’s model of
consociational democracy. Those who agree that the Canadian polity was originally based on
this principle, however, also agree that the principle has been eroding since 1960. Moreover, the
recent failures of elite accommodation over constitutional reform in 1990 and 1992 would seem
to have consecrated the breakdown of the model. On the evolution of consociationalism in
Canada, see Stevenson (1991) and Noel (1993).
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