1990s NATO
Topic B: The Balkans
Chair: Alex Gedalin
Moderator: Ashley Wood
Vice Chairs: Kassie Blanchard, Conner
Steines
Crisis Staffer: Kevin Ford
April 10-13, 2014
Gedalin 1
The Balkans
With the reordering of power structures following the collapse of the communist bloc in
Eastern Europe, a power vacuum was unleashed in the Balkans. During the Cold War period, the
majority of Eastern European countries had been dominated by puppet socialist regimes under the
influence of the Soviet Union. However, Yugoslavia, a pan-Slavic state encompassing a large portion
of the Balkans, maintained a significant degree of autonomy under the leadership of dictator Josep
Broz Tito. When Tito died in 1980, new leaders emerged in Yugoslavia like the Serbian Slobodan
Milosevic seeking to advance their own nationalist interests.1 As the Soviet Union collapsed and
perestroika ended Eastern European communism, the new nationalist movements influenced
Serbian nationalists within the Yugoslav government to pursue their own interests. Therefore,
NATO faced an increasingly deteriorating situation in the Balkans.
In the early 1990s, the Balkan issues presented new problems for NATO. The rising
nationalist sentiments resulted in the breakup of Yugoslavia with the declarations of independence
by Croatia and Slovenia. This encouraged Bosnia to proclaim its own independence in 1992, when it
became Bosnia-Herzegovina.2 The potential for a Serbian War against Croatia and Bosnia was high
at this point, and NATO considered acting as a mediator between the two sides and a peacekeeper
in the region. Soon, war erupted when ethnic Serbians living in Eastern Bosnia launched attacks
against the capital Sarajevo with the backing of Slobodan Milosevic and the Serbian dominated
Yugoslav army. The Serbians in Bosnia wish to establish a “Greater Serbia” by ethnically cleansing
supposed Serb lands of Bosnian Muslims. The ethnic cleansing typically involved murder, rape,
torture, and the forced removal of peoples so as to ensure the ethnic homogeneity of a particular
1
2
http://www.cotf.edu/earthinfo/balkans/BKhis.html
http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1997/bosnia/history/
Gedalin 2
region.3 January 1993 saw the breakdown in the alliance between Bosnian Croats and Muslims,
allowing the Serbians to dominate up to two-thirds of the nations territory. Then in April 1993, the
United Nations deployed its Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to halt Bosnian Serb attacks. The
following year in 1994, the United States and NATO brokered a deal to create a Muslim-Croat
Federation. The scene would shift to the eastern enclave of Srebrenica in March 1995 as the Bosnian
Serb President Radovan Karadzic issued orders for Serbians to cut off this refugee town.4
With the outbreak of war in the Balkans, NATO should re-evaluate its role in the region and
decide if a military intervention is in order. With signs of an ethnic cleansing program beginning to
take effect in the region, the committee should debate and discuss these signs and see if they warrant
an intervention. While debating this topic, NATO delegates should consider the larger questions at
hand about NATO’s post-Cold War policy. With ethnic and religious tensions building due to the
dissolution of Soviet States, should NATO work to discourage nationalist movements, which work
to impose an inferiority complex on other national, ethnic, and religious groups? Should NATO be
responsible for resolving clashes between different nationalist entities and maintaining peace in
Europe? Keep these questions in mind, as the committee’s actions will set policy precedence for
many years to come.
3
4
http://www.history.com/topics/bosnian-genocide
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/07/21/idUSL21644464
Gedalin 3
Background and Current Situation:
The Balkans Conflict: 1990-1993
At the onset of the 1990s, the non-aligned Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia “was one
of the largest, most developed and diverse countries in the Balkans,” a federation made up of six
republics: Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia.5
Additionally, Kosovo and Vojvodina were autonomous provinces within the Republic of Serbia.
The main religions in Yugoslavia were Orthodox Christianity, Catholicism and Islam.6 Bosnia and
Herzegovina’s diverse ethnic population, with “43 per cent Bosnian Muslims, 33 per cent Bosnian
Serbs, 17 per cent Bosnian Croats and some seven percent of other nationalities7” was reflected in
the shared government. With a political history of “tenuous compromise” between the Bosnians,
Croats and Serbs, the unity they had achieved “was only in the context of a federal Yugoslavia and
an independent Bosnia-Herzegovina government was not a strong enough institution to keep the lid
on the tensions just under the surface.”8
The central republic had a strategic position that Serbia and Croatia competed to assert their
dominance over territory after the leaders of Croatia and Serbia met in 1991, agreeing to divide up
the republic and leave a small enclave for Muslims.9 Over 60 percent of Bosnian citizens voted for
independence in a referendum in March of 1992, a referendum the Bosnian Serbs boycotted and
followed with a rebellion in April of that year, declaring a Serb republic within Bosnia and
Herzegovina to be under their control. The Yugoslav People’s Army and Serbia supported the
Bosnian Serbs. They were able to quickly grow to control over 60 percent of the country “through
"ICTY - TPIY : The Conflicts." International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. United Nations, n.d. Web. 26 Jan.
2014. <http://www.icty.org/sid/322>.
6 ibid
7 ibid
5
8 ibid
9
ibid
Gedalin 4
overwhelming military superiority and a systematic campaign of persecution of non-Serbs.10” At this
time in Sarajevo, violence escalated between Serbs and Muslims and clashes began in other areas
between Croats and Serbs11.
After the rebellion of the Bosnian Serbs, the Bosnian Croats declared their own republic,
backed by Croatia. Outside leaders complicated the conflict because of their own interests. The
Bosnian government attempted to maintain the republic, but “the conflict turned into a bloody
three-sided fight for territories, with civilians of all ethnicities becoming victims of horrendous
crimes.12”
In late 1994, President Jimmy Carter traveled to the former Yugoslavia to conduct peace
talks and work on a solution to the conflict. Once there, he held discussions with the presidents of
Bosnia, Croatia, and Serbia, as well as a multitude of multinational representatives and officials.
After two days of talks, “the leaders of Bosnia’s Muslim-led government and the Bosnian Serbs
reached agreement on a cease-fire and on the resumption of peace talks”13. Tensions in the area
continued to rise, though. In March of 1995, President Radovan Karadzic of the Bosnian Serbs
ordered that U.N.-designated safe areas Srebrenica and Zepa be cut off from convoys of aid.14 While
this cease-fire provided a temporary relief from the fighting, the conflict continues to rage on.
Background on Crimes Against Humanity
The legal definition of genocide was defined by the United Nations in the 1948 Convention
“What Happened to Yugoslavia? The War, The Peace and the Future.” Center for European Studies UNC Chapel
Hill. Fall 2004 http://www.unc.edu/depts/europe/teachingresources/balkan-crisis.pdf
10
11 Rigby, Vincent. “BOSNIA-HERCEGOVINA: THE INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE.” January 1994. http://publications.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/bp374-e.htm#THE
ROAD
12 ibid
13
14
http://www.cartercenter.org/countries/bosnia-peace.html
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/07/21/idUSL21644464
Gedalin 5
on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. The actual definition of genocide is
mentioned in Article 2 which states, “In the present Convention, genocide means any of the
following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or
religious group, as such
(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its
physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.”15
This definition opens up the definition of genocide to something beyond mere physical acts
such as torture or murder. Genocide is instead viewed as a framework that is designed to separate a
particular group of people with the intent of eradicating that group of people’s identity. This
framework can be depicted in numerous ways including human rights violations and discriminatory
legislation.
The United Nations created this legal definition of genocide during the Nuremberg Trials
when it became necessary to develop an international definition of standards of human rights.
“Genocide as defined in Articles II and III practically cover all those measures taken by the Nazis
during their persecution and brutal extermination of certain social, religious and cultural groups.”16
As such, the atrocities committed by the Nazis served to establish, for the first time, a set of
international doctrines on human rights that applied both during war and peace times. Such an
aspect is crucial to how genocide is defined today because, unlike the situation in World War II, a
country does not have to be in the midst of a war to be accused of genocide by international law.
15 https://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/osapg_analysis_framework.pdf
http://www.roberthjackson.org/the-man/speeches-articles/speeches/speeches-related-to-robert-h-jackson/theinfluence-of-the-nuremberg-trial-on-international-criminal-law/
16http://worldwithoutgenocide.org/genocides-and-conflicts/bosnian-genocide
Gedalin 6
These past discussions on the topic of genocide are important to NATO’s present-day
debate. Although a consensus on what exactly is going on in Bosnia has yet to be reached, Bosnian
Muslims seem to be accounting for a disproportionate amount of civilian casualties in the conflict.
There have also been signs of systematic raping occurring throughout the region. By 1993, the
death toll rose into tens of thousands with close to two million homeless in all of the former
Yugoslavia, with over 500,000 having completely fled the region.17
Current Situation
It is currently July 9th of 1995, and fighting has raged since the expiration of the ceasefire in
May. Muslim and Croatian forces have taken the offensive, and Bosnian Serb forces have “[retaken]
U.N.- secured weapons, brushing aside UNPROFOR guards” in the process.18 NATO recently
responded to these Bosnian Serb advancements with airstrikes, and deployed a combat-ready Rapid
Reaction Force to the area. Just days earlier, the Bosnian Serb commanders “launched an offensive
against the eastern enclaves of Srebrenica and Zepa.”
19
Bosnian Serbs have overtaken two UN
observation posts in Srebrenica, and have detained 30 Dutch peacekeepers. Artillery fire is spilling
into the city, and Bosnian Serb tanks have pushed to within 1,500 yards of the edge of the town.
American Enterprise Institute scholar Patrick Glynn in 1995 characterizes the situation in
Bosnia as a moral failure for the West as they “stood by essentially passively as rampaging Serbs
pursued a brutal war of aggression against their Muslim neighbors.20” There are multiple possible
plans of action to consider. Air power, for example, could possibly be used to attack Serbian
http://publications.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/bp374-e.htm#(34)txt
https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/bosnia
19 https://history.state.gov/milestones/1993-2000/bosnia
20 Rostow, Eugene Victor. “Bosnia: Is it too late? No.” Commentary; April 1995, Vol. 99, p34-36, 3p
17
18
Gedalin 7
weapons provisions and supply lines.21 Glynn points out, however, that it would be difficult to
destroy all of the Serbs weapons, and the associated logistical risks of action by air would be high.
An air strike, however, would not have a precedent in NATO history.22
Glynn argues the time for “relatively low-risk actions” has long past, such as “a well-targeted
use of NATO air power” to end the ethnic cleansing, suggesting a larger scale intervention will be
necessary. An additional factor to consider is the safety of UN peacekeepers and the civilian
populations they protect as certain population centers are inadequately defended by the Bosnian
government forces. UN Peacekeeping troops have been under fire, and the UN and NATO’s
“inability to protect civilians in the safe-haven has been met with mounting anger and contempt
from Bosnian government officials.”23
On May 30th, 1995, in remarks to the North Atlantic Council, Secretary General Claes said
NATO is ready “to support efforts towards the reinforcement of UN Peace Forces in former
Yugoslavia, with the aim of reducing their vulnerability and strengthening their ability to perform
their
essential
mission.24”
Claes
reaffirmed
NATO
will
commit
to
protecting
the
Bosnian Safe Areas set by the UN and “continue to support the efforts of the international
community to achieve a negotiated solution to the conflict.25”
United Nations Security Council resolution 836 authorizes member states “acting nationally
or through regional organizations or arrangements” to work under the Security Council’s authority
21
ibid
22http://www.nytimes.com/1994/04/11/world/conflict-balkans-nato-modest-air-operation-bosnia-crosses-major-
political.html
“U.N. under fire again in Srebrenica” CNN. 9 July 1994. http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/Bosnia/updates/july95/709/index.html
23
Secretary General's Opening Remarks to the NAC,Noordwijk, May 30th, 1995.
24http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1995/s950530a.htm
25
ibid
Gedalin 8
and in coordination with the Secretary-General and the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) to
support the UNPROFOR “in the performance of its mandate.26”
The Balkans War from a socio-morally perspective was utterly incomprehensible given the
aftermath of World War II and the Holocaust just half a century prior. NATO and Western society
vowed to never again tolerate acts of genocide, but countless Bosnians were brutally murdered. The
conflict saw the large scale use of one sided violence27 and cases of “ethnic cleansing where entire
villages or areas of minorities were persecuted,28” making it important for NATO to pay close
attention to the violence and consider humanitarian responsibilities.
In his May remarks, Claes condemned Bosnian Serbs’ “outrageous behaviour,” the “killing and
detention of the UN peacekeepers and the unacceptable threats against the lives of those held
hostage,” as well as “barbaric shelling” of the UN safe areas, causing the large-scale slaughter of
innocent civilians.29
"NATO/IFOR: UN Resolution S/RES/836 (1993)." NATO. N.p., n.d. Web. 26 Jan. 2014.
http://www.ucdp.uu.se/gpdatabase/gpcountry.php?id=20#
28 http://www.veterans.gc.ca/eng/remembrance/history/canadian-armed-forces/balkans
29 http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1995/s950530a.htm
26
27
Gedalin 9
Bloc Positions:
A five-nation Contact Group was formed in the spring of 1994 between United States, Russia,
Britain, France, and Germany with the goal of brokering a settlement between the Federation and
Bosnian Serbs.
France and Britain
France and Britain, the main contributors to the 35,000-member U.N. peacekeeping force30,
have a more vested interest in the safety of the peacekeepers and a NATO strategy that will protect
the efforts made by the UN as well. France deploys the largest national contingent to UNPROFOR,
with Britain following and the two countries working together closely in UNPROFOR, playing a
vital role in the UN peacekeeping effort.31
In April of this year, France threatened to withdraw its 4,530 peacekeeping troops from
Bosnia unless its diplomatic partners and the United Nations could insure their safety.32 Previously,
France proposed with the US to enable UN peacekeeping forces to be able to fight back harassment
by Serbian nationalists. Additionally, they proposed “a humanitarian aid corridor from the Adriatic
coast to the Bosnian capital of Sarajevo, and backing it up with heightened use of NATO warplanes
to protect aid convoys and other U.N. missions.33” Once hostilities resumed in the spring of 1995,
French foreign minister Alain Juppé predicted fighting would intensify.34 Juppé was correct, and the
violence resulted in the death of two French peacekeepers in April, prompting a French Security
Council resolution35 “stressing the unacceptability of all attempts to resolve the conflict […] by
http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/1994-06-30/news/9406290606_1_cease-fire-bosnia-serbs
Watson, Fiona M. and Dodd, Tom. “Bosnia and Croatia: the conflict continues.” Research Paper 95/55. London:
International Affairs and Defence Section, House of Commons Library. 1 May 1995.
www.parliament.uk/briefing.../RP95-55.pdf
32 http://www.nytimes.com/1995/04/19/world/france-threatens-to-withdraw-bosnia-force.html
33 http://articles.latimes.com/1994-12-13/news/mn-8450_1_peacekeeping-forces
34 Watson, Fiona M. and Dodd, Tom. “Bosnia and Croatia: the conflict continues.”
35 UN Security Council resolution 987, 19 April 1995. http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/u950419a.htm
30
31
Gedalin 10
military means,” calling to extend the cease-fire and resume peace talks.
British forces have remained essentially unchanged in structure and command since 1994,
with around 6,500 military personnel serving in Italy, in the Adriatic and Mediterranean and in
Croatia and Bosnia and a Royal Naval task group supporting UNPROFOR and helping police the
UN No Fly Zone over Bosnia.36
In Operation Determined Effort, a contingency plan for a NATO operation withdrawing
UN forces, “France is reported to be resisting NATO control of withdrawal in every circumstance,
favouring a UN-run mission in the event of only a limited pull-out.37”
United States
An important consideration is the actions and statements from political leaders in the US as
the conflict became so violent that, although not a security issue for the US, interventions and
possible solutions were discussed. However, the US has a difficult position; while they wish to
appear as a leader in NATO, they are limited by transatlantic separation and domestic pressure
against intervention. Before the air strikes in 1994, President Bill Clinton, outlining US interests said:
"We have an interest in showing that NATO, history's greatest military alliance, remains a credible
force for peace in post-cold-war Europe. We have an interest in stemming the destabilizing flows of
refugees that this horrible conflict is creating. And we clearly have a humanitarian interest in helping
to prevent the strangulation of Sarajevo and the continuing slaughter of innocents in Bosnia.38"
Additionally former President Jimmy Carter helped orchestrate a four-month cessation of
hostilities in January of 1994 after meeting extensively with representatives and leaders for all parties
Watson, Fiona M. and Dodd, Tom. “Bosnia and Croatia: the conflict continues.”
ibid
38 http://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/10/world/conflict-in-the-balkans-clinton-outlines-us-interest-in-bosnia-airstrikes.html
36
37
Gedalin 11
involved, including the UN.39
Germany
A statement by the government said the German force would “support both the newly
established United Nations rapid reaction force in Bosnia and any NATO plan to extricate United
Nations peacekeepers,” adding that “German transport planes would fly supplies for United Nations
troops outside Bosnia, and German military personnel would help run a field hospital in Croatia.40”
Germany was also taking in over half of Yugoslavian refugees as of 1994.41
Canada
“The value of NATO to Canada rests with the political and stability functions of the
Alliance42” and thus Canada will generally work to promote stability and work with its main allies.
Canada is a major contributor to UN peacekeeping operations and as of early 1994 had 2,000 troops
in the Balkans and had spent an estimated $210 million on Bosnian peacekeeping.43
Nordic Countries - Norway, Denmark, Iceland
Iceland has no armed forces. Otherwise, the Nordic bloc generally cooperates with the
Anglo-Saxon countries of the US, Canada and Britain.
Greece
35 http://www.cartercenter.org/news/documents/doc214.html
36 http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Articles/SpecialFeature/Detail/?lng=en&id=154572&tabid=1453376834&contextid774=154572&contextid775=154574
39 http://www.theguardian.com/world/2003/jan/05/balkans.warcrimes
Cowell, Alan. “Germany to Send Forces to Balkans to Support U.N.” The New York Times. 27 June 1995.
40 http://www.nytimes.com/1995/06/27/world/germany-to-send-forces-to-balkans-to-support-un.html
41 http://publications.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/bp374-e.htm#(34)txt
42 http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/sites/liu/files/Publications/webwp17.pdf
43 http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1994-01-09/news/9401090178_1_peacekeeping-mission-chretien-bosnia
Gedalin 12
“In May 1992, the United Nations Security Council imposed broad trade, financial and
political sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro for their role in provoking and supporting
aggression, ethnic cleansing and other atrocities in Bosnia.”35 Greece compromised these sanctions
by smuggling weapons and oil into Serbia that helped to fund Milosovic’s regime.36 Such an action
proves the strong understanding between such countries at this time. It is important to consider
such a relationship and how that relationship will determine Greece’s position in any future conflicts
between Serbia and the United Nations.
Spain, Portugal, Italy, Turkey, Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands:
Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Luxembourg, Belgium and the Netherlands have not maintained a
strong stance on the situation in the former Yugoslavia territory up until this point. However, all of
these countries have contributed to the aforementioned United Nations Protection Force
(UNPROFOR) by supplying troops, military observers, and civilian police to provide protection for
the population during the frequent outbreaks.42 Italy has not offered support for Determined case
but would provide logistical and other support at home, and “small contributions from Greece and
Portugal are likely to take the form of naval and logistical units.”44
44 Watson,
Fiona M. and Dodd, Tom. “Bosnia and Croatia: the conflict continues.”
Gedalin 13
Questions to Consider:
1. How will NATO work with the United Nations to protect peacekeeping troops?
2. What is the precedent for working with the UN Security Council?
3. What other multinational bodies in Europe have stakes in intervention?
4. What would an international response be like to an air strike?
5. What are the options being considered by different governments?
Gedalin 14
Recommended Sources:
1. Chronology – What happened during the war in Bosnia?
http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/07/21/idUSL21644464
2. Balkan Wars Article & The Economist in general
http://www.economist.com/node/379026
3. North Atlantic Treaty Organization Homepage: use search function for relevant articles
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/index.htm
4. UN Security Council Resolutions
http://www.un.org/en/sc/documents/resolutions/index.shtml
5. Bosnia-Hercegovina: The International Response
http://publications.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/bp374-e.htm
6. International Relations Journal
http://ire.sagepub.com/
7. Journal of the United Nations
http://www.un.org/en/documents/journal.asp
Gedalin 15
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Analysis Framework. Rep. N.p.: Office of the UN Special Advisor on the Prevention of Genocide
(OSAPG), n.d. Print.
"The Balkan Crisis: A Brief History." CNN. Cable News Network, 1997. Web. 26 Feb. 2014.
"The Balkans." The Balkans. N.p., n.d. Web. 26 Feb. 2014.
Bosnia and Croatia: The Conflict Continues. Rep. London: International Affairs and Defence Section,
House of Commons Library, n.d. Web. 26 Feb. 2014.
"Bosnia-Hercegovina: The International Response (BP374e)." Bosnia-Hercegovina: The International
Response (BP374e). N.p., n.d. Web. 26 Feb. 2014.
"Bosnian Genocide | World Without Genocide." Bosnian Genocide | World Without Genocide. N.p., n.d.
Web. 25 Feb. 2014.
"Bosnian Genocide." History.com. A&E Television Networks, n.d. Web. 26 Feb. 2014.
"The Canadian Forces in the Balkans." Veterans Affairs Canada. N.p., n.d. Web. 26 Feb. 2014.
"CHRONOLOGY-What Happened during the War in Bosnia?" Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 21 July
2008. Web. 26 Feb. 2014.
"CHRONOLOGY-What Happened during the War in Bosnia?" Reuters. Thomson Reuters, 21 July
2008. Web. 26 Feb. 2014.
Cowell, Alan. "Germany to Send Forces to Balkans to Support U.N." The New York Times 27 June
1995: n. pag. Print.
Gordon, Michael R. "CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS: NATO; Modest Air Operation in Bosnia
Crosses a Major Political Frontier." The New York Times 11 Apr. 1994: n. pag. Print.
"ICTY - TPIY : The Conflicts." ICTY - TPIY : The Conflicts. N.p., n.d. Web. 26 Feb. 2014.
"The Influence Of The Nuremberg Trial On International Criminal Law." The Robert H. Jackson
Gedalin 16
Center. N.p., n.d. Web. 25 Feb. 2014.
"International Peacekeeping Efforts - Bosnia - CarterCenter.org." International Peacekeeping Efforts Bosnia - CarterCenter.org. The Carter Center, n.d. Web. 26 Feb. 2014.
Jehl, Douglas. "CONFLICT IN THE BALKANS; Clinton Outlines U.S. Interest in Bosnia Air
Strikes." The New York Times 10 Feb. 1994: n. pag. Print.
"More Firepower Sought for U.N. Troops : Bosnia: U.S. and France Change Course, Seek
Alternative to Evacuating Peacekeepers. Allies Must Still Approve Plan." Los Angeles Times 13
Dec. 1994: n. pag. Print.
"President Carter Helps Restart Peace Efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina." President Carter Helps Restart
Peace Efforts in Bosnia-Herzegovina. N.p., n.d. Web. 26 Feb. 2014.
Rigby, Vincent. Bosnia-Hercegovina: The International Response. Ottawa: Research Branch, Library of
Parliament, 1994. Print.
Rostow, Eugene. "Bosnia: Is It Too Late? No." Commentary 99 (1995): 34-36. Web.
Rowley, Strorer H. "Canada Has Doubts About Role In Bosnia." Chicago Tribune 09 Jan. 1994: n. pag.
Print.
Secretary General's Opening Remarks to the NAC. Noordwijk. Speech.
Sens, Allen G., and Albert Legault. Canada’s Transatlantic Interests and the Enlargement of NATO.
Working paper no. 17. N.p.: Institute of International Relations The University of British
Columbia, 1997. Print.
Smith, Helena. "Greece Faces Shame of Role in Serb Massacre." The Observer. N.p., n.d. Web. 4 Jan.
2003.
UN Security Council. Resolution 836 (1993). New York: UN, 1993. Print.
UN Security Council. Resolution 987 (1995). New York: UN, 1995. Print.
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Watson, Fiona M., and Tom Dodd. Bosnia and Croatia: The Conflict Continues. London: House of
Commons Library, 1995. Print.
What Happened to Yugoslavia? The War, The Peace and the Future. Rep. N.p.: Center for European Studies
UNC Chapel Hill, 2004. Print.
Whitney, Craig R. "France Threatens to Withdraw Bosnia Force." The New York Times 19 Apr. 1995:
n. pag. Print.
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