From Curse to Cure
The Impact of Energy Exploration & Production in the Lake Tanganyika Basin
Part One of a Series on Integrated Development in Africa’s Great Lakes Region
Published in September 2014 by the Lake Tanganyika Floating Health Clinic / WAVE
1646 N. Leavitt Street, Chicago, Illinois, 60647 (USA)
LAKE TANGANYIKA FLOATING HEALTH CLINIC
WATER BASED AID, VALUE, ENGAGEMENT (WAVE)
This report is part of a series published by WAVE to highlight cross-sectoral development solutions in
one of the most under-developed and remote regions in the world, the Lake Tanganyika Basin. As
part of the African Great Lake region, Lake Tanganyika provides a snapshot into the region’s watercentric communities and their vulnerability to the negative impact of energy extraction, as well as the
opportunities, if developed smartly, to exploit resource wealth for the betterment of the millions of
people living in the Great Lakes region.
THE AUTHORS
Jody L. Lautenschlager, Corresponding Author, Director of Policy, Lake Tanganyika Floating Health
Clinic / WAVE
Amy G. Lehman, MD, MBA, Co-Author, Founder and CEO, Lake Tanganyika Floating Health Clinic /
WAVE
Lilian Haymann, Co-Author, Policy Intern, Lake Tanganyika Floating Health Clinic / WAVE
COVER: Thread, 33 Queen Street, London, EC4R 1AP (UK)
Copyright © 2014 Lake Tanganyika Floating Health Clinic / WAVE
Available for download at www.floatingclinic.org
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements
6
Abbreviations and Glossary of Terms
7
Preface
9
Summary and Recommendations
13
1.
Introduction
17
1.1
The Importance of Africa’s Great Lakes
17
1.2
What is at Risk?
18
1.3
Why Lake Tanganyika?
19
1.4
Mitigating Risks of Energy Extraction in a Region Rife with Conflict
20
1.5
Blueprint for the Great Lakes Region and Beyond
21
1.6
The Time to Engage is Now
21
2.
Lake Tanganyika and its Basin
23
3.
The Convention on Sustainable Management of Lake Tanganyika
26
3.1
Lake Tanganyika Authority and the Strategic Action Program
27
3.2
Utilizing the Lake Tanganyika Authority
27
4.
Oil and Gas Exploration and Production and Mineral Extraction
29
4.1
Democratic Republic of the Congo
29
4.2
Tanzania
34
4.3
Burundi
36
4.4
Current/Recent Disputes
37
4.5
Potential Disputes
39
4.6
Transparency and Good Governance Initiatives
40
Table of Contents
5.
6.
7.
Threat to Stability or Development Opportunity?
43
5.1
Environment
43
5.2
Health
48
5.3
Socio-economic Development
53
5.4
Case Studies
57
Emerging Security Threats
60
6.1
Geopolitical Context
61
6.2
Complex Regional History
62
6.3
Key rebel Groups
64
6.4
Security Situation in Katanga Province
67
6.5
Other Destabilizing Factors
68
6.6
The Water-Food-Energy-Climate Change Nexus
70
Conclusion and Recommendations
73
7.1
Promoting Resilience through Cross-sectoral Engagement
73
7.2
Lessons Learned
74
7.3
Next Steps for the African Great Lakes region
75
7.3
Conclusion
85
Figure 1: Lake Tanganyika Statistics
23
Figure 2: Map of Lake Tanganyika Basin
25
Figure 3: Long-term Objectives of the Strategic Action Plan
27
Figure 4: Map and Pictures of Health Centers on Lake Tanganyika
51
Table of Contents
APPENDICES
A
Lake Tanganyika Basin Treaties and Institutions
86
B
Map of the Mineral Sector in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
87
C
Maps of Oil Blocks in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
88
D
Companies Involved on Lake Albert
94
E
Chronology of Oil Contracts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
95
F
Armed Groups Present in Oil Blocks in Eastern Congo
97
G
Maps of Rebel Groups in Eastern Congo
98
H
Account of the M23 Offensive and Defeat in 2013
100
I
Maps of Gas and Oil Blocks in Tanzania
101
J
Maps of Oil Blocks in Burundi
104
K
Environmental Impacts
105
L
University of Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index
108
M
Millennium Development Goals
109
N
Application of Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s “Antifragile” Theory in Development
110
O
LTFHC’s Health and Community Outreach Programs
111
P
Rendering of the LTFHC’s Proposed Hospital Ship
115
Q
Recommended Reading
117
ENDNOTES
119
Acknowledgements
This report is the first of a series of publications on cross-sectoral collaboration, business and development
opportunities, as well as best practices in the African Great Lakes region in general and the Lake
Tanganyika Basin in particular. This project was led by the policy team at WAVE and in conjunction with
its programmatic arm, the Lake Tanganyika Floating Health Clinic (LTFHC), to highlight among other
things the vulnerabilities of one of the world’s greatest assets in the 21st Century: Water.
By adopting policy recommendations set out in this paper, multiple stakeholders and development
practitioners will be able to build more robust and resilient communities in underdeveloped regions rife
with conflict and rich in energy resources, including fresh water, oil, and gas.
The future of the Great Lakes and in particular, the Lake Tanganyika Basin, hangs in the balance. While
there is serious potential for a downward spiral into conflict, disease, and reckless extractive exploitation,
there is also a great opportunity for the riparian countries of the Great Lakes region to pull themselves
out of poverty and ensure the sustainability of water and energy resources through initiatives using a
cross-sectoral approach.
The LTFHC / WAVE have found new and effective ways of working in this isolated region by developing
efficient models for healthcare delivery and health systems building, by improving supply chains and
communications capacity and by promoting smart, transparent and collaborative development.
Importantly, we have become a trusted partner, mediator, and consultant for those with a stake in Lake
Tanganyika and its future.
We thank Lake Tanganyika village leaders, elders, and community members for their trusted support, as
well as the National and Provincial Governments of the Republic of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of
the Congo, the United Republic of Tanzania, and the Republic of Zambia and their Ministries with whom
we work. Without this close collaboration, especially with the Ministries of Health, our work would not be
possible. We also wish to thank the organizations that are active in the basin for their services in this
remote area.
The LTFHC / WAVE would like to extend its sincere appreciation and thanks to Saskia Marijnissen, Fabienne
Hara, Mungo Soggot, Christy Lorgen, Michael Kavanagh, Rachel Kleinfeld, Mvemba Dizolele, Colin Apse,
Stevenson McIlvaine, and Judith Heimann for taking the time to review drafts, as well as for their
significant and considered insights and comments. Special thanks to Ngana Andrew-Mziray, Frederick
F. Monroe, and the late Donald Gallagher for their valuable research and support. All inaccuracies are
our own.
The authors wish to express their gratitude to all our field staff and consultants for their advice and
editorial support throughout the project. They have been invaluable to this process.
Last but not least, LTFHC / WAVE would like to thank its financial supporters without whom it would not
be possible to produce this work.
The work of the Lake Tanganyika Floating Health Clinic
6
Abbreviations and Glossary of Terms
ADF
Allied Democratic Forces
AfDB/ADB
African Development Bank
ANC
Armée Nationale Congolaise / Congolese National Army
AU
African Union
CMO
Civil Military Operations
CNDP
Congrès national pour la défense du peuple / National Congress for the Defence
of the People
Congo War, First (1996-1997)
War on Congolese soil, pitting the government against the AFDL (q.v.), an
armed group backed by an alliance between Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, and
Angola. The war ended in May 1997 with the removal of deposed President
Mobutu Sese Seko.
Fighting broke out when President Laurent Kabila fell out with his Rwandan and
Ugandan allies. Angola, Zimbabwe, and Namibia supported the DRC during
this campaign.
Congo War, Second
(1998-2003)
CSO
Civil Society Organizations
DDR
Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration
DRC
Democratic Republic of the Congo
E&P
Exploration and Production
EAC
East African Community
EITI
Extractives International Transparency Initiative,
ENRC
Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation
ESIA
Environmental and Social Impact Assessment
EU
European Union
FAO
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations
FARDC
Forces armées de la République Démocratique du Congo / Armed Forces of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo
Forces démocratiques de libération du Rwanda; Democratic Forces for the
Liberation of Rwanda; primary remnant Rwandan Hutu rebel group in the east
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.
National Liberation Forces
FDLR
FNL
Framework Agreement/PSC
Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic Republic of the
Congo and the Region; agreement signed by 11 African states and four
multinational bodies (UN, AU, EU, and SADC) on 24 February 2013, to provide
a framework for peace and development in the eastern DRC.
FRPI
Force de résistance patriotique en Ituri / Ituri Patriotic Resistance Force
GDP
Gross Domestic Product
GDRC
Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo
GEF
Global Environmental Facility
Great Lakes region
Countries in the African Great Lakes region include Burundi, the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Kenya, Rwanda, Tanzania and Uganda
IDP
Internally Displaced Persons
IMF
International Monetary Fund
Infant Mortality Rate (IMR)
Probability of dying between birth and exactly one year of age expressed per
1,000 live births; global health indicator
The work of the Lake Tanganyika Floating Health Clinic
7
Abbreviations and Glossary of Terms
Interahamwe
Rwandan Hutu paramilitary organization who played a central role in the
Rwandan genocide
ICGLR
International Conference on the Great Lakes Region
Kimia II
LTA
Silence (Swahili); Congolese army offensive backed by MONUC (q.v.) against
the FDLR (q.v.) in 2009; followed the Umoja Wetu operations (q.v.)
Lake Tanganyika Authority
LTFHC
Lake Tanganyika Floating Health Clinic, programmatic arm of WAVE
M23
Mouvement du 23 mars / March 23 Movement
Mai-Mai
Community-based self-defense militias; from maji, ‘water’ (Kiswahili)
MDG
Millennium Development Goals
Maternal Mortality Rate (MMR)
The number of women who die during pregnancy and childbirth, per 100,000
live births
Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du
Congo; United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo or
MONUC (1999-2010)
MONUC
MONUSCO
Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en RD Congo;
United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DR Congo (2010 –
present)
NGO
Non -Government Organization
PSA
Production Sharing Agreement; private/government contract
RDF
Rwandan Defense Force
RPF
Rwandan Patriotic Front
SADC
South African Development Community
SAP
Strategic Action Program
SCM
Steering Committee Meeting
TCF
Trillion Cubic Feet
TPDC
Tanzanian Petroleum Development Corporation
UN
United Nations
UNESCO
United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization
Under Five Mortality Rate
UNDP
Probability of dying between birth and exactly five years of age expressed per
1,000 live births; global health indicator
United Nations Development Program
UNHCR
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF
United Nations Children’s Fund
UNOPS
United Nations Office for Project Services
UNPF
United Nations Populations Fund
UPDF
Uganda People's Defense Force
WAVE
Water Based Aid, Value, Engagement
The work of the Lake Tanganyika Floating Health Clinic
8
Preface
Investment in oil, gas, and minerals will continue to increase significantly by 2030 to meet strong
global demand, particularly in emerging markets.1 This investment should promise huge benefits
to countries with major reserves of natural resources. All too often, however, governments in these
countries have failed to make the most of their resource wealth potential.
Many of the countries in the African Great Lakes region exemplify this dynamic, such as the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). While it has long been known that the DRC holds
beneath its forests a treasure trove of mineral riches, there also lies a vast potential of oil wealth,
spanning from the off-shore blocks in the Atlantic Ocean to the Congo’s Central Basin to the Great
Lakes, which border resource rich countries in East Africa.*
“While it has long been
known that the DRC
holds beneath its forests a
treasure trove of mineral
riches, there also lies a vast
potential of oil wealth.”
New oil prospects are promising, especially between the fault line of Central and East Africa, as
extractive companies explore the oil rich sediment along the East African Rift Valley which twists
down the African Great Lakes. Tanzania, located in East Africa, shares its border with the DRC
along Lake Tanganyika and is another country that finds itself at this pivotal moment to tap into
its oil and natural gas resource wealth. With active oil exploration in Lake Tanganyika and recent
surveys indicating vast amounts of natural gas off-shore in the Indian Ocean, Tanzania sits at a
crossroads to implement sustainable extractive practices.
The Lake Tanganyika Floating Health Clinic (LTFHC), a health systems building organization, has
operated in the Lake Tanganyika Basin and along the Congolese and Tanzanian shoreline of the
lake for over half a decade. During this time the LTFHC became interested in the role of the
hydrocarbon industry, and what it will mean for governance, regional stability, and its potential
role in providing financial resources towards improving human development indicators for the
African Great Lakes region, and in particular, the Lake Tanganyika Basin.
From Curse to Cure
The DRC’s mining history serves as a good case study for the overall region to learn how to avoid
the pitfalls of mismanaged resource extraction and ways in which to improve a regulated energy
industry and implement intelligent development.
The impact of uncontrolled resource
exploitation in the DRC’s eastern provinces has been stark, fueling the conflict that has defined
that part of the country. If the rapid development of these hydrocarbon reserves goes awry, it
could trigger a new round of regional conflict and turn the DRC, which is the size of Western
Europe, into the quintessential “oil curse” wasteland. Yet, it could also stimulate a rapid
industrialization, help address this fractured nation’s underdevelopment, and give financial ballast
to a struggling government. With newly discovered petroleum deposits alongside its vast wealth
of natural resources (including minerals, fresh water, forests, and biodiversity), there is a window of
opportunity to take a different approach to developing the DRC’s energy sector, one that
considers intersecting issues such as regional instability, geopolitical factors, water security, public
health, and climate change.
The DRC is of imperative strategic importance to the continent. The DRC shares nine international
boundaries and is located at the crossroads where East and West meet Southern Africa. As such,
collaboration between multiple stakeholders towards an integrated, regional approach to
energy and socio-economic development is essential.
This high-risk, high-reward
extractives/development conundrum is mirrored throughout the African Great Lakes region: From
South Sudan’s oil extractive operations, threatened by domestic political instability; to Tanzania’s
bourgeoning energy sector, which lacks an indigenous labor force to self-sustain extractive and
development activities; to new energy prospects in Burundi, a country struggling with its own
security issues, political uncertainty, and influx of repatriated refugees.
This was the underlying message about the DRC’s nascent oil sector at the iPAD Oil & Gas Forum held in Kinshasa,
September 2013.
*
The work of the Lake Tanganyika Floating Health Clinic
9
The LTFHC stumbled on the hydrocarbon issue initially in 2010 while in Burundi. It soon became
apparent that this was the predominant threat (and also potentially the biggest salvation) to the
African Great Lakes, and especially to the DRC as a whole. While the international community is
aware of the energy security threats in West and East Africa, the opportunities and risks of energy
exploration and production (E&P) in Central Africa have been largely miscalculated. This
became apparent at a conference in Chicago in May 2014, during U.S. Secretary of Defense
Chuck Hagel’s response to our question regarding U.S. policy on oil and gas extractive activities
in Central Africa. While the Secretary noted the importance of incorporating energy security into
U.S. foreign policy, and the threats from East and West Africa, he did not speak to the emerging
threats in Central Africa. This only underscores the usefulness of educating policy makers on the
multiplicity of energy and development issues spiraling out from the DRC into Central and East
Africa.
“There are tremendous natural resources in areas for potential conflict, not just among nonnation states and organizations, but between nation states. The energy piece of this is
intricately woven into the fabric of our nation’s foreign policy. That is why we need to stay
ahead of this as much as we can to work with our foreign partners and use our influence to
help as these countries develop those energy resources.”
-
U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel on Priorities for the 21st
Century at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs, May 6, 2014
Regional Security in the Lake Tanganyika Basin
“Largely absent from the
security discussion is the
porous border between the
DRC and Burundi, as
well as the DRC and
western Tanzania.”
The Lake Tanganyika Basin has major cross-sectoral development concerns, including: water and
energy security, climate change, public and women’s health, the environment and mismanaged
resources, complex geo-politics and post-conflict development. Misappropriated funds focusing
predominantly around Goma and Bukavu have created a security vacuum in the areas that were
truly post-conflict after the Second Congo War ended, including the infamous “Triangle of Death”
where the LTFHC operates. This security and development vacuum places Africa’s Great Lakes
region and its already fragile human populations and ecosystems further at risk and vulnerable to
militarizing tribes affiliated with global terrorist networks and ethnic-driven state autocrats.
The LTFHC is in a unique position of having eyes and ears on the ground (via relationships with
local government agencies, community leaders, and citizens along the extremely poor, rural
coastline of Lake Tanganyika as well as first hand empiric evidence) incomparable to larger topdown organizations that appear to be missing the bigger picture: lack of development in postconflict areas of the Great Lakes region has left a security vacuum ripe for terrorist-affiliated tribes
to reassert control, potentially pulling the region into another ethnic-centric and potentially transborder war.
Over the past two years the international media and Western governments’ attention has been
on the M23 (and their defeat in late 2013) in the eastern part of the DRC. All eyes have been
trained on certain areas in North and South Kivu Provinces where the United Nations and the
African Union mobilized its forces to fight via a “peace enforcement” mandate against the M23,
and now the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and the Allied Democratic
Forces-National Army for the Liberation (ADF-Nalu).
While the international community continues to throw resources into the Kivus, little is known or
understood about what is taking place just outside this narrow lens. The resurgence of certain
Mai-Mai militias in Katanga Province is largely going unnoticed and could pose, in the long-term,
an even greater danger to the region than the militia activity in the Kivus, given Katanga’s
importance to the DRC’s economy. Katanga Province is located in the southeastern part of the
DRC and it has a significant border along Lake Tanganyika. The UN only recently acknowledged
the insecurity in Katanga Province and is mobilizing its peacekeeping and Intervention Brigade
forces to address the violent Mai-Mai militias stirring insecurity in the mineral rich province.
The work of the Lake Tanganyika Floating Health Clinic
10
Largely absent from the security discussion is the porous border between the DRC and Burundi, as
well as the DRC and western Tanzania. Repatriation of refugees into Burundi and mass movement
of refugees fleeing fighting in eastern Congo further exacerbates instability in the region. Little is
understood about the rampant mineral and timber smuggling operations between the DRC and
Tanzania, and there is little oversight to disrupt corruption as state governments and the energy
industry race to extract newly discovered oil and gas deposits in the region.
Such information is crucial for global policy leaders to make progressive security and development
policy decisions for a complex region still recovering from decades of war, and yet it is very difficult
to get accurate information from this largely misunderstood and isolated region. The LTFHC is able
to provide vital information to policy and development agencies from its experience operating in
this remote region, as well as staff’s daily interactions with Lake Tanganyika’s communities.
WAVE: Water Based Aid, Value, Engagement
Recognizing the complexity of the region, the Lake Tanganyika Floating Health Clinic mobilized
itself to engage on policy, legislation and technologies that promote effective development,
transparency, and ensure the safety of the Lake’s population. To do this, the organization has
expanded its role and created a broader identity for itself with the creation of WAVE: Water Based
Aid, Value, Engagement.
WAVE is in dialogue with all players on the ground in the Lake Tanganyika Basin, from rural village
leaders and small non-government civil society groups, to policy heads at the national
government level and within international organizations, development agencies, and the private
sector. WAVE advocates on behalf of the people of Lake Tanganyika to this vast network of
stakeholders for an integrated approach to health, security, and development in the region.
“There is a window of
opportunity to take a
different approach to
developing the DRC’s
energy sector, one that
considers intersecting issues
such as regional instability,
geopolitical factors, water
security, public health, and
climate change.”
WAVE is currently consulting on an integrated approach to development, security, and energy
extraction initiatives, understanding the significant interdependence between energy, water,
agriculture, and climate.2 Current trends of water use and availability indicate that meeting future
demands to support continued economic development will require improved management of
both energy and water resources.3 This will also greatly shape the humanitarian space in the
future, and influence the success of public health initiatives. Based on these consultations, WAVE
has developed a new publication initiative to highlight the benefits of using an integrated, crosssectoral approach to development in Central Africa and the Great Lakes region, specifically Lake
Tanganyika and its transboundary basin populations.
Over the coming years, WAVE will release a series of reports that explore the fragile biodiversity of
Lake Tanganyika and issues and opportunities in the basin. This includes reporting on the basin’s
geopolitical dynamics, water security, public health, environmental concerns, and economic
development. Issues like poverty, population growth, and pollution, mismanagement of
resources, climate change and protracted conflict are all addressed with respect to their impact
in the Lake Tanganyika Basin in this series of reports. Best practices and policy recommendations
are presented for health care delivery, sustainable socio-economic development, risk mitigation,
and other factors that complicate infrastructure development in Africa’s Great Lakes region are
also addressed. These reports will examine approaches to development programs that promote
societal resiliency in an “anti-fragile” scope posited by
Nassim Nicholas Taleb* (among several leading statisticians, economists†, and development
experts), as a way to break the cycle of vulnerability as the international community evaluates
ways to reach Millennium Development Goals beyond 2015.
Nassim Nicholas Taleb, PhD., is the author of “Antifragile: Things that Gain from Disorder” and “The Black Swan: The Impact
of the Highly Improbable.” Dr. Taleb advocates what he calls a "black swan robust" society, meaning a society that can
withstand difficult-to-predict events. He proposes "antifragility" in systems, that is, an ability to benefit and grow from random
events, errors, and volatility.
† Abhijit V. Banerjee and Esther Duflo, Harvard and MIT trained development economists who examine development theories,
microeconomic principles applied in developing countries, and issues that the development community has often ignored in
their popular press book, “Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global Poverty.”
*
The work of the Lake Tanganyika Floating Health Clinic
11
To kick off this series, WAVE published From Curse to Cure: The Impact of Energy Exploration and
Production in the Lake Tanganyika Basin. The timing of this publication comes on the heels of a
great boom in oil and gas exploration in Central and East Africa despite an increase in
destabilizing factors. From Curse to Cure is broad in context and introduces the complex
geopolitical dynamics and diverse number of stakeholders with intersecting interests in the Great
Lakes region – interests that are explored in more detail in subsequent reports. While this paper
underscores how mismanaged development, including infrastructure development by the
extractive industry, could negatively affect millions of people around the lake and possibly millions
more living a thousand miles downstream on the Congo River, it also highlights sustainable
development opportunities. From Curse to Cure dissects the high-risk, high-reward stigma
associated with energy Exploration and Production (E&P) activity and outlines preventive
practices through a cross-sectoral prism that mitigate risks while leveraging the development
opportunities of E&P to bring sustainable socio-economic development to one of the least
developed regions on earth: The Lake Tanganyika Basin.
About the Lake Tanganyika Floating Health Clinic / WAVE
“WAVE has become a
partner to the lakeside
communities, advocating
for the needs of the lake
and its people.”
The Lake Tanganyika Floating Health Clinic (now under the umbrella of WAVE) is an international
NGO, founded in 2008, whose goal is to create healthcare infrastructure and provide health
services to the 13 million acutely impoverished people living in the Lake Tanganyika Basin, one of
the most remote regions in the world.
WAVE has a diverse staff base that enables it to provide medical care and collect unique
information from the field in this remote area. Medical and logistical experts work alongside
former child soldiers, refugees from multiple backgrounds, tribes, and factions in the Great Lakes
region. Importantly, WAVE has cultivated trust and become a partner to the lakeside
communities, advocating for the needs of the lake and its people.
In a region where the only reliable transportation takes place by boat, and where there is currently
little to no healthcare, WAVE plans to build a state-of-the art hospital ship that provides education,
information and medicine to the communities and growing international workforce bordering the
lake. The ship will cover 1800 km of coastline in an extremely remote, rural, and poor area largely
untouched and under-invested in by national governments and multilateral organizations.
WAVE has already served hundreds of thousands of Congolese and Tanzanians by conducting a
number of medical and outreach programs, focused on the most urgent local challenges,
including: mosquito bed-net distributions, integrated malaria prevention education programs
and cholera treatment, and a comprehensive women’s reproductive health outreach initiative
in Tanzania’s remote southern region of Rukwa. WAVE is currently expanding essential
communications infrastructure and introducing the region’s first electronic medical record in the
Lake Tanganyika Basin, as well as developing a safe cesarean section training program in the
*
DRC.
*
LTFHC health and outreach programs – Appendix O
The work of the Lake Tanganyika Floating Health Clinic
12
Summary and Recommendations
Political and economic reforms in the past decade have increased trade opportunities in Africa and
laid the groundwork to shape an economic powerhouse of the future. An emerging landscape of
stable economies and growing democratic freedoms in a number of countries in Africa is allowing
the continent to take advantage of its extensive natural resource endowments, its improving human
capital, and its increasing attractiveness to global investors.
Investment in Exploration and Production (E&P) of petro-based energy sources and rare minerals in
the Great Lakes region has boomed over the past two years after several new oil and gas reserves
were discovered offshore and inland in East and Central Africa. These new oil and gas finds have
boosted current production rates and could potentially provide additional sources of income to
some of the poorest countries in the world. It has also caught the attention of foreign extractive
companies and governments interested in booking reserves, diversifying energy sources, and
expanding the consumer market across emerging economies.
“The risks associated with
exploratory drilling for oil
and gas may exceed the
benefits of that resource
wealth…with little to no
contingency planning or
capacity building initiatives
implemented in tandem
with E&P activities.”
This source of indigenous wealth could provide the kind of resources needed to significantly improve
the human development indices in the Great Lakes. However, this is also a risky endeavor. The
impacts of oil and gas pollution on the environment and well-being of basin communities are
interrelated and affect the lake’s biodiversity, socio-economic state, and health of its populations.
Most adverse impacts are a consequence of oil spills, gas flares, and effluent and waste discharges
in the watershed.
The extractive business in the Great Lakes region is expected to triple in the next two years. Yet the
risks associated with exploratory drilling for oil and gas may exceed the benefits of that resource
wealth, largely from poor infrastructure, political interference, uncertain regulatory frameworks,
instability in the region, extreme socio-economic poverty, and little to no contingency planning or
capacity building initiatives implemented in tandem with E&P activities. Without an integrated
development approach, regional cooperation, and risk mitigation practices, the health and
livelihood of millions of people in Africa’s Great Lakes region will continue to be at risk, as well as the
environment and investments pumped into the region.
The Niger Delta in West Africa offers a possible window into the Great Lakes future if energy
extraction does not incorporate risk mitigation practices, regulatory reforms, and integrated
development into its framework. The adverse effects of oil and gas exploration and extraction in
the Niger Delta illustrate how a water-based economy and the health of its people living in the area
of extraction can be decimated by oil and gas pollutants. The Delta has suffered hundreds of spills
over the past three decades, primarily from aging infrastructure, poor regulations and monitoring,
poor remediation and clean-up efforts, as well as spills/leakage caused by political insurgents and
thieves. This has profoundly affected the health and socio-economic well-being of the surrounding
communities.
To ensure a similar fate doesn't await the more than 12 million people of the Lake Tanganyika basin,
WAVE published From Curse to Cure, a comprehensive paper that examines current activities
conducted by the E&P industry and mining sector, the costs and benefits of energy extraction, and
its impact on the health, socio-economic development, environment, and security of the Great
Lakes region, in particular the Lake Tanganyika basin.
To protect the health and welfare of the region’s fragile populations and emerging economies, and
to ensure sustainable development, the E&P industry needs to engage non-governmental
organizations among other local civil society organizations before exploratory drilling begins, in order
to create legitimate capacity building projects in the Great Lakes region.
Case studies highlighted in the paper illustrate the negative impact of long-term, unsustainable
extraction in the Niger Delta, as well as countries that have pivoted away from these kinds of
practices and successfully limited damages from energy extraction through risk mitigating practices
and collaboration between extractive companies, governments and civil society organizations.
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WAVE recognizes E&P activity, including interest in Lake Tanganyika's natural resources, will only
increase in the coming years. With the inevitable draw of foreign interest in Africa's resources and
burgeoning economies, WAVE published this report on today's complex affairs in the Great Lakes
region to inform policy makers, regional leaders, extractives and the humanitarian community,
among other stakeholders, on how to develop a more effective, cross-sectoral approach for
sustainable resource management and development in the Great Lakes region.
WAVE encourages cross-sectoral and bottom-up engagement to collaborate on programs with
multiple stakeholders, including with the private sector and extractive industries, to address the
complex, intersecting issues in the Lake Tanganyika Basin and broader Great Lakes region.
Recommended actions include the creation of an Energy Institute to support the development of
the extractive industry and provide support to Great Lakes governments to intelligently develop the
region’s fledgling water-based economies and health systems, while protecting the basins’
ecosystems which are also crucial to these economies.
Based on the proceeding information and analysis, a number of recommendations are put forward
to influence stakeholders’ behaviors towards more sustainable practices in the Lake Tanganyika
Basin and the African Great Lakes region. Recommendations incorporate an inclusive cross-sectoral
approach to developments to enhance the aptitude of vulnerable populations and fragile
ecosystems to absorb the shocks of climate change, political conflict, and the effects of mineral
and energy extraction activities.
Recommendations for the International Community:
Create an independent organization, such as an Africa Energy Institute, where the international
community may engage the governments of the countries in the African Great Lakes region and
help them develop their extractive industries in collaboration with other good governance and
capacity building initiatives. Through this organization, the international community should:

Help countries develop tangible and practical goals necessary for a foundation that will
support good governance practices;

Train a cadre of indigenous technical experts to sustain recommended programs;

Help countries improve their hydrocarbon legislation and strengthen their respective legal
systems’ frameworks to enforce good governance and extractive regulations and protect
their citizens;

Offer a forum for private sector stakeholders, civil society organizations, international
development organizations, and governments to convene and discuss cross-sectoral issues
and develop integrated programs tailored to each region, starting with the Lake Tanganyika
Basin and the Great Lakes region as a whole;

Support the creation of advisory boards in transboundary lake basins on sustainable
development, the environment, climate change, and new technologies in under-invested
region;

Support transboundary advisory boards to define border demarcation lines and resolve
current cross-border grievances;

Encourage dialogue among regional governments to secure areas of instability;

Support international and regional organizations to hold non-state actors and government
leaders accountable from further inflicting regional instability for profit;

Empower regional institutional bodies, such as the Lake Tanganyika Authority, ICGLR, EAC,
SADC, and NEPAD;

Support grassroots, bottom-up initiatives in the Great Lakes basins through local civil society
organizations;

Encourage transboundary advisory boards to create local measures to build resilience to oil
spills and industrial waste, as well as the adaptive capacity to cope with climate change.
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14
Recommendations for the Corporate Sector:

Support transboundary institutional bodies that promote regional cooperation and help
establish mechanisms that support transparency and good governance by host countries as
they develop their energy sectors, such as an Africa Energy Institute;

Guide the public sector on economic reforms and lead on transparent extractive activities
in the Great Lakes region;

Revise Corporate Social Responsibility programs with input from local experts to create
community outreach and development programs that build resilient communities and
infrastructure prior to drilling;

Partner with non-traditional regional stakeholders (local civil society leaders) to develop a
comprehensive Environmental and Social Impact Assessments to include a human rights
assessment and a robust socio-economic development plan in their preliminary studies, prior
to exploratory drilling as part of core risk-mitigation strategies;

Utilize and develop new technology for cleaner drilling practices and early detection of spills.
Summary of Points:

Building strong and sustainable health systems in the African Great Lakes region will ensure
healthy and safer populations, as well as stronger local economies;

The Lake Tanganyika basin is the epicenter of major cross-sector development concerns
including water and energy security, climate change, health, the environment, mismanaged
resources, complex geopolitics and post-conflict development;

There are significant and newly-found deposits of oil, gas and minerals in and near Lake
Tanganyika and along Africa's Great Lakes region; this has initiated a new race to extract
energy resources without comprehensive Environmental and Social Impact Assessments
(ESIA) or regional contingency and intervention plans, further endangering the Great Lakes'
fragile ecosystems and vulnerable populations;

Local leaders, community groups and specialized international organizations have a strong
cultural understanding and institutional knowledge in the region where they live and work;
their insight is beneficial to foreign companies and is crucial to developing local buy-in to (oil
and gas) Exploration and Production programs;

Economic development of the Lake that ignores geopolitical, health, environmental and
water management issues will cause irreversible ecological damage to the lake, decimate
lakeside communities who are lake-dependent and risk igniting resource disputes in the
transboundary waters of Lake Tanganyika;

Long term-investment in the region will support the E&P industries' goals to mitigate risks and
increase profits while providing tools for fragile populations to build resilient societies;

Traditional approaches to Foreign Assistance in the African Great Lakes region are not
working; a new paradigm is needed to promote development, peace and security in this
fragile region;

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) and initiatives promote government transparency, while
empowering individuals and organizations to take ownership for improving their lives;
however the region's legal systems need to support, not hinder CSO activities.
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Putting Lake Tanganyika’s Global Importance into Perspective

Lake Tanganyika is the second largest freshwater lake in the world by volume, the second
deepest and world’s longest freshwater lake, and one of 20 ancient lakes on earth;

Lake Tanganyika contains 17% of the world's fresh water and is home to over 1,500 species
including 600 unique aquatic species;

Over 12 million people depend on Lake Tanganyika as a food and economic source, most
of them live in extreme poverty with little access to health care systems;

Lake Tanganyika's population growth rate is 3%, one of the highest in the world;

The U.S. State Department estimates that by 2025, 67% of the world's population could be
living under 'water-stressed' conditions, where lack of fresh water becomes an impediment
to health and peace;

With the global population estimated to rise from the current 6.85 billion to 8 billion in the next
20 years, demand for food, water and energy resources will soar, creating increased resource
vulnerability;

No UN Millennium Development Goal (MDG) can be met without proper attention to water
management, including eradication of poverty.
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1. Introduction
Pivoting between optimistic forecasts of economic growth and innovation, and pessimistic
narratives of cyclic instability and poverty, predictions of Africa’s future remain contradictory.
Nudging the continent to the right side of the fence in terms of socio-economic stability and
sustainable development is one of the great geopolitical challenges of our time. It will require
localized solutions with results-based evidence, developed in tandem with local African
stakeholders at the village and regional level, as opposed to one-size fits all development
packages for the great continent. It will also require long-term investment by the private sector
to stimulate economic growth and improve human development indices, especially in subSaharan Africa.
A study by the Economist Intelligence Unit in 2012, based on a survey of multinational companies
operating in Africa, found that Africa held the greatest overall investment potential for all frontier
markets, with an average of five to six percent of growth per year. By 2050, Africa is expected to
have produced more GDP than the U.S. and Eurozone combined do today, and African
countries’ social, demographic, and political realities will be reshaped as a result. 4
“Investment in E&P in
petroleum and natural gas
resources (and rare
minerals) in the Great
Lakes region has boomed
over the past five years.”
According to a 2010 McKinsey & Co. report, seven of the ten fastest-growing economies in the
world were African. This report also highlighted that Africa has the highest return on capital in the
world.5 The main driving force of growth in Africa is trade, which has risen in value since 2005,
much of this driven by BRICS investments, particularly India and China. Oil and minerals are still
the key exports in Africa, and investments in this sector are expected to increase from recent
discoveries of oil and gas in Central and East Africa. Despite recent economic growth from these
emerging markets, poverty and income inequality levels remain largely unchanged in Africa,
even in resource-rich countries. The disparity between the rich and poor is a particularly difficult
problem for countries in sub-Saharan Africa where nearly 50 percent of the population lives on
less than USD 1 per day and where six out of the ten most unequal countries worldwide are
located. Government policies and donor interventions can help lower income inequalities in these
countries by cultivating a middle class.6
A titanic force in this transformation, for good or for bad, will be the oil and gas industry. Investment
in Exploration and Production (E&P) in petroleum and natural gas resources (and rare minerals) in
the Great Lakes region has boomed over the past five years after several new oil and gas reserves
were discovered offshore and inland in Eastern and Central Africa. These new finds have boosted
current production rates, and have the potential to provide additional sources of income to some
of the poorest countries in the world. Yet the risks associated with exploratory drilling for oil and
gas may exceed the benefits of that resource wealth. Contributing factors that amplify these risks
include poor infrastructure, political interference, uncertain regulatory frameworks, instability in
the region, and little to no contingency planning or capacity building initiatives implemented
concurrently with E&P activities. Without an integrated development approach, regional
cooperation, environmental protection and risk mitigation practices, the health and livelihood of
millions of people in Africa’s Great Lakes region will continue to be threatened, as well as the
environment and capital investments pumped into the region.
1.1 The Importance of Africa’s Great Lakes
The Great Lakes of Africa include some of the largest and most ecologically diverse freshwater
systems on the planet. Twisting down the two arms of the Great Rift Valley, the lakes are located
in nine countries in Central and East Africa. Eight of the 15 lakes in this region are considered
"Great Lakes," one of which is Lake Tanganyika - the second largest and second deepest
freshwater lake in the world.
Each lake has its own ecosystem and unique fish populations, and supports tens of millions of
people who live in the lakes’ catchment basins and rely on fish as their main livelihood and food
source. They share the lakes’ resources among multiple countries, many of which are still
recovering from conflict and have some of the highest poverty rates and maternal and child
mortality in the world. They also have some of the highest human birth rates, averaging around
three percent.
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The extractive industry is expected to triple in the next two years in the Great Lakes region. The
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development estimates that USD 1.25 trillion will be
invested over thirty years (2001 to 2030) in African energy, with upstream exploration and
investment remaining the focus for both the oil and gas sectors. Much of this exploration will be
in East Africa where recent discoveries of oil and gas were found in Uganda, Kenya, and
Tanzania.7
The Great Lakes region has rich soil, minerals, and other resources make it an attractive location
to live, and urbanization in the region is fast paced. Yet, it is extremely under-invested in terms of
creating the circumstances that allow host countries to flourish. This fragile region and its
vulnerable populations are already experiencing adverse effects from climate change, pollution,
and poor resource management, protracted conflict and underinvestment in infrastructure and
development in the region. This is further exacerbated by an increased demand for global
resources (energy, water, and food) and the spread of conflict in the region from the renewed
fighting in the Democratic Republic of the Congo’s (DRC) eastern provinces and building political
tension in Burundi.
1.2 What is at risk?
When considering the negative impact of resource extraction in a region so fragile, the potential
risks increase substantially. The environmental risks in the Great Lakes region – one of the most
endangered water systems in the world – are not being appropriately addressed in a dialogue
outside of environmentalist and conservationist circles.
Understanding the limnology of the Great Lakes for instance, is important to predict the effects of
energy E&P activities on water quality, water and food security, and fish production. Large dilution
capacities and long flushing times can make the detection and removal of petro-based and
chemical pollutants in these waters difficult, and more vulnerable to protracted water pollution.
Species unique to each lake could be wiped out. Concentrations of petroleum contaminants in
fish and crab tissue could disrupt the ecosystem and adversely affect the lake population’s health.
Water pollution would most likely extend to the basin’s watershed, much of it used for irrigation of
subsistence agriculture and primary source of water for many wildlife refuges for endangered
species.
Coinciding with these immediate environmental threats, a small oil spill – and the inability to deal
with one –can have a number of direct and indirect effects on the health of the population, on
their fisheries and aquaculture. The entire watershed could be contaminated, paralyzing the
economy and triggering a humanitarian crisis from food and potable water shortages.
Furthermore, inhaling or touching oil products could affect the lakeside communities’ health.
The entangled, complex issues in the Great Lakes region only magnify these risks and perpetuate
the region’s vulnerability and volatility. In early 2012, there was an upsurge in fighting in the Kivus
and the emergence of a new rebellion in North Kivu has spurred renewed territorial expansion of
armed groups, further complicating stability in eastern DRC and neighboring countries.
Misappropriated funds focusing predominantly around Goma and Bukavu have created a
security vacuum in the areas that were post-conflict after the Second Congo War ended,
including the infamous ‘Triangle of Death’, where WAVE operates. Largely absent from the
discussion is the porous border between the DRC and Burundi, as well as the DRC and western
Tanzania, and how renewed instability in the north pushes southwards along Lake Tanganyika.
This security and development vacuum places Africa’s Great Lakes region and its already fragile
human populations and ecosystems further at risk.
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1.3 Why Lake Tanganyika?
Lake Tanganyika is used in From Curse to Cure as a comprehensive case study to highlight the
interconnected issues common in the Great Lakes region and how energy extraction activities
can negatively or positively impact the region. The Lake Tanganyika Basin, home to over 12
million impoverished people, is the epicenter of major cross-sectoral development concerns,
including: water and energy security, climate change, public and women’s health, the
environment and mismanaged resources, complex geopolitics and post-conflict development.
The lake holds 17 percent of the world’s available surface freshwater supply; it supports some of
the largest freshwater fisheries on the African continent; and it sits on three potential oil reserves in
the territories of Tanzania, Burundi, and the DRC. The Lake Tanganyika Basin also supports several
national parks and forest reserves, including Kigwena Forest Reserve in Burundi, Gombe Stream
(location of Jane Goodall’s seminal work), Katavi and Mahale Mountains National Parks in
Tanzania, and the Rusizi National Park’s wetlands on the border of Burundi and the DRC.
As is characteristic of the region, development statistics in the Lake Tanganyika Basin are among
the lowest in the world, with high poverty and mortality rates. The region constitutes a unique
epidemiologic unit, which up to this point, has been difficult to measure. Statistical analysis on the
causes and effects of the region’s health and disease conditions are difficult to define since data
collection is inhibited by the lack of infrastructure in the basin. Health care for preventive and
emergency medical treatment is hindered by the lack of telecommunications and transportation
infrastructure to support the basin’s remote and weak health systems.
It is difficult to investigate outbreaks, survey and screen diseases, biomonitor, and provide
statistical analysis of data for public health studies. Infectious diseases from poor sanitation and
inadequate infrastructure are endemic in the Lake Tanganyika Basin, but the true magnitude is
obscured by how the statistical data is presented, using country median public health rates for
the DRC, Tanzania, Burundi, and Zambia.
“The lake holds 17% of
the world’s available
surface freshwater supply;
it supports some of the
largest freshwater fisheries
on the African continent;
and it sits on three
potential oil reserves in the
territories of Tanzania,
Burundi, and the DRC.”
Viewing the basin from the perspective of the public health sector is a vital component to any
long-term investment plan in a region. The populations’ state of health and fragility should not
only be incorporated into the risk factors of E&P, but also to identify ways in which to invest in
infrastructural systems. By doing this, local and foreign stakeholders mutually benefit from
development.
Advances in environmental protection and sustainable development in the area are largely
affected by ongoing regional conflicts and threats from active militant groups. This hinders
operations of locally directed development and distracts the international community from
investing in long-term development programs, instead responding to security issues or providing
aid for immediate disaster relief.
Additionally, renewed oil interest in the DRC represents a real threat to stability in a still vulnerable
post-conflict country. The communities lining Lake Tanganyika’s western shoreline are no
exception. Oil prospecting is nurturing old resentments among local communities and
contributing to border tensions with neighboring countries. Great concern is shared by regional
experts that the confirmation of oil reserves in eastern DRC will exacerbate deep-rooted conflict
dynamics in the DRC’s eastern provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu and southeastern province
of Katanga; the latter two sharing the northwestern coastline of Lake Tanganyika.
However, as the international community continues to pour aid into the Kivus and its porous
borders with Rwanda and Uganda, little is known or understood about what is taking place just
outside this narrow lens. The resurgence of certain Mai-Mai militias in Katanga Province south of
the Kivus in the southeastern part of the DRC and along the shores of Lake Tanganyika is largely
going unnoticed. These groups could pose an even greater danger to the overall post-conflict
region than the former M23, FDLR, and ADF activity in the north given Katanga’s importance to
the DRC’s overall economy.
Smuggling activities have increased and resources are further strained as large populations of
displaced Congolese, who fled the violence in North Kivu, squat on land with limited resources
among poverty-stricken populations in the lake basin. These are agitators to a region still struggling
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19
to recover from the last Congo war with an already vulnerable population living in extreme
poverty. If these agitators are left unaddressed, they could ignite another transboundary conflict
in the Great Lakes region.
Conservationists, such as Mark Tercek, a former investment banker and current president and CEO
of The Nature Conservancy, have said that the classic debate, often cast as a tug-of-war
between “green” activists and corporate interests, is an old one, and that these camps have
overlapping interests and can align on everything from climate change to the sustainability of
water, food, and energy resources. It’s smart business to invest in nature and the Lake Tanganyika
Basin acts as a useful case study that lends context to the range of things at stake in the Great
Lakes region. WAVE sees this as an area where intersecting interests of oil extraction, water
security, and health of the basin communities, should be an incentive for public-private
partnerships that support sustainable development and the missions of multiple stakeholders in the
Lake Tanganyika Basin.
1.4 Mitigating Risks of Energy Extraction in a Conflict Region
From Curse to Cure is intended to facilitate efforts through transparent information access to break
this cycle of conflict and risk by examining current activities conducted by the E&P industry and
mining sector, the costs and benefits of energy extraction, and its impact on the security,
environment, health and socio-economic development of the Great Lakes region - in particular
the Lake Tanganyika Basin. WAVE recognizes E&P activity will only increase in the coming years,
including interest in Lake Tanganyika’s natural resources.
Transboundary issues covered in this paper include cross-border disputes and uninhibited
movement across these porous borders by armed militias increasingly influenced by terrorist
networks in East Africa; refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs); existing regulatory
frameworks to support transboundary cooperation; isolation of extremely impoverished
populations; increasingly vulnerable infrastructure; energy, water, and food security; illicit trade
activities; and mismanaged resources and impact on the environment. The latter issue is viewed
through the lens of Lake Tanganyika’s unique biodiversity and fragile ecosystem, as are the risks
and benefits of E&P activity in its catchment basin.
As the United Nations and African Union renew their peacekeeping operations and Intervention
Brigade forces to stop the mounting instability and violence in eastern Congo from spreading and
further destabilizing the greater Central Africa region, WAVE examines less invasive and more
sustainable means to contain and dissipate conflict in the Great Lakes region, turning to bottomup approaches that seek to address the root causes of the region’s conflict.
In From Curse to Cure, WAVE examines the innovative development programming opportunities
in a region easily misunderstood by foreign investors and stigmatized from years of protracted
conflict and top-down foreign aid development initiatives. A key component highlighted in this
paper is regional cooperation through engagement of multiple stakeholder partnerships with a
development approach focused on results and local ownership.
From Curse to Cure provides insight from WAVE and its staff of local experts to ensure qualitative
socio-economic development by the E&P industry and regional stakeholders to support the needs
of the lake’s population. WAVE introduces a set of policy recommendations and guidelines that
use a combined approach of bottom-up and top-down best practices for development in the
Lake Tanganyika Basin and the Great Lakes region as a whole. This includes ways to engage the
private sector and collaborate on programs that reduce their environmental impact while
catalyzing development programs that local stakeholders have weighed-in on during the
decision-making process, before project implementation. WAVE illustrates how this approach can
build a stronger economic base for developing countries and decrease risk factors for the foreign
investor, thereby increasing market value and investor profit in Africa’s emerging economies.
WAVE reviews key regional institutional bodies, their responsibilities and limitations, and provides a
set of recommendations on how to improve upon their charters to increase their effectiveness as
platforms for regional cooperation, and as mediators and enforcers of transboundary
agreements, such as the Lake Tanganyika Authority (LTA) and the Convention for Sustainable
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20
Management of Lake Tanganyika. Many of these recommendations address the ineffective
engagement in a region struggling to shed its reputation as a vulnerable population incapable of
pulling itself out of poverty.
With the inevitable draw of foreign interests in Africa’s resources and burgeoning economies,
WAVE provides an informative brief on today’s complex affairs in the Great Lakes region and lays
out a concise blueprint for action to inform policy makers, regional leaders, and multiple
stakeholders on how to develop a more effective, cross-sectoral approach for sustainable
resource management and development in the Great Lakes region, such as:

Mechanisms that support transparency initiatives to ensure transparency of revenue and
production, strong regulatory practices, and a judicial system that can enforce these
regulations;

Programs that enhance peacekeeping and good governance initiatives by recognizing
indigenous migratory patterns and intermixed populations – factors that can unwittingly
contribute to instability in this transboundary region if ignored;

Collaboration tools to develop and integrate risk mitigation practices into regional socioeconomic development programs using a cross-sectoral approach.
These recommendations, among others, enhance the aptitude of the region’s vulnerable
populations and fragile ecosystems, to absorb the shocks of climate change, political conflict and
the potential negative effects of mineral and energy extraction activities.
1.5 Blueprint for the Great Lakes Region and Beyond
WAVE’s policy and development recommendations to stakeholders in the Lake Tanganyika Basin
and the Great Lakes region is a blueprint designed to be adapted in other energy rich regions of
Africa, as well as other water-centric communities across the globe. These initiatives require long
term investment in infrastructure (health systems, telecommunication, education, etc.),
professionalization of security services, and education that interventionist top-down solutions
usually cannot sustain for long periods of time.
“Proper investment in
infrastructure and socioeconomic development by
foreign investors will help
bridge the gap between
instability and economic
sustainability.”
This blueprint is applicable to multiple stakeholders with intersecting interests in Africa, whether
applied to build health infrastructure, nurture emerging economies, extract minerals and energy
resources responsibly, streamline production rates, end poverty, lower maternal and child
mortality rates, save endangered animals, create sustainable fisheries, protect one of the largest
freshwater bodies in the world, or encourage good governance and enforce security along
porous borders. All of these intersect one another, yet most development programs address only
one or two of these connections, limiting the sustainability and outcomes of regional development
initiatives.
1.6 The Time to Engage is Now
In reaction to the spread of fighting along the eastern provinces of the DRC in the past two years,
the international humanitarian community has placed the Great Lakes region at the top of its
agenda. It has agreed with regional leaders to a new three-pronged approach to end the
protracted conflict in the Great Lakes region by supporting political negotiations and reforms,
economic packages worth billions of dollars, and through the creation of an additional security
force to complement the current UN peacekeeping mission in the DRC.
This peace and economic initiative is a new method to address the persistent instability in the
Great Lakes region by breaking the cycle of conflict through preventive measures (e.g.,
economic reforms to increase trade opportunities and invest in infrastructure), rather than
manage crisis in the aftermath of fighting, and increases public-private partnership opportunities
to support investment and development in the chronically unstable but resource rich Great Lakes
region.
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21
With the proportion of working aged people based in Africa predicted to double in the next 35
years, a window of opportunity is presented to the extractive sector to make use of a growing
labor force and a new economically active population. But this window is narrow, and
opportunity can only be realized through proper investment in infrastructure and socio-economic
development by foreign investors to help bridge the gap between instability and economic
sustainability.
For the first time in decades, the Great Lakes region has the chance to silence the fighting, boost
trust and trade between neighbors and international partners, build infrastructure that supports
health systems and education, empower women, and create economic opportunities that will
help the countries forge a path to prosperity, good governance, and lasting stability. If regulations
are changed to support such endeavors, and if countries’ foreign policies for economic
development in the Great Lakes region are revised, what seems like a pipe dream may become
a reality sooner rather than later. It is in this pursuit that the following piece hopes to offer a
contribution.
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2. Lake Tanganyika and its Basin
The negative impact of oil, gas, and mineral extraction is a major concern in the African Great
Lakes region, as it threatens both the health of local communities and the livelihoods upon which
they depend. The Lake Tanganyika Basin is used here as a case study to highlight the broader
issues in the Great Lakes region. The unique biodiversity and fragile ecosystem of Lake
Tanganyika is explored, as are the risks and benefits of E&P activity in its catchment basin.
Lake Tanganyika is attracting interest by the E&P industry after recent surveys indicated large
petroleum deposits under her lakebed. Alberta Oilsands Inc. and the oil and gas division of
Freeport-McMoRan have expressed interest in the DRC side of Lake Tanganyika, and Beach
Petroleum Tanzania Ltd, a subsidiary of the Australian exploration company Beach Energy, has a
production sharing agreement (PSA) with the Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation
(TPDC) for exploration on Lake Tanganyika’s southern block.
Beach Petroleum has been conducting metocean studies to assist in the design of drilling solutions
on the lake. The area is considered highly promising based on 18 petroleum prospects identified
from the high quality 2D seismic surveys conducted earlier in 2013.8 As the paper was going to
press, Beach Energy announced, Beach Petroleum Tanzania had signed an agreement for the
transfer of 70 percent of its 100 percent interest in the Lake Tanganyika south oil block, Tanzania,
to a wholly owned subsidiary of Woodside Petroleum Limited.9 Woodside is a large oil and gas
production company based in Australia.10 Industry sources have indicated that Woodside will drill
the first exploration well and will reevaluate their continued investment based on the results of that
exploration well.
Last year in October 2013, the Government of Tanzania announced a fourth round for companies
to bid for the lease of Tanzania’s fourth deep offshore block and the northern block on Lake
Tanganyika.11 The TPDC announced in a press release in May 2014 that a total of five bids were
received from five companies upon the close of the licensing round on 15 May 2014. 12
As Central and Eastern Africa get attention for new oil and gas reserves found both offshore and
inland along other lakes in the Great Rift Valley, Lake Tanganyika will likely become more popular
to explore for energy extraction. WAVE has observed that Lake Tanganyika Basin is largely
misunderstood by foreign investors due to its geopolitical complexity and isolation. It is WAVE’s
intention that this report informs policy makers and the private sector to develop a more effective,
cross-sectoral approach for sustainable resource management and development in the Lake
Tanganyika Basin and the African Great Lakes region as a whole.
About Lake Tanganyika
Located in the Albertine Rift Valley, Lake
Lake Tanganyika Statistics:
Tanganyika is shared by Burundi, the Democratic
 17% of the world’s surface fresh water
Republic of the Congo (DRC), Tanzania, and
 Second largest lake in the world
Zambia. The Lake Tanganyika Basin provides
essential sources of livelihood and income for over
 19,000 km3 of water
twelve million people, and contributes to the
 9-12 million years old
growing economies of its transboundary riparian
 1,900 km of shoreline
countries. Known for its rich biodiversity and
 Supports 12 million people
unique aquatic ecosystems, Lake Tanganyika
 600 unique aquatic species
harbors approximately 1500 aquatic species out
of which approximately 600 are endemic to the
Figure 1
ancient lake. Lake Tanganyika is the oldest and
deepest lake in Africa, the largest volume of the three African Great Rift Valley lakes, and the
second largest lake in the world by volume.13 It contains an estimated 17 percent of the world’s
available surface freshwater supply, supports some of the largest freshwater fisheries on the
African continent, and sits on three potential oil reserves in the territories of Tanzania, Burundi, and
the DRC.14
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23
The majority of the people in the Lake Tanganyika Basin live in small rural settlements along the
shoreline, largely underdeveloped as a result of its geographic isolation. Steep mountains encircle
much of the basin area: with little to no infrastructure along coastal plains, making access difficult.
The current population in the lake basin is estimated to be between 12.5 and 13 million, and largely
dependent on Lake Tanganyika to sustain a small-scale agriculture and fishing economy.
There are few alternative resources available other than fisheries and agriculture. Extreme
poverty, a high population growth rate, and under-development contribute to the unsustainable
use of resources in the lake basin, threatening its region’s biological diversity. The fragility of the
region places it at a disadvantage to deal with subsequent or secondary threats in the basin,
including: over-exploitation of fisheries, climate change, deforestation, air pollution,
agrochemicals, mining activities, and industrial waste.15
The ecological and environmental balance of the lake faces serious threats as the population
increases along the lakeshore, as well as from industrial activity based around Bujumbura and
Kigoma. The Lake Tanganyika Authority (LTA) expects the number of people dependent on the
natural resources in the basin to increase significantly in the near future. The population growth
rate in the basin is among the highest in the world, ranging from two percent to 3.2 percent each
year.16 Without proper water management and infrastructure development, these issues
jeopardize the water quality and especially the health of the lake ecology and biodiversity. If the
lake became polluted and its fish were no longer suitable for consumption, a water and food crisis
would ensue placing a vulnerable population in further peril.17

The Lake Tanganyika Authority (LTA) was launched in December 2008 as an institution management structure
established under Article 23 of The Convention on the Sustainable Management of Lake Tanganyika (June 2003)
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Figure 2. Source: International Lake Environment Committee 18
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3. The Convention on Sustainable Management of Lake
Tanganyika
Recognizing that the Lake Tanganyika Basin is a threatened global heritage site, its riparian
countries, along with international organizations, began a number of important initiatives to
establish a collaborative approach to the sustainable development and management of the
natural resources of Lake Tanganyika in the 1990s.19
In 2003, after a decade of preliminary conservation initiatives through the support of UNDP and
the Global Environmental Facility, the Convention on Sustainable Management of Lake
Tanganyika was signed by the lake’s riparian states and regional stakeholders.* The Convention
provided the framework for the establishment of the Lake Tanganyika Authority (LTA). Ratified in
2007, the LTA has the mandate of advancing and representing the common interests of the
contracting states in matters concerning the management of Lake Tanganyika and its catchment
basin.
The Convention states its primary objective is to “ensure the protection and conservation of the
biological diversity and the sustainable use of the natural resources of Lake Tanganyika and its
basin by the Contracting States on the basis of integrated and co-operative management.”20 To
that end, the Convention aims to facilitate the “development and implementation of harmonized
laws and standards concerning the management of Lake Tanganyika and its basin.” 21 The
Convention addresses several aspects of the lake’s management, including:

Sustainable fisheries management
o

Prevention and control of pollution
o

Article 12 directs the Contracting States to take steps to ensure freedom of navigation
on the lake and to prevent pollution from lake vessels; and
Environmental impact assessment
o
*
Article 11 obligates the Contracting States to cooperate in protecting and controlling
access to genetic and biochemical resources in the Lake and its basin and to share,
in a fair and equitable way, the utilization of those resources;
Navigation
o

Article 10 requires the Contracting States to take appropriate legal, administrative,
and technical measures to conserve biological diversity and to prevent and control
exotic species in the Lake basin;
Protection and utilization of genetic and biochemical resources
o

Article 9 directs the Contracting States to take necessary legal, administrative, and
technical measures to prevent excessive sedimentation from deforestation, land
degradation, wetlands destruction, and other causes;
Conservation of biological diversity
o

Article 8 requires the Contracting States to construct pollution reduction installations,
to prevent waste disposal in the lake, and to develop legal, administrative, and
technical measures for pollution reduction;
Prevention of sedimentation
o

Article 7 directs the Contracting States to establish a framework fisheries
management plan, to develop and implement harmonized national fisheries policies
and regulations, and to promote community participation in fisheries management;
Article 15 sets forth environmental impact assessment procedures to be followed by
the Contracting States to avoid and minimize adverse impacts on the Lake and its
basin from proposed projects, policies, plans, programs, and other activities.
Summary of initiatives leading up to the establishment of the LTA and SAP, Appendix A
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3.1 The Lake Tanganyika Authority and Strategic Action Program
The LTA oversees the implementation of a regional integrated management program, known as
The Strategic Action Program for the Protection of Biodiversity and Sustainable Management of
Natural Resources in Lake Tanganyika and its basin. The LTA recognizes the threats to the
biodiversity and natural resources of Lake Tanganyika and uses the Strategic Action Program
(SAP) to plan and implement complex integrated natural resource and socio-economic
development programs that affect multiple sectors with impacts that extend across national
boundaries.22
“The SAP should establish clear priorities that are endorsed at the highest levels
of government and widely disseminated. Priority transboundary concerns
should be identified, as well as sectoral interventions needed to resolve the
transboundary problems as well as regional and national institutional
mechanisms for implementing elements of the SAP.”
(GEF Operational Strategy, 1996)
Underlying the SAP is the recognition for the need for
integrated management of multi-sectoral problems. The
cause of environmental threats often involves complex
socio-economic and political situations, which usually
require inter-disciplinary solutions. Following stakeholder
consultations in 2010, the SAP’s Program of Priority Actions
was updated in compliance with its six long-term strategic
objectives. The revised SAP laid out strategic actions to
reduce pollution and improve water quality through
several components relative to the energy sector’s E&P
activities in Lake Tanganyika and its basin, as well as
infrastructure and socio-economic development in the
region by riparian countries. This includes reduced urban
and industrial pollution, reduced mining pollution, and
reduced risks related to petroleum E&P.23
Long-term Objectives of the
Strategic Action Program:






Climate change impacts
Sustainable fisheries
Reduction of sedimentation
Habitat protection,
restoration and management
Biological invasions
controlled and prevented
Reduction of pollution and
improvement of water quality
Figure 3
Despite the efforts of the LTA and supporting partners since its ratification in 2007, members of the
LTA Conference of Ministers expressed concern at the Fifth Ordinary Meeting 28 February 2012
that the biological richness and sustainable use of the natural resources in the Lake Tanganyika
24
and its basin are increasingly under threat.
“The LTA doesn’t have
the mechanism to enforce
these codes and Riparian
Countries’ have turned a
blind eye to many of the
reporting requirements.”
3.2 Utilizing the Lake Tanganyika Authority
It is important to alert stakeholders in the Lake Tanganyika Basin that the LTA is a body from which
a dialogue on transboundary issues can be used to promote solutions in a regional context to
many of the complex issues affecting the region. The LTA should be empowered to enforce
recommendations laid out in the Convention for Sustainable Management of Lake Tanganyika.
This framework presents a platform to discuss other regional issues, such as transparency in
extractive activities, management of urban pollution, climate change and its effects on health
and security, over-fishing and impact on food security, and demarcation border disputes.
Partnership Opportunities with the Lake Tanganyika Authority
According to the former Executive Director of Lake Tanganyika Authority, Dr. Henry Mwima, the
LTA seeks stakeholder partnerships to support the following programs:
1.
Seeking financial resources to carry out a baseline survey in the four countries, which will
determine how many fishermen earn a living from the lake, the types of fishing equipment
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2.
3.
they use, so as to establish uniform regulations and practices shared between four riparian
countries on Lake Tanganyika.
Exploring possibility to carry out a massive transboundary awareness campaign on issues
related to environmental management along Lake Tanganyika.25
Support initiatives under the umbrella of the Lake Tanganyika Water, Sanitation and
Environmental Management Program (LT-WATSAN) – a regional platform supported by
multilateral organizations (LTA, UNEP, UN-Habitat, EAC, UNIDO and European Investment
Bank, and basin country representatives) to map out an intervention program to unlock
trade and investment opportunities and address sustainable management challenges in
the Lake Tanganyika Basin.26
Enforcement is an Issue
The LTA is charged with upholding the Lake’s Riparian Countries’ governments’ signed Convention
for Sustainable Management of Lake Tanganyika, yet it doesn’t have the mechanism to enforce
these codes and Riparian Countries’ have turned a blind eye to many of the reporting
requirements such as licensing blocks to extractives that conduct exploratory drilling along the
lake.
Regional bodies such as the ICGLR, SADC, and EITI * have mandates to promote regional
cooperation, economic development and good governance; but many of these organizations
struggle to deliver long-term results. Much of this failure can be traced to the inability of the
mediating body to enforce agreements. As a result, regional cooperation is fleeting with lack of
accountability and breakdown of negotiations, fueling the very conflict the organization intended
to dispel.
The International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), the South African Development Community
(SADC), and the Extractives International Transparency Initiative (EITI), etc.
*
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4. Oil and Gas Exploration and Production, and Mineral
Extraction
Oil and gas deposits are being explored for potential extraction in areas once deemed too
expensive and geopolitically/environmentally risky, in order to maintain the pace of soaring
demand. This occurs at a time when, notwithstanding technological improvements, finding new
sources of energy supply and extracting them is becoming increasingly challenging and
expensive. As a result, trade-offs are being made that put populations and the biodiversity near
energy exploration sites at risk without proper infrastructure and socio-economic development
planning.27
One particularly vulnerable region subject to future oil extraction is the Lake Tanganyika Basin.
Exploration in Lake Tanganyika has been limited until now, but as Central and Eastern Africa get
attention from new oil and gas reserves found offshore and inland along other lakes in the Great
Rift Valley, Lake Tanganyika will likely become more popular to explore for energy extraction.28
As of February 2013, Burundi and Tanzania have leased oil blocks on Lake Tanganyika’s eastern
shoreline for exploration and there is growing interest in prospect oil blocks on the Congolese side
of the lake. Recent surveys on Lake Tanganyika suggest a large working petroleum system
underneath the Congolese side of the lake. Although the DRC has not issued any exploration
licenses for Lake Tanganyika, its energy minister publically stated mid-2012 that the Congolese
government “aims to start realizing the potential of Lake Tanganyika in the medium term.”29
4.1 Democratic Republic of the Congo
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), which is often labeled as the prime example of
the paradox of plenty, is making efforts to reverse its reputation as a country extremely rich in
natural resources, yet struggling to pull its people out of extreme poverty with the second lowest
per capita GDP in the world.30 The Congolese government is approaching this by submitting a
draft hydrocarbon bill to Parliament to encourage foreign investment; however, the proposed
hydrocarbon bill is poorly drafted and needs to be revised to support regulatory reform. Under its
current form, it would be very challenging to fashion a well regulated industry that provides a
sustainable anchor for industrial development. 31 Of growing concern is the external commercial
pressure by unregulated entities in the region to expedite the signing of this bill.
The DRC has also attempted to meet international standards of good governance and
transparent regulatory practices through the international Extractive Industry Transparency
Initiative (EITI). After seven years, the DRC earned full membership to the EITI in July 2014. EITI
announced on 2 July 2014 that the government had addressed issues raised in a 2010 report which
led to the DRC’s temporary suspension in 2013, and the Congo was now a compliant member
meeting EITI’s standards of transparent extractive accounting practices.32 33 34
Activists and organizations that promote good governance practices have pushed for the new
legislation to require an open and competitive tender process for oil permits, contract and
ownership transparency for oil and gas rights, and prohibition of drilling in the DRC’s national parks.
The DRC granted oil exploration licenses to SOCO International for Block 5 along its northeast
border with Uganda, a controversial move, as the blocks overlap with Virunga National Park.*
Home to approximately half of the world’s 950 mountain gorillas, Virunga National Park is one of
Africa’s oldest and most diverse national parks and a UNESCO world heritage sites.
Following mediation in London with the World Wildlife Fund and consequential negative press,
SOCO announced in June 2014 that it would withdraw from Virunga National Park.35 As of midAugust, no such move had been made. Rather, an information campaign by SOCO ensued in
which Chairman Rui da Sousa told investors at SOCO’s annual general meeting that “we have
not pulled out.”36 Since then, new details have come to light. A leaked letter from SOCO
insinuated that it did not necessarily intend to disengage exploration activities from Virunga
National Park and that the company was exploring other options, such as working with UNESCO
*
Map of Block 5 - Appendix C.
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to redraw Virunga’s borders. According to Global Witness, the letter was addressed to Congolese
Prime Minister Augustin Matata Ponyo and signed by SOCO’s DRC Chief José Sangwa.37
While the DRC is widely known for its mineral wealth*, its E&P oil and gas sector has become the
new frontier in the DRC’s extractive industries. The sale and distribution of natural gas and
products derived from crude oil will face issues as it tries to escalate distribution that will challenge
a burgeoning infrastructure. Based on records submitted to the EITI in 2013, the Congo produced
approximately 25,000 barrels per day, generating more than USD 320 million in tax revenue in
2010.38 Total government revenue from the oil, gas, and mining sector in 2010 was just over USD
875 million.39 Government revenue from the hydrocarbon sector increased by 60 percent the
following year to a record USD 1.4 billion, per two reports submitted to EITI in December 2013.40
According to EITI, “The reports identified areas of improvements in the tax systems, state-owned
companies, and the management of government revenues.”41 The Ministry of Hydrocarbons has
agreements with large oil companies such as Total and Chevron currently invested in the Congo.
A massive increase in the Congo’s oil production is likely once the new legislation has passed,
followed by the expectant agreement with Angola on sharing benefits of lucrative offshore
fields.42
Draft Hydrocarbon Bill
The Ministry of Hydrocarbons submitted a draft hydrocarbon bill to parliament in 2013, currently
under review for approval, which seeks to make the sector more attractive to investors. Global
Witness reports the planned revisions to the hydrocarbons law contain major flaws that could allow
gross mismanagement of the country’s oil wealth with serious environmental impacts and fail to
safeguard the country’s UNESCO-protected world heritage sites.43 44
The proposed oil code fails to insist on full, open tender processes for exploration licenses as
recommended by the UN, World Bank, IMF, and other organizations. Without such transparency,
it is feared corruption will flourish as it has in its many minerals contracts, costing hundreds of millions
of dollars or more in lost tax revenue for a country. Additionally, there is very little protection from
the transfer of mining and oil assets well below market price. In 2013, the Africa Progress Panel
reported five mining deals in the DRC were sold to offshore companies between 2010 and 2012
for USD 1.36 billion less than they were worth.45
There is concern that the Congolese government is irresponsibly expediting the process of drafting
and passing this new hydrocarbon law, with little transparency on the process and no open
debate or input from civil society organizations and expert bodies. The draft oil code was passed
in 2013 by the Congolese Senate, and has been under discussion in the Lower House of
Parliament, projected to be passed mid-2014. It has, however, remained in draft form due to
falling short of international standard for hydrocarbon law.46 47 Some critics report revisions to the
draft oil code in November 2013 did not go far enough and the bill remains inadequate to
discourage illegitimate and/or non-transparent energy deals in the DRC. The IMF reported that
the draft law falls short of the need for transparency to ensure a fair share of oil revenues go to
the Congolese people.48
Historically, exploitation of the DRC’s hydrocarbon resources came primarily from offshore fields.
Exploration for oil and gas began in the 1960’s along the country’s 22 km Atlantic Ocean coastline.
By 1983, 41 wells had been sunk. Out of this activity, five operating oil fields and one gas field were
discovered; the most significant find being offshore. Of these, the Mibale field contains 48 percent
of the Coastal basin’s recoverable reserves and remains the Congo’s most productive field.49
Western and Eastern Oil Blocks
Some of the DRC’s largest known reserves of oil are offshore. Perenco has a license for most of
these reserves including Mibale, Tshiala, and Motoba fields.50 Perenco was the first sole oil
producer in the DRC. Perenco's onshore drilling program started in 2002, shortly after it took over
the onshore operation and continued at an average rate of 25 wells per year. In 2013, onshore
production was stable, at an average of 10,000 barrels of oil per day. Offshore, Perenco halted
the natural decline with new producing wells drilled in 2012 and 2013. Production is expected to
*
Facts and figures on DRC’s global share of minerals and petroleum production/reserves – Appendix B and C.
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increase significantly thanks to an additional six months drilling campaign planned for 2014. An
exploration campaign will also be carried out with 3D seismic and one exploration well. 51 52
Despite earlier exploration, the DRC still has a vast number of unexplored oil reserves.* A number
of deals have raised interest in the DRC’s oil prospects in the last two years, including the Ndunda
block in western Congo which lies in the country’s western Bas-Congo Province. Italian oil and
gas group Eni recently signed a farm-in agreement with UK-based Surestream Petroleum to
acquire 55 percent and operatorship in the Ndunda block.
A number of foreign firms, including Eni, Total and Tullow Oil, have shown interest in rights to blocks
in the east along the Ugandan border.53 In March 2011, the Congolese Government issued a
license for a joint exploration operation with SacOil, Total, DIG, and a state-owned company for
Block III, located in the Albertine Graben in the DRC (near the border with Uganda). Block III is on
trend with Lake Albert discoveries in Uganda. To date, the majority of the exploration has been
within the borders of Uganda, but the DRC concessions are considered more promising, with Block
III’s proximity to recent significant discoveries.54
Caprikat, Ltd. and Foxwhelp, Ltd. won two permits in 2010 in a controversial bid to conduct E&P
activities in what is expected to be one of the most rewarding oil block prospects on the
Congolese side of Lake Albert.55 The companies obtained E&P rights for Blocks I and II of the
Albertine Graben through a Production Sharing Agreement with the Congolese government. The
bid was controversial since the same blocks had been claimed earlier by two other firms. Industry
sources claim the highly desirable and sought after blocks were awarded to newly incorporated
Caprikat and Foxwhelp, subsidiaries of the Fleurette Group, who will likely sell lease rights to a
higher bidder as the DRC’s oil sector matures. 56
Oil of DRCongo, the Fleurette Group’s subsidiary for E&P operational, technical, social, and
environmental activities, announced in early August 2014 that analysis from seismic studies in
Blocks I and II indicated three billion barrels of oil in place (total hydrocarbon content of an oil
reservoir).57 While it is still unclear what crude is recoverable at this time, the discovery will likely
increase other oil prospect blocks in the Albertine Graben. Oil of DRCongo estimates that
“production of 50,000 barrels of oil per day from Lake Albert would increase the Congo's present
GDP by 25 percent.”58 59 60 61 62
Of notoriety in the prospects on the Congolese side of Lake Albert is Dan Gertler, an Israeli
businessman who, since befriending President Kabila over a decade ago, has heavily invested his
family’s diamond fortune in mining activities and now oil assets in the DRC through Fleurette
Properties, Ltd., Fleurette Group and its subsidiaries, including Oil of DRCongo, Caprikat and
Foxwhelp, among others. 63 64
Lake Tanganyika Oil Block Prospect
Out of the four riparian countries, the DRC has the largest footprint on Lake Tanganyika, making
up the majority of lake’s western boundary, controlling 45 percent of the lake’s area.65 Within its
boundary lies a large natural oil seep, considered one of the largest in the world, located near
Kalemie. Though no licenses have been publically issued for oil exploration for this block, it is a
compelling investment for the gas and oil sector.
Several foreign companies have expressed an interest in exploring the blocks on the DRC side of
Lake Tanganyika, including Freeport-McMoRan’s oil and gas division and Alberta Oilsands Inc. In
a presentation to its shareholders in 2012, Alberta Oilsands Inc. noted that Lake Tanganyika shares
many geological similarities to the proven hydrocarbon-rich rifts of northern Uganda (Lake Albert)
and yet is currently unlicensed in the DRC, providing a low cost entry opportunity with staged
investment.66
Alberta Oilsands Inc. (AOS) announced in January 2013 that it is jointly pursuing a Production
Sharing Agreement with Pan African Oil (PAO) for two blocks on Lake Tanganyika, the Kalembe
Block and the Fatuma Block (together, known as the ‘DRC Blocks’), in which the AOS may earn a
43.75 percent interest in the DRC Blocks. PAO will remain the operator of the DRC Blocks. The
*
Graphic of active and unexplored DRC gas and oil blocks - Appendix C.
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DRC Blocks comprise over one million acres (gross) covering the Kalemie sub-basin on Lake
Tanganyika.67 Earlier in July 2012, PAO signed a Protocole d’Accord (Memorandum of
Understanding) with the DRC Ministry of Hydrocarbons for Block 5 and Block 6 through its business
connection in the DRC. Uprising SPRL, an indigenous DRC company, may also have a small
working interest, according to PAO records.68
Oil extraction on Lake Tanganyika’s is an area of potential contention due to unclear
demarcation line on the lake between the DRC, Burundi and Tanzania. This will likely complicate
prospect E&P on Lake Tanganyika. According to the International Crisis Group, the DRC needs to
reach clearer demarcation of its borders on Lake Tanganyika and on other lakes and coastal
areas before it can collaborate with its neighbors on oil exploration.69 This is also a requirement as
was signed and agreed by the Government of the DRC under the Lake Tanganyika Authority
Convention, which requires full transparency and reporting on such activities on the lake.
The prospect of drilling there has only been sweetened by a recently completed seismic survey of
Lake Tanganyika mid-2012, which indicates the lake has the potential for large discoveries with
signs of a working petroleum system on the Congolese side.70
Mining Activities
The DRC has considerable mineral wealth * (copper, cobalt, gold, diamonds, coltan, zinc, and
tin71). Some of it was exploited by the DRC’s neighboring countries during the Second Congo
War. Unfortunately, mineral smuggling practices are ongoing and a contributing factor to
instability in the region, especially along the eastern provinces of South Kivu and North Kivu and
the southeastern province of Katanga. Known as the DRC’s mining heartland and economic
engine, Katanga produces the majority of the country’s mineral wealth, including copper and
gold, as well as minerals that support the global electronics industry, such as cobalt and coltan.
In 2012 the DRC’s share of the world’s cobalt production amounted to 55 percent (and holds
about 45 percent of the world’s cobalt reserves).72 Yet 80 percent of its population lives on less
than USD 0.20 a day.73 Cobalt is used in the preparation of magnetic, wear-resistant and highstrength alloys and used for everything from jet aircraft engines and orthopedic implants to lithium
batteries.74 Gécamines, the Congo state-owned mining company, produced 837 tons of cobalt
in 2012 and plans to scale production to 7,400 tons in 2015.75 Privately owned companies also
mine cobalt in the DRC, including ENRC and Freeport-McMoRan, one of the world’s largest miners
and refiners of cobalt.76 Through its subsidiary, Tenke Fungurume Mining S.A.R.L. (TFM), FreeportMcMoRan operates the copper and cobalt mining concessions in the Tenke Fungurume minerals
district in Katanga Province, with a 56 percent interest in the Tenke mining concessions. In 2013,
TFM produced 28 million pounds of cobalt, and expects to produce 30 million pounds of cobalt in
2014.77
The DRC also contains a large amount of coltan, a crucial raw material for the production of
tantalum capacitors used in almost every kind of electronic device to include cellular phones,
computers, jet engines, missiles, ships, and weapons systems.78 Coltan (columbite-tantalite) is one
of several ore mixtures of tantalum found in the Kibaran deposit spanning from North Kivu in
eastern DRC to northern Katanga Province. A second deposit, known as the Eburnean deposit, is
located in the northern provinces of Equateur and Orientale. In the Kibaran deposit, a high
concentration of coltan is found within the boundaries of Kahuzi Biega National Park, a World
Heritage site and ecological sanctuary.† Twelve percent of the world’s tantalum production was
mined from the DRC in 2012, according to the U.S. Geological Survey.79 However, recent in depth
reporting on the amount of tantalum that is mined‡ and produced in central African countries
found that these figures are difficult to confirm.80 This is due in part by poor data collection and
the lack of good geological exploration work in the region over the last 20 years, and from the
under-reported export sales of coltan.81 The history of coltan mining in the DRC is connected to
mineral smuggling operations which started during the Second Congo War. This has skewed the
DRC’s coltan export statistics. Coltan that is smuggled from the DRC into Rwanda is counted in
Rwandan export statistics.82 The UN found evidence in 2003 that mineral smuggling financed rebel
List of minerals mined in the DRC - Appendix B.
Graphics depicting environmental impact of coltan production in DRC - Appendix K.
‡ Tantalum is obtained from mines, recycled and scrap materials, inventories, and the slag heaps around tin mines.
*
†
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group activities, contributed to human rights abuses and a spike in child labor; and adversely
affected the environment and gorilla population in the region. 83 84
Opaque Extractive Deals
The privatization of the DRC’s minerals and petro sector has been plagued by a culture of secrecy,
informal deals and allegations of corruption. This culture of corruption has spawned several backdoor deals with foreign corporations with little to no oversight and repercussion until recently. In
April 2013, the international EITI board temporarily suspended * the DRC from its EITI Candidature
status until reporting standards on revenues from the extractives sector were improved. 85 Of even
greater consequence, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) cancelled its loan program with the
DRC in 2012 for failing to publish details of a copper mining deal in 2011. The DRC lost part of its
USD 532 million loan from the IMF (the remainder of undisbursed funds) as a result of the
government’s insufficient response to the IMF’s line of inquiry about the opaque mining deal in
which a trade of assets appeared to be conducted in a non-transparent way. The IMF loan
cancellation also postponed consideration by the African Development Bank of a possible USD
87 million in budget support to the DRC.86
Gecamines, the DRC’s state-owned mining company, didn’t notify the Mines Ministry of a possible
sale of its stake in Kamoto Copper Co. (KCC) in 2013 with Dan Gertler, the leading candidate after
a “tender.”87 Gertler has entered into joint ventures in the DRC’s mineral sector with companies
including Glencore Plc and Eurasian Natural Resources Corp. (ENRC) since 1997. KCC is controlled
by Glencore Plc. The failure by state-owned companies to publish some of those deals prompted
the IMF to cancel its USD 532 million loan to the DRC in December 2012 after the Congolese
government failed to provide enough detail of Gecamines’ June 2011 sale of its 24 percent stake
in the Comide Sprl copper project to Gertler’s Straker International Corporation. The deal was
one of five sales by state-owned Congolese mining companies to Gertler questioned by the IMF
that year.88
Dan Gertler’s growing notoriety in Africa has prompted other companies to distance themselves
from his deals. ENRC, which co-owned Camrose Resources with Gertler, agreed in late 2012 to
buy out the remaining 49.5 percent of the company from Gertler for USD 550 million, following
months of pressure from politicians and campaigners.89 ENRC shareholders have expressed their
discontent being associated with Gertler and many were not in favor of this transaction. In 2010,
ENRC had purchased 50.5 percent of the company for USD 175 million.90
Caprikat and Foxwhelp
Companies are not the only entities concerned with how Dan Gertler is doing business. The
government of the DRC threatened in 2012 to take away two prospective oil blocks awarded in
2010 to start-up offshore companies linked to Gertler, Caprikat and Foxwhelp, citing little progress
had been reported back since the seismic studies began. Industry sources claim the highly sought
after blocks on the Congolese side of Lake Albert were awarded to Caprikat and Foxwhelp in
2010, two newly incorporated companies with no track record in the energy sector, and believe
the companies will sell lease rights to a higher bidder.91 Fleurette Properties, Ltd., owned by Dan
Gertler, is the parent company of Fleurette Group and its subsidiaries, including Caprikat and
Foxwhelp, among others. Fleurette Properties, Ltd. is owned by Line Trust Corporation Limited
“strictly and solely in its capacity as trustees of the Ashdale Settlement, a trust established in 2006
for the benefit of the family of Dan Gertler.” 92 According to DRC Oil Minister Crispin Atama Tabe
Mogodi, Dan Gertler is one of the principal partners in Caprikat and Foxwhelp, as well as South
African President Jacob Zuma’s nephew Khulubuse Zuma. 93 94
There is no available
documentation confirming Khulubuse Zuma’s ownership, and sources familiar with the deal say
that he is not a shareholder. However, the identity of the ultimate real owners of the companies
– believed to be South African – remains secret due to the companies’ incorporation in the Virgin
Islands, a known tax haven.95 96 †
*
†
The DRC has since been accepted as a Compliant Member of EITI. (EITI, 2 July 2014)
Reports of further internal transactions continue to circulate.
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33
The Nessergy Deal
In April 2013, the Gibraltar-registered Nessergy Ltd. (majority-owned by Dan Gertler), sold the
Congolese government back its rights to an oil block along the Congolese-Angolan border in a
deal criticized by transparency advocates. The amount of the resale wasn’t disclosed, which
prompted criticism from Global Witness. Reuters, citing an April 2013 contract it saw, reported the
Congolese government bought back block 14C for USD 150 million, which amounts to 300 times
the amount original asking price paid by Nessergy in 2006; reportedly obtained for USD 500,000
without a public tender.97
Block 14C is located in the Atlantic Ocean near some of Angola's most productive oilfields. At the
time it was acquired by Nessergy, it was located in an area at the heart of a maritime border
dispute between the DRC and Angola. However, the two countries have since created a zone
of common economic interest in an attempt to settle the border dispute. Congo sought to buy
back the rights from Nessergy in 2013 to allow negotiations for a new production sharing
agreement with Angolan state oil company, Sonangol. A Nessergy spokesman said the company
wasn’t able to make any progress in exploration on the block and it sold its rights back despite
“considerable efforts to find development partners” over the course of several years. However, a
confidential U.S. diplomatic cable from 2009 published online by Wikileaks said Gertler originally
bought the block in a “corrupt oil deal” with the help of Congolese officials. The sale infuriated
the Angolan government, which considered the blocks Angolan property, the cable said.98 99 100
Dan Gertler
Dan Gertler invested in mining assets in the DRC using his family’s fortune in diamonds fifteen years
ago. During this time, Gertler befriended the now Congolese President Joseph Kabila and has
paid state-owned entities undisclosed amounts for mining rights since Kabila began his
presidency. Gertler has stakes in companies that control 9.6 percent of world cobalt production,
based on U.S. Geological Survey data and company figures.101 In 2013, Dan Gertler’s fortune was
estimated to be between USD 2.2 billion102 and USD 3 billion,103 according to Forbes and
Bloomberg billionaire lists.
Good governance and other nonprofit groups have accused Gertler of using his ties to the
president to pay below market levels, essentially robbing the Congolese people from the
proceeds of their country’s great resource wealth.104 The African Progress Panel released a report
in May 2013 citing the DRC had lost out on USD 1.36 billion in revenue (double the state’s annual
budget for health and education), by selling undervalued copper and cobalt deposits now
controlled by Glencore Plc and ENRC.105 According to the report, the figure represents a small
share of overall losses as state-owned companies underprice assets they sold to companies
owned by Gertler between 2010 and 2012.106 Glencore, ENRC, and Gertler deny any wrongdoing
and instead highlight the income generation and tax revenue it brings the country, providing
20,000 jobs to local workers, as well as investment and donor community projects worth USD 150
million since 2004 through The Gertler Family Foundation.107
4.2 Tanzania
The Tanzanian extractive industry has experienced a boom in prospective gas and oil fields over
the past decade.108 New oil and gas discoveries of have recently been discovered off the coast
of Tanzania in the Indian Ocean and inland, including two blocks on the Tanzanian side of Lake
Tanganyika. Proven gas reserves off the eastern coast are estimated to be over one Trillion Cubic
Feet (TCF) according to the EITI Tanzanian country report. This number has increased ten-fold
based on recent discoveries in deep offshore gas which have been estimated at 13 TFC.109
Norwegian explorer Statoil made the most recent gas strike off the coast in December 2012,
discovering a “separate and significant” gas-bearing reservoir in Block 2. Stateoil operates Block
2 with a 65 percent stake on behalf of the Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC),
with ExxonMobil holding the remaining 35 percent.110 According to Tanzania Daily News, the
government recently raised its estimate of recoverable natural gas reserve to 33 TCF. These gas
strikes off East Africa’s coast have led to predictions that the region could become the world’s
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34
third-largest exporter of natural gas.111 Seismic surveys in Tanzania’s southern block of Lake
Tanganyika indicate additional gas and oil prospects.*
Prospects on Lake Tanganyika
Potential oil and gas fields in the southern block on the Tanzanian side of Lake Tanganyika were
leased by the TPDC and Tanzanian government in 2010 to Beach Petroleum Tanzania Ltd.112 Upon
completion of an initial survey of the southern block in August 2012, Beach Petroleum announced
that its exploration block has the potential to contain 200 million barrels of oil.113 However, finding
and pumping that oil at depths of up to 1.5 km will take much longer than in Lake Albert, where
oil production is expected to start on the Ugandan side of the lake in the next four years. 114
Beach Petroleum has been conducting metocean studies to assist in the design of drilling solutions
on the southern block of Lake Tanganyika. These surveys are ongoing with data being collected
and assessed. The area is considered highly promising based on 18 prospects and leads identified
from the high quality 2D seismic surveys conducted earlier in 2013.115 116
Oil major Total took steps to secure exploration acreage in Tanzania’s northern block of Lake
Tanganyika. However, Total’s Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) application came under
review mid-2011 by the Tanzanian Ministry of Minerals and Energy under the advisement of the
TPDC.117 118 The delay in licensing Total the PSA was partly in connection with the order by the
government to ratify its oil and gas licensing law before issuing additional permits. The fourth
international licensing round in September 2012 was halted by the Tanzanian government until
the oil and gas law was ratified.119 120 Total’s PSA application was under review when the TPDC
announced that a fourth Tanzania deep offshore and north Lake Tanganyika licensing round
would take place in October 2013.121 122 On 15 May 2014 the TDPC announced that the licensing
round had closed. Ras Al Khaimah Gas LLC (RAKGAS), a United Arab Emirates company, was the
only company to bid on the northern block on Lake Tanganyika. 123 RAKGAS has gas processing
facilities in the UAE and Oman and conducts E&P activities to develop oil and gas blocks in Africa.
RAKGAS is a major partner in a recent gas discovery in Tanzania.124 The four other bids for offshore
block four were submitted by Statoil and ExxonMobil (Norway and USA), Gazprom (Russia), China
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC), and Mubadala (UAE). 125
Good Governance Initiatives and Community Outreach
According to Tanzanian Deputy Minister for Energy and Minerals, the Tanzanian government has
a 70 percent stake in all gas and oil exploration deals, and is taking all necessary precautions over
the possibility of some investors inflating the exploration costs before commencement of
production, as has been the case in the DRC.126 The Tanzanian government has taken steps to
improve the transparency of its energy lease contracts and met the requirements as an EITI
Compliant Member in December 2012. The EITI obligates the government to publish revenues
they receive from these companies, promoting greater transparency and accountability in
managing the oil, gas, and mining sectors. This letter of transparency coupled with the new gas
block discoveries will likely raise revenue earnings significantly in the near future.127
Tanzania’s ability to reach EITI compliant status is a positive step towards more transparent energy
transactions but other initiatives need to be implemented to further develop good governance
of resources, such as financial support for infrastructure and technical skills to overcome Tanzania’s
insufficient technical labor force. It also needs to invest in public outreach and education
programs to rural communities on exploration and production (E&P) extraction activities in the
region.
Tanzania lacks a professional force of indigenous experts and instead relies on multinational buyers
and foreign professionals. This has placed it at a disadvantage, which has contributed to
unaccountability and improper distribution of the resource wealth to the Tanzanian population.
According to a paper on “Management of the Extractive Industries” presented by the University
of Dar es Salaam and Ministry of Finance, Tanzania’s extractive activities only contribute to one
percent of the country’s labor force. The head of the Economic Department at the University of
Dar es Salaam, Dr. Adolf Mkenda, contends that Tanzania fails to utilize its natural resources due
*
Graphic of Tanzanian oil and gas blocks - Appendix I.
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to insufficient investment in science education, lack of organic technical and legal expertise, and
the country’s dependence of living off the capital.128 Such problems are not new for developing
countries, yet most infrastructural approaches by the extractive sector and state have not
adjusted to resolve them.
Local community buy-in to the extraction of state-leased gas or oil is extremely important. Some
Tanzanian residents, most notably from Mtwara, have held demonstrations opposing the
construction of a gas pipeline from Mtwara to Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. Demonstrators from
Mtwara complain the national government will profit from the extraction of its natural gas reserves,
piping gas to the capital in the north, while continuing to ignore the infrastructural needs of the
Mtwara population. The protests have been peaceful under tight police security so far, but
mistrust by local residents of foreign energy companies in Tanzania is on the rise.129 Moving inland
to the eastern shoreline of Lake Tanganyika, residents from villages in Nkasi District continue to
raise concerns about the recent survey conducted by Beach Petroleum on the M/V
MWONGOZO, spreading stories that soldiers were using the vessel to extract and steal huge
quantities of minerals from the lake’s bed. Despite several meetings and a workshop to explain
current oil and exploration activities in the area and reassure villagers that no extraction of crude
was taking place, Beach Petroleum’s country manager Marcus Mng’ong’o admitted that one of
the company’s biggest challenges was the residents’ lack of understanding of its exploration
activities on Lake Tanganyika.130 This is testament for the need to incorporate education and
cultural outreach programs as part of the infrastructure development plan for extraction activities.
4.3 Burundi
Burundi was known more for its nickel deposits*, among other minerals, than for its oil reserves. This
thinking changed in 2008 when oil seeps were sighted on the Ruzizi River Basin along the border
with the DRC and along the northeastern shoreline of Lake Tanganyika.131 Burundi’s oil zones were
divided into four blocks (A-D) in 2008 and several E&P companies have expressed interest to lease
oil blocks.† In late 2008 Surestream Petroleum was awarded Block D and later Block B in October
2009; both blocks are on Lake Tanganyika and leased for an initial three-year term.
Surestream contracted WGP Exploration in 2011 to convert the TANGANYIKA EXPLORER, an ex-UN
fisheries vessel, to carry out a 2D seismic survey acquisition on Lake Tanganyika in 2012. Surestream
also said it was planning the acquisition of speculative 2D seismic survey over the Congolese areas
of the lake in support of the upcoming license round.132 Due to complications and logistical
setbacks Surestream’s seismic acquisition date was pushed out.
Surestream eventually
contracted GAC UK and GAC-Seaforth to deliver 60 tons of cargo to their seismic operations base
in land-locked Burundi in November 2012. Cargo comprised of fabricated steel sections, stores,
tools, chemicals, seismic equipment, and a 10 meter (33 ft) chase boat. Containers were shipped
by sea from England to Dar es Salaam, and then transported by road to Bujumbura, with selected
items sent by air direct to their final destination at Surestream’s seismic base on Lake
Tanganyika.133 134 This highlights the complexity and cost of moving equipment inland to an area
that lacks basic infrastructural support.
Poor Infrastructure
Burundi’s energy infrastructure was largely destroyed as a result of a decade long inter-ethnic
conflict and civil war in the 1990’s lasting a decade. Investment in energy projects were further
deterred by an embargo enforced in 1996, subsequent scarcity of foreign currency, and
outdated 1976 mining and petroleum legislation. As a result, Burundi has heavily relied on external
aid to support state-funded projects and has struggled to rebuild its infrastructure.‡
There have been efforts to address Burundi’s poor electricity grid through one of the regions first
regional hydroelectric projects funded by the World Bank. The Regional Rusumo Falls
Hydroelectric Project, which will generate power for residents of Burundi, Rwanda and Tanzania,
is the first project operated under the World Bank Group Great Lakes Regional Initiative. The 80
Burundi contains approximately six percent of known nickel reserves in the world. [Debacker, Binyingo, 2008]
Map of Burundi’s oil blocks on Lake Tanganyika - Appendix J.
‡ Sixty percent of the state’s 2012 budget is expected to be paid by donors.
*
†
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megawatt hydroelectric power station in Rwanda will dam the Kagera River on the border with
Tanzania, and projected to be operational by 2017. Environmentalists are concerned that the
ecosystem impacts of the project have not been evaluated.135
The Road to Self-sufficiency
In 2006, the Ministry of Mines and Energy consulted with the EU Energy Initiative Partnership
Dialogue Facility (EUEI PDF) to develop a new national energy policy to address the country’s
energy deficit.* EUEI PDF provided a diverse portfolio of recommended energy policy reforms to
the government to be adopted by the end of 2011. Of relevance to this paper, EUEI PDF
recommended the Government of Burundi reduce its dependence on oil imports; invest in a new
pipeline to Bujumbura to improve the security of Burundi’s oil supply; and support legal and
regulative institutions to promote good governance and induce private sector investment.136 In
October 2012, Finance Minister Tabu Abdallah described infrastructure development as key to
Burundi’s plans for self-sufficiency, to include building roads and energy generation projects.
Burundi expects its economy to expand by five percent annually over the next three to four years;
however, this is below the rate needed to lift it out of poverty.137
Mining and Petroleum Legislation Reform
The Government of Burundi recognized mining and prospective petroleum deposits were vehicles
for economic growth and began to reform relevant legislation. The new mining code is in the
process of being drafted. It does not, however, extend to petroleum E&P activities.138 Thus, a
separate legislative framework governing petroleum activities will need to be issued in the near
future to adapt to present economic and social conditions and environmental regulations,
including those agreed upon in the Strategic Action Program as outlined in the Lake Tanganyika
Authority.
Good Governance Initiatives
Unlike Tanzania and the DRC, Burundi is not working towards becoming a member with EITI.139 It
has, however, created anti-corruption agencies and improved regulatory reforms to lessen
Burundi’s reliance on external budget support. Unfortunately, high inflation in 2012 curtailed
Burundi from meeting its economic goals, with rates as high as 25 percent in April 2012. 140
Furthermore, the International Crisis Group reports a deepening corruption crisis in Burundi from
“neopatrimonialist” practices by the CNDD-FDD,† which has reduced Burundi’s appeal to
Western-based foreign investors. It has also sowed social discontent, pitting former Tutsi and new
Hutu elites against each other, while undermining the credibility of post-conflict institutions.141 142
4.4 Current/Recent Disputes between State Actors
Lake Malawi: Dispute between Tanzania and Malawi
Lake Malawi/Nyasa has been a source of disagreements since colonial times, which was recently
rekindled when Malawi claimed ownership of the whole lake and awarded oil and gas
exploration rights in Lake Malawi near Tanzanian shores.143 Lake Malawi, referred to as Lake Nyasa
to Tanzanians, is considered a global heritage based on its unique biodiversity and size as the third
deepest freshwater lake on earth.144 It is located south of Lake Tanganyika in the African Great
Lakes system, surrounded by the countries of Malawi, Tanzania, and Mozambique.
Lake Malawi is believed to have rich oil and gas reserves. In September 2011, the government of
Malawi awarded Surestream Petroleum licenses to explore Blocks 2 and 3.‡ These blocks total
20,000 km2 and meet the Tanzanian shoreline.145 The Tanzanian government demanded Malawi
halt exploration activities on the Tanzanian side of the lake, claiming entitlement to half of the
Burundi’s high population growth is straining the country’s antiquated hydropower-dependent electric power
grid system and rolling blackouts occur on a regular basis. In addition, the population’s reliance on biomass
energy for cooking has caused severe deforestation in the region.
† Conseil national pour la defense de la démocratie-Forces de defense de la démocratie (CNDD-FDD) rebellion
came into power in 2005, shifting political power from the Tutsi to the Hutu.
‡ Map of Lake Malawi and Blocks 2 and 3 - Appendix I
*
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37
northern portion of the lake, and therefore by extension Malawi would have no legal jurisdiction
to explore oil on their half.
The Tanzanian claim is rooted in common international law, which stipulates that when a body of
water separates two countries, the border is in the middle of said body. Malawi, however, cites
an 1890 agreement between the former colonial powers, which puts the Malawi border at the
Tanzanian shoreline of the lake.146 Tanzania and Malawi have been unable to resolve this dispute.
Bilateral negotiation came to an impasse after an escalation in rhetoric mid-2012, when the
Tanzanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Bernard Membe, told the Tanzanian Parliament that should
Malawi not stop its plans to explore oil on the Tanzanian side of Lake Tanganyika, the government
would regard this as an act of aggression. The media reports following the minister’s statement
created fears that that Tanzania was ready to go to war with Malawi.147
Having failed to bilaterally negotiate territorial jurisdiction of the lake after a year, Tanzania and
Malawi requested the Chairperson of the Forum of Former African Heads of State of Government,
former Mozambique President Joaquim Chissano, to act as a third party mediator in December
2012.148 The Forum began mediation efforts in early 2013.149 However, Malawi and Tanzania failed
to agree on a compromise and negotiations concluded without a resolution in March 2014.
Chissano said the mediators recommended the two countries first use the natural resources in
common benefit and then discuss the delimitation.150
Throughout the negotiation process, verbal rhetoric between the two countries increased as did
the number of assaults on fishermen in the northern part of Lake Malawi. The Tanzanian
government requested Malawi return to the negotiation table but whose unwillingness to stop the
planned deployment of ships on Lake Malawi stoked tensions between the two countries, and
Malawi issued a formal protest to the Tanzanian government in June 2013. 151 152
While negotiations were underway, Surestream continues its preparatory activities for an
Environmental Impact and Social Assessment survey on Lake Malawi prior to targeting potential
drilling sites.153
Lake Albert: Dispute between Uganda and the DRC
The DRC contested its natural border with Uganda on Lake Albert as soon as oil exploration started
in 2003. Interestingly, oil exploration on Lake Albert at that time was initiated by the Congolese
government, which signed a Memorandum of Understanding in June 2002 with the British
exploration company, Heritage Oil. Heritage Oil was contracted to explore 30,000 km2 from the
town of Rutshuru, south of Lake Edward, to Mahagi, at the northern end of Lake Albert. Heritage
Oil did not carry out its exploration in the DRC due to increased instability and poor infrastructure.
Heritage did, however, explore the Ugandan side of Lake Albert. This revived tensions between
the two states over the control of Rukwanzi Island and contributed to bloodshed during the interethnic conflict in Ituri District, DRC in 2003.
In August and September 2007, there were two military clashes between the DRC and Uganda
that lead to a Ugandan - Congolese presidential agreement, designed to increase security
cooperation and work towards a “joint oil production zone” on Lake Albert. The agreement,
known as the Ngurdoto Accords, has been lauded as successfully pacifying the previous zero-sum
war reaction between the Ugandans and Congolese. Two weeks after the treaty was signed the
Ugandan army killed six Congolese while they travelled in a ferry from Rukwanzi Island. It was later
revealed that Heritage Oil played a key role in triggering that military operation, after its staff had
recklessly crossed illegally into Congolese waters.
Diplomats and oil consultants concur that bilateral relations between Uganda and the DRC have
improved since the treaty was signed.154 Uganda has moved forward with its oil production on
Lake Albert. Drilling operations commenced in 2014 which confirmed the presence of about 3.5
billion barrels of oil in place on the eastern side of Lake Albert. Uganda is now entering into the oil
production development phase (with an estimated flow of about 200,000 barrels per day). It has
plans for an export pipeline through Kenya and a 60,000 barrels per day refinery in the vicinity of
the oilfields.155 156 157
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The International Crisis Group warns that tensions remain to fester over the demarcation line of the
lake’s border and sovereignty of Rukwanzi Island. Mounting concern lies within the production of
oil with both countries vying for a refinery and a pipeline. In February 2011, Uganda announced
its plans to construct a refinery for its impending oil production on Lake Albert. 158 Since then, the
Congolese government unilaterally authorized the UPDF to increase security on Lake Albert, a
move that may elevate tensions in the region once more. 159
Off shore Dispute between the DRC and Angola
The DRC has an ongoing oil-related maritime boundary dispute with Angola off its Atlantic Ocean
coastline in Bas-Congo Province. Most of the DRC’s borders were not well defined upon
independence, and the country had accepted the status quo until 2003 when the DRC claimed
two of Angola’s deep-sea oil blocks were in DRC territorial waters. Since then, Angola has
increased its oil production from the contested deep-sea blocks, making it the second largest
exporter of oil in Africa. About half the oil produced by Angola comes from contested oil blocks.
In a submission to the UN in July 2009, the Congo laid claim to Angola’s most profitable offshore
oil blocks and threatened to go to international arbitration. Angola eventually offered Congo a
stake in some of the offshore blocks but negotiations to share oil revenue halted after violent
expulsions and Angolan military incursions increased as a result of the oil block dispute
exacerbating tensions from a long history of security, political, humanitarian, and resource
ownership issues between both countries.160 In late 2010, the UN reported evidence of the
systematic rape of Congolese women and girls as part of the Angolan expulsion of Congolese.161
In 2011, the DRC postponed the submission of its experts' report on the issue until 2014.162
In the spring of 2014 the issue over offshore blocks off the coast of Cabinda heated up after
Angola submitted a map and claim to the UN in December 2013 to extend its maritime boundary
from 200 miles to 350 miles offshore. The Congolese government formally contested Angola’s
request to the UN to extend the length of its continental shelf in April 2014, claiming that Angola
supplied the UN a "unilaterally drawn" map. The DRC requested that the commission refuse to
review the map to allow an international tribunal to rule on the dispute. The UN will review
Angola’s submission during its session from 21 July to 5 September 2014.163 164
4.5 Potential Disputes
Lake Tanganyika
In the context of a general oil rush in Central and East Africa, the lack of clearly defined borders
(especially in the Great Lakes region), poses significant risk to regional stability.165 No disputes
have erupted between state actors in the Lake Tanganyika Basin thus far; however, the potential
for disputes exists given that the borders between the four littoral countries have not been clearly
demarcated. Even if the four riparian countries observed current practices under international
law to divide the lake up by the median line, the location of that line would need to be reassessed,
given that water levels have dropped considerably in recent years.166 The International Crisis
Group recommends the DRC reach clearer demarcation of its borders on Lake Tanganyika and
on other lakes and coastal areas before it can collaborate with its neighbors on oil exploration.167
Increased E&P activity on Lake Tanganyika is another source of tension, if activities are not
carefully coordinated with littoral countries and accepted by community leaders. Although
Surestream only has a PSA agreement with Burundi to explore on the Burundi portion of Lake
Tanganyika, the company announced in 2011 that it was planning the acquisition of speculative
2D seismic over the Congolese areas of the lake.168 169
In 2008 the Congolese Ministry of Hydrocarbons divided the country’s share of Lake Tanganyika
into ten blocks, but the divisions are not official.170 Later that year, the Congolese government
reportedly signed a joint exploration deal with Tanzania for Lake Tanganyika. According to the
International Crisis Group, this agreement was never implemented. The DRC Energy Minister
Atama Tabe announced in August 2012 that his government intended to begin looking at its oil
potential on Lake Tanganyika in the medium term.
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Separately, the Tanzanian Petroleum Development Corporation (TPDC) asked permission for
Beach Petroleum to enter the Congolese side of the lake to facilitate its exploration on the
Tanzanian side.* The request has not been granted, but the Congolese government asked the
TPDC to resubmit their request for the next licensing round, once the new hydrocarbon law was
passed. Beach Petroleum said getting that permission from the DRC has been an issue for the
company, but it was possible to carry out its survey without entering Congolese waters.171
Meanwhile, eastern shoreline communities in Tanzania have voiced discontent with Beach
Petroleum’s exploration activities, viewing the activity as an illegal oil extraction operation. Again,
this misunderstanding by locals echoes the need for better awareness and engagement
campaigns by E&P companies along the lakeshore to counter any mistrust by locals which may
compromise future extraction activities (e.g., sabotage of extraction infrastructure, or other).
There is concern that this local attitude of mistrust will spread to the Burundi and DRC shoreline of
Lake Tanganyika as Beach Petroleum, Surestream, Alberta Oilsands, and possibly others, increase
their exploration activities on the lake.
Lake Edward
Exploration on Lake Edward is reportedly starting soon on both the Ugandan and Congolese sides
of the lake but there are major security and environmental concerns. In 2010, Dominion Petroleum
was awarded exploration rights by Uganda for block 4B, and the Government of the DRC
awarded Block 5 to SOCO International and Dominion Petroleum. Fifty-two percent of Block 5 is
in Virunga National Park, North Kivu causing alarm by environmentalists. Block 5 is also on the
Rutshuru and Lubero territories where militias have clashed. 172 There is concern oil development
in Lake Edward will deepen the instability in the region.173 In June 2014, SOCO announced that it
would pull out of Virunga National Park following mediation with the World Wildlife Fund and
international pressure by the British Government, UNESCO, and other high profile figures, such as
Richard Branson.174 There has since been controversial reports that SOCO is seeking other avenues
to legally drill in parts of Block 5 that overlap with Virunga National Park’s boundaries, such as
lobbying for UNESCO to redraw Virunga’s borders.175 176
4.6 Transparency and Good Governance Initiatives
Several African countries have announced the intention to redistribute their energy wealth into
local development programs by leasing oil or gas blocks to E&P companies; however, they lack
the mechanisms to support an effective, long-term development plan that would ensure local
communities would receive benefits from energy extraction. Energy wealth rarely trickles down
to the under-served and poorer classes in autocratic governments.
In many countries the failure to steer natural resource wealth towards national well-being is largely
linked to a failure of national governance. Of the hundreds of millions of citizens living under USD
2 a day in resource-rich nations, 85 percent live in poorly governed countries. According to
Worldwide Governance Indicators, these countries rate low in corruption control and other
governance dimensions.177 Establishing a legal framework with initiatives that promote good
governance and support transparent public-private energy block leases will discourage illicit
transactions and corruption. The governments of the DRC and Tanzania have begun to take steps
within their national governments and through the EITI, to meet international transparency
standards for their national extraction industries.
The EITI is a coalition of governments, extractive companies, and civil society organizations
committed to the implementation of internationally recognized standards and procedures
related to transparent management of revenues generated by the extractive industry. To be
considered a compliant country under the EITI, certain requirements must be met, one of which is
the reconciliation and publication of material payments and revenues in the extractive sector.
When countries join the EITI they are required to promote transparency by consistently disclosing
material payments by extractive companies, as well as the receipts reported by government
The request to enter DRC waters would permit Beach Petroleum’s contracted MWONGOZO perform turns with
the 3km seismic streamer whilst recording seismic data on the Tanzanian side. This would allow Beach to record
right up to the border before having to turn the vessel, and not to record data on the DRC side of the lake.
*
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40
agencies responsible for collection of revenues.178
Tanzania reached EITI Compliant Member Status in December 2012.179 Tanzania is now
committed to providing annual EITI reconciliation reports of payments made by extractive
companies and revenues received by the government from these companies, in accordance
with the EITI rules.180 181
Until recently, the DRC had been temporarily suspended from EITI candidature status due to
continual problems submitting supporting documents as part of their annual reports to EITI. On 2
July 2014, EITI announced the DRC had reached Compliant Member status after successfully
meeting all requirements in their 2011 report. EITI Compliant Members must meet 21 standards of
reporting, as directed by the EITI, prior to receiving EITI compliance status for transparency of its
natural resources industry.182 183 184
Foreign Governments’ Regulations
The U.S. Congress and the European Parliament have sought to reform laws that would help
regulate mineral trade and promote peace in Africa’s Great Lakes region. U.S. efforts to crack
down on violence associated with the exploitation of mineral resources in the DRC have
culminated in what is commonly known as the Dodd-Frank Act (Sec 1502 and 1504). Finalized in
August 2012, the act requires all companies buying minerals from the region to prove that they
are not indirectly supporting conflict in the region. The U.S. Securities Exchange Commission (SEC)
enacted regulations on 22 August 2012 under Sections 1502 and 1504 of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, detailing the reporting requirements of any oil or
mining company publicly listed on a U.S. stock exchange to disclose taxes and other fees they
pay to foreign governments for resource development. 185 186
Section 1502 supports regional and international efforts to prevent armed groups or abusive state
forces in the African Great Lakes region from benefiting from the sale of tin, tantalum, tungsten
and gold. It is designed to encourage companies to undertake due diligence measures to ensure
that their supply chains do not contribute to conflict or human rights abuse in the DRC or the
broader African Great Lakes region.
Section 1504 requires oil, natural gas, and mining companies to disclose annual reports to the SEC
detailing certain payments made to governments for resource development.187 188 Previously,
companies were able to conceal this information, enabling a culture of corruption, through tacit
support of militia and authoritarian who leaders exploit their country’s resources while disregarding
human rights and good governance practices. The rule will apply to about 1,100 companies and
cover any payment over USD 100,000, beginning in the 2014 fiscal year. 189 190
The European Parliament and the Council of Ministers have been monitoring U.S. reforms within
the extraction industry in Africa, and are currently conducting their own discussions to pass a
European Union reform package to promote greater transparency in foreign oil and mineral
payments. EU Trade Commissioner Karel De Gucht stressed the need for the EU approach to align
with the U.S. Dodd-Frank Act.
The proposal for EU legislation on conflict minerals has been delayed until later in 2014, according
to EURACTIVE and other reports. It appears that the impact assessment performed by the
European Commission Trade Directorate is not considered sufficient and further work will need to
be done before is it finalized. Issues at stake include how many minerals should be covered in any
new law, and whether European firms should face mandatory or voluntary due diligence
requirements for checking their raw materials’ sourcing. The focus would be on the narrowest
point of the supply chain, the smelters, with incentives to upstream supplies to carry out due
diligence.191
There is concern within EU circles that exemptions and loose definitions of extraction projects in its
current law provide a loop hole for most EU companies to avoid disclosing payments to foreign
governments.
While critics argue that reporting payments by project would damage
competitiveness, key ministers of the European Parliament work to find a strong position that the
whole institution can back, and may choose to negotiate with individual member states to gain
traction, in particular, the UK and France.192
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In March 2014 the EU announced that European firms will be offered a voluntary self-certification
scheme to prove that their products' mineral components were not sold by warlords to fuel bloody
conflicts, under a draft EU law that falls short of campaigner’s expectations. Also, it will only apply
to companies placing raw materials on the market, such as Europe's 20 or so smelters, not apply
to importers of products such as mobile phones, which may already have had the materials
installed.193
Proponents of the U.S. regulations argue that the measures squeeze the profits of armed groups
limiting their nefarious activities and support good governance practices, while critics warn it is
prohibitively expensive for investors, impractical to enforce in developing countries, and risks the
livelihood of millions of people. Supporters of this regulation assert that armed conflicts in the
mineral-rich eastern provinces of the DRC have been perpetuated by the income from the illicit
trade in these minerals and a solution to this issue is through the regulation of such conflict minerals.
Some opponents to the U.S. regulations believe that unregulated extraction of natural resources
is not the direct cause of instability in the region; rather, it is a symptom of protracted conflict.
Therefore, the desired outcome of regulations falls short and cannot singularly reduce militia
activity, violence and human rights abuses associated with mineral trade. Without a political
solution, the regulation could hurt more than help the people in the DRC and neighboring
countries by obstructing foreign investment and economic development in the region.194 195 This
is further explored in Part V and Part VI, as is an alternative “anti-fragile” perspective that includes
input from local civil society organizations for a more practical and viable solution.
Joint Initiatives Countering Conflict Minerals
The ITRI Tin Supply Chain Initiative (iTSCi) is a joint initiative that assists upstream companies (from
mine to the smelter) to instigate/initiate the actions, structures, and processes necessary to
conform with the OECD Due Diligence Guidance at a very practical level, including small and
medium size enterprises, co-operatives and artisanal mine sites. It is designed for use by industry,
but with oversight and clear roles for government officials, in keeping with the recently published
OECD Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected
and High-Risk Area. It also takes into account the recommendations of the UN Security Council
(UNSC) to expand due diligence to include criminal networks, as well as armed groups and to
include violations of the asset freeze and travel ban on sanctioned individuals and entities.196
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42
5. Threat to Stability or Development Opportunity?
The following chapter will examine what is truly at stake for those directly affected by the
extraction process. The potential benefits of foreign investment pumped into some of the poorest
economies in the world (to develop the infrastructure needed to extract natural resources) are
weighed against the risks of ecological disasters and poorly implemented socio-economic
development programs associated with E&P activity.
“The water in Lake
Tanganyika has an average
residence time of 440 years,
and its flushing time is
estimated to be 7,000 years.
As such, pollution takes
significantly longer than in
most lakes to be naturally
removed from its aquatic
ecosystem.”
While the E&P industry can be viewed as a threat to stability in Central and East Africa, it can also
be a development opportunity; but there is a fine line between the two. As it stands, current E&P
activity in Africa’s Great Lakes region, compounded by the region’s complex geopolitical
dynamics, further destablizes the region. This, despite the unrealised development opportunities it
presents to an area largely void of basic infrastructure. A more pertinent question stakeholders
should ask is how to lower the costs and mitigate the risks of extraction to avoid the negative
impact of E&P activity on the regions health and environment, which in turn would support
economic development in some of the most under-invested communities in the world. To answer
this question, WAVE examined the potential risks and benefits of E&P on a microeconomic scale
in the Lake Tanganyika Basin.
The main threats to the biological diversity and sustainable use of the resources in the lake basin
result from high rates of human population growth; extreme poverty; lack of overall sustainable
development; over-fishing; climate change; pollution caused by deforestation, agrochemicals,
mining and extractives activities, and industrial waste. The ecological and environmental
balance of the lake faces a serious threat as the population increases along the lakeshore, as well
as from industrial activity based around Bujumbura and Kigoma. Industrial waste from
mismanaged urbanization and development of infrastructure supporting E&P activities in the
region is expected to increase in coming years.
Without an effective prevention plan in place, the lake is extremely vulnerable to mass pollution
of its waters. Of noted concern, Lake Tanganyika’s ability to recover from pollution is
incomparable to most large bodies of water. The water in Lake Tanganyika has an average
residence time of 440 years, and its flushing time is estimated to be 7,000 years. As such, pollution
takes significantly longer than in most lakes to be naturally removed from its aquatic ecosystem. 197
This raises the environmental risks substantially for the E&P industry in the region. Downstream
extractive chemicals and even a small oil spill within the lake itself would have a devastating
effect on the health of the basin and livelihood of its residents.
Case studies highlighted in this chapter illustrate the negative impact of long-term, unsustainable
extraction in the Niger Delta. Focus is also placed upon countries that have pivoted away from
these kinds of practices and successfully limited the negative impacts of energy extraction
through risk mitigating practices and collaboration between extraction companies and civil
society organizations.
Based on the deepening water-food-climate crisis and the lakeside communities’ complete
reliance on Lake Tanganyika as a source of their livilihood, WAVE has determined that, in absence
of comprehensive planning, the risks of current E&P risk mitigation and development practices
outweigh the benefits. A sophisticated, integrated resource management and socio-economic
development approach is needed to counter this imbalance. As such, WAVE provides policy
recommendations to support this analsyis in Chapter 7.
5.1 Environment
The Lake Tanganyika Basin is recognized globally for its unique richness of aquatic and terrestrial
biodiversity and high overall ecologic and environmental value, as well as its potential from
human capital and economic perspectives. It is home to over 1500 species, of which 600 exist
nowhere else in the world.
At over 10 million years old, Lake Tanganyika is among an elite group of only 20 ancient lakes in
198
the world, and the oldest lake in Africa.
The lake’s valuable aquatic ecosystem and the many
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43
natural resources found in its basin provide essential sources of livelihood and income for over
twelve million people around the lake, and contribute to the growing economies of the four
surrounding riparian countries.
The lake contains 17 percent of the world’s available surface freshwater, providing a permanent
source of drinking water, as well as water for domestic use, agricultural and industrial
development. It supports one of the largest fisheries on the African continent, and hosts almost
95,000 active fishers, according to a 2011 LTA Frame Survey.199
“Lake Tanganyika
supports one of the largest
fisheries on the African
continent, and hosts almost
95,000 active fishers."
The Lake Tanganyika Basin faces multiple challenges from the activities of a rapidly expanding
human population. Other than fisheries and agriculture, there are few alternative occupations
available for these populations. As a result, the extraction rate of natural resources like overfishing
and woodland clear-cutting, has become unsustainable.200 The most immediate threats are
unsustainable fisheries, degradation of habitats through mismanaged agricultural practices and
deforestation, erosion and sedimentation, pollution, and biological invasions. * The magnitude of
these threats is expected to be intensified by the impacts of climate change. 201
These issues jeopardize the water quality and especially the health of the lake ecology and its
exceptional biodiversity. There are 1500 species of algae, aquatic plants, fish, birds, reptiles, and
mammals, including chimpanzee troupes in Mahale National Park, as well as in Jane Goodall’s
reserve at Gombe Stream.202 The lake is valuable not only for the presence of these unique
species, but also as a microcosm in which to study the evolutionary processes that have led to this
diversity. Of all the lakes on earth, Lake Tanganyika contains the most unique and diverse
assemblage of freshwater fishes, including the brightly colored cichlids coveted by aquarium
owners around the world. The cichlids of Lake Tanganyika show a greater degree of adaptation
and uniqueness of shape and habitat preference than those in any other lake or river system in
Africa.
Most other categories of aquatic animal and plant life found in Lake Tanganyika show a similar
degree of diversity, much of which is related to species’ ability to adapt to Lake Tanganyika’s
rise/recede cycle, from three ancient lakes into one, over a long period of time since its initial
formation in the Albertine Rift Valley. 203 The emergence of a massive lake in the Upper Congo
basin provided a perfect opportunity for all kinds of river animals to diversify into hundreds of
species endemic to the lake, resulting in a lake with some of the greatest freshwater biological
diversity on the planet.204
The Lake Tanganyika Basin is not only renowned for its aquatic biodiversity, but also for its scenic
beauty. Both the Ruzizi River Delta Reserve in Burundi and the Malagarasi-Muyovozi wetlands in
Tanzania are included in the Ramsar List† of internationally important wetlands, harboring a wide
diversity of birdlife, crocodiles and hippopotamus. The basin contains several forest reserves and
national parks including Kigwena Forest Reserve in Burundi; Gombe Stream, Katavi and Mahale
Mountains National Park in Tanzania; and Nshumbu National Park in Zambia.205 The area’s forests
and mountains support 80 mammal species, including more than 90 percent of Tanzania’s
endangered chimpanzee population.206 Both Gombe and Mahale have become famed as
some of the few remaining habitats for chimpanzees, whereas Nshumbu is known for its rare blue
duiker, as well as the swamp dwelling sitatunga. Other wildlife that can be found in some of the
parks and protected areas in the basin are a range of antelopes, buffalo, zebra, bushbuck,
warthog, hyena, jackal, serval, and occasionally elephant, lion, and leopard.207
Figures depicting environmental impacts from extractive activities - Appendix K
The primary objective laid out in the Strategic Framework of the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands is to “develop
and maintain an international network of wetlands which are important for the conservation of global biological
diversity and for sustaining human life through the maintenance of their ecosystem components, processes and
benefits/services.” (www.ramsar.org, June 2014)
*
†
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44
Population Growth
An increase in population along the lakeshore, industrial activity based around Bujumbura and
Kigoma, and burgeoning mineral and energy exploration and extractive activities in the region
threatens the ecological and environmental balance of the lake. At around three percent, the
basin’s human population growth rates are among the highest on the planet. With an estimated
population between 12.5 and 13 million,* it is expected that the number of people who depend,
either directly or indirectly, on the natural resources in the lake will increase significantly in the near
future.
Importantly, Lake Tanganyika’s fish account for a significant source of protein for the millions of
inhabitants in the lake region. Were the lake to be polluted and these fish were no longer suitable
for consumption, a water and food crisis would ensue, further threatening an already vulnerable
population.208 Commercial overfishing has already reduced the catch for many subsistence
communities. In a recent survey, the majority of fishermen interviewed said they now have to
travel farther than they did five years ago to catch even fewer fish.209
Illegal fishing
“The basin’s human
population growth rates are
among the highest on the
planet. With an estimated
population between 12.5
and 13 million, it is
expected that the number of
people who depend on the
natural resources in the lake
will increase significantly.”
A rise in illegal fishing practices due to commercial overfishing is becoming a regular activity in
parts of the lake and may strain riparian countries’ judicial systems over time. The fishing industry
faces a serious shortage of raw materials to include fish and materials to catch fish, largely as a
consequence of uncontrolled illegal fishing, which in turn jeopardizes the economic health of the
lake and its populations.210
The Tanzanian government repatriated 28 illegal fishermen (rather than investing court time and
money to send the Zambian-based men to trial) to Zambia late December 2012 after they were
caught fishing along Lake Tanganyika’s Tanzanian shoreline in Rukwa Region.211 According to
villagers in the area, there is a huge presence of fishermen from neighboring Zambia, Burundi, and
the DRC who enter Tanzanian’s waters illegally.212 Illegal fishing occurs across multiple borders.
Congolese authorities detained 18 Zambian fishermen illegally fishing in DRC waters in May 2013.
The fishermen were later released after paying penalty fees and following negotiations between
the Zambian and Congolese governments.213 Fisheries experts believe three-quarters of the fish
that pass through Mpulungu, Zambia’s only port, came from waters outside of Zambia’s territorial
control.214
Despite government warnings to fishermen to stop illegally fishing in foreign water bodies, illegal
cross-border fishing practices are expected to increase as the demand for the lake’s fish rises to
meet the needs of the growing population. Stakeholders in the fisheries asked riparian
governments and fisheries associations to step up strategic interventions to halt illegal fishing in
Lake Tanganyika, which they said has adverse impact on each countries’ fishing industry.215
Deforestation
Increased conversion of forests to agricultural land is causing significant losses to biodiversity in the
Lake Tanganyika Basin. Almost 100 percent of the native vegetation has been cleared in its
northern watershed.216 Deforestation has greatly accelerated erosion rates, leading to losses of
nutrient-rich soil and sedimentation. Critical lake habitats in littoral zones are threatened by
erosion and sediment accumulation, disturbing breeding habitats of local fauna. Deforestation
leads to loss of diversity of plant and animal species, including many that could be useful to human
populations as a source of food, timber and medication. Erosion and sedimentation rates can be
reduced through sustainable land management practices as outlined by the Lake Tanganyika
Strategic Action Program.217
*
2011
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Climate Change
Climate change is increasingly impacting Lake Tanganyika’s already stressed aquatic and
terrestrial ecosystems as temperatures in the region continue to rise and precipitation becomes
more volatile. Between 1956 and 1994 Lake Tanganyika’s mean water temperature increased by
0.9 degrees Celsius. This changed the stratification of water layers, reducing nutrient availability
and oxygenation in the water. If this trend continues, fisheries, biodiversity and water quality in
Lake Tanganyika will decline significantly.218
Small changes in temperature can have big impacts on tropical lakes, as studied by Professor
Catherine O’Reilly at Illinois State University in 2003 and Peter McIntyre, an aquatic ecology
professor at the University of Wisconsin-Madison’s Center for Limnology.219 O’Reilly’s team
examined sediment cores taken from Lake Tanganyika’s depths that suggested how a deep,
tropical lake is affected by climate change. O’Reilly found that water temperatures in Lake
Tanganyika warmed 0.1 degree Celsius per decade over the past 100 years and concluded that
it has resulted in a 20 percent reduction in biological productivity in the lake. This study provided
evidence that the impact of regional effects of global climate change on an aquatic ecosystem
can be larger than that of local anthropogenic activity or overfishing.220
“Due to their large volume
and relatively small outflow,
Lakes Tanganyika,
Malawi, and Victoria all
have long flushing times;
with Lake Tanganyika
having the longest flushing
time of 7,000 years. To put
this in perspective, Lake
Superior in North America
(the world’s third largest
freshwater lake after Lake
Tanganyika) has a flushing
time of 191 years.”
At almost a mile deep, Lake Tanganyika’s extreme depth keeps it stratified between warmer
surface water and cooler water at depth. Other than an occasional upwelling of nutrient rich
water from the bottom of the lake, the two water temperatures don’t mix. This upwelling provides
a critical annual injection of nutrients to the littoral areas where most species are found. The lake’s
biodiversity depends on the high productivity fueled by this upwelling of nutrients. As the surface
temperature continues to rise, the barrier between the surface water and colder waters at depth
inhibits these upwelling events. Scientists are already seeing signs that the amount of mixing of
waters has decreased. There is concern that a reduction in the magnitude and frequency of
upwelling events cause by climate-related changes puts at risk the entire ecosystem.221
Understanding the Risks and Impacts of Energy E&P in the African Great Lakes Region
The impacts of oil and gas pollution on the environment and wellbeing of basin communities are
interrelated. They affect the lake’s biodiversity, socio-economic state, and health of its
populations. The riskiest potential threats are borne from oil spills, gas flares, and effluent and
waste discharges in the watershed.
Understanding the limnology of the Great Lakes is important to predict the effects of energy E&P
activities on water quality, water and food security, and fish production. Large dilution capacities
and long flushing times can make the detection and removal of petro-based and chemical
pollutants in these lakes difficult, making them more vulnerable to water pollution. Due to their
large volume and relatively small outflow, Lakes Tanganyika, Malawi, and Victoria * all have long
†
flushing times; with Lake Tanganyika having the longest flushing time of 7,000 years.222 To put this
in perspective, Lake Superior in North America (the world’s third largest freshwater lake after Lake
Tanganyika) has a flushing time of 191 years.223 “The relatively minor contribution of river flows to
the water balances of most of the East African Great Lakes, when couple with their large volumes,
leads to very long residence or flushing times, exceptionally so for the Lake Tanganyika.” 224
An oil spill can have a number of effects on both the environment and health of the population,
and on their fisheries and aquaculture, as well as agricultural-based economies. The entire
watershed could be contaminated, paralyzing the economy and triggering a humanitarian crisis
from food to potable water shortages. Species unique to each lake could be wiped out.
Concentrations of petroleum contaminants in fish and crab tissue could disrupt the ecosystem
and adversely affect the lake population’s health. Water pollution would most likely extend to
the basin’s watershed, much of which is used for irrigation of subsistence agriculture and as a
primary source of water at many wildlife refuges for endangered species.
Morphometric and hydrological data for Lakes Tanganyika, Malawi, and Victoria - Appendix K.
The flushing time or water retention rate in a lake is the mean time that water spends in the lake by calculating
total volume of lake, mean rates of inflow and outflow.
*
†
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46
The Niger Delta in West Africa offers a window into the future of the Great Lakes, should energy
extraction not incorporate risk mitigation practices, regulatory reforms, and integrated
development. The adverse effects of oil and gas exploration and production (E&P) in this region
illustrate how a water-based economy, its environment and the health of its people living in the
area of extraction can be decimated by oil and gas pollutants. Over the past three decades,
the Delta has suffered hundreds of spills, primarily as a result of aging infrastructure, poor
regulations and monitoring and clean-up efforts, as well as spills/leakage caused by political
insurgents and thieves. This has profoundly affected the health of the environment and socioeconomic well-being of the Delta communities.
Strategic Action Plan to Counter Pollution and Mitigate E&P Risks
The Strategic Action Program (SAP) incorporates strategies for the riparian countries of Lake
Tanganyika to achieve regional prosperity by protecting the basin’s natural resources to sustain
future generations. This vision is supported by six main environmental quality objectives that are
aimed to be achieved by 2035. For each objective, the SAP presents a set of specific targets that
are subsequently broken down into a set of strategic actions.225
The strategic action to reduce pollution and improve water quality (Strategic Component F) notes
that pollution is an increasing threat to the Lake Tanganyika Basin region, exacerbated by the
following areas human population growth, increased urbanization and industrialization, and
prospect of exploration and future production of oil. Of particular concern is the fact that Lake
Tanganyika’s ability to recover from pollution is not comparable to most large bodies of water. As
previously mentioned, the water in Lake Tanganyika has an average residence time of 440 years,
and its flushing time takes thousands of years making it highly vulnerable to pollutants, such as
industrial waste from oil extraction and/or a minor oil leak. 226
Within Strategic Component (F), short-, medium-, and long-term targets spanning from five to 25
years in the basin have been determined by regional stakeholders to reduce pollution from mining
activities and to reduce risks related to petroleum E&P. Currently, agreements include monitoring
of mercury concentrations (a processor for gold mining) in fish sold at markets and the exploitation
of a nickel resource in the Burundi part of the basin. Challenges remain in developing,
institutionalizing and enforcing regionally agreed mines acts/regulations. There are limitations on
the level of control of industrial mineral exploitation among the riparian countries. In practice
there is little control of smallholder systems and little experience of environmentally sound
management of major industrial operations.
Recent surveys of Lake Tanganyika indicate viable oil and gas blocks, several of which have
already been licensed for exploration in Tanzania and Burundi. Beyond the environmental
assessment that must take place before petroleum exploration, Component (F) recommends
developing a regional contingency and intervention plan to mitigate risks and allocate resources
for an emergency action in case of an oil spill and other environmental hazards related to
petroleum E&P in the region.227 Petroleum E&P are known to cause grave risks for aquatic and
terrestrial ecosystems. This concern is heightened by Lake Tanganyika’s slow flush process to
naturally cleanse ecosystem if a spill were to occur.
Beach Petroleum announced in 2012 that it would begin targeting potential sites to drill on Lake
Tanganyika in the first half of 2013.228 The Australian company is optimistic drilling operations will
begin within several years depending on outcome of the drill site studies. Despite impendent
extractive activity on Lake Tanganyika, public records do not indicate a definite date for an
environmental impact assessment.229
Based on the projected time frame before drilling begins, it is crucial that programs are developed
within the next two years to mitigate risks when drilling commences in the near future. Therefore,
WAVE calls on the international community, riparian governments, and private stakeholders in the
Lake Tanganyika Basin region to develop programs under the auspices of the LTA, and in
reference to the recently finalized SAP, to protect the already fragile biodiversity of Lake
Tanganyika. This would need to include an environmental impact assessment followed by an
agreed upon contingency action plan prior to exploratory drilling on Lake Tanganyika.*
*
Detailed policy recommendations are descripted in Chapter 7.
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47
5.2 Health
Poverty and inadequate health care are part of a vicious cycle that are compounded by growing
pressures on natural resources in the Lake Tanganyika Basin. Understanding the intricacies of the
region places stakeholders in a better position to design programs that support its fledging health
systems.
As described in the previous chapter, a compromised ecosystem can affect the Lake
Tanganyika’s fishing industry which directly correlates to the health of the population since the
twelve million people living in the basin are dependent on the lake’s fish as its primary source of
protein. Another example of this cycle is the overfishing in the basin which has reduced the catch
for many communities, forcing families to expand their corn and rice fields into neighboring forest.
This in turn reduces wildlife habitat and increases runoff, which then damages fish-spawning areas
in the lake, further degrading the fishery and adding to human suffering. 230 Programs need to be
developed to help communities escape this cycle of extreme poverty, poor health, and
unsustainable pressure on local natural resources.
Reproductive Health at the Heart of Development
“The population around the
lake is subjected to a perfect
storm of dangerous forces:
inaccessible prenatal care,
dilapidated roads and poor
communications
infrastructure, high teen
childbirths, extreme poverty,
and an extremely low socioeconomic status.”
The driving forces behind the economic growth in sub-Saharan Africa are connected to a
decade-long commodity boom and new economic policies. However, the continent’s long-term
prospects depend on the health of the people living there. “To build on Africa’s recent
progress…we have to extend the revolution in child survival and start saving newborn lives,”
astutely asserts Melinda Gates in an interview reported in the November 2012 special edition of
the Economist.231 A large part of that bears on the health of the mother. And yet, reproductive
health problems remain the leading cause of ill health and death for women of childbearing age
worldwide.
Maternal, Infant and Child Health in the Lake Tanganyika Basin
Impoverished women, especially those living in developing countries, suffer disproportionately
from unintended pregnancies, maternal death and disability, sexually transmitted infections
including HIV, and gender-based violence.232 The United Nations Populations Fund (UNPF)
reported early 2013 that maternal deaths would drop by two-thirds if the needs for family planning
and maternal and newborn health care were met. In sub-Saharan Africa alone, UNPF estimated
maternal deaths would drop by 69 percent and newborn deaths would fall by 57 percent, if only
the right health care systems were in place.233 Armed with these numbers that WAVE presents the
alternative approach to delivery health care in an isolated, extremely rural part of sub-Saharan
Africa, primarily dependent on water-based transportation.
Currently, maternal health care is nearly non-existent in the Lake Tanganyika Basin. The
population around the lake is subjected to a perfect storm of dangerous forces: prenatal care is
inaccessible; dilapidated roads are often non-passable (particularly in the rainy season);
communications infrastructure is poor; childbearing often begins in teen years; extreme poverty is
the norm, and the population has an extremely low socio-economic status. One result of this is
extremely high maternal-fetal death rates. Another is fistula formation in women and girls who
survive obstructed labor.
Maternal mortality rates in Lake Tanganyika’s riparian countries range as high as 800 deaths out
of 100,000 live births according to 2010 rates reported by the World Health Organization. 234
However, realistic statistics in the Lake Tanganyika Basin are extremely hard to gather, as many
women do not visit a health center or hospital where they can be counted. Most births take place
in ultra-rural* areas along the lakeshore, with traditional birth attendants present, if at all. This is a
major contributor to a one in five under five mortality rate, which is estimated at 20-25 percent in
the basin. With an estimated annual population growth of three percent, one can extrapolate
that there is also tremendous morbidity and mortality accompanying this high birthrate. 235
LTFHC/WAVE defines “ultra-rural” as the social-geographic disposition of “ultra-poor.” Where “ultra-poor”
connotes being among the poorest of the poor in low-income countries; “ultra-rural” means living in the most
isolated and underdeveloped rural areas in the world.
*
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48
Millennium Development Goal 5, “To Improve Maternal Health”, only tracks indicators that reduce
maternal mortality and achieve universal access to reproductive health. 236 It does not address
any of the chronic nonfatal but still physically and socially disabling consequences of pregnancy
that occur far more often than maternal death. Long-term or permanent physical, social, or
emotional disabilities associated with pregnancy* are 15 to 30 times more common than death in
pregnancy.237
Inadequate Measurement of Public Health
Infectious diseases from poor sanitation and inadequate infrastructure are endemic in the Lake
Tanganyika Basin, but the true magnitude of these diseases is obscured by how the statistical data
is presented, using country median public health rates for the DRC, Tanzania, Burundi, and
Zambia.
The Lake Tanganyika Basin constitutes a unique epidemiologic unit that, up to this point, has been
difficult to measure. Statistical analysis on the causes and effects of the region’s health and
disease conditions are difficult to define since data collection is inhibited by lack of infrastructure.
This is further exacerbated by the region’s isolation. The steep incline of land along the lake’s
shoreline and the tough terrain, limiting road infrastructure, physically isolates the basin’s
populations who are ultimately “lake-locked” and completely reliant on the health of the lake for
their livelihood.
Health care for preventive and emergency medical treatment is hindered by the lack of
telecommunications and transportation infrastructure necessary to support the basin’s remote
health system. It is difficult to investigate outbreaks, survey and screen diseases, biomonitor, and
provide statistical analysis of data for public health studies. As a result, aggregated statistics that
are published by country (median of data collected across each country), does not accurately
reflect the status of poverty stricken regions that are well below the national average, whether
referring to the level of available basic services or public health indicators.
This perpetuates the cycle of inaction in regions that need it the most. National public health
statistics published by country for the DRC, Tanzania, Burundi, and Zambia mislead the status of
the populations’ health in the Lake Tanganyika Basin, smoothing out the basin’s unusually high
rates of under-five deaths, maternal mortality, and death from preventable diseases such as
cholera and malaria.
Public Health Reality in Western Tanzania along Lake Tanganyika
The Millennium Development Goal (MDG) progress report on Africa, published in June 2013,
reported that Tanzania was on schedule to meeting most of its MDGs by 2015. 238 UNICEF echoes
this observation, noting in a September 2013 report, that a few low-income countries with high
child mortality rates, such as Tanzania, have already reduced their under-five death rates by twothirds or more since 1990, reaching MDG 4 for the reduction of child deaths ahead of the 2015
deadline.239 240
This data conflicts with the public health reality of western Tanzania. According to local village
leaders, regional-level health officials, and the field staff at the Lake Tanganyika Floating Health
Clinic, Tanzania’s western rural region of Rukwa (located along the eastern shoreline of Lake
Tanganyika) has an unusually high under five mortality rate. † In 2013, 160 under five deaths
occurred per 1,000 live-births in Rukwa.241 Many of these are causes of entirely preventable
diseases such as diarrhea, malaria and malnutrition. This is compared to the national average of
54 under five deaths per 1,000 live-births in 2012.242 243 Kigoma Region, which also includes large
area on the lake has an under-five mortality rate of 112 deaths per 1,000 live-births in 2013.244
Similarly, the infant mortality rate in Rukwa was 99 deaths per 1,000 live-births in 2013245 compared
to the national average infant mortality rate of 37.7 deaths per 1,000 live-births in 2012.246 The fact
that only 29.3 percent of deliveries occur in health centers in this province, compared to 51
This includes infertility, chronic obstetric fistula, ruptured or prolapsed uterus, postpartum depression, and severe
nutritional deficiencies and injuries from intimate partner violence.
† Based on local stakeholder meetings and initial epidemiological data collected by the Lake Tanganyika Floating
Health Clinic field staff in late 2013.
*
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49
percent nationally, is likely contributory.247 The average distance to a regional hospital where
comprehensive obstetrical care is available is over 94km. 248
There are conflicting reports regarding maternal mortality rates along the Tanzanian side of Lake
Tanganyika, ranging from 127 women deaths per 100,000 live-births to over 453 women deaths
per 100,000 live-births.249 This roughly calculates to 24 to 35 women deaths each day while giving
birth.250 251 This highlights the fact that resources should be invested in the region to better collect
more reliable public health data. WAVE staff are in the process of collecting this information to
provide a better analysis of the region’s public health and women’s health conditions in the Lake
Tanganyika Basin, which also includes surveys of community health workers.
Public Health Reality in Eastern DRC along Lake Tanganyika
“The mortality rate for the
whole of the DRC
population is 57 percent
higher than the average for
the sub-Saharan Africa
countries, according to the
UNDP.”
Infrastructure along the Congolese side of Lake Tanganyika is even worse than on the Tanzanian
shoreline. As a consequence, data collection is scarce and rarely correct. Health data collected
by province has not been formulated with population and baseline variables to add context and
compute an accurate percentage rate to compare with the national average on public health
statistics. For example, the World Health Organizations reports under-five mortality national
average rate for the DRC is 146 under five deaths per 1,000 live-births in 2012.252 253 There is no
reliable data on under five mortality rates by province, only total number of perinatal deaths, live
births, and maternal deaths reported from each province in 2009. 254 255
For a provincial comparison, Katanga Province which hugs the southwestern shoreline of Lake
Tanganyika, reported 397 maternal deaths in 2009, compared to the urban province of Kinshasa
which reported 143 maternal deaths in the same year; and these are only the maternal deaths
that have been formally reported.256 257 Many maternal, prenatal, and child mortality rates are
underreported due to poor infrastructure and lack of accessibility to health systems in the conflict
stricken eastern DRC. Many Congolese who live in ultra-poor rural communities do not go to clinics
for the professional care they need to give birth safety or treat diseases.
What is known on the national level for the DRC, is that the mortality rate for the whole of the
population is 57 percent higher than the average for the sub-Saharan Africa countries, according
to a 2012 UNDP report.258 259 The lack of infrastructure, or its state of decay, makes many areas
difficult to access both for services, including health care, and for humanitarian aid. The state is
struggling to provide basic services for health and education despite having a technical labor
force and medically trained professional class. This contributes to excessive poverty, morbidity
and mortality within the population, especially for populations in conflict zones such as Katanga
Province and South Kivu Province, which share the DRC side of Lake Tanganyika.
Strengthening the Basin’s Health Systems
Among the factors contributing to the riparian countries’ inadequate achievement of the child
health MDGs along the lake are weak health systems (physical and financial barriers to essential
health services, shortage of medicine, poor human resources) and poor conditions as
determinants of health (household education, income, insufficient and inappropriate nutritional
practices, poor sanitation facilities, etc.).
In many sub-Saharan Africa countries, Ministries of Health (MoH) are organized as a tiered system:
dispensaries, district level hospitals, and Regional Hospitals. Dispensaries and/or "Health Centers"
are the first points of care for rural to ultra-rural populations. They are designed to provide primary
care/preventative services. These centers refer patients to a general or district level hospital when
greater diagnostic or treatment capacity is required, and thence on to a Regional Hospital, again
for greater access to services, specialty care, and so on.
The Regional Hospital is the functional unit for the MoH, responsible for taking care of the people
in the region who have illnesses and injuries that cannot be handled by a rural dispensary. It is
also responsible for supply chain management of medicines and consumables; for ensuring
professionalism and adequate training of health care workers; and also for collecting regional
level epidemiologic data.
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“For many people living in
the basin, walking is the
only way to get medical
assistance.”
This referral system, in practice, doesn't work very well in many sub-Saharan countries. Regional
Hospitals struggle to provide the services that they are intended to serve. The systems may
manage to limp along in areas that are connected by roads and mobile networks but in areas
that have very little road infrastructure or connectivity, such as the Lake Tanganyika Basin, the
population has very little access to health services by the Regional Hospitals, and in turn, their local
health centers fail without that support.
Figure 4
“Populations in the Lake
Tanganyika Basin not only
do not have access to referral
services (all surgical services),
but the health centers and
dispensaries cannot carry out
their main mission either, as
there is no supply chain or
professional oversight.”
In the Lake Tanganyika Basin, the referral and oversight system completely breaks down. Referral
centers are located at a great geographic distance from ultra-rural communities in the area. In
addition to the challenges of traveling that distance, poor road infrastructure and lack of
transportation options make the referral centers inaccessible to many basin communities. People
that live in the basin report that it is already difficult to visit their own “local” dispensaries for many
of the same reasons they cannot reach the referral centers and the Regional Hospital. The health
center in Kabanga, DRC for example supports a population of 5,250 people. There is no road
access and no GSM network and the nearest referral center is 70 miles over water from Kabanga.
In Tanzania the Kizumbi dispensary with a population impact of 4,165, has no road access and no
GSM network.* The nearest referral center/hospital is eight miles over water and 87 miles by road,
much of which is not accessible due to poor road conditions and little public transport. For many
people living in the basin, walking is the only way to get to the centers for medical assistance.260
Populations in the Lake Tanganyika Basin not only do not have access to referral services (all
surgical services which include cesarean section), but the health centers/dispensaries cannot
carry out their main mission either, as there is no supply chain or professional oversight. A regional
hospital on a ship solves both problems: it supports the health centers and provides an accessible
referral hospital for ultra-rural (water based and plateau dwelling) communities.†
*
†
Data was collected by Lake Tanganyika Floating Health Clinic field staff later 2013 and early 2014.
Rendering of proposed hospital ship and description of services on hospital ship – Appendix P
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Climate Change: Impact on Health
Several reports and new studies reveal rising global temperatures are increasingly threatening the
health and livelihoods of the most vulnerable populations. In sub-Saharan Africa, researchers
found that food security will be the overarching challenge, with dangers from droughts, flooding,
and shifts in rainfall, compromising the health of the populations in sub-Saharan Africa. Climate
change impacts on water and food security have a direct correlation with the health and welfare
of populations in developing countries. With a region already suffering from malnutrition, and
because of the intrinsic link between agriculture and health, many populations in sub-Saharan
Africa currently do not have the resilience to stand up to the shocks of climate change.
Climate change is a key development issue in sub-Saharan Africa because of the region’s special
vulnerabilities including natural fragility, significant and fragile terrestrial and coastal ecosystems,
and high exposure to natural disasters, and current economic challenges as developing countries.
The University of Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index (ND-GAIN)* ranks Burundi the second most
vulnerable country and the ninth least ready country to adapt to climate change among other
global challenges in measuring its resilience on a global scale. 261 The DRC is the eighth most
vulnerable country and the thirteenth least ready country to adapt to these challenges. 262
Tanzania and Zambia are also ranked low in vulnerability and poor ability to adapt to climate
change, according to the ND-GAIN.†
Climate change impacts fall disproportionately on the world’s poorest, most marginalized
communities, particularly those highly dependent on direct use of natural resources, such as
subsistence fishing communities. The 12 million plus people living in the Lake Tanganyika Basin fit
into this category.263 Populations located inland along freshwater lakes will be some of the first
population groups to feel the negative effects of climate change as bodies of water absorb a
huge amount of heat, which alters its ecosystems. Several scientific studies on Lake Tanganyika
already indicate the lake has warmed in the past century by 0.9 degrees Celsius and has
contributed to lower production rates of fish, further straining available resources and the basin’s
unique ecosystem.
Global warming has caused profound changes in the frequency and severity of some infectious
diseases, such as malaria. There is concern this will spread as time goes on. Several climate
warming models predict large geographic range expansions of human mosquito-borne diseases,
like malaria and dengue fever, into higher latitudes (temperate zones); however, some
researchers have argued that ranges will shift with warming, rather than expand, and that the
best predictors of infection risk are economic and social factors, especially poverty. 264 Detecting
impacts of climate change on human vector-borne diseases remains difficult. Several unresolved
issues include identifying conditions under which climate warming will cause range expansions
versus contractions, understanding the impact of increasing variability in precipitation, and
determining the additional economic costs associated with increased disease risk caused by
warming.265
Water Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) issues and exposure to diarrheal diseases have also been
linked to warmer temperatures and heavy rainfall. Human infections of cholera affect millions of
people annually with a high fatality rate. Cholera is typically acquired through ingestion of
contaminated water or undercooked seafood.266 Water-based communities need to be more
cautious as water temperatures rise and alter the ecosystem. Modeling indicates coastal Vibrio
infections (associated with zooplankton blooms, warmer water, and severe storms), could
increase nearly twofold for every one degree Celsius in the Baltic sea region, and that is in open
water with properties to flush at a much faster rate than an inland freshwater lake such as Lake
Tanganyika.267
Climate driven shifts in diseases of humans, crops, and natural systems will demand solutions and
mitigation, including early-warning programs/forecasting systems. Local measures to build
resilience and adaptive capacity are critical to ensure that resource-dependent communities are
The ND-GAIN Index summarizes a country's vulnerability to climate change and other global challenges in
combination with its readiness to improve resilience. It aims to help businesses and the public sector better
prioritize investments for a more efficient response to the immediate global challenges ahead.
† ND-GAIN rankings of the Lake Tanganyika riparian countries - Appendix L.
*
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able to cope with the immediate and long-term effects of climate change. Several programs
through the World Bank, among others, are underway to detect vulnerable communities and
ecosystems to climate change and provide climate-resilient programs in sub-Saharan Africa.268
These programs are explored further in section Chapter 7.
5.3 Socio-Economic Development
Opportunities for Investment in Africa
“Underinvestment in Africa
by Western countries has
opened the economic space to
China and Russia, among
other BRICS countries.”
“China and Russia have
eclipsed Western countries in
their investment of
infrastructure to export
minerals and energy resources
to meet their own growing
populations’ demands, much
to the detriment of Africa’s
environment.”
The rate of foreign investment in Africa has risen tenfold in the past decade despite the presence
of oil-sodden kleptocracies and corruption, largely attributed to a burgeoning middle class and
the development of manufacturing and service economies.269 McKinsey Global Initiative
estimates at that least USD 1 trillion additional investment in the resource system is needed
annually to meet future resource demands.270 China is investing in African infrastructure to meet
this elevated demand, with other non-Western countries following its lead.271 Despite these efforts,
responsible investment in infrastructure, development, and good governance initiatives is missing
in areas of potential energy extraction in African countries late in exploiting their oil and gas
wealth, such as the DRC.
Many Western states, including the United States, have been slow to make long-term trade
agreements with some of the more dysfunctional but resource rich countries in Africa, perceiving
the risks as too costly to invest in the region. Underinvestment in Africa by Western countries has
opened the economic space to China and Russia, among other BRICS* countries. As a result,
China and Russia have eclipsed Western countries in their investment of infrastructure to export
minerals and energy resources to meet their own growing populations’ demands, much to the
detriment of Africa’s environment due to poor implementation and appropriate resource
management.†
There is a limited opportunity for Western states to build trade partnerships, in addition to traditional
aid programs, with the governments and private industry sectors in Africa. Foreign investment
should enhance the local private sector and support civil society organizations that propagate
best practices for their countries’ economic development. These best practices commit to
investment that support subsistent economies for the African people and counter-balance the
damage already afflicted on the environment and local rural communities by regional
kleptocracies and mismanaged foreign investment and trade.
Western states (both governmental and non-governmental entities) should focus on the energy
E&P industry in Africa to cultivate economic development opportunities. Oil and gas extractive
activities can be a catalyst for foreign and local investments if implemented correctly and with
the appropriate regulatory oversight. The “oil curse” narrative has distracted the development
community from the practical methods of employment and locally empowered economic
opportunities that can come from such extractive activities. These are key ingredients to
transforming conflict-prone regions into stable environments, which entice future investment by
stakeholders whose are not as resilient as extractive stakeholders in developing countries. While
development around oil itself offers some employment opportunities, most of the jobs come from
other infrastructure building projects that help sustain extractive activities, many of which operate
for decades. WAVE offers a roadmap to create this profitable cycle and best practices for foreign
investment in one of the most under-invested, resource rich regions of Africa; the Lake Tanganyika
Basin.
Lake Tanganyika: Benefits and Risks of Investment in the Basin
The Lake Tanganyika Basin offers attractive opportunities in various industries from fisheries, mining
and energy extraction, livestock production and agriculture/aquaculture/aquaponics; to water
transport infrastructure, tourism, and recreational water sports. Research and Development (R&D)
BRICS refers to the countries/economies of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa in relation to their
partnership for socio-economic advancement and growth, and global strategic impact.
† The May 2014 Russian advance into Crimea, Ukraine, has brought instability to the region, including an energy
crisis in Eastern Europe. This has reinvigorated European leaders to search for alternative sources of energy
(independent of Russia) and expand their strategic interest in Africa’s energy resources.
*
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53
opportunities extend to multiple disciplines including: development economics, global health,
environmental sciences, and product development for low-resource settings.
As the Lake Tanganyika region’s resource wealth becomes more widely known, with active oil
prospecting being underway to confirm recent discovery of oil and gas reserves, proper
implementation of socio-economic development measures and investment in the region will be
essential to provide a sustainable economy. While there are huge private-public sector
opportunities through revenue sharing agreements, these will be nullified if mismanaged
extractive practices destroy the basin’s freshwater-based economy.
“Investment in the Lake
Tanganyika Basin is
contingent on long-term
stability and resource
management. Extractive
stakeholders have the
resilience to initiate longterm investment in this
region.”
Despite the level of interest in the region, the security risks of investing in E&P activities in the Lake
Tanganyika Basin are extensive. Preventative action is needed to turn the real threats to stability
in the provinces of the western shoreline of Lake Tanganyika, Katanga and South Kivu, into a
genuine development opportunity. An upsurge in fighting since the start of 2012, including the
emergence of a new rebellion in North Kivu (DRC) and the resumption of armed groups’ territorial
expansion, has further complicated stability in the Kivus. There is great concern that oil
prospecting in eastern DRC will exacerbate deep-rooted conflict dynamics in the Kivus and ignite
new conflict in the Central Basin. Conflict in the Kivus has forced people to flee their homes and
seek refuge further south along Lake Tanganyika’s western shoreline. Criminal activity has also
migrated south. Recent reports indicated an uptick in illicit activities on Lake Tanganyika,
including piracy and smuggling of gold between the DRC and Burundi.272 An in-depth analysis of
the security situation in the Great Lakes region and along Lake Tanganyika’s shoreline is further
explored in the next chapter.
Currently, the main threats to the biological richness and the sustainable use of the resources in
the Lake Tanganyika Basin result from high rates of human population growth, extreme poverty *,
and lack of overall sustainable development.273 Pollution and the impacts of climate change on
the health of the basin’s populations are new concerns as the E&P industry becomes more active
along the lake. A potential spill or leak of extractive-production chemicals could seep into the
basin’s groundwater, contaminating crops and devastating the fishing industry -- the region’s
primary source of protein and economy. Proper socio-economic investment along Lake
Tanganyika can mitigate these risks while building robust and resilient communities in the basin.
To address these concerns, the Lake Tanganyika Authority (LTA) outlined potential trade and
investment opportunities in the region that support infrastructure development for multiple industry
growth sectors, while protecting the environment and livelihood of the basin populations in its
Strategic Action Program† (SAP). The Strategic Action Program supports the Lake’s riparian
countries’ commitment to meet Millennium Development Goals and provides best practices that
ensure efficient management of fisheries and other resources, as well as the ecosystem
conservation.
Lake Tanganyika: Potential Trade and Investment Opportunities
Investment in the Lake Tanganyika Basin is contingent on long-term stability and resource
management. Extractive stakeholders have the resilience to initiate long-term investment in
unstable conditions. They also have the capacity to lay the foundation for future stakeholders
who are less inclined or capitalized to invest in transitional regions.
To initiate a profitable cycle of investment in the Lake Tanganyika Basin, there need to be crosssectoral partnerships as extractive companies begin to invest in infrastructure development. There
are interesting incentives that promote partnerships to create an environment for employment in
non-extractive activities as described below. Most of these opportunities are mutually beneficial
for both foreign and local stakeholders, like projects that promote local capacity building, a
market for skills, and risk mitigation practices.
A word about extreme poverty: As discussed in the previous chapter, the fundamental building blocks for socioeconomic development must start with the health and strength of the community. It is imperative that
stakeholders and multilateral organizations interested in investing or developing socio-economic programs in the
basin, take into account the basin’s extreme poverty rate.
† The Lake Tanganyika Authority, Strategic Action Program for the Protection of Biodiversity and Sustainable
Management of Natural Resources in Lake Tanganyika and its Basin (2012)
*
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Investment in transport and communication infrastructure in the Lake Tanganyika Basin is critical
for developing an integrated and sustainable economy. Transporting supplies to build the
infrastructure needed for mining and E&P activities will heavily rely on the dual use of the railway
and waterway transport system in the basin. There are several areas for investment by the private
sector on infrastructure such as railways, ports, and networks, and economic trade incentives.
Investment in Railways and Economic Zones
The Central Rail Line is in disrepair despite it being the main railway for both passenger and
cargo services from the east coast (Indian Ocean) to Eastern DRC, Burundi, and Zambia.
The Central Lines central terminus is in Kigoma, Tanzania, a declared Free Trade Area to
cater to regional trade; however, it has not been implemented and laws do not reflect this
declaration.
Investment in Ports
One of the most potentially productive oil blocks in the basin is thought to be near the DRC
port of Kalemie.274 Kalemie’s port has been in continual decline since the post-colonial
era, and was further degraded during the last Congo War, with little post-conflict
reconstruction funding invested in its infrastructure.
Investment in Aquaculture, Agriculture and Resource Management
Agri-business and fisheries could be other growth industries on Lake Tanganyika. Lake
Tanganyika provides one of the largest freshwater fisheries on the African continent and
the annual fish production potential of the four riparian countries is estimated to range
between 165,000 and 200,000 metric tons. In addition to fishing, mining and energy
extraction, Lake Tanganyika offers investment opportunities in sustainable wood
processing; cotton ginneries; salt mining; and the processing of salt, palm oil, cassava
products, rice, honey and bees wax.
The approximately three and a half million people around the lake are dependent on its
fish resources. At the current rate of demand, there is mounting concern that the lake will
be over-fished to the detriment of the basin populations’ health and economy. This
problem is only compounded by the region’s population growth rate at a little over three
percent.
Overfishing is already occurring in the southern part of Lake Tanganyika, around the
Tanzanian, Zambian, and Congolese borders, and has led to a form of piracy and general
increase in illicit fishing activities. There have been several accounts of fishermen illegally
fishing in their neighboring countries’ boundaries on Lake Tanganyika. In some cases the
fishermen are jailed and fined, or worse, physically harassed by local fishermen, and then
released to find their own way back home.275 In 1995 about 45,000 fishermen were counted
in the lake basin, whereas in 2011 there are almost 95,000 active fishers on Lake
Tanganyika.276 In keeping with this increase, so has the number of fishing vessels (mostly
canoes or motorized canoes), which has doubled, and yet the number of landing sites has
decreased.277
Here within lie investment opportunities in the fishing industry to remediate the problem of
overfishing through the investment in a sophisticated aquaculture system on the lake and
ecologically sensitive landing sites. Investment in fish farms aligns with LTA’s sustainable
catchment management plan while supporting the basin’s water-based economy by
providing another source of income generation.
Research and Development Opportunities
Investment in R&D is another area in the basin that offers tremendous opportunity for
private-public partnerships, benefiting multiple stakeholders in the region. Worth noting is
the epidemiological data that could be collected in the basin and be of interest to public
health professionals to analyze ultra-poor populations living in remote rural regions.
Information from the population that lives “beyond the last mile” (a crucial and unknown
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55
frontier for the larger aid and development sector) are increasingly targeted to improve
poor human development indices.* Lake Tanganyika’s rich freshwater ecosystem is also
an area of great interest to environmentalists and conservationists. Research on the basin’s
ecosystem could inform investment decisions that promote better management of the
environment of the lake and the catchment. This will sustain the lake’s ecological balance
and the resources on which local communities depend. The R&D could lead to interesting
commercial opportunities for small to mid-sized business in the creation of new products
and services for this previously untapped region.
Extractive companies bring economic power that can mobilize the communities along Lake
Tanganyika. This can help drive investment by acting as the catalyst for foreign investment in local
revenue sharing agreements with the lakes’ riparian countries. The hypothetical restoration of a
port and nearby beach on the DRC side of Lake Tanganyika by an extractive company illustrates
the possible development outcomes from an integrated investment plan. With consultation from
a body of experts (e.g., the LTA, among others), this conjectural infrastructure project could
protect the lake’s endemic freshwater crabs and cichlid species through proper beach
restoration while promoting economic vitality. Trade opportunities and E&P activities could
increase due to investment in infrastructure support along the port. A working port and restored
beach could increase income generation by creating jobs to support port operations, through
improved catchment areas and a tourist industry along the beach.
Successful Socio-Economic Programs
Successful development in the Lake Tanganyika Basin is measured by its sustainability and socioeconomic impact. To improve the chances of sustainability in the Lake Tanganyika Basin a nonvertical program approach needs to be implemented by combining the strengths of multiple
organizations, spanning across several sectors in the region, that have substantial capacity to
influence change and also understand the complexity of the post-conflict region. Most
importantly, these organizations need to have long-term development commitments in the
region.
Although it helps to have an institution with extensive experience in the basin, it is the inclusiveness
of the primary stakeholder that generates local ownership and helps seal a program’s success.
This is highlighted in lessons learned from a two year project for sustainable catchment
management interventions in South Kivu Province, DRC. The UNDP-supported, GEF-financed
project on Partnership Interventions for Implementation of the Strategic Action Program for Lake
Tanganyika’s DRC Component, promoted activities that offered opportunities for sustainability
and long-term improvement of local livelihoods in South Kivu’s catchment between late 2010 and
early 2013.278
A significant lesson learned from the UNDP/GEF/LTA project was the importance of genuine
participation by primary stakeholders by providing an inclusive partnership which allowed them
to be key decision-makers in the implementation process of the project, ensuring ownership by
the local communities and a bottom-up approach that melded local expertise with international
development specialists.279 Of noted success was the innovative method of combining
sophisticated scientific analysis with local knowledge to improve catchment management
practices and support local livelihoods. This was applied to catchment management practices
as well as communication and outreach efforts that used both traditional and innovative tools
resulting in increased stakeholder awareness about environmental problems and knowledge of
possible solutions. The project highlighted the importance of working closely with stakeholders in
high risk areas, defined as inaccessible and insecure areas. Risks were minimized by maintaining
communication networks to monitor security threats, and by having contingency plans in place.280
The challenge with sustainable development in the Lake Tanganyika Basin is characterized and
compounded by a post-conflict context, with porous borders and transboundary issues, fragile
government institutions and weak civil societies, and divided populations living in extreme
poverty.
*
In order to achieve the MDGs and post-2015 agenda - Appendix M.
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Project organizers found that the poor economic conditions in South Kivu limited local
stakeholders from investing in a long-term scale-up of the project which diminished the full, longterm impact of the program. They also concluded that a joint strategy could be designed that
recognizes the complexity of the post-conflict context, incorporates the geopolitical dynamics of
the region, and integrates good practices and lessons learned from this study among other
sustainable natural resource management interventions, that can provide multiple opportunities
to help rebuild societies and buffer them from the shocks of tomorrow.281
5.4 Case Studies
Niger Delta (negative impact)
The Niger Delta offers a possible window into the future of the Great Lakes, should energy
extraction not incorporate risk mitigation practices, regulatory reforms, and integrated
development from the outset. It offers a poignant example of how a water-based economy can
be decimated by oil and gas pollutants. The Delta has suffered hundreds of spills over the past
three decades, primarily from aging infrastructure, poor regulations and monitoring, insufficient
remediation and clean-up efforts, as well as spills/leakage caused by political insurgents and
thieves. This has profoundly affected the health and socio-economic well-being of Delta
communities. Two that share similar characteristics with the Great Lakes are examined briefly
below to illustrate the impact of pollution in water-centric regions.
In May and June 2001, two Shell oil spills occurred in the Niger Delta. Similar to Lake Tanganyika,
the Niger Delta hosts a large biodiversity and its population consists predominantly of fishermen
and farmers who depend on the ecosystem for survival. The Delta is one of the world’s largest
wetlands and has one of the largest mangrove forests in Africa. Endangered species, such as the
manatee and pygmy hippopotamus, live here.
In the rural town of Ogbodo, Nigeria, at least 9500 tonnes of oil leaked from an oil pipe in need of
repair. After a three month delay in clean-up efforts all across the Delta, the water and soil had
been poisoned with hydrocarbons and heavy metals, damaging the soil, aquatic resources, and
biodiversity of the area. Catches fished for subsistence were contaminated. Health impacts
included respiratory and gastro-intestinal diseases, as well as mental distress. Thousands of toxins
waste in pits are suspected of being linked to rising cancer rates and formerly potable water wells
have been contaminated. Waterborne illnesses such as cholera, typhoid and diarrheal diseases
from unsafe drinking water are partially attributed to the pollution following the oil spill over ten
years ago, and present challenges for local communities in the Niger Delta.282 283
A month earlier in Ogoniland, a similarly devastating spill resulted from a deteriorating Shell
pipeline. A UN working group study found that the unchecked oil pollution in Ogoni led to the
complete destruction of its ecosystem and destroyed the traditional fishing and farming systems.
As a result, there were food shortages, which forced the people of Ogoniland to fully import food.
This led to unemployment for most of the youth and women since their economic livelihoods as
fishermen became unsustainable. In an effort to find work, many have migrated from their
traditional land to cities. However, many lack the skills and training to find viable work there and
find themselves living in slums.284
Like the people in Ogbodo, there has been a rise in certain diseases and malnutrition connected
to ground water contamination.285 Of noted concern is the depth of pollution in the underground
water system, found as deep as five meters in some places. One test found oil three inches thick
floating atop water used in a community well.286 Shell remediation efforts in Ogoni only dealt with
surface contamination, despite oil seeping far into the ground.
A United Nations Environmental Protection study in 2010 concluded that a wider variety of more
intensive remediation measures are necessary, including mangrove restoration, cleaning of the
topsoil, groundwater decontamination, and close monitoring of natural regeneration of the area;
however, Nigeria’s regulatory mechanisms need to be strengthened to enforce the UN’s
recommendations.287
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Mongolia (balancing conservation and development)
Mongolia is in the early stages of its mining and oil boom. It and has taken precautionary steps to
develop its extractive industry while protecting the health of its population and the environment
its nomadic culture and livelihood depend on. The government has designed solid management
systems before large revenues started flowing and has a progressive public-private partnerships
with The Nature Conservancy to balance conservation and development.
Mongolia recognized its susceptibility to corruption due to the capital-intensive nature of largescale infrastructure projects for mining and oil extraction. To deviate from falling prey to the
resource curse, Mongolia passed the Fiscal Stability Law aimed at supporting macro-economic
stability. It also established a Fiscal Stability Fund to provide protection from volatile commodity
prices and a Human Development Fund to support vulnerable segments of the population over
time.288
While resource wealth could benefit the country’s burgeoning economy, it could also harm
Mongolia’s habitats that have sustained its nomadic culture for millennia. Mongolia has one of
the world’s largest expanses of wild grassland habitat. Approximately 16 percent of Mongolia’s
600,000 square miles have been leased for exploration, and another 26 percent of that land is
available for lease, according to The Nature Conservancy.289
Recognizing the risk of irreversibly damaging Mongolia’s grasslands, parliament incorporated The
Nature Conservancy’s ‘Development by Design’ approach into national law in 2012. The law
requires mining and oil development projects to evaluate and then offset their environmental
impacts.
The Development by Design model gives equal weight to the needs of conservationists, herders,
and developers in Mongolia. Mitigation and conservation planning informs on the type of the
development to implement as the country scales its mining activities. One activity through this
program includes the compilation of environmental data spanning over 150,000 square miles in
eastern Mongolia. The information gleaned from this survey determined which areas are of
greatest importance for Mongolia’s people and wildlife, which in turn created a map of highpriority sites to conserve.
This model is a guide for intelligent development that can support other initiatives. Mongolia has
used it to determine the location of the most economically vital lands, as well as how threats like
climate change and unsustainable herding are affecting health concerns in these areas.
By creating funds to sustain its economy and population health, and by legally requiring intelligent
development practices, Mongolia is paving its way to a more sustainable future, one that makes
it less vulnerable to the threats of mineral and oil extraction while benefiting from its resource
wealth.
Botswana (legislation reform)
Botswana is another example of a country that has improved human development indicators
through effective use of its mineral wealth. By value, Botswana is the world’s largest producer of
diamonds. Other mineral exports include copper and nickel. Over the past 20 years, mining has
contributed tremendously to Botswana’s economic growth, rising per-capita incomes, and
government revenues.290 Approximately 35 percent of its GDP and 50 percent of its tax revenue
comes from the mining industry. Botswana’s record of mineral-led development has contributed
to its rapid economic growth while avoiding many of the other negative impacts of resource
extraction. It is relatively free of the corruption and environmental damage that is often
associated with mining industries.291
The government of Botswana established mechanisms to ensure that a significant part of its
mineral resource revenue is allocated for investment in health and education and economic
sustainability. They succeeded through prudent fiscal policies; by maintaining a negligible level
of external debt; and through funds designed to preserve its mineral wealth for future generations.
Notably, the government has effectively managed strategic public-private ventures to generate
revenues. This income was translated into infrastructure, education, and health and poverty
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alleviation programs. The government did this by carefully working out revenue- and risk-sharing
agreements with the private sector.
Reported levels of corruption are relatively low in Botswana. In 2013, the Transparency
International Corruptions Perception Index rated Botswana at place 30 out of 177 countries. 292 This
positive rating is reflective of preemptive action taken by the government in the 1990s, when new
legislation and anti-corruption structures were developed based on the three pronged approach
of detailed investigation, corruption prevention and public education through the Corruption and
Economic Crime Act. This lead to the establishment of the Directorate on Corruption and
Economic Crime in 1994, a system with judicial oversight that enforces extractive regulations.
Botswana also subscribed to the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative in 2007.
One of the key features of the regulatory environment of the mining industry in Botswana is the
integration of government involvement in all mining ventures through equity participation and
board representation. Minimum controls are exercised on business operations, and management
is left entirely to the private sector. To ensure that the wealth from Botswana’s resources is used to
sustain the economy, the government created the Pula Fund. * A portion of its resource wealth is
invested in its Pula Fund, which serves as a buffer against price volatility and preserves a share of
the rents from diamond exports for future generations.
Traditionally, Botswana’s diamond mining operations have had a limited environmental impact.
Residue from diamond mines are open cast with spoil heaps, which have not been a major
concern given the country’s extremely low population density. Environmentally, the main
concern has been related to the Bamangwato Concessions Ltd. copper-nickel smelter, which
had problems in the past maintaining safe levels of sulfur dioxide emissions. This affected the
respiratory health of populations living in the vicinity of the smelter. To deal with this issue, the
government required all mining operators to take environmental considerations into account and
conduct operations to preserve the natural environment as much as possible through the Mines
and Minerals Act of 1999.293 This law requires all applicants for mining licenses to carry out an
Environmental Impact Assessment as part of their application process. The lack of environmental
incidents in Botswana reflects both the government’s commitment to environmental policies and
low environmental pollution from most mining operations to date.
Botswana’s regulatory framework, anti-corruption institutions, and best practices with publicprivate ventures in the mining industry are exemplary for countries that have a narrow window of
time to reform their energy sector legislation. Botswana’s success in managing the exploitation of
its resource wealth is attributable to the following factors: 1) Compared to other resource-rich
countries such as Nigeria and DR Congo, Botswana leaned on a strong institutional framework
that placed effective constraints on the political elite before diamond mining started in 1967 294;
2) the government created policies that supported a stable macroeconomic framework and
encouraged private investment; 3) the government engaged the private sector as the main
driving force in mineral resource extraction through a constructive partnerships; 4) anti-corruption
institutions were established and funds that ensured a significant part of governmental mineral
resource revenue was allocated for investment in health and education; 5) the primary minerals
extracted in the country had a relatively small environmental impact.
The aforementioned case studies illustrate the different types of mechanisms, partnerships, and
initiatives that help mitigate the negative impact of mismanaged resource extraction and
promote intelligent development. Tools that strengthen checks-and-balances to increase the
capacity of parliaments† and support the emergence of a credible judiciary are critical to reverse
the negative development outcome of extraction.
*
†
Botswana’s Sovereign Wealth Fund.
To exert effective constraints on the executive branch of government.
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6. Emerging Security Threats
On January 16, 2013, one of the largest assaults on an energy facility occurred at El Amenas Gas
Facility in Algeria by local terrorists affiliated with Al-Qaida. The attack closed down one of
Algeria’s largest gas plants, which produced about ten percent of its natural gas before the
attack. After three days under siege and a brutal military reaction by Algerian government
security forces, El Amenas was secured; but not before 38 hostages were killed, many of whom
were foreign workers from Europe, Japan, and the United States. The Algerian government has
since admitted that it was not prepared for such a well-coordinated attack on its infrastructure
and is currently overhauling the security of its oil and gas facilities country-wide.295
“Renewed oil interest in the
DRC represents a real threat
to stability in a still
vulnerable post-conflict
country.”
The attack on El Amenas, a natural gas plant jointly operated by BP, Statoil and Algeria’s national
energy company Sonatrach, has sensitized gas and oil companies to the security risks of operating
in regions of instability, especially in areas with armed groups that target foreign and Western
enterprises.296
There is great concern by regional experts and energy companies that the siege at the gas plant
in Algeria will inspire copy-cat incidents on a smaller scale. Indeed later that year, in May 2013, a
similar hostage situation occurred at a French operated Uranium mine in Niger. Islamist suicide
bombers coordinated attacks targeting Areva’s mine at Arlit and an army barracks in Agadez in
northern Niger, killing 20 people and wounding dozens after militants took hostages. The AlQaeda-linked group MUJAO claimed responsibility for coordinated suicide attacks in retaliation
for a French-led offensive this year against Islamist insurgents in neighboring Mali.
Nigeria, now considered to have the largest economy in Africa (largely attributed to its oil
wealth),297 is struggling to contain the Al-Qaida-linked Boko Haram from expanding its influence
and attacks in the country. Boko Haram regularly mounts attacks in northern Nigeria; however,
there have been a significant number of attacks in other Nigerian states over the past year. On
19 February 2014, the organization issued a video threatening to attack oil installations and workers
in the Niger Delta region of southeast Nigeria; an area not previously targeted by the group.298
Despite the Nigerian military’s year-long offensive against Boko Haram, the terrorist group’s
activities have been escalating. In April, Boko Haram kidnapped 276 girls from their school in
northeastern Nigeria.299 In early June, militant fighters were killing and terrorizing civilians in villages
in northeastern Nigeria.300 Both incidents have raised the profile of Boko Haram as a formidable
Islamic extremist group in Africa.301 302
While there is a large body of reporting on Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) activities in
North Africa and the spread of Islamist militant attacks in West Africa, it is not as well known that
Islamic extremist influence is spreading into the Great Lakes region from the Somalia-based AlQaida group al-Shabaab. The ADF-NALU,* one of the oldest but least known armed groups
operating along Congolese-Ugandan borders is considered to be influenced by radical Islam
from East Africa.303 Even without Al-Qaida affiliation, armed tribal groups are reinserting their
control along the DRC’s eastern border region. There is growing concern that they may target
foreign E&P companies operating in this gas and oil rich region.
Government response time to a complex attack on an energy facility in the Great Lakes region
would likely take much longer than the Algerian government’s response to the attack on El
Amenas gas plant in North Africa. Current and future energy extraction sites in Central and
Eastern Africa are extremely vulnerable in a region struggling to maintain peace and recover from
years of conflict.
Security concerns by the E&P sector in the Great Lakes region escalate by the lack of
infrastructural support and geographic isolation; and the absence of government control along
Congolese, Rwandan, Ugandan, and Burundian borders. This area is rich in rare minerals, natural
gas and oil, with much of the land already parceled out in blocks for extraction without
transparency or legislation. Lawlessness is still prevalent due to armed militant groups operating
with impunity.
*
The Allied Democratic Forces-National Army for the Liberation of Uganda.
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If foreign government security personnel or military assets were requested to support local security
forces’ efforts to secure a compromised facility in the Great Lakes region, their response time
would likely take longer than if they were to respond to a security situation in Northern Africa due
to proximity of foreign bases and dedicated security support to the region. Despite such high risks
to conduct extraction activities by foreign companies, the E&P industry is still booming due to its
long-term, high-risk, high-reward investment strategy.
Security Concerns along Lake Tanganyika
“Oil prospecting is nurturing
old resentments among local
communities lining Lake
Tanganyika’s western
shoreline and contributing to
border tensions with
neighboring countries.”
Renewed oil interest in the DRC represents a real threat to stability in a still vulnerable post-conflict
country. The communities lining Lake Tanganyika’s western shoreline are no exception. Oil
prospecting is nurturing old resentments among local communities and contributing to border
tensions with neighboring countries.
Great concern is shared by regional experts that the confirmation of oil reserves in eastern DRC
will exacerbate deep-rooted conflict dynamics in the DRC’s eastern provinces of North Kivu and
South Kivu and southeastern province of Katanga; the latter two sharing the northwestern
coastline of Lake Tanganyika. There was an upsurge in fighting in early 2012 in the Kivus and the
emergence of a new rebellion in North Kivu has spurred renewed territorial expansion of armed
groups’ further complicating stability in eastern DRC and neighboring countries.
One narrative overlooked by international media is a likely power shift that would be prompted in
the region once oil is confirmed and E&P activities begin in eastern DRC. New oil reserves could
shift the center of power and political influence from the DRC’s traditional economic hub in
central Katanga Province to eastern and southeastern Congo along the seam of the Great Lakes.
This could feed secessionist tendencies in the context of failed decentralization and financial strife
between the central government and the provinces. For a better understanding on the
transboundary impact of E&P activity in the region, WAVE examines the Great Lakes’ history
through a geopolitical and security scope in the proceeding text.
6.1 Geopolitical Context
Over the past two years the international media and Western governments’ attention was
directed on the reemergence of the M23 and the deteriorating security situation in the eastern
provinces of North and South Kivu. While the international community continues to throw
resources into the Kivus and its porous borders with Rwanda and Uganda, little is known or
understood about what is taking place just outside this narrow lens.
Regional and International Engagement in the Kivus
Conflicts in the eastern provinces of North Kivu and South Kivu have persisted throughout the last
decade, many of which take root from colonial rule as deftly explained in Jason Stearns’ Dancing
in the Glory of Monsters.* Contributing to the cycles of violence in the last ten years have been
the continued presence of Congolese and foreign armed groups taking advantage of power
and security vacuums in the eastern part of the country; the illegal extraction of resources;
interference by neighboring countries; pervasive impunity; inter-communal feuds; and the weak
capacity of the national army and police to effectively protect civilians and ensure law and order.
In order to address the underlying causes of conflict and ensure sustainable peace in the country
and the wider region, the Peace, Security and Cooperation Framework for the Democratic
Republic of the Congo and the region was signed by representatives of eleven countries in the
region, the Chairs of the African Union, the International Conference on the Great Lakes Region,
the Southern African Development Community, and the United Nations Secretary-General on 24
February 2013 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
In support of the objectives of the PSC Framework agreement, the UN Security Council
unanimously adopted resolution 2098 on 28 March 2013, which extended the mandate for the
*
Recommended reading list - Appendix Q.
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peacekeeping operation in the Congo, known as MONUSCO, and created a specialized
“Intervention Brigade” to strengthen the mission.* The Intervention Brigade had expanded legal
authority to conduct offensive operations† and after a six-month campaign successfully
disbanded‡ the militant group known as the M23 with the combined assistance of the FARDC. §
The International Brigade, other MONUSCO units, and the FARDC are conducting offensive
operations post-M23, targeting FDLR, ADF, and armed Mai-Mai groups in the Kivus. Regional
experts and military strategists believe these new campaigns in 2014 will be harder to win than the
operation against the M23, in part due to the FDLR’s and ADF’s experience in guerrilla tactics and
asymmetric warfare.304
On 28 March 2014, the UN Security Council unanimously adopting resolution 2147 (2014) to extend
the mandate of MONUSCO until 31 March 2015. The renewed mandate would also include
MONUSCO’s Intervention Brigade; however, the Security Council noted the need for a clear exit
strategy for the Intervention Brigade. It was therefore decided that the Mission’s further
reconfigurations and mandates should be based on the evolving situation and progress towards
several objectives set out in accordance with its three priorities: 1) protecting civilians, 2) stabilizing
the country, and 3) supporting implementation of the PSC Framework for the DRC and the
region.305
Katanga Province
“Martin Kobler, head of
MONUSCO, admitted that
Katanga Province had been
ignored when troops stepped
up their campaign against
M23 rebels in the eastern
provinces of North and South
Kivu.”
From a topographical perspective, one can trace today’s conflicts in the Kivus and Katanga
Province along Lake Tanganyika’s coastline, connecting over 20 years of local struggles over land,
resources, and power that often involved and implicated actors outside the region. As a
consequence, and against the backdrop of rebel fighting against the government and internal
hostility, many communities in the region have taken arms in self-defense. Armed violence and
the threat thereof have become strategic and political ploys to bolster stature and protect
interests in east Congo, and especially the mineral rich Katanga Province.
The resurgence of certain armed Mai-Mai militias in Katanga Province went largely unnoticed
while the DRC and international community focused on security issues in the Kivus. Several
Katanga-based Mai-Mai groups, who seek to expand their area of influence through bloodshed,
could pose a greater danger to the overall post-conflict region than M23 did in the north.
It is only in the last couple of months that the international community has acknowledged the
destabilizing Mai-Mai activities in Katanga Province. Martin Kobler, head of MONUSCO, admitted
that Katanga Province had been ignored in recent months as troops stepped up their campaign
against M23 rebels in the eastern provinces of North and South Kivu. Kobler told journalists in
January, "It's a humanitarian catastrophe. I feel an element of guilt when I think of Katanga
because we have concentrated our military activity on the Kivus but it is important not to neglect
Katanga."306
6.2 Complex Regional History
A History of Violence in the Congo
To understand the scope of the corruption, bloodshed, and political instability in this region, it is
advisable to consider the origins of the prevailing issues. The problems in the Congo can be
traced back over 125 years, when King Leopold II of Belgium claimed the central region of Africa
as his fiefdom in 1885 during the colonial powers’ scramble to divide Africa. After setting up the
Congo Free State, a private enterprise, he reaped the rewards of the region’s rubber and ivory,
among other resources. During that time, colonial officers created a draconian system of forced
labor during which they killed or mutilated hundreds of thousands and pushed millions of others to
The UN Security Council has since extended the mandate for MONUSCO and Intervention Brigade through 31
March 2015 (UN Press Release, 28 March 2014)
† MONUSCO’s rules of engagement was previously limited to defense.
‡ Many hardcore M23 fighters and M23 leaders fled the DRC in Oct/Nov 2013 and now reside in Uganda and
Rwanda.
§ A comprehensive account of the offensive and defeat against M23 - Appendix H.
*
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starvation or death from disease.
Eventually in 1908, King Leopold was pressured to hand the country over to the Belgian
government, when the territory became an official colony. Although the government established
a much more elaborate administration with extensive primary education, the Belgians still focused
on resource extraction and did little to encourage local development. By the time power was
ceded to the Congolese during the decolonization, the Belgians had set the new nation up for
failure without a self-sustaining infrastructure. The transfer of power during the Cold War,
condemned Congo to become a pawn in the U.S. - Soviet conflict.
Between the assassination of Patrice Lumumba and the secessionist activity in Katanga, from the
moment of independence, the country was plunged into turmoil, which ultimately saddled the
country with 32 years of autocratic rule by Joseph Mobutu (later known as Mobutu Sese Seko).
Although Mobutu helped create national unity, renaming the nation Zaire in 1971, he dismantled
and cannibalized state institutions in order to maintain power, ultimately leading to Zaire’s
economic collapse. Mobutu feared dissent from within the ranks of his single-party state by the
1980’s and robbed his own institutions of capital. Political interference and corruption eroded the
judicial system, administration, and security services. This allowed internal ethnic rivalries and
conflicts over access of land to fester, which were most prevalent along the eastern border with
Rwanda and Uganda. In a desperate attempt to remain in power, Mobutu further fuelled these
ethnic tensions to distract his enemies from challenging his position.
Regional problems further eroded Mobutu’s control as he catered to multiple rebel groups in the
region. Contributing to this problem were the effects of the civil war in Rwanda in 1994, which
had escalated into the genocide of 800,000 Tutsi and moderate Hutu at the hands of Hutu militia
and the army. When the incumbent Hutu regime crumbled, the Tutsi Rwandan Patriotic Front
(RPF) rebels, led by Paul Kagame, took power. Over one million Hutu fled across the border into
Zaire, along with the soldiers and militiamen who had carried out the massacres, causing massive
upheaval in this eastern region. Mobutu had also come to host over ten other foreign, armed
groups in Zaire as part of his strategy to become a regional power broker, which only further
angered his neighbors.
By 1996, a regional coalition led by Rwanda and Uganda (and supported by other regional
players such as Angola) under the cover of the newly formed the Alliance of Democratic Forces
for the Liberation of Congo-Zaire (ADFL) had formed to overthrow Mobutu, with long time
Lumumbist revolutionary, Laurent Kabila, as its ostensible head. This became known as the First
Congo War, which ended with overthrowing Mobutu in May 1997. After a brief lull in the fighting,
the new president of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) Laurent Kabila fell out with his
Rwandan and Ugandan handlers. This sparked the Second Congo War in August 1998 and a
reshuffling of regional support and interests.
Following Kabila’s assassination in 2001, his son Joseph Kabila took over the presidency. The war
lasted until June 2003 when a peace deal was signed and reunified the country. Despite an
official end to the war, conflict has simmered and occasionally boiled over mainly in the east and
south-east of the country ever since, with flares of violence also occurring in Kinshasa. Much has
been written on the history of the Congo, including the past twenty years, and recommendations
for further reading are listed in the appendix.*
Since the end of the Second Congo War, many of the current problems in the DRC and
surrounding regions are connected to the poor implementation of the peace deal and
consequences of reunification of militias into the state military, the decentralization of government
control, and foreign state interference.307 Since 2003, fighting has continued in the DRC’s eastern
and southeastern provinces stoked by outside influence from other states, discovery of new petroand mineral resources, and underinvestment by the central government with serious shortcoming
in security along its porous borders. This has in turn empowered local rebel groups to fill the security
vacuum and expand their own territorial influence through means of violence, while depleting
the regions mineral wealth. Because these armed groups have had such a profound effect on
regional security, a brief primer of them is included below.
*
Recommended reading list on the history of the Congo - Appendix Q.
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6.3 Key Rebel Groups*
Since the M23 insurgency ended in November 2013, militant groups in eastern Congo are
responding to the change in the region’s security dynamics. While new groups crop up to take
advantage of territory lost by the M23, others have surrendered to the FARDC and MONUSCO
forces, and entrenched armed rebels have become more aggressive or have adopted defensive
postures for fear of being attacked by the Intervention Brigade or FARDC. Security threats remain
high with at least three violent rebel groups active in eastern Congo: the Rwandan rebels of the
FDLR (Democratic Forces for the liberation of Rwanda), the Ugandan ADF (Allied Democratic
Forces), and the separatist militia group, Kata Katanga. These groups are responsible for grave
human rights abuses and massive displacement, and continue to sow instability in the Kivus and
Katanga Province.308
FDLR
The history of the Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) is fundamental to
understanding the existence and actions of many rebel groups in eastern DRC today. Rebel
groups in the region are formed and disbanded on a fairly frequent basis; a dynamic justified for
self-defense, but many times with an ulterior motive such as power, land control, and resource
exploitation. This, along with rebel groups’ complex interactions with each other and
internal/external government entities, can easily misconstrue the reality on site.
The FDLR was formed largely as a repercussion of the Rwandan genocide in 1994. Many FDLR
members were former Rwandan Hutu rebels, who either directly participated in or are
descendants of those who were involved in the genocide that killed an estimated 800,000 people.
When the genocide ended with the seizure of power by the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), led by
current Tutsi President Paul Kagame, many of the Hutu militiamen and defeated Interahamwe
(the original perpetrators) retreated to eastern DRC.
The Rwandan government classifies the FDLR as a major threat to its stability and invaded the DRC
in 2003 under this pretext. At the time, one of the several militia groups borne out of the Rwandan
invasion and made up primarily of Tutsi fighters was the National Congress for the Defense of the
People (CNDP). It wasn’t until 2009 that the CNDP was disbanded and incorporated into the
Congolese Army (FARDC). Out of that group, 1,000 former Tutsi CNDP rebels who had been
integrated into the FARDC mutinied and broke away, naming themselves M23. The M23 militia
reemerged in 2012 in response to perceived inaction by the Congolese government that it had
not fulfilled its half of the peace accord signed in 2009.
One of M23’s demands was the eradication of the FDLR. The Rwandan government has been
accused of backing the Tutsi-led M23 rebellion to counter the Hutu FDLR in eastern DRC and to
maintain control as the number of members in the FDLR dwindled. The most recent report
supporting this claim was published December 2013 by the UN Panel of Experts on the DRC. The
continued danger of Rwanda using the FDLR as a pretext to conduct cross-border operations into
the DRC prompted the UNSC to authorize an operation to neutralize and disband the FDLR
following disarmament of the M23 rebels in November 2013. Neutralizing the FDLR would further
delegitimize Rwanda’s nearly constant meddling in eastern DRC.
Unlike the swift operation against the M23 rebels (likely due to Rwanda ceasing its regular support),
the FARDC and UN forces will likely be challenged by the FDLR’s unconventional military tactics,
operating within civilian population centers and difficult terrain, as well as conducting asymmetric
attacks. Since the start of the campaign on 27 November 2013, UN forces and the FARDC have
only been able to clear a major trade route that had been under control by the FDLR for the past
two years, connecting part of North Kivu to its capital, Goma. Unlike the campaign against M23,
there is concern over real collateral damage across ethnic Hutu communities in the DRC, where
it is difficult to distinguish FDLR combatants from Congolese Hutu civilians and Rwandan Hutu
civilians who have lived in the DRC for years.
A comprehensive list of armed rebel groups present in areas of energy and mineral extraction and potential
blocks for exploitation in the DRC - Appendix F.
*
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UN officials estimated in December 2013 that there were about 1,500 FDLR fighters spread out in
small groups across North and South Kivu provinces.309 * Around 70 percent of the FDLR is below
the age of 30 and had no direct involvement in the 1994 genocide. In addition to the UN’s
deployment of a Regional Intervention Brigade, which has the authority to conduct offensive
operations, unarmed drones are being employed to conduct aerial reconnaissance and gather
intelligence, which has helped the UN force avoid civilian casualties, among other benefits.
The UN force needs to improve its understanding of the structure of armed conflict and social
interaction on the ground in eastern DRC. Any lasting political solution however needs to take
into account the local dimensions of conflict. Even then, there are questions about how to
successfully integrate a rebel group or marginalized ethnic group into the established system.
Following two decades of ethnic fracturing caused by external and internal armed groups and
all these population movements, there is a real dilemma to demobilize FDLR combatants and
integrate ethnically fractured communities.
M23
After 20 months of armed struggle and violence that displaced thousands of people in the Kivus,
the rebel group known as M23 announced it had ended its armed campaign on 5 November
2013. The group declared it would employ political means rather than military means to achieve
their goals in the future.†
In a November 2012 UN report, the UN Group of Experts on the DRC concluded that the Rwandan
government, with the support of its allies, “created, equipped, trained, advised, reinforced and
directly commanded the M23 rebellion.”310 Multiple sources, including M23 members, Ugandan
officers, and ICGLR verification officers, reported instances of direct and indirect support to the
M23 during its two month offensive in late 2012.311 A much more comprehensive report on the
backing to the now disbanded M23 was published in January 2014 by the UN Group of Experts on
the DRC: “The Group documented that M23 received continued support from Rwandan territory.
The most consistent forms of support were through recruitment and provision of arms and
ammunition, particularly during periods of combat. M23 also received direct troop reinforcement
by Rwandan soldiers in August [2013]. During the October fighting [2013], Rwandan tanks fired
into DRC in support of M23.”312
Although the main M23 insurgency has ended,‡ conflict and displacement continues in eastern
Congo. The UNHCR estimates that 800,000 – 900,000 people were displaced by fighting between
the M23 and government forces over the past two years.313 Violence and human rights violations
committed by other armed groups, local self-defense militia (Mai-Mai) and armed forces, in
addition to unresolved land and inter-communicable conflicts, and localized natural disasters
have also contributed to the 2.7 million people currently displaced across the eastern DRC.314
While some internally displaced persons (IDPs) in North Kivu have returned, many of those who
relocated several times or for long periods of time are hesitant to return to their homes in North
Kivu. Many Congolese that fled to Uganda during the M23 fighting in October and November
§
2013 have not returned, out of fear of resurgent attacks against perceived collaborators. 315
Dozens of armed groups, such as the FDLR, ADF, and Mai-Mai groups, operate in this region.
History has shown that new revolts spring up in the wake of those that have been suppressed or
negotiated. The M23 is one of many armed groups that embody the manifestation of a deeper
crisis in the DRC: the mismanagement and lack of rudimentary security and administrative
infrastructure to ensure law and order. A political solution in the region is the only clear way
forward to end protracted conflict, bolstered by economic development opportunities to
fundamentally change the poor living conditions for Congolese citizens. Another M23-like group
will emerge if a dual political and economic solution is not found.
In 2008 there were more than 6,000 FDLR fighters in the Kivus (IRIN News, 17 March 2008)
Comprehensive account of the offensive against M23 - Appendix H.
‡ Many of the former M23 hardcore fighters and leadership are in Uganda or Rwanda.
§ Congolese refugees who have attempted to return to the DRC have experienced grave difficulties. On 22
March 2014 a boat carrying 150 Congolese capsized on Lake Albert, killing 107 Congolese refugees on board the
boat. (Bloomberg, 25 March 2014)
*
†
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Mai-Mai
The international press has a tendency to clump Mai-Mai groups as one rebel group, not
identifying the localized nature of Mai-Mai groups within specific Congolese villages and regions.
This misidentification is one of several examples of oversimplification on a very complex region
with hundreds of interconnected groups and intersecting interests.
This misperceived
categorization to one sole group likely grew out of the notoriety of a collective of Mai-Mai groups
in North and South Kivu, although there are many Mai-Mai groups throughout the DRC.
The word “Mai-Mai” was influenced by the Kiswahili word meaning “water.” This term is widely
used to refer to any of the community militias composed of male Congolese villagers that joined
forces during the Second Congo War to defend their land and homes in the northeastern regions
of the DRC. The choice of the word Mai-Mai refers to the way in which free men of the Congo
choose to come together or disband depending on the defensive needs of the people, to the
fluid sense of unity which comes and goes, or ebbs and flows like water. Mai-Mai or Rega societies
were initially formed by localized groups to defend a small number of villages against injustices
ignored by the government, with no charters or commissions paid by the state. Most came
together without guns, carrying the hoes and the machetes they used in their fields as weapons.
Mai-Mai and the FDLR
Mai-Mai groups in the Kivus played a crucial role in the Second Congo War, and were composed
of local men from districts in the northeast region of the country, loosely grouped together to resist
the forces of the Hutu Interahamwe.
These were the Hutu guerilla fighters who eventually called themselves the Democratic Forces for
the Liberation of Rwanda (FDLR) and settled in both North and South Kivu provinces. Mai-Mai
groups also fought against the Congolese Tutsi-supported militias such as the CNDP who also
fought the FDLR in the region. The modus operandi of the Kivu based Mai-Mai groups was to seek
out and kill or expel any non-Congolese troops in the DRC. During that time, many Mai-Mai fought
with the Congolese army to rid their districts of enemy soldiers.
Mai-Mai: After the Peace Accords
Many Mai-Mai in the Kivus were historically committed to stopping the infiltration of Rwandasupported militias in the area but their allegiances were fluid and changed frequently. Although
these groups participated in the Second Congo War they were never included in the peace
accord that brought an end to the war and were never made to disband like the CNDP.
The membership profiles of specific Mai-Mai groups have developed past the initial grassroots
basis to protect villages and have a wide range of individuals that are difficult to pin down to any
one affiliation. Some groups that would be considered “Mai-Mai” are private armies led by
warlords, tribal elders or village leaders. There are also a few Mai-Mai groups that espouse limited
political agendas. Certain groups have been known to ally themselves to established guerrilla
groups, terrorists, and even other foreign governments if it helps them to survive. This in turn
supports foreign proxy wars on neighboring territory. More recently, the UN among other
organizations, has documented from interviews with local villagers and recognized that several
Mai-Mai groups are far more harmful than helpful to the villagers placed in their care and are
considered killers and thieves.316
Mai-Mai: Failed Peace Process and the Reemergence of the Raia Mutomboki
In terms of controlled territory, the Raia Mutomboki is one of the largest armed Mai-Mai groups in
the eastern Congo. Over the past two years they have managed to flush the Rwandan FDLR
rebels out of vast areas, forcing them to abandon their headquarters in southern Masisi, North Kivu
Province. Despite its success, the Raia Mutomboki is also one of the most fragmented and illdisciplined armed groups in eastern DRC.
The Raia Mutomboki, “Furious Citizens” in Kiswahili, began a rampage of revenge killings in late
2011 against Hutu villagers that the Raia believed were supporting the FDLR. Congolese forces
eventually quelled the Raia in 2012 but not before over 100 civilians were killed by the group. The
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Raia Mutomboki were encouraged to reassert themselves while the Congolese Army was
preoccupied with fighting the M23 in the Kivus in 2012 and 2013.
Regional experts believe the Raia Mutomboki is a product of flawed peace processes. In 2005, its
first tentative appearance was made in southern Shabunda, South Kivu, when Mai-Mai left the
area to participate in army integration, giving the FDLR unfettered access to the lucrative mines
around Kalole, and where the first Raia Mutomboki group was created by witchdoctor Jean
Musumbu. It was initially established in 2005 in Shabunda territory to protect the villagers in the
area from the Interahamwe and the forces of the FDLR. During this time Congolese civilians were
massacred by the FDLR in March 2005 in the forests outside of the village of Kyoka, in Shabunda.
These villagers were hacked to death with machetes, which fueled the indignation of the
Congolese males in the area to the point where they willingly came together to pledge
themselves to serve in Mai-Mai Raia Mutomboki. Eventually, the Raia Mutomboki pushed the FDLR
out of Shabunda.
The group never would have reached out of its jungle backwater if it hadn't been for the
integration of the CNDP in 2009; a deal which was only possible because Rwanda and the
Congolese forces agreed to join operations against the FDLR. While many diplomats heralded
the deal, it caused a humanitarian catastrophe that caught Congolese civilians in the messy
governmental counterinsurgency operations. This was the main precursor to the recent explosion
of the Raia Mutomboki.
FDLR soldiers entered Shabunda in early 2011 after FARDC units in the area were relocated. The
FDLR soldiers immediately started stealing from villagers and killing civilians in the area, again
causing the men to come together. Talks of resurrecting the Raia Mutomboki resurfaced.
Ironically, it was an initiative that was intended as a corrective to CNDP integration, which had
given the former rebels disproportionate control of operations in the Kivus, that which rekindled
the Raia. The regimentation exercise, which was supposed to streamline army units and counter
CNDP networks, drew soldiers out of large areas of the Kivus to army camps, leaving the
population at the mercy of the FDLR, especially in remote areas like Shabunda. It was particularly
the mining areas here where violence erupted, as the FDLR tried to violently impose their
authority.317
When the Congolese army returned to the area in late 2011, the Raia helped track the movements
of the FDLR within the local forests; however they began to resent the presence of the Tutsi soldiers
(ex-CNDP troops serving in the Congolese army) following the peace deal to integrate them back
into the national army. The Raia considered these ex-CNDP troops as foreigners who had no right
to be living in the Congo, serving as soldiers in the Congolese Army. This animosity provoked the
Raia Mutomboki to attack the Congolese Army on several occasions and their amicable work
deteriorated into open warfare, again fighting internally.
As the Raia continued to hunt for the FDLR soldiers, it also began to kill the dependents of the
Interahamwe, including women and children, mutilating them before they killed them. FDLR
deserters told UN officials that the Raia Mutomboki were their greatest worry. The brutal tactics
employed by the Raia caused the FDLR to retaliate in kind, causing the massacres of civilians on
both sides of the conflict. By May 2012, the Raia moved into North Kivu in Tembo and Kano/Rega
where they killed FDLR dependents and also massacred close to one hundred people, most of
whom were Hutu villagers without FDLR ties.
6.4 Security Situation in Katanga Province
Inter-tribal rivalry is one of several drivers of instability in Katanga Province; a region rich in rare
minerals where extractive activities are the backbone of the nation’s economy. It is also a region
that has long desired autonomy from the national government with an active secessionist
movement. Government forces have moved at times to try to regain control of the region. In
response local Mai-Mai, including the separatist group Kata Katanga, have attacked FARDC
troops and pillaged villages for food and child soldiers. Since October 2013, small armed militia
bands have burned villages in the impoverished area of central Katanga, known as the “triangle
of death.”318
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Humanitarian access is limited and the number of displaced people climbed in 2013 as tensions
increased in the province. According to UNHCR, an estimated 400,000 people were living either
in IDP camps or with host families in Katanga, and those are only the known number of displaced
persons; the actual figure is estimated to be much higher. Of heightened concern is the
methodology of Kata Katanga to build their ranks by kidnapping children.319
Members of the Kata Katanga have connections to regional politicians and receives military,
financial and logistical support from a senior ranking police official and politicians. The December
2013 report by the UN Group of Experts on the DRC wrote that the Kata Katanga militia is
responsible for serious human rights abuses and war crimes. Kata Katanga is accused for the two
attacks on Katanga Airport in 2013, and is responsible for the one-day occupation of Lubumbashi,
the capital of Katanga. The rebel group has also been accused of kidnapping hundreds of
children, some as young as eight-years, to replenish its militia force.320
Kata Katanga primarily operates in the “triangle of death,” between the territories of Manono,
Mitwaba and Pweto. The group condemns the unequal distribution of wealth between north and
south Katanga. North Katanga (where the Tanganyika District is located) remains largely
impoverish and undeveloped compared to the more prosperous southern half of the province.321
Much of the anti-government activity in Katanga is related to President Joseph Kabila’s failure to
implement the decentralization elements of the 2006 federal constitution that call for the
provinces of the DRC to retain 40 percent of mining revenues. Part of the plan approved in a
referendum in 2008 called for the division of Katanga into four smaller provinces – a plan that is
counter to secessionists’ goal to have an independent Katanga Province. There is also concern
by north Katangans, and the governor of Katanga Province (who is from the north), that Kinshasa’s
inaction to implement the decentralization plan in Katanga is a move by Kabila to continue the
flow of wealth to south Katanga while ignoring the impoverished north.322
President Joseph Kabila previously relied on his advisor, Katumba Mwanke, to handle discontent
from the powerful north Katangan politicians based in Kinshasa, who were seated in government
under the influence of former President Laurent Kabila (Kabila’s grandfather was from North
Katanga). Since Mwanke’s untimely death in a 2011 plane crash, Joseph Kabila has encountered
difficulties in appeasing this influential group of politicians from north Katanga, who in turn have
become dissatisfied with the president’s inability to provide security in Katanga and no longer
backing his support in Katanga Province.
On March 23, 2013, the Katangan capital of Lubumbashi was occupied by 300 Kata Katanga
fighters (some of them children) who raised the old flag of independent Katanga in the city’s main
square. After a battle with security forces that killed 35 people, the militants forced their way into
a UN compound where 245 of them surrendered. Though the army had been able to defeat the
militia in a relatively short time, the occupation raised concerns in Katanga over the government’s
ability to establish and maintain security in the region.*
Kata Katanga is one of several militias operating in the Katanga Province that are more criminal
organizations than politically ideological movements. The UN Group of Experts on the DRC argue
that the secession issue provides political cover to Kata Katanga, who is manipulated by local
politicians to pressure the Kabila government in Kinshasa.323
6.5 Other Destabilizing Factors
Internally Displaced Persons and Refugees
The Great Lakes region has a long history of internally displaced persons and refugees from ethnic
conflicts between majority and minority clans; military coups; government infighting for
centralized state control; general exploitation of the land; lack of development in the region; poor
governance and security along the porous borders; empowered armed rebel groups or
secessionists; the availability, or lack thereof, resources; control over these resources; and the
MONUSCO presently maintains a 450-man brigade from Benin in Katanga, which was reinforced in 2013 by an
Egyptian Special Forces unit. The Congolese army maintains only one battalion in the area, far from enough
manpower to begin restoring order.
**
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stressors of climate change. These factors contribute to instability in the region and have led to
systematic rape and pillaging of people in villages, sparked regional conflicts and genocides.
Recent waves of displacement in the eastern DRC, affecting approximately one million people
since the beginning of the 2012 in the Kivu provinces, reflect a new dimension to the country’s
ongoing crises. Given the lack of attention to other regions such as Katanga and Manial Province,
the number of displaced people in the DRC is underreported.
Kivus
While the Congolese army fought M23 rebels, localized armed groups emerged, and areas that
were relatively stable since the last Congo War are finding themselves under attack. Evidence
gathered by Oxfam in 2012 indicated that government soldiers, armed rebels, police and civilian
authorities were all vying for the right to exploit local communities and extort money or goods from
them, pushing people further into poverty and undermining their efforts to earn a living. 324 Those
that fled to safer locations are now a burden on host communities who and have all but
exhausted their own resources. Increasing pressure on resources can exacerbate tensions
between the host community and newly arrived refugees, particularly in situations where
displaced families are ‘returnees’ and can demonstrate land claims when they arrive. This leads
to an increase in inter-ethnic tension, as seen between villages, their associated Mai-Mai groups,
and between Hutu and Tutsi ethnic communities in Masisi and Walikale, North Kivu Province, as
well as in Burundi.325
Although international attention has focused on the emergence of the M23 rebel group since
April 2012, which since then has resulted in a disintegration of state control and violence, much of
this is not a new crisis. It is a new dimension to a protracted conflict that has trapped communities
in relentless cycle of chronic abuse and constant insecurity, corroding people’s ability to lift
themselves out of poverty. Multiple organizations including Refugees International, Human Rights
Watch, Oxfam, and the United Nations have documented alarming levels of abuse of men,
women, and children in the eastern DRC by armed groups, and exploitation by the very state
officials who are supposed to protect and support the local population. Communities themselves
have increasingly become commodities of war, fought over by armed groups by both state and
non-state actors, seeking to control lucrative opportunities to extract their money and possessions.
Many people have felt compelled to take security into their own hands due to an abusive or
absent state, adding to the growing numbers of new armed groups in the region, fueling the cycle
of violence, displacement and refugee problems.
Refugees International reported that in North Kivu Province alone, 914,000 people took shelter in
camps and with host families, but the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR) only coordinated
support for one ninth of the displaced population, because their supportive capacity is limited to
those persons living in official camps (estimated at 112,000 people). Displaced persons in remote
areas, particularly those living in ‘spontaneous settlements’ and with host families, fell through the
cracks in the UN coordination mechanism, and in many cases they have received little to no
assistance or protection.326
The most vulnerable of this group are women and girls. The recent spike in displacement due to
conflict in eastern DRC has multiplied the risk of gender-based violence and current programs to
protect women and girls are insufficient. Refugees International recommended in March 2013
that aid organizations working in the DRC needed to improve aid coordination and ensure that
assistance is based on vulnerability rather than status.327
Repatriation from Tanzania and Burundi
The burden of refugees in other countries can be destabilizing to the host country, straining
resources, increasing criminal activity and exploiting vulnerable refugees; at times it can change
the fabric of the society into which the new refugees have integrated. Repatriation efforts
following the end of a conflict or closure of refugee camps need to be carefully coordinated
between state actors and civil society to ensure reintegration is successful and doesn’t
exacerbate preexisting tensions, such as unemployment.
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Recent repatriation efforts of Burundian refugees by Tanzania are a concern in the Great Lake
region. Several thousand Burundian refugees, many of whom are second or third generation
refugees whose families’ fled the 1972 genocide in Burundi, have been repatriated with few job
opportunities and or training. There is great concern this will increase illicit activities along the
border of Burundi and the DRC, especially if no income generating programs are initiated by the
government or aid organizations. Although the Burundian government and the UNHCR have
claimed to have repatriated the last 34,000 former Burundi refugees from Mtabila refugee camp
in northwest Tanzania, social and security services for their needs may not last beyond a year
later.328
In 2013, Tanzania ordered thousands of migrants from Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda to leave the
country by mid-August 2013. In August alone, President Kikwete ordered at least 20,000 Rwandans
to leave Tanzania whom he accused of illegal entry and settlement into Tanzania. Systematic
expulsions have since tapered off, but the forced displacement of thousands of people and the
social upheaval it has caused was felt throughout the transboundary region of Tanzania, Burundi,
and Rwanda.329 By the end of November, IOM estimated 36,000 Burundians, 13,000 Rwandans
and 4,000 Ugandans had left Tanzania, many of whom were born in Tanzania and/or had lived in
Tanzania for decades. IOM reported the largest number of those expelled fled to Burundi, which
is the least prepared of the three countries to handle the sudden influx, particularly given that
Burundi has one of the smallest, least developed and vulnerable economies in Africa. Burundi’s
infrastructure has been strained ever since it absorbed the additional 34,000 returnees in 2012,
following the closure of Tanzania’s Mtabila refugee camp. 330
Illicit Mineral Activities (the DRC, Rwanda, and Uganda)
Warring parties in the “Triangle of Death,” a region of DRC’s Katanga Province and along the Kivu
Provinces in eastern DRC, are fueled by mineral smuggling activities. Much of these illicit activities
are indirectly supported by regional state actors for economic profit and ethnic-based ties in the
region. Instability in eastern DRC bordering along Uganda and Rwanda is not solely the result of
illicit mineral transactions but a symptom of the conflict and a contributor to warring parties’ funds.
It is important to note, that conflict minerals are only one means by which warring parties pursue
their grievances, and other sources of commodity exist.331
6.6 The Water-Food-Energy-Climate Nexus
“Energy sector development
needs to incorporate risk
mitigation practices and
mechanisms to manage the
impacts of energy extraction
on the increasingly vulnerable
African Great Lakes, which
are already struggling to adapt
to climate change and the
increased demand on water
and energy.”
With the global population estimated to rise from the current 6.83 billion to 8 billion in the next two
decades, demand for food, water, and energy resources will soar, increasing resource
vulnerability and competition of these interdependent resources.332 This is especially true for
developing countries. Three billion middle-class consumers are expected to join the global
economy by 2030, triggering a dramatic expansion in global urban infrastructure.333 Water
security is an important link among resources that support infrastructural and socio-economic
growth, from agriculture production and public health (e.g., water-borne diseases, infantmortality rate, sanitation, potable water), to energy extraction and production. The U.S. State
Department estimates by 2025, as much as two-thirds of the global population could be living
under water-stressed conditions, where water becomes an impediment to health, peace, and
socio-economic development.334
Success of humanitarian initiatives in the African Great Lakes region greatly rests on the security
of water. No MDG can be met without attention to water management, and no private sector
investment in support of a MDG, separate development- or infrastructural program should invest
in the region without a full understanding of the energy-water nexus.335 If this symbiotic relationship
is not considered prior to implementation of a development program in the African Great Lakes
region, it poses further risks to the region’s already fragile state.*
Energy production requires an abundant source of water for oil and gas extraction, refining and
processing; especially for safer, less intrusive extractive methods such as directional drilling.336 The
International Energy Agency projects that the amount of fresh water consumed for world energy
This fragility is further explored in the subsequent chapters, as is an “antifragile” approach to development in the
region.
*
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production will double within the next 25 years.337 With this in mind, the demand for water will only
increase and may compete (or eventually outpace) with the need for petroleum and gas
reserves in difficult areas of extraction. It is in this light that energy policy should be crafted in
connection to a sustainable water policy and proper resource management in Africa’s Great
Lakes region.
Climate Change Impact on Food and Water
Evidence suggests that climate change is increasingly threatening the health and livelihoods of
the most vulnerable populations, magnifying many of the problems sub-Saharan Africa is
struggling with today. A large portion of the populations are reliant on subsistence rain-fed
agriculture.338 There are also high baseline levels of rainfall variability and high levels of poverty,
reducing the resilience of many communities. The World Bank reports that food security will be
the overarching challenge in sub-Saharan Africa, with dangers from drought, flooding, and shifts
in rainfall that threaten food supplies.339
Based on current rising temperature rates, scientists at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact
Research and Climate Analytics ran several climate change models that indicated by 2080, the
world would be warmer by four degrees Celsius.340 Models indicate that East Africa will receive
more precipitation and be more at risk of floods and water-borne diseases, while annual
precipitation may decrease by up to 30 percent in southern Africa, reducing crop production. A
temperature rise could also cause major loss of savannah grasslands and threaten pastoral
livelihoods. By the 2050s, the proportion of the population undernourished is projected to increase
by 25 to 90 percent depending on the sub-region (of sub-Saharan Africa). A 1.5 – 2 degree Celsius
increase would contribute to the loss of 40-80 percent of cropland by the 2030s. Further
exacerbating food security needs is the high population rate, which is expected to double by
2050 in East Africa alone.341
The impact of climate change on water security is profound. Regions with a high amount of
biodiversity reliant on a large source of water, such as Lake Tanganyika, are especially
threatened. Patterns of precipitation, temperature, and evaporation will change and affect the
hydrological cycles and the water cycle of the planet. This in turn will affect the availability of
water around the world. Models indicate as much as a 50 percent reduction in water availability
in some regions.342 The scientific community projects that that up to 20 percent of the world’s
population living in river basins will be affected by flood hazards by the 2080s due to global
warming.343
Climate Change Impact on the African Great Lakes
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change reported that climate change will exacerbate
existing environmental degradation in Africa, threatening the rich diversity of plant and animal
species as well as the livelihoods of large populations. Climate change affects the function and
operation of existing water infrastructure, as well as water management practices, economic
activity, land-use change, and urbanization. 344 This threatens the populations living along Africa’s
Great Lakes, where water supports the livelihoods of the millions of people living in the basins.
Water is the essential resource that fuels the life of each lake basin, including the Congo Basin and
the world’s ‘second lung’ – the forests of the Congo.345
The Conservation Strategy for the Great Lakes of East and Central Africa reported that studies and
modeling of past and present-day climate and hydrological conditions suggest the following local
and regional climate impacts in the African Great Lakes region in the 21st Century:

The current trend of temperatures increase will continue throughout the 21st Century at a rate
of approximately one third of a degree Celsius per decade, affecting lake basin’s
ecosystems;

Hydrological stress will intensify initially under the warmer and more variable climate the postindustrial warming of the global;

An increase of more than two degrees Celsius in Lake Tanganyika’s surface temperature is
the warmest temperature the lake has been recorded; the temperature increase occurred
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far more rapidly at the surface than in the deeper waters in the lake; this in turn diminishes
mixing of surface and deep waters causing reductions in nutrient transport to the surface;

Total annual precipitation will increase markedly across much if not all of the region by the
end of the century, in the range of 15-20%;

Seasonal precipitation will shift, especially in the southern basins, with pronounced increased
in late-year rainfall;

Significant seasonality changes are evident in model results in the Lake Tanganyika and
Malawi/Niassa/Nyasa basins, which project most of the annual rainfall increase to occur as a
lengthening of the end of year Short Rains.346
These are alarming figures and emphasize the need to build resilient communities in the most
vulnerable populations in the Great Lakes region.
“Shifts in climate are strongly
linked to human violence
around the world, according to
a 2013 report published in
‘Science’…The report
concluded that warmer
temperatures by two degrees
Celsius and more extreme
rainfall patterns could boost
interpersonal violence by 16
percent and group conflict in
some regions by 50 percent by
2050.”
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change concluded that current water management
practices are very likely to be inadequate to reduce the negative impacts of climate change on
water supply reliability, flood risk, health, energy, and aquatic ecosystems. 347 Energy sector
development needs to incorporate risk mitigation practices and mechanisms to manage the
impacts of energy extraction on the increasingly vulnerable African Great Lakes, which are
already struggling to adapt to climate change and the increased demand on water and
energy.348 349
There are available tools WAVE recommends stakeholders in the Great Lakes region to utilize to
counter the negative impacts of energy extraction and climate change, such as the Global
Environmental Management Initiative, which focuses on water risk assessment tools, including the
IPIECA Global Water Tool for Oil and Gas, a customized version of the World Business Council for
Sustainable Development Global Water Tool.350
Climate Change and Conflict
Linking climate change to violence and conflict has been a subject of debate. Although scientists
and researchers for the most part agree that climate change has made things harder for those
who live in a politically unstable and economically challenged region, it wasn’t quantified until
econometrician Solomon Hsiang published a report in August 2013 that found shifts in climate are
strongly linked to human violence around the world. The report, based on dozens of published
studies correlating extreme weather and human conflict, illustrates how the Earth’s climate plays
a more influential role in human affairs than previously thought. 351 It concludes that warmer
temperatures by two degrees Celsius and more extreme rainfall patterns could boost
interpersonal violence by 16 percent and group conflict in some regions by 50 percent by 2050.
This includes ethnic violence, civil conflicts, and land invasions – all underlying issues in sub-Saharan
Africa.352 353
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7. Conclusion and Recommendations
Debate by economists and development specialists on the best approaches for developing
countries has veered from the wildly optimistic, Jeffrey Sachs, who believes that by massively
scaling up foreign aid, poverty will end in Africa; to the anti-interventionist and radically pessimistic
William Easterly; to self-reliance promoter, Dambisa Moyo. Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo of
the MIT Poverty Action Lab, provide a more middle of the ground approach to aid and
development – one that WAVE embraces and which informs its programs and policies in Africa’s
Great Lakes region.
Following this pragmatic approach to development, WAVE promotes preventive and anticipatory
practices that cultivate resilient communities in developing countries by engaging multiple
stakeholders in the Great Lakes region. WAVE applies Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s “anti-fragile”
theory* in the development context, lessons learned in the Great Lakes region by subject-matter
experts and industry leaders, as well as WAVE’s empirical experience on the ground for half a
decade.
WAVE’s recommendations are based on the studies, reviews, and lessons learned in the Great
Lakes region by OXFAM, UNDP, and the Global Environment Facility; as well as public-private
partnerships (e.g., PEPFAR, Saving Mothers Giving Life, The Nature Conservancy’s DbD); and
water, climate, and public health reports (e.g., Lancet Global Health 2035 and Dublin
Conference’s Integrated Water Resources Management Concept).
Importantly, WAVE
integrates extractive and food & beverage industries’ long-term investment plans into its
recommendations to support economically sustainable outcomes. This is a paradigm that needs
to be scaled up to help sustain programs in fragile regions.
7.1 Promoting Resilience through Cross-sectoral Engagement
WAVE encourages cross-sectoral and bottom-up engagement to collaborate on programs with
multiple stakeholders, including with the private sector and extractive industries, to address the
complex, intersecting issues in the Lake Tanganyika Basin and broader Great Lakes region.
Recommended programs range from the creation of an Energy Institute to support the
development of the extractive industry and provide support to Great Lakes governments to
intelligently develop the region’s fledgling water-based economies and health systems, while
protecting the basins’ ecosystems.
Recommended stakeholder collaboration includes rural community leaders, national and
provincial governments, foreign extractive companies, multilateral organizations (humanitarian,
good governance organizations, and development agencies), and environmentalists and
conservationists, who have traditionally worked within their own spheres of expertise with little to
no engagement with each other, despite intersecting interests.
It is important for these stakeholders to engage with strategic partners in the region. The increased
need for energy and water resources compounded by the rise in the global population requires
a diverse group of stakeholders (governments at the national and local levels, the private sector,
scientists, NGOs, and international organizations) to cooperate on resource management, risk
mitigation, infrastructure for E&P activities, and socio-economic development. It is especially
important to consult with local civil society organizations that have a better understanding of the
situation on the ground. WAVE recommends a list of these organizations as future partners to codevelop recommended programs, to include local civil society organizations and current or
potential public-private partnerships, such as the 2030 Water Resources Group.
WAVE also lists regional institutional bodies, their responsibilities and limitations, and provides a set
of recommendations on how to improve upon their charters to increase their effectiveness as
platforms for regional cooperation, and as mediators and enforcers of transboundary
agreements, such as the Lake Tanganyika Authority and the Convention for Sustainable
Background on Taleb, Nassim Nicholas’ “Antifragile” philosophy as applied in development in the Great Lakes
region - Appendix N
*
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Management of Lake Tanganyika.
Many of these recommendations address the ineffective engagement among stakeholders with
intersecting interests in the Great Lakes region. Most stakeholders’ development programs
address issues in a vertical fashion. But post-conflict fragile regions do not have the underpinnings
to support vertical initiatives which take for granted statal functionality and do not consider the
needs of the local population. Vertical programs concentrate on one issue or one slice of one
topic, whether it is public health, WASH, education, telecommunication infrastructure, etc.
Vertical programs are not designed to incorporate the nuances of each community or culture
that it is targeting, thus the program falls short from reaching its goal and cannot solve the problem
from a holistic standpoint based on its narrow and limited approach to the problem.
Alternatively, an approach that takes into account the multiplicity of issues from each sectors will
be more effective. This is why cross-sectoral partnerships are crucial. They help develop programs
that foster inter-sectoral collaborations and sustainable paradigms in the Great Lakes region to:
build health systems infrastructure; create sustainable economies; extract minerals and energy
resources responsibly; streamline production rates; support emerging economies; end poverty;
lower maternal and child mortality rates; save endangered animals; create sustainable fisheries;
protect one of the largest freshwater bodies in the world; and encourage good governance and
enforce security along porous borders. These are all mutually interdependent.
Based on the preceding information and analysis, a number of recommendations are put forward
to influence stakeholders’ behaviors towards more sustainable practices in the Lake Tanganyika
Basin and the African Great Lakes region. Recommendations incorporate an inclusive crosssectoral approach to developments to enhance the aptitude of vulnerable populations and
fragile ecosystems to absorb the shocks of climate change, political conflict, and the effects of
mineral and energy extraction activities. It is a blueprint for intelligent development in resource
rich countries with emerging economies, rife with conflict or recovering from years of unrest in
Africa’s Great Lakes region.
7.2 Lessons Learned
In a Chatham House case study, Norway, Chile, Botswana and Indonesia are cited as countries
that have been able to exploit their natural resources sustainably and to the benefit of all. 354
Despite their differences there are four common threads of good governance practices:
1.
2.
3.
4.
A widely shared commitment to stability and growth;
A capable and empowered cadre of technical advisers and specialists;
Strong social constituencies able to moderate and inform political debate; and
Widespread popular buy-in to spending priorities; an informed society.
Lake Tanganyika’s four riparian countries (DRC, Burundi, Tanzania, and Zambia) have struggled to
create and/or support these pillars of good governance for a variety of reasons, and for the postconflict countries (DRC and Burundi) trying to recover from years of upheaval, it is even more
challenging.
Rather than making empty and glib suggestions to these countries that they simply need adopt
the above pillars of good governance and all will be well, the international community (including
the public and private sectors) should help these governments take tangible and practical steps
which will help create a foundation to eventually support these pillars in a sustainable way. The
reality is, that in the African Great Lakes region, this process will be iterative and will need much
support to help guide the pathway towards good governance and the creation of a cadre of
indigenous technical experts.
Recommendation:

Through a series of cross-sectoral partnerships, stakeholders should develop incentives that
mutually align goals in each region/sector and lead to these four pillars;

Expertise by multiple stakeholders is needed to identify underlining inputs and practical
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benchmarks to help host countries’ and their local CSOs create the necessary foundation to
adopt and sustain these pillars of good governance;

A public education and outreach strategy needs to be developed to support shared
accountability. A well-informed population is more likely to engage in good governance
practices, hold their local leadership accountable, and will in turn build a positive feedback
mechanism between the people and the state, limiting future abuses.
An example of a failed governance framework in Chad illustrates weakness of a technocratic
approach to oil management. In the 1990’s Chad began developing its oil resources in
partnership with the international community.355 Despite the close collaboration between the
government and oil companies, and the best available technical expertise from the World Bank,
the framework proved ineffective. The government renegotiated the terms of revenue-sharing
agreements repeatedly, bringing a greater percentage under its direct control with little oversight
and unbeknownst to its population. The oversight committee was undermined by political
interference, and the government directed spending as it wished, notably on its military and
security services. The government repaid its remaining debt to the bank and ended its
involvement with the oil sector in 2008. 356
Lessons learned from Chad:

Externally sponsored regulatory frameworks were not enough to ensure that Chad’s oil
revenues contributed to poverty reduction or improvements in government. 357

Highlights importance of a credible and stable cadre of technocrats who hold some influence
with political leaders.

Multiple stakeholder incentives to sustain programs addressing complex, intersecting issues.
7.3 Next Steps for the African Great Lakes Region
WAVE advocates for policies which cultivate a more robust and resilient society and ecological
system in the Lake Tanganyika Basin and throughout the Great Lakes region through a set of
preventive programs that incorporate local input. Good policies encourage partnerships with
mindful and law abiding partners and built-in safe guards for extractive activities.
WAVE recommends the creation of programs that are designed to incentivize foreign
stakeholders to support cross-sectoral development projects to insulate the lake basins in the
Great Lakes region from the shocks of environmental, health, economic disasters or instability as
a result of poor resource extraction management. Cross-sectoral partnerships should promote
resilience, first by recognizing that there is an interdependence and shared accountability among
stakeholders. Any successful outcome is dependent on working together under an umbrella or
platform that acts as a repository of best practices in that sub-region or intersecting issue. Stable
political systems are one of several elements to creating a strong foundation to build on, as is
community resilience, industry resilience, and environmental resilience.
Political Resilience
Principles and programs that promote good governance have widely been accepted by the
international community as a course of treatment to relieve Africa from its “resource curse.” All
too often these programs rely solely on technical criteria and do not fold in political, social and
economic dynamics of each country or transboundary region. This risks oversimplifying the
complexities of the region as a whole, thus generating policies that may be conducive in one
country, yet ineffective for a neighboring country. An example of this is the European and U.S.
governments’ regulatory solution to the conflict mineral conundrum. Since conflict minerals are
a symptom rather than the primary cause of instability in Central Africa, integrating political and
local economic solutions, not just a regulatory measure, make for best policy. 358 Unfortunately,
this holistic approach has not been integrated into these regulatory measures and as a result will
most likely fail to reach its goal of eliminating funding for warring parties in the eastern Congo and
may produce unintended consequences including loss of local economic activity which in turn
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weakens and destabilizes communities.
This is not an easy task in the case of Central and East Africa with a history of countries governed
by kleptocratic heads of state with overlapping agendas and transboundary tribal affiliations;
militias that act as proxies for neighboring state-actors; in a region with complex ethnic, cultural,
religious identities. Add into the fold a region rich in energy and mineral wealth, as well as unique
biodiversity; but lacking in education, development and infrastructure; and under pressure by its
growing population needs, climate change, and increased global demand for both water and
energy. It was with this in mind that WAVE published From Curse to Cure to help policy makers
and stakeholders identify facts from fiction and to provide a real-world context for an informed
discussion of the policy options open to the region, and practical implementation.
1) Create a Regional Energy Institute
A regional Energy Institute can act as an independent umbrella organization with tools and
subject-matter experts to support countries in the development of their extractive industries in
collaboration with other good governance and capacity building initiatives. The institute will
serve as a watch dog and center of cross-sectoral expertise as the hydrocarbon sector
develops in Central and Eastern Africa. In addition to providing a repository of best practice
expertise, it will also midwife vital regional collaboration over the industry.
The overall concept of the African Energy Institute is to broaden the idea of “governance”
from its typical technical criteria (e.g., public oversight and regulatory checks and balances),
to a more comprehensive understanding of the dynamics of the region. The Africa Energy
Institute would identify the social, political, and economic dynamics that may be the most
important in successful resource management by country and region. This mechanism can
merge interrelated policies to support regulatory measures and enforcement with dual-track
solutions, such as a political solution as well as a regulatory policy to end illicit mining activities
from fueling the conflict in eastern Congo. The Africa Energy Institute would encourage
revenue and production transparency through countries’ publication of accounts and oil
contracts with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative.
The Africa Energy Institute will do this by:

Engaging the governments of the DRC, Tanzania, Kenya, Burundi and Uganda to
improve their respective countries’ hydrocarbon legislation;

Strengthening legal system frameworks to enforce good governance and extractive
regulations;

Training to create a cadre of civil servants who have the appropriate technical skill sets
and are incentivized towards long term growth and stability;

Offering a forum for private sector stakeholders, civil society organizations, international
development organizations, and governments to convene and discuss cross-sectoral
issues and develop integrated programs tailored to each region, starting with the Lake
Tanganyika Basin and the Great Lakes as a whole;

Supporting the creation of advisory boards in transboundary lake basins on sustainable
development, the environment, climate change, and new technologies in underinvested region (e.g., creation of a civil society advisory board for the development on
Lake Tanganyika).
2) Practice Good Governance and Oil Revenue Transparency
The DRC and countries in the Great Lakes region should continue to reform oil governance
and general good governance practices by:

Supporting the creation of an independent body, such as the recommended African
Energy Institute, that offers tools to support riparian country governments’ develop
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comprehensive hydrocarbon legislation.

Enacting modernized, comprehensive hydrocarbon code that makes it compulsory for
independent companies to use “clean technology,” enforce the polluter pays
principle, and conduct an environmental impact study every two years and publish
the results.

Implementation of transparency initiatives for revenue and production of resources;

Establishment of a framework that ensures the local communities benefit from these
revenues, to include an independent third party to monitor and evaluate measurable
outputs on the communities health, income, and education.

Through the creation of Local Governance Education Campaigns to improve
administration and promote appropriate local elections and decentralization, as well
as building capacity of local communities to understand and promote their rights
through social and/or political platforms.
3) Define Border Demarcation Line and Resolve Current Cross-border Grievances
Although applicable for all littoral countries, it is especially important for the DRC to reach
clearer demarcation of its borders on Lake Tanganyika and on other lakes and coastal areas
before it can collaborate with its neighbors on oil exploration. To that end, the Government
of the DRC and neighboring countries need to begin a border demarcation program, with
technical support from regional umbrella organizations, such as the African Union’s Border
Program and World Bank, before allocating any more exploration blocks in disputed areas.
The border demarcation process should:

Clarify the situation and update demarcation line on Lake Tanganyika and other crossborder lakes;

Implement the Ngurdoto Accords with Uganda for exploration and extraction rights on
Lake Albert;

Help resolve the border dispute between the governments of Malawi and Tanzania on
Lake Malawi;

Monitor joint economic zone between Angola and the DRC, and any outstanding
issues along the demarcation line off the Atlantic Coast.
4) Secure Areas of Instability
Riparian governments need to cease exploration of insecure areas, especially in eastern DRC
where the situation is again deteriorating and the porous border is difficult to control, until
these territories are made secure and involve the provinces in the main management
decisions concerning exploited resource. Regional governments may do this by:

Creating regionally focused solutions and dialogue;

Supporting capacity building to build resilience communities address food insecurity,
health, etc.);

Declaring a moratorium on resource E&P of insecure areas;

Investing in training and the professionalization of their security services;

Follow through on agreements and stabilization plans to end violence in the Kivus and
Katanga Province.
5) Security and Diplomacy
This includes support from international and regional organizations such as the AU, UN, and
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ICC, to hold non-state actors and government leaders accountable from further inflicting
regional instability for profit by:

Monitor lead up to the Presidential elections in Burundi and support good election
practices;

Monitor lead up to the Presidential elections in the DRC and support good election
practices through effective incentives;

Meet with local stakeholders in Katanga to better understand and monitor events
largely going unnoticed by the International Community;

Holding the DRC government accountable to ensure the CNDP is effectively
integrated into the national Congolese army per the March 23, 2008 agreement;

Investigation by the ICC into the actions of former M23 leaders and currently active
members of the FDLR, ADF-Nalu, and armed Mai-Mai groups in Katanga and the Kivu
provinces;

Establishment of a joint verification mechanism for the DRC and Rwandan border;

Establishment of an embargo on weapons sales to Rwanda.
Community Resilience
There is growing consensus among the international community that reducing vulnerability and
managing risk in areas of recurrent crisis requires strategically coordinating development and
humanitarian assistance. Large aid organizations have begun to adopt this “anti-fragile”
approach, or as they deem it, “building resilience.” Although this term of reference has become
a buzzword among many donors and NGOs, it has only recently been etched into a definable
policy by USAID as outlined in its Policy and Program Guidance on Building Resilience to Recurrent
Crisis (Dec 2012).359 The report responds to the chronic poverty and recurring shocks that are
driving the same communities into crisis year after year, undermining development gains, and
provides evidence that development with an intended outcome of building resilience prepares
communities in advance and helps them prevail afterwards. 360 This is a new approach to how
USAID is doing business to help vulnerable communities’ move from cycles of crisis to a pathway
toward development.
Development agencies are not the only stakeholders that should advocate for a development
policy that promotes building resilient communities. Local populations and the private sector
have vested interests in the socio-economic status and welfare of their communities and areas in
which they conduct business. Local stakeholders, especially, are integral to developing this new
approach of economic sustainability. First and foremost, the local population needs to be
consulted to ensure there is space in resilience development guidance that ensures programs
can be tailored to the local environment and not a one-size fits all top-down approach. By
incorporating a bottom-up approach with input from local NGOs, leaders and civil society
organizations, the top-down guidance to “build resilience” will be more relevant and applicable
for the needs on the ground. A development program has a higher rate of success reaching the
most vulnerable with measurable outputs if collective action, local buy-in, and practical on-the
ground variables are integrated into the resilience model of development.
There are a number of institutional bodies that encourage regional cooperation, including a series
of new local institutions that should be engaged in addition to the better known multilateral
organization such as the ICGLR. While these organizations have the foundation to support other
community resilience programs, their own limitations, such as an inability to enforce regulations,
should also be addressed in order to improve upon their charters to increase their effectiveness
as platforms for regional cooperation, and as mediators and enforcers of transboundary
agreements. Below is a list of regional institutional bodies, their responsibilities and limitations, and
a set of recommendations on how to improve upon their charters.
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1) Empower Regional Institutional Bodies

The Lake Tanganyika Authority (LTA)
The LTA needs help to further develop its strategic plan to counter pollution and
implications of potential energy extraction within the Convention’s Strategic Action
Program Component (F), to include:


a.
Ability to enforce a comprehensive Environmental and Social Impact Assessment
prior to exploratory drilling on Lake Tanganyika;
b.
Development of a Regional Contingency and Intervention Plan;
c.
Improve the integration of national level programs from riparian countries into the
SAP.* The LTA is given the authority to coordinate and oversee the implementation
of the Regional Integrated Management Program, which focuses on
establishment of sustainable fisheries, catchment management, pollution control,
climate change adaptations, and monitoring programs which is a key role for
offensive cross-sectoral and cross-border coordination.
d.
Advise on new agreements subject to environmental controls of major industrial
operations, to include drilling operations inland and offshore.
International Conference on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR) – An inter-governmental
organization of the countries in the African Great Lakes Region establishment to address
the regional dimension of political instability in the region. The ICGLR needs support by
the international community to:
a.
Hold members accountable if they violate peace agreements, support proxy
forces, or intentionally exasperate cross-border disputes;
b.
Encourage economic development in the region by encouraging cross-sectoral
partnerships, public-private partnerships, and host economic delegations to fact
find in remote areas of the Great Lakes region.
East African Community (EAC)
The East Africa Community was established in 2000 (again, after having been dissolved in
1977) to work towards integrating the economies of its member states: Kenya, Tanzania,
Uganda (original three), Rwanda and Burundi (joined in 2007). Having already established
a customs union and a common market, the EAC is hoping to deepen its collaborative
force by working on a monetary union and eventually entrenching political ties through a
Political Federation of East African States. Its institutions pertain to economic focuses, but
also matters of security, water management and collaborative development efforts. 361

Intergovernmental Authority on Development in East Africa (IGAD) – To assist and
complement the efforts of the Member States to achieve food security and environmental
protection, promote peace and security, and encourage economic cooperation.

The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)
The NEPAD is an African Union strategic framework for pan-African socio-economic
development, spearheaded by African leaders to address: Agriculture and food security,
climate change and resource management, regional integration and infrastructure,
human development, economic and corporate governance, and cross-sectoral issues.
The international community should suggest the NEPAD:
Linking the proposed SAP actions to other international and national policies and action plans is an important
issue. In addition to being parties of the Convention on the Sustainable Management of Lake Tanganyika, the
four riparian countries are parties to a number of international agreements and have their own existing national
action plans and policies that address topics pertinent to the SAP. To ensure clear links between programs, the
LTA in collaboration with the UNDP/GEF Project, is supporting the development of National Action Plans for
implementation of the SAP.
*
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a.
Develop a local agenda that speaks more to the ground truths in that particular
region by engaging and being more inclusive to local civil society organizations;
b.
Increase their number of partnerships with regional, local, and sector-specific
experts;
Revise development targets to be more practical and achievable goals.
c.

Southern African Development Community (SADC)
Formed in 1992, the SADC’s 15 member states are dedicated toward regional integration
to aid common goals of economic development, poverty alleviation and security.362 Part
of their common objectives, as stated in the SADC Treaty, are specifically dedicated to
the sustainable use of natural resources and environmental protection.363

United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA)
The UNECA is one of five regional UN Commissions established to promote socio-economic
development of its member states. The mandate of the African office covers 54 states, for
which it provides technical advisory services for macroeconomic policy, development
planning, support in contractual negotiation and management of natural resources. 364

United Nations Environment Program (UNEP)
While this expansive UN institution does not focus solely on the Great Lakes region, its
specific objectives towards resource efficiency and environmental governance render it
a particularly relevant acting body in eastern Africa. UNEP work includes assessment of
environmental trends on all regional levels and is geared towards strengthening institutions
that promote environmentally safe and sustainable practices.365
2) Support bottom-up initiatives in the Lake Tanganyika Basin through international organizations
and local CSOs, including but not limited to:

Africare

Friends of Lake Tanganyika

The Jane Goodall Institute

Jhpiego

Lake Tanganyika Floating Health Clinic*

The Nature Conservancy

OXFAM

Pathfinder

PLAN International

Primary Health Care Project, Kipili, Tanzania

Resource Oriented Development Initiative (RODI)
Examples of organizations collaborating on community-focused initiatives:

Friends of Lake Tanganyika – A Local Grassroots Initiative in Lake Tanganyika Basin
Friends of Lake Tanganyika (FOLT) engages local communities and partners to foster
sustainable livelihoods through the conservation of aquatic and terrestrial ecosystems of
Lake Tanganyika and its basin. FOLT meets these objectives through research, education,
advocacy, and engagement.
*
Comprehensive list of LTFHC’s Health and Community Outreach Programs – Appendix O
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The Lake Tanganyika Center for Village Sustainability:
Working in conjunction with village governments and key partners, FOLT is planning the
construction of the “Lake Tanganyika Center for Village Sustainability” on the eastern
shoreline of the lake in Kigoma, Tanzania. The Center will support conservation and
sustainable development activities in the basin. It will conduct research, provide training,
encourage information sharing, and contain a weather station to support lake-side
communities.
Outreach and education projects:

a.
Bed Net Misuse Survey in partnership with the LTFHC*
b.
Clean Energy 4 All Campaign
c.
Tree Planting Campaign
d.
Environmental Clean-up Campaign
e.
National park tours for school youth
f.
Training village government officials on land and forest policy
g.
Primary school material support
Mothers and Infants, Safe, Healthy and Alive (MAISHA) Program
This Jhpiego-led, USAID funded project equips health providers with competency-based
training and necessary supplies for basic emergency obstetric and newborn care
(BEmONC) at 26 health facilities in Rukwa and Mwanza regions, Tanzania.

The Wazazi na Mwana Program
This health program, funded by the Canadian International Development Agency and
implemented in partnership with PLAN International, Africare, and Jhpiego, will equip
health providers at four health facilities in the MAISHA Program with comprehensive
emergency obstetric and newborn care (surgical services, including delivery by cesarean
section, and blood transfusions), in addition to BEmONC services.366

The Tuungane Project
The Tuungane Project is The Nature Conservancy’s community-focused initiative designed
to bring together reproductive health and conservation interventions for integrated
solutions to reduce threats and improve the resilience of the Lake Tanganyika and the
Greater Mahale Ecosystem.
Tuungane is a collaboration between The Nature
Conservancy, Pathfinder International, the Frankfurt Zoological Society, the Jane Goodall
Institute, Tanzania National Parks, and the Tanzanian Government, among other partners,
to strengthen local governance, improve access to social services and create sustainable
livelihoods. The Greater Mahale Ecosystem spans over 4.8 million acres eastward from
Lake Tanganyika’s shoreline, and is home to 93 percent of Tanzania’s endangered
chimpanzees. It is also inhabited by local farmer and fisher communities that depend
greatly on the health of the area’s natural resources; threatened by a high human
population growth rate and extreme poverty.367

Jane Goodall Institute Projects in the Lake Tanganyika Basin
The Jane Goodall Institute (JGI) is well known for its diverse programs supporting
conservation and education, spanning across continents. The following are two JGI
projects that support Lake Tanganyika’s communities:
Girls' Scholarship Project
The Girls’ Scholarship project empowers women’s education in the Kigoma community of
*
Detailed description of the Bed Net Misuse Survey – Appendix O
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Tanzania to narrow the education gap between genders. In addition to improving
women’s education levels, the scholarship program trains recipients’ families in
sustainable farming techniques, as well as forest regeneration and preservation. The
program has sponsored 249 girls to attend elementary school, high school and university.
The sponsored girls are members of Jane Goodall’s Roots & Shoots program, JGI’s
environmental and humanitarian program for youth within their schools.368
Gombe-Masito-Ugalla (GMU) Program
The GMU Program aims to conserve biodiversity and protect and restore wildlife habitat
in critical ecosystems in western Tanzania near Lake Tanganyika. The GMU program helps
local communities living near key chimpanzee habitats make a living in ways that do not
destroy the forest. The program targets 52 villages surrounding the focus conservation
area, which includes Gombe National Park in the north, Masito and Ugalla forests in the
south and the corridor that joins the two ecosystems. The area is home to approximately
311,000 people who depend on fishing and farming as their primary economic activities.
JGI’s community-centered conservation approach was developed in 1994 through the
implementation of the Lake Tanganyika Catchment, Reforestation and Education
(TACARE) Project. Since then, TACARE has expanded into the Gombe-Masito-Ugalla
Program.369
Industry Resilience
Private industry is another stakeholder that should be tapped to collaborate in integrated
development programs. By investing in frontier markets, especially in developing countries rich in
energy and mineral wealth but lacking in stability, security, and good governance, private industry
has the incentive to mitigate risks. With equities in developing countries’ volatile environments
and frontier markets, private industry has the incentive to mitigate high-risks. The energy E&P
sector should incorporate the following policies into their operations to lower the risks associated
with drilling in the Great Lakes region.
1)
Support transboundary institutional bodies that promote regional cooperation and help
establish mechanisms that support transparency and good governance by host countries as
they develop their energy sectors, such as an Africa Energy Institute.
2) Guide the public sector on economic reforms and lead on transparent extractive activities in
the Great Lakes region.

Disclose contracts and payments made to the governments in the Great Lakes region;

Respect international laws and agreements and the laws of the countries extracting
resources from.
3) Revise Corporate Social Responsibility programs.

Initiate development programs that build resilient communities and infrastructure prior to
drilling with input from local experts;

Partner with non-traditional regional stakeholders (local civil society leaders) to develop
a comprehensive Environmental Impacts Assessment to include a human rights
assessment and a robust socio-economic development plan in their preliminary studies,
prior to exploratory drilling.
4) Develop and utilize new technology for cleaner drilling practices and early detection of spills.

Monitoring and clean up oil spills through the use of network radio towers, a separate
mobile phone-based technology, or another form of communications equipment (e.g.,
HF radios) easily accessible to the lakeside communities to report oil spill in a timely
manner.
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Environmental Resilience
Focusing on risk mitigation rather than disaster management is a policy direction that, in terms of
sustainability and resilience, is particularly of interest to the resource rich Great Lakes region.
Particularly because of the available resource wealth, there is an opportunity to directly
incorporate this wealth into forward-thinking, long-term initiatives that render governments and
communities less vulnerable to the risks of oil and gas E&P.
Naturally, such a system is inherently complex and a vast network of acting bodies dedicated to
environmental protection already exist. These form an institutional basis in pushing environmental
priorities and embedding strategic economic incentives for climate protection in policy agendas,
such as incorporating environmental factors into the costs of extractive operations.
An important concept in driving this effort forward in a tangible way that promises to present
concrete results is that of 'natural capital'. An idea that is taking increasing hold among policy
makers and environmental advisors, natural capital refers to a process that projects or calculates
pricing the world's 'natural assets' like soil, air, forests, water, geology, etc. 370 The term is derived
from the idea that because these assets have no specified financial worth in the way that oil or
minerals do, the appropriate market value of their conservation and protection is not being
*
realized. Pricing it, however, would have a substantial effect on calculated risk, perceived output
of various activities, and ultimately the nature and transparency of investment decisions -particularly with activities like energy extraction.371 Treating natural assets in this way can also
incentivize external actors to invest in conservation efforts, as well as provides a way of holding
stakeholders, policy makers and consumers more accountable (both with respect to any
damages done, or in reducing emissions or pollution levels for instance). 372 While this concept is
still in its fledgling stages, and its complexity reaches beyond the scope of this paper, it nonetheless
presents a crucial development in advancing efforts of environmental sustainability; especially in
potentially driving pivotal actors like extractive companies.
An institutional platform that encourages collaboration among technocrats and policy makers
will help forge a more resilient future for developing countries. This central hub, be it our proposed
African Energy Institute or some other independent platform, presents a point of convergence at
which international collaboration on risk mitigation practices can occur.
1) Build resilience to cope with climate change

Local measures to build resilience and adaptive capacity are critical to ensure that
resource-dependent communities are able to cope with the immediate and long-term
effects of climate change. Several programs through the World Bank, among other
international organizations, are underway to detect vulnerable communities and
ecosystems to climate change and provide climate-resilient programs in sub-Saharan
Africa. These programs incorporate climate change risk into development and focus on
initiatives with strong country and/or African institution ownership, an important
component for successful outcome of development programs: 373
a.
Country-driven National Adaptation Plan of Action – A tool that helps poor
countries prepare for climate change impacts focusing on capacity building and
awareness raising, agriculture and natural resource management, livelihood
enhancement, disaster management, and health.
b.
World Bank Group Africa Action Plan – A platform for climate-resilient
development.
c.
World Bank Carbon Finance Program – Initiatives that reduce poverty through
environmental and energy strategies, build more transparent transactional
systems, and promotes international cooperation on climate change.
d.
ClimDev for Africa Initiative – An initiative that supports Africa’s response to
climate variability and change by building regional, sub-regional, and national
For more on the theoretical and practical underpinnings to the concept of Natural Capital follow
www.teebweb.org.
*
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policy capacity through the African Climate Policy Center.
e.
UNDP Adaptation Program for Africa – UNDP will assist 20 African countries to
develop policies that incorporate climate change risks and opportunities to
secure development gains under a changing climate.
2) Recommended Environmental Programs

Emergency Action Fund
Create Emergency Action Funds to support a Regional Contingency and Intervention
Plan for potential oil spills or pollution generated by extraction activities, thereby ensuring
the livelihood of the lake’s population.

Independent Oil Spill Response Teams
Pre-designate international interagency oil spill response teams staffed with international
experts in petroleum clean-up in addition to the Regional Contingency and Intervention
Plan. An independent team may help remediation from the political context and any
regional financial constraints.

NEPAD Climate Change Fund
Established in a collaborative effort with the German government, the fund seeks to
provide technical and financial assistance to African institutions and African Union (AU)
member states in climate change programs. Focus is given to capacity development for
coordination of climate change activities and the promotion of projects that should
present models for sustainable livelihoods. The hope is to use the fund to strengthen the
capacity of African institutions and AU Member states in these endeavors, develop
national and regional policies to support adaptation efforts and promote sustainable
investment, as well as mainstreaming National Agricultural Investment Plans.

Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+)
REDD is a collaborative UN initiative, led by the FAO, UNEP and UNDP, that works to
establish financial value for carbon stored in forests. This aims to create incentives for
countries to reduce emissions and invest in sustainable solutions. REDD+ is an extension of
this concept, to incorporate the merits of conservation and sustainable management
additional to forest conservation.

African Convention on Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources
This treaty was originally adopted in 1968, the revised terms of which were then agreed
upon by the member states of the African Union in 2003. The Convention addresses
economic and development goals in tandem with the central tenet of conservation,
stressing that this provides a strategic framework for sustainable progress. The treaty
covers an extensive range of issues in this regard, from land use, vegetation cover, water
and forestry, to community rights, capacity building and security concerns.374

Africa Mining Vision (AMC)
This AU-led initiative was adopted in 2009, and seeks to combat the paradox of mineral
wealth coexisting with extreme poverty levels. Focus is laid on integrating mining practices
into development policies at all regional operational levels.

African Mineral Development Centre (AMDC)
A subsidiary of the Africa Mining Vision, the AMDC is designed to address strategic
operational support for the AMC. It is to work with member states and their regional
organizations to aid positive redirection of benefits from mining activities to improve
development indicators.

IGAD Climate Prediction and Applications Centre (ICPAC)
The ICPAC is responsible for eleven IGAD (Intergovernmental Authority on Development)
countries in central and eastern Africa. It is a data-oriented organization dedicated to
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collection of climate data, mapping weather patterns and forecasting climate trends to
aid risk management, resilience and inform sector specific policies.

International Environmental Law Research Centre (IELRC)
The IELRC focuses on conducting collaborative research efforts between experts in the
North and South. With an office in Kenya dedicated to environmental law, gender issues
and biotechnology, it is strategically placed to advice on resource issues in the Great
Lakes and bridge collaborative policy efforts. Particular areas of expertise include
property rights and environmental resources; environmental agreements and resource
rights; environment, conflict and cooperation; the role of civil society in management of
transboundary water resources; and mapping the environment dynamic of conflict in the
Great Lakes.
7.4 Conclusion
The next two years will be pivotal for Lake Tanganyika’s riparian countries and the greater Central
and East Africa region. Both Burundi and the DRC have impending presidential elections with high
stakes and security concerns wrapped in the election process.
The international community is lobbying extensively for free and fair elections; however, it is
neglecting the inputs that help create the conditions for good governance. One of those crucial
inputs is the economic capacity to build institutions that help design good governance initiatives
and create palpable incentives for political will and local buy-in. Often ignored or blamed for the
region’s troubles, if properly incentivized, the DRC has an opportunity to reverse the trajectory of
its poor governance, human development, and energy extraction practices, and lead the region
towards a more stable, sustainable, and economically bright future.
How the governments of the DRC, Tanzania, and Burundi move forward to exploit their energy
sector will inform the experience and livelihoods of generations of Tanzanians, Burundians, and
Congolese. The decisions made by the countries’ leaders on policies in the energy and
development sectors will either impair the development index of their people or support the
development and economic revitalization of their countries for generations to come. By creating
a platform for technocrats to educate and advise these countries develop smarter infrastructure
that considers not only the development of their energy industry but the health of their people,
the sustainability of their environment, and the capacity to build resilient communities to buffer
from the long-term threat of climate change, energy and water security, millions can prosper.
Fresh water is one of the most under rated, threatened resource in the Great Lakes region. Despite
being a crucial component to health, development, and even energy extraction, water security
is often ignored in the Great Lakes region. Water is the lifeline to the 12 million people living in the
Lake Tanganyika Basin. This is echoed throughout the Great Lakes basins and why WAVE
published this report to highlight its significance, as well as best practices and policies to protect
some of the largest sources of fresh water in the world. //
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Appendix A
Lake Tanganyika Basin Treaties and Institutions
The International Scientific Conference on the Conservation of Biodiversity of Lake Tanganyika in
1991 was the catalyst for a number of partnerships and initiatives to further enhance knowledge
relevant to sustainable management of biodiversity and natural resources in the lake basin. From
1992 to 2001 the Lake Tanganyika Research Project (LTR) was implemented by the United Nations
Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) in close collaboration with research institution in the
riparian countries. The LTR investigated the production of fisheries potential of the lake, and
developed modalities for regional management of fisheries resources. Parallel to the LTR, the
Project on Pollution Control and Other Measures to Protect Biodiversity (LTBP) in Lake Tanganyika
took place from 1995 to 2000. The LTBP was funded by the Global Environmental Facility (GEF)
and was implemented in partnership with the United Nations Development Program, the
governments and research institutions of the four riparian countries, as well as NGOs. The
Transboundary Diagnostic Analysis and the Strategic Action Program (SAP) were finalized in 2000
and a draft convention on sustained management of the lake was developed to provide a formal
framework for the joint management of Lake Tanganyika.375
The Convention on Sustainable Management of Lake Tanganyika
On June 12th, 2003, the Convention on Sustainable Management of Lake Tanganyika was signed
by the four Lake Tanganyika riparian governments in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. By November 2007,
all four Contracting States had ratified the Convention. The Convention provided the framework
for the establishment of the Lake Tanganyika Authority (LTA) which was signed in 2008 by the four
riparian countries.376
The Convention on Sustainable Management of Lake Tanganyika provides the necessary right,
responsibilities, institutions and framework in international law that compels Contracting States to
cooperate in the management of Lake Tanganyika and its basin. The Convention is one of the
few examples of a regional agreement designed to achieve the conservation and sustainable
use of unique and shared natural resources. Importantly, the Convention recognizes the
significance of the lake for the development of the riparian countries, and the necessity of
cooperative management of natural resources. Specifically, the Convention establishes:

A binding legal framework ensuring certain standard of protection

Institutions for implementing the Convention at the national and regional levels

Mechanisms for implementing the Strategic Action Program

Procedure for settling disputes
Lake Tanganyika Authority
Article 23 of the Convention on the Sustainable Management of Lake Tanganyika provides for the
establishment of the Lake Tanganyika Authority (LTA), whose function is to coordinate the
implementation of the Convention by the Contracting States. The LTA has the mandate of
advancing and representing the common interests of the Contracting States in matters
concerning the management of Lake Tanganyika and its catchment basin.
Strategic Action Program
From 1995 to 2000, the Lake Tanganyika Biodiversity Project (LTBP) commissioned a number of
special studies, including on socioeconomic parameters, levels of pollution, and the effects of
deforestation on lake habitats. The LTBP led to formulation of a final Transboundary Diagnostic
Analysis (TDA) and a Strategic Action Program (SAP) in 2000. “The SAP should establish clear
priorities that are endorsed at the highest levels of government and widely disseminated. Priority
transboundary concerns should be identified, as well as sectoral interventions (policy changes,
program development, regulatory reform, capacity-building investments, and so on) needed to
resolve the transboundary problems as well as regional and national institutional mechanisms for
implementing elements of the SAP” (GEF Operational Strategy, 1996).377
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Appendix B
Mineral Sector in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
DRC’s 2012 global share of mineral production:






55% Cobalt
21% Industrial diamond
12% Tantalum
5% Gem-quality diamond
3% Copper
2% Tin
(Source: US Geological Survey, 2012 Mineral Yearbook for the DRC,
June 2014)
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Appendix C
Oil Blocks in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
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Appendix C
Oil Blocks in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Lake Albert Oil Blocks
Source: Platform, May 2010
Source: Oil of DR Congo iPAD Oil and Gas Conference, Kinshasa, DRC, September 2013
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Appendix C
Oil Blocks in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Source: Ministry of Mines, Crisis Group Africa Report No. 188, July 11, 2012
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Appendix C
Oil Blocks in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
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Appendix C
Oil Blocks in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Lake Tanganyika
Source: Alberta Oilsands, November 2012
Source: Pan African Oil (PAO) 2012
Source: Pan African Oil, 2012
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Appendix C
Oil Blocks in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
Natural Oil Seep in Lake Tanganyika
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Appendix D
Companies Involved on Lake Albert, DRC
Company
Where
registered or
listed
Where
active
Remarks
Caprikat
Virgin Islands
(tax haven)
DRC
Possibly owned by nephew of South African President
Zuma
China National Offshore Oil
Corporation (CNOOC)
China
Uganda,
interested in
DRC
Very large, state-owned; partnering with Tullow
COHYDRO
Congo Petroleum & Gas
DRC
DRC
State-owned
DRC
DRC
Private
Divine Inspiration
Consortium
South Africa
DRC
Private; close links to Encha Group (South Africa) and
financiers Investec (UK/South Africa); links to Kabila family
Dominion
Uganda?
DRC,
Uganda
ENI
Italy
Interested in
DRC
&
Uganda
Publicly listed
Exxon
US
Interested in
Uganda
World’s largest oil multinational; publicly listed
Foxwhelp
Virgin Islands
(tax haven)
DRC
Possibly owned by nephew of South African President
Zuma
Global Petroleum
Australia, UK
?
Upstream exploration
Heritage
UK listed,
Jersey (tax
haven)
registered,
previously
Canada
DRC,
Uganda
Owned by former mercenary; history of military
involvement, eg in Angola; nominally partnering with Tullow
in DRC
H-Oil
Cyprus, also
Spain?
DRC
Private; links with Repsol (Spain)
Neptune
UK?
South Africa?
UK
DRC
SacOil
Soco
DRC
DRC
Joint venture between Divine and Encha Group
Sud Oil
DRC
France
DRC
Uganda,
interested in
DRC
Private; oil trader? Links to Kabila family
Total
Tower Resources
UK
DRC,
Uganda
Upstream exploration
Tullow Oil
UK, Ireland
DRC,
Uganda
Publicly listed; mainly upstream exploration; partnering in
Uganda with CNOOC and Total; nominally partnering in
DRC with Heritage; likely to remain operating in Uganda
Publicly listed; one of world’s largest oil multinationals;
partnering with Tullow
Date of information: 2010-2012
Source: Oil Extraction in Lake Albert, Briefing Booklet, Action for Better Governance Program, 2012
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Appendix E
Chronology of Oil Contracts in the DRC from 2005 to 2012
Production Sharing Contracts approved by the Congolese Government from 2005 to 2012
Region
Block
2006
Block 1
PSC between
Heritage Oil
(39.6%), Tullow
Oil (48.4%) and
Cohydro (12%),
June 2006.
2007
A ministerial
decree took away
block 1 from
Tullow Oil, 17
October 2007.
2008
2010
PSC between
Petro SA, Divine
Inspiration,
(51%), H Oil
(37%), Sud Oil
(2%), Congo
Petroleum and
Gas (3%),
Cohydro (7%),
21 January 2008.
PSC CaprikatFoxwhelp,
May 2010.
2011
Approved by
presidential
decree (10/041),
18 June 2010.
Block 2
Albertine
Graben
Block 3
PSC between
South Africa
Congo Oil
(SacOil) 85%
and Cohydro
15%,
4 December
2007.
PSC approved
by presidential
decree (10/042
et 10/043),
18 June 2010.
Agreement
between
SacOil and
Total that buys
60% of SacOil
shares in Block
3.271
Block 4
Block 5
PSC between
SOCO (38.25%),
Dominion Congo
Ltd (46.75%) and
Cohydro (15%),
November 2008.
PSC approved
by presidential
decree
(10/044 ),
18 June 2010.
Source: Ministry of Mines, Crisis Group Africa Report No. 188, July 11, 2012
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Appendix E
Chronology of Oil Contracts in the DRC from 2005 to 2012
Production Sharing Contracts approved by the Congolese Government from 2005 to 2012
Region
Block
2000
2005
2006
PSC
Between
Surestream
Oil and Cohydro (8%),
16 November 2005.
PSC approved
by presidential
decrees
(05/003 and
05/004),
2 February
2006.
2007
2008
2010
MatambaMakanzi Block
Yema Block
Ndunda Block
PSC
between
Energulf
Africa Ltd and
Cohy- dro
(10%),
16 November 2005.
Lotshi Block
Bas-Congo
PSC between
Soco DRC 85%
and Cohydro (15%),
29 June 2006.
Nganzi Block
“Perenco” Est
Mibale Block
PSC
approved by
presidential
ordinance
(08/021),
12 March
2008.
Perenco
buys
onshore
blocks of
Fina Elf
Offshore Block
PSC between
Nessergy and
Cohydro about
Congolese deep
offshore,
October 2006.
PSC
approved by
presidential
ordinance
(08/022),
12 March
2008.
Source: Ministry of Mines, Crisis Group Africa Report No. 188, July 11, 2012
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Appendix F
Province
Armed Groups Present in Oil Blocks in Eastern Congo
Oil block
Oil company with
a CCP
Block 2
Caprikat,
Foxwhelp
Territory
Armed group
Irumu Territory
FPRI (Front for Patriotic
Resistance in Ituri)
Mambasa Territory
Colonel Kasambasa aka
Simba, deserter
Beni Territory
ADF-Nalu, Mai-Mai
Lubero Territory
ADF-Nalu, Mai-Mai
Masisi Territory
FDLR, APFSC (Alliance of
Patriots for a Free and
Sovereign Congo), CDF
(Congolese Democratic
Front), Pareco Fort,
Mai-Mai
Rutshuru Territory
FDLR, Mai-Mai, M23
Uvira Territory
Mai-Mai, FNL (National
Liberation Forces)
Fizi Territory
FDLR, FNL, Mai-Mai
Yakutumba, Mai-Mai
Bwasakala, Raïa Mutomboki
Mboko
Oriental Province, Ituri District
Total, Sacoil
Block 3
Total, Sacoil
Block 4
North Kivu
Block 5
South Kivu
Soco, Dominion
Lake
Tanganyik
a
Source: Crisis Group Africa Report No. 188, July 11, 2012
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Appendix G
Rebel Groups in Eastern Congo
Snapshot of Rebel Groups in 2012 (before M23 was dissolved)
Source: BBC378
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Appendix G
Rebel Groups in Eastern Congo
Approximate areas of influence of main armed groups active in the eastern DRC, mid-2013
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Appendix H
Account of the M23 Offensive and Defeat in 2013
After several months of stagnant negotiations and intense fighting against the FARDC, MONUSCO
and its Intervention Brigade, the 1,365 members of the M23 surrendered to Ugandan forces in early
November 2013. The decision to disband came after a week of rapid advances by the FARDC
and UN forces.379 Even before this offensive push against the M23, the rebel group had grown
progressively weaker. This was in part by the M23 rebels losing their last major stronghold in
Bunagana, located along the Congolese side of the border with Uganda. Moreover, it was
connected to the loss of external support from Rwanda and divisions within their own ranks.
The UN Group of Experts on the DRC reported in December 2013 that Rwanda had provided
support to M23 from Rwandan territory until late October, including soldiers in August and
ammunition delivered June through August 2013.380 International pressure on Rwanda to
discontinue support to the M23 likely played a small part in Rwanda’s decision. However, shifts in
regional politics and Congolese community dynamics may have also influenced the Rwandan
government to cease delivery of supplies to the M23.381
The Intervention Brigade deployed around Goma and Sake in June and July 2013. The M23
reinforced their positions during this time with little to no fighting. This strategically strengthened
the Intervention Brigade and by the end of August, M23 had lost territory, troops, and morale was
low. FARDC’s use of attack helicopters had proven effective and had pushed the M23 north
where the Intervention Brigade was posed to attack back on ground and air in the Kibati area.
Between the 24th and 27th of August, the M23 lost 17 officers.
By 30 August, M23 retreated north towards Kibumba and Kanyamahoro, losing artillery range of
Goma. Following this attack, M23 and the FARDC began negotiations, which ended with no
resolve on 21 October. Fighting immediately recommenced, but by then the FARDC’s 6,000strong troops and strategic firepower, supported by the Intervention Brigade, pushed M23 back
to Tshanzu and Runyoni, located close to the border with Uganda and Rwanda.
During this time, armed groups operating in Rutshuru attacked M23 positions, further weakening
the group. By 5 November 2013, M23 fighters surrendered or retreated to Rwanda or Uganda.382
Their leader, General Makenga, crossed into Uganda on the 5th of November with the bulk of the
remaining force.
General Makenga remains under the control of the Ugandan government. He negotiated with
Ugandan and Congolese government officials, AU officials, and regional envoys to provide
information in exchange for not being prosecuted by the International Criminal Court. Over
10,000 people fled the fighting into Uganda during this last offensive by the FARDC and UN
forces.383 On 12 December 2013, the Congolese government signed a peace agreement with
the M23 rebels in Nairobi.384
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Appendix I
Gas and Oil Blocks in Tanzania
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Appendix I
Gas and Oil Blocks in Tanzania
Offshore Blocks
Source: Tanzanian Petroleum Development Corporation, October 2013
Lake Tanganyika Oil Blocks
Source: Tanzanian Petroleum
Development Corporation, Oct. 2013
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Appendix I
Gas and Oil Blocks in Tanzania
Map of contested blocks on Lake Malawi
Source: Surestream385
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Appendix J
Oil Blocks in Burundi
Burundi’s Oil Blocks on Lake Tanganyika. Surestream Petroleum holds interests in Blocks B & D. 386
Source: Surestream Petroleum
Source: Surestream Petroleum
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Appendix K
Environmental Impacts
Lake Tanganyika: Comparison with aerial extent of 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill
Illustrates what a spill the size of the 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill would look like relative
to Lake Tanganyika.
Source: New York Times and Andy Cohen (University of Arizona), 2013
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Appendix K
Environmental Impacts
This map, courtesy of the University of Michigan, shows the relationship between the areas in
Africa with a threatened biome status and the areas with a significant rate of
deforestation. There is a high rate of deforestation shown in Rwanda and Burundi, where coltan
is mined. There also appears to be a high rate around the western part of the continent. The
most critically threatened biomes are shown to be in central Africa, a section which also borders
the coltan reserves.387
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Appendix K
Environmental Impacts
Map zoomed in on the coltan mining region showing Kahuzi Biega National Park. 388
Morphometric and hydrological data for Africa’s three largest lakes
Source: Conservation Biology, September 1993389
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Appendix L
University of Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index (ND-GAIN)
ND-GAIN Rankings of the Lake Tanganyika Riparian Countries
The ND-GAIN Index, a project of the University of Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index (NDGAIN), summarizes a country's vulnerability to climate change and other global challenges in
combination with its readiness to improve resilience. It aims to help businesses and the public
sector better prioritize investments for a more efficient response to the immediate global
challenges ahead.
The Readiness Matrix illustrates the comparative resilience of countries. The vertical axis
measures the relative vulnerability of countries. The horizontal axis measures to what degree a
country is ready to deal with climatic and environmental changes.
Source: University of Notre Dame Global Adaptation Index (ND-GAIN), 2013
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Appendix M
Millennium Development Goals
In September 2000, 189 member states of the United Nations came together at the Millennium
Summit and adopted the Millennium Declaration, including commitments to poverty eradication,
development, and protecting the environment. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) were
borne out of consultations that followed the Millennium Summit and would focus the efforts of the
international community on achieving significant, measurable improvements in people's lives by
the year 2015.390
The eight MDGs have been commonly accepted as a framework for measuring development
progress in the development sector.
Source: World Bank
Post-2015 Agenda: Sustainable Development Goals
The UN is working with governments, civil society and other partners to build on the momentum
generated by the MDGs and carry on with ambitious Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs),
which will serve as the core of a post-2015 development agenda. This agenda is expected to be
adopted by UN Member States at a Summit in September 2015. Member States are now fully
engaged in discussions to define SDGs. To date, over 100 consultations have taken place. Results
from consultations and other processes in 2014 will feed into the Secretary-General’s Synthesis
Report, which will be published by the end of 2014.391
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Appendix N
Application of Nassim Nicholas Taleb’s “Anti-Fragile” Theory in Development
The preceding chapters describe the fragility of the African Great Lakes region, and in particular
the Lake Tanganyika Basin. This section examines current development programs with an “antifragile” scope, a non-traditional development theory through the philosophical writing of Nassim
Nicholas Taleb.* Dr. Taleb advocates what he calls a "black swan robust" society, meaning a
society that can withstand difficult-to-predict events. He proposes "antifragility" in systems that
have the ability to benefit and grow from random events and volatility.392
Dr. Nassim Nicholas Taleb describes fragility “as what does not like volatility,” stressors, harm, chaos,
events, disorder, or any other unforeseen consequence. Taleb’s thesis for the “anti-fragile” is the
inert response to the unpredictable, to respond more effectively to random events of shocks.
Therefore the “anti-fragile” are innovative and may excel in times of random shocks, such as an
earthquake or unforeseen consequences from a conflict.
The WAVE has applied this method to ascertain and distinguish characteristics of “anti-fragile”
entities in Central Africa and the Great Lakes region, and how to export these characteristics to
the most vulnerable populations and fragile ecosystems in the region. The lack of post-conflict
development in the southeastern region of the Congo may also be seen as a shock that
empowered Mai-Mai groups to reassert control in the Katanga Province and along Lake
Tanganyika’s western coast. With little development, infrastructural supports, or basic services in
this region, Mai-Mai rebels among other entities, are strategically positioning themselves to fill this
security vacuum.
According to Taleb, fragility can be measured, as this paper has done, by pointing out Lake
Tanganyika’s unique but fragile biodiversity, her underserved lakeside communities and their
water-based economy.
But risk cannot be accurately measured despite the popular
methodology of risk mitigation (aggregate), because it is easier to understand if something is
harmed by volatility (hence fragile) than try to forecast harmful events. Taleb describes a
roadmap to modify man-made systems to let the simple – and natural – take their course.393 WAVE
applies this theory to policy recommendations and in doing so, turns the classical development
and risk management approach by the E&P industry and development sector, among other
stakeholders, on its head, in an attempt to implement a practical system of development in a
volatile region.
Nassim Nicholas Taleb, PhD., is the author of “Antifragile: Things that Gain from Disorder” and “The Black Swan:
The Impact of the Highly Improbable.”
*
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Appendix O
LTFHC’s Health and Community Outreach Programs
Working toward our ultimate goal of a fully operational floating clinic, the LTFHC has already served
hundreds of thousands of Congolese and Tanzanians by completing a number of outreach
programs, focused on the most urgent local challenges.
We have conducted large-scale mosquito bed-net distributions, integrated malaria prevention
education programs and cholera treatment, as well as spearheaded a comprehensive VVF repair
outreach in Tanzania’s remote southern region of Rukwa. We are currently expanding essential
communications infrastructure, introducing the region’s first electronic medical record and
developing a safe cesarean section training program. In the process, we have succeeded in
establishing strong, trustworthy relationships with the lakeside communities, as well as key
stakeholders in the region – from tribal chiefs to multinational executives and ministers of state.
Current Projects and Projects in Development:
1) Communications for Health Impact – Radio Network Expansion
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Tanzania
Over the past two years, the LTFHC has created an innovative hardware and software solution
that bridges the massive communications gap that exists across most of the Lake Tanganyika
Basin. Our system enables voice and data communication between remote health centers and
provides a solution for gathering epidemiologic data among the three million people living around
the lake. This represents a critical milestone in the development of the region’s healthcare
infrastructure, including its first Electronic Medical Records (EMR).
Over the next few years, the LTFHC will continue to expand its radio network to support over a
million people in the DRC and Tanzania. We have already witnessed the dramatic impact the
High Frequency (HF) radios have on required reporting to the Ministry of Health in DRC, and we
anticipate seeing those same benefits in the other locations, with the EMR leading not only to
improved epidemiologic data collection, but also better treatments, preventative practices and
healthcare outcomes.
Fall 2014: The LTFHC will expand its data-transfer technology and EMR platform in the DRC. This
will involve installation of HF radios and EMR hardware in seven new locations in Kalemie and
Nyemba Health Zones (two zonal head offices at Kalemie General Hospital and five ultra-rural
health centers). We will then extend the network further by installing HF voice only radio units in
three additional locations, for a total of ten new sites added to the network. The regional hospital
serves some 460,000 people while the eight rural health centers reach almost 60,000 more.
2) Bringing Safe Cesarean Section to the Lakeside
Democratic Republic of the Congo
The maternal mortality rate in the Lake Tanganyika Basin is among the highest in the world, due to
a lack of adequately trained staff to perform basic gynecologic and Emergency Obstetrical Care
(EOC). Thus, the LTFHC is in active development of a project aimed at training local health care
worker (HCW) staff in performing safe cesarean-sections in rural locations.
In this pilot initiative, we expect to train 8-10 providers over two phases, lasting a total of one year.
These providers will vastly increase the geographical coverage where safe cesarean-section is
available in the Tanganyika District in the DRC. Most training programs investing in rural health care
workers are very short in duration. One element of this proposal that is truly unusual is the
recognition that long-term training and investment is required for rural health staff in order to have
a meaningful and sustainable impact on outcomes for rural populations. The evaluation of this
pilot will enable us to scale the initiative in future years, including on the Tanzanian side of the lake.
Our capacity to train will increase as well, as former trainees will become certified as instructors.
We estimate that in the year after completion of our training project, maternal and neonatal
mortality in these sites will have decreased by 20%.
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Appendix O
LTFHC’s Health and Community Outreach Programs
3) Bed Net Misuse Survey
Tanzania and Democratic Republic of the Congo
Malaria is the leading cause of death in the Lake Tanganyika Basin. Long-lasting Insecticide
Treated Bed Nets are recommended by the WHO as part of a 3-pronged strategy for reducing
malaria incidence. However, there is significant evidence that these nets are being used for fishing
in the basin.
As such, the LTFHC has begun rigorous study on bed net misuse in the region. The LTFHC presented
our research to much acclaim at the Alliance for Malaria Prevention 2014 Partners' meeting in
February. We will soon submit this research to Malaria, a peer-reviewed scientific journal. We plan
to conduct similar efforts on the DRC side of the lake and will correlate this information with our
findings in Tanzania.
In collaboration with the University of Chicago’s Graduate School of Business and the William
Davidson Institute, we will further expand our experimental design to quantify and qualify this
crucial International Aid and Development issue from a broader development and behavioral
economics perspective.
4) Project Fabio - Tanzania
In early 2013, the LTFHC began conducting research in DRC under “Project Fabio,” named for an
Italian doctor interested in naturopathy and in whose name funds were donated. Through this
research initiative, we have created a database cataloging hundreds of indigenous plants used
by traditional healers, as well as mapped the sources of these commonly used botanical
medicines and the ways they are prepared. The project intends to assess acceptability and
feasibility of the introduction of botanical gardens as a way of conserving the biodiversity of the
Lake Tanganyika Basin.
Crucially, Project Fabio has allowed the LTFHC to build relationships with trusted traditional healers
in the community. These healers are central to the local healthcare infrastructure, as often patients
cannot travel to hard-to-reach health centers and instead rely on these local, traditional healers
for care; sixty percent of the population sees traditional healers exclusively.
Project Fabio will be immensely useful in providing baseline data for future evaluation of the
significance and magnitude of traditional healers’ contributions to the public healthcare system
in the basin.
5) Establishment of Basic Epidemiologic Data Markers in Lakeside DRC: A Cluster Survey of Health
Centers and Community Health Workers
Objective:

Determine whether a discrepancy exists between infectious disease and mortality reports
submitted by rural health centers and cases tallied by community health workers

Better understand the full scope of maternal and under 5 mortality, as well as
communicable diseases such as cholera and malaria

Knowledgably guide allocation of resources for future health interventions
6) Water Sanitation Innovation Project, DRC
Objective:

Install rainwater catchment systems in five lakeside health centers in rural DRC that
currently don’t have access to clean water

Community education seminars regarding safe water use
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Appendix O
LTFHC’s Health and Community Outreach Programs
7) Family Planning Outreach, Rukwa, Tanzania
Objective:

To teach rural health care providers to counsel patients regarding IUD use and then
perform safe IUD insertion

Perform a contraception outreach at Kirando Health Center, which serves 250,000 people
Past Projects
Tanzania Radio Network Expansion and Electronic Medical Record
Nkasi District, Tanzania Pilot – October/November 2013
In October 2013, the LTFHC beta tested its innovative HF radio hardware and software system in
Nkasi District of Tanzania’s southern coastline to validate our newly-developed data transfer
technology, commissioned by the LTFHC to meet the specific communication and reporting needs
of Ministries of Health in this remote region. The pilot involved installations at four strategic health
centers and clinics along 130km of shoreline, as well as the District Health Offices in the town of
Namanyere. This project brings new healthcare possibilities to almost 80,000 people.
DRC High Frequency Radio Pilot
Moba, DRC – March 2012
As part of a pilot program funded by HP, the LTFHC installed HF Long Wave Radios at eight health
centers in Moba Territory, DRC, serving a population of 80,000. These radios are the only practical
and affordable way to overcome the communications gap in the region, enabling Moba’s health
centers to connect with each other and the Moba Regional Hospital. This new communication
brings faster life-saving medical services to women in complicated labor, increased disease
reporting rates by 60 percent, and supported the outreach and monitoring of the DRC’s Ministry
of Health 2012 polio vaccination campaign.
Project Fabio - DRC
In early 2013, the LTFHC began conducting research in DRC under Project Fabio, a research
initiative to create a database cataloging different medicines used by traditional healers and
exploring the sources of commonly used medicinal plants and the way they are prepared. The
project intends to assess acceptability and feasibility of the introduction of botanical gardens as
a way of conserving biodiversity. Project Fabio has allowed the LTFHC to build relationships with
trusted traditional healers in the community on the DRC side of the lake. These healers are central
to the local healthcare infrastructure, as often patients do not travel to hard-to-reach health
centers and instead rely on local, traditional healers.
Women’s Reproductive Health Outreach
Rukwa, Tanzania and Moba, DRC – October 2011
Supported by HP, the Fistula Foundation and private donors, the LTFHC provided fistula repair
along Lake Tanganyika in the remote region of Rukwa, Tanzania in 2011. This outreach was the
first of its kind in the basin, bringing dozens of Congolese and Tanzanian fistula patients and several
healthcare providers together for surgical repair, education seminars and counseling. To carry out
this work, the LTFHC upgraded the Kirando Health Center that serves some 250,000 people living
in Nkasi District in Tanzania and donated equipment and supplies to the Sumbawanga Regional
Hospital in Tanzania and the Moba Regional Hospital in DRC.
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113
Appendix O
LTFHC’s Health and Community Outreach Programs
Katanga Kicks Malaria
Moba, DRC - 2010
Harnessing the excitement and energy that surrounded the FIFA World Cup 2010, the LTFHC
created and implemented Katanga Kicks Malaria (KKM); a unique, innovative, and multi-phase
anti–malaria educational outreach program tailored specifically for the Great Lakes Region of
Katanga Province.
The program’s curriculum, co-designed by Grassroots Soccer in close collaboration with the LTFHC,
engaged professional Congolese football players and community role models to educate and
engage youth and community leaders in a football–based malaria education project in rural
communities along Lake Tanganyika. Twenty-five local community role models and four
professional Congolese football players were trained as KKM coaches to educate adults and
young people in their communities, distributing some 15,000 Long Lasting Insecticidal Nets.
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Appendix P
LTFHC’s Proposed Hospital Ship
Over 200 feet long and 40 feet wide, the LTFHC’s state-of-the-art ship is uniquely designed to provide patients with
everything from acute and ICU critical care, surgery and recover, to laboratory research, pharmaceutical supplies and
training for local and foreign healthcare workers.
Once on the lake this 1300 ton floating medical and educational facility will serve as a regional-level hospital, working
in collaboration with all shore-based community health centers around the lake. The ship will be able to provide the
highest levels of acute care in sterile surroundings unavailable elsewhere in the Lake Tanganyika Basin.
With room for 25 medical/research staff and 15 crew, the ship is designed to be self-sufficient, environmentally efficient,
and can be maintained from its own stores and workshops with a minimal need for long-term docking or repairs.
By designing from scratch, the LTFHC is able to construct a vessel that serves a multitude of purposes: hospital, supply
store, dispensary and educational facility for both medicine and global health study. It will also have the ability to pilot
products and tools for application in the developing world, promote appropriate and improved agricultural
techniques, and provide a setting for those collecting data on development interventions.
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115
Appendix P
LTFHC’s Proposed Hospital Ship
The work of the Lake Tanganyika Floating Health Clinic
116
Appendix Q
Recommended Reading
The Congo and the Great Lakes

“Africa’s World War” by Gérard Prunier

“Blood River” by Tim Butcher

“Congo: The Epic History of a People” by David Van Reybrouck

“Dancing in the Glory of Monsters” by Jason K. Stearns

“The Democratic Republic of Congo: Between Hope and Despair” by Michael Deibert

“The Dynamics of Violence in Central Africa” by René Lemarchand

“The Great African War: Congo and Regional Geopolitics 1996 – 2006” by Filip Reyntjens

“The Great Lakes of Africa: Two Thousand Years of history” by Jean-Pierre Chrétien and
translated by Scott Straus

“In the Footsteps of Mr. Kurtz” by Michela Wrong

“Radio Congo” by Ben Rawlence

“The Trouble with the Congo: Local Violence and the Failure of International Peacebuilding”
by Séverine Autesserre
Historical

“Congo: The Epic History of a People” by David Van Reybrouk

“The Congo: From Leopold to Kabila – A People’s History” by Georges Nzongola-Ntalaja

“King Leopold’s Ghost” by Adam Hochschild

“The Lake Regions of Central Africa: From Zanzibar to Lake Tanganyika” by Sir Richard Francis
Burton

“Mimi and Toutou’s Big Adventure: The Bizarre Battle of Lake Tanganyika” by Giles Foden

“The State of Africa: A History of the Continent Since Independence” by Martin Meredith
Aid and Development

“Aid on the Edge of Chaos: Rethinking International Cooperation in a Complex World” by
Ben Ramalingam

“The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What Can Be Done About It”
by Paul Collier

“Congo Masquerade” by Theodore Trefon

“The Crisis Caravan: What's Wrong with Humanitarian Aid?” by Linda Polman

“Dead Aid” by Dambisa Moyo

“The Idealist: Jeffrey Sachs and the Quest to End Poverty” by Nina Munk

“More Than Good Intentions: Improving the Ways the World's Poor Borrow, Save, Farm, Learn,
and Stay Healthy” by Dean Karlan and Jacob Appel

“The Politics of Aid: African Strategies for Dealing with Donors” by Lindsay Whitfield

“Poor Economics: A Radical Rethinking of the Way to Fight Global Poverty” by Abhijit V.
Banerjee and Esther Duflo

“Poor Numbers: How We are Misled by African Development Statistics and What to Do About
it” (Cornell Studies in Political Economy) by Morten Jerven

“Smart Aid for African Development” edited by Richard Joseph and Alexandra Gillies

“Understanding Poverty” by Abhijit Banerjee, Roland Bénabou and Dilip Mookherjee

“The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor” by
William Easterly
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117
Appendix Q
Recommended Reading
China in Africa

“China into Africa: Trade, Aid, and Influence” by Robert I. Rothberg

“African Perspectives on China in Africa” by Stephen Marks and Firoze Manji

“Winner Take All: China's Race for Resources and What It Means for the World” by Dambisa
Moyo

“China and Africa: A Century of Engagement” by David H. Shinn and Joshua Eisenman

“The Devouring Dragon: How China's Rise Threatens Our Natural World” by Craig Simons

“The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa” by Deborah Brautigam
Natural Resources

“The Atlas of Water” by Maggie Black and Jannet King

“The Big Thirst: the Secret life and Turbulent Future of Water” by Charles Fishman

“The Burning Question: We Can't Burn Half the World's Oil, Coal, and Gas. So How Do We
Quit?” by Mike Berners-Lee and Duncan Clark

“The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Wealth Shapes the Development of Nations” by Michael L.
Ross

“Oil Wealth in Central Africa: Policies for Inclusive Growth” Edited by Bernardin Akitoby and
Sharmini Coorey

“The Politics of Water in Africa” by Inga M. Jacobs

“Power Plays: Energy Options in the Age of Peak Oil” by Robert Rapier

“The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money & Power” by Daniel Yergin

“The Quest: Energy, Security, and the Remaking of the Modern World” by Daniel Yergin

“The Ripple Effect: The Fate of Freshwater in the Twenty-First Century” by Alex Prud’Homme

“The Scramble for African Oil: Oppression, Corruption and War for Control of Africa's Natural
Resources” by Douglas A. Yates

“Water: The Epic Struggle for Wealth, Power and Civilization” by Steven Solomon

“Water, Peace and War: Confronting the Global Water Crisis” by Brahma Chellaney

“Water Security: Conflicts, Threats, Policies” by James A. Tindall and Andrew A. Campbell

“Water Security: The Water-Food-Energy-Climate Nexus” published by the World Economic
Forum Water Initiative

“When the Rivers Run Dry: Water – The Defining Crisis of the Twenty-First Century” by Fred
Pearce
HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and Neglected Tropical Diseases

“The Fever: How Malaria Has Ruled Humankind for 500,000 Years” by Sonia Shah

“Lifeblood: How to Change the World One Dead Mosquito at a Time” by Alex Perry

“No Time to Lose: A Life in Pursuit of Deadly Viruses” by Peter Piot

“Tinderbox” by Craig Timberg and Daniel Halperin

“The Viral Storm: The Dawn of a New Pandemic Age” by Nathan Wolfe
The work of the Lake Tanganyika Floating Health Clinic
118
Dobbs, et al. Reverse the Curse: Maximizing the Potential of Resource-driven Economies, McKinsey Global Institute,
December 2013.
2 The World Economic Forum Water Initiative, Water Security: The Water-Food-Energy-Climate Nexus (Island Press, 2011), 3.
3 Tindall, Campbell. Water Security: Conflict, Threats, Policies. DTP Publishing, 2012.
4 Robertson, Charles. The Fastest Billion: The Story Behind Africa's Economic Revolution. Renaissance Capital, 2012.
5 Roxburgh, Charles, et al. Lions on the Move: The Progress and Potential of African Economies. McKinsey Global Institute,
McKinsey & Company, June 2010.
6 “Income Inequality in Africa, Briefing Note 5,” African Development Bank Group, 7 March 2012,
<www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/PolicyDocuments/FINAL%20Briefing%20Note%205%20Income%20Inequality%20in%20Africa.pdf> (June 2014).
7 “Oil and Gas in Africa,” KPMG Africa, 2013, <https://www.kpmg.com/Africa/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Documents/Oil%20and%20Gas%20in%20Africa.pdf> (June 2014).
8 “September 2013 Quarter Activity,” Beach Energy-Tanzania, September 2013,
<www.beachenergy.com.au/irm/content/tanzania.aspx?RID=265> (November 2013).
9“Woodside Agrees to Acquire 70% Interest in Lake Tanganyika South Block,” RigZone, 14 June 2014,
<http://www.rigzone.com/news/oil_gas/a/134012/Woodside_Agrees_to_Acquire_70_Interest_in_Lake_Tanganyika_South_Blo
ck?rss=true> (14 July 2014).
10 Woodside, <www.woodside.com.au/Pages/default.aspx> (July 2014).
11 “Joint announcement by the Government of the United Republic of Tanzania and Tanzania Petroleum Development
Corporation,” Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation Press Release, October 2013 <www.tpdctz.com/Lake_Tanganyika_Licensing.pdf> (October 2013).
12 Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation Press Release, May 2014, <www.tpdc-tz.com/Press%20Release%20Closing%20Ceremony%20%2815%2005%202014%29.pdf> (June 8, 2014).
13 Jorgensen, Ntakimazi, Kayombo, Lake Tanganyika: Experience and Lessons Learned Brief, International Water Learning
Exchange and Research Network, Lake Basin Management Initiative, 2005.
14 Long, Nick. “Survey Shows Lake Tanganyika’s Oil ‘Potential’ in Tanzania,” Voice of America, 28 August 2012.
15 The Governments of the Republic of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the United Republic of Tanzania, and
the Republic of Zambia; The Convention on the Sustainable Management of Lake Tanganyika, (November 2007), 4.
16 The Strategic Action Program for the Protection of Biodiversity and Sustainable Management of Natural Resources in Lake
Tanganyika and its Basin. The Lake Tanganyika Authority in partnership with UNDP, GEF, and the Global Environment Facility,
2011.
17 Lake Tanganyika Floating Health Clinic, <www.floatingclinic.org> (June 2014).
18 International Lake Environment Committee, <www.ilec.or.jp/eg/lbmi/pdf/22_Lake_Tanganyika_27February2006.pdf>
(February 2013); also cited by Jorgensen, et al, “Lake Tanganyika: Experience and Lessons Learned Brief,” Royal Danish
University of Pharmaceutical Sciences, Copenhagen, Denmark, 27 February 2006, World Lakes,
<www.worldlakes.org/uploads/22_Lake_Tanganyika_27February2006.pdf> (September 2014).
19 The Strategic Action Program for the Protection of Biodiversity and Sustainable Management of Natural Resources in Lake
Tanganyika and its Basin. Lake Tanganyika Authority in partnership with UNDP, GEF, and the Global Environment Facility,
2011.
20 The Governments of the Republic of Burundi, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the United Republic of Tanzania, and
the Republic of Zambia; The Convention on the Sustainable Management of Lake Tanganyika, (November 2007), 4.
21 ibid.
22 Lake Tanganyika Authority, <http://lta.iwlearn.org/management-program> (June 2014).
23 Lake Tanganyika Authority, The Strategic Action Program for the Protection of Biodiversity and Sustainable Management
of Natural Resources in Lake Tanganyika and its Basin, Lake Tanganyika Authority in partnership with UNDP, GEF, and the
Global Environment Facility, 2011.
24 “5th LTA Conference of Ministers Declaration,” Lake Tanganyika Authority, 2012, <http://lta.iwlearn.org> (March 2014).
25 Phiemon, Lusekelo, “Fish catches from Lake Tanganyika going down,” The Guardian, 2 January 2012.
26 UNEP in Africa Newsletter, July-August 2013.
27 McKinsey Global Institute, McKinsey Sustainability & Resource Productivity Practice, “Resource Revolution: Meeting the
World’s Energy, Materials, Food, and Water Needs,” McKinsey & Company, November 2011.
28 “Tanzania’s Lake Tanganyika North Block up for grabs,” Menas Borders, 13 April 2011.
29 Long, Nick, “Survey Shows Lake Tanganyika’s Oil ‘Potential’ in Tanzania,” Voice of America, 28 August 2012.
30 World Bank, World Development Indicators, GDP per capita, 2012.
31 “Congo's Mining and Oil Codes,” Global Witness, <www.globalwitness.org/node/8424> (March 2014).
32 “Democratic Republic of the Congo temporarily suspended,” EITI DRC News, 18 April 2013,
<http://eiti.org/news/democratic-republic-congo-temporarily-suspended> (September 2013).
33 Long, Nick, “Congo Improves Natural-Resources Accounting,” VOA Online, 4 July 2014,
<http://www.voanews.com/content/congo-improves-natural-resources-accounting-/1951169.html> (July 2014).
34 “DR Congo becomes full member of EITI,” EITI Press Release, 2 July 2014, <http://eiti.org/news/dr-congo-becomes-fullmember-eiti> (July 2014).
35 Vidal, John, “Soco Halts Oil Exploration in Africa's Virunga National Park,” The Guardian, 11 June 2014,
<www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jun/11/soco-oil-virunga-national-park-congo-wwf> (July 2014).
36 “Oil-lobby antics cast more doubt on Soco’s promise to protect African park,” Global Witness, 14 August 2014,
<www.globalwitness.org/blog/oil-lobby-antics-cast-more-doubt-on-socos-promise-to-protect-african-park-2> (August 2014).
37 ibid.
38 “EITI DRC Hydrocarbons Sector Report 2010,” EITI Democratic Republic of Congo, 2012, <http://eiti.org/files/Congo-DRC2010-EITI-Report-ENG_0.pdf> (29 April 2013).
39 EITI DRC Reports < http://eiti.org/DRCongo/reports> (August 2014).
40 “Rapport ITIE – RDC Secteur des Hydrocarbures 2011,” EITI DRC Reports, December 2013,
<http://eiti.org/files/Rapport%20ITIE%202011%20Hydrocarbures%20%20vf.pdf> (August 2014).
41 “Generating "ripple effects" in DR Congo,” EITI News, 24 January 2014 <http://eiti.org/news/generating-ripple-effects-drcongo> (August 2014).
42 Kavanagh, Michael J., “Sonangol, Cohydro of Congo Reach Agreement on Offshore Oil Block,” Bloomberg Online, 22
1
The work of the Lake Tanganyika Floating Health Clinic
119
April 2013.
43 Mandelbaum, Toledano, et al., “Draft DRC Hydrocarbon Law,” Vale Columbia Center on Sustainable International
Investment, 28 March 2013, Global Witness, <www.globalwitness.org/sites/default/files/library/DRCHyrdoCarbonsLaw_0.pdf>
(April 2013).
44 ibid.
45 “Equity in Extractives – Africa Progress Report 2013,” Africa Progress Panel, 2013: 56
<www.africaprogresspanel.org/publications/policy-papers/africa-progress-report-2013/> (December 2013).
46 “Congo Aims to Pass Hydrocarbons Law Requiring Tenders by April,” Bloomberg, 31 January 2013.
47 “Oil Law Before Congo Parliament Fails to Safeguard Against Corruption or Environmental Damage,” Global Witness, 5
May 2013.
48 “A Murky Deal for the Congo as Oil exploration threatens corruption and environmental damage,” inyenerinews.org, 18
November 2013, <www.inyenyerinews.org/democracy-freedoms/a-murky-deal-for-the-congo-as-oil-exploration-threatenscorruption-and-environmental-damage-and-london-based-soco-international-is-first-in-the-queue/> (November 2013).
49 iPAD Oil and Gas Forum, Kinshasa, DRC, October 2012, <http://oilgas.ipad-africa.com/verticals/> (October 2012).
Perence Operations in DRC, <www.perenco.com/operations/africa/drc.html> (June 2014).
“EITI report on the DRC,” EITI, 2011: 15, <http://eiti.org/files/Rapport%20ITIE%202011%20Hydrocarbures%20%20vf.pdf> (2 July
2014).
53 “Italy’s Eni to Take Share in Congo Oil Block,” ABN Digital, 16 November 2011.
54 SacOil Holdings Limited, “Operational Update Block III, DRC,” London Stock Exchange, 15 August 2011.
55 Fleurette Group Oil Operations <http://fleurettegroup.com/operations/oil/> (August 2014).
56 Manson, Katrina, “Congo threatens to take back oil blocks,” Financial Times, 24 June 2012.
57 “Fleurette’s Oil of DRCongo – Seismic Update” Fleurette Press Release, 7 August 2014, <http://fleurettegroup.com/pressreleases/fleurettes-oil-of-drcongo-seismic-update/> (August 2014).
58 ibid.
59 “Congo’s Lake Albert oil block may hold 2 bln barrels,” Reuters, 8 September 2013.
60 “Oil of DRCongo Announces Major Road Investment and Update on Exploration Activities,” PRNews Wire, 19 February
2014, <www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/oil-of-drcongo-announces-major-road-investment-and-update-on-explorationactivities-246105011.html> (February 2014).
61 “DR Congo to start drilling in Lake Albert area,” Oil in Uganda, 22 March 2014,
<http://www.oilinuganda.org/features/companies/dr-congo-to-start-drilling-in-lake-albert-area.html> (August 2014).
62 Bariyo, Nicholas, “Oil Explorer to Spend $100 Million on Congo Drilling Campaign,” The Wall Street Journal, 19 March 2014.
63 Jones, Pete, “REVISITING CRISIS IN THE GREAT LAKES Series: Star of The Zuma Clan Hits a Jackpot in DR Congo,” Sapa-AFP,
19 September 2013, Naked Chiefs Blog, http://nakedchiefs.com/2013/09/19/return-to-crisis-in-the-great-lakes-star-of-thezuma-clan-hits-a-jackpot-in-dr-congo/> (September 2013).
64 Fluerette Group Corporate Structure, <http://fleurettegroup.com/about-us/corporate-structure/> (August 2014).
65 Interview with Executive Director of the LTA, Philemon, Lusekelo, “Fish catches from Lake Tanganyika going down,” The
Guardian, 2 January 2012.
66 http://www.aboilsands.ca/_pdfs/Presentations/AOS-Presentation-November-2012-v2.pdf
67 Alberta Oilsands website, <www.aboilsands.ca/democratic-republic-of-the-congo-project/> (June 2014)
68 http://www.panafricanoil.ca/operations/democratic-republic-of-congo
69 “Black Gold in the Congo: Threat to Stability or Development Opportunity?” Africa Report No. 188, International Crisis
Group, 11 July 2012.
70 Long, Nick, “Survey Shows Lake Tanganyika’s Oil ‘Potential’ in Tanzania,” Voice of America, 28 August 2012.
71 CIA World Fact Book, Democratic Republic of the Congo, CIA World Fact Book, <www.cia.gov/library/publications/theworld-factbook/geos/cg/html> (December 2013).
72 US Geological Survey, 2012 Minerals Yearbook for the DRC, June 2014, USGS Online,
<http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2012/myb3-2012-cg.pdf> (September 2014).
73 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI), DRC Country Report, <http://eiti.org/DRCongo> (May 2013).
74 U.S. Geological Survey on Cobalt, May 2013, USGS Online, <http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/cobalt/>
(May 2013).
75 US Geological Survey, 2012 Minerals Yearbook for the DRC, June 2014, USGS Online,
<http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2012/myb3-2012-cg.pdf> (September 2014).
76 Farchy, Jack, “Pricing shift in $2bn-a-year cobalt market sets post-Libor trend” Financial Times, 18 November 2013,
<http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/93dc856e-5057-11e3-befe-00144feabdc0.html#axzz3CHkf2e1d> (September 2014).
77 Freeport-McMoRan 2013 Annual Report < http://www.fcx.com/ir/AR/2013/FCX_AR_2013.pdf> (September 2014).
78 “Coltan Mining in the DRC,” Computer Industry Impacts on the Environment and Society, University of Michigan,
<http://sitemaker.umich.edu/section002group3/coltan_mining_in_democratic_republic_of_the_congo> (September 2013).
79 “2009 Minerals Year Book, Niobium (Columbium) and Tantalum,” USGS Online,
<http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/niobium/myb1-2009-niobi.pdf> (May 2013).
80 Nest, Michael Coltan. Cambridge: Polity Press, 2011.
81 ibid.
82 Ibid.
83 “Coltan Mining in the DRC,” Computer Industry Impacts on the Environment and Society, University of Michigan,
<http://sitemaker.umich.edu/section002group3/coltan_mining_in_democratic_republic_of_the_congo> (September 2013).
84 Sharife, Khadija, “Who Benefits from Coltan?” World Hunger Organization,
<http://www.worldhunger.org/articles/10/editorials/sharife.htm> (September 2013).
85 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Announcement, 18 April 2013.
86 Kavanagh, Michael, “Congo Affidavit on Gecamines Deal May Allow IMF Loans to Proceed,” Bloomberg, 9 May 2013.
87 Kavanagh, Michael, “Gecamines Didn’t Tell Government of KCC Gertler Deal,” Bloomberg, 18 October 2013.
87 Forbes Profiles Online, <www.forbes.com/profile/dan-gertler/> (July 2014).
88 Kavanagh, Michael, “Gecamines Didn’t Tell Government of KCC Gertler Deal,” Bloomberg, 18 October 2013.
89 Ferreira-Marques, Clara, “Miner ENRC buys out Gertler in $550 million Congo deal,” Reuters, 8 December 2012.
90 Casey, Kayakiran, “ENRC Offers $550 Million to Buy Gertler Out of Congo Unit,” Bloomberg, 7 December 2012,
<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-12-08/enrc-offers-550-million-to-buy-gertler-out-of-congo-unit.html> (August 2014).
51
52
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Manson, Katrina, “Congo threatens to take back oil blocks,” Financial Times, June 24, 2012.
Fluerette Group Corporate Structure, <http://fleurettegroup.com/about-us/corporate-structure/> (August 2014).
93 Jones, Pete, “REVISITING CRISIS IN THE GREAT LAKES Series: Star of The Zuma Clan Hits a Jackpot in DR Congo,” Sapa-AFP,
19 September 2013, Naked Chiefs Blog, http://nakedchiefs.com/2013/09/19/return-to-crisis-in-the-great-lakes-star-of-thezuma-clan-hits-a-jackpot-in-dr-congo/> (September 2013).
94 “News Over Ownership of Congolese Oil Blocks Raises Further Corruption Concerns,” Global Witness, 29 June 2012.
95 ibid.
96 Jones, Pete, “REVISITING CRISIS IN THE GREAT LAKES Series: Star of The Zuma Clan Hits a Jackpot in DR Congo,” Sapa-AFP,
19 September 2013, Naked Chiefs Blog, http://nakedchiefs.com/2013/09/19/return-to-crisis-in-the-great-lakes-star-of-thezuma-clan-hits-a-jackpot-in-dr-congo/> (September 2013).
97 “Congo fails to reveal loss-making oil deal with controversial businessman’s offshore firm,” Global Witness, 23 January 2014,
<http://www.globalwitness.org/library/congo-fails-reveal-loss-making-oil-deal-controversial-businessman%E2%80%99soffshore-firm> (February 2014).
98 Bavier, Joe, “Israeli billionaire sells Congo oil rights for 300 times purchase price,” Reuters, 23 January 2014,
<http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/23/congo-democratic-gertler-idUSL5N0KW3WW20140123> (March 2014).
99 http://blogs.wsj.com/riskandcompliance/2014/01/24/israeli-billionaires-company-defends-congo-oildeal/?cb=logged0.14761683381709556
100 Kavanagh, Michael, “Congo’s Failure to Publish Gertler Deal Breaches Law, Group Says,” Bloomberg, 23 January 2014,
<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-01-23/congo-s-failure-to-publish-gertler-deal-breaches-law-group-says.html>
(September 2014).
101 U.S. Geological Survey on Cobalt, May 2013, USGS Online, <http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/cobalt/>
(May 2013).
102 “The World’s Billionaires,” Forbes, March 2013, < www.forbes.com/profile/dan-gertler/> (March 2013).
103 Kavanagh, Michael, “Gecamines Didn’t Tell Government of KCC Gertler Deal,” Bloomberg, 18 October 2013.
104 “The World’s Billionaires,” Forbes, March 2013, < www.forbes.com/profile/dan-gertler/> (March 2013).
105 “Business in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Murky Minerals,” The Economist, 18 May 2013.
106 Kavanagh, Michael, “Annan Says Deals on ENRC, Glencore Mines Cost Congo $1.4 Billion,” Bloomberg, 10 May 2013.
107 “Fleurette Group Appoints Lord Mancroft as Head of group’s Advisory Board,” PRNewswire, Wall Street Journal, 8 July
2013.
108 Dobbs, et al, “Reverse the curse: Maximizing the potential of resource-driven economies,” McKinsey Global Institute,
December 2013.
109 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Tanzania Country Report, EITI, <http://eiti.org/Tanzania> (April 2014).
110 Marshall, Steve, “Statoil Makes New Tanzania Gas Strike,” Upstreamonline.com, 21 December 2012.
111 Kishweko, Orton, “Tanzania: Schlumberger to Invest More Next Year,” Tanzania Daily News, 20 November 2012.
112 “Beach Commences Seismic on Lake Tanganyika,” Beach Energy Press Release, 18 June 2012.
113 Long, Nick, “Survey Shows Lake Tanganyika’s Oil ‘Potential’ in Tanzania,” Voice of America, 28 August 2012.
114 U.S. Energy Information Administration, 30 May 2013, <http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=ug> (August
2014).
115 Long, Nick, “Survey Shows Lake Tanganyika’s Oil ‘Potential’ in Tanzania,” Voice of America, 28 August 2012.
116 September 2013 Quarter Activity, Beach Energy-Tanzania, September 2013,
<www.beachenergy.com.au/irm/content/tanzania.aspx?RID=265> (September 2013).
117 Beach Energy, Operations in Tanzania, Beach Energy,
<http://www.beachenergy.com.au/irm/content/tanzania.aspx?RID=265> (September 2014).
118 “Tanzania says Total Close to Signing Exploration Agreement,” Reuters, September 6, 2012.
119 “Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation, Licensing Situation, December 2012,” Tanzania Petroleum Development
Corporation, <www.tpdc-tz.com/Activity_Map_2012.pdf> (January 2014).
120 Wild, Franz, “Total Set to Get Tanzania Oil, Gas Exploration Licenses,” Bloomberg, February 8, 2013.
121 “Tanzania Petroleum Development Corporation, Licensing Situation, December 2012,” Tanzania Petroleum Development
Corporation, <www.tpdc-tz.com/Activity_Map_2012.pdf> (January 2014).
122 “Fourth Tanzania Deep Offshore and North Lake Tanganyika Licensing Round 2013,” Deloitte Press Release, May 2013,
<www.psg.deloitte.com/newslicensingrounds_tz_130518.asp> (May 2013).
123 “Closing of the 4th Tanzania Deep Offshore and North Lake Tanganyika Licensing Round,” Tanzania Petroleum
Development Corporation Press Release, May 2014, <www.tpdc-tz.com/Press%20Release%20Closing%20Ceremony%20%2815%2005%202014%29.pdf> (June 8, 2014).
124 UAE RAKGas International Operations, RAKGas, < http://www.rakgas.ae/index.php/international-ventures> (September
2014).
125 “Closing of the 4th Tanzania Deep Offshore and North Lake Tanganyika Licensing Round,” Tanzania Petroleum
Development Corporation Press Release, May 2014, <www.tpdc-tz.com/Press%20Release%20Closing%20Ceremony%20%2815%2005%202014%29.pdf> (June 8, 2014).
126 Rugonzibwa, Pius, “Tanzania: Ministry – Not Anyone Can Announce Oil, Gas Finds,” Tanzania Daily News, 18 October
2012.
127 Magomba, Leonard, “Tanzania: Nation Earns U.S. $305 Million From Extractive Industries,” East African Business Week, 25
December 2012.
128 Magomba, Leonard, “Why Tanzania Fails to Utilize Extractive Industry,” East African Business Week (Kampala), 25
December 2012.
129 Simba, Hassan, “Tanzania: Mtwara Residents Oppose Gas Pipeline Construction Plan,” Tanzania Daily News, Dec 28, 2012.
130 “Lake Tanganyika Exploration Causes Concern,” Petroleum Africa citing Tanzania Daily News, 30 Oct 2012.
131 DeBacker and Binyingo, “Mining and Upstream Petroleum Activities in Burundi – Sectors that are Attracting Interest,”
Denton Wilde Sapte’s Africa Agenda, edition 2008.
132 “Burundi: WGP Awarded Surestream Petroleum Contract for Seismic Vessel Conversion,” Africa Business News Release
118907, MBendi.com, 21 September 2011.
133 “Seismic Cargo Completes Complex Journey to Lake Tanganyika,” Offshore, November 2012.
134 “GAC Overcomes Challenges, Delivers to Central Africa,” MarineLink.com, Press Release, 23 November 2012.
135 “World Bank Funds Hydro Dam for Africa’s Great Lakes Region,” Environment News Service, 14 August 2013, http://ensnewswire.com/2013/08/13/world-bank-funds-hydro-dam-for-africas-great-lakes-region> (December 2013).
91
92
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121
Energy Strategy and Action Plan for Burundi, EU Energy Initiative Partnership Dialogue Facility, November 2011.
Miriri, Duncan, “Burundi Grow, but Still Falls Short,” Reuters, 26 October 2012.
138 DeBacker and Binyingo, “Mining and Upstream Petroleum Activities in Burundi – Sectors that are Attracting Interest,”
Denton Wilde Sapte’s Africa Agenda, edition 2008.
139 Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, <http://eiti.org> (August 2014).
140 Miriri, Duncan, “Burundi Grow, but Still Falls Short,” Reuters, 26 October 2012.
141 “Burundi: A Deepening Corruption Crisis,” Africa Report No. 185, International Crisis Group, 21 March 2012.
142 “World Bank Helps to Address Power Outages in Burundi,” World Bank, 21 September 2012.
143 Majaliwa, Christopher, “Tanzania: Border Dispute Talks Set to Resume,” Tanzania Daily News, 18 October 2012.
144 “Jorgensen, Bootsma, “Lake Malawi/Nyasa: Experience and Lessons Learned Brief,” International Water Learning
Exchange and Research Network, Lake Basin Management Initiative, 2006.
145 “Surestream Petroleum Awarded Exploration Licenses in Malawi,” Surestream Petroleum Press Release, 22 September
2011.
146 Mponda, Felix, “Entire Lake Belongs to Malawi,” AFP, 31 July 2012.
147 “Fear Grips Malawians Over Tanzania’s War Threats,” Nyasa Times, 9 August 2012.
148 Clottey, Peter, “Malawi, Tanzania Seek Mediation Over Border Dispute,” Voices of America, 20 December 2012.
149 “Chissano Agrees to Mediate Malawi, Tanzania over Lake Dispute,” Nyasa Times, 23 December 2012.
150 “Tanzania, Malawi fail to reach agreement on border dispute," CIHAN, 22 March 2014,
<http://en.cihan.com.tr/news/Tanzania-Malawi-fail-to-reach-agreement-on-border-dispute_4055-CHMTM4NDA1NS80;9Sdds5S> (March 2014).
151 “Tanzania Upset As Malawi Withdraws From Negotiations,” Tanzanian Daily New, AllAfrica, 5 April 2013,
<http://allafrica.com/stories/201304060466.html> (April 2013).
152 “Malawi Protests to Tanzania On Plans to Deploy Passenger Ships On Lake Malawi,” Malawi News Agency, AllAfrica, 2
June 2013, <http://allafrica.com/stories/201306030951.html> (June 2013).
153 “Malawi Declares Position over Lake Malawi Wrangle with Tanzania,” Nyasa Times, 31 January 2013.
154 Lay, Taimour, “A New Frontier – the Rush for Oil and Gas in East Africa,” Africa Arguments, 29 May 2012.
155 “Uganda takes over Ngassa oilfield from Tullow Oil,” Oil Review Africa, 29 May 2014,
<http://www.oilreviewafrica.com/exploration/exploration/uganda-gains-possession-of-ngassa-oilfield> (June 2014).
156 Wachira, George, “Imminent oil bonanza should finally wake up ‘sleeping giant’ DR Congo,” Business Daily Africa, 19
August 2014, < http://www.businessdailyafrica.com/Opinion-and-Analysis/Imminent-oil-bonanza-should-finally-wake-upsleeping-giant-DRC/-/539548/2424314/-/cu142iz/-/index.html> (August 2014).
157 “Will Kenya or Uganda be the first East African Countries to Export Oil,” The Guardian, 12 May 2014 <
http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2014/may/12/kenya-uganda-east-africa-first-oilproducer> (August 2014).
158 Ssekika, Edward, “Uganda: Oil Refinery Winning Bidder to Be Announced in June,” The Observer, AllAfrica, 18 March 2014,
<http://allafrica.com/stories/201403190191.html> (April 2014).
159 “Black Gold in the Congo: Threat to Stability of Development Opportunity?” Africa Report No. 188, International Crisis
Group, 11 July 2012.
160 ibid.
161 Kamako, “Angola and Congo: Bad Neighbors,” The Economist, 6 August 2011.
162 Long, Nick, “Survey Shows Lake Tanganyika’s Oil ‘Potential’ in Tanzania,” Voice of America, 28 August 2012.
163 Misser, François, “DRC and Angola's Borders and barrels,” The Africa Report, 4 July 2014,
<http://www.theafricareport.com/Central-Africa/drc-and-angolas-borders-and-barrels.html> (July 2014).
164 “Border Focus: Angola and DRC” Menas Borders, <http://www.menas.co.uk/menasborders/border_focus/AngolaDRC.aspx> (July 2014).
165 “Black Gold in the Congo: Threat to Stability of Development Opportunity?” Africa Report No. 188, International Crisis
Group, 11 July 2012.
166 “Tanzania’s Lake Tanganyika North Block up for grabs,” Menas Borders, 13 April 2011.
167 Long, Nick, “Survey Shows Lake Tanganyika’s Oil ‘Potential’ in Tanzania,” Voice of America, 28 August 2012.
168 “Burundi: WGP Awarded Surestream Petroleum Contract for Seismic Vessel Conversion,” Africa Business News Release
118907, mbendi.com, 21 September 2011, < https://www.mbendi.com/a_sndmsg/news_view.asp?I=118907&PG=35> (June
2014).
169 ibid.
170 “Black Gold in the Congo: Threat to Stability of Development Opportunity?” Africa Report No. 188, International Crisis
Group, 11 July 2012.
171 Long, Nick, “Survey Shows Lake Tanganyika’s Oil ‘Potential’ in Tanzania,” Voice of America, 28 August 2012.
172 “Black Gold in the Congo: Threat to Stability of Development Opportunity?” Africa Report No. 188, International Crisis
Group, 11 July 2012.
173 “Oil Exploration in Virunga National Park will Take Place,” savevirunga.com, 21 June 2012.
174 “Soco halts oil exploration in Africa's Virunga national park” The Guardian, 11 June 2014,
<www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/jun/11/soco-oil-virunga-national-park-congo-wwf> (July 2014).
175 “Oil-lobby antics cast more doubt on Soco’s promise to protect African park,” Global Witness website, 14 August 2014,
<http://www.globalwitness.org/blog/oil-lobby-antics-cast-more-doubt-on-socos-promise-to-protect-african-park-2/>
(August 2014).
176 ibid.
177 Kaufmann, Daniel, “Anti-Corruption Views – Poverty in the midst of abundance: Governance matters for overcoming the
resource curse,” TrustLaw, 17 September 2012.
178 Tanzania Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative, Second Annual Report for 2010, EITI, 2012,
<www.teiti.or.tz/news_images/news50581073bb67f.pdf> (September 2013).
179 “Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Tanzania Country Report,” EITI, <http://eiti.org/Tanzania> (April 2014).
180 “Tanzania Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Press Relieve,” EITI, 12 December 2012.
181 “Tanzania Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative,” EITI, <http://www.teiti.or.tz/> (April 2014).
182 “Democratic Republic of the Congo temporarily suspended,” EITI DRC News, 18 April 2013,
<http://eiti.org/news/democratic-republic-congo-temporarily-suspended> (September 2013).
183 Long, Nick, “Congo Improves Natural-Resources Accounting,” VOA Online, 4 July 2014,
136
137
The work of the Lake Tanganyika Floating Health Clinic
122
<http://www.voanews.com/content/congo-improves-natural-resources-accounting-/1951169.html> (July 2014).
184 “DR Congo becomes full member of EITI,” EITI Press Release, 2 July 2014, <http://eiti.org/news/dr-congo-becomes-fullmember-eiti> (July 2014).
185 Colgan, Jeff, “Regulating the Resource Curse,” Foreign Policy, 27 August 2012.
186 Krauss, Clifford, “U.S. oil and Mining Companies Must Disclose Payments to Foreign Governments,” The New York Times, 22
August 2012.
187 “Final Rules for Dodd-Frank Sections 1502 and 1504,” U.S. Department of State Media Note, 23 August 2012.
188 “H.R. 4173 (111th): Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act,” U.S. Congressional Legislation
Database, July 15, 2010, <http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/111/hr4173/text> (June 2014).
189 Colgan, Jeff, “Regulating the Resource Curse,” Foreign Policy, 27 August 2012.
190 Krauss, Clifford, “U.S. oil and Mining Companies Must Disclose Payments to Foreign Governments,” The New York Times, 22
August 2012.
191 “EU Conflict Mineral Law Proposal Delayed,” ITRI news announcement, ITRI, 18 November 2013,
<https://www.itri.com/index.php?option=com_zoo&task=item&item_id+2903&Itemid=177> (December 2013).
192 Todd, Eloise, “Transparent Oil?” European Voice, 17 September 2012.
193 Neslen, Arthur, “EU draft law on conflict minerals fails to satisfy campaigners,” The Guardian Development Network, 4
March 2014, <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/mar/04/eu-draft-law-conflict-minerals> (March
2014).
194 Dizolele, Mvemba, “The Costs and Consequences of Dodd-Frank Section 1502: Impacts on America and the Congo,”
Testimony presented at the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on International
Monetary Policy and Trade, 10 May 2012.
195 Arimatsu, Mistry, “Conflict Minerals: The Search for a Normative Framework,” Chatham House, September 2012.
Lake Tanganyika Authority, The Strategic Action Program for the Protection of Biodiversity and Sustainable Management
of Natural Resources in Lake Tanganyika and its Basin, Lake Tanganyika Authority in partnership with UNDP, GEF, and the
Global Environment Facility, 2011.
198 “Borre, Lisa, “Warming Lakes: Climate Change Threatens the Ecological Stability of Lake Tanganyika,” Water Currents,
National Geographic, 7 March 2013.
199 Lake Tanganyika Authority, The Strategic Action Program for the Protection of Biodiversity and Sustainable Management
of Natural Resources in Lake Tanganyika and its Basin, Lake Tanganyika Authority in partnership with UNDP, GEF, and the
Global Environment Facility, 2011.
200 ibid.
201 ibid.
202 Lake Tanganyika Floating Health Clinic, <www.floatingclinic.org> (September 2014).
203 Smith, Mark Phillip, “Lake Tanganyika Cichlids,” Barron’s Educational Series, Inc., 2008.
204 “Borre, Lisa, “Warming Lakes: Climate Change Threatens the Ecological Stability of Lake Tanganyika,” Water Currents,
National Geographic, 7 March 2013.
205 Lake Tanganyika Authority, The Strategic Action Program for the Protection of Biodiversity and Sustainable Management
of Natural Resources in Lake Tanganyika and its Basin, Lake Tanganyika Authority in partnership with UNDP, GEF, and the
Global Environment Facility, 2011.
206 Geiger, Beth, “Habitat’s,” Nature Conservancy, Issue 3, 2012.
207 Lake Tanganyika Authority, The Strategic Action Program for the Protection of Biodiversity and Sustainable Management
of Natural Resources in Lake Tanganyika and its Basin, Lake Tanganyika Authority in partnership with UNDP, GEF, and the
Global Environment Facility, 2011.
208 Lake Tanganyika Floating Health Clinic, <www.floatingclinic.org> (September 2014).
209 Geiger, Beth, “Habitat’s,” Nature Conservancy, Issue 3, 2012.
210 Lake Tanganyika Authority, The Strategic Action Program for the Protection of Biodiversity and Sustainable Management
of Natural Resources in Lake Tanganyika and its Basin, Lake Tanganyika Authority in partnership with UNDP, GEF, and the
Global Environment Facility, 2011.
211 “Tanzania: State to Repatriate Illegal Fishermen,” Tanzanian Daily News, 27 Dec 2012
212 ibid.
213 Mundia, Namatama, “Government warns against fishing in foreign water bodies,” The Post Newspapers Zambia, 20 May
2013.
214 Philemon, Lusekelo, “Fish catches from Lake Tanganyika going down,” The Guardian, 2 January 2012.
215 ibid.
216 Borre, Lisa, “Warming Lakes: Climate Change Threatens the Ecological Stability of Lake Tanganyika,” Water Currents,
National Geographic, 7 March 2013.
217 Lake Tanganyika Authority, The Strategic Action Program for the Protection of Biodiversity and Sustainable Management
of Natural Resources in Lake Tanganyika and its Basin, Lake Tanganyika Authority in partnership with UNDP, GEF, and the
Global Environment Facility, 2012: Section 3.5 Strategic Component C - Sustainable Land Management, 41.
218 Lake Tanganyika Authority, The Strategic Action Program for the Protection of Biodiversity and Sustainable Management
of Natural Resources in Lake Tanganyika and its Basin, Lake Tanganyika Authority in partnership with UNDP, GEF, and the
Global Environment Facility, 2012: Section 3.3 Strategic Component A - Adaptation to Climate Change Impacts, 32.
219 O’Reilly, et al, “Climate change decreases aquatic ecosystem productivity of Lake Tanganyika, Africa,” Nature Journal
#424, 14 August 2003, <www.nature.com/nature/journal/v424/n6950/abs/nature01833.html> (April 2014).
220 ibid.
221 Borre, Lisa, “Warming Lakes: Climate Change Threatens the Ecological Stability of Lake Tanganyika,” Water Currents,
National Geographic, 7 March 2013.
222 Bootsma, Hecky, “Conservation of the African Great Lakes: A Limnological Perspective,” Conservation Biology, Volume
7, Issue 3, September 1993: 664-656.
223 University of Wisconsin Sea Grant Institute, Lake Superior, <www.seagrant.wisc.edu/home/Defualt/aspx?tabid=591> (July
2013).
224 Johnson, Ivan A., Limnology, Climatology, and Paleoclimatology of the East African Lakes. (CRC Press, 1 October 1996),
109.
225 Lake Tanganyika Authority, The Strategic Action Program for the Protection of Biodiversity and Sustainable Management
197
The work of the Lake Tanganyika Floating Health Clinic
123
of Natural Resources in Lake Tanganyika and its Basin, Lake Tanganyika Authority in partnership with UNDP, GEF, and the
Global Environment Facility, 2012
226 ibid.
227 ibid.
228 Long, Nick, “Survey Shows Lake Tanganyika’s Oil ‘Potential’ in Tanzania,” Voice of America, 28 August 2012.
229 ibid.
230 Geiger, Beth, “Habitat’s,” Nature Conservancy, Issue 3, 2012.
231 Gates, Melinda, “Next, Focus on the Newborn,” The Economist: From The World In 2013 print edition, 21 November 2012.
232 Increasing Access to Reproductive Health: Key Results of the Global Program to Enhance Reproductive Health
Commodity Security 2007-2012,” United Nations Population Fund, 2013.
233 ibid.
234 World Health Organization, Country Profiles, <http://www.who.int/gho/countries/cod/country_profiles/en/index.html>
(April 2014).
235 Maternal Health Outreach Project, Lake Tanganyika Floating Health Clinic, <www.floatingclinic.org> (August 2014).
236 Millennium Development Goal 5, <http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/maternal.shtml> (June 2014).
237 “Nieburg, Phillip, “Improving Maternal Mortality and Other Aspects of Women’s Health,” Center for Strategic and
International Studies, October 2012.
238 “MDG Report 2013: Assessing Progress in Africa Toward the Millennium Development Goals,” UNDP, 13 June 2013,
<www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/librarypage/mdg/mdg-reports/africa-collection/> (November 2013).
239 UNICEF Child Health Progress Report 2013: “Committing to Child Survival: A Promise Renewed - Progress Report 2013,”
UNICEF, 13 September 2013, <www.unicef.org/publications/files/APR_Progress_Report_2013_9_Sept_2013.pdf> (October
2013).
240 “UNICEF: Around 6 Million Children Under Five Died in 2012,” UNICEF World Bulletin, 13 September 2013,
<www.worldbulletin.net/?aType=haber&ArticleID=117837> (September 2013).
241 Knoema, World Data Atlas, Under Five Mortality Rate in Rukwa, Tanzania, Knoema, 2013,
<http://knoema.com/atlas/United-Republic-of-Tanzania/Rukwa/Under-Five-Mortality-Rate-U5MR> (August 2014).
242 World Bank, Mortality Rate of Under-five deaths, 2008-2012 Table, World Bank,
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.MORT> (August 2014).
243 Knoema, World Data Atlas, Under Five Mortality Rate in Tanzania, Knoema, 2012, <http://knoema.com/atlas/UnitedRepublic-of-Tanzania/Child-mortality> (August 2014).
244 Knoema, World Data Atlas, Under Five Mortality Rate in Kigoma Region, Tanzania, Knoema, 2012,
<http://knoema.com/atlas/United-Republic-of-Tanzania/Kigoma/Under-Five-Mortality-Rate-U5MR> (August 2014).
245 Knoema, World Data Atlas, Infant Mortality Rate in Rukwa, Tanzania, Knoema, 2013, <http://knoema.com/atlas/UnitedRepublic-of-Tanzania/Rukwa/Infant-Mortality-Rate-IMR> (August 2014).
246 Knoema, World Data Atlas, Infant Mortality Rate in Tanzania, Knoema, 2012, <http://knoema.com/atlas/United-Republicof-Tanzania/Infant-mortality> (August 2014)
247 WHO-Partnerships for Maternal, Newborn & Child Health; Workshop on Enhancing Capacity for Budget Analysis &
Advocacy for Women’s and Children’s Health, Nairobi, Kenya, 27-30 August 2013,
<http://www.who.int/pmnch/media/events/2013/tanzania.pdf> (August 2014).
248 Ibid.
249 “Tanzania: Rukwa Plans to Reduce Maternal Deaths,” Tanzania Daily News, 7 April 2013,
<http://allafrica.com/stories/201304080494.html> (August 2014).
250 WHO-Partnerships for Maternal, Newborn & Child Health; Workshop on Enhancing Capacity for Budget Analysis &
Advocacy for Women’s and Children’s Health, Nairobi, Kenya, 27-30 August 2013,
<http://www.who.int/pmnch/media/events/2013/tanzania.pdf> (August 2014).
251 “MDGs: Tanzania will Never Reduce Maternal Death Rates as Planned,” Business Times, 9 September 2011,
<http://businesstimes.co.tz/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1366:-mdgs-tanzaniall-never-reducematernal-death-rates-as-planned&catid=1:latest-news&Itemid=57> (August 2014).
252 World Bank, Mortality Rate of Under-five deaths, 2008-2012 Table, World Bank,
<http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SH.DYN.MORT> (August 2014).
253 Knoema, World Data Atlas, Under Five Mortality Rate in DRC, Knoema, 2012, <http://knoema.com/atlas/DemocraticRepublic-of-the-Congo/topics/Health/Health-Status/Under-5-mortality-rate> (August 2014).
254 Knoema, World Data Atlas, DRC province Profiles, Knoema, 2012, <http://knoema.com/atlas/Democratic-Republic-ofthe-Congo/Province-profiles> (August 2014).
255 Knoema, World Data Atlas, DRC Health Rankings, Knoema, <http://knoema.com/atlas/Democratic-Republic-of-theCongo/ranks/> (August 2014).
256 Knoema, World Data Atlas, DRC, Number of Maternal Deaths Ranked by Province, Knoema, 2009,
<http://knoema.com/atlas/Democratic-Republic-of-the-Congo/ranks/No-of-Maternal-Deaths> (August 2014).
257 UNDP, Country Development Indicators Report for the DRC, UNDP, 2012.
258 Ibid.
259 Knoema, World Data Atlas, DRC Crude Mortality Rate (Ranking), Knoema, 2012, <http://knoema.com/atlas/ranks/Deathrate> (August 2014).
260 Lake Tanganyika Floating Health Clinic staff reports, Lake Tanganyika Floating Health Clinic, January 2014.
261 Notre Dame Climate Change Adaptation for Burundi, ND-GAIN, 2012, <Index, http://index.globalai.org/country/burundi>
(November 2013).
262 Notre Dame Climate Change Adaptation for DRC, ND-GAIN, 2012, <http://index.globalai.org/country/dem-rep-of-thecongo> (November 2013.)
263 Westerman, Oleson, Harris, “Building Socio-ecological Resilience to Climate Change through Community-Based Coastal
Conservation and Development: Experiences in Southern Madagascar,” Western Indian Ocean J. Mar. Sci. Vol. 11, No. 1
(2012): 87-97.
264 Altizer, Ostfeld, Johnson, Kutz, Havell, “Climate Change and Infectious Diseases: From Evidence to a Predictive
Framework,” Science, Vol 341 (2 August 2013): 514-519.
265 ibid.
266 ibid.
267 ibid.
The work of the Lake Tanganyika Floating Health Clinic
124
“Making Development Climate Resilient: A World Bank Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa,” World Bank Report No. 46947AFR, 30 October 2013.
269 McKinsey Global Institute, McKinsey Sustainability & Resource Productivity Practice, “Resource Revolution: Meeting the
world’s energy, materials, food, and water needs,” McKinsey&Company (November 2011).
270 ibid.
271 “Africa Rising,” The Economist, 3 Dec 2011.
272 “Black Gold in the Congo: Threat to Stability or Development Opportunity,” Crisis Group, Africa Report # 188, 11 July
2012.
273 Lake Tanganyika Authority, The Strategic Action Program for the Protection of Biodiversity and Sustainable Management
of Natural Resources in Lake Tanganyika and its Basin, Lake Tanganyika Authority in partnership with UNDP, GEF, and the
Global Environment Facility, 2012.
274 Long, Nick. “Survey Shows Lake Tanganyika’s Oil ‘Potential’ in Tanzania,” Voice of America, 28 August 2012.
275 ibid.
276 Lake Tanganyika Authority, The Strategic Action Program for the Protection of Biodiversity and Sustainable Management
of Natural Resources in Lake Tanganyika and its Basin, Lake Tanganyika Authority in partnership with UNDP, GEF, and the
Global Environment Facility, 2012.
277 ibid.
278 Marijnissen, Saskia A.E., “Sustainable Catchment Management Interventions in the Uvira Territory, South Kivu Province,
DRC,” February 2013.
279 ibid.
280 ibid.
281 ibid.
282 Ordinioha and Brisibe, “The human health implications of crude oil spills in the Niger delta, Nigeria: An interpretation of
published studies,” Nigerian Medical Journal, Jan-Feb; 54(1): 10–16 posted on the U.S. National Library of Medical, National
Institutes of Health, 2013, < http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3644738/> (April 2014).
283 ibid.
284 Pyagbara, Legborsi Saro, The Adverse Impacts of Oil Pollution on the Environment and Wellbeing of a Local Indigenous
Community: The Experience of the Ogoni People of Nigeria, The United Nations International Expert Group Meeting on
Indigenous Peoples and Protection of the Environment, 27-29 August 2007.
285 ibid.
286 Pitkin, Julia, “Oil, Oil, Everywhere: Environmental and Human Impacts of Oil Extraction in the Niger Delta,” Pamona
University, Senior Thesis, Paper 88 (2013).
287 ibid.
288 Clark, Helen, “Avoiding the Resource Cure: Managing Extractive Industries for Human Development,” UNDP, October
2011.
289 “Mongolia: Development by Design,” The Nature Conservancy, <www.nature.org> (April 2014).
290 Keith, Jefferis, “The Role of NTCs in the Extractive Industry of Botswana,” Transnational Corporations, Vol. 18, No. 1 (April
2009)
291 ibid.
292 Transparency International Corruptions Perception Index for 2013, Transparency International,
<http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2013/results> (April 2014).
293 Republic of Botswana Mines and Minerals Act 1999, Government Gazette, 17 September 1999,
<http://www.mines.gov.bw/mines%20and%20minerals%20%20Act.pdf> (April 2014).
294 Carbonnier, Wagner, and Brugger, The Impact of Resource-Dependence and Governance on Sustainable
Development, The Center on Conflict, Development and Peacebuilding, Graduate Institute of Geneva, 2011
295 Walt, Vivienne, “We Did Not Predict This” – Top Algerian Ministry Discusses January Hostage Crisis, Time Magazine,
February 11, 2013
296 ibid.
297 Magnowsk, Daniel, “Nigeria Economy Set to Leapfrog South Africa on Data Revamp,” Bloomberg, 4 April 2014,
<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-03/nigeria-s-economy-set-to-leapfrog-south-africa-on-data-overhaul.html>
(August 2014).
298 United Kingdom Foreign Travel Advice, Nigeria, UK Government, April 2014, <https://www.gov.uk/foreign-traveladvice/nigeria/terrorism> (April 2014).
299 Donnelly, Elizebeth, “Nigeria’s child catchers,” Chatham House, The World: June 2014, Volume 70, Number 3,
<http://www.chathamhouse.org/publication/nigeria%E2%80%99s-child-catchers> (June 2014).
300 “Boko Haram Seizing Villages in Niger, Washington Post, 4 June 2014,
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/witnesses-boko-haram-seizing-villages-in-nigeria/2014/06/04/5237740cec01-11e3-b10e-5090cf3b5958_story.html> (June 2014).
301 Nzwili, Fredrick, “Africa’s Islamic extremist groups are on the rise,” Washington Post, 29 May 2014,
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/religion/africas-islamic-extremist-groups-are-on-the-rise/2014/05/29/68358f48e754-11e3-a70e-ea1863229397_story.html> (June 2014).
302 “Curbing Violence in Nigeria (II): The Boko Haram Insurgency,” Africa Report No. 216, International Crisis Group, 3 April
2014, <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/west-africa/nigeria/216-curbing-violence-in-nigeria-ii-the-boko-haraminsurgency.aspx> (April 2014).
303 Stearns, Jason, “From CNDP to M23: The Evolution of an armed movement in eastern Congo,” Rift Valley Institute,
Usalama Project, 2012.
304 “DR Congo Risks Violence Despite Rebel Defeat,” Al Jazeera, 7 January 2014.
305 “Security Council Authorizes Year-long Mandate Extension for United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in
Democratic Republic of Congo,” United Nations Security Council, SC/11340, 28 March 2014,
<http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2014/sc11340.doc.htm> (April 2014).
306 Smith, David, “Human catastrophe in DRC's Katanga province being ignored, warns UN,” The Guardian, 30 January 2014,
<http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2014/jan/30/drc-democratic-republic-congo-katanga-humanitariancatastrophe-un> (February 2014).
307 Stearns, Jason K., Dancing in the Glory of Monsters, New York: Public Affairs (2011).
308 United Nations, Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 22 January 2014,
268
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<www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_42.pdf> (July 2014)
309 ibid.
310 United Nations, UN Report by the Group of Experts on the DRC on preliminary findings of support to the M23 and
escalation of conflict in the Great Lakes region, 27 November 2012 (pursuant to UNSCR 1533 (2004) and extended pursuant
to the UNSCR 2021 (2011)
311 Ibid.
312 United Nations, Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 22 January 2014,
<www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_42.pdf> (July 2014): 8-9.
313 UNHCR DRC Country Profile, August 2014, < http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45c366.html> (June 2014).
314 “M23’s insurgency is over but crisis and displacement continues,” ReliefWeb, 14 November 2014
<http://reliefweb.int/report/democratic-republic-congo/m23-s-insurgency-over-crisis-and-displacement-continues > (May
2014).
315 United Nations, Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 22 January 2014,
<www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_42.pdf> (July 2014):
316 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2013/433 (need updated Dec 2013 version)
317 Stearns, Jason, et al, “Raia Mutomboki: The flawed peace process in the DRC and the birth of an armed franchise,” Rift
Valley Institute, Usalama Project (April 2013).
318 “UN to Boost Troops in DRC’s Troubled Katanga Province,” IRIN (15 February 2014).
319 ibid.
320 United Nations, Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Letter dated 22 January
2014 from the Coordinator of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of
the Security Council), <www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_42.pdf> (July 2014).
321 “UN to Boost Troops in DRC’s Troubled Katanga Province,” IRIN (15 February 2014).
322 Sandner, Philipp, “Decentralization plans for DRC's Copperbelt region,” Deutsche Welle, 15 April 2013,
<http://www.dw.de/decentralization-plans-for-drcs-copperbelt-region/a-16739785> (January 2014).
323 United Nations, Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Letter dated 22 January
2014 from the Coordinator of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of
the Security Council), <www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_42.pdf> (July 2014).
324 “Commodities of War: Communities Speak out on the True Cost of Conflict in Eastern DRC,” Oxfam Brief 164, November
2012.
325 “Protection Concerns in Southern Masisi,” MONUSO Protection Cluster North Kivu, 7 August 2012.
326 “DR Congo: Outdated Approach, Misplaced Priorities,” Refugees International, March 2013.
327 “DR Congo: Poor Coordination Obstructs Emergency Response to Gender-Based Violence,” Refugees International,
March 2013.
328 Mtei, David, “Last Group of Burundi Refugees Leave Msabila,” The Guardian, 14 December 2012.
329 “Police Deploy on Tanzania Border to Stop Entry of Expelled Rwandans,” Inyenyeri News, 24 August 2013.
330 “Conditions for many migrants expelled from Tanzania “Dire,” International Organizations for Migration, 22 November
2013.
331 Arimatsu, Mistry, “Conflict Minerals: The Search for a Normative Framework,” Chatham House, September 2012.
332 Water Security: The Water-Food-Energy-Climate Nexus, The World Economic Forum Water Initiative (Island Press, 2011): 7.
333 Resource Revolution: Meeting the world’s energy, materials, food, and water needs, McKinsey Global Institute, McKinsey
Sustainability & Resource Productivity Practice, London: McKinsey&Company (November 2011).
334 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental Scientific Affairs,
<www.state.gov/e/oes/water> (December 2012).
335 Black, King, The Atlas of Water: Mapping the World’s Most Critical Resource (University of California Press, 2009): 86.
336 “U.S. Energy Sustainability: The Missing Piece,” Sandia National Laboratory, <http://www.sandia.gov/energywater/nexus_overview.htm> (August 2014).
337 Lavelle, Marianne, Grose, Thomas K., “Water Demand for Energy to Double by 2035,” National Geographic, 30 January
2013.
338 Schellnhuber, H. J., et al; “Turn down the heat : climate extremes, regional impacts, and the case for resilience - full
report,” World Bank, 19 June 2013
339 ibid.
340 ibid.
341 ibid.
342 Null, Schuyler, “New Partnerships for Climate Change Adaptation and Peacebuilding in Africa,” Wilson Center New
Security Beat Blog, 8 April 2013, <http://www.newsecuritybeat.org/2013/04/partnerships-climate-change-adaptationpeacebuilding-africa> (January 2014).
343 IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: Climate Change, 2007, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Pachauri, R.K. and
Reisinger, A., IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, 2007,
<http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_synthesis_report.htm> (June
2014).
344 ibid.
345 Lake Tanganyika Floating Health Clinic, <www.floatingclinic.org> (June 2014).
346 “Conservation Strategy for Great Lakes in East and Central Africa,” Birdlife International and Partners, July 17, 2012
347 IPCC Fourth Assessment Report: Climate Change, 2007, Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Pachauri, R.K. and
Reisinger, A., IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, 2007,
<http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_ipcc_fourth_assessment_report_synthesis_report.htm> (June
2014).
348 “What Climate Change Means for Africa, Asia, and the Coastal Poor,” The World Bank, 19 June 2013.
349 Cooke, Kieran, “Climate Change Adds to East Africa’s Food Plight,” Climate News Network, 20 December 2013.
350 IPIECA-GEMI Water Risk Assessment Tools and Webinar, 2014, <http://www.ipieca.org/publication/ipieca-gemi-water-riskassessment-tools-webinar-and-workshop-outcomes-summary> (June 2014).
351 Hsiang, Burke, Miguel, “Quantifying the Influence of Climate on Human Conflict,” Science, (August 2013): 341.
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“Study Links Climate Change and Violence, Battle Ensures,” Science Vol. 341, 2 August 2013.
Hsiang, Burke, Miguel, “Quantifying the Influence of Climate on Human Conflict,” Science, (August 2013): 341.
354 Shepherd, Ben, “Oil in Uganda: International Lessons for Success,” Chatham House, February 2013
355 “Chad: Escaping from the Oil Trap,” International Crisis Group, Africa Briefing No. 65, August 26, 2009
356 Artur Colom Jaen, “Lessons from the Failure of Chad’s oil Revenue Management Model,” Real Instituto Elcano, 3
December 2010, <www.realinstitutoelcano.org> (April 2014).
357 Shepherd, Ben, “Oil in Uganda: International Lessons for Success,” Chatham House, February 2013.
358 Dizolele, Mvemba, “The Costs and Consequences of Dodd-Frank Section 1502: Impacts on America and the Congo,”
Testimony presented at the U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Financial Services, Subcommittee on International
Monetary Policy and Trade, 10 May 2012.
359 US Agency for International Development Resilience Program, USAID, <www.usaid.gov/resilience> (March 2014).
360 “USAID Launches Policy and Program Guidance on Building Resilience to Recurrent Crisis,” USAID Press Release, 29
November 2012, <www.usaid.gov/news-information/press-releases/usaid-launches-policy-and-program-guidance-buildingresilience> (November 2013).
361 East African Community, <http://www.eac.int/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1&Itemid=53> (June
2014).
362 South African Development Community, Fact and Figures, <http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/sadc-factsfigures/> (June 2014).
363 South African Development Community, Overview, <http://www.sadc.int/about-sadc/overview/sadc-objectiv/> (June
2014).
364 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, <http://www.uneca.org/pages/overview> (July 2014).
365 United Nations Environment Program, <http://www.unep.org/about/> (July 2014).
366 MAISHA Program, Jhpiego, <http://www.jhpiego.org/content/you-saved-mothers-life-week> (August 2014).
367 Tuungane Project, The Nature Conservancy,
<http://www.nature.org/ourinitiatives/regions/africa/wherewework/tuungane-project.xml> (August 2014)
368 Girls’ Scholarship Project, Kigoma, Tanzania, Jane Goodall Institute, <http://www.janegoodall.org/programs/girlsscholarship-project> (September 2014).
369 GMU, Western Tanzania, Jane Goodall Institute, <http://www.janegoodall.org/programs/gmu> (September 2014)
370 “Natural Capital: Valuing goods and services from the natural environment,” International Institute for Sustainable
Development, <http://www.iisd.org/natres/agriculture/capital.asp> (August 2014).
371 http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/environment/brief/environmental-economics-natural-capital-accounting
372 “What is natural capital?” World Forum of Natural Capital, <http://www.naturalcapitalforum.com/what-is-naturalcapital> (August 2014).
373 “Making Development Climate Resilient: A World Bank Strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa,” World Bank Report No. 46947AFR, 30 October 2013.
374 African Union, African Convention on the Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources,
<http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/AFRICAN_CONVENTION_CONSERVATION_NATURE_NATURAL_RESOURCES.pdf> (July
2014).
375 Lake Tanganyika Authority, The Strategic Action Program for the Protection of Biodiversity and Sustainable Management
of Natural Resources in Lake Tanganyika and its Basin, Lake Tanganyika Authority in partnership with UNDP, GEF, and the
Global Environment Facility, 2011.
376 Lake Tanganyika Authority, Countries, <http://lta.iwlearn.org/Countries> (March 2013).
377 Lake Tanganyika Authority, Management Program, <http://lta.iwlearn.org/management-program> (March 2013).
378 “DR Congo's Lubumbashi hit by fighting,” BBC, 7 January 2014, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-25645434>
(January 2014).
379 Kulish, Nicholas, “Congo Rebels, After Giving Up Struggle, Are Disarmed,” New York Times, 7 November 2013.
380 United Nations, Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Letter dated 22 January
2014 from the Coordinator of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of
the Security Council), <www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_42.pdf> (July 2014)
381 Shepherd, Ben, “The Fall of the M23: African Geopolitics and the DRC,” Chatham House, 14 November 2013.
382 United Nations, Final report of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo (Letter dated 22 January
2014 from the Coordinator of the Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo addressed to the President of
the Security Council), <www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2014_42.pdf> (July 2014)
383 Kulish, Nicholas, “After Outside Pressure, Rebels in Congo Lay Down Their Arms,” The New York Times, 5 November 2013.
384 “Congo Signs Peace Deal with M23 Rebels,” Reuters, 12 December 2013.
385 “Surestream Petroleum awarded exploration licenses in Malawi,” Surestream News Release, 22 September 2011,
<http://www.surestream-petroleum.com/news.aspx> (December 2013).
386 “Burundi: WGP awarded Surestream Petroleum contract for seismic vessel conversion,” Energy-pedia News, 20 Sep 2011,
<http://www.energy-pedia.com/news/burundi/wgp-awarded-surestream-petroleum-contract-for-seismic-vesselconversion> (December 2013).
387 “Coltan Mining in the DRC,” Computer Industry Impacts on the Environment and Society, University of Michigan,
<http://sitemaker.umich.edu/section002group3/coltan_mining_in_democratic_republic_of_the_congo> (September 2013).
388 ibid.
389 Bootsma and Hecky, “Conservation of the African Great Lakes: A Limnological Perspective,” Conservation Biology, Vol.
7, Issue 3, September 1993.
390 Millennium Development Goals, World Bank, <http://data.worldbank.org/about/millennium-development-goals> (June
2014).
391 Millennium Development Goals, United Nations, <www.un.org/millenniumgoals> (June 2014).
392 Nassim Nicholas Taleb biographical information, Polytechnic Institute of Engineering, New York,
<http://engineering.nyu.edu/people/nassim-nicholas-taleb> (Oct 2013).
393 Taleb, Nassim Nicholas, Antifragile: Things That Gain from Disorder, New York: Random House (2012).
352
353
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About Lake Tanganyika Floating Health Clinic
The Lake Tanganyika Floating Health Clinic (LTFHC) is an international NGO whose goal is to create
healthcare infrastructure and provide health services to the 12 million acutely impoverished
people living in the Lake Tanganyika Basin, one of the most remote regions in the world.
The LTFHC has a very diverse staff base which enables it to provide medical care and collect
unique information from the field in this remote area. Medical and logistical experts work
alongside former child soldiers, refugees from multiple backgrounds, tribes, and factions in the
Great Lakes region.
Recognizing the complexity of the region, the LTFHC has mobilized itself to engage on policy,
legislation and technologies that promote effective development, transparency and ensure the
safety of Lake Tanganyika’s populations.
Get Involved
The LTFHC is ready to work with organizations that are issue-based or projectbased, providing a range of data, knowledge, expertise and the capabilities
to help global and local initiatives succeed.
To find out more about our work on Lake Tanganyika, talk to one of our staff or
receive our full brochure, please make contact now.
1646 North Leavitt Street, Chicago, Illinois 60647
+ 1.312.715.8342
www.floatingclinic.org
[email protected]
facebook: www.facebook.com/LTFHC
Twitter: twitter.com/@LTFHC
The work of the Lake Tanganyika Floating Health Clinic
The work of the Lake Tanganyika Floating Health Clinic