INTERNATIONAL MAX PLANCK RESEARCH SCHOOL
on the Social and Political Constitution of the Economy
Köln, Germany
Annette Michaela Hübschle
A Game of Horns
Transnational Flows of Rhino Horn
Studies on the Social and Political Constitution of the Economy
Annette Michaela Hübschle
A Game of Horns
Transnational Flows of Rhino Horn
© Annette Michaela Hübschle, 2016
Published by IMPRS-SPCE
International Max Planck Research School on the Social and
Political Constitution of the Economy, Cologne
http://imprs.mpifg.de
ISBN:I978-3-946416-12-8
DOI:10.17617/2.2218357
Studies on the Social and Political Constitution of the Economy
are published ­online on http://imprs.mpifg.de. Go to Dissertation Series.
Studies on the Social and Political Constitution of the Economy
Abstract
A multi-sectorial regime of protection including international treaties, conservation and
security measures, demand reduction campaigns and quasi-military interventions has been
established to protect rhinos. Despite these efforts, the poaching of rhinos and trafficking
of rhino horn continue unabated. This dissertation asks why the illegal market in rhinoceros
horn is so resilient in spite of the myriad measures employed to disrupt it. A theoretical
approach grounded in the sociology of markets is applied to explain the structure and
functioning of the illegal market. The project follows flows of rhino horn from the source
in southern Africa to illegal markets in Southeast Asia. The multi-sited ethnography included
participant observations, interviews and focus groups with 416 informants during fourteen
months of fieldwork. The sample comprised of, amongst others, convicted and active rhino
poachers, smugglers and kingpins, private rhino breeders and hunting outfitters, African
and Asian law enforcement officials, as well as affected local communities and Asian
consumers. Court files, CITES trade data, archival materials, newspaper reports and social
media posts were also analysed to supplement findings and to verify and triangulate data
from interviews, focus groups and observations.
Central to the analysis is the concept of “contested illegality”, a legitimization mechanism
employed by market participants along the different segments of the horn supply chain.
These actors’ implicit or explicit contestation of the state-sponsored label of illegality serves
as a legitimising and enabling mechanism, facilitating participation in gray or illegal markets
for rhino horn. The research identified fluid interfaces between legal, illegal and gray markets,
with recurring actors who have access to transnational trade structures, and who also
possess market and product knowledge, as well as information about the regulatory regime
and its loopholes. It is against the background of colonial, apartheid and neoliberal
exploitation and marginalization of local communities that a second argument is introduced:
the path dependency of conservation paradigms. Underpinning rhino conservation and
regulation are archaic and elitist conservation regimes that discount the potential for
harmonious relationships between local communities and wildlife. The increasing
militarization of anti-poaching measures and green land grabs are exacerbating the rhino
problem by alienating communities further from conservation areas and wild animals. The
third argument looks at how actors deal with coordination problems in transnational illegal
markets. Resolving the coordination problems of cooperation, value and competition are
considered essential to the operation of formal markets. It is argued that the problem of
security provides an additional and crucial obstacle to actors transacting in markets. The
systematic analysis of flows between the researched sites of production, distribution and
consumption of rhino horn shows that the social embeddedness of actors facilitates the
flourishing of illegal markets in ways that escape an effective enforcement of CITES
regulations.
About the author
Annette Michaela Hübschle was a doctoral researcher at the IMPRS-SPCE from 2011 to
2015.
Studies on the Social and Political Constitution of the Economy
Agameofhorns:
Transnationalflowsofrhinohorn
Inauguraldissertation
zur
ErlangungdesDoktorgrades
der
Wirtschafts-undSozialwissenschaftlichenFakultätder
UniversitätzuKöln
2016
vorgelegtvon
AnnetteMichaelaHübschle
aus
Pretoria,Südafrika
Referent:ProfessorDr.JensBeckert
Korreferent:ProfessorDr.SigridQuack
TagderPromotion:26.Januar2016
2
TableofContents
Tableoffigures,graphs,mapsandtables.............................................................................6
Abbreviationsandacronyms................................................................................................7
Acknowledgments..............................................................................................................11
Chapter1:Anunstoppablepathwaytoextinction?............................................................15
1.1Settingthescene:Wherehavealltherhinosgone?................................................................15
1.2Problematizingtheresilienceofillegalmarkets......................................................................22
1.2.1Rhinohorntradeasapoachingproblem...............................................................................22
1.2.2Rhinohorntradeasatransnationalorganizedsupplychain.................................................30
1.2.3Rhinohorntradeasamulti-actorbusinessenterprise..........................................................38
1.2.4Synthesizingtheresearchgaps..............................................................................................41
1.3Theoreticalframing................................................................................................................43
1.3.1Rhinohornmarketsaresociallyembedded...........................................................................44
1.3.2Defining‘illegalmarkets’andintroducingthenotionof‘flows’............................................46
1.3.3Thenotionofcontestedillegalityanditsimpactontheemergenceandfunctioningofflows
........................................................................................................................................................49
1.3.4Resolvingcoordinationproblemsinillegalmarkets..............................................................53
1.4Structureofthedissertation..................................................................................................66
Chapter2:Researchingillegalmarkets...............................................................................69
2.1Introduction...........................................................................................................................69
2.2Researchingillegalmarkets....................................................................................................70
2.2.1Choosingthequalitativeroute...............................................................................................74
2.2.2Researchdesign:Amulti-sitedethnography.........................................................................76
2.2.3Single-casestudyandtheoreticaldevelopment....................................................................80
2.4Methods................................................................................................................................82
2.4.1Desktopandarchivalresearch...............................................................................................83
2.4.2Fieldwork................................................................................................................................87
2.5Triangulationanddataanalysis..............................................................................................96
2.6Grayareasofsocialresearch:Researchethics........................................................................98
2.6.1Informedconsent.................................................................................................................101
2.6.2Anonymityandconfidentiality.............................................................................................103
2.6.3Positionalityoftheresearcher.............................................................................................105
2.6.4Reciprocity...........................................................................................................................112
2.6.5Securityconcerns.................................................................................................................115
2.7Concludingremarks..............................................................................................................119
Chapter3:Ofunicornsandrhinohorns:Thedemandforrhinohorn................................121
3.1Introduction.........................................................................................................................121
3.2Thephysicalandchemicalpropertiesofrhinohorn..............................................................122
3.3Aglobalhistoryintothemythologyoftherhino..................................................................130
3.4.Huntingtalesandmyths......................................................................................................147
3.5TheculturallegacyofthejambiyaanditssymbolicvalueinYemen.....................................153
3.7Currentrhinohornuse,consumerprofilesandproductdifferentiation................................157
3.7.1Rhinohornasaninvestmentandmoneylaunderingtool...................................................157
3.7.2Rhinohornasastatussymbol.............................................................................................161
3.7.3Rhinohornasmedicine........................................................................................................164
3.8Concludingremarks:Sacredvalueandcontestedillegality...................................................168
3
Chapter4:Rhinoprotection:Parks,privatelandandconservationparadigms..................170
4.1Introduction.........................................................................................................................170
4.2Whyshouldrhinosbeprotected?.........................................................................................171
4.3ColonialconservationmeasuresinSouthAfrica...................................................................172
4.4Privaterhinos:Thecommodificationandprivatizationoftherhino.....................................179
4.4.1Privateownershiprights......................................................................................................182
4.4.2Large-scaleconversiontogameranchinginthe1990s.......................................................190
4.4.3Privatizationoftherhino.....................................................................................................194
4.4.4Thesaleofliverhinosasafundraisingstrategyfornationalparks.....................................199
4.5Theascendancyofneoliberalconservation?........................................................................209
4.5.1Casestudy:ThecreationoftheGreatLimpopoTransfrontierPark.....................................211
4.6Concludingremarks..............................................................................................................221
Chapter5:Theinternationalpoliticalprotectionregime:Theroadtoextinctionispaved
withgoodintentions........................................................................................................223
5.1Introduction.........................................................................................................................223
5.2Theinternationalregulatorybackdrop:CITES.......................................................................224
5.3Theinternationalresponse...................................................................................................239
5.3.1TheVietnameseresponse....................................................................................................244
5.3.2TheSouthAfricanresponse.................................................................................................246
5.4Concludingremarks..............................................................................................................254
Chapter6:Ridingontheedgeoflegality:Interfacesbetweenlegal,grayandillegalmarkets
.........................................................................................................................................256
6.1Introduction.........................................................................................................................256
6.1‘Putandtake’andotherhuntingtransgressions..................................................................257
6.2Permitfraud.........................................................................................................................265
6.2.1TheGroenewaldgang..........................................................................................................266
6.2.2Thepseudo-huntingphenomenon......................................................................................270
6.2.3Thaisexworkersastrophyhunters.....................................................................................273
6.2.4TheresilienceoftheXaysavangnetwork.............................................................................277
6.2.5“Round–tripping”:Rhinohornintransit..............................................................................281
6.2.6Theimpactofpseudo–huntingonpricestructuresandtrustissues...................................282
6.3Cooperation:TheAfrican-Asianconnection..........................................................................284
6.4Contestedillegality:Legitimizingregulatorybreaches..........................................................286
6.5Conclusion...........................................................................................................................291
Chapter7:Poachingrhinos:Illegalflowsofrhinohorn.....................................................293
7.1Introduction.........................................................................................................................293
7.2Diffusion,expansionandadaptationofflowsfrom2008onwards.......................................295
7.3Kingpins,intermediariesandsmugglers:Thelocalstronghold..............................................305
7.3.1Thesocialeconomyintheborderlands:Whatdoesittaketobecomearhinokingpin?....306
7.3.2Need,greedandenvironmentaljusticeprinciples..............................................................308
7.4Feedbackloopsofrhinopoachingandanti-poachingmeasures...........................................313
7.5Rolesandfunctionswithinpoachinggroups.........................................................................321
7.6Cooperation,securityandcompetition:Howkingpinssecurethecontinuityoftheflow......328
7.7Smugglingthehorn:Efficiencyversussecurityconcerns.......................................................333
7.8Conclusion...........................................................................................................................341
Chapter8:Fakerhinohorn:Trustandtheissueofqualitycontrol....................................342
8.1Introduction.........................................................................................................................342
8.2LegalactorsandErsatzhorn.................................................................................................342
8.3CriminalactorsandfakeorErsatzhorn................................................................................346
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8.4Trust,qualitycontrolandtheroleofthehornassessor........................................................348
8.5Rhinohornpills:Trustinfactory-producedmedicines..........................................................355
8.6Fakehornproductionandqualitycontrolatthesource.......................................................358
8.7Cooperationbetween‘con-men’anddealers.......................................................................360
8.8Fakeantiquelibationcupsandthenotionof‘pre-Convention’rhinohorn...........................361
8.9Conclusion...........................................................................................................................362
Conclusion:Howcantherhinobebetterprotected?........................................................364
Whyhastherhinonotbeenbetterprotected?..........................................................................364
Thesacredvalueofrhinohorn...................................................................................................364
Historicallock-in........................................................................................................................365
Contestedillegality....................................................................................................................366
Theinterfacebetweenlegalityandillegality..............................................................................367
Theresilienceofflows...............................................................................................................368
Thestructureofthemarket.......................................................................................................369
Theoreticalcontribution............................................................................................................369
Partingwords............................................................................................................................370
AppendixA:Researchsitesandmaps...............................................................................371
AppendixB:Indemnityformforinterviewswithoffenders...............................................375
Bibliography.....................................................................................................................376
5
Tableoffigures,graphs,mapsandtables
Figure1:CTscanofawhiterhinoceros...................................................................................125
Figure2:Rhinohorngrindingbowls........................................................................................126
Figure3:ThegoldenrhinocerosofMapungubwe..................................................................132
Figure4:AlbrechtDürer's'Rhinoceros'...................................................................................138
Figure5:RhinohornlibationcuporiginatingintheQingdynasty..........................................143
Figure6:Atraditionaljambiyawithhiltcarvedoutofrhinohorn..........................................155
Figure7:Rhinoalcohol............................................................................................................162
Figure8:TheborderfencebetweentheKrugerNationalPark,SouthAfrica&Mozambique219
Figure9:Thaipseudo-hunter.................................................................................................275
Figure10:RhinotrophywithErsatzhorn................................................................................343
Graph1:PricecomparisoninUS$/kgofrhinohorntoothercommodities............................18
Graph2:Structureofrhinohornconduits...............................................................................31
Graph3:Structureoforganizedrhinohornnetworks.............................................................33
Graph4:Nationalityofhuntersapplyingforwhiterhinohuntsjuxtaposedagainstthe
averagepriceoftrophyhunting,2004-2011...................................................................271
Graph5:SouthAfrica'sofficiallyreportedexportdataversusVietnam'sofficiallyreported
importdataofrhinohorn(2003-2010)...........................................................................272
Graph6:Anti-poachinginterventionsintheKrugerNationalPark........................................316
Graph7:Mozambicanarrest,rifleconfiscationandfinesdata,2011-2013.........................340
Map1:Globalpopulationnumbers..........................................................................................17
Map2:MapofSouthAfrica....................................................................................................371
Map3:MapoftheKrugerNationalPark,LimpopoNationalParkandMassingir...................372
Map4:MapofSoutheastAsia................................................................................................374
Table1:SouthAfricanrhinopoachingstatistics(2000–2015)................................................20
Table2:Numberofrespondentsbyfunction...........................................................................91
Table3:Respondentsbyregion................................................................................................92
Table4:WildlifeexportsfromtheportofDurban,1844-1904...............................................152
Table5:Thechangingpoliticalecologyofwildlife..................................................................180
Table6:AnnualincomeoftheSouthAfricanwildlifeindustryin2011..................................186
Table7:SANParks'rhinosales,2007–2014.............................................................................201
Table8:SANParks'revenuefromthetotalsaleofwildlifeversusliverhinosales(2011-2014)
.........................................................................................................................................204
Table9:PriceofrhinosatVleissentraalprivateauctionsinSouthAfricain2014..................207
Table10:ConditionsoftradeundertheAppendicesI,IIandIIIofCITES...............................227
Table11:Whendidrhinorange,transitandconsumerstatesjoinCITES?.............................229
Table12:ArrestsanddeathsofpoachersintheKrugerNationalPark,2010-2014..............314
6
Abbreviationsandacronyms
ABSA:AmalgamatedBanksofSouthAfrica
ACTCM:AmericanCollegeofTraditionalChineseMedicine(UnitedStatesofAmerica)
AFD:AgenceFrançaisedeDéveloppement(FrenchDevelopmentAgency)
AoIR:AssociationofInternetResearchers
ANC:AfricanNationalCongress(SouthAfrica)
APNR:AssociatedPrivateNatureReserves(SouthAfrica)
APU:Anti-poachingunit
AfRSG:AfricanRhinoSpecialistGroup
ASEAN–WEN:AssociationofSoutheastAsianNationsWildlifeEnforcementNetwork
BCE:BeforeCommonEra
CAMPFIRE:CommunalAreasManagementProgrammeforIndigenousResources(Zimbabwe)
CCAOM:CouncilofCollegesofAcupunctureandOrientalMedicine
CCR:ConsultationCommitteeonResettlement(LimpopoNationalPark)
CE:CommonEra
CEO:ChiefExecutiveOfficer
CITES:UnitedNationsConventiononInternationalTradeinEndangeredSpeciesofWildFauna
andFlora
CBNRM:Community-BasedNaturalResourceManagement
CoE:CommitteeofExperts
CoP:ConferenceofParties(CITES)
CRAVED:concealable,removable,available,valuable,enjoyableanddisposable
CT:ComputerizedTomography
DA:DemocraticAlliance(SouthAfrica)
DCS:DepartmentofCorrectionalServices(SouthAfrica)
DDR:disarmament,demobilizationandreintegration
DEA:DepartmentofEnvironmentalAffairs(SouthAfrica)
DEA:DrugEnforcementAgency(UnitedStatesofAmerica)
DEAT:DepartmentofEnvironmentalAffairsandTourism(SouthAfrica)
DPCI:DirectorateforPriorityCrimeInvestigation(SouthAfrica)
7
DNPWLM:DepartmentofNationalParksandWildLifeManagement(Zimbabwe)
DSC:DallasSafariClub(UnitedStates)
DUAT:Direitodeusoeapproveitamentodaterra(Mozambique)
EFF:EconomicFreedomFighters(EEF)
EIA:EnvironmentalInvestigationAgency(conservationNGO)
ESPU:EndangeredSpeciesProtectionUnit(SouthAfrica)
EU:EuropeanUnion
FRELIMO:FrentedeLibertaçãodeMoçambique(Mozambique)
GEAR:Growth,EmploymentandRedistribution(SouthAfrica)
GEF:GlobalEnvironmentalFacility(UnitedNations)
GIS:GeographicInformationSystems
GLTP:GreaterLimpopoTransfrontierPark
ICCWC:InternationalConsortiumonCombatingWildlifeCrime
IFAW:InternationalFundforAnimalWelfare(conservationNGO)
IGO:IntergovernmentalOrganization
ISS:InstituteforSecurityStudies(SouthAfrica)
ITC:informationtechnologycommunication
IUCN:InternationalUnionforConservationofNature
KfW:KreditanstaltfürWiederaufbau(GermanDevelopmentBank)
KNP:KrugerNationalPark(SouthAfrica)
KZN:KwaZulu–Natal(provinceofSouthAfrica)
LATF:LusakaAgreementTaskForce(southernAfrica)
LEDET:LimpopoDepartmentofEconomicDevelopment,EnvironmentandTourism(South
Africa)
LMMC:GroupofLike-MindedMegadiverseCountries
LNP:LimpopoNationalPark
MK:UmkhontoweSizwe(armedwingoftheANC)
MOU:MemorandumofUnderstanding
MPIfG:MaxPlanckInstitutefortheStudyofSocieties
NEMBA:NationalEnvironmentalManagementBiodiversityAct
NEPAD:NewPartnershipforAfrica'sDevelopment
NSA:NationalSecurityAgency(UnitedStatesofAmerica)
8
NGO:Non–GovernmentalOrganizations
NPA:NationalProsecutionAuthority(SouthAfrica)
NWCRU:NationalWildlifeCrimeReactionUnit(SouthAfrica)
PGR:privategamereserve
PH:professionalhunter
PIU:ProjectImplementationUnit(LimpopoNationalPark)
PNL:ParqueNacionaldoLimpopo(LimpopoNationalParkinMozambique)
POCA:PreventionofOrganizedCrimeAct(SouthAfrica)
PPF:PeaceParksFoundation(SouthAfrica)
R:SouthAfricanRand(localcurrency)alsoshortenedtoZAR
RENAMO:ResistênciaNacionalMoçambicana(MozambicanNationalResistance)
RIM:RhinoIssueManager(SouthAfrica)
SADC:SouthernAfricanDevelopmentCommunity
SADCRMG:SouthernAfricanDevelopmentCommunityRhinoManagementGroup
SADF:SouthAfricanDefenceForce(defenceforceduringtheapartheidregime)
SANDF:SouthAfricaNationalDefenceForce(defenceforceinpost–apartheidSouthAfrica)
SANParks:SouthAfricanNationalParks(SouthAfrica)
SAPS:SouthAfricanPoliceService(SouthAfrica)
SARPCCO:SouthernAfricanRegionalPoliceChiefsCooperatingOrganization
SCP:situationalcrimeprevention
SRT:SavetheRhinoTrust(Namibia)
SWAPO:SouthWestAfricanPeoplesLiberationArmy(Namibia)
TCM:TraditionalChineseMedicine
TFCA:TransfrontierConservationArea
TOPS:ThreatenedorProtectedSpeciesregulations(SouthAfrica)
TRAFFIC:TradeRecordsAnalysisofFloraandFaunainCommerce
TVM:TraditionalVietnameseMedicine
UAV:unmannedaerialvehicles(drones)
UAS:unmannedaerialsystems
UNEP:UnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramme
UNITA:UniãoNacionalparaaIndependênciaTotaldeAngola
UNODC:UnitedNationsOfficeOnDrugsandCrime
9
US:UnitedStatesofAmerica
USAID:UnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment(US)
VAT:ValueAddedTax
WAZA:WorldAssociationofZoosandAquaria
WTO:WorldTradeOrganization
WWF:WorldWideFundforNature
10
Acknowledgments
FirstandforemostIwouldliketopayrespecttoallmyresearchinformantswhoagreedto
participateininterviews,focusgroupsandsubsequentfollow-upvisits,chatsorphone
conversations.Yourprecioustimeanddedicationmadethisresearchpossible.Therewere
otherswhohelpedwithintroductions,backgroundinformationandresearchmaterials.Each
oneofyouassistedinshapingthisdissertation.Ithankyouforyourinvaluablecontributions.
Thisresearchprojectwouldnothavebeenpossiblewithoutthegenerousfinancial,
administrativeandintellectualsupportandassistanceofthestaffattheMaxPlanckInstitute
fortheStudyofSocieties.TheFederalGovernmentofGermanythroughitsgenerousfunding
totheMaxPlanckInstitutefortheStudyofSocieties(MPIfG)fundedtheresearch,which
allowedmetofollowrhinohornfromthebushinsouthernAfricatomarketsinSoutheast
Asia.IamparticularlygratefultomysupervisorJensBeckert,whoencouragedandsupported
myuniqueresearchprojectandreturntoacademia.Hisadviceontheoreticalconstructs,
conceptsandmethodshelpedstructurethefinalproduct.MyotheradviserSigridQuackgave
thought-provokingguidanceontheinitialresearchproposalandanearlierversionofthe
dissertation.MycolleaguesandfriendsintheIllegalMarketsresearchgroup,RenateMayntz,
MatíasDewey,NinaEngwicht,ArjanReurinkandFrankWehingerprovidedmuchfood(and
somewine)forthought.TheMPIfGisnotdissimilartothechurch:Manyfascinatingscholars,
researchersandjournalistspassthroughitsdoors.Manyintellectualdiscussionswerehad,
andheapsoffuntoo.AspecialthankstoCarolineLang,AnaCarolaAlfinitoVieira,Lothar
Krempel,IpekGoecmen,AzerKilic,PhilipMader,MarkLutter,ArneDressler,AldoMadriago,
MarcinSarafin,BetsyCarter,AdelDaoud,SolomonZori,AndreNahoumVereta,Maria
Markantonatou,JiskaGojowczyk,KimeyPflücke,MayZuleikaSalao,NicoleRuchlak,Sebastian
Kohl,BabaraFulda,IngaRademacher,AnninaHeringandKarlijnRoex,allofwhommademy
timeinColognememorable.
Theadministrativesupportwasoutstandingandamazinglyaccommodatingwhenitcameto
theintricaciesofundertakingfieldworkinfarawayplaces,whereWesternaccountingnorms
arenotalwaysfollowedandspurofthemomentdecisionshadtobetaken.Thanksverymuch
11
toJürgenLautwein,theadministrativedirector;UrsulaTrappe,theIMPRSresearch
coordinatorandthefabulousaccountingteam:PetraZimmermann,RenateBlödornand
SwetlanaSchander.RuthHanisch,thanksverymuchformakingsurethatIexperiencedasoft
landinguponarrivalinKöln.GabiBreuniglightenedupdarkwinterdayswithhertalesofthe
countryofmychildhood,beautifulNamibia.BrunoEggerandhisITteamwereveryhelpfulin
navigatingaMacdisciplethroughtheworldofWindows–baseddataprogrammes.Thanks
verymuchtoMargaretheHinzmann,DanielNeumairandTobiasHeinrichfortheirintrepid
support.Bruno,IamstillinaweofyourskillsinsettingupatranscontinentalSkype
conferencewithmythreePh.D.supervisors,whohappenedtobelocatedinAustralia,North
AmericaandEuropeatthetimeofthecrucialdissertationcompletionmeeting.Google
Scholartellsus“standontheshouldersofgiants”.Whilemanyofthoseareinsituatthe
MPIfG,SusanneHillbringandherteamrunsthemostimpressivelibraryserviceIhavecome
across,whichconnectedmetootherpublished‘giants’.TheMPIfGholdsanamazing
collectionofbooksandjournals,aswellasaccesstomultipledatabases.Myliterature
researchwentfarbeyondtheusualassortmentofsociologicalandcriminologicalliteratures,
rangingfromhuntingdiariesof‘greatgamehunters’toancientbooksonChineseart.Ioften
requestedbooksthathadlonggoneoutofprintandwereessentiallyunobtainable.Elke
Bürgener,CoraMolloy,SebastianLangandthemanylibraryinternsusedtheirmagic–thanks
forhelpingwiththemanyinterlibraryloans!BeyondtheMPIfG,Iwouldliketothank
NdamonayaOtto(Rutz),myoldschoolfriendfromNamibia,whomIrediscoveredinCologne
aftera20-yearbreak.NdamonaandThorsten,Iameternallygratefulforyourfriendshipand
thesupportyouprovidedduringmyfinalstintinCologne–aroomwithaviewoftheRhine
wasunsurpassable.
AspecialtributegoestoCliffordShearing,myPh.D.supervisorbackhomeinCapeTown,
SouthAfrica.Thanksverymuchforyourhelp,constructivecriticismandpraise.Iamlooking
forwardtofuturejointprojectsattheEnvironmentalSecurityObservatory(ESO).Ihavelearnt
somuchfromourinteractions.ElrenavanderSpuyjoinedthedotsbetweenCliffordandmy
mutualresearchinterests.ElaineAtkins,thankyouforfacilitatingaccesstoon-linedatabases
andassistingwithotheronerousadministrativetasks.Mygratitudealsogoesouttomynew
(and‘old’)colleaguesattheCentreofCriminology,UniversityofCapeTownandtheGlobal
InitiativeagainstTransnationalOrganizedCrime:MarkShaw,PeterGastrow,TuesdayReitano
12
andJulianRademeyer.Julianhasbecomeagoodfriendwhoseinputandadvicewasmuch
appreciatedwhenitcametosteeringthroughthemuddywatersofdifferentrhinonarratives.
SeveralgovernmentdepartmentsandconservationNGOsfacilitateddatacollection.Ithank
GeneralDramatandMajor-GeneralArendseforapprovingmyresearchpermit,whichallowed
theinclusionofmembersoftheDirectorateforPriorityCrimeInvestigationsintheresearch
sample.IwouldalsoliketoexpressmygratitudetotheResearchDirectorateofthe
DepartmentofCorrectionalServicesforauthorizationtoconductinterviewswithrhino
offendersinSouthAfricancorrectionalcentres(prisons).Iamespeciallyindebtedtomy
researchguide,VuyelwaMlomo-Ndlovu,whohelpedtoarrangeandcoordinateresearch
within15correctionalcentresacrossSouthAfrica.Aspecialwordofthanksgoesouttothe
socialworkers,headsofprison,administrativestaffandwardenswhoassistedatindividual
correctionalcentres.TheSANParksScientificCommitteeandMajor-GeneralJohanJooste
(Retired)grantedpermissiontoundertakefieldworkintheKrugerNationalParkandother
nationalparks.IthankyouforallowingmetolearnandobservewhathappensatGround
Zero.DrLouiseSwemmeractedasanamazingfacilitator–thankssomuchforyourhelpand
persistence!AspecialthankyougoesouttomyresearchinformantsintheKrugerNational
Park,allofwhomtooktimefromtheirbusyschedules(protectingrhinos)tosharetheir
experienceswithme.
Iwouldalsoliketorecognize:JoShawofWWFSouthAfricawhoprovidedintroductionsto
themainplayersinthewildlifeindustry;JamesCompton,directorofTRAFFICAsiaandSean
LamtheofficemanageroftheTRAFFICofficeinHongKongforhostingmeforpartofmystay
inHongKong;AnaLeaoforco-presentingwithmeatthe‘One-healthpolicyforGreater
LimpopoTransfrontierConservationArea’workshopandDarrellAbernethyfromtheFaculty
ofVeterinarySciencesattheUniversityofPretoriaforinvitingmetotheworkshop;Rusty
HustlerforextendinganinvitationtotheNationalBiodiversityInvestigators’Forumand
ColonelJohanJoosteforprovidingmysecurityclearance;JeffreyMartinandGordonBrownof
theEastAsianPolicingStudiesForumattheUniversityofHongKongforinvitingmeto
presentmyresearchatalunchtimeseminar;TedReillyandfamilyfortheirhospitalityin
Swaziland;JohnandAlbinaHume,AntandTessBaber,aswellasSelomieMaritzforhosting
meontheirfarms;DamianManderforhissupport;JeremyandLizAndersonforofferingmea
13
bed,deliciousfoodandgreatadviceduringpit-stopsinWhiteRiver;GraemeandDanifor
takingmeundertheirwings;LaurenClifford–HolmesfortheroadtriptoMauricedale;
Michael‘tSas–Rolfes,PaulO’Sullivan,SamFerreira,MichelePickover,MichaelChadman,
TheoNel,PoobalanSavari,MarkusBürgener,JohnHanks,RichardEmslie,EliseDaffue,De
WetPotgieter,FransvanNiekerk,KevinBewick,KobusduToit,SimonBloch,PelhamJones,
AdriKitshoffandSuneshIndhurforprovidinginvaluableintroductionsandconnections,
and/orresearchmaterials;andMiraDutschke,JeffreyBarbeeandNavomiNaidoofor
accommodating,feedingandentertainingmewheneverIpassedthroughJohannesburg.
Manyothershelpedduringtheresearchproject.Forreasonsofanonymityandconfidentiality
linkedtothesensitivityoftheresearchtopic,Icannotlistyournames–youknowwhoyou
are.Withoutyou,theresearchwouldnothavebeenpossible.Aspecialthankyougoesoutto
myresearchassistantsinVietnamandMozambique,theinterpretersincorrectionalcentres
andthetranscribers.Yoursupportwasvitaltothesuccessofthisproject.
IwouldalsoliketopaymyrespecttoBrianSandberg,HoaDuongandStephenEllis,who
passedawayduringtheproject.Theyprovidedsoundadvice,guidanceandinsightsforwhichI
wishIcouldhavethankedtheminpersonbutdosonow.Myheartgoesouttotheirfamilies
andlovedones.
Thisadventurewouldnothavebeenpossiblewithoutthebuy-infrommypartnerMarkand
thesupportofournearestanddearest.TheopportunitytopursueaPh.D.inafarawayplace
arose3monthsintoourmarriageandafurtherthreemonthslaterIwasonboardanairplane
toCologne.Thefollowing42monthswerefilledwithflightstoandfro,dailychatsandphone
calls.Ithastrulybeenadifficultrelationship-strengtheningexercise.Thankssomuchforyour
support,toleranceandlove.IdedicatethisdissertationtoMark,mylatefatherOtto,my
motherMichaela,andmybrotherTim.Theytaughtmetolookatissuesfromdifferentangles,
encouragedcriticalthinking,afairempatheticandethicalengagementwithfellowhuman
beingsirrespectiveofrace,gender,sexualorientationorsocio-economicstrataandlovefor
nature.TomystepdaughterTatum:Yourgenerationwillhavetolivewiththeconsequences
ofourchoicesandthoseofourancestors.Hereistohopingthattomorrow’sworldwillbea
happyandhealthyplacewherehumansliveinharmonywiththeirenvironment.Maytherebe
plentyofrhinos,otheranimalsandplants,andsustainableecosystems.
14
Chapter1:Anunstoppablepathwaytoextinction?
“Onlywhenthelasttreeiscut,onlywhenthelastriverispolluted,onlywhenthelastfishis
caught,willtheyrealizethatyoucan’teatmoney.”
AmericanIndianproverb
1.1Settingthescene:Wherehavealltherhinosgone?
Thedaysoftherhinoceros1,thesecondlargestlivingmammalaftertheelephant,appear
numbered(Rippleetal.2015).BlackrhinopopulationsinSouthAfrica’sKrugerNationalPark
(KNP)arebelievedtobedeclining,andwhiterhinonumbersarelikelytofollowsuitifrhino
poachingtrendscontinue(Ferreiraetal.2015:16).SouthAfricahaslostmorethan5000
rhinossincepoachingsurgedin2008.SomeconservatorsgivetheAfricanrhinospecies
another6to8yearsinthewild(Interviews,2014).Thereafter,thepachydermsmightbe
relegatedtozoosandhigh-securityenclosures;andinyearstocome,possiblytotheannalsof
naturalhistorybooksandnarrativesofthose,whosharedtheplanetwiththerhinoatsome
pointinthepast.Therhino’sprehistoricancestorsandotherspeciesofcharismatic
megafaunahavegoneextinctoverthemillenniaduetoclimatechange,habitatlossand
humanintervention(Lorenzenetal.2011).Whilethesefactorscontinuetoimpacttherhino’s
chancesofsurvival,thesurprisingbountyonitskeratin-likenasalappendage–therhinohorn
–andtheassociatedillegalandgraymarketsconstitutemajorthreatstothemodernrhino’s
existence.Extraordinaryregulatory,institutionalandmilitarymeasureshavebeen
implementedtosavetherhinofromextinctionanddisrupttheillegalmarketinrhinohorn.So
far,thesemeasureshavefailedtostemthetide.Theaimofthisdissertationistoanalyse
rhinohornmarketstructuresandsituatethesewithinsocial,economicandpoliticalstructures
andthebroadersocialsystem,therebyexplainingwhymeasurestodisruptflowsofrhino
hornhaveachievedlimitedsuccess.
1
Theterm“rhino”,theshortenedformofrhinoceros,willbeemployedthroughoutthedissertation.
15
Ofthefiveextantrhinospecies(seeMap1),theblackrhino(Dicerosbicornis)andthewhite
orsquare–lippedrhino(Ceratotheriumsimum)liveinSub–SaharanAfrica.Twosubspeciesof
whiterhinoarerecognized:thenorthernwhitespecies(Ceratotheriumsimumcottoni)and
thesouthernwhitespecies(Ceratotheriumsimumsimum).Thenorthernwhitesubspecies
werewipedoutthroughpoachingintheirnaturalrangeinCentralandEastAfricaby2007.
ThelastfourpotentialbreedingnorthernwhiterhinosweremovedfromazoointheCzech
RepublictoarhinosanctuaryinKenya,wherearmedguardsprotectthesurvivorsaroundthe
clock(Jones2015).2Theothersubspecies–thesouthernwhiterhinos–arecurrentlylistedas
“nearthreatened”ontheInternationalUnionforConservationofNature(IUCN)RedList
(IUCN2012a).Withapproximately5000animalsremaininginthewild,theIUCNcategorizes
theblackrhinospeciesas“criticallyendangered”(IUCN2012b).3Thegreatestnumberofblack
rhinos–approximately1850animals–liveinNamibia.Community–basedconservation
initiativesarebelievedtohaveledtopositivegrowthratesafteraperiodofseverepoaching
duringtheborderwarsofthe1970sand1980s.TheNamibianrhinopopulationsrecovered
until2014when24rhinocarcasseswerediscoveredinthenorth-westerndesertregions(New
Era2015).Inlightofafurther81illegalrhinokillingsin2015,rhinosarefacinganuncertain
futureinNamibia.
SouthAfricaishometoaboutthree-quartersofworld’sremainingrhinos(Milliken/Shaw
2012:8).Bythe1960s,anestimated650whiterhinoswereleftinAfrica.TheNatalParks
Boardrescuedthewhiterhinofromalmostcertainextinctionthroughinnovativeconservation
2
Scientistswerehopingthatthemovetotherhino’snaturalhabitatwouldencouragebreeding.Oneofthetwo
rhinobullsdiedofnaturalcausesinOctober2014,pushingthesubspeciesclosertoextinction(Knightetal.2015:
13).
3
TheIUCNRedLististheworld'smostcomprehensiveinventoryoftheglobalconservationstatusofplantand
animalspecies.Itusesasetofcriteriatoevaluatetheextinctionriskofthousandsofspeciesandsubspecies.
Thesecriteriaarerelevanttoallspeciesandallregionsoftheworld.Withitsstrongscientificbase,theIUCNRed
ListofThreatenedSpeciesisrecognizedasthemostauthoritativeguidetothestatusofbiologicaldiversity.
WithintheRedListtheconcept“threatenedspecies”isusedasanoverarchingconcept.Thefollowingcategories
ofimperilmentarerelevant:
•
•
•
“criticallyendangered”:speciesfaceanextremelyhighriskofgoingextinctinthewild
“endangered”:speciesfaceaveryhighriskofgoingextinctinthewild
“vulnerable”:speciesfaceahighriskofgoingextinctinthewild(IUCNStandardsandPetitions
Subcommittee2010)
16
measuresinthe1970s(Player2013).Oftheremaining21000rhinos4–19300aresouthern
whiterhinosandapproximately1700animalsbelongtotheblackspecies(Milliken2014:15)
–between8001to9290whiterhinossurviveintheKrugerNationalPark(KNP)(Molewa
2015),SouthAfrica’ssignaturenationalpark.Roughlyone-quarterofSouthAfrica’srhinosis
onprivatelandwhilenationalandprovincialparksauthoritieshostapproximately15700
blackandwhiterhinos(Ferreira2013a).Acriticaltippingpointinrhinopopulationswas
reachedin2014withrhinodeathsoutstrippingbirthsinthatyear.Atthecurrentrateof
attrition(threerhinosarepoachedeachday),rhinosmightbeextinctinthewildinSouth
Africaby2022(Africanrhinoexpert,personalcommunication,2015).Withtheexceptionof
Nepalwheretherhinopopulationincreasedby21percentbetween2011andMay2015
(WWF2015),theAsianrhinospeciesarenotfaringbetterthantheirAfricanrelatives.The
Indianorgreaterone–hornedrhino(Rhinocerosunicornis)–fromwhichtheNepalese
populationstems–isthemostcommonAsianspeciesatanestimated3350animals.The
Javanorlesserone–hornedrhino(Rhinocerossondaicus)andtheSumatranortwo–horned
rhino(Dicerorhinussumatrensis)bothcountlessthan100animals.
Map1:Globalpopulationnumbers
Source:SavetheRhino(2014)
4
MillikencollatedrhinonumbersfromIUCN/SSCAfRSGdatathatwaslastupdatedon13October2013.In2015,
conservators(personalcommunication,2015)estimatedthatthetotalnumberofrhinoshaddroppedto19700
animalsofbothspecies.
17
Atthecoreoftherhinocrisisisthetenaciousdemandforrhinohorninconsumermarkets.
PowderedrhinohornhasbeenusedinTraditionalChinesemedicine(TCM)formorethanfour
millennia.Carvedintohiltsfortraditionaldaggersknownas‘jambiyas’,rhinohornwasalsoin
highdemandinYemenduringthe1970sand1980s(Varisco1989a).Smallpocketsofdemand
remainintheMiddleEasterncountry(seeformoredetail:Vigne/Martin2008);however
consumerscannotcompetewiththehighpricesofferedinthesoutheastandeasternAsian
markets(Vigne/Martin2013:324).5Anothercenturies-oldtraditionrelatestothetrophy
huntingofrhinos.Theresultanthuntingtrophiesareexportedtothehunter’shomecountry
wheretheyarekeptinprivatecollections,galleriesandmuseums.Whiletheseolduses
enduretolesserdegrees,rhinohornisincreasinglyemployedasaninvestmenttoolandasa
criminalcurrency.Italsoservesasastatussymbol,religiousorculturalartefactandgift
amongsttheupperstrataofAsiansocieties.Thehornofthethree-toedungulateisamongst
themostexpensivecommoditiesintheworld(seeGraph1).
Graph1:PricecomparisoninUS$/kgofrhinohorntoothercommodities
Source:DatacollectedforthisprojectinSoutheastAsiaandBloombergBusiness(2015)
5
Infact,therecenteconomiccrisisinYemenhasledtosomejambiyasgettingsoldoff.VigneandMartin(2013:
opcit)observedthatYemenisappearedmoreguardedandavoidedshowingofftheirdaggersinpublicforfearof
theft.Whileolddaggersremainincirculationandaremnantdemandfor‘fresh’rhinohornpersists,alternative
materialshavebeendevelopedtoreplacerhinohorn,whichresemblesrhinohornbutischeaperandnotdeadly
torhinopopulations.Gumandsomesecretingredientareusedthatprovidejambiyaswiththeauthenticlookof
rhinohorn(Vigne/Martin2008).
18
Asthenumberofliverhinosgrowsless,thepriceforrhinohornappearstobesurging.
AccordingtoreportsfromnorthernVietnam(Amman2015a)consumerswerepaying
between$100to$120/gforrhinohornbanglesandprayerbeadsin2015.However,
fieldworkundertakenforthisprojectinVietnamin2013foundarangeofpricesbetween$25
000to$65000/kg.Thepricewascontingentonthetypeofhorn(AfricanversusAsian/fakeor
real),use(medicinalversusstatus)andsize/composition(wholehorn/disks/powder).Atan
averageweightof5,5kgperpairofrhinohorns(Pienaar/Hall–Martin/Hitchens1991),the
hornsofasinglefree-rangingwhiterhinoareworthclosetohalfamillionDollarson
consumermarkets.Meanwhile,theaverageweightofapairofhornsofblackrhinoinSouth
Africannationalparksandreservesis2,65kg(Pienaar/Hall–Martin/Hitchens1991:102).The
currentpoachingstatisticsprovideanapproximatesizeofillegallyhuntedrhinohornentering
illegalmarketseachyear.InlightofSouthAfricalosing1004,1215and1175rhinosto
poachingin2013,2014and2015respectively(seeTable1),aminimumof4tonsofillegally
andfreshlyharvestedrhinohornenteredillegalflowseachyear.Inaddition,rhinopoaching
hasflaredupinNamibiaandZimbabweandcontinuestotroublesafariparksinKenyaand
otherrhinorangestates,furtheraugmentingfreshhornsupplies.Gangsofthieveshavebeen
stealingrhinohornfromprivatecollections,state-ownedstockpiles,museumsandgalleries
acrosstheglobe.Anunknownamountofpreviouslyharvested,evenantiquerhinohorn,horn
artefactsandhuntingtrophiesareeitherincirculationorsafelystowedaway.Duetothehigh
valueofrhinohorn,entrepreneurshavealsodevelopedfakeor‘ersatz’horn,forwhich
consumersarewillingtopartwithsubstantialsumsofmoney.
Rhinosandtheirbodypartswereamongthefirstspeciestobeaffordedvariabledegreesof
protectionwhentheUnitedNationsConventiononInternationalTradeinEndangeredSpecies
ofWildFaunaandFlora(CITES)6enteredintoforcein1975.Inspiteofthepartialtradeban
andvariousotherconservation,protectiveandsecuritymeasures,theillegalhuntingofrhinos
continues.TheKrugerNationalPark(KNP)andseveralpublicallyandprivatelyownedgame
reserveshavebecome‘battlefields’,wherestatesecurityforces,gamerangerandprivate
6
CITESprotectsabout5000speciesofanimalsand28000speciesofplantsagainstoverexploitationthrough
internationaltrade.Protectedspeciesareincludedinoneofthreelists,calledtheAppendices.EachAppendix
detailstheextentofthethreattoaspeciesandtradecontrols.Speciesareconsideredforinclusioninordeletion
fromtheAppendicesatmeetingsoftheConferenceofParties,heldapproximatelyonceeverythreeyears.
19
anti-poachingunitsfightfortherhino’ssurvivalintheSouthAfricanbush.TheSouthAfrican
NationalDefenceForce(SANDF),amultitudeofprivatesecuritycompanies,publicandprivate
intelligenceoperatives,lawenforcementagenciesandhundredsofNGOshavesteppedup
measuresto‘save’therhino.Inspiteofalltheseinterventions,financialdonationsandthe
increasingmilitarizationofresponses,morethan5000rhinoshavebeenpoachedinSouth
Africasince2008(seeTable1).
Table1:SouthAfricanrhinopoachingstatistics(2000–2015)
Year
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015
KrugerNational
Park
0
4
20
14
7
10
17
10
36
50
146
252
425
606
827
826
RestofSouthAfrica
7
2
5
8
3
3
7
3
47
72
187
196
253
398
388
349
Total
7
6
25
22
10
13
24
13
837
122
333
448
668
1004
1215
11758
Source:DepartmentofEnvironmentalAffairs(2014b)&Molewa(2016)
Itisnotonlyrhinosthatarelosingtheirlivesinwhatisdescribedasa“WaronPoachers”in
publicdiscourse:anti-poachingunitshaveshotdeaddozensofsuspectedpoachersintheKNP
since2009.9Aswillbeshowninlatersectionsofthisdissertation,theincreasingmilitarization
7
2008ishighlightedinredtoindicateasuddenincreaseinthefrequencyofrhinopoaching.
8
TheDepartmentofEnvironmentalAffairs(DEA)isresponsibleforcollatingpoachingstatistics,whichwere
releasedonamonthlybasisuntil2015.Sincethebeginningof2015,thestatisticsarereleasedatirregular
intervals.
9
Meanwhile,aKrugerParkrangerandapoliceofficerwereshotandkilledinApril2012ina“blueonblue”
20
ofanti-poachingresponsescomesatahighcostnotonlyineconomictermsbuthasalsoled
tothefurthermarginalizationandalienationofruralcommunitieslivinginthevicinityof
conservationareas. Takenatfacevaluetheregulatory,militaryandconservationmeasures,aswellasdemandreductioncampaignsemployedtosafeguardtherhinosuggestthatthewildanimalshouldbe
oneofthebest–protectedandcaredforcreaturesintheworld.Whatexplainsthefailureof
regulation,andthelimitedsuccessofmilitaryandotherinterventions?Whatistheroleof
marketsforrhinohorninthis?Towhatextentcanasociologicalunderstandingoftheillegal
globaltradeinrhinohorn,andananalysisofthemechanismsofthemarkethelpus
understandwhythesemeasureshavefailedandcontinuetodoso?
Itisagainstthisbackgroundthattheleadingresearchquestionofthisdissertationfocuseson
theresilienceofillegalwildlifemarkets.Thedissertationexploreswhythemyriadmeasures
employedtodisruptthemarkethavefailedtoprotecttherhinoeffectively.Atheoretical
frameworkgroundedineconomicsociologyisappliedtoexplainthestructureandfunctioning
oftheillegalmarketinrhinohorn.Itwillbearguedthatasociologicalstudyofvaluation,
competition,cooperationandsecurityintheillegalmarketforrhinohorncanassistin
understandingthereasonswhyitissodifficulttodisrupttheflowsofrhinohorn.Centralto
theanalysisistheconceptof“contestedillegality”,alegitimizationmechanismthatactors
employtojustifyillegaleconomicactionincontraventionofthelawonthebooks.Actorsmay
alsouseittodefendtheexploitationoflegalorregulatoryloopholes.Thedissertationshows
howcontestedillegalitytiedtothevaluationoftherhinoanditshornplaysanimportantrole
intheconstitutionandresilienceoftheglobalmarketinrhinohorn.Thenotionof“contested
illegality”isfurtherunpackedandconceptualizedinthetheoreticalframework(section1.3).
Thenextsectionprovidesareviewofscholarlyresearchintotheglobaltradeinrhinohorn,
identifiesgapsintheliteratureandexpandsonthecontributionofthisdissertation.
incident.FivesoldierswerekilledinahelicoptercrashinApril2013.InMay2013,arangerwasaccidentallyshot
inthestomachandseriouslywoundedbyasoldier(datasuppliedbyJulianRademeyer).Whilethedeathtollis
comparativelylow,theemotionalandpsychologicalburdenfacedbythoseformerlyemployedtoconserveall
wildlifeintheParkandnowre-deployedto“fightawar”tosavethelastrhinosisimmense(InterviewswithKNP
officials,2013).
21
1.2Problematizingtheresilienceofillegalmarkets
Ofinteresttothisdissertationisthequestionwhytheillegalmarketinrhinohornhasnot
beendisruptedinspiteofregulation,lawenforcementandothermethodsofintervention
suchasdemandreductioncampaignsinconsumercountries.Differentstreamsofscholarly
literaturehaveattemptedtoanswerthisquestionthroughdistincttheoreticalorparadigmatic
lenses.Thesheerabundanceofpapersandbooksdealingwiththeplightoftherhinoseemto
suggestthatweshouldhaveaclearunderstandingofhowtheillegalmarketinrhinohornis
structured,howitworksandhowtodisruptit.Thisishowevernotthecase(Nadal2015).10
Manyscholarlyandpolicycontributionssufferfromparadigmaticconvergenceemploying
eitheranthropocentricorecocentricperspectives(Shoreman-Ouimet/Kopnina2015),aswell
asethnocentricorculturalrelativistinterpretationsofsocialfacts(Sitas2014).Scholarswho
employanthropocentricperspectivescentretheiranalysisaroundhumanbeingsandsocial
concernswhereasecocentricscholarsregardtheecosphereasfundamentaltotheplanet’s
existenceandsurvival.Centraltotheargumentofthisdissertationisanelaborationofhow
thesebiasesandinterpretationsweakennormativeclaimsaboutrhinoprotectionand
conservation.Thisdissertationhasbenefittedsignificantlyfrominsightsgatheredfromso–
calledgrayliteraturesuchaspositionpapers,blogsandtechnicalreports.Inthefollowing
subsections,Iwilldiscussaselectionofrelevantscholarlycontributionsandgapswithinthe
literature.Thenetiscastwiderthroughtheinclusionofinsightsfromotherwildlifeandillegal
markets.
1.2.1Rhinohorntradeasapoachingproblem
Thereisanoticeablebiastowardsdescribingthesupplysideofwildlifemarketswithinthe
literature,asmanystudiesfocusalmostexclusivelyonthefirstsegmentorstageofthesupply
10
Roughly,theliteraturecanbedividedintoreportsaimedatinfluencingpolicywiththeimplicitorexplicit
suggestionthatregulatoryresponsescouldleadtoandisruptionofrhinohornmarkets(‘tSas-Rolfes2012;‘t
Sas–Rolfes2011;DiMininetal.2014;EconomistsatLarge2013;Eustace2012;Martin2012;Nadal/Aguayo
2014;Taylor,Andrewetal.2014),papersthatassessorsuggestresponsestorhinopoaching(Duffy2014;
Duffy/Emslie/Knight2013b;Duffy/StJohn2013;Humphreys/Smith2014;Lunstrum2014;Massé/Lunstrum;
Mouton/deVilliers2012;Lopes2014;Koenetal.2014;Eloff2012;Eloff/Lemieux2014)andanalysesofmarket
segmentsorsupplychainsofrhinohorn(Milliken/Shaw2012;Montesh2013;Rademeyer2012;Swanepoel
1998;Milliken2014;Orenstein2013;Milledge2007;IpsosMarketing2013;Ellis2013;Ayling2013).
22
chainwithlittleconsiderationofwhathappensfurtherdowntheline.Scholarsthusportray
“poachers”astheprincipalsuppliersofwildlifecontraband,11ignoringtheroleofthestate,
thewildlifeindustry,NGOsandcriminalnetworksintheoverallmarketstructure.Ananalysis
ofactorconstellationsatthesourceofrhinohornandthestructuralconditionsunderwhich
poachingtakesplacearenonethelessessentialtoanysociologicalstudy.Criminologistshave
setthetoneintheliteratureonwildlifetraffickingbydescribingthecrime,profilingwildlife
offendersandprovidinginstrumentalexplanationswhywildlifecrimeisperpetrated,suchas
motivationstopoach,andstructuralorgeographicdrivers.12
SouthAfricancriminologistGerhardSwanepoel(1998:8–9),forexample,examined45police
dockets,profilingoffendersinvolvedintheillegaltradeinrhinohorninthemid–1990s.13Back
then,closeto80%oftheoffenderswereofSouthAfricanoriginwhile2%hailedfromAsia.
Accordingtorhinocrimeinvestigatorsandprosecutors(Interviews,2013,2014and2015),
about70%ofrhinooffenderswereofMozambicandescent,andtheoverallpercentageof
Asianoffendershadalsoincreasedduringtheactiveresearchphase.GregWarchol(2004)
undertookasimilarstudyabouttenyearslater,focusingonthetransnationalillegalwildlife
tradeinSouthAfricaandNamibia.Althoughobserving“hundredsofconfiscatedivorytusks
andrhinohorns”intheESPU’swarehousesin2004,Warcholregardedthethreattorhinos
andelephantsasmarginalattheselectedresearchsites.Helinkedtheabundanceof
stockpiledrhinohornandivorytoSouthAfrica’sgeographicalposition,whichserved(andstill
does)asatranshipmentnodeforpoachedwildlifefromotherAfricancountries(Warchol
11
Iwillproblematizethedistinctionbetweenpoachersandhunterslaterinthedissertation.Sufficetonotehere
thatthedistinctiondenotesraceandclassdifferencesinthesouthernAfricancontext.
12
Mainstreamcriminologistshaveshownlimitedinterestinthestudyofenvironmentalsecurityandillegal
wildlifemarkets.Therehavebeeneffortstoexpandtheboundariesofthedisciplinetoincludewhathasbeen
termed‘greencriminology’,‘conservationcriminology’or‘environmentalcriminology’(Wellsmith2011:126).
Eachsub-disciplineappliesdifferenttheoreticalframeworks.Thegreencriminologicalapproachoffersrichand
diversestudiesdealingwithproblematichuman–environmentrelations;however,itlacks“acoresetof
theoreticalconceptsthatexplainthemeaningofgreenandgreencriminologicalorientation”(Lynch/Stretesky
2011:293).Moreover,thedefinitionofgreencriminologyperseiscontestedandhasbeenassociatedwith
politicalperspectivesanda“narrowrangeofassociatedissues”(Gibbsetal.2010:125).ScholarsatMichigan
StateUniversityhavedevelopedconservationcriminology,whichoffersamultidisciplinaryandinterdisciplinary
frameworkforthestudyofenvironmentalcrimesandrisks“thatlieattheintersectionofcriminology,natural
resourcesandrisksciences”(Gibbsetal.2010:129).CentraltotheMichigandefinitionof“environmental
crimes”arepolitical,cultural,economicandsocialinfluences.
13
Swanepoelobtained45docketsdatingfrom1992to1995fromthenowdefunctEndangeredSpecies
ProtectionUnit(ESPU)formerlylocatedwithintheSouthAfricanPoliceService(SAPS).
23
2004:62).Poachersandtraffickerswere“individualoperators”ratherthanbelongingto
organizedcriminalgroupingswithabalonetraffickers14beingtheexception(Warchol2004:
63).Noteworthyistheobservationthat“unsophisticatedpoachers”struggledtolocate
buyersforrhinohorn:“Iftheysucceedinlocatingabuyer,theymaybeofferedaslittleasUS
$50fortherhinohorn”(Warchol2004:63).Thequestionarisinghereis:Howhaverhino
poachersaddressedtheproblemoffindingasuitabletradepartnersincethen?Whathas
changed?
In2011,WarcholcollaboratedwithSouthAfricancriminologistFriedoHerbig.Theresearchers
appliedtheroutineactivitytheorytoexplainthepoachingprobleminSouthAfrica’s
protectedconservationareas.Accordingtothistheoreticalapproach,crimeismorelikelyto
occurwhenamotivatedoffenderispresent,asuitabletargetisnearbyandtheabsenceof
“capableguardians”(Herbig/Warchol2011:5).15Theassumedrationalchoiceconsiderations
ofcriminalactors,togetherwiththecrime’ssituationalfeatures,and“thetarget’sdegreeof
attractivenessinthecontextoflevelsofguardianship”(ibid)areusedtoexplainwhypoaching
occursinsomeplacesandnotinothers.Whilethenotionofopportunitystructuresisuseful,
thestudysayslittleaboutthesocialsetting,theroleofmarketdemandandhowpoachers,
traffickers,andtraderslocateandtradewitheachother.EloffandLemieux(2014)examine
howcriminalopportunitystructuresdevelopandareexploitedbyrhinopoachersinthe
KrugerNationalPark.Conceivedasanextensionoftheroutineactivitytheory,theresearchers
proposesituationalcrimeprevention(SCP).16Thisapproachincorporatesaninterventionthat
attemptstodefuseopportunitystructuresalongthetradechainfromtheAfricanbushto
Asia.Eloff(2012)usesGeographicInformationSystems(GIS)andremotesensingtoplotrhino
poachingincidentsintheKrugerNationalParkinanotherstudy.Hedifferentiatesbetween
“organized”and“foot”poachers:
“Theorganizedpoacherwithhishelicopter,nightvisionandtechnologicallyadvanced
14
WarcholfoundthatChineseorganizedcrimegroupscontrolledthetraffickinginabalone.
15
“Capableguardians”referstothequalityofgamerangersandsupervisors,andpresenceorlackthereofdueto
labourlawsorinadequatebudgeting(Herbig/Warchol2011:13).
16
Situationalcrimepreventionseekstoreduceopportunitiesforparticularformsofcrime(Lemieux/Clarke
2009).RonaldClarke’stheory,whichheconceptualisedin1980,hasfoundresonanceamongstcriminologists
andpractitioners.
24
riflesreceivesanestimatedR12000perkgcomparedtotheunorganized“foot”
poacherwhoreceivesanestimatedR81000perhorn.17Thefinalbuyerwillpay
between$20000to$60000perkg,dependingonwhetheritisablackorwhiterhino
horn.18The“money”circleinvolvedwithinthiscriminalactivityleadstovarious
secondarycrimes–thebribingofpubliccustomofficials,theillegalissuingofpoaching
permits,andsoon.”(Eloff2012:4)
Therationalchoiceandtheroutineactivitytheoriesstandoutfromclassicalcriminological
approaches,astheydonotfocusoncriminaloffendersandsuitablecriminaljusticeresponses
only.Thesetheoriesconsidersituationalfeaturesandthetarget,therebybypassingcritiques
ofmono-causalfallacies(Brantingham/Brantingham1993:259).Scholarsclaimtoexplainthe
complexitiesofthecrimeandtheinterconnectednessofoffenders,situationalfeatures,and
thetarget.Theapproach,nevertheless,fallsshortofexplainingthesocialembeddednessof
economicaction,non-economicreasonsforpoaching(suchasdefianceoftherulesorrule–
makers)andtheframingoftheproblem.Anadvantagetomostcriminologicalapproachesis
theaction-orpolicy-drivenagendaunderpinningtheorybuilding.Theroutineactivityand
situationalpreventionapproachesarebothtailoredtowardsofferingpolicyandcriminal
justiceinterventions.Inotherwords,theoreticalconstructsprovideadviceonhowbestto
respondtothecrimeathand.Theaction-orientatedapproachofcriminologycanalso
constituteashortcoming:lawenforcersandregulatorsaretargetedwithimmediateand
oftenshort-termpolicyinterventions,suchastheprovisionofadditionalbootsontheground,
newtechnologies,andmilitaryequipment.Withregardstoillegalwildlifemarkets,there
tendstobelimitedconsiderationoftheoverallmarketstructure,thestructuraldriversof
offendingandthequestionofdemand.Thetheoreticalandnormativeobjectivesofsuch
approachesappeartooverlapwiththepolicyandbudgetobjectivesoflawenforcement
agenciesandthemilitary-industrialcomplex,whichcallsintoquestiontheautonomyand
objectivityofsuchresearch(Abercrombie,Nicholas/Hill,Stephen/Turner,BryanS[1984]
2006:88).
17
Thewebsitewww.oanda.comisusedforcurrencyconversionthroughoutthisdissertation.Oandaoffers
historicalcurrencyconversions,whichallowforatruthfulreflectionofthepriceofgoodsinthepast.Where
appropriateandknown,historicalratesofforeignexchangearereflected.Asregardsthecurrentquotation:R12
000approximated€1120andR81000wasworth€7600in2012.
18
Thisinformationisincorrect.Accordingtodatacollectedforthisprojectandindependentlyverified,buyers
andsellersdonotdifferentiatebetweenwhiteandblackhornbutbetweenAsianandAfricanhorn.Theformeris
highlycovetedinTCMmarketsdueitspotencyandrarity;consumersarehencewillingtopayapremium.African
rhinohornwastradedfor25000to45000$/kgwhileAsianhorncost45000to65000$/kginVietnamin
September2013.
25
Theroleofwildlifeprofessionalsinillegalsupplymarketsisomittedinmanycontributions
withafewnotableexceptions:Milledge(2007)referstotheunregisteredstockpilingofrhino
hornandthelaunderingofhornintoillegalflows.MillikenandShaw(2012)andRademeyer
(2012)describepermitfraudandorganizedpoaching.Beyondwildlifeindustryprofessionals,
therearemyriadNGOs,privatesecuritycompanies,andthemilitary–industrialcomplex,allof
whichhavebecomeinextricablylinkedtoanti–poachingmeasuresandbroaderconservation
issues.Theirroleincreatingpublicawareness(a“moralpanic”ofsorts),andtheframingof
poachingasasecurityissuehasbeenlargelyoverlookedintheliterature.Lunstrum(2014)
observesagrowingandmutually–beneficialpartnershipbetweenpublicconservationofficials
andprivatemilitarycompaniesintheKrugerNationalPark.Sherefersto“theuseofmilitary
andpara-military(military-like)actors,techniques,technologies,andpartnershipsinthe
pursuitofconservation”as“greenmilitarization”(Lunstrum2014:2),whichhas“ledtoa
conservation–relatedarmsrace”(Lunstrum2014:7).Duffy(2014:819)arguesthatparks
agenciesandconservationNGOsare“wagingawartosavebiodiversity.”Accordingto
HumphreysandSmith(2014:795)the“rhinowars”haveledtothe“rhinofication”ofSouth
Africansecurity.Theanti-poachingstrategyhasbeenfusedwith“broaderissuesofnational
security,suchastheconcernoverSouthAfrica’sbordersandtransnationalcrime”(ibid)and
thepersistentlegacyofapartheidintheformof“whiteexceptionalism”,whichprecludes
broad-basedparticipationinwildlifemanagementandconservation(Humphreys/Smith2014:
818).BüscherandRamutsindela(2016)extendthenotionof“greenmilitarization”and
“rhinofication”tothebroaderconceptof“greenviolence”,arguingthatthediscourseofwar
andviolenceunderpinsconservationinitiativesinandbeyondthephysicalboundariesof
conservationareas.Thisdissertationdealswiththeimpactoftheconservation‘armsrace’on
economicandsocialstructures.The“collateraldamage”ofthesemilitaryinterventionson
socialstructures,suchasvillagecommunitieslivinginandaroundconservationareas,remains
under-researched.Moreover,wedonotknowwhethermilitaryandnon–military
interventionsleadtothesocialreproductionofhistoricalinequalities,stigmatization,and
alienationofvillagecommunities,who,underdifferentcircumstancesandframing,mightbe
agentsofchangeanddisruptorsofillegalhornsupplies.
Whatisknownaboutpoachinginthebroaderliteratureonillegalhunting?Scholarsface
severaldilemmaswhenwritingaboutpoachersandtheactofpoaching.VonEssenetal.
26
(2014:7)commentonthedifficultyofcategorizingthemotleyassortmentofactorsinvolved
inpoachinganddefiningcriteriatouseintheprocessofcategorization.Thescholars
distinguishbetweenthreemainapproachesthathavebeenusedtodeconstructpoachingor
illegalhunting:“driversofdeviance”19,“profilingperpetrators”20and“categorizingthecrime”
(vonEssenetal.2014:1).Intheiropinion,theexistingapproachesignorethesocio-political
dimensionsofillegalhunting“thatrenderanumberofhuntingcrimesdifficulttoexplainby
useofeconomicandopportunistmodelsofbehaviour”(vonEssenetal.2014:14–15).
Insteadofstigmatizingpoachersascriminals,21theyproposeasystematicexaminationofthe
socio-politicalcontextthatmayleadtoillegalhunting(vonEssenetal.2014:14).While
19
MuthandBowe(1998)provideacomprehensivetypologyofpoachingmotivations,whichincludescommercial
gain,householdconsumption,recreationalsatisfactions,trophypoaching,thrillkilling,protectionofselfand
property,poachingasrebellion,poachingasatraditionalright,disagreementswithspecificregulationsand
gamesmanship.
20
UsinginterviewswithstateconservationofficialsinKentuckyasabasisforclassification,Eliason(2008)
providesamotive–groundedtypologyof“backdoorpoacher/hunter”,“experienced/habitualpoacher”,
“opportunistpoacher”,“trophypoacher”,“poacherthatmixesuphisschedule”and“thequietone”.Some
scholarshavesubsumedthesecategoriesintheiranalyses(Blevins/Edwards2009;Kahler/Gore2012;Filteau
2012;Pires/Clarke2012;Crow/Shelley/Stretesky2013;Groff/Axelrod2013).Othersfocusontherural–urban
divide(Brymer1991;Jacoby2003;Ingram2009),trophyorsportshuntingversussubsistencepoaching
(Parker/Wolok1992),opportunisticversussophisticatedororganizedpoaching(Ayling2013;
Warchol/Zupan/Clack2003;Brymer1991).Whilethesetypologiesprovideusefulanalyticaltools,theyallowlittle
flexibilityasregardscategorizationofactorsinmorethanonecategory,actorsmorphingfromonecategoryto
thenext,ortheirrelationshipswiththestateorwildlifeprofessionals.Forexample,actorsseekingupwardsocial
mobilitymaygraduatefromopportunisticpoachingtopre–meditatedorganizedpoaching.IntheAfrican
context,acontinuum(ratherthanatypology)ofsubsistence,opportunity,trophyandorganizedpoaching
appearsappropriate(myidea).
21
Scholarshavemadenormativedifferentiationsbetween“good”and“bad”poachers,whichtiesintothe
greaterdebateonthemoralityofhuntingandgunownership.InWesternfolklore,thenotionofpoaching
conjuresupimagesofRobinHoodandhisgangsneakingthroughSherwoodForest,huntingtheKing’sdeerin
defianceoftheSheriffofNottingham(Muth1998:5).Inthishistoricalcontext,theactofpoachingisshroudedin
mythologiesofresistanceoftheweakagainstthepowerfulortheoppressedagainsttheoppressor.Themythof
“good”versus“evil”poachingpersistsinmanysocietiestothisday.“Good”poachersaresociallysanctionedor
acceptedbytheircommunityandlawenforcementagents(vonEssenetal.2014;Fischeretal.2013);“bad
poachers”areperceivedasmorallyrepugnantandhencelacksocialandinstitutionallegitimization.Huntersthat
engageinthrill-seeking(Muth/Bowe1998;Katz1988;Forsyth/Marckese1993),trophyhuntingofprotected
species(Eliason2011),organizedpoachingtosupplyillegalmarkets(Cohen1997)orhuntingmorethanwhat
theyneedortheuseofunethicalhuntingpractices(e.g.blindinganimalswithbrightlightsatnightor
electrofishing)lacksocialsanctioningamongstlargesectorsofsocietyandthehuntingfraternity
(Bell/Hampshire/Topalidou2007).Thepoachersthemselvesmayengageinpoachingforanumberofreasons;
somemightbesociallysanctioned,othersnot.Micro-leveljustificationsforpoachingrangefromtheperceived
harmlessness,throughtonecessityandreasonableactionduetounfairrulemaking.Thenormative
differentiationbetween“good”and“bad”poachersrevealsnotonlywhatisacceptabletothepoachers
themselves,fellowcommunitymembersandlawenforcementbutalsotopoliticalandeconomicelites,whoare
responsibleforsteeringthemoralcompassinsocietyandhence,thedevelopmentandimplementationof
wildliferulesandenforcement.
27
observanceofthesocio-politicalandsocio-economiccontextisindeedoverlookedinmany
contributions,somescholarsconsidersocio-politicalfactorsinfluencingcomplianceornon–
compliancewithhuntingorpoachingrules.KahlerandGore(2012)undertookastudyof
stakeholders’perceptionsandmotivationstoupholdwildlifelawsinNamibia.Anumberof
motivationsextendedbeyondwhattheytermed“cookingpotandpocketbook”explanations
forpoachingbehaviour.Somepoachersweremotivatedbyrebellionordisagreementswith
therules.Thesewerelinkedtonegativesentimentstowardstheestablishment,governance
orbenefitsdistributionsystemofcertaincommunityconservanciesinNamibia(Kahler/Gore
2012:115).22Filteau(2012)foundthattheinteractionbetweengamewardensandpoachers
wasanimportantdeterminantofvoluntarycompliancewithconservationrules.Instudying
motivationsforillegalfishinginLakeKerkiniinnorthernGreece,Bellandcolleagues(2007:
415)portraypoachingasaformofcollectiveresistanceand“violationofthecultural
aestheticsofthehuman-natureinteraction”.Poachersareseenassocialactors“withgroup
solidarityforminganimportantpartofpoachingbehaviour”.Withtheaidofacasestudyon
theillegalprotest-drivenhuntingofwolvesinNordiccountries,vonEssenandAllen(2015)
arguethatillegalhuntingshouldbeconstruedasacrimeofdissent.Insteadoffocusingon
crimeandpunishment,theysuggestthattheonusisonregulatoryagenciestobetter
communicatehuntingdirectivesandgarnerbuy-infromhunters.VonEssenetal.(2014:14)
thusrecommendanexaminationofthesetting,thelegitimacyofthelegislationand
interactionsbetweenhuntersandtherestofsociety.Theysuggestdefiancetheory23asa
theoreticalanchoringforthisapproach.Thistheoryhasbeentestedinthebroaderfieldof
criminology;howeverfewwildlifecrimestudies(Bell/Hampshire/Topalidou2007;Filteau
2012;Kahler/Gore2012)classifyillegalhuntingasanexpressionofdefianceorrebellion.24
22
KahlerandGore(2015)conductedafollow-upstudyinthenorth-westernZambeziregionofNamibia.The
studylookedathowhuman–wildlifeconflict(HWC)mightinfluencethevaluationofwildlifeandpotentiallylead
topoachingdecisions.Thestudyrevisitedinequitablebenefitdistributionsystems,suggestingbroader
communityengagementandnuancedopencommunicationandmessagingwithlocalcommunities.
23
Theoriginatorofthetheoryofdefiance,Sherman(1993:460)theorizedthatshamingoffendersandexcessive
desertsincreasedthelikelihoodofreoffendingunderconditionswhereweaksocialbondstothesanctioning
society,andperceptionofunjustlawsexisted.
24
Resourcegovernanceandmanagementscholarsapplytheenvironmentaljusticeframeworktoexplainwhy
actorsoperateoutsideresourcemanagementrulesandsystems.ThecaseofabalonefisheryinSouthAfrica,for
example,isusedtodemonstratehowmanagementandanti-poachingresponseshavefailedtosuppressabalone
poaching.MariaHauck(2009)arguesthatsocialjusticeprincipleswerenotconsideredwhenfisherieslawand
policywereformulatedandadoptedaftertheendoftheapartheidregimeinSouthAfrica.Localfishersdonot
28
Onetechnicalreport(Fenio2014)inthebroadliteratureonrhinopoaching,referencesanger
andmarginalizationofcommunitieslivingadjacenttoconservationareasasdriversofrhino
poaching.Thesocio-political,economicandhistoricalcontextofvillagecommunitiesliving
adjacenttoconservationareasandtheirinteractionswiththestate,conservationauthorities
andbroadersociety,aswellasconsiderationofhowthesecontextsmighttieinto
conservationobjectivesandrhinopoaching,constitutegapsintheliterature.
Whilethisstreamofscholarlyworkprovidesimportantempiricalandtheoretical
contributionsregardingpoachingandsupply-sidedynamics,thereislimitedconsiderationof
actorsotherthanpoachers,theconsumermarketordemandforrhinohorn.Asignificant
contributionisacriticalengagementofsomescholarsregardingtheusefulnessofmilitary
interventionstodisruptpoachers(greenmilitarization,greenviolence,rhinofication).Others,
ontheothersideofthenormativespectrum,regardrhinopoachingasanactofwar(Gwin
2012)orasa“matterofnationalsecurity”(Sellar2015),linkingtheresilienceofrhino
poachingtoinsufficientlawenforcement,inadequatelegislationandunjustdeserts,lackof
politicalwillandtheneedformorebootsontheground.Somescholarsproposethe
legalizationorfreemarketregulationofthetradeinrhinohornasaviableoptiontodisrupt
flows.25Theresilienceofthesupplychainishencelinkedtoafailureofregulationonthe
supplyside.
Otheropenquestionsare:Howdopoachersandbuyerslocateoneanother?Orformulatedin
moregeneralterms:Howdosupply-sideactorsfindbuyersforillicitwildlifecontrabandin
supportfishinggovernancearrangementsduetosocio–politicalandculturalfactors,atop–downprocessofrulemakingandimplementationofthenewfisherymanagementsystem(Raemaekersetal.2011;Hauck2009).Inan
expressionofunhappinesswiththestatusquoandthequestforenvironmentalandsocialjustice,fisherscatch
protectedspeciesoffishinprotectedareasorexceedtheirquotas.Inordertosatisfyscientificandconservation
agendas,thestateoftenpayslittleattentiontotheneedsoflocalpeoplelivinginornearconservationareas.
25
Severalscholarsofferapro-tradestanceinpeer-reviewedjournals(Child2012;Conrad2012;Moyle2013;
Biggsetal.2013;DiMininetal.2014),technicalreports(‘tSas–Rolfes2011;Martin2012;Ferreira/Pfab/Knight
2014;Vigne2013)andgreyliterature(Eustace2012;‘tSas-Rolfes2012).Thesurgeinrhinopoachingis
frequentlylinkedtothetradeban.Tradeinhorn(andotherwildlifeproducts)issuggestedasaviablepolicy
optiontosavetherhinofromextinction.Proponentsofthisapproachofferdifferenttrademodels,suchaslegal
tradethroughacentralsellingorganization(Martin2012),through‘futurestrading’(Interviewwithpro-trade
activist,2013)oronce-offauctions(Msimang2012).Attheotherendofthespectrumistheanti-tradefaction,
whosestanceandassociatedremedialpoliciesdifferinlevelsofpersuasion,explanationandalternative
strategiesoffered(Examplesinclude:Scholtz2012;Nadal/Aguayo2014;Collins,A./Fraser,G./Snowball,J.2013;
Mason/Bulte/Horan2012).
29
overseasmarkets?Andviceversa(shouldthemarketbedemand-driven):Howdoesthe
prospectivebuyerofanillicitgoodpinpointasupplierlivingonanothercontinent?Whatare
therolesandfunctionsofotheractorsatthepointofsupply?Isthecontestationofrulesand
rule-makersanissueonlyatthesupply-endofthemarket?Thisdissertationaimstoaddress
theseopenquestions.
1.2.2Rhinohorntradeasatransnationalorganizedsupplychain
Anotherstreamofliteraturedescribesrhinohorntradeasa“globalsupplychain”or“global
productionchain”thatisdemand–drivenanddominatedbyorganizedcrimenetworks.
AustraliancriminologistAyling(2013)providesanuancedstructureofthisglobalsupplychain.
Shesubsumespoachingandorganizedcrimenetworksunderthecategoryof“harvesting
networks”.Ayling’sclassificationalsoincludestheftnetworksthatobtainrhinohornthrough
theftfrompublicandprivatestockpiles.Bothharvestingandtheftnetworksarelinkedto
distributionnetworksthatdistributerhinohorntoconsumers.Sheattributestheresilience26
oftherhinohornsupplychaintotheinherentfeaturesofcriminalnetworksandthe
operationalenvironmenttheyoperatein.Environmentalfactorsthatfacilitateresilience
include“non-orpartialimplementationofrules”,“socialnormsthatcontradicttherules”and
“theexistenceofcomplexorambiguousrulesandcorruption”(Ayling2013:76–77).She
identifiesgapsinknowledgegapswithregardstohowactorsfindeachotherandproceedto
establishtrust–basedrelationshipsandhowtheycommunicateandtradeacrossnational
borders(Ayling2013:75).Thequestionarisinghereiswhethertheserelationshipsare
necessarilyreliantontrust;orwhetherahealthydoseofdistrust,assuggestedbyGambetta
(1988b:166)inhisanalysisoftheSicilianmafia,accompaniedbysecrecy,duplicity,
intelligencesharingandbetrayal,characterizesuchrelationships.
Thequestionofwhetherrhinohornpoachinginspecificandillegalwildlifemarketsingeneral,
constituteaformoforganizedcrime27orwhetherorganizedcrimenetworksarethemain
26
Ayling(2013:69)attributestwocapacitiestotheconceptofresilience,namely“theabilitytoabsorband
therebywithstanddisruption”and“toadapt,whennecessary,tochangesarisingfromthatdisruption”.
27
Theconceptof‘organizedcrime’iscontested.Iwillproblematizethisinlatersectionsofthedissertation.
Sufficetomentionherethatthetermisusedinterchangeablytodepictagroupofactorsorcriminalactivity.
30
players,isacontestedissueintheliterature.Aylingissomewhatambiguousinheranalysis,
citinganauthoritativereportproducedbyMillikenandShaw(2012)forthetrademonitoring
networkTRAFFIC.TheresearchersprovideadetaileddescriptionofSouthAfricanactors
involvedinthesupplychainbetweenSouthAfricaandVietnamandtheconsumermarketin
Vietnam.Accordingtothem,“theorganizationandplanningofSouthAfrica’srhinohorntrade
hasrapidlyevolvedintoasophisticatedandefficientphenomenon”(Milliken/Shaw2012:76).
Theassertionthatmultinationalcrimesyndicatesspecializinginabouquetofrelatedillicit
trades28havemovedintothelucrativetradeinrhinohorn(Milliken/Shaw2012:12),isnot
furtherexplainedorreferencedinthereport.MillikenandShawprofferahierarchical
structureofthelevelsoforganizedcrimeinvolvedintherhinohorntrade(seeGraph2).29
Graph2:Structureofrhinohornconduits
Buyer/
Consumer
International
Exporter/
Buyer/
Courier
National Courier/
Middleman/Buyer
National Runner/Buyer
Poaching gangs, pseudo–
hunters, stockpiled rhino horn
Source:adaptedfromMillikenandShaw(2012:61and78)anddataprovidedbySouthAfricanlawenforcement
officials
28
Theseillicittradesincludedruganddiamondsmuggling,humantraffickingandeconomicexchangeofother
wildlifeproductslikeelephantivoryandabalone.
29
The‘levels’pyramidreflectsthethinkingofSouthAfricanlawenforcementagenciessuchastheDirectorate
forPriorityCrimeInvestigations(DPCI)andtheNationalWildlifeCrimeReactionUnit(NWCRU).
31
Itissuggestedthatlocal,nationalandinternationallevelsoforganizedcrimemanagethe
transnationaltradechain,ofwhichthehighestlevel“invariablycomprisedAsianindividuals”
(Milliken/Shaw2012:62).Montesh(2013:19)alsopointstotheroleofAfrican–basedAsian
syndicateleadersinthesupplychain,suggestinglinkstoorganizedcrimegroupssuchasthe
ChineseTriadsalreadyresidentinSouthAfrica.Itremainsunclearhowthedifferentlevelsof
organizedcrimeareconnectedtooneanother.Milliken(2014:18)explainsinasubsequent
TRAFFICreportthatLevel4operatives(internationalexporter,buyerorcourierasperGraph
2)are“African-basedAsianoperativeswithpermanentresidentorlong-termstatuswithin
keycountriessuchasSouthAfrica”.Theseoperativesassociatewithcorruptactorswithinthe
privatesectorandstate.Theyarehighlymobileandwell-financed,whichallowsthemto
travelinthesouthernAfricanregionsandAsiatosetupdeals(Milliken2014:18).Whilenot
furtherexplained,theimplicitsuggestionisthattheLevel4operativesfulfillabridging
functionbetweenpoachersandbuyersbywayofcooperativealliancesandcorruption.
Milliken’scontributionisthustheacknowledgmentoftheexistenceofaninterfacebetween
illegalityandlegality(thesignificanceoftheinterfaceisexplainedinthenextsection)andthe
useofcorruptionbycriminalplayerstoensurethecontinuedflowofrhinohornfromthe
sourcetothemarket.InvestigativejournalistJulianRademeyer(2012)30supportsthenotion
ofahierarchicalstructureunderpinningorganizedrhinoandwildlifetraffickingnetworksbut
healsopointstotheflexibilityandchangeabilityoftheoverallnetworkstructureandits
components.Rademeyertrackeddownthe“PabloEscobarofanimaltrafficking”,Laotian
nationalVixayKeosavang,whoisbelievedtoheadtheXayasavangnetwork.31Thekingpin
“remainedintheshadows,adistantpuppet–masterreapingtherewardsofthekillingbut
rarelydirtyinghisownhands”(Rademeyer2014b).Heexplainstheresilienceofthe
XayasavangnetworkbywayofKeosavang’sarms-lengthapproachtorunningthenetwork,
protectionfromarrestbyLaotianlawenforcementofficialsandhugefinancialresourcesas
comparedtothelesserresourcesoflawenforcementagencies,bureaucraticred–tapeand
“investigations[that]stopwherebordersstart”.HendrikandEliseDaffue(2013)providea
30
Rademeyerresearchedtheillegalrhinohorntradeovera2-yearperiod,culminatinginthepublicationofhis
non–fictionbookKillingforProfit:Exposingtheillegalrhinohorntradein2012.
31
USauthoritiesissuedaonemillionDollarrewardforinformationleadingtothedismantlingofthenetworkin
2013(Kerry2013).Thecriminalnetworkwasinvolvedinacleverscam,whichinvolvedthefalsificationofhunting
permits.Theschemewillbediscussedinlatersectionsofthedissertation.
32
nuancedstructureoftheglobaltradechain(seeGraph3)inanewsletterpublicationofa
rhinoconservationNGO(formoredetailssee:Daffue2013).Thenewsletterprovidesa
detailedanalysisofthecompositionofrhinopoachinggroupsandtheirmodusoperandi,
dealingwithwhatistermedthe“collection”stageofthesupplychaininthegraph.The
authorsprovidenofurtherexplanationsastothemechanismsthatconnectthe‘collection’
stagetothesubsequentsegmentsofthehornconduits,otherthanthesidebar“someleaders
havelinksdirectlyintoMozambique”.
Thestatedroleoforganizedcrimeinrhinoandwildlifecrimesechoesthesentimentsof
severalorganizedcrimescholarsandhigh-levelpractitioners(Sellar2008;Bennett2012;
UNODC2010;Nellemannetal.2014;Gosling/Reitano/Shaw2014;Felbab-Brown2011).These
expertsseetransnationalorganizedcriminalsincreasinglyenteringtheillegalwildlifetradeas
a“low-riskandhigh-rewardactivity”(Cook/Roberts2002:4).
Graph3:Structureoforganizedrhinohornnetworks
Source:HendrikandEliseDaffue(2013)
33
RetiredCITESlawenforcementofficialJohnM.Sellar(2014c:2)notestheabilityoforganized
crimenetworkstoinnovateandtoventureintonewcommodities,territoriesandmarkets–
hebelievesthatthetradeinendangeredspeciesoffersalucrativenewbusinessopportunity.
Linkstoterroristandrebelgroupingshavealsobeensuggested,especiallyinrelationto
elephantpoachingandivorytraffickinginEastAfrica(Lopes2014;Cardamone2012;Levey
2007;BrookeDarby2014;Vira/Ewing2014).ViraandEwing(2014:3)argue:
“Atthemostmacrolevel,theivorytradeisessentiallyalarge-scaleillicitresource
transferfromAfricatoAsia;ontheground,however,ivoryisbushcurrencyfor
militants,militias,andterrorists,andoneofthemostvaluablepiecesofillicit
contrabandfororganizedcriminalsandcorruptelites.”
Organizedcrimescholarsandpractitionerslookatthestructureandcompositionoforganized
crimetoprovideanswersastowhythisgroupofactorsisdifficulttodisrupt.Withinthe
literaturefourmodelsoforganizedcrimehavebeensuggested(Standing2006:71–77):the
bureaucratic,network,clanormafia,andbusinessmodel.Thebureaucraticmodel(Cressey
1969)tallieswithMaxWeber’sunderstandingofarationalbureaucracy(Weber[1921]1972:
551–579).Socialorderisachievedthroughrulesandplanning,ahierarchicalawardstructure,
apredeterminedcontractsettingoutnormsandrulesofengagement,andareasof
specialization.Accordingtothenetworkmodel(Chambliss1988;Williams1998),actors
pursueaflat,flexibleandinformalapproachtocoordinatingcriminalactivities.Shared
economicobjectivesareachievedthroughrelationshipsbasedontrustwhilemutual
dependencyoperatesasthecentralcoordinatingmechanism(Standing2006:72–73).
Networksareformedthroughintroductionsandsharedconnections,whichcomplements
Granovetter’stheoryonthestrengthofweakties(Granovetter1983).32Paoli(2001)has
devisedthe‘clan’modeloforganizedcrime.Familyandkinshiptiesdeterminemembership
whilegrouployaltyandsolidarityarethecentralcoordinatingmechanisms.Accordingtothe
‘business’or‘enterprise’modeloforganizedcrime(Reuter1985;Schelling1967;Schelling
1978),rationaleconomicactorscoordinatecriminalactivitiesonthebasisofcost/benefit
32
Granovetter(1983:1378)arguesthatweaktiesareessentialtoanindividual’sopportunitiesandintegration
intocommunitieswhilestrongtiesleadtolocalcohesionbutoverallfragmentation.IwillreturntoGranovetter’s
assumptionsinthenextsection.
34
calculations.33Marketforcesarebelievedtoshapethecoordinationandorganizationof
crime.Indirectcontradictionoftheotherthreemodels,Reuter(1985)arguesthat‘organized
crime’seldomachievesmonopolycontrolinillegalmarketsduetoeconomicforcesincluding
economiesofscale,andpeculiaritiestoillegalmarkets(suchaslegallyunenforceable
contracts).AccordingtoReuter,organizedcrimemaymakeuseofviolencetoincreaseits
marketshareinillegalmarkets;however,theuseorthreatofviolencecomeswithitsown
potentialpitfallssuchascompetitionbyotherviolentgroupsorunwantedattentionfromlaw
enforcers(Reuter1985:20–21).Bothelements–theuseorthreatofviolenceand
competition–constituteimportantanalyticalconsiderationsinunderstandingillegalmarkets
andhencedeservefurtherattentioninthesectionontheoreticalframing(discussedinthe
nextsection).
Cost/benefitcalculationsconstituteexplicitrationalchoiceassumptionsofthebusinessmodel
34
-theothermodelsarehoweveralsosteepedinrationalchoiceassumptions.Scholars
presenteachorganizedcrimemodelasasuperiorcrimecoordinationmechanismagainst
regulation(lawenforcement).Moreover,theofficiallyrecognizedbutcontesteddefinitionof
organizedcrimeemphasizestheprofitmotifoforganizedcrimeirrespectiveoftheidealtype
ormodel.35Lawenforcementresponsestodisruptordismantleorganizedcrimearetailored
accordingtotheassumptionsofthepreferredmodeloforganizedcrime,ignoringhybrid
formationsorthetransnationalreachofsomeorganizedcrimegroups.Nonetheless,the
compositionandstructureoforganizedcrimegroups,assuggestedbythesemodels,shed
lightonquestionsoftrust,groupcohesion,andcontrol,andthusontheissueoftheresilience
ofsuchgroups.Theseinsights,however,donotconstituteasufficientexplanationofthe
33
Elementsofthepreviousparagraphwereusedaspartofapaperentitled“Economicsociologyand
opportunitiesfororganizedcrimeresearch”inEconomicSociology–TheEuropeanElectronicNewsletter.The
newsletterwaspublishedinJuly2015andisavailableat:http://econsoc.mpifg.de/archive/econ_soc_163.pdf#page=38.
34
Curiously,economistshadinitiallysnubbedorganizedcrimeresearchduetotheperceptionthatcriminal
actorswereirrational,andthefieldwasbettersuited“toasociologicalanalysisofpathologiesanddeviances”
(Fiorentini/Peltzman1997:2).
35
StateactorsinvolvedinthePalermonegotiationsleadingtothefinaltextoftheUnitedNationsConvention
againstTransnationalOrganizedCrimeagreedthatfourcharacteristicswereessentialcriteriaofthecrime.
Organizedcrimethusinvolvedagroupoftwoormorepersons,whowereactinginconcerttocommita
“serious”crimerepeatedlyforfinancialormaterialgain(UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly15November2000).
35
resilienceofillegalmarkets.Theclanmodel,forexample,suggeststhattrustiscontingenton
membershipofthegroupandreproducedthroughfamilyorkinshipties.Theinternalcontrol
structurecentresonomertà36andenforcementofthesameoathagainstthosewhobreakit.
AssuggestedbyGambetta(1988b),distrustofone’sassociatesandbusinesspartnersmight
leadtoadditionalsecurityprecautions.Trustwithinnetworkorbusiness-likestructuresmight
benegotiatedthroughdifferentstrategiessuchasreputationandtherelianceonexistingor
previousnetworkconnectionswithinlegalandillegalmarkets.Anothermechanismrelatesto
thetrickyissueofinformationsharing:operationalinformationmightthusbesharedona
need-to-knowbasiswiththosenetworksornodesnecessaryfortheexecutionofaplanned
activity.Inthecaseofdefectionorneutralization,onlythosedirectlylinkedtothenodeor
network(strongties)mightbetemporarilyorpermanentlydisabled.Thefourmodelsare
presentedasstand-aloneandopposingidealtypesintheorganizedcrimeliterature.Each
model,therefore,carriesexplicitnormativeassumptionswithregardstothebenefitsofits
associatedtypeofcrimecoordinationandsuitablelawenforcementinterventions.Scholars
facethedangerofparadigmaticconvergencebypresentingortailoringdatatosuitthe
normativeandtheoreticalassumptionsoftheirchosenmodel(Standing2003:17).Criminal
entitiesarehoweverunlikelytoconformtoanyoneofthesuggestedmodels(ibid).Infact,
crimecoordinationmayrelyonhybridformationsthatalignwiththegeographic,politicaland
temporalcontext,aswellasthepersonalpreferencesofthoseinvolved(Standing2003:20).
Afinalnoteworthyaspectoforganizedcrimeliteratureisthedominantnarrativeof
stigmatizing“theother”.Althoughtheso-called‘alienconspiracytheory’37hasbeen
discreditedintheliterature(Varese2011;Gambetta2009;Naylor2004(b);Reuter1987);
stereotypicalnotionsof“goodversusevil”oranunderworldofcriminalsversusaseaoflawabidingcitizenspersistsinmuchoftheliterature.38Ofconcernintherhinoliteratureisthe
36
‘Omerta’referstothecodeofsilencepractisedbysomemafiagroups,preventingMafiosifromcooperating
withagentsofthestate.Similaroaths,signs,andsymbolshavebeenobservedintheTriads,Yakuzaandstreet
gangs.
37
ThealienconspiracytheorywasborneoutoffindingsoftheUSSenate’sKefauverCommittee.Thereport
identifiedorganizedcrimewiththemafiaormafia-likegroups(foreigners).Thesegroupsweresupposedly
hierarchicallyorganized,threatenedtheintegrityoflocalgovernmentwhileinfiltratinglegitimatebusinessand
subvertingtheintegrityofafreesociety.
38
Bearepostulatesthatthisnarrativeisalsovisibleintheinternationalconceptualizationoforganizedcrimeas
pertheUnitedNationsConventionagainstTransnationalOrganizedCrime(UnitedNationsGeneralAssembly15
36
“othering”andstigmatizationofforeigncriminalswhiletheroleoflocalcrimesyndicates,
wildlifeindustryplayersandstateactorsisdownplayed(Daffue2013;Montesh2013).This
furthercontributestoestablishednotionsofforeignor“transnational”organizedcrime
networksdisruptingpoliticalgovernanceandeconomicstructuresinsouthernAfricawhile
localor“indigenous”criminalgroupsserveasthefootsoldiersoftheseforeigngroups(see
forexample:Standing2003).Corruptionispresentedasakeystrategyoforganizedcrimeto
underminethegovernment,lawenforcement,andtheformaleconomy.Theideaofaforeigndominatedparasiticconspiracythatridesontheweaknessesofregulatoryandlegislative
structuresassuggestedintheliteratureiscriticallyinterrogatedinthisdissertation.The
relianceonthistraditionalnotionof‘organizedcrime’asthedrivingforcebehindtheillegal
rhinohornmarketignorestheroleofother‘non-criminal’actorswithinthesupplychain,such
astheroleofconsumers,culturalframesthatinfluencevaluation,tastesandpreferences
(Dewey2014a:5–6).
Whilethesemodelsprovidepartialexplanandaastowhyorganizedcrimeisresilientandwhy
someillegalmarketsaredifficulttodisrupt,thesocialembeddednessofillegaleconomic
action,theimpactofregulationontheorganizationalstructureofillegalmarkets,the
interfacebetweenlegalityandillegality,aswellasculturalexplanationsfortheresilienceof
illegalmarketsconstitutegapsinexistingliteratureandresearch.Animportantanalytical
considerationiswhetherthedifficultyofdisruptingrhinohornmarketsislinkedtotheprofile
oftheactors(suchasthecompositionandstructureoforganizedcrime),orwhetherintrinsic
(valuationofrhinohorn)andstructuralfeaturesrelatingtothemarketanddifferentflowsof
hornprovidesufficientorpartialexplanandaoftheresilienceofrhinohornsupplychains.
Similartotheresearchgappointedoutintheprevioussub-section,thisstreamofliterature
fallsshortofprovidingaconvincinganswerastohowdifferentsegmentsintherhinohorn
supplychainareinterlinked.Putdifferently,usingthesuggestedhierarchicalmodelof
organizedrhinocrimes:Howdothevariouslevelsintherhinohornorganizedcrimehierarchy
connecttooneanother?Putintoasociologicalperspective:Howareillegaleconomicactions
November2000).Accordingtoher,theconvention“reproducesaglobalhegemonicrhetoricand
countermeasuresthatdependonthepublic’sperceptionofagrowingthreatoftransnationalcrimethat
originatesfromcountriesforeigntothe‘developed’metropolis,ledbyorganized‘mafia’-likenetworksand
gangsterswhoareseentothreatenthepeaceandsecurityofthecorecapitalistnations,andrequiringastate
responseofstrictborderandimmigrationcontrols”(Beare2003:XVIII).
37
atthemicro-level(poaching,illegalharvestingandtheft)connectedtotradestructuresatthe
macro-level(horntraffickinganddistribution)?Withregardstotheoverallrhinohornmarket
structure,anopenquestionpertainstowhetherthenotionof“organizedcrime”asconceived
intherhinoandbroaderorganizedcrimeliteratureisausefulconceptualandtheoretical
construct,orwhetheritservestomuddytheanalyticalwatersandfeedsintoregulatory
objectives.
1.2.3Rhinohorntradeasamulti-actorbusinessenterprise
Thedominantnarrativeassignsorganizedcrimeasarisingifnotdominantactorinillicit
wildlifemarkets,afewresearchers(Ellis1994;Naylor2004;Wyatt2009;Wyatt2011)
nonethelesspointtothesignificantroleofagentsofthestate,thewildlifeindustryand
conservationNGOsinsuchmarkets.Inthisstreamofliterature,illegalrhinohorntradeis
describedasabusinessenterprisefacilitatedbyamultitudeofdiverseactorswithclose,
limitedornolinksto‘organizedcrime’.Insiderknowledgeofmarketstructuresandexposure
oraccesstopoliticaloreconomicelitesrendersuchactorsimportantfacilitatorsor
intermediariesofillegalwildlifemarkets.Theissueofagencyintheillegalwildlifemarketsis
notonlytheoreticallysignificantbutalsobearspolicyconsequencesintherealworld.
Regulatoryresponsesto‘insidertrading’withinthewildlifeindustry,corruptionandcollusion
betweenstateandindustryplayers,asopposedtoorganizedcrimeandterrornetworks,are
likelytodifferintermsoftheperceivedseriousnessofthecrime,punishmentand
recompenses.
Severalreportsattempttodebunktheascendancyoforganizedcrimeinwildlifecrime.A
reportissuedonbehalfofWWFandTRAFFICin2002forexample,foundlimitedevidenceof
theinvolvementof“major”organizedcrimegroups39inillegalwildlifemarkets(Cook/Roberts
2002).TheauthorsobserveanexceptionwithregardstoillegalcaviarmarketsinRussiaand
“inkeydrugproductionanddistributionstateswhichcoincidewithmajorrangestatesfor
wildlife”(Cook/Roberts2002:23).Schneider(2012:53)postulatesthatduetotransnational
39
Theauthorsdenoteas“major”organizedcrimegroupswell–knownSouthAmerican,WestAfrican,Chinese,
WestIndianandRussiannetworks.
38
criminalshavingmasteredtheartoftraffickinglegalandillegalcontrabandandpeopleacross
borders,theinferencethatsuchcriminalsmightbeinvolvedintheillegalwildlifetradeisnot
far–fetched.Beyondtheillegaltradeinsturgeon/caviar,abalone,sharkfinandtigers,she
found,however,anecdotalandspeculativeevidenceonlytosuggestthelink(Schneider2012:
57).Naylor(2004:263)referstothe“recurrentfables”of“OrganizedCrime”(Naylor’s
capitalization)operatinginillegalwildlifemarkets“alongwithstoriesaboutlinksbetween
wildlifetraffickinganddrugsmuggling,andparallelclaimsthatthecontrabandinwildlife
rankssecondonlytothatindrugsintermsofvalue”.Naylor(2004:opcit)pointstothe
dominantroleofthewildlifeindustryandcorruptstateofficialsintheillegalwildlifetrade:
“Inrealitythisisabusinesslargelyrunbyindustryinsidersfromtheforesttothe
factory,fromprimaryacquisitiontofinalsale,althoughitmaybeaidedandabettedby
complicitpoliticiansandcorruptfunctionaries.”
GreencriminologistTanyaWyatt(2009)foundthatstrictregulationoftheRussianfurtrade
constitutedsignificantbarrierstoentry,preventing‘organizedcrime’andother‘outsiders’
fromenteringthelucrativeillegaltrade.Localimpoverishedvillagersfromthetaiga,
registeredhunters,wealthyindividuals,andlawenforcementofficialspoach,huntorlaytraps
forwildanimalswhosepeltsaredestinedforthefurtrade.Well–heeledpeoplewithpolitical
connectionsorbusinessinterestsinthelegalfurtradeactastheintermediariesandlaunder
illegallyobtainedpeltsintolegaltradechannels.Cook(2002:23)arguesthatfamiliaritywith
tradecontrols,governmentregulations,andtransportrouteswouldprovideactorsalreadyin
thelegaltradewithknowledgeofthe‘tricksofthetrade’andpossiblelegalloopholesto
exploitopportunitiesinillegalmarkets.40
Alimitednumberofscholarscastthenetbeyondthe‘usualsuspects’–poachersand
organizedcrime–inresearchanalysingtherhinohornsupplychain.StephenEllis(1994)
providesasuccinctanalysisoftheSouthAfricanapartheidstate’sinvolvementintheivory
andrhinohorntradestructuresofthe1970sand1980sbyshowinghowtheseillicittrades
financedtheSouthAfricansecretservicesandindividualslinkedtothem.Thehistorian
40
SomestudiespointtothefalsificationofCITESpermits,import/exportcustomsdocumentsortothe
manipulationofdomesticpermittingsystemsregulatingdomesticorcross–bordertradeoflivewildlifeorwildlife
products(Naylor2004;Schneider2012;Felbab-Brown2011),andspecificallyinthecaseofrhinos(Rademeyer
2012;Falberg2013;Milliken/Shaw2012;Orenstein2013;Leader-Williams2003).
39
providesfascinatinginsightsonthenexusbetweenthemilitaryapparatusandconservation
actorsinsouthernAfrica,whicharenotonlyrelevanttocurrentdebatesrelatingtothe
militarizedconservationparadigmbutalsopointtothepossiblebeginningsofablurring
betweenlegalandillegalmarketexchangesinrhinohorn.Otherresearchers(Rademeyer
2012;Milliken2014;Milliken/Shaw2012;AnimalRightsAfrica2009)depictthecomplicitrole
ofwildlifeindustryactorsalongrhinohornsupplychains.Rademeyer(2012),forexample,
showstheinvolvementofthe“boeremafia”(whiteAfrikanerswhoareinvolvedinthewildlife
industry)intheillegalrhinohorntrade.Whileauthorsdescribepermitfraudandthe
launderingofillegallyharvestedhornintolegalflows,theliteratureremainssilentonthe
socialmechanismsandmarketstructuresthatenabletheseflows.
Italsoremainsunclearhowwildlifeindustryactors(andthe‘usualsuspects’)areconnectedto
Asiandistributionnetworks.Anothergaprelatestohowactorsmakeinitialcontactand
establishbusinessrelationsdespitecleavagesbasedonlanguage,culture,nationality,social
statusandethnicity.Moreover,littleisknownabouttheverticalandhorizontalintegrationof
thesediverseactorsinthetransnationaltradechain.Whilethepublicdiscourseonthe“rhino
crisis”isincreasinglysteeredtowardsthe‘underworld’oforganizedcrimeandterrorism,
importantquestionsrelatingtotheinterfacebetweenlegalityandillegalityremain
unresolved.
Meanwhile,scholarsfromthefieldofantiquitiestraffickinghaveshiftedthetheoreticalfocus
fromstaticstructuralnotionsof‘organizedcrime’toconceivingofhybridformationsthat
movelootedculturalobjectsfromthesourcetothemarket.MackenzieandDavis’research
intotheanatomyofantiquitiestraffickingnetworksinCambodiaprovidessignificantinsights
ontheintegrationof‘groups’and‘networks’ofactorsusingasocialcapitalapproach
(Mackenzie/Davis2014).41Thescholarsidentifytradechannelsalongwhichlootedartefacts
aremovedfromcultural-historicalsitestotheinternationalmarketbuyer(frequentlya
legitimatetradeoutlet).Theresponsibletraffickingnetworksare“stable,hierarchicaland
41
WingLo(2010:868)pioneeredasocialcapitalframingandappliedittoastudyofTriadsocietiesinHongKong
andChina.Heidentifiedinternal‘bondingcapital’intraditionalhierarchicalorganizedcrimegroups,together
withhorizontal‘bridging’andvertical‘linking’capital.Thesesocialcoordinationmechanismsprovide
opportunitiesforillegaltrade,includingthecollusionwithotherlegitimateandillegitimategroups,orcorrupt
stateinterests.
40
repetitivelyfunctioningsupplychains”(Mackenzie/Davis2014:16).Giventhemanyparallels
betweenantiquitiesandwildlifetraffickingsupplychains,42theirconclusion(Mackenzie/Davis
2014:4)provideshelpfulhintsonhowtomodelrhinohornsupplychains:
“Broadlystated,ourconclusionwillbethatwhilethepresentcasestudyis
undoubtedlyofanetwork,inwhichnodes,contactsandcertaintypesofsocialcapital
areusefulexplanatoryconcepts,thereisalsoanobservablestability,andidentifiable
formsofhierarchy,bothalongthechainofthewholenetworkandwithineachofits
nodes.Weconceptualizethenetworkasarepetitiveprocess,havingdevelopedby
wayoflinkingnodalactorsinlong-termtradingrelations,andharnessingthebenefits
atdifferentstagesinthechainofbothlocalizedterritorial‘structure-controlled’
organizedcrimeand(asthetradesmoveincreasinglytowardsthetransnational)more
flexibleentrepreneurialtrafficker-dealerswhoarelesstiedintoframeworksinvolving
territoryorgroup.”
1.2.4Synthesizingtheresearchgaps
Theearliersub-sectionswereaimedathighlightingimportanttheoreticalcontributionsand
gapswithintheliterature.Anoverviewoftheliteratureonthedemandorconsumermarket
wasexcludedfromtheliteraturereviewastoolittleisknowntowarrantaseparate
subsection.Whenitcomestothedistributionandtradeofrhinohorninconsumermarkets,
theliteraturepredominantlyreferstothetraditionalmedicinesmarketsinAsia(‘tSas-Rolfes
2012;Nowell2012a;Drury2009;Rademeyer2012).Severaltechnicalreportsandjournalistic
investigations(IpsosMarketing2013;Milliken/Shaw2012;Gwin2012;Amman2013b)
referencenewdemandandusergroupsandareconsideredassuchinthechapterdealing
withthedemandandvaluationofrhinohorn.Withregardstounderstandingthedemandfor
rhinohorn,manyopenquestionsremain.Itisunclearwhyconsumersarewillingtopaya
premiumforakeratin-likesubstanceandhowqualitycontrolisenforcedinlightofthehigh
42
AlderandPolker(2005)andBrodie(2003)notesimilaritiesregardingthefunctioningoftheillicitsupplychain,
differentiation,themainactorsandroles,exploitativeeffects,smugglingnetworksandcorruptiveinfluences.
Bowman(2008:226)arguesthatunlikeothertraffickedgoods,thetradeinantiquitiesislegalperse;however,
theillicitsourcehastobedisguisedtorenderthestolenartefactprofitable.Whenitcomestograyflowsof
wildlifecontraband,theillicitsource(poaching)isalsochangedtolegalsources(trophyhunting).Moreover,
illegalwildlifecontrabandisequallysoldathighpricestobuyersofhighsocio-economicstatus(Bowman2008)
orthoseseekingupwardsocialmobility.
41
incidenceoffakerhinohornatthesourceandintheconsumermarket(Amman2013a).Other
unansweredquestionspertaintothestructureandfunctioningofdistributionandtrade
networks.
Insynthesizingthecontributionsofexistingliteratureontheillegalrhinohorntrade,several
gapsandshortcomingshavebeennoted.Thedifferentstreamsofliteraturesufferfrom
theoreticalseparatenessinthatonlyaspecificaspectorsegmentoftheillegaltradechainis
considered.Whilescholarsacknowledgetheexistenceofa“globalsupplychain”orofa
“transnationaltradechain”,itremainsunclearhowthedifferentsegmentsofthesupplychain
arebridgedacrosscleavagesfromdifferentnationalities,ethnicities,socialstrata,languages,
andcultures.Withafewnotableexceptions(Ellis1994;Milliken/Shaw2012;Rademeyer
2012;Naylor2004),scholarsfocusonthe“usualsuspects”–poachersandorganizedcriminals
–withoutinterrogatingtheroleofthestate,thewildlifeindustry,andotheractors.The
resilienceofthesupplychainislinkedtoshortcomingswithintheregulatoryframework.
Scholarsrecommendthatthestateshouldputmore“bootsontheground”(increased
securitizationandmilitarization),amendtheregulatoryframeworkorrefocusattentiontothe
perceivedorganizedcrimethreat.Afewscholars(Büscher/Ramutsindela2016;Lunstrum
2014;Massé/Lunstrum2015)havequestionedtheprudenceofsuchmeasures,thereby
pointingtotheflawedbasisoftheregulatoryframework.Others(Ayling2013;von
Essen/Allen2015)havearguedthattheperceivedillegitimacyofrulesandnormsmight
provideaconduciveenvironmentforwildlifecrimetoflourish.Withtheexceptionofthefinal
streamofliterature(subsection1.2.3),scholarshavepaidlimitedattentiontotheinterface
betweenlegalityandillegality.Anopenquestionrelatestotheroleof‘organizedcrime’inthe
illegalrhinohorntradeandhowregulationimpactstheglobalsupplychain.Noneofthese
streamsofliteraturedeliversasatisfactoryanswerastowhytherhinohasnotbeenbetter
protectedinlightofthemyriadmeasurestodisruptillegalrhinohornmarkets.Itisagainst
thisbackgroundthatatheoreticalframeworkbasedonthesociologyofmarketsinthefieldof
economicsociologyisproposedinthefollowingsection.
42
1.3Theoreticalframing
Atheoreticalapproachgroundedineconomicsociologyhasbeenchosentoaddressthegaps
identifiedintheprevioussection.Thistheoreticallensoffersboththeoreticalandempirical
integrationbystudyingnetworks,institutions,andcognitiveframes.Therecognitionthat
marketsaresocially,culturallyandpoliticallyembeddedisofsignificancehere.Economic
sociologistsareconcernedwithunderstanding(“verstehen”)thesocialembeddedness43of
economicactionandinstitutions(Granovetter/Swedberg2011:XIX).Granovetter(1985:487)
explains:
“Actorsdonotbehaveordecideasatomsoutsideasocialcontext,nordotheyadhere
slavishlytoascriptwrittenforthembytheparticularintersectionofsocialcategories
thattheyhappentooccupy.Theirattemptsatpurposiveactionareinsteadembedded
inconcrete,ongoingsystemsofsocialrelations.”
Strategicsitesofinquirywithineconomicsociologyincludemarkets,socialnetworksand
institutions.Whileagrowingbodyofliteratureconsidersthestructureandmechanicsofthe
informaleconomy,44thestudyofillegalandtransnationalmarketsremainsunderstudiedin
thefieldofeconomicsociology.45SpecificcaveatsidentifiedbyBeckertandWehinger(2011),
43
Granovetterrevivedtheconceptof“embeddedness”inhismuch-citedarticlepublishedin1985,which
suggestedthateconomicactionwasembeddedinsocialstructures(Granovetter1985).Thearticleinspiredmany
sociologiststobecomeinterestedinthefieldandgaveanewlifetotheconceptof“embeddedness”,whichhad
featuredinKarlPolanyi’scollaborativebook‘Tradeandmarketintheearlyempires’(Polanyi/Arensberg/Pearson
1957).Polanyi’susageoftheconceptwaslimitedtopre-industrialsocieties,whichhedeemedtobeembedded
insocial,religiousandpoliticalinstitutions.Tohimandotherscholars,theIndustrialRevolutionpresenteda
watershed.Asofthen,economictransactionswerenolongerdefined“bythesocialorkinshipobligationsof
thosetransactingbutbyrationalcalculationsofindividualgain”(Granovetter,1985:482).
44
LabouranthropologistKeithHartcoinedtheterm“informaleconomy”afterconductingresearchonurban
labourmarketsinGhanaduringthe1970s.Hepostulatedadualistsystemofincomeopportunitiesoftheurban
labourforcebydistinguishingbetweenwagelabourandself-employment.TheWorldBank,theInternational
LabourOrganization(ILO)andmanyothershavesincere-appropriatedtheconcept,andithasbecome
somewhatcontestedindevelopmentliterature.Severalconceptuallyandtheoreticallyinterestingresearch
studieshavebeenpublishedinrecentyears(Hart1990;Portes/Haller2005;Portes2010;Feige1989;DeSoto
1989;Jenkins1988;Schneider2002;Fernández-Kelly/Shefner2006).Geertz(1978:120-121)inhisseminaltext
oninformaleconomiesshows,forexample,howthequestforinformationinMoroccanbazaars“isanadvanced
art(…),amatteruponwhicheverythingturns.”
45
AmongstthefewpublishedcontributionsareBeckertandWehinger’stheoreticalandconceptualframework
forillegalmarkets(Beckert/Wehinger2011;Beckert/Wehinger2013);Wehinger’smonographcomprisinga
detailedreviewofliteratureonillegalmarkets(Wehinger2011);andjournalarticlesontheemergenceofillegal
marketsafteracrisisscenario(Dewey2014a),policeprotectionintheusedcarpartsmarketinArgentina(Dewey
2011),“streetcapital”andcannabisdealinginNorway(Sandberg2008),theimportanceofcultureintheillegal
43
includeamongstothers,theorganizationalfeaturesofillegalmarkets,theinterfacebetween
legalandillegalmarketsandtheroleofthestateinillegalmarkets.Thesecaveatsdovetail
withtheresearchgapsidentifiedintheprevioussection.Inspiteofscholarlyinterestin
globalization,economicsociologistshavealsopaidscantattentionto‘global’or
‘transnational’markets(Aspers2011:175;Quack2009:125).Quack(2009:134)attributesthe
lacunatoscholarlypreoccupationwiththenationstateasthesolepoliticalauthorityandthe
preferenceforperceivingmarketsasunifiedsocialorders.Transnationalmarketsare“likelyto
bepopulatedbyactorswithheterogeneousculturalandinstitutionalorientations”.
Thedisciplineofeconomicsociologyprovidesnuancedideasastothetheoreticalintegration
ofsocialnetworks,institutionsandcognitiveframeswhenexplainingthestructureand
functioningofmarkets.Thefollowingsub-sectionswillhighlighttheoreticalconstructs,the
explanatoryapproachandargumentofthedissertation.
1.3.1Rhinohornmarketsaresociallyembedded
Ofinteresttomyprojectisthesubfieldofthesociologyofmarkets,whichattemptsto
“understandtheorigins,operations,anddynamicsofmarketsassocial
structures”(Fligstein/Dauter2007:106).Thesubfieldincludes,amongstothers,thestudyof
firmsandcommoditymarkets,relationshipsbetweensuppliers,workersandregulatory
institutionsandtheroleoflocalculturesassystemsofmeaningsinsofarastheyinfluence
productpreferences,andtheroleofmoralnormsinthegenerationofparticularkindsof
markets.Marketsareseenasthecoreeconomicinstitutionsofcapitalisteconomies.While
enablinganeconomicmechanismfortheallocationofgoodsandservices,marketsarealso
socialinstitutions,inseparablyinterwovenwiththepolitical,social,andculturalenvironments
inwhichtheyoperate(Beckert2009).Economicsociologistshaveemployedanumberof
explanatorymechanismstoexplaintheemergenceandfunctioningofmarkets,suchas
marketsasnetworks(Granovetter1985;White1981);marketsasinstitutions
drugeconomy(Sandberg2012)andwhyNorwegiancannabisgrowerskeepasmall–scaleproduction
(Hammersvik/Sandberg/Pedersen2012).
44
(DiMaggio/Powell1983;Fligstein2001a);marketsasfields(Bourdieu[2000]2005(a);
Bourdieu2005(b));andtheperformativityapproachwhichexaminestheroleofeconomic
theoryinmarketstructuration(MacKenzie2003;Callon1998).Inemployingoneofthese
explanatorymechanismsorbyfocusingonspecificaspectsofmarkets,scholarlycontributions
maysufferfrom“theoreticalseparateness”(Fligstein/Dauter2007:2).Tocircumventthis
shortcomingandcognizantofthelacunaenotedintheliteraturereview,thenotionof
marketsasfieldsisusedasthetheoreticalbackboneofthedissertation.
Thisapproachintegratessocialnetworks,institutionsandcognitiveframes,andregardsthem
asirreduciblemacrostructureswhilealsoofferinganuancedexplanatorymechanismthat
incorporatesstructureandagency(Beckert2010:611).Accordingtothistrainofthought,
marketsarecomposedof“aheterogeneousgroupofactorsthatconstituteasocialarenaby
orientingtheiractionstowardeachother”(Fligstein2001b:108).Actorsinthemarketfield
areproducers,consumersandintermediaryregulatoryagenciesrangingfromthestateto
unions,lobbying,advocacyandsocialmovementgroups(Beckert2010:611).Beckert(2010:
612)positsthat:“[e]achofthethreestructuringforcescontributestothesocialorganization
ofmarketexchangesbyshapingopportunitiesandconstraintsofagentsaswellas
perceptionsoflegitimacyandillegitimacy.”Theissueofagencyisdealtwiththrough
recognisingthefollowing:
“Agencyinfieldsisstructuredbytheinfluencesthatsocialforcesexerciseonthe
actorswhopopulatethefield.Theseforcesconsistoftherelationaltopographiesof
networks,theinstitutionalrulesprevalentinthefield,andcognitiveframesstructuring
theperceptionsofagents”(Beckert2010:611–612).
Althoughtheframeworkwasconceivedforlegalmarkets,itwillbearguedthatthesame
typesofactorsarerelevanttoillegalandgreymarkets.Withregardstothechosenproduct
marketofthisdissertation–rhinohorn–legalandillegalproducers(poachers,hunters,
thieves,wildlifeprofessionalsandagentsofthestate),transporters(organizedcrimegroups,
wildlifeprofessionalsandagentsofthestate),intermediaryregulatoryagencies(the
internationalcommunitythroughCITES,representativesofthestate,conservationNGOs,
privatesecuritycompanies,andbusinesses),aswellasconsumersinteractandstructurethe
marketforrhinohorn.Ofsignificanceisthattheglobalmarketforrhinohornconsistsoflegal,
45
grayandillegalflows,whichraisesintriguingquestionsastowhetherthesameactorsareof
importanceineachflowandwhetherthereareconnectionsbetweenthedifferentflows
(interfacebetweenlegal,grayandillegalmarket),asopposedtounderstandingthe
connectionsbetweendifferentsegmentsofthesupplychainonly.Theinstitutionalrulesare
butoneofthestructuringforcesinfluencingtheflowofrhinohorn.
1.3.2Defining‘illegalmarkets’andintroducingthenotionof‘flows’
Theglobalrhinohorntradeisunderstoodintermsofasociologicaldefinitionofmarkets,
whichdescribesmarketsas“arenasofregularvoluntaryexchangeofgoodsorservicesfor
money,[goodsorservicesofequitablevalue]46…underconditionsofcompetition”(Beckert
andAspers(2008)citedin:Beckert/Wehinger2013:7).Marketsarethusnotonly
characterizedbyeconomicexchangebuttheyalsoinvolvecompetitionwherebyatleastthree
actorsarepittedagainstoneanotheratthesupplyanddemandendofthemarket(Beckert
2007:7).Weber(quotedin:Abercrombie,Nicholas/Hill,Stephen/Turner,BryanS.[1984]
2006)definedcompetitionasapeacefulconflicttoattaincontroloverscarceresources.Inthe
contextofthisdissertation,Weber’sdefinitionisparticularlyinterestingasrhinosarenotonly
rare,buttheyarealsoendangered.Thequestionarisinghereiswhethercompetitionislikely
tobecomeless‘peaceful’andmoreviolentasrhinonumberscontinuetodwindle.The
subsectiononcompetitionwilldealwiththisinmoredetail.Asignificantfactorleadingtothe
emergenceofmarketsisthatmarketactorsneedtoshowinterestintheexchangeofthe
goodsorservices.Conflictsmay,however,ariseasregardsthepriceorspecificationsofthe
productsorservicestobetraded.Ultimatelytheactorshavetoreachacompromiseforthe
economicexchangetosucceed(ibid).Basedontheassumptionofmutualrespectforproperty
rights,marketexchangesoughttobevoluntaryandpeacefulintheformalsector
(Aspers/Beckert2011:4-5).
46
JensBeckerthasadjustedhisdefinitionofmarketstoincludeexchanges,whicharenotsubjecttomoney
transactionsbutcouldinvolvethebarterorexchangeofsimilargoodsorservices(Ph.D.consultationbetween
JensBeckertandAnnetteHübschle).Anobviousadvantageofavoidingmonetarytransactionsisthelackof
paperoraudittrail,thusrenderingobsoletethe“followthemoney”approachoflawenforcementagencies.
46
Marketsareconsideredillegaliftheproductperse,itsexchangeorconsumptionviolateslegal
stipulations.Thestatedeniespropertyrightsinsuchmarkets,setsandenforcesnoquality
standardsandhasthepowertoprosecutemarketactors(Beckert/Wehinger2013:7).47What
rendersamarket“illegal”is,therefore,amatteroflegaldefinitionandmaydifferbetween
legaljurisdictionsandacrosstime(Beckert/Wehinger2013:7).Thefactthatanelementofan
economicexchangeisdeemedillegalinaspecificplaceatacertainpointintimebearsnot
onlyactionableconsequencesfortheactorsbutislikelytoimpactthestructureand
functioningofthemarket(comparewiththesectionon‘contestedillegality’).Adistinction
needstobemadewithregardstoeconomicexchangesthatoccurattheinterfacebetween
legalityandillegality;thesemarketsareneitherlegalnorillegalastheyhoverinan
undeterminedgrayzone.Somemarketactorsmayexploitlegalorenforcementloopholesin
whatIterm‘graymarkets’.Actorscapitalizeonambiguitiesofthelegal/illegalitynexusby
falsifyingtheprovenanceofatradedgoodasaformerlylegalcommodity(e.g.pre–CITES
horn)orconvertanillegallyacquiredgoodtoa‘legal’commodity(e.g.poachedhornis
convertedintotrophyhuntedrhinohorn).
Afurtherconsiderationrelatestothetransnationalnatureoftheillegalmarketinrhinohorn.
Historically,marketandplacewerecloselyintertwined.Whilemarketsofteninvolvedthe
inclusionoflongdistancetradeandforeignmerchants,marketswereconnectedtothesocial
andeconomiclivesoflocalcommunities,occurringatfixedintervalsandinspecificplaces–
thelocalmarketplace(Zukin1993:6).Withtheemergenceofmigrantlabourandhuttaxes
duringthecolonialerainthesouthernAfricancontext,48marketandplacestartedto
separate.Producers,tradersandconsumersnolongerhadtobeatafixedtimeandlocation
toengageineconomicexchange.Inthecurrentclimateofinstantaneouscapitalflows,global
transactionsandvirtualmarketplaces,economictransactionsarefluidanddifficulttopolice
orlocate.Inrecognitionofthefluidanddynamicstructureofthemarket,theconceptof
transnationalflows(insteadofcommodityorsupplychains)isemployedinthisdissertation.
47
Government’sabilitytoprosecutemarketactorsisnotonlyrestrictedtoillegalmarkets.Thestatemayequally
prosecutemarketactorsinlegalorgraymarkets.
48
AsimilarpatterncanbeobservedinWesternEuropeduringIndustrialization(seeforexample:
Polanyi/Arensberg/Pearson1957).
47
Theconceptofflowsisusefulinshowcasingthefluidconnectionsandcrossoversbetween
legal,illegalandgrayeconomicexchanges.Castells(1999:295)introducedtheconceptof
“spacesofflow”,suggesting,“materialarrangementsallowforsimultaneityofsocialpractices
withoutterritorialcontiguity”.Castells(2011:407)andothers(vanSluisetal.2012;CôtéBoucher2015;vanSluis/Marks/Bekkers2011)usetheconceptofflowswithspecificreference
tothe“networksociety”,49whichischaracterizedbyincreasingfragmentationofindividuals
andcommunities,necessitatinginterdependentrelationshipsbetweenindividuals,public
services,thepolice,informationcommunicationtechnology(ITC)andmodesoftransport.
Accordingtothisview,people,money,goods,andinformationareincirculation,travelingto
andfromdifferentplaces,employingdifferentinfrastructuresandtherebygenerating
different“flows”whichconnect,collideormeetinnodes(vanSluisetal.2012:73).The
governanceofflowsandnodesprovidesacomplexconundrumtoregulatorswhileoffering
immediacy,connectednessandnewopportunitiesforeconomicactorsoperatinginlegal,gray
orillegalmarkets.
Inthecontextofthisdissertation,theideaofdynamicflowsinsteadofsupply,commodityor
tradechainsallowsflexibilitywithregardstotrajectories,influencesandcontingent
relationshipsthatmayevolve,developorperishbetweenactors,flowsandinstitutionsinthe
marketfield.Takeninaliteralsense,theconceptof‘flows’mayinvokedifferent
characteristics,suchasbifurcation(flowssplitbecauseofablockage,disruptionor
intervention),directionalityandinterdependence(whathappensupstreammayhavean
impactdownstream),theconfluenceoftributaries(flowsthatmerge),deadends(flowsthat
dryupordisappear),deltas(aflowsplitsintomyriadoffshoots),dryriverbedsthatflowagain
uponnewrains(re-joiningflows).Theideaofdifferentflowsformingconstitutiveelementsof
theaggregatemarketinrhinohornpresentsadynamicmodelthatintegratesmarket
processes,actors,socialnetworks,andinstitutionswhilealsocoveringspatial–temporal
considerations.Itwillbearguedthatillegal,grayandlegalflowsofrhinohorncannotbe
studiedinisolationbecausetheymerge,convergeanddiverge,impactedbyoneanotherand
byinstitutions,networksandcognitiveframesfoundinthemarketfield.Unliketherather
staticconceptofasingularsupplychain,theconceptof‘flows’allowsfordynamicand
49
Castells(2000:5)suggeststhatthenetworksocietyisaspecificformofsocialstructureemblematicofthe
InformationAge.
48
interdependentrelationships.
1.3.3Thenotionofcontestedillegalityanditsimpactontheemergenceandfunctioningof
flows
Criminologists,anthropologistsandhumangeographershavecommentedontheblurred
boundariesbetweenthelegal/illegal,licit/illicitandlegitimate/illegitimatebinaries(seefor
example:Heyman/Smart1999;Heyman2013;Hall2013;VanSchendel/Abraham2005;RoseGreenland/Heatherington2014).Theblurringoftheinterfacebetweenlegalityandillegalityis
ofparticularinterestinthestudyoftransnationalflows.Forexample:whatislegalinone
placemaybeillegalelsewhere.Legalityorillegalitymayalsochangeovertime.Social,moral
andculturalnormsmaydivergefromlegalrules,thusdelegitimizingthem.
Mostscholarsrelyonthestateastheiranalyticalpointofdeparturewhenstudyingregulatory
frameworksandtheirimpact.Whilethestate50delineateswhatitconsidersaslegalorillegal,
theremaybeadisconnectbetweenthestateandsocietyregardingsuchlegaldefinitions,
theirinterpretation,andthelegitimacyofsuchrules.Both,agentsofthestateandmembers
ofsociety,mightfloutsomerules.Onceaneconomicexchangemovesbeyondthepolitical
boundariesofthestate(theexchangemayhappeninseveraldifferentstatesornoneatall–
invirtualmarketplaces),issuesofjurisdictionmuddythewaters.Moreover,theconstructed
andfixeddichotomiesoflegal/illegalorstate-approved/forbiddenignorehowillegal,informal
andgrayeconomicpracticesarefrequentlyintertwinedwithourdailylives(Van
Schendel/Abraham2005:4–6).
Thisdissertationcontributestothedebatebyintroducingtheconceptofcontestedillegality.
Whileaformalpoliticalauthoritymayhavecriminalized(declaredas“illegal”)anactatsome
pointintime,actorsin“illegal”andgrayflowsmaynotagreewiththelabel.Itwillbeargued
thatactors’implicitandexplicitdefianceorcontestationofthestate–sponsoredlabelof
illegalityserveasalegitimizingandenablingmechanism,whichfacilitatesparticipationingray
50
Itisacknowledgedthatthestateisnotaunitaryactor.Forthepurposesofthisargument,thestateand
differentarmsofgovernancearepresentedasahomogenousunit.
49
orillegalflows;occasionallyevenleadingtothecreationofnewgrayorillegalflows(seefor
example:Taylor2015).Thefollowingsubsectionexpandsonimportantaspects.
Thestatedillegalityofaneconomicexchangemaybesubjecttonormativecontestationand
socialacceptance.Diverseculturalframesassignmoralandnormativemeaningstothe
legitimacyorillegitimacyofeconomicexchanges,thegoodsorservicestobeexchanged,the
actofproducingorexchangingthegoodsorservices,theactorconstellationsinvolvedinany
ofthestages/segmentsofthemarketexchangeortheimpactofthemarket(seefor
examples:Satz2010:91–114).Sociallegitimationofsomegoodsandservicesislikelyto
obtainadditionalchallenges:Whiletheproduction,exchangeorconsumption/useofsuch
goodsorservicesmayhavebeendeclaredtobe‘illegal’,thecommodificationofsuchgoods
orservicesmayalsobeconsideredmorallyorculturallycontested,questionableoreven
repugnant(Beckert2009).Importantactorsalongthesupplychainthushavetoovercome
moralscruples,culturalhurdlesorpersonalinhibitionsassociatedwithtransactinginsuch
illegalorgraymarkets(Beckert/Wehinger2013:7).However,actorsmayfinditlessdaunting
toenter,transactinorestablishmarkets,whichareillegalbutsociallyaccepted.Levelsof
socialacceptanceofthelawonthebooksmayvarybasedonnewinformation,emergentor
ancientculturalpreferencesortrendsorpolitico-legaldevelopments.51Wildlifecontraband
(especiallyrhinohorn)fallsintowhathasbeencalleda“contestedmarket”
(Steiner/Trespeuch2013)ora“contestedcommodity”(Radin1996)elsewhere.52Aswillbe
showninlaterchapters,therearecompetingclaimsastowhetherrhinohornshouldor
shouldnotbeatradablegoodorcommodity,callingintoquestionwhetherthelabelof
illegalityisappropriate,sufficient,orconstitutesacaseofethnocentricvaluation(valuation
thatisbasedonaparticularculturaloutlook).
51
Thesmokingofcannabisderivativesasopposedtotheintravenoususeofopioidsubstances,forexample,is
subjecttodifferentlevelsofsocietalsanctioning.Thedifferentialranking(progressivesectorsofsocietyare
moreforgivingwithregardstocannabisconsumption)isnotonlylinkedtotheseriousnessoftheoffencebut
extendstomoraljudgmentasregardsthebroaderimpactonsociety,thelevelofsocialandotherharms
experiencedbytheindividual(theoffender)andtheirsocialenvironment.
52
SteinerandTrespeuch(2013:144)define“contestedmarkets”as“marketsinwhichcontestedcommodities
areboughtandsold”.TheauthorsbuildonRadin’sconceptionofcontestedcommodities,whicharegoodsthat
maybeopentomoralchallenges.
50
Theprocessofsociallegitimationfortheeconomicexchangeofgoodsandservicesisnotonly
significanttotheemergenceofillegalmarkets;actorsencountersimilardifficultiesinthelegal
field(forexample:organs,sexwork,andgeneticallymodifiedorganisms).Thedifficultyof
transcendingsocietaltaboo’sinestablishingneweconomicventureshasbeenshownin
empiricalstudiesofthelifeinsuranceindustryinnineteenth-centuryAmerica(Zelizer1979;
Zelizer[1978]1992),marketsforadoptingchildren(Zelizer[1985]1994),organsandbody
tissue(Healy2006;Scheper-Hughes/Wacquant2002;Steiner2003/5)andwhalewatching
(Lawrence/Phillips2004).Moralscrupleslinkedtoreligious,culturalorsocietalvalueshadto
bebridgedbeforestablemarketexchangescouldemerge.Regulatorydeterminationsasto
thelegalstatusofagoodorservicemaydifferacrossjurisdictionsandtimedistantiations,
offeringmoralwindfallstoactors.
Thecorollaryisalsotrue:Theeconomicexchangeforcertaingoods–suchaswildlifeproducts
–waslegalandlegitimateuntilregulatorsdeclaredotherwise.Ideally,theregulationofa
formerlylegalactivityorproductshouldinvolveaprotractedprocessofpublicconsultation
withaffectedconstituents,negotiation,drafting,andimplementation.Illegalizationperse
presentsasocio-politicalprocessratherthanastaticcondition,likelytoleadtosocialand
culturalbiasesthattendtofavourthepreferencesoftherule-makers(Heyman2013:304).It
isimportanttonotethesignificantroleofthestate,regulatoryauthoritiesandlaw
enforcementagenciesindetermininglegalrulesandnormsaboutthelegalityorillegalityof
economicexchange.Theinfluenceofprofessionalknowledge,scientificinsights,and
disciplinaryregimesislikewisenottobediscountedintheprocessoflegalizationor
illegalization(Heyman2013:306).Afurtherdimensionrelatestothesponsorsoflegalrules
andnorms,whomaybeeconomicelitesorcorporationsseekingtoprotecttheireconomic
interests.Moreover,thehistoryof“overrulethateithersuspendedlegalitiesordeployed
themtoauthorizepredationandcriminalizeopposition”hasledthepoorandmarginalized
strataofpostcolonialsocietyinsouthernAfricatocontinuetodistrustthestateandits
perceivedanti-poorpoliciesby(Comaroff/Comaroff2006:11).Thefollowingobservationis
insightfulinthisregard:
“Asprivatizationandenclosurecreatenewformsofproperty,theysimultaneously
definenewformsoftheft,frompiracyandpoachingtocloningandhacking.Such
51
practicesarenotalwaysdeemedillegitimateacrosssocialandnationaldivides.”
(Comaroff/Comaroff2006:11)
Ofsignificancetothisdissertationisthusanotheranalyticalissueconcerningtheillegalstatus
ofaneconomicexchange:Whathappenswhentheeconomicexchangeofagoodisdeclared
illegalataspecificpointintime,outlawingorbanninganexchangethatwaslegaland
legitimateupuntiltheprohibitiontakeseffect?Putdifferently:Howdoesthesociallegitimacy
orillegitimacyofabanaffecttheemergenceandfunctioningofanillegalmarket?Moreover,
prohibitiononlyappliestoonestageorsegmentoftheeconomicexchangeinsomeeconomic
exchanges.Achangedlegalstatusofagoodfurtherdownstreamorupstreammaybe
unknowntomarketactors(Beckert/Wehinger2013:10).Afurtherquestioniswhathappens
inscenarioswhereinternationalactors(suchasamulti-lateraltreatyorganization)imposea
banthatlackslegitimacyatthelocallevel.Thepoachingofendangeredwildlife,forexample,
isillegalinso-calledrangecountries,53whereastradehoversinagrayzonebetweenlegality
andillegality,andconsumptionissociallylegitimateinconsumercountries.Noteworthyisthe
partialbanonthetradeinrhinohorn;thesaleofliverhinosandtrophyhuntingofwhite
rhinosisallowedinafewjurisdictionswhileafulltradebanapplieselsewhere.Pre–
Convention54processedivoryistradedlegallyinmanyjurisdictionswhereasnocommercial
tradeofpost–ConventionrawivoryisallowedinCITESmemberstates.
Thenotionof‘contestedillegality’isintroducedinthisdissertationtocapturealegitimation
strategyemployedbyimportantactorstojustifytheirparticipationinillegalorgrayflowsof
rhinohorn.Suchactorsmightnotacceptthelawonthebooksforavarietyofreasons
includingtheperceivedunfairnessoftheban,divergentsocialorculturalnormsthatclash
withtheban,ortheymightnotacceptthelawforpolitico-historicalreasons.Contestationof
thelawonthebooksmaybelinkedtoissuesofagency.Whoaretherule-makers?Were
importantandaffectedconstituenciesconsultedbeforetheenactmentoftheban?Howisthe
banimplemented?Divergentviewsregardingthelegitimacyofaprohibition-basedsystemare
likelytoinfluencethefunctioningofillegalmarkets.Itwillbearguedthatthemechanismof
53
Rangecountiesrefertocountrieswherespecificpopulationsofwildlifeoccurinthe‘wild’.SouthAfrica,
Namibia,Kenya,SwazilandandZimbabwearekeyAfricanrhinorangestates.
54
CITEScameintoforcein1977.AnywildlifeproductsthatpredatedtheenactmentofCITEScanbetradedin
mostCITESmembersstatesprovidedthatprovenancecanbeshown.
52
contestedillegalityiscloselylinkedtothevaluationofthebannedgoodorservice.The
coordinationproblemofvaluationisunpackedinthenextsubsection;sufficetomentionhere
thatvaluationofrhinohornasasacralgoodorasamiraclecureislikelytooverrideconcerns
regardingthelegalstatusandprovenanceofrhinohorn.Theothercoordinationproblems
consideredinthisdissertation–competition,cooperation,andsecurity–arealsoinfluenced
bycontestedillegality.Theserelationshipswillbefurtherunpackedintherelevant
subsections.
Followingthetrajectoryoftheargument,actorsmaycontesttheillegalstatusofthegood–
rhinohorn–duetodifferentculturalmeanings,politicaljurisdictionswithconflictingornonexistentregulationsaboutitslegalstatus,spatial–temporalconsiderationsandothersocial
mechanisms.Thisdissertationwillshowthatimportantactorsrefusetoaccepttheillegalityof
therhinohornexchangebasedontheirvaluationofrhinosandrhinohorn.Insteadofbridging
moralscrupleslinkedtotheillegalityofthetradeinrhinohorn,theseactorsdefythebanand
legitimizetheirtransgressionsthroughtheirvaluationofrhinosandrhinohorn.The
legitimizingmechanismofcontestedillegalitythusfacilitatestheflowofrhinohornfromthe
sourcetothemarket.Chapter5ontheinternationalregulatorysystemhighlightshistorical,
conceptualandpoliticalissuesthatimpactthelegitimacyoftheban.Subsequentchapters
explainhowthetradebanisintertwinedwithlanduseandhuntingrightsoflocal
communitieslivinginorclosetoconservationareas.
1.3.4Resolvingcoordinationproblemsinillegalmarkets
Tostudytheoperationandstructureofillegalmarketssystematically,Beckertand
Wehinger(2013:12)proposetheuseofthetypologyofcoordinationproblems.Thepointof
departureliesintherecognitionthatformarketstooperate“uncertaintyinmarket
transactionsmustbereducedinseveraldimensions”(Beckert/Wehinger2013:12).
Uncertaintyinmarketsstemsfromthethreecoordinationproblemsconcerningvalue,
competition,andcooperation.Actorsinillegalmarketsarelikelytobeconfrontedwith
coordinationproblemssimilartothoseoflegalmarkets,subjecttoadditionalchallengesdue
totheillegalityofthemarketexchanges(Beckert/Wehinger2011:7).WhileBeckertand
53
Wehinger(ibid)arguethatmarketactorsrequire“stableworlds”(Fligsteincitedin:Beckert
2007:23)andcalculabilitytoreproducelegalandillegalmarkets,thisdissertationargues
againstthenotionofstabilityinillegalmarkets.Reuter(1983)introducedthenotionof
‘disorganizedcrime’,suggestingthesupplyofillegalcommoditiestakesplaceina
disorganizedmannerduetotheconstraintimposedbyillegalityandthelackoflarge-scale
criminalenterprisesinillegalmarkets(Paoli2002:52).Marketactorsmayseektoreduce
uncertaintyinillegalmarkets;however,theymightnotbeseeking‘stableworlds’asstability
andpredictabilityconstituteoperationalweaknesses,whichcouldbeexploitedbyregulators
(especiallylawenforcementagencies)whoseektodisruptillegalmarkets.Thecoordination
problemsofvalue,competitionandcooperationareunpackedinthefollowingsections.An
additionalcoordinationproblem–theproblemofsecurity–isintroduced.
a) Thecoordinationproblemofvalue
Theproblemofvaluerefersto“theassignmentofvaluetoacertaincategoryofgoods(for
instance,cars,wine,travel)andsecond,totheassignmentofdifferentvaluesto
heterogeneousproductswithinthesamemarket”(Beckert2011b:764).Duringtheprocessof
valuation,productsarerankedaccordingtofunctionalityorstatustheybestowuponthe
consumer.Whileactorsinlegalmarketsmayhaveaccesstomarketing,advertisingresources,
andproductreviews,thesuppliers’roleinpreferenceformationandtheconsumer’saccess
regardingproductqualitymaybelimitedinillegalmarkets(Beckert/Wehinger2013:12).
However,thereputationoftraders,‘wordofmouth’referralsandproductreviewsinonline
market–placeslikethenowdefunctSilkRoad55mayassistmarketactorsonbothendsofthe
supplychaininmakinginformedchoices.Thisdissertationwillshowthatconsumershave
developedinnovativestrategiestoensureprovenanceandqualitycontrolinillegalrhinohorn
markets.
55
SilkRoadgainednotorietyasanon–lineglobalmarket–placeforsellingmostlydrugsandrelated
paraphernalia.Operationalsince2011andeffectivelyshutdownin2014,userscouldbuydrugswiththe
Internet–basedcurrencyBitcoin.Crowdsourcingtechniqueswereusedtovetbestsellersandidentifyscammers.
Consumersavoidedstreet-basedtransactionswiththeassociatedrisksofviolenceandpossiblygetting“ripped
off”.Theyalsocoulddoqualitychecksandpricecomparisons(SilkRoadDrugs2014).Similarsiteshavesprung
upsincethemuch-publicizedarrestoftheallegedmastermindofSilkRoadinFebruary2014.
54
Rhinohornfallsintothecategoryofillegalwildlifeproducts.Ithasbothfunctionaland
investmentvalueinthatitisusedintraditionalmedicines,andstatusisattributedtothose
abletoaffordit.Interestingly,AsianrhinohornisvaluedhigherthanthehornofAfrican
species,andevenfakerhinohornisattributedwithvalue.Cognitiveframesplayanimportant
roleintheprocessofvaluationastheyenablethementalorganizationofthesocial
environment.Socialnormsandrulesformpartofsociallyinscribedmeaningstructures
operatinginamarketfieldthroughwhichthevariousactorsassesssituationsanddefinetheir
responses(Beckert2010:9).Thisdissertationexaminessocial,culturalandnormativebeliefs
astheyrelatetotherelationshipbetweenhumansandnature.Withitsprehistoricfeatures
reminiscentofmammothsandothercreatureslonggone,therhinohasbeencomparedto
mysticalimagessuchastheunicorn–(forexample:Unicornsarereal2009)andpopular
memesonsocialmediaplatformsoftherhinoasa“unicornwithcurves”.Actorsalongthe
supplychainassigndifferentphysical(physicalperformanceofagood)andsymbolicvalues
(consistsofimaginativevaluethatactorsascribetoanobjectandpositionalvalueascribedto
anobject,positioningtheownerinthesocialspace)torhinohorn(Beckert2011a).Poachers,
wildlifeprofessionals,conservators,environmentalactivistsandconsumersattachdifferent
cognitivemeaningstotherhinoasawildbeastanditsproduct,therhinohorn.Itwillbe
arguedthatthesecognitiveframesandassociatedmeaningsaresteepedinculturalframes
aboutthehuman–naturenexus.Canthehighpriceofrhinohornbeexplainedinreferenceto
culturalframes?Istheprocessofvaluationaccompaniedbyprocessofsacralization56ofrhino
horn?Inotherwords,haveculturalframesledtothevaluationofrhinohornasasacredor
magicalgood?Zelizerdistinguishesbetween“profane”,“magical”and“sacred”moneyinher
researchonthelifeinsuranceindustryin19thcenturyAmerica(Zelizer[1978]1992:291-
293).InborrowingfromZelizer,profanevaluationreferstothevaluationofgoodsasworldly,
whilesacredvaluationreferstotranscendentalcommunitynorms.Ofimportanceisthusa
cleardelineationofthedifferentfactorsthatbearonthevaluationofrhinohorn,the
instrumentalityofrhinohorn(whatisitusedfor)andhowdifferentactorsvaluerhinohornat
56
Sacralizationreferstoaprocessduringwhich“valueshapes[the]price,investingitwithsocial,religiousor
sentimentalmeaning”(Zelizer[1985]1994:21).
55
differentstagesofthevaluechain.Moreover,Ishallinvestigatewhetherrhinohornhas
becomeacommodityofconspicuousconsumption.57
Afurtherconsiderationpertainstothenotionofcontestedillegality.Aspertheearlier
section,itwillbearguedthatthevaluationofrhinohorniscloselylinkedtothelegitimization
deviceofcontestedillegality.Thevaluationofrhinohorntrumpsitsillegalstatusacross
importantactorgroups,facilitatingitsflowfromsourcetomarket.
b) Thecoordinationproblemofcompetition
Thesecondcoordinationproblemrelatestotheissueofcompetition.Itisintheinterestof
producersandsupplierstosetupmarketstructuresthatprovideprotectionagainst
competitivepricingastoascertainviableprofitmargins.Producers,intermediariesandthe
statecompeteforpositionsintheformaleconomy,whichmayresultincartelization,
monopolization,productdifferentiation,innovation,first–moveradvantages,barrierstoentry
andlegalregulationsthatdeterminetherulesofengagement(Beckert/Wehinger2013:14).
Whilethestateprovidessomegroundrulesintheformaleconomy,illegalmarketactors
regulatecompetitiontovaryingdegreesthemselves.
Scholarshavelinkedtheself-regulationofcompetitioninillegalmarketstotheuseorthreat
ofviolentmeansofpersuasionandcorruption(corruptionisdiscussedinmoredetailbelow).
Theearlierdiscussionofthedifferentmodelsoforganizedcrimemadereferencetotheuseor
threatofviolencebysomecriminalentitiesinabidtoenforcecontractualobligationsinillegal
markets.Reuter(2009:275)arguesthatviolencemaybeafeatureofsomeillegalmarkets
duetothefollowingcharacteristicstypicalofillegaleconomicexchanges:
“Themarketsforillegalgoodsandservicesoperatewithouttheusualprotections
againstfraudandviolenceofferedbythecourtsystem.Thestateinsteadof
attemptingtofacilitatetransactions,aimstodisruptthem.Contractscannotbe
enforcedthroughwrittendocumentsandthelegalsystem;agreementsaremade
57
Inhisthesisonthe“leisureclass”,Veblen(1899)arguedthatwealthyindividualsoftenconsumehighly
conspicuousgoodsandservicesinordertoshowcasetheirwealth,therebyachievinggreatersocialstatus.
56
hurriedly,sometimesinambiguouscode,andorally.Territoriescannotbeallocated
throughbiddingfordesirablelocations,sincethereisnoenforceableownershipof
propertyforthesepurposes.”
Whilesomeofthementionedcharacteristicsdealwithcontractenforcement,thepower
vacuumandopportunitiesforviolenceduetheabsenceofan“independent”arbitrator58in
illegalmarkets,others(suchasterritorialdisputes)dealimplicitlywithmattersof
competition.Drugmarketsareoftenregardedassteepedinviolence,furtherexacerbatedby
the“WaronDrugs”rhetoricandviolentmeasuresusedtodisruptsuchmarkets.Scholarly
research(Reuter2009;Reuter/Haaga1989)hashowevershownthatdrugmarketsare
surprisinglypeaceful.Severalsourcesmaygenerateviolenceinspecificdrugmarkets,suchas
intra-organizationalissues(successionplanningordisciplinaryaction),inter-organizational
issues(territorialortransactional)andconflictbetweenillegaldrugmarketactorsandthe
stateoritsrepresentatives(Reuter2009:275).ReuterandPollack(2012)showthatthetravel
distancesofsellersandbuyershaveimplicationsforviolenceondrugmarkets.Import
marketsconsistingoflocalbuyersandforeignsellersdisplayedthehighestlevelsofviolence,
suggestingthatsocialtiesbetweenbuyersandsellersmayreducethereadinesstouse
violence.Gambetta(1996:1-2)referstotheSicilianmafia’stradeinprotectionservices.To
him,themafia’sprovisionofprotectionentailsaninsurancepolicyduringeconomic
exchanges,whichfunctionsas“apoorandcostlysubstituteoftrust”(Gambetta1996:2).
AccordingtoPaoli(2002:64-65),illegalentrepreneurswillresorttofraudandviolencetoget
whatevertheycanand“resorttopeacefuldickeringonlywheretheyareconfrontedwitha
powerequaltotheirownorwheretheyregarditasshrewdtodosoforthesakeoffuture
exchangeopportunities”.Thescholarsrelyontheartificialdivisionof‘underworld’and
‘upperworld’typicaloftheorganizedcrimediscourse,allowinglimitedscopeforthenefarious
activitiesoflegalactors.Reuter(1983:187),ontheotherhand,postulatesthatthe“magicof
themarketplace”resolvesthedistributionofillegalgoodsandservicesinillegalmarkets,with
the“visiblehand”ofviolenceandcorruptionoftengettingtrouncedbymarketeconomics.
Afirstglanceattheillegalrhinohornmarketappearstosuggestthatcriminalactorsexudea
propensityforviolentmeansofexecution,whichmayalsoincludefendingoffpotential
58
Itisacknowledgedthatregulatorsmaytweakregulationstosuittheinterestsofthestateanditsnon-state
partners.
57
competitors.Theactofharvestingrhinohornillegally59–thepoachingofaliverhino–isa
violentactperse,involvingthewilfulkillingofawildanimal.Thequestionarisinghereis
whetherviolenceisreproducedalongtheflow.Howdopoachers,kingpins,wildlife
professionalsandothersdealwithcompetition?Doesrhinopoachingleadtofurtheractsor
threatsofviolencebetweenillegalmarketactors?Afurtherconsiderationpertainstothe
dwindlingnumbersofrhinos.Ifcompetitionisfoundtobe“peaceful”(asperWeber’s
definitionofcompetition)inthecurrentclimate,whatistheoutlookasrhinonumbersgrow
less?Thedecreasingrhinonumbersmaynotonlyleadtoconflictatthesource(withpoachers
possiblyfightingoneanotheroverthelastrhinos)butalsocompetitivepricingstructuresin
consumermarkets.
Marketactorsmayalsorelyoncorruptionorcollusionwithrepresentativesofthestateto
‘takeout’thecompetition.Inthisinstance,criminalactorsmayworkinconcertwithcorrupt
stateagenciesorindividualagentsofthestate.Thestate“isnolongerabletoimplementlaw
becausestateofficials(theagents)makelawenforcementitselfatradablecommodity”
(Beckert/Wehinger2013:15).Thepracticeofcorruptioninillegalmarketsisnotrelegatedto
unlawfulrelationshipsbetweencriminalactorsandagentsofthestateonly.Itcanalsoinvolve
actorsfromtheformaleconomy,suchasbusinesspeople,representativesofmultinational
corporationsandfromthemilitary–industrialcomplex.Corruptrelationshipsmayreduce
uncertaintyinillegalmarketsbyloweringtheprospectsofeffectivelawenforcementand
criminalprosecution(Dewey2012).Contestedillegalityinthisinstancemayfacilitatethe
participationofagentsofthestateinillegalmarkets.Ifprohibitionweretolacklegitimacyand
henceacceptanceamongstsuchactors,thentheremightbelessmoralscruplestoparticipate
inillegalmarkettransactions.Corruptionofstateagentsandcollusionwithindustry
professionalsplaysasignificantrolealongtherhinohornsupplychain.Suchstrategiesare
employedatseveralnodesfromthepointoforiginthroughtothefinaldestinationofthe
rhinohorn.Aswillbeshowninlaterchapters,targetedorconditionallawenforcementplays
ansignificantrolein‘takingoutthecompetition’.
59
Whilecriminalactorscanemploynon-lethalmeansofhornremoval(suchasthedartingofrhinos),the
harvestingofhornusuallyinvolvesthekillingoftherhino.
58
Inlookingatthecareeradvancementofacelebrateddrugsmuggler‘MrNice’,Morselli(2001:
228)foundthatBurt’sstructuralholeargument60offeredanuancedalternativetoframing
competitionofcriminalentrepreneurs:
“Structuringone’spersonalworkingnetworktoincludetradememberswhoarenot
directlyconnectedtoeachotherbutwhomayhaveinterestsindealingwithone
anotherrepresentsacooperativewayofbeingcompetitive.Thecombinationof
reputation,know-how,consistentandquickaccesstoprivilegedinformationsources,
andnon-redundantpersonalnetworkinggivesaplayerthecompetitiveedgeneeded
forfurtheradvancement.”
Themaintenanceofsocialtiesthatstretchbeyondone’ssocialgroup(heterogeneoussocial
networks),soMorselliargues,maythusprovideacompetitiveadvantagetocriminalplayers.
Theroleoftheintermediaryandtheiraccesstoprivilegedinformationisofinteresthere.
Gambetta(1996)showstheimportanceofintermediariesinhisanalysisoftheSicilianmafia.
Whilemafiosisellguarantees,patrons(intermediaries)sellinformation.Inthiscontext,the
roleoftheintermediaryisasfollows(Gambetta1996:18):
“Theyprovideintroductions,recommendations,adviceaboutcompetitionforpublic
contracts,thenamesofkeypeopletoapproach;theybacknewlegislationor
applicationforjobsandbenefits;theytranslateclientdemandsintoappropriate
language,simplifyrules,andidentifymeansofavoidingsanctionsandobtaining
favours.”
Itwillbearguedthatintermediariesplayafacilitatingrolebetweensourceandmarket.61They
arenotonlyimportanttransmittersofinformation,buttheyareoftenpeopleofsocialranking
thatinspiretrustworthinesstoactorsfurtherdownstreamandupstreamthesupplychain.
60
AccordingtoBurt(1992:17-18)negotiatingearlyaccess,timingandreferralstoinformationmayprovidea
competitiveadvantagetosavvyactors.Suchactorscultivatetheirbusinesscontactsprudentlyinordertoseize
“structuralholes”.Burtdifferentiatesbetweenredundantandnon-redundantcontacts.Thenumberofnonredundantcontactsiscrucialasthesemightleadtoprivilegedinformation.Redundantcontactsfailtoprovide
thecompetitiveedgeastheyleadtothesamepeopleandhencethesamepoolofinformationavailableto
others.“Structuralholes”referto“theseparationbetweennon-redundantcontacts”(Burt1992:18).By
occupyingastructuralhole,actorsareinapositiontobrokeradealwithpreviouslyunconnectedplayers.
61
Intermediariesaresignificanttoresolvingtheothercoordinationproblemstooduetotheircentralrolein
supplychains.Theyprovidealinkagebetweenactorsfurtherupstreamanddownstreamthesupplychainand
therebyplayanactiveroleinvaluationandcooperation,aswellassecurityofillegalmarketstructures.
59
Intermediariesmaywellhaveseizedstructuralholesinnegotiatingtheirroleinillegaland
grayflows,andaswillbearguedlater,inlegalflows.Assuggestedintheliterature,itwould
appearaxiomaticthatactorsfromthelegalsectorcommandacompetitiveadvantagein
negotiatingtheflowofillegalgoodswherealegalparallelmarketexists.Suchactorswouldbe
apprisedofregulatoryloopholesandthetricksofthetrade.Theyalsohaveintimate
knowledgeofsupplyanddistributiondynamicsalonglegalgoodsflowsandtheavailablepool
oftradepartners.Actorswithheterogeneoussocialnetworks,experienceinlegalflowsand
adaptability(theabilitytoreactswiftlytonewimpulses)aresignificantarbitratorsand
facilitatorsofillegalflowswithacoordinatingrolethatmayaffectcooperation,competition,
valuation,andsecurity.
Afurtherconsiderationrelatestolimitedcompetitionwhenitcomestodeterminingor
acceptingthepricingofgoodsonillegalmarkets.Itbecomesincreasinglydifficultto
determine“theprice/qualitynexus”asgoodsmovealongthevaluechainfromproducerto
consumers.Suppliersandcustomershaveimperfectinformationaboutbothqualityand
pricesofgoods,which“distortscompetition”(Beckert/Wehinger2013:16).Whilethe
demandforrhinohornhasancientculturalroots,onecannotautomaticallyassumethatthe
marketispurelydemand-driven.Duetotheriskassociatedwiththeprocurementand
transportationofrhinohorn,hornproducersandintermediariesmaybeabletoleveragethe
priceofthehorn.Afurthertrainofthoughtpertainstothehighincidenceoffakesenteringat
variousstagesofthesupplychain.Doillegalmarketactorsconsiderfakerhinohornproducers
andtradersascompetition?Whatimpacthasthefakerhinohornmarketondemandand
qualitycontrol?
c)Thecoordinationproblemofcooperation
Actorsalsohavetofacethecoordinationproblemofcooperation.Thepossibilityofabreach
ofcontractornon–performanceconstitutesarisktoanyeconomicexchange.Inillegal
markets,theserisksarisefrom“asymmetricdistributionofinformationregardingtheprice,
productqualityandthepossibleopportunismofexchangepartnersinlightofincompleteor
non–enforceablecontracts”(Beckert/Wehinger2013:17).
60
PortesandHalleridentifythe“paradoxofembeddedness”intheiranalysisofinformal
economies.Intheabsenceofstateregulationininformaleconomies,thereareopportunities
“forviolationsofnormativeexpectationsandwidespreadfraud”(Portes/Haller2005:406).
Theparadoxliesinthecontentionthatthemoretheinformaleconomyapproachestheideal
ofanunfetteredmarketexchange,“themoreitisdependentonsocialtiesforitseffective
functioning”(Portes/Haller2005:407).Thesignificanceofsocialembeddednessisparticularly
clearintransactions“wheretheonlyrecourseagainstmalfeasanceismutualtrustbyvirtueof
commonmembershipinsomeoverarchingsocialstructure”.Membershipofthesamesocial
networkorsharedsocial/culturalidentitiescombinedwiththecertaintythatwrongdoerswill
bepenalizedorexcludedfromfuturetransactionsbolstersandsustainstrust(Portes2010:
136-137).Gambetta’sdefinitionoftrustisusefulinthisinstance.Gambetta(1988a:217)
definestrustas“aparticularlevelofthesubjectiveprobabilitywithwhichanagentassesses
thatanotheragentorgroupofagentswillperformaparticularaction,bothbeforehecan
monitorsuchaction(orindependentlyofhiscapacityevertobeabletomonitorit)andina
contextinwhichitaffectshisownaction.”
PortesandHalleralludetosignificantdifferencesbetweeninformalandillegalbusiness
practices.62Illegalityrobsactorsoflegalprotectionofpropertyrightsusuallyprovidedbythe
stateforlegalmarkettransactionsandlimitsthebusinessstrategiesandorganizationalforms
availabletoactors(Beckert/Wehinger2011:1).Thestatedoesnotenforcecontractsinillegal
markets;actorsthushavetorelyondifferentenforcementstrategies,suchastheuseor
threatofviolence(Portes/Haller2005).Despitetheabsenceofthestate,PortesandHaller
arguethatactorsinlegalandillegalmarketssharesimilarsystemsofenforcementand
redress.Theenforcementofcontractsorremovalofcompetitorscanbeoutsourcedto
protectionbrackets(Beckert/Wehinger2013:15).IntheAfricancontext,thetradeingems,
gold,ivoryandotherhigh–valueexportproductsisoftenhighlyorganized.Majorexporters
needtobeassociatesormembersoforganizationsthatareeither“quasi–political”or“quasi–
62
BeckertandWehinger(2013:11)arguethattherearedifferentresearchfociinstudiesofinformalandillegal
markets.Conceptually,studiesontheinformaleconomyfocusonhowpoorpeopleekeoutalivingbeyondstate
regulation;meanwhile,researchintoillegalmarketslooksintomarketstructuresandcoordinationproblems
beyondtherealmoflawfulness.
61
criminal”innatureastheexploitationofsuchresourcesrequires“theexerciseorthreatof
physicalforce”(Ellis/MacGaffey1996:36).63
However,notallactorsinillegalmarketsarepronetouseviolencetoenforcecontracts.
Violentbehaviourorthethreatofviolenceislikelytoobtainattentionfromunwanted
spectators,suchaslawenforcementagenciesorthemedia.Unlesstheseactorsareactively
seekingoutattentiontopropeltheirbusinessinterestsortogainareputationfora
propensityforviolence,theyarelikelytoforegounwantedattention.Therelianceupon
relationshipsbasedontrustoreconomicexchangessecuredthroughcorrupttransactions
constitutesanalternativestrategytoenforcecontracts,andmayalsocircumventdetection
fromlawenforcement(seetheprevioussubsection).Moreover,thelegitimizationdeviceof
contestedillegalitymayswayactorstocooperateinillegalmarkets.
Granovetter(1985:481-482)introducesthenotionof“honouramongstthieves”inacase
studyofembezzlementinthebusinesscommunity.Hearguesthatmalfeasancenotbe
possiblewithoutpriorexistingrelationshipsoftrust.Gambetta(1988a)showshoweverthat
trustmaygrowasaresultofcooperationratherthanasapreconditionofcooperation
(comparewiththesectiononsecurity).BeckertandWehinger(2013)arguethatwhileformal
institutions,socialnetworks,andcognitiveframesarenecessaryforthestabilizationof
marketexchangesintheformalsector,illegalmarketsarelikelytorelymoreheavilyon
personalnetworksandtrusttosolvecoordinationproblems.Personalizednetworksbasedon
therightcombinationofarm’slengthandembeddedties(comparewiththenotionof
‘integratednetworks’inUzzi1997)andreputationbasedonsocialkinshiparelikelytofeature
prominently.Whilesomeactorsuseviolenceorthethreatofviolencetoenforcecontractsin
illegalmarkets,othersemploycorruptiontosecureillegalmarkettransactions.The
trustworthinessofnewbusinesspartnersmightalsogettested(Gambetta2009).
Adiverseassortmentofactorswithpotentiallydeepcleavages–stretchingfromdifferent
languages,nationalities,culturalbackgrounds,socialstratatoethnicity–isinvolvedinillegal
andgrayflowsofrhinohorn.Beyondbridgingsocial,culturalandotherdifferenceslocally,
63
LiberianwarlordCharlesTaylor,formerUNITArebelcommanderJonasSavimbiandbrokersonbehalfofthe
apartheidregimeinSouthAfrica,Mugabe’sregimeinZimbabweandRENAMOnegotiatedimport–exportdeals,
whichwereprotectedbythemightofthesword.
62
theseactorsalsohavetoestablishandmaintainrelationshipswithoverseastradingpartners
insuboptimalconditions.Howisthisachieved?Moreover,whatistheroleofintermediaries
(seetheprevioussection)?Thisdiversecollectionofactors,theirpersonalizednetworks,and
mechanismsemployedtoevadedetectionfromlawenforcementshouldgleaninteresting
insightsonhowillegalmarketsarestructuredandoperateunderprecariousconditions.
(d) Thecoordinationproblemofsecurity
Theproduction,distributionandconsumptionofgoodsandservicestradedinillegalmarkets
leadtoanothercoordinationproblem,theproblemofsecurity.Securityinthisinstance
constitutesamulti-dimensionalproblemwithimplicationsforthepersonalsecurityofmarket
actors,securityofthesupplychainandtheillegalgoodsorservicestradedinillegalmarkets
andthepotentialadditionofasecuritypremiumaddedtothecostofillegalgoods.Security
measuresandprotection(seesubsectiononcompetition)canbeprocuredlocallybuthowdo
actorsensurethesecurityofthesupplychain,thesafetransferofillegalgoodsfromsourceto
marketandpaymentforthegoodsandtransfercosts?
Thecoordinationproblemofsecurityproposedhereisqualitativelydifferentfromthe
problemofcooperation.Infact,illegalmarketactorshavetostrikeacarefulbalancebetween
cooperationontheonehand,andsecurityontheother.Whilecooperationmayentail
partnershipsandresourcesharing,securitymaycurtailcooperativeeffortsinfavourof
secrecyandconcealment(Morselli2008:63).KenHawkeyeGross(1992:coverpage)pointsto
thedilemmathatactorsfacebysurmising,“…mistakescancostnotjustdollarsandmarket
share,butyearsofone’slife”.CentraltowhatMorsellietal.(2007:145)describeasthe
“efficiency-securitytradeoff”iswhethercriminalnetworkactorscanrelyexclusivelyon
trustingrelationshipsorwhethertheyhavetoengageinuncertainandpotentiallyrisky
relationships.Reducingriskandtherebyincreasingsecurityleadstoasacrificeintermsof
timeandefficiency,as“eachoperationandthetransmissionofinformationtakelongerto
63
processacrossthenetwork”(ibid).Inreferencetotransactioncosttheory,64Basu(2014:4)
proposesthatduetoregulatoryattemptstodisruptillicittradechains,actorshavetofactorin
“directorindirectcostsofexchange(concealment,corruption,evasion),aswellasbe
preparedtowriteoffacertainpercentageoftheirprofitsduetocircumstancesinvolving
contrabandshipmentsbeingseizedbycustomsorpolice”.Thequestionarisinghereis
whetherthesuggestedsecuritypremiumleadstoanescalationoftheoverallpriceofan
illegalgoodorwhetheractorscanconceiveofinnovativemechanismsthatincreaseboth
efficiencyandsecurityoftheillegalsupplychain.Theillegalandtransnationalstatusofgoods
mayperhapsleadtocostsavingselsewhere,suchastaxandtariffsavoidanceorastructural
adaptationofthesupplychain(e.g.fewersegmentsorshortermoredirectroutes).Afurther
considerationrelatestowhetherallmarketactorsareequallyaffectedbysecurity
considerationsandprecautions.Arecertainflowsorsegmentsofthesupplychainmoreprone
todangerthanothers?Howdosecurityconsiderationsaffecttheflowofgoods?
Theissueofincompleteinformationisalsoofimportancehere.Thenotionofbounded
rationality65isonlypartiallyusefulinassessinghowillegalmarketactorsmightdealwith
assessingsecurityrisksinlightofincompleteinformationavailabletothem,andwhetherthey
encounteranincompleteinformation/securitydilemma.Infollowingthetrajectoryofthe
boundedrationalityargument,theremaybeamismatchbetweenthedecision-making
environment(themarketexchangeisdeemedillegal)andthedecisionmaker’schoice(Jones,
B.D.1999:298).Theimplicitgoal-orientedrationalchoiceapproach(formoredetailssee:
Beckert2003;Dewey2014b)provideslimitedinsightsastohowillegalmarketactors
undertakesecurityassessments,howculturalframesandsocialembeddednessmayinfluence
choices.Thesocialembeddednessofillegalmarketsactors,forexample,mayprovide
operationalinformationabouttheirimmediateenvironmentandtheirsocialnetwork.Howis
64
Transactioncostsrelatetothecostsofparticipatinginamarket.Williamson(1989)arguedthatfrequencyof
theexchange,specificity,uncertainty,limitedrationalityandopportunisticbehaviouraredeterminantsofsuch
costs.
65
Accordingtothenotionofboundedrationality(Simon1972),thepoolofavailableinformation,theactor’s
cognitivelimitationsandtimeavailabletotakeadecisionmightexplainan‘irrational’decisionthatdoesnot
optimizeutility(profit).
64
informationaboutactorsandtransactionsupstreamanddownstreamattained?Dothe
goalpostschangeastheproducttravelswiththeflow?Howdoactorsensurepayments?
Insociologicalresearchoncross-bordertradeinMedievalEurope,Quack(2009)foundthat
theprovisionofsecuritywasaprerequisiteforsuchtradetoemerge.Merchantsjoinedin
tradingcommunities.Theseself–regulatoryassociativeorderscontrolledexclusivetrading
rightsintheirhomebaseandprovidedprotection,informationsharingandsocialbonding.
Theemergenceofaninterregionalfinancialcircuit,maritimeinsuranceandearlyformsof
transferpricing,overdraftfacilitiesandcreditnotesfurthereasedtransnationaltrade.Crossborderlawandregulatoryenforcementwereequallyimportant,includingtheextrajurisdictionalexpansionofdomesticlaw,theemergenceofspecificlocallawsintradehubs
andthesigningofinter-cityagreementsallowingformutualjurisdictioninconflictresolution
(Quack2009:135–136).Africanmigranttradingcommunitieshadcrossedhugeregionsof
Africaonhorseback,donkeyorcamelbeforepoliticalborderlinesdrawnbycolonialrulers
dividedtribes,communitiesandclans.Allianceswereforgedbetweenlocalentrepreneursand
foreignmerchantsduringcolonialtimeswiththeexplicitobjectiveofsupplyingoverseas
marketswithexoticgoodssuchastea,spicesandivory.Theabilitytoengageinillicitcrossbordertradecontinuestohingeonthesehistoricalconnectionsandsocialtiestoholdersof
politicalofficeandthequalityofsuchpoliticalcontacts(Ellis/MacGaffey1996:31).Ellisargues
thattransnationaltradeoccupiesa“crucialstrategicposition”inAfricaduetoascarcityof
foreignexchangetobuymanufacturedgoods,which“canplayavitalroleintheconstruction
ofapoliticalpower-base”(ibid).TheaccesstohardcurrencysuchasUSDollarsiscrucialto
enterandsustainmarketposition:“…asuccessfulexporterfromAfricarequiresnotonlythe
usualrangeofcommercialskillsandcapital,butalsopolitical,andoftenalsophysical,
protection(Ellis/MacGaffey1996:34).”SimilartothetradeassociationsinMedievalEurope,
EllisalsoidentifiedtheformationoftradeassociationsofAfricanswithfellowAfricanslivingin
thediaspora.Theadvantagesaremanifoldsuchasrestrictingtheprofitstomembersofa
distinctsocialgroup(usuallykin),verticalintegrationofthetrade(e.g.Nigeriansmarketing
drugsinEuropeanorUScitiesonbehalfofNigeriandrugtraffickingnetworks)andsecure
accesstosourceandmarket(Ellis/MacGaffey1996:37).
65
Ofimportancetothisdissertationarethemechanismsemployedbyvariousactorsalongthe
supplychaintoensuretheirsecurityandthatoftheiragents,thesecurityofthesupplychain,
andthatoftheillegalgoods.Aretheabove-mentionedtradeassociationsofsignificancein
illegalflowsofrhinohorn?Securityrisksmayarisefromenvironmental,regulatory,intra-or
inter-organizationalfactors,furtherexacerbatedbythefactthatmarketexchangesareboth
illegalandtransnational.Howdoestheend-userofanillegalgoodensurethatitissafefor
consumption?Howdoesthebuyerensurethatanotheractorupstreamisnotcheatingher?
Doillegalmarketactorsoutsourcesecurity?Whatmechanismsareemployedtoensure
security?Thelegitimizationdeviceofcontestedillegalitymaysecuretheflowofrhinohornin
someinstances.Aswillbeshownlater,diplomatsandagentsofthestatehavesmuggled
rhinohornfromthesourcetothemarket.Itwouldappearaxiomaticthatsecurityconcerns
becomesecondaryifanillegalgoodistraffickedinsideadiplomaticpouch.Thequestion
arisinghereiswhetherdiplomatsarerecruitedbyillegalmarketactors,whetherdiplomats
areinstigators,orperhaps,opportunisticactors.
1.4Structureofthedissertation
Theargumentofthedissertationisthattheconsecutiveconservationregimesandprotection
economieshaveledtoahistoricallock-inthathasallowedtheillegalmarketinrhinohornto
flourish.Scatteredalongtheinterfacebetweenlegalityandillegality,importantactorsdonot
acceptthetradeban.Theyusecontestedillegalityasalegitimizingdevicetojustifygrayor
illegaleconomicactivities.
ThedissertationcontinueswithChapter2,whichprovidesbackgroundandjustificationfor
thechosenresearchapproach,selectionofresearchsites,methodsofdatacollectionand
analysis.Manyethicalissuesaroseduringinceptionandinthecourseoftheresearchproject.
Thesecondpartofthechapterlooksatissuesofanonymityandconfidentiality,informed
consent,powerdifferentialsbetweentheresearcherandrespondents,reciprocityand
securityconcerns.
66
Chapter3contributestoanuancedunderstandingofthevaluationofrhinohornasasacred
goodforwhichconsumersarewillingtopayahighprice.Thequestionofdemandandthe
associatedcoordinationproblemofvaluationarevitaltounderstandingwhyflowsofrhino
hornaresodifficulttodisrupt.Thischapterdealswiththedemandforrhinohornbytracing
thehistoricalrootsofitsvaluationasasacredgoodwithstatus-elevatingqualities.It
continueswithashortoverviewofcurrentuses,consumerprofilesandproduct
differentiation.
Chapter4pointstothepathdependencyofconservationregulators.Wildlifeprotectionwas
closelylinkedtocolonialdispossession,subjugation,exploitationandlossofhuntingrightsof
thelocalandindigenouscommunitiesduringthecolonialperiod.Problematicconservation
approachesandparadigmshaveledtoahistoricallock-in,whereromanticandutopian
notionsof‘Africa’sWildEden’continuetounderminethesupportandbuy-infromlocal
communitiesinwildlifeconservation.Thechapteralsoshowshowlegalrhinohornsupplies
wereestablishedthroughtheeconomicvaluationofrhinosonprivateland.
Chapter5explorestheinternationalpoliticalprotectionregimethatledtotheillegalizationof
thetradeinrhinohorn.Stateactorsconceivedofthemulti-lateralenvironmentaltreatymore
thanfortyyearsago.Thetradebanitselfisambiguousasitonlyconcernsinternationaltrade
ofrhinohorn,leavingspaceforillegalmarketactorstomanoeuvreatthedomesticlevel.
Whilemostcountrieshaveillegalizedrhinohorntrade,hornconsumptioncontinuestohover
inagrayzone.ThechaptershinesalightonwhyCITESislosingcredibilityamongststate
actorsandimportantactorsintheGlobalSouthandwhydiffusionoftradebansmayruninto
obstaclesinthemoderncontext.
Chapter6revolvesaroundgrayandsub-legalflowsofrhinohorn.Theseflowsinvolvewildlife
professionalswithintimateknowledgeofrhinohorn,theinstitutionalandlegislative
frameworkgoverningtheinternationaltradeofrhinohorn.Theseactorsbelongtoinfluential
andtransnationalsocialnetworkswithlinkstopoliticalandeconomicelitesinsupply,transit
andconsumercountries.Akeyfeatureoftheseflowsistheexploitationoflegaland
regulatoryloopholeswithinthesystem,asactorsrideontheedgeoflegality.
67
ThedissertationcontinueswithChapter7,whichdealswithillegalflowsofrhinohorns.Itis
arguedthatrhinopoachingisnotonlyacrimedrivenbygreedandimpoverishmentbutalso
motivatedbyenvironmentalandsocialjusticeprinciples.Thischapterdemonstratesthe
historicallockinlinkedtoconservationparadigms,whichrendersdisruptionoftheseflowsa
difficultifnotimpossibleundertaking.Theincreasingmilitarizationofanti-poaching
operationsiscontributingtofurtheralienationoflocalcommunities,whichunderdifferent
circumstances,couldactasthefirstlineofdefenceagainstrhinopoaching.Actorsinthisflow
havemasteredthecoordinationproblemsofcompetition,cooperationandsecurity.
Thefinalchapteranalysesfakeand‘Ersatz’rhinohorn.Thechapterbeginswiththe
differentiationofdifferenttypesoffakerhinohornbeforelookingatactorsinvolvedinthe
productionanddistributionofsuchhorns.Theresearchidentifiedtheroleoftherhinohorn
assessor,whofulfilsthefunctionofqualitycontrolandriskmitigation.Thechapterillustrates
howactorsbridgeseveralcoordinationproblems,namelythecoordinationproblemsofvalue,
cooperationandsecurity.Inlightofthehighpriceofrhinohorn,itisnotsurprisingthat
criminalentrepreneursaswellasactorsfromthelegalsector,haveseizedthisthriving
businessopportunity.
Thedissertationconcludeswithanassessmentofwhytransnationalflowsofrhinohornshave
beensodifficulttodisrupt.
68
Chapter2:Researchingillegalmarkets
“Theillegalityofthedrugindustryprecludestheuseofmanycommonresearch
sourcesandtechniquesandimposesstrongconstraintsontheinterpretationof
availableinformation.Thecomplexityofthesubjectmatterandthedatalimitations
makeitimpossibletodrawacompleteandaccuratepictureoftheindustry.
Researchingillegaldrugsislikepaintingimpressionisticratherthanrealisticpictures.
Thepainterhopesthatthepictureprovidesanapproximateandslightlydistorted
visionofreality,highlightingthemainaspects;heorshedoesnotpretendtopaintan
exactreplica.”(Thoumi2003:2)
2.1Introduction
FranciscoThoumi’sopeningquotationtothischaptersuccinctlycapturesthedifficultyof
researchingillegalmarkets.Researchersfacemultiplechallengesrangingfromaccessto
informantstoverificationofdata.Asshowninthepreviouschapter,limitedempirical
researchexistsonillegalrhinomarkets.Withtheexceptionofawell-researchedjournalistic
exposé(see:Rademeyer2012),streamsofscholarlyandpolicyliteraturestakea‘top-down
approach’.Whilecollectingdata,researchersthusengagealmostexclusivelywithrule-makers
includingconservators,governmentregulatorsandothereconomicandpoliticalelites.Asa
resultofthis,thereareonlyahandfulofstudiesthatdealwiththeentiremarketexchange,
from“production”(poaching,huntingortheft)ofrhinohornandtransnational“product”
exchangethroughtounderstandingtheconsumermarkets(Ayling2013;Milliken/Shaw2012).
ItisfromthispointofdeparturethatIchosetostudytheillegalrhinohornmarketinits
entirety,takingabottom-upandsideways66approachtounderstandingeconomic,political
andsocialstructures,powerconstellations,rule-makingandculturalframing.Thefollowing
chapterhonesinonthedifficultiesassociatedwithstudyingillegalmarketsingeneral,andthe
illegalmarketinrhinohorninspecific.Mymethodologicalchoicesareexplainedandhow
impasseswerebridged.Thefinalsectiondelvesintoethicalconcerns.67
66
Dubow(1995:8)arguesthatthenotionofbottom-uportop-downideasoversimplifiythetransmission
process.Atanygivenpointintimetherearemanyfashionablethoughts;whether“theygetpickedup”and
popularizedbythought-leadersislinkedtotheextent“thattheymayresonatewithwidersocialconcerns”.
67
Asthischapterdealswithpersonalaswellasscholarlychoices,Ichosetowriteinthefirstperson.Inlater
chapters,Ireverttothelesspersonalthird-personnarrative.
69
2.2Researchingillegalmarkets
Scholarsfromthefieldsofcriminology,sociologyandanthropologyhaveundertaken
intriguingqualitativeandmixedmethodsresearchintoillegalmarketsandassociated
criminal,politicalandeconomicstructures.Thestudyofcrime,criminalactorsandillegal
marketsinsituhasalongtraditioninthesedisciplines(Jacques/Wright2008).Several
ethnographicstudies,includingresearchintocrackcocainedealing(Jacobs1999),hustling
(Pryce1979),Venkatesh’sbookbasedonthedecadehespentwiththe‘BlackKings’gangin
Chicago(Venkatesh2008)orSteinberg’sresearchintoSouthAfricanprisongangs(Steinberg
2004;Steinberg2005b)arerecognizedfortheirscholarlycontributionsontheinnerworkings
ofillegalmarketsandgangsatthelocallevel.However,studyingillegalmarketsandactors
beyondtheconfinesofthenation-state(transnationallyorregionally)isladenwithadditional
logisticalandotherchallenges,andhencedonelessfrequently.Exceptionaltransnational
studiesinclude,amongstothers,researchintoorgantrafficking(Scheper-Hughes2000),
humantrafficking(Chin/Finckenauer2011;Shelley2010;Bales1999),peoplesmuggling
(Zhang/Chin2002;Zhang/Gaylord1996),thecocainetrade(Kenney2007;Thoumi2003),
traffickingofantiquitiesandculturalobjects(Mackenzie/Davis2014),cigarette‘bootlegging’
intheEuropeanUnion(Hornsby/Hobbs2007),theillicitarmsindustry(Ruggiero1996),and
theworldheroinmarket(Paoli/Reuter/Greenfield2009;McCoy[1972]2003).
WiththenotableexceptionofRebeccaWong’sdoctoralresearchintotheorganizationofthe
illegaltigerpartstrade(Wong2013)andMoyle’sstudyonthesamesubject(Moyle2009),
TanyaWyatt’sresearchintotheillegalfurandfalcontradesinRussia(Wyatt2009;Wyatt
2011),researchintoivorymarkets(Gao/Clark2014),caviar(Zabyelina2014),parrots(Pires
2014),abalone(Hauck1997)andafewothers,scholarshavechosentoanalyseillegalwildlife
marketsfromthecomfortoftheiroffices.68Desktopstudiesareattractivewhenample
empiricalandsecondarydataincludingmediaandtechnicalreports,existandareeasyto
access(seeforexample:Moreto/Clarke2014;Moretoetal.2014).Incountrieswherecrime
68
Theliteraturereviewacknowledgedexistingresearchintoillegalrhinohorntrades.Rademeyer(2012)did
fieldworkatthesourceandinmarkets.Ayling(2013)usedsecondarydatawhileothers(Büscher/Ramutsindela
2016;Lunstrum2014;Montesh2013;Massé/Lunstrum2015;Fenio2014)conductedtargetedfieldworkin
poachinghotspots.Technicalreportsreliedlargelyondocumentaryandtradeanalysis(seeforexample:Milliken
2014;Milliken/Shaw2012).
70
data,policereportsandcourtmaterialsarereadilyavailable,researchersmightwantto
foregoheadingoutintothefield.Fieldwork,however,doesprovideaccessto“fieldsofaction
andexperiencesthatotherwisereceivescantornoacademicanalysis”(Goldsmith2003:104).
Thecitedscholarsinterviewedactiveorconvictedcriminals,andsometimestheirlaw
enforcementcounterpartswereincludedinthesample,situatingtheillegalmarketinbroader
socialandpoliticalstructures.Engagingwithillegalmarketactorsandregulatorsisnotonly
importantfordataverification;italsoprovidesajuxtapositionof“underworld”versus
“upperworld”views.Thisinclusiveapproachstandsatloggerheadswithtraditionaltop-down
approaches.Inchoosingtheconventionalrouteresearcherswouldtypicallyconductahandful
ofexpertinterviewswithpoliticaloreconomicelites,whichoftenresultsindataassimilation
tosuitpoliticaloreconomicinterests(seeLombardo’sanalysisofhowpolicingnarratives
influencedtheperpetuationofthe“alienconspiracytheory”intheUS:Lombardo2013).
Manyoftheaforementionedstudiesextendbeyondthepoliticalboundariesofthenationstateandinvolvemonthsofpainstakinglyconductedfieldworkstretchingovermonths,
sometimesyears,oftenfarawayfromtheresearcher’scomfortzone.Researchersface
multiplechallengesinthefieldwhenundertakingmulti-sitedorcross-borderresearchinto
illegalmarkets.Beyondlogisticalconcerns(mobility,languageproficiencyandfinances),
additionalproblemsmayariseduetounfamiliarregulatoryframeworksgoverningdata
collection,securityoftheresearchteam,ethicsandpositionality.Forexample,thelead
researchersresponsiblefortheworldheroinstudyoutsourcedindividualcountrystudiesto
localexperts.Outsourcingdatacollectionmightprovidealocalfootholdbutthelead
researcherhaslimitedcontroloverthequalityofthedata.Localexpertsmightgetexposedto
associationalriskssuchasaccusationsofspyingonbehalfofforeigninterests(Glazer1970).
Theremarksoftheleadauthorsoftheworldheroinstudy(Paoli/Reuter/Greenfield2009:7)
areinstructivewithregardstoundertakingtransnationalresearchintoillegalactivities:
“Itisdifficulttogatherthisinformationevenindemocraticnationswithrelatively
opengovernmentsandsophisticateddatacollectionsystems.Itisexceptionally
difficultinnationsthatareclosed,haveweakdatacollectionsystems,orhavelittle
traditionofpublishingpolicy-relevantdata.Drug-relatedcorruptioncreatesstill
furtherobstaclesinsomecountries.”
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Undertakingfieldworkintothesociallifeofotherscomeswithitschallengesandevenmore
sowhenenteringtherealmofgreyorillegalactivities.Thetargetedassassinationof
sociologistKenPryce(hewasresearchinghighmurderratesinJamaicaatthetimeofhis
death)orthehomicideofa“fixer”(researchfacilitator)involvedinpreparatoryworkfora
studyoftheRussianshippingindustry(Belousovetal.2007)aretheexception.Violationsthat
threatentheresearcher’swell-beingandsafety(Jacobs2006:157)areonefacetofthedanger
spectrum.WhileconductingastudyofpoliceaccountabilityinColombia,Australian
researcherGoldsmith(2003),forexample,wasthoughttobeaUSDrugEnforcementAgency
(DEA)“spy”(intelligenceoperative)whenhewalkedthestreetsofapoorneighbourhoodin
BogotainthecompanyoftwoColumbiancommunitypoliceofficers.Hemanagedtoescape
thetensesituationunharmedbutemotionallyshaken.BruceJacobs(1998)waslesslucky.
Oneofhistrustedsourcesinanon-goingresearchprojectintostreet-levelcrackcocaine
dealingrobbedhimatgunpointandtelephonestalkedhimafterthat.Lessdangerousbut
equallyconcerningistheresearcher’sexposuretolegaldangerssuchasbeingconsideredan
accessorytoacrime(Jacobs2006:158).Polsky(1967:141)capturedhowuncalculatedrisksin
thefieldmightderivefromunexpectedsources:
“[I]fonerefusestobeasociologistofthejailhouseorcourtsystem,takesMalinowski
toheart,andgoesoutintothefield,thereisriskinvolved...Itisthesortofriskthat
writersofcriminologytexts,foralltheireagernesstoputdownfieldwork,surprisingly
don’tmention:mostofthedangerforthefieldworkercomesnotfromthecannibals
andheadhuntersbutfromthecolonialofficials.”
Withafewexceptions(suchastheearliermentioned:Venkatesh2008),ahandfulofscholars
hasundertakenembeddedresearchintoillegalmarketsorgangs.Whilefewacademic
institutionswouldallowtheirstafforstudentstoundertakeovertlydangerousfieldwork,
investigativejournalistsarelikelytofacefewerinstitutionalobstacles(suchasagrillingby
ethicscommitteesatuniversities)whenembarkingonstudytoursofthe“underworld”.
InvestigativejournalistRobertoSaviano(2007),forexample,studiedtheNeapolitanmafia
whileembeddedintheCamorra’sstructures.AfterhisbookGomorrahwaspublished,he
receiveddeaththreatsfromhisformermafiacolleaguesandcontinuestoliveunder24-hour
policeguardtothisday.WhileSaviano’sbookhasprovidedamplematerialforscholarly
72
analysis(seeforexample:Varese2006),scholarshavequestionedthecredibilityofdata
presentedelsewhere(foracritiqueofGlenny's"McMafia"see:Levi2009).Although
journalisticinvestigationsareoftencriticizedforlackinginacademicrigourandverifiable
data,scholarsarenotshieldedfromsuchcritiques.Goffman’sethnography(Goffman2013;
Goffman2009)intothelivesofyoungblackmeninalow-incomeneighbourhoodin
Philadelphiahasledtoapublicwitch-huntagainstthesociologist(seeforexample:Lubnet
2015;Parry2015).Reviewersexpressedconcernsabouttheaccuracyofherportrayalofthe
blackexperience,thesoundnessofhermethods,thepossibilitythatherbookmightharmits
subjects,andshewasevenaccusedofbeinganaccompliceinthecommissionofacrime
(Lubnet2015;Parry2015).Parry(2015)surmises:
“Thedust-uprevealsanxietiesthatgobeyondthecensureofMs.Goffman,openinga
freshdebateoverlongstandingdilemmasofethnographicresearch:theethical
boundariesoffieldwork,thetensionbetweendatatransparencyandsubjects'privacy,
andthereliabilityofoneethnographer'ssubjectiveaccountofasocialworld.Some
sociologistsworrythatthecontroversymayputachillonsensitivefieldwork.Others
fearthatitcoulddamagethecredibilityofethnographyatatimewhensociologistsare
beingexhortedtogetmoreinvolvedinpublicdebates.”
SomeofGoffman’scriticsdisplayalimitedunderstandingoflong-standingdebatesasregards
“goingnative”69ornot(Stoller2015)inthedisciplineofanthropology.Thefallout(and
collegialsupportbysome)fromGoffman’sethnographydemonstratestheimportanceof
documentingandjustifyingmethodologicalandethicalchoicesmadeinpursuitofresearch.
Thisshortreflectionacknowledgespastscholarlyventuresintothefieldwhilealsobeing
mindfulofexposingpotentialdangersandshortfalls.Ihavepurposefullyfocusedonresearch
thatextendedbeyondthereachofthearmchairanddesktop(theproverbialivorytower).It
followsfromtheabovethatdataverification,mediationofpotentialdangersandpositionality
areofparticularimportancewhenstudyingtransnationalillegalmarkets.Personalexperience
andexposuretofieldworkinthepastrenderedthisthepreferredoption,especiallyinlightof
thesparsefirst-handdataregardingsocial,economicandpoliticalstructuresandsystemsof
meaningunderpinningillegalandgrayflowsofrhinohorn.Muchthoughtwentintothe
planningandexecutionofthedatacollectionphaseofthisproject.Givencritiquesof
69
‘Goingnative’referstoembeddedresearch.
73
subjectivity(seenextsection)andthelackofreproducibledatasets,triangulationand
verificationofdatawerevitalcomponentsoftheresearchprocess.Therhinofieldissteeped
innarratives,controversiesandmyths.Sortingfactfromfictionandsituatingnarrativesin
specificpolitical,economicorhistoricalcontextswereessentialstepsintheresearchprocess.
Thefollowingsectionswillexpandonthechallenges,opportunities,strengthsandweaknesses
ofthechosenapproach.
2.2.1Choosingthequalitativeroute
Onthebasisoftheearlierobservations,itisperhapsnotsurprisingthatlargefactionsofthe
academiccommunityconsiderthestudyofactivecriminalsandillegalmarketsachallenging
andpotentiallydangerousundertaking.Fieldworkisoftenshunnedbecauseofthedangers
andrisksassociatedwithdelvingintothe“underworld”(Wong2015:1).Scholarsencounter
difficultiesingeneratingtheirdata,astheresearchobjectorsubjectmaynotonlybe
shroudedinsecrecy,butsecurityconcernsmayariseaswell.Thesemayleadtoan
overrelianceoncontestedcrimeandinterdictionstatisticsorsecondarydata,renderingmany
aresearchstudymethodologicallyunsoundorrepetitive.Fioramonti(2014)makesa
convincingargumentregardingthedangersandsometimeshiddenagendasunderpinning
numbersandstatistics,especiallywhensuchnumbersareusedtoreinforcethelogicofthe
marketonsocialandpoliticallife.Statisticsaboutthesizeandvalueofillegalwildlifemarkets
areparticularlycontested(Naylor2004:263;Harken2011:11),thenumbersarenonetheless
co-optedintopolicyandscholarlyliteratureonthesubject.Availablestatisticsinthenarrow
fieldofrhinoresearchfailtoinspireconfidenceandreliability.ConservationNGOsclaimthat
rhinopoachingstatisticsaremanipulated(Schrader2015),arrestdataandconvictionsrates
areunreliable(Interviewwithrhinoexpert,2015;interviewwithpoliceinvestigatorsand
prosecutors,2013),andthecurrentrhinopopulationnumbersarecontested(duToit2015).
Therequestforwhatwouldappeartobe“harmless”numbers(suchasthenumberofantipoachingandgeneralstaffdeployedinparks),potentiallyexplosivedata(suchasthesizeof
anti-poachingbudgetsandbasicsalaryinformationofparkemployees)orunequivocally
controversialdata(numberofallegedpoacherskilledinSouthAfricanparksorrhinohorn
traffickersprosecutedandconvictedinVietnam)inpursuitofthisresearchallproved
74
immenselydifficulttoattainifforthcomingatall.Whilethepoliticalsensitivitiesandpotential
falloutunderpinningthelatterrequestareunderstandable,70the‘rhinoissue’hasbecome
securitizedandasaresult,manyprobingquestionsorlegitimaterequestsforquantitative
dataaredismissedas“forprivilegedaccessonly”(Iwillreturntothislaterinthischapter).
Whenstudyingillegalmarkets,traditionalquantitativemethodssuchastheadministrationof
questionnairesandsurveyscouldeasilybemisconstruedaspoliceinterrogations,likelyto
leadtolimitedandbiasedresults(Sissener2001:6).Quantitativeresearcherstendto
disengagefromthepeopleandthesubjecttheyarestudyingbyfocusingonstatistical
correlationsofvariables(Gray2009:165).Thevirtuesofquantitativeapproachesarenot
disputedhere;theliteraturereviewreferredtosubstantialcontributions.Moreover,
qualitativeandquantitativeapproachesarenotmutuallyexclusivegiventherecentinterestin
mixedmethodsresearch(Flick[1998]2014:35).However,numbercrunchingandstatistical
analysesofpotentiallybiasedandincompletedatasetsappearillsuitedinpursuitofa
sociologicalunderstandingofillegalrhinohornmarkets.
Incontrasttotheimpliedobjectivityandvalidityofthequantitativeapproach,qualitative
researcherssustaintheirresearchbyengagingwith“people’ssocialandculturalconstructions
oftheirreality”(Gray,opcit)andtheirlivedexperiences.Theanalysisofspecificcasesintheir
temporalandspatialparticularity(Flick[1998]2014:22)providesusefulsourcesforanalysis
andtheory–building.SomeofthekeyelementsofqualitativeresearchlistedbyMilesand
Huberman(1994:6)illuminatewhythequalitativeapproachiswell-suitedforastudyof
illegalandgrayflowsofrhinohorn:Itisconductedthroughintenseorprolongedcontactwith
thefield.Theresearcher’sroleistogaina“holistic”overviewofthecontextthrougha
“processofdeepattentiveness,ofempatheticunderstanding(Verstehen),andofsuspending
or“bracketing”preconceptionsaboutthetopicsunderdiscussion”.Theresearchercaptures
data“fromtheinside”,whichneedtobereviewedandverifiedwithrespondents.Inlightof
theinsufficientquantitativedataavailable,limitedpossibilitiesofquantitativedata
70
Therhinopoachingcrisis,aswellasthegreatnumberofMozambicancitizens,killedinsidetheKrugerNational
Park(accordingtoMozambicansources,400MozambicanshavelosttheirlivesinsidetheKNPsince2009–see
Chapter7),haveledtofurthercomplicationsinthealreadyacrimoniousdiplomaticrelationsbetweenSouth
AfricaandMozambique.Atthetimeoffieldwork,VietnameseauthoritieswerepointingtoChinaasthemajor
consumermarket.
75
generationandmypreferenceforfieldwork,aqualitativeresearchapproachwasthe
preferredchoice.Theresearchsoughtanalternativetothedominantnarrative,whichcannot
begainedfromcrunchingnumbersbutfromengagingwithpeople’slivedindividual
experiences.Thefollowingsub-sectionexpandsonthechosenresearchdesignofmulti-sited
ethnography.
2.2.2Researchdesign:Amulti-sitedethnography
Thedisciplineofanthropologyisknownforitsfrequentapplicationofethnographicresearch.
Amongstthevirtuesoftheapproacharetheresearcher’sintenseinteractionwithactors,
gettingimmersedinthefield(“goingnative”)andinsituexposuretosystemsofcultural
meaning(seeforexample:Hart1988;Malinowski/Young1979).However,theethnographer’s
focusonspecificplacesorgroupshasbeencritiquedforstaticandatomicreproductionsof
socialrelations(Desmond2014)and“methodologicalnationalism”–thereductionoflived
experiencestothenation-stateinsteadofacknowledgingavarietyofmacrosocialand
transnationalcontexts(Weiß/Nohl2012).Forthepurposesofstudyingflowsofrhinohorn,
anethnographicresearchdesignappealedduetoitsfocusonsystemsofculturalmeaning
withintemporal-spatialcontexts.Anuancedvariant–themulti-sitedethnography–eschews
thecritiqueofmethodologicalnationalism,insofarastheethnographerfocusesondynamic
relationshipsandconnectionsthattranscendthelocalcontextandtheconfinesofthenationstate.
Whenapplyingtheresearchdesignofmulti-sitedethnographies,researchersreplacemicroperspectiveswiththestudyofrelationshipsorconnectionsbetweensites,ideas,informants
and/orthings(Marcus1999:7).Proponentsoftheresearchdesignhaveco-optedelementsof
theworld-systemsapproachastheorizedbyWallersteinandothersinthe1970s.71However,
71
Wallerstein’sworldsystemsapproachwasnovelandrevolutionaryinthe1970s,questioningkeyelementsof
thetheoryofmodernizationsuchasthestate-centredapproachandEurocentricperspectivesonthe
developmentdiscourse.Theapproachreceivedafairamountofcritique(seeforexample:Skocpol1977);for
thepurposesofthediscussionhereWallerstein’snotionoftheworldsystemasasetofmechanismsemployed
toredistributesurplusvaluefromthe‘periphery’(GlobalSouth)tothe‘core’(GlobalNorth)suffices(Wallerstein
2011).Withtheexceptionoftrophyhunting,theftofrhinohornandhornartefacts,therhinohornexchange
occurslargelyoutsidewhatWallersteindefinedas“core”nations.However,inlightofchanginggeopoliticsand
76
forinvestigating“commoditychains”or“flows”,thetheoreticalorientationofemployingthe
world-systemastheunitofanalysiscreatespracticalproblemsasitfocusesatthemacro–
levelonly(Talbot2004:5-6).72TotheculturalanthropologistMarcus(1995),theapplication
ofmulti-sitedethnographiespresentsacomplementaryresearchdesignthatincorporatesthe
structuralelementsoftheworld-systemsapproachwithoutrelyingonitforthe“contextual
architectureframingasetofsubjects”(Marcus1995:96).Italsoprovidesamanageable
researchapproachandunitsofanalysis.Heobserves:
“Multi-sitedresearchisdesignedaroundchains,paths,threads,conjunctionsor
juxtapositionsoflocationsinwhichtheethnographerestablishessomeformofliteral,
physicalpresence,withanexplicit,positedlogicofassociationorconnectionamong
sitesthatinfactdefinestheargumentoftheethnography(Marcus1995:105).”
Proponentsofmulti–sitedresearchfollowthetrajectoriesofpeople,images,plotsandideas
(Marcus1995:107).Latour(1993)andHaraway(1991)werepioneersinextendingtherealm
andsitesofscientificinquirythroughtheinvestigationofnon-humanactorsandcyborgs.The
“followthething”approachhasgainedrecognitioninrecentyears.73Appadurai(1994:76-91)
demonstratesintheintroductiontoTheSocialLifeofThingshowthestatusofthingsas
“commodities,gifts,andresources”incirculationchangeacrosstimeandspatialcontextby
drawingondifferenttypesof“scapes”(localcontexts).Peopleexperience,defineand
interpretglobalprocessesfromtheirparticularlocalframeofreference;and“globalforces
areplottedagainstconstellationsoflocalcircumstance,fragmentarytoanoutsideobserver
butformingacoherent,fixedview–a“scape”–toalocal”(Bestor2001:80).Kopytoff(1986:
theascendancyofChinaastheworld’ssecondlargesteconomy,thenotionofanunequaldistributionofsurplus
valueattachedtorhinohornfrom“peripheralstates”insouthernAfricatoVietnam(notacorenation)and
China(arguablya‘core’nation)ishenceonlypartiallyvalid.
72
Talbotusedthecommoditychainapproachforhisanalysisoftheglobalcoffeesupplychain.Thisapproach
presents“anintermediatelevelofanalysis,biggerthanthenation-statebutsmallerthantheentireworld
system”(Talbot2004:6).Whilefocusingonthespecificcommodityathand,thefloworcommoditychainis
interdependentonotherflows.Hearguesthatitisimpossibletoanalyzeproducers,consumersandotheractors
withoutsituatingthecommodityflowwithinthebroaderworldeconomy(ibid).
73
TheapproachisnottobeconfusedwithMarx’notionof‘commodityfetishism’,accordingtowhichproducers
andsuppliersperceiveofoneanotherintermsofthemoneyandgoodsthattheyexchange(Marx[1867]2015).
Criticalfetishism,ontheotherhand,isqualitativelyclosertothe“followthething”approachbecauseit
incorporatesa“heightenedappreciationfortheactivematerialityofthingsinmotion”(Foster2006:286).
77
66)addsthatascommoditiestravelacrosstimeandgeographies,theirvalueandmeanings
changeandtheytakeontheirown“culturalbiography”.AccordingtoFoster(2006:285),the
renewedfocusofacademiaonthemovementofcommoditiesshows“howsuchmovement
linksgeographicallyseparatelocalesandconnectsproducersandconsumersstratifiedby
class,ethnicity,andgender”.Theapproachishoweverfarremovedfromamechanicaljoining
thedotsbetween‘a’and‘b’;insteadscholarstrace“socialrelationsandmateriallinkagesthat
thismovementcreatesandwithinwhichthevalueofcommoditiesemerges”(Foster2006:op
cit).Whileglobalizationmayhaveledtoageographicdistancebetweenproducers,
consumersandothermarketactorsasfarastransnationalsupplychainsareinvolved,the
flowofgoods,information,andcapitalconnectactorsonacultural,economicandsociallevel
thattranscendstimeandplace.74Mintz’research(1985)onsugar,forexample,tracesthe
commodity’soriginsbackwardintimefromdomesticationthroughtoitsspreadthroughout
theWesternindustrialworld.Tsing(2005)showshowacomplexexplanationofdeforestation
inIndonesiaisnotfoundintherainforestsofIndonesiaalonebutbyundertakingan
“ethnographyofglobalconnection”.Bestor(2001:92)investigatestheglobalpopularityof
sushiasa“complexeconomicrelationship”betweentheEastandtheWest.Withregardsto
illicitcommoditiesandservices,severalscholarshavelikewise‘followedthething’.Nancy
Scheper-Hughes(2004)explorestheillegalcirculationofhumansandtheirbodypartsacross
theplanet.GordonMathews’(2011)depictionofmigrantsfromacrosstheworldlivingin
ChunkingMansionsinHongKongrevealstheircloseconnectiontotheinternational
circulationofgoods,moneyandideas.CarolynNordstrom(2007:207)sketchestheflowof
“il/legal”goodsandpeople(Nordstrom’swordplay)beyondthereachofthestate,whichshe
depictsas“static”,“bounded”and“defined”.Thestaticnatureofthe‘state’asamonolith
standsatloggerheadswiththedynamicnotionofcircuitsandflowsinwhichnon-stateactors
playasignificantrole,whichislikelytorattlelong-standingconceptionsofpowerand
authorityasespousedinWesterntheoriesofthestateandstatebuilding.
Animportantelementofmulti-sitedethnographiesrelatestothecarefulobservationofhow
goodscirculateinsteadofassumingtheinfluenceofgovernancestructuresapriori.Inthis
74
Thistrailofthoughtconnectstooneofthemainthesesofeconomicsociology,namelythatmarketsare
embeddedinsocialnetworks.
78
researchproject,Isoughttofollowtheflows(pathways)ofrhinohornfromthesourcetothe
market.Theresearchdesigncomesnotwithoutitsshortfalls.Marcus(1995)providesa
thought-provokingassessmentoftheapproach,detailingmethodologicalproblemswhile
drawingthereader’sattentiontoitsgreatestadvantage,thebridgingofthedualistic“them–
usframeofconventionalethnography”(Marcus1995:100).ToMarcus,thelossofthe
subaltern,thesubstitutionofqualityanddepthwithquantityandsuperficiality,aswellasthe
intensityandimpracticalityoffieldworkduetospreadingtheanalyticallensacrossmultiple
researchsitesarelegitimateconcerns.Heobserves:“Theinevitableconnotationofmulti-sited
asatermissomethingthatisprofligate,impatient,unfocused,emphasizingsurfacerather
thandepth,andrequiringeffortbeyondthecapacityofthesinglefieldworker”(Marcus1999:
7).Bestor(2001:78)likewisewarnsofthedangerofpresenting“drive-byethnography”when
undertakingawhistle-stoptourofresearchsiteswithoutsufficienttimeandpreparationset
asidetounderstandtheintricaciesoftheresearchsite,itsconnections,andsignificancetothe
overallcommoditychain,flowormarket.
Cognizantofthedangersofsuperficialanalysis,thismulti-sitedethnographyiscentredonthe
globalflowsofonespecificthing:rhinohorn.Althoughtheresearchentailedvisitstoseveral
differentresearchsites(describedbelow),greatcarewastakennottodilutetheresearch
focus.Theproverbialcrossingofthebridgebetween“usandthem”ledtoabetter
understandingofactors’motivations,framesandinstitutions.Aswillbeshowninlater
sections,thedesignationofrhinohornasacommodityiscontestedamongstcertainactors,
whobelieverhinohornshouldnotbeforsaleorconsideredacommodityinthefirstplace.
The‘followthething’approachisthusseenasaneutralpointofdepartureinlieuofusingthe
terminologyofcommoditychains.Rhinohornitselfisusedastheintegratingperspective
aroundwhichdiversedataareorganizedandanalysed.Theremainderofthischapterdeals
withmethodologicalandethicalchoicesmadeduringthisproject,someofwhichspeakto
critiquesof(multi-sited)ethnographiesandhowtheywereresolved.
79
2.2.3Single-casestudyandtheoreticaldevelopment
Casestudieshavebeenpraisedfortheachievementofhighconceptualvalidity,thecapacity
toaddresscausalcomplexityandtoderivenewhypotheses(George/Bennett2005:20–22).A
single–casestudyinvolvestheintensiveempiricalinquiryofaparticularcasewiththepurpose
of“shed[ding]lightonalargeclassofcases(apopulation)”(Gerring2007:20).Therearea
numberoflimitationsandpossible“trade-offs”,suchascaseselectionbias,theexchangeof
parsimonyforthickdescriptions,aswellasindeterminacyandlimitationstothe
generalizabilityoffindings(George/Bennett2005:22).Thechoiceofasinglecasestudymay
bequestionedonthebasisoftheabovearguments.However,‘following’several‘things’
(broadeningtheresearchscopebeyondrhinohorn)wouldhaverenderedtheresearch
impracticalanddatavolumesunmanageable;notwithstandingthethreatoffurtheramplifying
thepitfallsof“drive-byethnography”(seeprevioussection).Thisdissertationisorganized
aroundflowsofrhinohorn–thejourneyofrhinohornfromthebushtothemarket.While
theanalysisfocusesonrhinohorn,different‘cases’areinvestigatedandcontextualized.
MultipleresearchsitesandinformantsfromheterogeneousbackgroundsinsouthernAfrica
andSoutheastAsiaenrichthissinglecasestudy.Moreover,Yin(1994:38–40)submitsthatthe
selectionofasinglecasestudyisjustifiedifthecaseconstitutesa“criticalcase”,“anextreme
oruniquecase”ora“revelatorycase”.75
Inthisinstance,Yin’sthree-prongedcriteriaapply.Thecharismaticrhinohasgarnered
worldwideattentionfromconservationNGOs,internationalorganizations,militaryand
securityoutfits,governmentdepartmentsandcivilsociety,andcausedamoralpanicamongst
someoftheseactors.Therhinofieldissteepedincontroversies,rangingfromalacking
acknowledgmentofthecoloniallegaciesunderpinningAfricanwildlifeconservationthrough
tocontestedsolutionsaimedatdisruptingthemarket.Fewsocialscientists(seeliterature
review)haveengagedwiththerhinoissue,renderingthisstudytimeous.Therhinois
emblematicofotherendangeredspeciesoffaunaandflora,andhence,certainfindings
regardingthestructureandfunctioningofgrayandillegalflowsmaybeofrelevanceto
75
Arevelatorycaseexistswhentheresearcherhas“anopportunitytoobserveandanalyzeaphenomenon
previouslyinaccessibletoscientificinvestigation”(Yin1994:40).
80
analysesofotherwildlifemarkets.Forexample,across-caseanalysisofshadowcasesmaybe
usefulindeterminingwhichfactorsleadtospecificmarketoutcomesandassistin
constructinganexplanationastowhytherhinocasemaybedifferentfromotherillegal
wildlifemarkets,orwhyitisthesame.Cross-caseanalysisalsomakessenseofuniquefindings
andassistsinarticulatinghypothesesandtheoriesdiscoveredduringdatacollection
(Khan/VanWynsberghe2008).
InmyformerroleasappliedpolicyresearcherataSouthAfricanresearchinstitute,Ifirst
engagedwiththe‘rhinopoachingproblem’througharegionalprojectonorganizedcrime
trendsinSouthernAfricain2009.76Adecade-longresearchcareerpriortoembarkingonthe
journeytowardsthedoctorateallowedmetobuildupaprofessionalandsocialnetworkof
contactswithinthebroaderfieldofcrimeresearchinthesouthernAfricanregionandbeyond.
Thesenetworks,knowledgeoftheresearchsubjectandfieldworkexperiencefacilitated
(sometimesprivileged)accesstoabroadspectrumofrelevantactors.
Whilethetheoreticalandexplanatoryapproachesofthisdissertationaregroundedin
economicsociology,theresearchapproachwaspartiallyguidedbyprinciplesofgrounded
theory.Inessence,groundedtheoryinvolvesareiterativeresearchprocesswheredata
collectionisinterspersedwithperiodsofdataanalysisandconceptformation.Theunderlying
expectationofgroundedtheoryisthat“theoreticalpreconceptionsshouldbeavoidedin
ordertoallowtheorytoemergefromdata”(Flick[1998]2014:84).Asdataaccumulate,the
researcherbeginstoframeinterpretations.Itwasimportanttocheckdataagainstthose
interpretationsbecause“thedatathemselvesdonotlie”(Strauss/Corbin1998:45).While
groundedtheoryallowsforflexibilityasregardsdatacollectionastheoriesevolve,three
techniquesareessential:“makingcomparisons,askingquestions,andsampling”
(Strauss/Corbin1998:46).
Datacollectionandsamplingwasdrivenbytheoreticalandempiricalgaps;initially,these
relatedtothegeneralstructureandfunctioningofillegalmarkets.Iaddedandcompareddata
76
Rhinopoachingwasidentifiedasagrowingorganizedcrimeconcernatthetime.Iprovidedresearchfindings
andpolicyrecommendationstotheregionalpolicingorganization,theSouthernAfricanRegionalPoliceChiefs
CooperationOrganization(SARPCCO),andconservationNGOsonrhinopoachinganditsconnectionsto
‘organizedcrime’.
81
gleanedfromrespondentstoexploretheoreticalhunchesand“illustratenewvariations”(Flick
[1998]2014:86).Importantconceptualandtheoreticalelementsemerged,suchasthenotion
ofcontestedillegality,thestructuralimportanceoftheinterfacebetweenlegalityand
illegality,andthesecuritizationofrhinoconservation.Theresearchquestionevolvedandthe
theoreticalfocuswassharpenedduringthereiterativeprocess.Groundedtheoryhasbeen
criticizedonmanyaccounts.Criticsdoubtwhetherresearcherscanundertakeresearch
withoutpreconceivedideasandpracticeanunbiased,neutralapproach,nottaintedbypreexistingvalues,assumptions,andvalues(Flick[1998]2014:94).Ahealthydoseofnaïveté
underpinstheassumedneutralityofgroundedtheory,asitdemandsofresearchersthe
capabilitytoplaywhatDonnaHarawaycalledthe‘Godtrick’(Haraway1991).77Mindfulofthis
limitation,Iconsideredmypositionality(theethicssectiondealswiththisinmoredetail)and
Weltbild(situatedperspectives)inapproachingdatacollectionandanalysis.
2.4Methods
Thefollowingsectionconsidersthedifferentmethodsofdatacollectionemployedduringthe
courseofthisresearchproject,including:(a)aliteraturereview,(b)archivalresearch,(c)Web
2.0research,(d)interviews,(e)focusgroups,(f)participantobservationand(g)participation
inmeetings.Eachmethodcomeswithasetoflimitationsandethicalconsiderations.Irefer
brieflytotheseethicalconsiderationsundereachheading;thefinalsectionofthischapteris
dedicatedtobroaderethicalconsiderationsandsecurityconcerns.Theliteraturereview,
archivalandWeb2.0researchwereundertakeninlibrarysettings.Theinterviews,focus
groups,participantobservationsandparticipationinmeetingsformedpartofthefieldwork
component.
77
Haraway(1991)arguesconvincinglyagainsttraditionalnotionsofobjectivityinscienceandphilosophy,which
assumethattheinvestigatorcanremoveherselffromtheobjectofinquiry.Shebelievesthatthistypeof
objectivityisimpossibletoachieve;sheassociatesthe“God-trick”withscholars,whoeschewargumentationand
takingaclearpositionbasedontheirperspectivesandpositionality.
82
2.4.1Desktopandarchivalresearch
(a) Literaturereview
Literaturereviewsarenotusuallylistedasmethodsfordatacollection.Thisresearchproject,
however,reliedheavilyoninsightsgleanedfromacademiccontributions,technicalreports,
courtrecords,parliamentarysubmissionsandgovernmentdocumentsthroughoutthe
researchprocess.Notallofthesematerialswereeasilyaccessible;insomeinstances,theright
‘gate-keeper’hadtobefound.Unlesswrittenpermissionwasreceivedtoreferencethe
materials,confidentialdocumentsweretreatedasbackgroundinformation.Technicalreports,
arrestandconvictiondatabases,courtfiles,CITESdocumentation,newspaperreportsandopedcontributionsprovidedusefulinsightastohowactorsperceiveandframethe‘rhino
problem’.Someinformationwasintegratedintothedissertation;theremainderservedas
backgroundinformationtopreparefortheinterviewingprocess.
(b) Archivalresearch
Attemptsweremadetogainaccesstoevidencegivenatthe“KumlebenCommissionof
InquiryintotheAllegedSmugglingofandIllegalTradeinIvoryandRhinocerosHorninSouth
Africa”.In1994,formerSouthAfricanPresidentNelsonMandelaappointedJusticeKumleben
toinvestigatetheinvolvementoftheSouthAfricanDefenceForceintheillicittradeofrhino
hornandivoryduringthebushwarsinAngola,NamibiaandMozambique.Unfortunately,my
attemptswereunsuccessful.Theoriginalmaterials(suchaseyewitnesstestimony)hadbeen
movedfromthestatearchivestoanundisclosedrepository.Kumleben’sfinalreporthasbeen
scannedandisaccessibleon-line.Thereportwasregardedawhitewashbysome(Interviews,
2013and2014)asallegationsremainedunsubstantiatedandimportantwitnessesfailedto
appearinfrontoftheCommission,leadingtonosuccessfulprosecutions.Isupplemented
potentialknowledgegapsbyinterviewinginformants,whohadintimateknowledgeofthe
proceedingsandfindings.
IalsovisitedthearchivesoftheKrugerNationalParkinSkukuza,whereIaccessedreportsand
articlesthatdealtwithrhinosandthehistoryofthePark.Whilerhinopoachingwasmy
principalinterest,Icastthenetwiderinordertosituatetherhinoissuewithinthebroader
83
socialandpoliticalcontextoftheParkanditsdevelopment.Theworld’smostcomprehensive
on–linearchiveofknowledgeonrhinos,theRhinoResourceCentre78andJulianRademeyer’s
KillingforProfitarchive79wereusefulinaccessingup-to-dateinformationonrhinoissues.
(c) Web2.0research
Web2.0refersto‘bigdata’(boyd/Crawford2012)or‘user–generatedcontent’onthe
Internet(Snee2008:3).TheuseofWeb2.0technologiesforthepurposesofsocialresearchis
initsinfancy.Somescholarsquestiontheusefulness(boyd/Crawford2012;Bollier2010;
Anderson2008);othersfearthatsocialscientistsmaybeleftbehindinthebravenewworld
ofsocialmediaplatforms(Savage/Burrows2007;Snee2008;Murthy2008;Robinson/Schulz
2009).Ifhistoryisanythingtogoby(theuseoftaperecordingtechnologiesinthe1950s
providedaboneofcontentioninresearchcommunities),thentheinitialtrepidationwillblow
overbytheendofthedecade.80
SocialnetworkssuchasFacebook,TwitterandLinkedInarebuiltupontheprincipleof
establishingnetworksthroughfriendsandcompoundrelations(Murthy2008:844).Murthy
(2008:845)arguesthatsuchnetworkswouldbeusefultoresearchersbecausetheyactas
“virtualgatekeepers”tochainsoffriends,whocanactasresearchinformantsormayhave
connectionstopersonsofinterest.IusedFacebook,LinkedIn,andblogsforthepurposesof
identifyingresearchinformants,researchassistants,transcribersandinterpreters,engagedin
on-linedebatesandaccesseddocumentsandmulti-mediaresources.Whilesome
78
DrKeesRookmaakeristheeditorofthearchive,whichcanbeaccessedat
http://www.rhinoresourcecenter.com/.
79
ThearchivewasstartedbyinvestigativejournalistandauthorJulianRademeyerandcanbeaccessedat
http://killingforprofit.com/.
80
ComputeraccessandthespreadofInternettechnologieshaveledtoawiderrangeofentitiessuchas
marketingcompanies,governmentagenciesandmotivatedindividualstogenerate,analyze,organizeandshare
data.SavageandBurrows(2007)warnofacrisisinempiricalsociologyduetodatasetspreviouslyinthe
exclusivedomainofsocialscientists“nowbeingaggregatedandmadeeasilyaccessibletoanyonewhoiscurious,
regardlessoftheirtraining”(boyd/Crawford2012:664).Regardlessofthetypeoftrainingreceivedbythedata
generator,alldatasetsshouldbeequallyscrutinizedforpossiblebiasandputincontext(e.g.Whoisbehindthe
research?Whoisfundingit?Whatistheobjective?).ForthepurposesofdatacollectionontheInternet,alldata
wasscrutinizedandtriangulated.
84
ethnographicresearchershidebehindpseudonymsandavatarsinon-lineplatforms
(boyd/Crawford2012:672),Iusedmyfullnameanddisclosedmyresearchinterestwhile
engagingon-line.I‘met’severalinformantson-line,whichledtointerviewsintherealworld.
ThesesocialmediaportalsprovedparticularlyusefulwhenIpreparedforfieldworkinHong
KongandVietnam,researchsitesthatIhadnotvisitedbefore.Throughtheon–line
accommodationserviceAirBnB,Imanagedtofindaffordablelodgingwithlocalsacross
Vietnam,whichgavemealocalfootholdandunexpectedaccesstoinvaluableresearch
informants.On-linefriendsandconnectionsprovidedintroductionstotheirsocialand
professionalnetworksinMozambique,HongKong,andVietnam,manyofwhomImetinfaceto-faceinterviewsandsocialgatherings.
Socialnetworksitesholdvaststoresofmultimedia-resources“regardingeventhemost
marginalsocialmovementsorgroups”(Murthy2008:845).Therhinohasmostcertainlyan
enormoussocialmediapresence.FacebookgroupslikeTheGreatBigNOTrade/PROTrade
Debate,81FocusAfricaFoundation,82OutragedSACitizensagainstPoaching,83RhinoNews,84
RhinoS.O.S./WildandFreeSA,85personalblogs86andtheFacebookandTwitterpagesof
conservationNGOs,Anti–PoachingUnits(APUs)andIntergovernmentalOrganizations(IGOs)
provideusefullinkstodocumentsanddatabases,newsreportsandinsightsastohowthe
rhinoproblemisframedinpublicdiscourse.Severalhardtofindpolicypapersandreports
were‘crowd–sourced’fromsuchplatforms.Moreover,‘on–lineobservation’wasconducted
81
Accessibleathttps://www.facebook.com/groups/RhinoTradeDebate/
82
Accessibleathttps://www.facebook.com/pages/Focus-Africa-Foundation/640463866006417?fref=nf
83
Accessibleathttps://www.facebook.com/groups/OSCAP/
84
Accessibleathttps://www.facebook.com/groups/506340646046722/
85
Accessibleathttps://www.facebook.com/groups/rhinosos/and
https://www.facebook.com/groups/WILDANDFREESA/?fref=ts.TheWildandFreeSAgrouphadreplacedRhino
S.O.S.,whichwastheoperationalgroupwhenIundertookscopingresearchfortheproject.
86
ThepersonalblogofBrianSandbergisagreatexampleofthought-provokingideasbeingsharedviasocial
media.Brianfrequentlypublishedonrhino–relatedmattersonhispersonalblog
(https://vivaafrika.wordpress.com/).IcontactedhimuponreadingablogaboutthevillagesontheMozambican
borderoftheKrugerNationalParkandthevillagers’linkstorhinopoaching.Weconnectedovercoffeeafew
dayslater.Unfortunately,BrianpassedawayinApril2014.
85
invirtualmarketplaces87,whererhinohornandotherwildlifecontrabandweretraded.Ialso
accessedtheDeepnet(alsoknownastheDarknetorHiddenWeb)throughtheanonymity
networkTortocastthenetwiderandassessopportunitystructuresaccessibletocriminal
players.
Thesenewtechnologiesarenotonlygeneratingnewkindsofdataandgrantingaccessto
difficulttoreachpopulations,buttheycarrywiththemethicalandmethodologicalchallenges
(McKie/Ryan2012:5).Firstly,thereareethicalconcernstiedtoprivacy88–someFacebook
updates,tweetsorchat-roomramblingswerecreatedin“highly-contextsensitivespaces”,
theoriginatorsthusmaynotconsenttotheirdatabeingusedelsewhere(boyd/Crawford
2012:673).89SallyHambridge,developerofthe“NetiquetteGuidelines”(citedin:Ess/AoIR
EthicsWorkingCommittee2002:5)qualifiestheopennessofcommunicationbywarningthat
notevene–mailcorrespondenceissafefrompryingeyes:
“Unlessyouareusinganencryptiondevice(hardwareorsoftware),youshould
assumethatmailontheInternetisnotsecure.Neverputinamailmessageanything
youwouldnotputonapostcard.”90
Iusedcommonsensetojudgewhethertheinteractionsofsocialmediauserswereintended
aspublicand“performative”(Ess/AoIREthicsWorkingCommittee2002:7)orprivateand
protected.Anonymity,protectionofconfidentialityandinformedconsentguideddata
87
Usingacrimescriptanalysisapproach,Lavorgna(2014)arguesthattheInternetisnotonlyacommunication
toolforwildlifetraffickersbuthasalsotransformedthestructureofthecriminalwildlifemarketbylowering
barrierstoentry.Asianinformantslikewisesuggestedthaton-linemarketplaces,socialnetworkplatformsand
auctionwebsitesofferrhinohorninvariousforms(TCM,carvings,unprocessedhorn).MyVietnameseresearch
assistantintroducedmetoseveralauctionwebsites,whichostensiblysoldrhinohornproducts.However,
criminalinvestigatorsstatedthatrhinohorntradedon–lineismostlyfake(Interviewwithorganizedcrime
experts,Bangkok,HanoiandHongKong,2013).Severalon-lineauctionandmarketplaceshavebeenshutdown
(suchastheformerwww.kerwawa.com),andlistingsonseveralreputableauctionwebsiteshavebeenflagged,
reportedanddeleted.MyempiricalinvestigationcouldonlypartiallyconfirmLavorgna’sthesis–thepartofthe
Internetbeingusedasacommunicationtool(seechapter8);however,interviewswithrhinohornconsumers
revealedthattheyreliedonpersonalintroductionsandword-by-mouthreferralstoreputablehornsellers.
88
Theon-goingrevelationstiedtotheNationalSecurityAgency(NSA)scandalhaveshonealightonhowsocial
mediaplatformsareusedforintelligencegatheringpurposes.
89
UnbeknownsttomanyInternetusers,deletinganupdate,tweetorcommentmayremoveitfromone’s
computerscreenwhileback-ups,mirrorimagesandscreenshotsmayremainincirculationlongafter.
90
Availableathttp://www.pcplayer.dk/Netikette_reference.doc
86
collectionthroughouttheresearchprocess.Inreturn,somesocialnetworkersrequested
assistancewithspecifictasks,suchasreferralstotherelevantliteraturesupportingtheir
stancefororagainstthelegalizationofthetradeinrhinohorn,inputintomoviescriptsand
op–edpieces,orintroductionstosourcesofinformation.91Iassistedwiththerequestsaslong
astheydidnotclashwithmyresearchethicsandtimeconstraints.
Secondly,administratorsofsocialmediainterfaceshavethepowerofthe“delete”button.In
otherwords,on-linecontentsisoftencensored,mediatedandcondensedasnottoupsetthe
mainstreamorcatchtheattentionoflawenforcementandintelligencebodies.Insomecases,
socialmediauserspracticeself-censorshipanddeletetheircommentsuponreceiving
negativesanctioningfromothers.Ihaveoftenwatchedcomments‘disappear’frommylaptop
screen;theseincludeamongstothers,racistremarks,personalattacksaimedatfellowusers
anddeaththreatstopoachersorAsiannationals.The“newdigitaldivide”(boyd/Crawford
2012:673)presentsanotherlimitationbecauseofthegrowingriftbetweenthemostlyurban
wealthystrataofsocietywithhigh-speedInternetaccessanddatavolumesandtheless
fortunateones(ofteninruralsettings)whocannotaffordaccessoruserestrictedwireless
accesstoconnecttotheInternet.Arguably,accesstosocialmediaislargelylimitedtothe
“digitalhaves”while“ethnic/genderdigitaldividesstronglypersist”(Murthy2008:845).
Consciouseffortsweremadetocontact‘digitalhave–nots’anddifficulttoreachpopulations
inthe‘real’world.
2.4.2Fieldwork
Fieldworkreferstoprimaryresearch“thattranspires‘inthefield’…outsidethecontrolled
settingsofthelibraryorlaboratory”(McCall2006:3).Thedurationofthefieldwork
componentstretchedover14monthsandentailedtwophases.Duringtheinitialexploratory
phase,thecasestudyandkeyexpertswereidentified(andinterviewedtoinformtheresearch
approach)andtheresearchsitesweredetermined.Ialsoinitiatedtheprocessofobtaining
researchpermissiontoundertakeresearchinSouthAfrica’snationalparksandcorrectional
91
Anumberofjournalistsrequestedcontactdataofrhinocriminals.Forreasonsofanonymity,confidentiality
andsafety,thecontactdatawasnotshared.
87
centres(prisons),aswellaswithofficialsfromlawenforcementagenciesandgovernment
departments.Thesecondphaseinvolved12–monthsofimmersedfieldworkinsouthern
AfricaandSoutheastAsia.Thetimingoffieldtripswaslargelyflexible,contingentonthe
availabilityofinformantsandweatherconditions,92andschedulednottocoincidewith
electionsormajorholidays.
Ivisitedseveralresearchsitesmorethanonce,whichallowedtimetoestablishtrustand
rapportwithinformants.Duetothegeographicscopeandtheremotenessofmostresearch
sitesinsouthernAfrica,Iusedcarsandtookoccasionalflightstogetaround.InSoutheast
Asia,Iusedpublictransportation(trains,ferries,busandmotorbikes).MyhometownofCape
TownintheWesternCaperegionofSouthAfricawasthebasefromwhereIembarkedon
immersedfieldtrips(seeAppendixAforadetailedlistofresearchsitesandmaps).Imadepit
stopsatseveralprivategamereservesandrhinofarms,informalsettlementsandvillagesin
thevicinityofconservationareas,aswellasformalandunofficialbordercrossings.Interviews
andfocusgroupswerefrequentlyarrangedawayfromtherespondent’splaceofworkor
officetoencourageanopenandinformalapproach.
WhileIcouldvisitallmajorrhinopoachinghot–spots,criticalthinkingandplanningwere
investedinthe“places”ofresearch.Beyondthephysicalpropertiessuchasthedemarcation
ofboundaries,“figurative”and“metaphorical”aspectswerealsorelevant(Stein2006:61).
Theidentificationofdividedgeographiesandcontestedspacesbecameanimportantaspect
ofattributingmeaningandcontext.
92
Duetotheheightenedriskofflooding(leadingtoimpassableroads),malariainfectionandextremelyhotand
humidweatherconditions,itisnotadvisabletotraveltoMozambiqueandtheKNPduringtherainyseason
(DecembertoFebruary).IwasalsocautionedtoavoidtravelingtoSoutheastAsiaduringthesouthernsummer
monsoonseason.Mooncycleswerealsoimportantconsiderationsaspoachingusedtosurgearoundfullmoon.
Poachersusethenaturalmoonlighttoguidethemthroughthebushatnight.Theroleoflunarphaseshas
becomelessimportantduethegreatnumberofpoachingteamsandincursionsoccurringatalltimesofdayand
night.
88
(a) Interviews
Researchinformantswereinterviewedinface-to-facesemi-structuredorunstructured
interviews.Researchinterviewsare“professionalconversations”aboutsociallife,uponwhich
“knowledgeisconstructedintheinteractionbetweentheinterviewerandtheinterviewee”
(Kvale/Brinkmann2009:4).Beforediscussingsampling(whichisalsorelevanttosub-section
(e),whichdealswithfocusgroups),anoverviewoftheinterviewingapproachandprocessis
given.
Theapproachtakenwasoneofsteppingbackand“relinquish(ing)expertstatus”(Simpson
2006:126),listeningtorespondents’lifestories,insightsandascribedmeaningsofillegal
economicactioninvolvingrhinohorn.Thistypeof“responsiveinterview”isusefulineliciting
responsesasitunderscores“theimportanceofbuildingarelationshipoftrustbetweenthe
interviewerandintervieweethatleadstomoregive-and-takeinconversation”(Rubin/Rubin
2012:37).Greatcarewastakentoprovideaninterviewsettingthatwasinformalandrelaxed;
thequestionswereflexible,open-endedand“evolvedinresponsetowhattheinterviewees
havesaid,andnewquestionsweredesignedtotaptheexperienceandknowledgeofeach
interviewee”(Rubin/Rubin2012:37).Oncethesubjectofillegality(forexample:involvement
inpoaching)wasbroached,Ierredonthesideofcautionwhenitcametoaskingfollow-up
questionsorprobingfurther(Flick[1998]2014:208).Duetothepossibilityofinterviewer
effects,93concertedeffortsweremadetoavoid“prompting”respondentstoproducean
answer(Fielding/Thomas:250).Attemptsweremadetodiscourageinformantsfrom
anticipatingtheresponsetheythoughtIwasseeking.Tominimizerespondenteffects
(irreducibleambiguityofquestionsduetodifferentbackgroundsoftheresearcherandthe
researched),localinterpreterswereemployedtohelpexplainquestionsratherthanthe
researchertickingoffquestionsinapredeterminedquestionnaire(Burawoy1998:12).
Researchintosensitiveissuestendstoengenderresistanceamongstthoseintervieweddueto
feelingsofshame,fearofreprisalsandotherconsequenceslinkedtocontinuityinwork–
basedrelationships.Basedonpreviousfieldworkexperience,theuseofcontroversial
terminologyor‘loadedterms’suchascorruptionwashencesidesteppedbydescribingthe
93
Personalattributesoftheinterviewer(suchasgender,ethnicityorreligion)ortheinterviewschedule(orderor
formofquestions)–so-calledintervieweffects–canimpacttheinterview(issuesofpositionalityofthe
researcherwillbediscussedinthefinalsectionofthischapter).
89
conceptinlooseterms(Hübschle/VanderSpuy2012:326).Theassuranceofconfidentiality
andanonymityinandbeyondthefieldwascrucialtoobtainingdatathatdelvedbeyond
standardone-lineresponses.
Attemptsweremadetointerviewrespondentsmorethanonce.Thefirstinterviewwasused
toestablishrapportwiththeinformant(s)andfollow–upinterviewswouldservethepurpose
ofdatacollectionandverification.Inlightofthegeographicalscope,timeandinstitutional
constraintsofthestudy,thiswasnotalwayspossible.Theresearchpermitstoundertakedata
collectioninthenationalparks,andcorrectionalcentreswereapprovedandprocessed
halfwaythroughtheresearchprocessanddemandedfurtherlogisticalpreparations.
Unfortunately,inthisinstancerespondentscouldonlybeinterviewedonce.However,followupphonecallsandemailsweremadeto‘keepintouch’andverifyinformationwithmany
respondentsbeyondtheinitialinterviewprocess.
Keyinformantsprovidedintroductionstotheirprofessionalnetworks,actingasgatekeepers.
Throughtheinterviewsconductedintheinitialexploratoryphase,Iestablishedrelationships,
whichIcultivatedthroughouttheresearch.Conservators,investigators,officialsand
communityleadersareimportant‘gatekeepers’,whoprovidedintroductionstotheir
professionalandsocialnetworks.Moreover,purposivesamplingwasemployedtotarget
specificpersonsofinterestasameansofassistingwithfillinggapsinthedataand
contributingtowardstheorybuilding(Gray2009:152).Iusedsnowballsamplingtorecruit
otherrespondentsthroughpre-existingsocialandprofessionalnetworks.Typically,the
samplegroupgrowsovertime(likeasnowball)untilenoughdataisgatheredtosatisfythe
researchobjective.Thistechniqueisparticularlyusefulforaccessingdatafromhidden
populations–suchaskingpins,smugglersorpoachers–wheregroupmembershipmaybe
concealedduetotheillegalnatureoftheactivity.Moreover,snowballingcanbeusedto
accessmarginalizedcommunities,liketheruraldwellersinterviewedintheMozambican
borderlands.Thetechniquereliesheavilyonpersonalrecommendationsthat“vouchforthe
legitimacyoftheresearcher”(Sturgis2011:180).Itallowsresearcherstogainaccessand
informationastrustisbuiltamongsthiddenand/ormarginalizedpopulations.Theprocessof
securingentryintoagivensocialnetworkallowsresearcherstounderstandtheinter-group
relationships,hierarchies,andconnectionsbetweenparticipants.Whileitisacknowledged
90
thatsnowballsamplingisinexact(Miller2005:69),itcanofferusefulinsightsintoillegalor
marginalsectorsprovidedthedataisverifiedortriangulated.416interviews(includingfocus
groups)wereconductedduringthisresearch.Thisincludes360face-to-faceinterviewswith
respondents,someofwhomwereinterviewedmorethanonce.Inlightofconfidentialityand
anonymityrequirements,twogeneraltablesofinformants,theirrolewithintherhinosupply
chainandabreakdownbyregionaregiven.Table2liststhefieldofexpertiseofresearch
informants.
Table2:Numberofrespondentsbyfunction
Function
Prisoners94
Criminalactors95
Community96
Conservation97
Lawenforcement&intelligence
(public)98
Privatesecurity&intelligence99
Wildlifeindustry100
Academia
Journalism
Socialmovement101
Total:
Numberofrespondents
30
38
43
47
46
25
29
34
21
47
360
94
Forallintentsandpurposes,the‘prisoner’categorycouldbesubsumedunder‘criminalactors’.Thepurposeof
separatingthetwoservestoindicatethatboth,activeandconvictedrhinocriminals,wereinterviewed.
95
Poachers,kingpins,traders,corruptofficials,roguewildlifeindustryactorsandconsumersareconsideredin
thiscategory.
96
Criminalactorsareembeddedincommunitystructures.Itwasthusimportanttointerviewcommunity
membersdirectlyaffectedbyillegaltrade.Typically,suchrespondentswouldprovidethebroadersocietal
contextofthestudy.
97
Acleardelineationwasmadebetweenconservatorsandrespondentsrepresentingsocialmovementsor
specialinterestgroups.Theprimaryfunctionofconservatorsislinkedtonatureconservation.Respondentsin
thiscategoryworkinparksorcarryoutofficialdutieslinkedtoconservation.
98
Thiscategoryincludesstate-runpolice,military,customsandprosecutorialagencies.
99
Privateanti-poachingunits,intelligencegatherersandprivateinvestigatorsareincluded.
100
Thiscategoryincludespeoplethatareprofessionallylinkedtotherhinohornexchangesuchaswildlife
veterinarians,professionalhunters,gamecapturersandwildlifeinsurancebrokers.
101
Representativesofcharities,NGOsandothercivilsocietyorganizationswereinterviewed.
91
Insomeinstances,thecategorizationwasnotstraightforward.Acriminalactor,forexample,
mayalsofitthecommunity,conservationorlawenforcementcategory.Thesalient
categorizationrelevanttotheresearchquestionwaschoseninsuchcases.
Table3providesanoverviewofrespondentsbyregion.Themajorityofrespondentshailfrom
eitherSub-SaharanAfricaorSoutheastAsia.Thecategorizationreliesontheknowledgebase
andcontextoftherespondent.Forexample,someAsianrespondentswereinterviewedin
SouthAfricaandMozambique.Astheinterpretationoftheirdataisrelevanttounderstanding
theAsiandimensionsofthesupplychain,theyfallunderthe“Asia”category.
Table3:Respondentsbyregion
Region
Sub–SaharanAfrica
Asia
Australia
Europe
NorthAmerica
Numberofrespondents
239
102
5
10
4
360
Qualitativestudiesseldomencompassabigsample;thepresentstudyisthusunusual.
Critiquesofcasestudies,snowballingandpurposivesamplingtechniquesfaultthelackof
adherencetostandardsofrepresentativenessandthusgeneralizability(Miller2005:70).
Whilecognizantofsuchcritiques,thebigsizeofthissampleisattributabletotheillegalityof
therhinohornexchange,therelateddifficultyofnegotiatingaccessto‘experts’(rhino
criminals),andmostimportantly,theimportanceassignedtodataverification.Insome
instances,thetrustofgatekeepersortheproverbial‘footinthedoor’hadtobenegotiated
overaseriesofinterviewswithseveraldifferentrespondents.Inotherinstances,ittookafew
interviewsuntilintroductionstothe‘rightperson’weremade.Unstructuredinformal
interviewswereconductedwhentheopportunityarosetospeaktoofficials“offtherecord”
afterworkshopsorformalmeetings.Sometimesimpromptuinterviewsdevelopedat
researchsiteswithinformantsfromunexpectedcorners,suchaspatientswaitingtoseea
TCMdoctororpeoplegoingabouteverydaybusiness.Thelengthofinterviewsvariedfrom10
92
minutestocloseto5hours,averagingatapproximately2hoursperinterview.Theresearch
projectbenefittedgreatlyfromrespondents’goodwill,time,andtrust.
Theneedfordatatriangulationandverificationgrewascollecteddatastarteddivergingfrom
insightsfoundintheliteratureordifferedfromofficialpositionstakenbygatekeepersor
socialcontrolagents.Whilefact-checkingconstitutedoneresearchstrategy,equally
importantwastherequirementtoestablishthe“sociologicalpertinenceandanalytical
adequacyforexplainingthesocialpractices”ofrespondents(Waquant2002:1481).During
theinterviewingprocess,itprovedimportanttoreflectonwhowasbeinginterviewed,their
roleinthecommunityandsociety,andintherhinohornsupplychain.Moreover,I
interrogatedtheprocessandimplicationsof‘othering’,102leadingto“alienationandsocial
distance”betweenkeyactorsand‘supportingroles’(Krumer-Nevo/Sidi2012:300).Earlyin
theresearchphase,thefluidinterfacebetweenillegalityandlegalitywasrecognized.For
example,theambiguousroleofsocialcontrolagentsandbigbusinesswasdulyincludedand
researched.
(b) Focusgroups
Focusgroupswerearrangedwithvillagers,conservation,lawenforcementandgovernment
officials.Gatekeepersandkeyinformantsinitiatedsomefocusgroups;Iorganizedtheothers.
Insomeinstances,focusgroupsconstitutedthefollow-upinteractionofone-on-one
interviewsactivelysoughtoutbyrespondentswhopreferredagroupsetting.Onother
occasions,focusgroupsandmeetingsprovidedthespringboardforone-on-oneexchanges
lateron.BarbourandKitzinger(1999:4–5)regardasfocusgroup“anygroupdiscussion…as
longastheresearcherisactivelyencouragingandattentiveto,thegroupinteraction”.What
differentiatesfocusgroupsfromplaingroupinterviewsisthe“explicituseofgroup
interactiontogeneratedata”(Kitzinger/Barbour1999:4).Thesizeoffocusgroupsranged
102
Iusethesociologicalunderstandingoftheconceptof‘othering’,whichrefersto“theprocessofattaching
moralcodesofinferioritytodifference”(Krumer-Nevo/Sidi2012:300).Krumer-NevoandSidi(ibid)identify
objectification,de-contextualization,de-historicization,andde-authorizationasotheringmechanismsemployed
withregardstowomenlivinginpoverty.
93
fromthreetoeightparticipants.Focusgroupinteractionsprovedparticularlyusefulin
encouragingpeopletotalkfreelyabouttheimpact,drawbacksandbenefitsofpoachingto
thecommunity,governmentpolicyandactionandsensitivetopicssuchaspublicsector
corruption.
Michel(1999:36)warnsthatwhilefocusgroupsareusefulfortheidentificationofcollective
experiencesandsharedidentities,theymaysilencethevoicesofparticipantslowerinthe
social“peckingorder”(especiallywhenon-goingsocialrelationsmaybeaffectedbypublic
disclosure).Contrarytothiswarning,scholarsfromthefeministtraditionhavefoundthat
respondentsweremorelikelyto“self–discloseorsharepersonalexperiencesinagroup
settingthanindyadicsettings”duetofeeling“empoweredandsupportedinagroupsetting”
(Faraquhar/Das)1999:47).Theresearcher’sidentityandlinkedasymmetricpowerrelations
duetorace,genderandagemay,however,amplifythesensitivityoftheresearchtopic.The
presenceofayoungish103whitewomaninfluencedtheprocessofdatacollectionandwillbe
furtherproblematizedinthefinalsection.Focusgroupshelpedtoleveltheplayingfield,as
somerespondentsexpressedcomfortofbeingsurroundedbymembersoftheirpeergroupor
supportstructures.Assuranceofconfidentialityandanonymitywasparticularlyimportantfor
focusgroupsettings.
(c) Participantobservation
Participantobservationassistedinunderstandingandinterpretingtheresearchcontextand
howactorsinteractwithinagivenenvironment.Itinvolves“thesystematicviewingof
people’sactionsandtherecording,analysisandinterpretationoftheirbehaviour”(Gray2009:
397).Observationisintegraltomostqualitativeresearcher’stoolboxand,liketheother
methodsemployedcarriesethicalandsecurityconcernsparticularlywhereitinvolvesillegal
activities.Whiletheresearcherobservesthefield,shealsoinfluenceswhatsheisobserving
duetoherparticipation(Flick[1998]2014:312).Covertobservation(whenpeopledonot
knowthattheyarebeingobserved)isfavouredwhenthevalidityoftheresearchresultsmight
103
Iwasinmymid-30sduringtheperiodofactivefieldwork.
94
beinfluencedbypriorknowledgeoftheobservation.However,thisformofobservationis
ethicallyquestionableandfallsshortofspyingonothers.
Forthisproject,overtandinvitedparticipantobservationwasthepreferredmethod,which
included,amongstothers:accompanyinginvestigatorstocrimesceneinvestigations;visiting
thefencelinebetweenKrugerNationalParkandprivateconcessionsontheMozambican
side;anti–poachingpatrols;consultationswithTCMdoctors;rhinohornconsumptionandthe
observationoforganizationalandinstitutionalprocessesingovernmentdepartments,law
enforcementagencies,anti-poachingunits,conservationNGOsandIGOs.Duetosecurity
concerns,observationsatsomesitesremainedunannounced,suchasvisitstothemedicines
streetsanddistrictsofHongKong,Hanoi,CatBaandHoChiMinhCity;TCMparaphernalia
stallsandshopsinHanoi,HoChiMinhCityandBatThienh;TCMwholesalersinHanoi;and
observationsofvillagelifeinbordertownsandvillagesinMozambique.Theseobservations
assistedincontextualizingthesocialsettingandthelevelofembeddednessofcriminalactors,
theinterfacebetweenlegalityandillegality,interactionsbetweenrespondents,howthey
carriedthemselvesintheirdailyroutines,andbehavedintheirinteractionswiththestate.
Beyondthelistedobservations,observationaltechniqueswereusedtodeterminethe
credibilityofrespondents(Becker1958:654),whetherrespondentsvolunteeredordirected
information(Becker1958:655)andthesignificanceofbodylanguageofrespondentsinthe
interview,meetingoreverydaysocialsettings.Itisdifficulttocategorizesuchobservations
andusethemasevidentiaryprooffortheoreticalconclusions(Becker1958:666).To
compensateforthisdeficiency,theempiricalsectionsofthisdissertationrelyon‘thick
narratives’andtriangulationofdataandmethods.Theuseofthicknarrativeconveysthe
richnessofthedatacollectedduringthisproject.
(d) Participationinmeetings
Theopportunitytoparticipateinmeetings,workshopsandroundtablediscussionsdealing
withrhino-relatedmatterscontributedgreatlytounderstandingandcontextualizingpolicy
matters.Thisalsoprovidedtheopportunitytonetworkwithkeystakeholders,leadingto
follow-upinterviewsorintroductionstoimportantgatekeepers.Particularlyusefulwere
95
invitationstopresenttheobjectivesofthisresearchprojecttotheSouthAfricanNational
BiodiversityInvestigators’Forum,theDPCI(DepartmentofPriorityCrimeInvestigationsin
SouthAfrica),andstakeholdersoftheGreatLimpopoTransfrontierConservationArea,aswell
asmembersofthePolicingStudiesForumattheUniversityofHongKong.Othermeetings
(suchasattendingtheannualcongressofWildlifeRanchingSouthAfrica,anawarenessraising
campaignundertakenbytheCITESScientificAuthorityataprimaryschoolinHanoior
meetingsofprivaterhinoowners)werelessformalbutequallyinformativeandprovided
insightsonstakeholder’sperceptionsoftherhinoissue.
2.5Triangulationanddataanalysis
Theresearchdesignofmulti-sitedethnographyfacilitatedthegarneringofinsightsand
perspectivesfromdifferentactorsandplacesalongrhinohornflows,allowingfor
juxtapositionandcomparison.Qualitativedataanalysishasbeencriticizedduetosupposed
lackof“methodologicalrigour”,biasduetoresearchersubjectivity,thesmallnessofcases,as
wellas“limitedevidence”toinformempiricalandtheoreticalconclusions(Gray2009:493).
Earliersectionsofthischapterservedtoshowthata“rigorousandlogicalprocess”(ibid)was
followedinattachingmeaningandsubsequentanalysistothecollecteddata.Moreover,
multiplequalitativemethodswereadoptedasastrategytopromotescientificrigour.The
originalideabehindtheso-calledmethodoftriangulationwastoinstitutemeasurement
practicesinsocialandbehaviouralresearch.Triangulationservesasaresearchstrategy“to
comparetheevidencecollectedfromdifferentsourcestobetterunderstandthebiasesor
omissionsofeachandtoproduceamorecomprehensiveviewofthesocialphenomena”
(Espeland2005).Italsoreferstotheuseofdifferentdatasources(suchasstudying
phenomenaatdifferenttimes,indifferentplaces,aswellasgatheringdatafromdifferent
people),theuseofdifferentinterviewersand/ortheuseofmultipleperspectivesand
hypothesestogeneratetheories(Flick[1998]2014:183).104AccordingtoFlick([1998]2014),
104
Denzin(1970)differentiatesbetweendata,investigator,theoreticalandmethodologicaltriangulation.Forthe
purposesofPh.D.research,theuseofseveralinvestigatorswouldbeconstruedascheating.Nonetheless,
96
triangulationisnotastrategyortooltotestdatavaliditybutservesasanalternativeto
validation.Iuseddifferenttypesandsourcesofdata,approximatingfact-checkingundertaken
byinvestigativejournaliststoverifyinformationandsources(Espeland2005:66),105aswellas
multiplemethodsofdatacollection.Inaddition,theconsiderablenumberofresearch
informants,aswellassnowballandpurposivesamplingledtoheterogeneityoftheoverall
sampleandensuredthathiddenpopulationsreceivedavoice.Thus,theblendofmultiple
methods,empiricalmaterialsandperspectivesadded“rigour,breadthcomplexity,richness,
anddepth”(Denzin2012:82)tothestudy.
Forthepurposesofanalysis,dataemanatingfrombothfieldworkanddesktopresearchwere
analysedthroughoutthedatacollectionphase.Theprocesscontinuedoncetheactive
fieldworkphasehadended.Fieldnotes,audiorecordingsanddocumentsmadeuptheraw
data.Throughoutthedatacollectionprocess,extensivefieldnotesofinterviewsand
observationswerecreated.Interviewswererecorded,dependentontheconsentofthe
researchinformant.106ThetranscribingservicesofnativespeakersofShangaan/Tsonga107and
Vietnamesewereemployedforinterviewsthatwereconductedinlanguagesnotknownto
theresearcher.Localresearchassistantswereaskedtodoinsitutranslationsinthefield.It
washopedthatthetranscriberswouldcatchdetailsthatmayhavebeen‘lostintranslation’in
thefield.Theinterviewsweretranscribed,re-checkedforaccuracy,anonymizedandstoredin
secureandencryptedfolders.Relevantnewspaperarticles,policydocumentsandacademic
articleswerecollectedthroughouttheprojectandinsertedintoaself-deviseddatabaseonmy
laptop.Ialsocreatedmemostoreflectonthought-provokingaspectsofthedata,which
providedthebasisfordeeperanalysis(Miles/Huberman1994:44).
Whileinitialdataanalysisandthedevelopmentoftheconceptualframeworkweredone
collaborativeprojectsusingmorethanoneresearcherareusefulnotonlyfortriangulation,butcouldalsodeal
withissuesofpositionalityandrelatedbiases.
105
Investigativejournalistsusuallyconfirmasetofinformationthroughthreeindependentsources.
106
Recordingwasnotalwayspossibleduetothesensitivityofthesubjectmatterandtherequestbyrespondents
nottoberecorded.
107
TsongaandShangaanarelocallanguagesspokenbymanypeoplelivingadjacenttotheKNPonbothsidesof
theborder.Thetwolanguagesaresimilar.
97
manually,theNVivodataanalysissoftwarewasusedinthelaterstages.Opencodingallowed
forthedevelopmentofcodesthatcapturedtheessenceof‘new’theoreticalideasand
meaningsofdatathatcouldnotbeintegratedintopreconceivedcodessuchasthenotionof
contestedillegalityandthecoordinationproblemofsecurity.Thisallowedthedata“tospeak
forthemselves”(Glaser/Strauss1967:101).Ofimportancewastheapplicationoftheoretical
ratherthandescriptivecodes,whichIdevelopedthroughprimarydatacollection.Moreover,
theviewsofrespondentswereverified,criticallyassessedandinterpretedintheprocess
(Gibbs2007:54–55).Data–drivencodingwassupplementedwithconcept-drivencoding
derivedfrompreviousstudiesintheliterature,topicscoveredduringtheinterviewprocess
andhunches(Gibbs2007:44–45).Framesandframingprocesseswerealsoconsideredduring
theanalysisofbothprimaryandsecondarydata.Goffman(1974:21)conceivedofthenotion
offramestodenote“schemataofinterpretation”,whichallowsindividuals“tolocate,
perceive,identifyandlabel”eventsintheireverydaylivesandthewidersocialsystem.He
arguesthataspeopleframethe“organizationoftheirexperience,theybuttress,and
perforce,self–fulfillingly”whichleadsthemto“developacorpusofcautionarytales,games,
riddles,experiments,newsystoriesandotherscenarioswhichelegantlyconfirmaframe–
relevantviewoftheworkingsoftheworld”(Goffman1974:563).Textswerescrutinizedfor
attributionofcausality,blameanddelineationbetween‘good’and‘evil’(adversarialframing)
(Schwellnus2012).Formsofothering,differentiationbetweengoodversusbad(suchasthe
notionof“goodhunters”versus“badpoachers”)andculturalrelativistframeworkswere
significantelementsintheanalysisofcognitiveframes.
2.6Grayareasofsocialresearch:Researchethics
Whenresearchingthesocialworldandpeople,socialscientistsshouldconsidertheimpactof
theirresearchontheresearchparticipants,thesocialenvironment,andtheemotionaland
psychologicalimpactonthemselves.Thisresearchprojectfallsintothecategoryofwhat
SieberandStanley(:49)describeas“sociallysensitiveresearch”:
98
“Sociallysensitiveresearchreferstostudiesinwhichtherearepotentialsocial
consequencesorimplications,eitherdirectlyfortheparticipantsoftheresearchorthe
classofindividualsrepresentedbytheresearch.”
Whilethepursuitofgreaterknowledgeislaudable,“respectforhumandignity”shouldbethe
guidingprincipleofsocialresearch(Bulmer2008:146).Intheaftermathofcontroversialsocial
sciencesexperimentssuchasthoseundertakenbyMilgram,ZimbardoandRosenhan,the
infamousProjectCamelot(David/Sutton2011:31–32)andsocialresearchinterpreted
througharacial,racistorideologicallensduringtheapartheidregimeinSouthAfrica
(Bless/Higson-Smith/Kagee2006:140–141),108theneedforanhonestengagementwith
ethicsofanysocialsciencesresearchhasbecomeaxiomatic.SieberandStanley(1988:50)list
fouraspectsofscientificactivitythatrequirescrutiny,including:“theformulationoftheories
orresearchquestions,theconductofresearchandthetreatmentofparticipants,the
institutionalsettinginwhichtheresearchisconducted,andtheinterpretationandapplication
oftheresearchfindings.”
AlthoughtheMaxPlanckSociety109endorsesfreedomofresearch,110restrictionsapply
concerningresearchthatundermines“othersignificantconstitutionallyprotectedvalues”
108
TheCarnegieCorporationofNewYorkfundedthefirstmajorsociologicalstudyinSouthAfrica,whichdelved
intothepoorWhitesphenomenon(Welsh1981:28).Inits1932report,theCommissionrecommendedthat
transitionaljobreservationshouldbeintroducedinordertoaddressthe“poor-Whiteproblem”(Webster1981:
90).Noconsiderationwaspaidtotheproblemsofpoorblackpeople.Theresearchwasdesignedtoproffer
ideologiesofwhitesupremacyduringthecolonialera(Bless/Higson-Smith/Kagee2006:139).HendrikVerwoerd,
theintellectualfatherofapartheid,startedhisdubiouscareerasasociologistattheUniversityofStellenbosch.
HedeclaredthatblackSouthAfricansneededto“’administered’and‘properlyserviced’sothattheycanfunction
intheirprescribedrole”(Adam1981:119).Verwoerd’scareerandtheabuseofsocialresearchtofirmly
entrenchtheapartheidideologyisamatterofhistoricalrecord.Duringtheapartheidregime,manyquestionable
researchandscienceprogrammeswereintroducedandusedtoupholdthedominantCalvinistandracist
apartheidideology.AnothernotoriousexampleisProjectCoast,thecovertchemicalandbiologicalwarfare
programmeledbyWouterBasson,alsoknownas‘DoctorDeath’.Theprogrammeproducedandtestednarcotic
drugsandpoisonsfortheuseagainstanti–apartheidactivists(Singh,J.A.2008:5).Scoresofscientists
collaboratedonProjectCoast,whichalsoincludedaeugenicstrategytocontrolpopulationgrowthamongstthe
blackpopulationbydevelopingaclandestineanti–fertilityvaccine.Thevaccinewasgoingtobeselectively
administeredtoblackSouthAfricans(Singh,J.A.2008:6);fortunately,theendofapartheidsubvertedthese
plans.ChandreGould(2002)arguesthatProjectCoastoffersimportantlessonsonwhyscientistsgetinvolvedin
questionableresearch,suchasprofessionalambition,thedesiretodointerestingscience,patriotismand
financialgain.Between1960and1991,theSouthAfricanDefenceForcealsoimplementedaversiontherapyto
‘heal’gaymenandlesbiansfromtheir‘deviant’sexualpreferences.Thisso-calledtherapyincludedforcedsex
changeoperations,chemicalsterilizationandelectricshocktreatments(Eybers2000;Kaplan2004).
109
TheMaxPlanckInstitutefortheStudyofSocieties(MPIfG)providedfinancial,administrativeandadvisory
assistanceforthisproject.TheMPIfGisoneof82researchinstitutesthatoperateundertheumbrellaoftheMax
PlanckSociety.
99
(MaxPlanckSociety2010:3).Italsoacknowledgesthedangerofmisappropriationof“neutral
orusefulperse”research“forharmfulpurposes”bythirdparties(ibid).111Allresearch
(includingthisresearchproject)conductedthroughinstitutesaffiliatedwiththeMaxPlanck
Societyaregovernedbystrictethicalandlegallimitations.112AnEthicsCommissionprovides
supporton“issuesofresearchethics,mediatesdifferencesofopinionbetweenresearchers
onrelevantmattersandissuesrecommendationsontheimplementationofresearch
projects”(MaxPlanckSociety2010:10).TheMaxPlanckSociety’sprinciplesofethically
responsibleresearchprovidedtheinstitutionalblueprinttonavigatingthroughethicalissues
duringtheproject.Inaddition,Ihadpreviousexperienceinundertakingfieldworkinto
human,drugandnaturalresourcetraffickingandbroaderorganizedcrimeissuesamongst
vulnerable,disenfranchisedandcriminalpopulationsinsouthernAfrica.Membersofthe
Ph.D.advisorycommittee,fellowresearchersandsociologists,aswellastherelevant
authorities(forexampletheresearchguideappointedbytheDepartmentofCorrectional
Services)advisedonspecificaspectssuchastheinterviewingprocessinprisons.
Manyethicalissueswereencounteredduringinceptionandinthecourseoftheresearch
project.Inthefollowingsubsections,issuesofanonymityandconfidentiality,informed
consent,powerdifferentialsbetweentheresearcherandrespondents,reciprocityand
securityconcernsarediscussed.
110
Considerationsofwhatisethicalorunethicalinbroadersocietyinfluencethesuccessofresearchquestions
andproposals(David/Sutton2011:39).Rhinonarrativesarefraughtwithethicalconcerns,suchaswhetherto
endorselegaltradeofakeratin-likesubstancewithlimitedprovenmedicaleffects,theuseofrhinohornfor
medicinalpurposes(cancercure),thehighervaluationofwildanimalsoverhumanbeings,callsforshoot-to-kill
enforcementagainstpoachers,orcultural-relativistassessmentsovertheuseofanimalproductsintraditional
medicines.
111
TheKaiserWilhelmSociety,theMaxPlanckSociety’spredecessor,carriedoutunethicalexperimentsand
researchduringthenationalsocialistregimeinGermany.Thislegacyhasledtothedevelopmentof
comprehensiveguidelinesnotonlydealingwithgeneralresearchethicsbutalsowithclearlydelineated
responsibilitiesofindividualresearchersandresearchinstitutes(MaxPlanckSociety2001).
112
AnexcerptfromtheMaxPlanckSociety’sprinciplesofethicallyresponsibleresearchstates:
“TheMaxPlanckSocietyundertakestocarryoutresearchwhichextendstheboundariesofknowledge
andenhancesthewelfareofmankindandtheprotectionoftheenvironment.Scientistsmusttherefore
preventorminimizedirectorindirectharmtohumansandtheenvironmentasfaraspossible.
Researchersmustnotsatisfythemselveswithadheringtolegalregulationswhenmakingapplicable
decisions,butmustalsotakeaccountofethicalprinciples(MaxPlanckSociety2010:6).”(Author’s
emphasis)
100
2.6.1Informedconsent
Theprincipleofinformedconsentiswell-establishedinthemedicalfraternity.Itbecamea
researchstandardintheaftermathofatrocitiescommittedagainstconcentrationcamp
inmatesinthenameofmedicalsciencesattheNurembergtrials(Gilbert2008:150).Since
then,theprinciplehasbecomeacornerstoneofnaturalandsocialscienceresearchinvolving
humansubjects.AccordingtoBerg(citedin:David/Sutton2011:43),informedconsententails
“theknowingconsentofindividualstoparticipateasandexerciseoftheirchoice,freefrom
anyelementoffraud,deceit,duress,orsimilarunfairinducementormanipulation.”Whilethe
principleprovidesa“legalremedy”primarilyinhealthresearch,informedconsentisbyno
meansthestopgapforethicalconcerns(Malone2003:813).O’Neillcommentsthatmany
researchdesignsaretoocomplexforlay-personstomakeaninformeddecisionaboutthe
impactoftheresearch(basedonapresentationbyO’Neill,whichiscitedin:
Richardson/McMullan2007:1116).Despitethesevalidconcerns,theprincipleofinformed
consentwasupheldinthisresearchproject.
Withtheexceptionofthecovertparticipantobservationsmentionedearlier,allrespondents
consentedtoparticipatingintheresearch.Usuallyanintervieworfocusgroupwaspreceded
byeitheratelephonic,emailintroductionoranintroductoryvisit.Theresearcherpointedout
thatparticipationintheinterviewwasvoluntaryandthattheinformantcouldwithdrawat
anystage.Itiscustomarytoexchangebusinesscardsinsomesettings(e.g.Asia).Ialways
carriedinstitutionalbusinesscards,whichprovidedalocalcontactnumberandemailaddress.
Nophysicaladdress(otherthantheMPIfG’saddressinCologne)wasgivenasasecurity
precaution.Afterpersonalintroductions,theinstitutionalbackgroundandresearchwere
introduced.Priortocommencinganyinterview,Iexplainedtheobjectivesoftheresearch,
issuesofconfidentiality,anonymityanddataprotection.Respondentswereencouragedto
discusstheirconcernsandanyissuesarising.
Researchershavetoapplyforresearchpermitstoconductresearchwithinpublicinstitutions
inSouthAfrica.113Theresearchregistrationprocesscanstretchoverseveralmonths.Permits
113
Althoughcommoninothercountries,thestrictresearchpermitsystemappearstobearelicofSouthAfrica’s
apartheidpast.Backthenresearcherswererequiredtoobtainresearchpermitsfromeitherthecentral
governmentorlocalauthoritiestoconductresearchinSouthAfricanhomelandsandtownships.Thepermit
101
stipulatewithwhomtheresearchermayinteract,howthedataistobeusedand
disseminated.Duetothe‘sensitivenature’ofrhinopoaching,therelevantresearchand
scientificcommitteesscrutinizeresearchproposalscarefullyandatlength,vettingprospective
researchersastheymaywellbe‘wolvesinsheepskin’.Thereareobviousandlessobvious
dangerstoconductingfieldworkinnationalparks,wherehighly–armedpoachersandanti–
poachingpersonnelroamthebush.Notonlyistheretheriskofaccidentaldeathofthe
researcherinthefield(apublicitydisasterislikelytoensue),therearejustifiedfearsthat
institutionalweaknessesandoperationalproceduresmaybesharedwiththirdpartiesor
exposedonpublicplatforms.Throughouttheresearchprocess,IhadtoconfirmthatIwasnot
affiliatedwithintelligencebodies,lawenforcementauthoritiesormediahouses.Oncemy
academiccredentialshadbeenconfirmedandfearsofintelligencegatheringhadbeen
dismissed,mypresencewaseitheracceptedorendured–dependingonthegeneralattitude
andapproachabilityoftheresearchparticipants,theirworkload,otherinstitutionalpressures
andidiosyncrasies.Therequesttosharedatasetswiththepermittingauthorities(SANParks
andEzemveloKZNWildlife)wasgentlydeclined,andgraciouslyaccepteduponexplanation
whyitwouldbeunethicaltodoso.Thestandardresearchcontractisaimedatnaturalscience
researchers,whoconductecologicalorbiologicalresearchintheparks.Unlikemostsocial
sciencesresearchthatdealswithpeople,societyandtheirmeanings,naturalsciences
datasetscanbesharedandcheckedforreproducibility.
TheresearchpermissionobtainedfromtheDepartmentofCorrectionalServices(DCS)
stipulatesthatresearchersneedtoobtainwrittenpermissionfromeachoffenderbefore
commencinginterviews.Theresearchguide114providedadepartmental“indemnityform”
(AppendixB),whichwastranslatedintoVietnameseandMandarintoenableoffendersto
readtheformintheirnativetongue.Oneoutofthirtyoffendersrefusedtosigntheformon
groundsofallegedlyhavingbeendupedbylawenforcementagenciesintosigningan
admissionofguiltform.Theinterviewcouldnotproceed.
stipulatedthatpermit-holdershavetosharetheirdraftswiththepermittingauthoritypriortopublication
(Welsh1981:34–35).Severaldraftresearchcontractsforthisprojectstipulatedpriorapprovalofthedraft
researchreport(thePh.D.dissertation)priortosubmission.Thesecontractswereamendedtoreflectthatthe
dissertationwouldbesharedwiththepermittingauthorityonceithadbeensubmittedandaccepted.
114
TheDCSResearchCommitteeappointsdepartmentalresearchguidesthatactasresearchcoordinators
betweentheresearcherandtheDepartment.
102
Informedconsentshouldnotbeaonce-offengagementbutanon-goingprocess(Sieber:38).
Somerespondentswerevisitedmorethanonce;itwashenceimportanttore-checktheir
willingnesstoengagewiththeresearcher,whethertheywerecontentwiththeinterview
processorhadanysuggestionsforimprovement.Moreover,updatesonthefieldworkand
subsequentwritingprocesswereprovidedtosomekeyinformantsandotherswhohad
requestedupdatesontheprogressoftheproject.
2.6.2Anonymityandconfidentiality
Sincetheeconomicexchangeofrhinohornisillegal,theassuranceofanonymity,
confidentialityanddataprotectionwasveryimportantinestablishingtrustandrapportwith
respondents.Accordingtoveteranscholarsofinformalandillegalmarketsinsub-Saharan
AfricaEllisandMacGaffey(1996:24),thelikelihoodofgainingthetrustofinformants“will
dependinpartonthedegreeofillegalityofthecommoditiesbeingexchanged,onlocal
politics,onstatepoliciesandtheirimplementationorlackofitandontheextentof
involvementofstateofficialsandthedegreetowhichtheyenforcethelaw”.
Theprinciplesofanonymity,confidentialityanddataprotectionwereadheredtothroughout
andintheaftermathofdatacollection.Althoughsomeintervieweeswereindifferentabout
anonymity,forthesakeofconsistencyallquotesfrominterviewsandfocusgroupswere
anonymized.Wheredirectquotesareused,thegeneralattributesandcontextofthe
intervieweearegiven(asperthebreakdowninthesamplingsection).Respondentswhohad
privilegedknowledgeofillegalactivitiesconnectedtorhinopoaching,traffickingortrade
wererequestednottotalkaboutspecificpersons(oratleastnottomentiontheirreal
names),crimelocationsorplannedcriminalacts.Aguidingrulewasthatiftheresearcher
weretolearnaboutaseriousoffencebeingplanned,shewouldinformtheauthorities.Unlike
relationshipsbasedontheprincipleofprivilegedcommunicationfoundbetweendoctorsand
patientsorlawyersandclients,researchersandtheirrespondentsarenotprotectedbythe
sameprinciple(Sandberg/Copes2013:189).Theresearchertookaguardedandcautious
approachduringtheinterviewprocessinSouthAfricanprisonsbecause“indealingwith
103
inmates,aresearcherisinapositionwhereinadvertentlyperhaps,hemightbeinformedof
unresolvedcrimes,ofplanstodisturbprisonroutineortobreakjail,ofcorruptionamongst
guards,orofvicewithinthewalls”(NewmanquotedinSchlosser2008:8).Inmateswere
requestedtofocusontheirlifestoriesandinvolvementwithrhinosonlyandtoforego
mentioningspecificnamesandplaces.Whileassuringprisonersofnolinkagestothepoliceor
media,theywerediscouragedfromdisclosingpotentiallydamaginginformationduringthe
interview.
Duringfieldwork,theNationalAssemblyofSouthAfricapassedthecontroversialProtectionof
StateInformationAct(2010);atthetimeofwriting,theStatePresidenthadnotyetsignedoff
theAct.Concernedwiththeregulation,classification,anddisseminationofstateinformation,
theActisalreadyimpactingdatacollectionofresearchersandnewsgatheringofjournalists.
Onceenacted,obtainingclassifiedstateinformation“unlawfullyandintentionally”is
punishablewithextendedprisonsentences.115Whilelawsgoverningespionagearestandard
aroundtheworld,therearereasonablefearsthatSouthAfricanministersandintelligence
staffwillobtaindiscretionarypowersofclassificationthroughthenewlegislation.South
Africangovernmentrepresentativesareawareofthenewlaw,whichmadetheofficial
authorizationoftheresearchproject,intheformofresearchpermits,anabsolutenecessity.
Manygovernmentofficialstookacautiousapproachbyprovidingtheofficialpositiononrhino
issues.SouthAfricanparkofficials(includinganti-poachingpersonnel)havetosignasecrecy
clauseintheiremploymentcontract.Disclosureofincriminatingorprivilegedinformationto
thirdpartiescouldpotentiallyleadtotheterminationoftheemploymentcontract(Interview
115
Section41oftheActdealswiththepossessionanddisclosureofclassifiedinformation:
“Anypersonwhounlawfullyandintentionallydisclosesorisinpossessionofclassifiedstateinformationin
contraventionofthisActisguiltyofanoffenceandisliabletoafineorimprisonmentforaperiodnotexceeding
fiveyears,exceptwheresuchdisclosureorpossession—
(a)isprotectedorauthorisedundertheProtectedDisclosuresAct,2000(ActNo.26of2000),theCompaniesAct,
2008(ActNo.71of2008),thePreventionandCombatingofCorruptActivitiesAct,2004(ActNo.12of2004),the
NationalEnvironmentalManagementAct,1998(ActNo.107of1998),ortheLabourRelationsAct,1995(ActNo.
66of1995);
(b)isauthorisedintermsofthisActoranyotherActofParliament;or
(c)revealscriminalactivity,includinganycriminalactivityintermsofsection45ofthisAct.
104
withparkofficials,2013).Thisclauseseemstoensconceanatmosphereofsecrecyand
concealmentasregardstowhathappensat“GroundZero”inconservationareas.116
Researchassistantsandtranscribershadtosignconfidentialityagreements,andanencrypted
platformwasusedtotransmitrecordingsandtranscriptions.Moreover,oncetheir
assignmentswereconcluded,alldatarelatingtotheprojecthadtobedeleted.Alldevices
usedinthecourseoftheresearcharepasswordprotected;dataisencryptedandsecurely
stored.Atnostagewasinterviewdatasharedwiththirdpartiesalthoughsuchrequestswere
receivedonoccasionfromlawenforcementagentsandjournalists(thesectiononreciprocity
willdealwiththisinmoredetail).
2.6.3Positionalityoftheresearcher
Thereisaneedtocontextualizethebackgroundoftheresearcherandexplainwhythismay
beimportantinsituatingresearchmethods,datalimitations,andvalidity.Iamawhiteyoung
marriedSouthAfricanwomanwithNamibianandGermanroots,whoconductedtheresearch
withinstitutionalandfinancialbackingbyaGermanresearchinstitute.Thereisnodoubtthat
thesepersonalandinstitutionalattributesinfluencedtheresearchprocessandoutcome.
Anyexplanationofsociallifeis“filteredthroughthelensesoflanguage,gender,socialclass,
raceandethnicity”(Weiner-Levy2009:8).Inessence,aperson’sbackground,socialization,
socialcapitalandpersonalattributesimpactaccessinthefield,choiceofmethodsand
researchoutcomes.Withinthesocialsciences,along–standingriftexistsbetweenproponents
ofeither‘insider’or‘outsider’research.Inhisanalysisofthe‘insiderdoctrine’,RobertMerton
(1972:11)commented:
“Within[the]contextofsocialchange,wecomeuponthecontemporaryrelevanceof
along-standingprobleminthesociologyofknowledge:theproblemofpatterned
differentialsamongsocialgroupsandstratainaccesstocertaintypesofknowledge.In
itsstrongform,theclaimisputforwardasamatterofepistemologicalprinciplethat
particulargroupsineachmomentofhistoryhavemonopolisticaccesstoparticular
kindsofknowledge.Intheweaker,moreempiricalform,theclaimholdsthatsome
116
Insomeinstances,simplerequestsforuncontroversialdataorfollow-upinterviewshadtobeclearedbythe
immediatesuperiordespitetheresearchauthorization.
105
groupshaveprivilegedaccess,withothergroupsalsobeingabletoacquirethat
knowledgeforthemselvesbutatgreaterriskandcost.”
The‘doctrineofinsiderism’emergedinthe1960sasacounterpointtothedominanceof
whitemeninWesternacademicinstitutions.Itholdsthatonlyinsiderscantrulyunderstand
andinterpretthesociallifeofthe‘underdog’,includingstudiesonAfricanAmericans(Merton
1972:13),womenintheGlobalSouth(Narayan1999)orindigenouspeople(Brayboy/Deyhle
2000;Zinn1979).Advocatesofthedoctrinearguethatmembersofthedominantor
privilegedstratacannotrelateorunderstandmechanismsofdomination.Infact,the
‘whiteness’ofresearchersmayreinforcesystemsofexploitation(Zinn1979),perpetuatethe
superiorityof‘theself’juxtaposednextto‘theother’(Cesara1982)ornormalizea
‘homogenized’approach(Abbott2006:326).EdwardSaid(1979:43)addsthefilterof
‘orientalism’–the‘westisbest’–avisionthatpromotes“thedifferencebetweenthefamiliar
(Europe,theWest,‘us’)andthestrange(theOrient,theEast,‘them’).”Followersofthe
positivistscienceparadigm,ontheotherhand,promote“inquiryfromtheoutside”.The
approachrecommendsthatscholarsdetachfromtheresearchsubjectandactneutrally
(Brannick/Coghlan2007:60).Itisarguedthat“overfamiliarity”and“insiderknowledge”
compromisestheresearchprocess(Lawhon/Herrick/Daya2014:18).Moreover,the
assumptionthatinsiders“automaticallyhaveamoresophisticatedandappropriateapproach
tounderstandingsocialrealityin‘their’society”isreferredto‘asfallingintothefallacyof
ThirdWorldism’(Sidaway1992:406).117Itmaybeusefultoavoidbifurcationofinsidersand
outsidersbecauseresourceful‘outsiders’haveshowntheabilitytomovealongthe‘outsider–
insidercontinuum’andachieveacceptance,even‘insider’statusamongsttheresearched–
“goingnative”–asevidencedinlegendaryethnographiesundertakenbyRabinow(1977)in
Morocco,118Malinowski(1979)intheWesternPacificregion,andGeertzandhiswifeonJava
(1976).Pragmatistsarelikelytorecommendthemiddleground;Merton’scall(1972:44)for
insidersandoutsiderstouniteisperhapsinstructiveinthisinstance.
117
Thefallacyof‘ThirdWorldism’renegesontheassumptionthatresearchersfromtheGlobalSouthshouldonly
researchThirdWorldtopics.
118
Rabinowachievednotorietyorcultstatus(dependingonwhoisjudging)forsharingdetailsofasexual
encounterwithaBerberwomaninhisbookreflectingonhisexperiencesduringfieldworkinMorocco–no
doubt,aboldattempttoachieve‘insiderstatus’.
106
Itstandstoarguethatthisresearchprojectcomprisesboth‘insider’and‘outsider’
perspectives.Whilethehermeneutictraditionof“subjectiveinterpretation”(understanding
socialreality“byinterpretingthemeaningsheldbysocialactorsormembersofthesocial
group”)wasfollowed,Iwouldstepbackandconsiderthereliabilityandvalidityofdata
(Brannick/Coghlan2007:63–64),andhowmyownbiasesmightinfluencetheinterpretation
ofmeanings(Maykut/Morehouse1994:123).Despitemyparents’activeoppositiontothe
apartheidregimeinpre-independentNamibia,thereisnodenyingthatIwasborninto“white
privilege”orwhatLawhonandcolleagues(2014:18)label“themostaffluentandempowered
socialstratum”.119Itisnotunusualforresearchersfromaprivilegedbackgroundtotaketopdown,‘selfversusothers’approachestosamplingandinterviewingwithoutcriticallyassessing
thepowerdifferentialsbetweentheresearcherandtheresearched(Schmid2010:170–172).
GiventhelegacyofapartheidandcolonialisminSouthernAfrica(andinAsia),Iwasconcerned
aboutacknowledgingpossiblebias,dismissingstereotypedperceptionsandItooknoteof
formsof‘othering’expressedduringtheinterviewingprocess.While‘othering’andsituational
powerdynamicscanhappenunknowinglyandsubliminallyininterpersonalinteractions,so
canfeelingsofempathy,understanding,comprehensionofattendantlifeexperiencesand
ideologiescontributetothebridgingofcleavages(Weiner-Levy2009:3).Myapproachwasto
exudeempathyandunderstandingwithoutbeingdismissiveorjudgmentalduringthe
researchproject.Severalscholarshaveshownthat‘emotionwork’canoverrulethe
researcher’spositionalityandleveltheplayingfield(Weiner-Levy2009;Dickson-Swiftetal.
2009).
Inpractice,thewindsofchangeblowslowlythroughmanypartsofsouthernAfrica,where
cleavagesbasedonasymmetricalpowerrelationshipsofyesteryearpersist.Mostofthe
actorsinvolvedintheillegalrhinohorntradechainaremen,whichmayleadtoaonedimensionalfocusonmen’slivedexperiences(Chambers1983:77).Themarketisembedded
insociety,andthus,Ipurposefullyincludedwomentoassesshowpoaching,trafficking,and
consumptionofrhinohornimpactedtheirdailylivesandsocietalstructures.Concerted
119
Inits2013assessmentofinequalityacrosscountries,theUnitedNationsDevelopmentProgrammefound
SouthAfricatobethemostunequalsocietyintheworld(UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme2013).The
assessmentwasbasedonthecontroversialGinicoefficientmethod,whichhasbeencriticizedonmanyaccounts,
includingthatitdisregardsthesocialgrantssysteminSouthAfrica(Donnelly2013).Controversiesaside,deep
andgrowingeconomicandsocialcleavagespersistmorethan20yearsaftertheendofapartheid.
107
effortsweremadetoleveltheplayingfieldbetweentheresearcherandtheresearched.As
mentionedearlier,theprinciplesofinformedconsent,anonymity,confidentialityanddata
protectionwereethicalcornerstones.Moreover,respondentswereencouragedtotake
controloftheresearchprocessbyhavingtheoptiontowithdrawfromtheinterviewatany
stage,inviteotherstoparticipateintheinterview,directtheflowofinformationby
withholdingoronlypartiallyansweringsensitivequestions(Scheyvens2014:9).Duetothe
unstructured,interactiveandnarrative-conversationalstyleoftheinterviews,research
participantshadconsiderableandimplicitcontrolovertheinterviewprocess(Corbin/Morse
2003:338).Researchinformantsonlytoldtheirstoryiftheyfeltateasewiththeresearcher.
Unlessthereweresecurityconcerns,respondentschosethelocationoftheinterviewand
determinedhowmuchtimetheyweregoingtodedicate.Whenasuitableinterpreterwas
available,theyweregiventheoptionofgettinginterviewedintheirpreferredlanguage.
Itookaccountoftheprioritiesofrespondentsontheground(Raghuram/Madge2006:276)
andreassessedtherelevanceoftheresearchquestion,methodsandapproachthroughout
thedatacollectionprocess.Academicproceduresandprocessesusuallyallowlittleflexibility
onceresearchprojectshavebeenapproved.Inthisinstance,theMPIfG,myadvisors,andthe
researchcoordinatorsupportedunscheduledchangesoradditions,suchasadaptingthe
researchfocus,extendingstaysandaddingadditionalresearchsites.Greatcarewastakento
respectandcomplywithlocalcustomsandtraditionsinsouthernAfricaandSoutheastAsia.
Localresearchassistantswereemployedtobridgecultural,socialandlanguagedivides.
Permissiontovisitandconductinterviewswassoughtfromcommunityleaders,traditional
chiefsorcommunitygatekeeperswhenenteringvillagecommunities.120
120
VillagecommunitieslivingontheedgeoftheKrugerNationalParkhavebeenlabelledas“smugglertowns”,
“poachingvillages”or“criminalisedcommunities”inpublicnarratives.Manyprivateandpublicspooks,aswellas
journalistsandfilmmakers,havevisitedtheregion,oftendisrespectingthemostbasicrulesofsocialengagement
suchasrespectforthedignityofcommunitymembers,privacyandpoliteness.Ilearntofoutrightdisrespectand
trespassingatthehandofsuchactorsduringfocusgroupswithcommunitymembersin2013.Spooksand
journalistswouldtakerandompicturesofvillagersandtheirdwellingswithouttheirconsent,labellingthemas
‘poachers’and‘housesbuiltfromtheproceedsofpoaching’insubsequentpublications.Forexample,aprivate
intelligencereport(inmypossession)reproducedthepictureofawell-knownconservatorgoingaboutdaily
choresinMassingir,fingeringhimasapersonofinterest.Whilemanycommunitymembersmightbeliving
belowthebreadline,theydohavereadyaccesstothemediafurtheraggravatingasenseof‘othering’,andthe
implicitcriminalizationofthewholecommunityinsteadofafew.Inhotpursuitofaninterviewwithapoaching
kingpininMozambique,aSwedish-Germanjournalistteamborethebruntofthegrowingangerandfatigueof
affectedcommunities(Grill2015).Theywenttoseekoutapoachingkingpinathisprivateresidencewithoutan
invitationorintroduction.Oninstructionbythekingpin,abiggroupofvillagersaccusedtheduooftrespassing.
108
Attemptsweremadetoseekoutassistantstowhomtheresearchwouldbebeneficialnot
onlyinfinancialtermsbutalsoinfurtheringpersonalambitionssuchascareeradvancement
inthefieldofresearch,translation,transcriptionoractingasa‘fixer’.Astheresearchwas
undertakentowardsaPh.D.,co–authorshiporanyassistancebeyondresearchfacilitation
wouldconstituteabreachofintellectualownershipandisnotallowedbythedoctoraldegree
regulationsoftheUniversityofCologne.121Toshowcourtesyandrespect,Ipickedupbasic
languageskillstobeabletogreetandthankresearchinformantsintheirmothertongue.122
ThesamplealsoincludedtheinterviewingofpoliticalandeconomicelitesinsouthernAfrica
andSoutheastAsia.Theaimwastoassesstheirroleandagencyinthedevelopmentand
implementationofwildlifeconservationpolicies.In-depthknowledgeoftherhinofield,
familiaritywiththerespondent’sbackground,organizationalcultureandculturalnormsof
behaviourfacilitatedgainingtheirtrustandestablishingrapport(Mikecz2012:482).
Decorum,etiquette,punctualityandformaldresssenseassistedinimprovingtheresearcher’s
positionality.Eliteinterviewersrecommendthattheresearchershouldshowflexibilityto
accommodatethebusyschedulesofelites(Odendahl/Shaw2001:312).Theresearcherdid
notdifferentiatebetweeneliteandotherinterviewees.Itwasassumedthateachrespondent
hadmoreimportantthingstotakecareofthantalktoaresearcher.Asaconsequence,I
displayedutmostflexibilityasregardsthetime,lengthandvenueoftheinterview.Ihad
undertakeninterviewswithelitesinthepastdecade.Withincreasingmaturityandagrowing
professionalreputation,elitesappearedto‘takememoreseriously’.Odendahlsharesthis
Theywerearrestedallegedlyoninstructionbytworhinopoachingkingpinsandheldinpoliceholdingcellsfora
fewdays.Thejournalistsacknowledgedthattheyshouldhaveintroducedthemselvestothecommunityelderin
amagazinearticleaftertheirrelease,whichwasbrokeredthroughhigh-leveldiplomaticintervention.
BartholomäusGrill’ssideofthestorycanbeaccessedat:
http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/investigation-into-rhino-poaching-turns-into-kidnapping-a1022611.html
121
IparticipatedinthejointPh.D.programmeoftheInternationalMaxPlanckResearchSchoolontheSocialand
PoliticalConstitutionoftheEconomyandtheFacultyofManagement,EconomicsandSocialSciencesofthe
UniversityofCologne.The“Promotionsordnung”canbefoundat:
http://www.wiso.unikoeln.de/fileadmin/wiso_fak/fakultaet/dokumente/forschung/Promotion/Promotionsordnung_EN.pdf
122
Respondentsspokethefollowinglanguages:Shangaan,Tsonga,Zulu,Xhosa,Venda,Afrikaans,English,
Portuguese,Vietnamese,CantoneseandMandarin.IamfluentinAfrikaansandEnglishandhavesomeverybasic
XhosaandPortugueselanguageskills.
109
observation(ibid)andwarnsthatelitesareusedtobeinginchargeandresearchersshould
readnon–verbalcues(2001:312).Althoughconsciousofstatusandpowerdifferentials,Idid
notmakespecialprovisions(beingmoresubmissiveorassertive)whendealingwithelites.An
egalitarianapproachwaspursuedwherebyallrespondentsweretreatedlike“elites”.
Whileempathyandsharedideologiescanbridgepre–existingcleavagesofethnicity,religion,
andgender,sociologistsandcriminologistsareoftenaccusedofbiasinfavourofthe
“underdog”(Becker1967;Liebling2001).Becker(1967:241–242)describesthechargeofbias
asfollows:
“Associologists,weprovokethechargeofbias,inourselvesandothers,byrefusingto
givecredenceanddeferencetoanestablishedstatusorder,inwhichknowledgeof
truthandtherighttobeheardarenotequallydistributed.“Everyoneknows”that
responsibleprofessionalsknowmoreaboutthingsthanlaymen,thatpolicearemore
respectableandtheirwordsoughttobetakenmoreseriouslythanthoseofdeviants
andcriminalswithwhomtheydeal.Byrefusingtoacceptthehierarchyofcredibility,
weexpressdisrespectfortheentireestablishedorder.”
Howdoresearchersdealwithtakingsides?Beckerarguesthatitisimpossiblenottotake
sides.However,researchersshouldensurethatresearch“meetsthestandardsofgood
scientificwork”byusing“precautionarymeasures”designedtoguardagainstthe
manipulationofresearchtools,theories,andtechniques(Becker1967:246).Thedangerof
presentingone’sresearchas“objective,scientificandprecise”(Bosworthetal.2005:258)lies
inthesuperficialtreatmentofpowerdifferentialsbetweentheresearcherandthe
researched.
Nowherearethepowerdifferentialsbetweentheresearcherandtheresearchedmore
evidentthaninaprisonenvironment.Themostcrucialdifferencerelatestotheresearcher’s
abilitytoextractherselfatlibertyandleavethephysicalconfinesoftheprisonatherbehest.
Inmates“sleep,playandwork”inoneandthesameplace,inwhatGoffman([1957]1970:
314)classifiedasa“totalinstitution”.Typicaloftotalinstitutionsaretighttimescheduleswith
noleewayformanoeuvring.Routineactivitiesareimposed“throughasystemofformal
rulingsandabodyofofficials”(ibid).Avisitbyacompletestrangeristhusanextraordinary
event,whichsetsintomotionseveralbureaucraticandsocialprocesses.Inpreparationformy
110
visit,socialworkersattachedtotheindividualcorrectionalcentresintroducedmyprojectand
researchobjectivesinpreliminarymeetings.Ihadseveralcontactpersonsateachprisonwith
whomIinteractedinthemonthsprecedingtheinterviews.Someoftheinmatesexpressed
initialconcerns,fearingthatIwasattachedtothepoliceandthattheirsentencemight
increase,shouldtheysay“somethingwrong”.Conversely,someinmateshopedthatby
openinguptome,Iwouldputinagoodwordtohavetheirsentencereduced.The
significanceofdailyroutinesandscheduleswasalsoapparentwhenitcametoschedulingthe
interviews,whichhadtohappeneitherstraightafterbreakfastandbeforelunchorafter
lunchandbeforelock-down.123Adheringtoinstitutionalregulations,acknowledgingand
accommodatingdailyroutines(suchaslunchorphysicalexercise)wereimportantaspectsof
showingrespecttoinmates.124Interviewstookplaceinprisonoffices(suchastheofficeofthe
socialworker,administratorsorheadofprisonandboardrooms).Insomeinstances,Iwas
allowedtoconductinterviewswithprisonersonaone-by-onebasiswithnooneelsepresent.
Whileperhapslessthanidealconcerningsecurityconsiderations,theseinterviewswerethe
mostopenandfruitful.Inotherinstances,prisonwardens,DCSsupervisorystaff,and
interpreterswerepresent,whichfailedtoinspireconfidentialityandanonymity,and
consequentially(andunderstandably)ledtolessrewardingexchanges.
InthewordsofLiebling(2014:482):”Thisisnoordinaryresearchenvironment”.Eachprison
camewithitsown“barrierstoaccess”(ibid),whichtheresearcherhadtonegotiatewithstaff
andprisoners.Asmentionedinearliersections,theDepartmentofCorrectionalServices
sanctionedtheresearchbywayofaresearchpermit.Numerousregulationsandrestrictions
wereimplementedprior,duringandaftertheresearchprocess.Securityandbackground
checkswereundertaken(criminalrecorddisqualifiesentryontoprisongrounds).Goffman
portraysthe“mortificationofself”whenindividualsfirstentertotalinstitutions.Personal
123
Lock-downreferstothetimewheninmateshavetoreturntotheircellsforthenight.Insomecorrectional
centres,thelockdownprocesshappensasearlyas3or4PM.Thelockdownprocedureinvolvesaheadcount,
earlydinnerandreturntotheprisoncellsforthenight.
124
Ihadtore-scheduleoneinterviewatshortnoticeduetotrafficcongestion,whichledtotheinmate’sgym
routinegettinguprooted.Uponmylatearrival,Isensedangerandunhappiness.Aftersomeprobing,Igottothe
coreofmyinterviewpartner’sannoyance.Uponacknowledgingtheinmate’sangerasjustified,apologizingand
explainingwhyIarrivedlate,Icouldgoaheadwiththeinterview–whichturnedouttobehighlyinsightfuland
interesting.
111
belongingsareremovedthrough“strippingprocesses”andinmateshavetosubmittothe
prison“staffclass”,leadingtotheminimizationof“ego–investedseparatenessfromfellow
inmates”(Goffman[1957]1970:317–318).Prisongangsimposeanotherlayerofmortification
throughtheirsocialorder,systemofprivilegesandruleswithintheSouthAfricanprison
system.125UponenteringtheLosAngelescountyjailforthefirsttime(similartomy
experience),sociologistWacquant(2002:373)observes:
“Whatgrabsyouimmediatelyandbeforeallelseuponpenetratingintothis
humongoushumanstorehouseisthedeafeninganddisorientingnoise:doorsbanging,
boltsopeningandclosing,keysjangling,feetshuffling,shrillshouts,bluntorders,and
tatteredshredsofconversationsthatrussle,rippleandresoundinahigh-densitysonic
mishmashunlikeanyother.”
Althoughmyentryintoprisonswastemporary,Iexperiencedasenseof“mortification”and
alienationfromtherestofsocietywhileonthe“inside”.Ihadbeenaskedtowearplain
clothing,practicalshoesandnojewellery.Nobagsormobilephonesweretobetakeninto
prisons.Ihadtoobeyinstructionsfromprisonstaff.Whatmadetheseriesofinterviewsless
dauntingwasmyfrequentcontactwithinmatesandformerinmatessinceteenageyearsdue
tomymother’sprofessionalcareerintheprisonsector.
2.6.4Reciprocity
Theissueofreciprocityprovidesadifficultconundruminqualitativeresearch.Differentstages
ofresearchrelyon“negotiatingcomplexsocialsituations”(Harrison/MacGibbon/Morton
2001:323),whichrelyondegreesofreciprocitybetweentheinterviewerandinterviewee.
Thissectiondealslesswiththesocialaspectsofprovingtheresearcher’strustworthinessto
respondents;thefocusisdirectedattheresearcher’sabilitytoreciprocateforthetimeand
effortofrespondents.Itcouldbearguedthatresearchperseservesthecommongood,which
initselfsignalsreciprocity.Inhisanalysisoftheconvertibilityofdifferentformsofcapital,
125
Similartopenitentiaryinstitutionsaroundtheworld,competingprisongangsareactiveinSouthAfrican
prisons.Oftenreferredtoasthenumbergangs,the26s,27sand28sfulfilspecificfunctionsandrunillicitprison
economies.Steinberg’s‘Thenumber’offersafascinatingethnographicaccountofthenumbergangsoperatingin
CapeTown’sPollsmoorprison(2005b).
112
Bourdieu(1986:48)ponderstheroleofacademicqualificationsinreproducingsocial
structure“bysanctioningthehereditarytransmissionofculturalcapital”.Unlikeotherforms
ofcapital,thetransmissionofculturalcapital(anacademicqualificationisitsinstitutionalized
form)is“neithertransmissiblenornegotiable”(Bourdieu1986:55).126
Whilethedoctoraldegreeisobviouslytotheresearcher’sbenefit,thesubstantialproductof
theresearchisthewrittendissertation.Manyoftherespondentsgavemeseveralhoursof
theirtime(oftenafterhours),whichcouldhavebeenspentatworkorwiththeirfamiliesor
friends.Somealtruisticrespondentshadnoexpectationsofdirectreciprocity:“Everyoneis
tryingtosavetheirrhinotheirway”(Interviewwithconservator,2013).Somerespondents
haverequestedfeedbackorcopiesofthedissertationonceithasbeenfinalized.Iwillwrite
upanexecutivesummaryoftheresearchfindingstobedistributedamongstinterested
respondents,whichismoreaccessibletolaypersonsthanalengthyacademicdissertation.
AnthropologySouthernAfrica,aregionalassociationofanthropologists,hascodifiedthe
practiceofreciprocityinitsprofessionalcodeofethics.127Wherepossible,anthropologistsare
responsible“forfeedingthebenefitsthatflowfromtheresearchbackintotheresearch
communitiesthatparticipatedintheresearch”(AnthropologySouthernAfrica2014:3).Inits
‘CodeofEthics’,theInternationalSociologicalAssociationdealswithissuesofsecurity,
anonymity,andprivacyofresearchsubjects.Perhapsduetotheascendencyofquantitative
methodologiesinsociologyoverthepastdecades,theissueofreciprocityisonlyconsidered
ingeneralterms:
126
Bourdieu(1986:55)arguesthatculturalcapitalistransferredcontinuouslywithinthefamilyunit.Itis,
however,difficulttomeasureandcontrol.
127
AsmostofthefieldworkwascarriedoutinsouthernAfrica,itonlyseemstoappropriatetoconsultlocal
ethicsstandardsandcross–comparingthemwithinternationalstandards.Anthropologistsseemtohavegiven
ampleconsiderationtoethicalissuesthatmightoccurinfieldwork.TheAmericanAnthropologicalAssociation
hasdevelopedseveralpositionpapersandanethicsblog(http://www.aaanet.org/cmtes/ethics/EthicsResources.cfm),andtheWorldCouncilofAnthropologicalAssociationshasestablishedanethicstaskforceto
reviewglobalethicsguidelines(http://www.wcaanet.org/about/task_force.shtml#et).Whilesociological
associationsalsohaveacodeofethics(e.g.theAmericanSociologicalAssociation:
http://www.asanet.org/images/asa/docs/pdf/CodeofEthics.pdfortheabovementionedInternational
SociologicalAssociation),thecodesareaimedatbothqualitativeandquantitativeresearchers.Thus,issuesthat
areparticularlypertinenttoqualitativeresearchersaredealtwithingeneralterms,ifatall.
113
“Paymentofinformants,thoughacceptableinprinciple,shouldbediscouragedasfar
aspossibleandsubjecttoexplicitconditions,withspecialregardtothereliabilityof
theinformationprovided(InternationalSociologicalAssociation2001).”
WhileInevercompensatedrespondentsforinformationorinterviews,Ipaidforcoffee,lunch
orrefreshmentsonoccasion.Inreturnforthetimeandeffortofthoseinterviewed,requests
forresearchmaterials,adviceongeneralorganizedcrime-relatedissuesandcallsforprogress
reportswereheeded.Anyrequeststoshareresearchdataorfindingsprematurelywere
declined.
Oncepublished,thereisariskthatothersmayuseresearchfindingstofurthertheirpolitical
agendas.Whileitisbeyondtheresearcher’scontrolhowtheworkwillbeusedorinterpreted,
greatcarewastakento“guardagainstabuses”(David/Sutton2011:21).Theguiding
principlesweretheprotectionofresearchrespondentsfrompersonalidentificationand
responsibilityasregardsanyclaimsmadeinthisdissertation(ibid).TheInternational
AssociationofSociologistsfurthermoresuggeststhatincaseof“distortions,simplifications
andmanipulations”ofresearchmaterial,theresearchershould“intervenetocorrectanykind
ofmisinterpretationormisuseoftheirwork”(InternationalSociologicalAssociation2001).I
reservetherighttodoso,shouldtheneedarise.
Theissueofreciprocityconstitutesaseriousethicalchallengeinprisoninterviews.TheDCS
indemnityformstipulates(seeAppendixB):“Idonotwantorexpectanyrewardofany
natureforpartakingintheinterview”.Thereishencelittleincentivetoparticipateinresearch,
otherthantherebeingnopunitiveconsequencesforparticipation,andtalkingtosomeone
“fromtheoutside”maybebeneficialtotheinmate(Schlosser2008:9).USresearchonthe
perceptionsofbenefitsandharmsofprisoninterviewsshowedthatinmatesexperienced
“psychologicalsatisfactions,arespitefromtheboredomofprisonlife,andmonetarygain”
andnoonefeltcoercedintopartakingorharmedduringtheinterview
(Copes/Hochstetler/Brown2013:182).Iofferednomoneyinexchangefortheinterviews.
SeveralinmatesrequestedthatIshouldreturnduringvisitinghoursreservedforfamily
members,perhapssignallingloneliness,stigmatizationandirregularvisitsbyfamilymembers.
Othersrequestedpracticalitemssuchassoaporfood.Iwasveryclearaboutmypersonal
spaceandethicalrestrictions.Duetotimeconstraints,prisonsandinmatescouldonlybe
114
visitedonceforthisresearchproject.Arelationshipbasedonhonestyandtrustworthinessis
difficulttoestablishduringaonce-offvisit.Theresearcherundertooktoshareherdissertation
withsocialworkersresponsiblefortheinmatesthatwereinterviewed.128
2.6.5Securityconcerns
Thesecurityofrespondentsandresearchassistantswasofmajorimportance.Beforeentering
thefield,researchersshoulderronthesideofcautionandensurethat“informantsarenot
jeopardizedinanyway”(Ellis/MacGaffey1996:29).Lengthyscopingassessmentswere
undertakentoassessriskstorespondents,researchassistants,andtheresearcher.Afurther
dimensionrelatestothetrustworthinessofresearchassistants,astheymayconstitutea
securityriskormaybelinkedtointelligenceservices.Theresearcherreliedonreferralsfrom
trustedsources.
Researchthatinvestigatesinter-personalviolencecarriestheriskofsecondaryvictimization
ortraumatizationofrespondents.Interestingly,bothpoachersandgamerangersshared
personaltalesoffear,lossanddanger.Whilesomenarrativesweredisturbing(tothe
researcher,researchassistants,andtranscribers),respondentsexpressedgratitude
(sometimesevenrelief)tobeabletosharetheir“versionofthetruth”.Socialworkers
providedpre–andaftercareforincarceratedrespondents,theresearcherdebriefedresearch
assistantsandtranscribers.Iwasconsciousoftheriskofbecomingdesensitizedasa
consequenceofwhatIhadwitnessedinthefield(Dickson-Swiftetal.2007)and“warstories”
sharedbyconvictedrhinocriminalsandanti-poachingpersonnel.Talkswithadvisors,fellow
researchers,andfamilymembers129assistedmyownprocessofdebriefing.Bahnand
Weatherill(2013:22)warnthatdesensitizationcouldleadtoresearchersbecomingless
vigilantabouttheirpersonalsecurity.Thepositionalityoftheresearcherregardinghaving
livedthebetterpartofherlifeinsouthernAfricaandtheunfortunateexperienceof
aggravatedassaultinthepastprecludedrecklessbehaviour.
128
Theprospectof“teachinganoldcatnewtricks”bydisseminatingtheresearchtoconvictedrhinopoachers
andtraffickersisunlikely.Inthisinstance,disseminationoftheresearchwillbehandledatthediscretionofthe
responsiblesocialworkers.
129
MymotherrunsanNGOthatdealswiththereintegrationofex-prisonersintosociety.
115
Despiteundertakingresearchinfar-flungruralareaswithlittleornophonesignal,Imade
surethatmyhusbandoranassignedpersonknewwhereIwasandhowtogetholdofme.
However,accurateinformationondetaileditinerariesandrespondentswassharedona
‘need-to-know’basis(Felbab-Brown2014:2).Asarule,meetingswerescheduledinpublic
spacesunlessitwouldhavebeenrudetorejectaninvitationtoattenddinnerorasocial
occasionintheprivatespaceofknownrespondents.Sensitiveinformationincludingthe
namesandtelephonenumbersofgatekeepersandrespondentsweredestroyeduponleaving
theresearchsite(Felbab-Brown2014:3).Myhusbandaccompaniedmeonthesecondfield
triptoMozambique,whichaddedalayerofsecurityandwasusefulduringinterviewswith
communitymembers,poachersandkingpins.Mypositionalityasthe“wife”renderedthe
interviewlessthreateningandeventhoughIwasdoingtheinterviewing,respondentswould
oftenaddresstheirresponsestohim.
GainingaccesstorhinopoachersandestablishingtrustwassurprisinglyeasyinMassingirand
surroundingvillagesinMozambique.Afewdayswerespentwalkingaroundthevillage,
chattinginformallytopeopleonthestreets,inbarsandmarkets.130Forsecurityreasons,Iwas
initiallyguardedaboutmyresearchsubject.UponexplainingthatIwaswritingabookthat
dealswiththejourneyofrhinohornfromAfricatoAsiatoaprimarygatekeeper(‘MrBig’131
inavillage),greatopportunitiesaroseandourinitialmeetingservedasan‘icebreaker’.
Respondentswerekeentoprovidetheirsideofthestory.Perhapsmostsignificantly,some
respondentsregardedtheiractivitiesorthoseoftheirfellowvillagersaslegitimateand
providedlegallabels:“poacher”became“hunter”,“kingpin”became“businessman”and
“poachingintheKrugerNationalPark”became“visitingSkukuza”132(thiswillbediscussedin
moredetailintheempiricalchapters).OncewehadbeeninMassingirformorethanone
week,itbecameclearthatweshouldnot‘overstayourwelcome’.Naturally,Ihadinterviewed
thosekingpinsandpoachersthatwerewillingtotalktome.Animosityandcompetition
betweendifferentpoachinggangsandkingpinsmadeforadifficultterrainriddledwith‘turf
130
TheservicesofanativeShangaan-speakerwereemployedtoassistwithtranslations.
131
Organizersofrhinohunts(kingpins)areoftenreferredtoas‘MrBig’(therearenoMrsBig’satthislevel).
132
SkukuzaisthemaincampandadministrativecentreoftheKrugerNationalPark.
116
issues’.Towardstheendofourstay,rivalpoachersstartedfollowingus,ourphotowastaken,
andwefoundascrewdriverwedgedintothethicktireofourvehicle.Weweresentclear
signalsthatitwastimetoleave.133OurnextstopwasinChokwe,formerlyknownasthe‘Wild
West’ofMozambique‘whereanythinggoes’.134InformantswarnedustocoverupourSouth
Africanvehiclenumberplateatnightdespitethefactthatthecarwasparkedbehindalocked
gatewithasecurityguardinattendance.
Theexpectationof‘teamoney’135providedafurthersecurityandtimeconcern.Certain
popularMozambicanroutesarenotoriousforformalandunofficialroadblocks.Publicofficials
areunderpaidandsomeusetheirofficialstatus(anduniform)toaugmenttheirincome.
Foreign-registeredcarsareeasyprey.Wearrivedatoneofficialbordercrossingonehour
beforeitwasduetoclose.Althoughwewereinpossessionofalltherequiredpaperwork,
traffictriangles,specialstickersandbibs,136theofficialswerestallingtheprocesswithseveral
securityteams‘searching’ourcar.Despitethelegitimatefearthatwewouldnotmakeit
acrosstheborderthatdayandtheprospectofhavingtodrivebacktotheclosestsettlement
about2hoursfromtheborder,wedidnottakethebait.Eventually,oneoftheofficialsasked
foravisibleT-shirtinthecar,whichwehappilypartedwithandthenwereallowedonward
passagemomentsbeforetheborderpostwasduetoclosefortheday.Obviously,corruption
isatwo-sidedaffairofsomeonesolicitingabribeandthecounterpartbeingwillingtopaya
bribetoforegoworsescenariossuchasbeingholedupinthemiddleofnowherewith
133
IreturnedtoMassingirafewweeksafterthescrewdriverincident,pursuanttoreceivingconfirmationfrom
anotherkingpinandhisassociate(anactivepoacherandtransporter)thattheywerewillingtotalktome.Ihad
beenincontactwiththekingpinforseveralweeksaftergettingapersonalintroductionandreferraltohim.My
husbandhadreturnedtoCapeTowninthemeantime,soItookalongafriendasasecurityprecautiononmy
thirdtriptoMassingir.Thekingpindidhissecurityverification.Ifeltsafeandwelcomethroughoutthe
encounter.Basicrulesofengagementhadbeenfollowedonbothsides.Asaresult,theinterviewwaslong,
intensiveandinsightful.
134
AccordingtoSouthAfricanpolicesources,manyvehiclesstoleninSouthAfricaaretraffickedthroughor
tradedinChokwe.Interestingly,wenoticedthatmanypoachersandkingpinsweredrivingluxuryfour-wheel
drivevehicleswithSouthAfricannumberplateswithnovalidregistrationdisks.Lawenforcementsources
confirmedtheexistenceofbartertradeofrhinohornforluxuryitemsincludingcarsandseasidepropertiesin
Mozambique.
135
Lawenforcementofficialsseldomaskstraightoutforabribe;corruptibilityishiddenbehindmodestdemands
foradonationtowardstea/juice/lunchorvisibleluxuryitemsinone’spossession.
136
Theomissionofanyofthesecanleadtohefty‘fines’.WemetoneSouthAfricanholiday–maker,whowas
finedR2500(approximately220Euros)foronlycarryingonereflectivebib.
117
nowheretogo.Inthisinstance,partingwithaT-shirtseemedthesmallerpricetopay.We
weresparedfromanyfurtherincidentsdespitedrivingthrough11roadblocksduringthe
Mozambicanfieldtrip.
BeforetravelingtoVietnam,Iwaswarnedthattherhinoissuewas“sensitive”andthatitwas
bestnottomentionmycountryoforigin(SouthAfrica)orresearchtopic.Thefall-back
positionwasinterestinthepracticeofTraditionalChineseMedicine.Ajudgmentcallwas
madeonacase-by-casebasis;I,however,foundthatplayingopencardsaboutthereal
objectiveoftheresearchledtobetteraccessanddata.Moreover,theinterviewquestions
werenevertargetedatobtainingintelligence,namesofcriminalsorinformationthatcould
putrespondents,researchassistantsortheresearcher(myself)atrisk.
Theneedforcheckingsecurityarrangementsatfieldsiteswasnotaone-sidedaffair.Oncean
interviewhadbeensecuredandconfirmedwithtwohigh-levelactorsintheillegalrhinohorn
supplychain,Iwasdirectedtoarestaurantinapublicsquareandwaitedfornearlyfourhours
fortheresearchinformantstoarrive.Theyhadsentseveraladvancepartiestocheckoutthe
researchteam.OncetheyweresatisfiedthatIwasabonafideresearcher,thepairarrived,
andtheinterviewcouldstart.Severalotherrespondentsalsodidtheir‘duediligence’,
phoningupmyreferenceorconfirmingwithlawenforcementthatIwas‘trustworthy’.
Eveninsocietieswheregenderequalityismoreorlessrespected,femaleresearchershaveto
overcomeadditionalhurdleswhenitcomestostudying“hardboiledmen’stopics”suchas
organizedcrimeorillegalmarkets(Felbab-Brown2014:11).Ihadpreviousexperiencein
conductinginterviewswithsecurityforces,lawenforcementagents,andothers.Keyto
conductingsuccessfulinterviewsisto“stay[…]calmbutconfident”andtoestablish“one’s
professionalcredibilityanddepthofknowledge”(ibid)throughouttheinteraction.Ibriefed
localsecurityforcesandlawenforcementagenciesonmyresearch,notonlytoreceivetheir
buyinandparticipationininterviewsbutalsoasaprecautionarymeasuresothatotherlocal
informantscouldnotbeblamedforcollaborationininterviews(Wilson1992:195).While
undertakingmyfieldwork,Icontinuallyassessedwhethermyresearchposedarisktothose
interviewed(Brooks2014:37).
118
Sexualharassmentorsexualadvances,frequentlyencounteredbyfemaleresearchersinthe
field,seldomgetsproblematizedinresearchreportsormethodssections.Thepowerof
wearingaweddingringneedstobeacknowledgedalthoughthismayserveasevenmore
encouragementinsomecircles.Unfortunatelyonceembeddedinthefield,Ihadtoforget
aboutfeminist,religiousorpoliticalbeliefsforthelengthoftheintervieworfieldvisit.Several
sexualadvanceswerelaughedoff.It,however,provedmoredifficulttonavigatethrough
interactionswithrespondentswhoexpressedracistattitudesorincitementtokillalleged
poachers.Innormalcircumstances,thiswouldhaveledtomy,atleast,leavingthe
conversation,ifnotreportingtheoffendingpersontoEqualityCourts137fortheuseof
derogatoryterms,theuseofwhichisbannedunderSouthAfricanlaw.
2.7Concludingremarks
Theaimofthischapterwastoexpandontheresearchdesign,methodologicalchoicesandthe
salientethicalissuesencounteredduringthe14monthsoffieldwork.Thebreadthandlength
offieldworkmeritsengagementwithmethodologicalchoicesandethicalconcerns,andmay
beusefultootherresearcherswantingtoundertakemulti-sitedethnographieswith
respondentsfromdifferentsocialstrata,nationalities,culturalbackgroundsandgender.
Verificationandtriangulationofdatawereessentialelementsofdatacollectionandanalysis,
necessitatingthehugesampleandthedifferentmethodsofdatacollectionemployed.While
ethicalconsiderationscontributelittletotheresearchfindingsandtheoreticalcontributionof
thestudyperse,theyarenonethelessdeemedsignificantinexplainingmethodological
choices,potentialshortcomings,meritsandinterpretationofthedata.Thelegacyofsocial
sciencesexperimentsandresearch‘gonewrong’reverberatestheneedforcriticalreflection
onone’sownreasonsandobjectivesfordoingsensitiveresearch.Despitetheearlier
mentioned‘unethical’researchbeinglabelledas‘misguided’or‘reprehensible’,thescientists
137
CreatedthroughthePromotionofEqualityandPreventionofUnfairDiscriminationActof2000,SouthAfrican
equalitycourtsarespecializedcourtsthatdealwithmattersofunfairdiscrimination,hatespeechand
harassment(seemoreathttp://www.justice.gov.za/EQCact/eqc_faq.html#sthash.Jg72gwSO.dpuf).
119
were“prominentintellectualswhooccupiedinfluentialpositionsandgenerallyconformedto
theacceptedstandardsofacademicrigouroftheday”(Dubow1995:3).
120
Chapter3:Ofunicornsandrhinohorns:Thedemandforrhinohorn
3.1Introduction
Currentlyrhinohorntradesasoneoftheworld’smostexpensivegoods(comparewithGraph
1inChapter1).Accordingtostandardeconomicprinciples,withoutdemandthereisno
supplyandhencenomarket.Thequestionofdemandandtheassociatedcoordination
problemofvaluationarevitaltounderstandingwhyflowsofrhinohornaresodifficultto
disrupt.Thischapterdealswiththedemandforrhinohornbytracingthehistoricalrootsofits
valuationasasacredgoodwithstatus-elevatingqualities.Scholarshavelargelyfocusedonits
useinTraditionalChineseMedicine(TCM).138FromaWesternperspective,thedemandis
difficulttounderstandgivenscientificassessmentsofitsperceiveduselessnessinmedicinal
preparations.However,theancienthistoryofthecurativepropertiesofrhinohorndatesback
severalmillenniaandspansacrosstheOccidental,AfricanandOrientalrealm,evenextending
toEuropeanmythologiesoftheunicorn.Thechapterstartswithanexaminationofthe
physicalandchemicalpropertiesofrhinohornbeforedelvingintoaglobalhistoryof‘belief’
andancientformsofuse.Iconcludewithashortoverviewofcurrentuses,consumerprofiles
andproductdifferentiation.Whiletradestructureswereresearchedduringthisproject,they
areonlydiscussedinreferencetoflowsofrhinohorninlaterchaptersofthisdissertation.139
Achapterisincludedlaterinthedissertation(Chapter8)thatdealswithfakerhinohorndue
toitsimpactonthestructureandfunctioningoftheoverallmarket.Theaimofthischapteris
tocontributetoanuancedunderstandingofthevaluationofrhinohornasasacredgoodfor
whichconsumersarewillingtopayahighprice,whichmayultimatelyleadtotheunfortunate
extinctionofthepachyderm.
138
Theterm‘traditional’medicineisusedwithcautioninthisdissertation.Streamofpolicyandacademic
literatureusethetermfrequentlywithoutacknowledgingthejuxtapositionof‘modern’versus‘traditional’.
WhenIconducteddatacollectioninSoutheastAsiaandHongKong,Iaskeddoctors,academicsandpolicymakerswhether‘traditional’wasindeedthecorrectlabel.Theresponsewasthattheuseoftheterm‘traditional’
waslegitimateasitrelatedtoamillennia-oldtradition.ThejuxtapositionofWesternversustraditionalmedicine
wascontroversial,however,asthedevelopmentofmodernevidence-basedmedicinewasaglobalachievement.
139
Mypostdoctoralresearchwilldelveintotradeanddistributionstructures,whichwerealsoresearchedduring
thecourseofmyfieldworkinSoutheastAsia.Forreasonsofspaceandbrevity,thesetradestructuresareonly
discussedinreferencetotransnationalflowsofrhinohorn.
121
3.2Thephysicalandchemicalpropertiesofrhinohorn
Manymillenniaago,crashesofrhinosinmanyformsandsizeswereroamingacrossmostof
theplanet’sforests,savannahsanddeserts.Secondinsizeonlytoelephants,rhinosare
resilientandadaptableherbivores.TheforebearsoftheAfricanrhinospeciessplitfromthe
Asianone–hornedspeciesatthepeakoftherhinoevolutionabout17millionyearsago
(Borchert2012).Scientistsbelievethatmostrhinolineageswentextinctattheendof
Mioceneperiodaboutfivemillionyearsagowhenmassiveclimaticchangesoccurred
(Orenstein2013:25).
Oftheremainingfivespecies,thewhiteorsquare–lippedrhinocerosandtheblackrhinoceros
(Dicerosbicornis)liveinsouthernandeastAfrica.Theotherthreespecies(theIndian,Javan
andSumatranRhinos)surviveinAsia;althoughtheAsianspeciesareultimatelyoneofthe
triggersforthedemandforrhinohorninAsia,theyplayalimitedroleincurrentillegalflows.
ThetwoAfricanspeciesareneitherblacknorwhite;140theyaredifferentshadesofgray.
Whilerhinosarenotasasocialandsolitaryaspreviouslythought,theylackthecomplexsocial
structuresfoundinherdsofelephants(Orenstein2013:26).BlackRhinosareknownfortheir
“ferocity,chronicbadtemperandcunning”(Drummond1875:128);theovertlyaggressive
behaviour(suchaschargingwhentheyfeelthreatened)islinkedtotheirpooreyesight,
possiblyservingasadefencemechanism(Orenstein2013:27).
BothAfricanrhinospeciescarrytwohorns,whichserveas“theirchiefweaponsofdefence
andoffense”(ibid).Malerhinosusetheiranteriorhornstofighteachotherfordomination
andterritorialsupremacy.Thelongerandmoreslenderhornsoffemalerhinosareusedto
defendthemselvesandtheircalvesagainstpredators.Femalerhinosguidetheircalveswith
theirhornastheywalkinfrontofthem.Blackrhinosalsousetheirhornstobreakoff
branchestoreachbetterbrowsingortogreetoneanotherbywayofrubbinghornstogether.
140
ThereisafairamountofconfusionaboutthedenotationofAfricanrhinospeciesas‘black’or‘white’.One
theory(whichwasrepeatedandbecametheacceptedexplanation)suggeststhattheDutchword‘wijd’(wide)
waswronglytranslatedtowhite(Feely:111).TravelerJohnBarrowwasbelievedtohaveappropriatedtheterm
‘whiterhino’torecountGriquaAfrikaner’staleofhuntingsevengiraffesandthreewhiterhinocerosesinoneday
(Walker/Walker2012:18).RecentresearchshowsthattheoldestwrittenDutchrecordsunequivocallyreferred
to‘black’and‘white’rhinos(Feely:112).Anothertheorysuggeststhatthenamemightnotrefertothe
appearanceofthetworhinospeciesbuttheirdifferenttempers(ibid).Whilethedebateofthesemioticorigin
remainsunresolved,thenamesremainandhavebeenintegratedintolanguagetraditions.
122
Interestingly,scientistshavenotfoundaspecificexplanationfortheuseofthesmallerhorn
onbothrhinos(AfricaGeographic2012a:14).Unlikethetusksofelephants,rhinohornsgrow
atarateof6to10centimetresor0,6kgto1kginfemalewhiterhinosand0,8kgto1,5kgin
malewhiterhinosperannum(Interviewwithrhinobreedersandwildlifeveterinarians,2013).
Horngrowthiscontingentongender,sex,age,populationtype(i.e.free-rangeversus
captive-bred)andspecies(comparewith:Pienaar/Hall–Martin/Hitchens1991).Theanterior
hornisusuallythebiggerhorninbothspecies:shorterandsturdyinthewhiterhino,and
longerandnarrowerintheblackrhino.Underexceptionalcircumstances,anteriorhornsof
blackrhinosinthewildcangrowaslongas1,2meters(Interviewwithwildlifeveterinarian,
2012).
ThetwohornsontheAfricanrhino’sforeheadhavebecomeoneofthemostexpensive
commoditiesintheworld.Whatexplainsthehighcostofrhinohorn?Scientifictestsshow
thatrhinohornismadeupofkeratin–aconstituentsubstancefoundinhairandnails.It
would,however,beincorrecttosuggestthatrhinohorn,hairandnailsareidentical141asthe
chemicalcompositionofeachisdifferent(Patton2011:2).Rhinohorngrowsinlayersfrom
specializedskincellswithnocellularfunctions.Thecellsbecomekeratinized,inertand
hardened(Nowell2012a:1).Uniqueamonghornedanimals,therhinohornisnotan
extensionoftherhino’sskull.Asamatteroffact,rhinohornhasnobonycorebutconsistsof
afibrouscomposite(comparewithFigure1);itishence“anindependentlyderivedexample
ofacornifiedpapillaryepidermalappendage(Hieronymus/Witmer/Ridgely2006:1176).”
Toprotecttherhinohornagainstphysicalwearandtearitscoreisstrengthenedwithcalcium
saltswhilemelaninoffersprotectionagainstharmfulUVlightexposure(Nowell2012a:6).The
hornalsoconsistsofnuclearDNA,whichallowsforidentificationofindividualsand
traceabilitybymatchingofrhinocarcassestoconfiscatedhornsthroughDNA–analysis
(Harper2011:3).Theconicalshapeofthehornderivesfromrhinosconstantlyrubbingtheir
hornsontheground,andothersurfaces(AfricaGeographic2012b:16),andthedensercore
leadstothepointedstructureofthehorn(Yang2011:8).Theentirehorncanberemoved
141
Severalconsumerawareness-raisingcampaignssuggestthatingestingrhinohornislikechewingone’s
fingernails,seeforexamplehttp://envietnam.org/our-work/rhino-horn-trade-in-Vietnam.html(accessed18
August2014)
123
surgicallywithasmallcuttingknifealongthesoftdermis,whichseparatesthehornfromthe
bonytissueoftheskull(Interviewwithwildlifeveterinarian1,2013)142orinthewordsofan
experiencedpoacher(Interviewwithpoacher17,2013):
“Thehornisnotattachedtotheskull.Itmoves,butitisabitrigid.Itislikeakneecap.
Withapanga,143itcantakeovertenminutes,butifitisanax,ittakeslessthan10
minutes,fiveminutesorso.”
TheefficacyofrhinohorninTraditionalChineseMedicine(TCM)orTraditionalVietnamese
Medicine(TVM)144hasbeenthefocusofseveralscientificstudies;withmanymorebeing
conductedinVietnamandChinaatpresent(InterviewsinHongKongandVietnam,2013).
Rhinohornwastraditionallyusedfordispellingheat,coolingblood,relievingconvulsionand
counteractingtoxins(But/Lung/Tam1990:158).Recently,ithasbeenappliedtotreatahost
ofotherdiseasessuchascancer,strokeandimpotence(ĐỗTấtLợi1962;Anonymous2013)–
thenewusesarediscussedinthefinalsectionofthischapter.145Theappearanceand
chemicalcompositionofrhinohornaresimilar(butnotidentical)tothatofthehornsofwater
buffalos,cattle,yakandsaigaantelopes(Shengqing/Endong/Lijun2011),allofwhichareused
tosubstituteorfakerhinohorn.Intakingascience-basedapproach,thechemical
compositionofrhinohornmaybesignificantindeterminingthepharmacologicaleffectsof
rhinohorn.Keratintheconstituentcomponentofrhinohorn,forexample,isbelievedtobe
indigestibleinmammals,astherearenoknowndigestiveenzymes(so-calledkeratinases)
withtheabilitytohydrolysekeratininsidethehumandigestivetract(writtencommunication
withpathologist,2015).146Keratinasesarepresentincertainmicrobes,insectsandfungi
142
Noscientificstudieswerefoundthatdescribetheimpactofremovingthehornoffaliverhinointhismanner.
Removingthehornafewcentimetresabovethegrowthpoint(dehorning)ispracticedbysomeprivaterhino
ownersinSouthAfrica,andinpublicparksinNamibiaandZimbabwe.
143
A‘panga’isamachete.Skilledpoachersuseknivestoloosenthehornoffthebaseplate.Unskilledpoachers
tendtoresorttoaxesandpangas.
144
AlthoughtherearesomegeographicnuancesinthepracticeofTVM,TVMisessentiallyanoffspringofTCM.
Thelabelof‘TCM’isappliedinscholarlyandpolicyliteratureonthematterandisusedforthepurposesof
consistencyandcontinuityinthisdissertation.
145
TheuseofrhinohornasanaphrodisiacwasaWesternmythuntilfairlyrecent.Thepracticeofusingrhino
horntocurbimpotenceandasasexualstimulantisanewdevelopment,specificallyinVietnam(Interviewswith
consumers,2013).
146
Bothpepsinandtrypsin,enzymesinthestomachandsmallintestinerespectively,cannothydrolyzekeratin.
124
(Gupta/Ramnani2006);147bezoars(hairballs)andtrichobezoars(theRapunzelsyndrome)can
leadtoobstructionsinthegastrictractandcausecomplicationsinhumans.However,bezoars
originatingfromthewaterbuffalo,oxorcowareprecious,expensiveandrareingredientsin
TCM.
Figure1:CTscanofawhiterhinoceros
Explanatorynote:Redareasshowdenserareasofmelaninandcalciumcontentwhiletheblueareasaretheleast
dense.Thescanalsoshowsthatthehornsarenotboneprotrusionsoftheskull.
Source:Yang(2011:6)adaptedfromHieronymus/Witmer/Ridgely(2006)
Likerhinohorn,so-calledniuhuangisusedtoclearheatandtoxicity–andwhenusedin
conjunctionwithrhinohornorthehornofwaterbuffalo,ittreatslegionnaire’sdisease,
meningitisandencephalitis(Borten2014).Todate,nospecificexperimentshavebeen
conductedtotesttheoveralldigestibilityofrhinohorn(Nowell2012a:7).148Itisalsonot
knownwhichorwhethercomponentsofrhinohornneedtobedigestedtoachievecurative
effects.Rhinohorniseithergroundupwithabitofpurifiedorcoldboiledwaterinagrinding
bowl(seeFigure2),149orpoweredrhinohornistakeninconjunctionwithotherherbal
147
TheTineafunguscaninfecthumantoenailsbywayofkeratinase,leadingtoathlete’sfoot(Nowell2012a:7).
148
Nowell(2012a:8),forexample,suggeststhatkeratinmightbedigestedinthealkalineenvironmentofthe
largeintestineinsteadoftheacidicstomachenvironment.
149
Grindingbowlsaremadefromclay.Theclaybowlhasasaturatedbottom(feelslikesandingpaper),which
facilitatesthegrindingprocess.Thebowlscomeinmanyformsandsizes.Theresearchervisitedaceramic
factorynorthofHanoi,where‘organic’grindingbowlswereproduced.Accordingtotheceramicist(Interview,
2013),affluentJapaneseandVietnamesebuyerswereorderingthesebowls.Hementionedthatconventional
grindingbowlswerefinishedwithchemicalpaintsandstamps,whichunderminedthecurativepropertiesof
125
ingredients.Theprocessofgrindingthehornandtheadditionofsupplementaryingredientsis
believedtofacilitateabsorption(InterviewswithTCMdoctors,2013).
Possiblythemostwell-knownseriesofscientificstudiestodatewereconductedbyProfessor
ButandhisresearchteamattheChineseUniversityofHongKonginthe1980s,andpublished
in1990and1991respectively.Thestudiesfoundthatrhinoceroshornextractdemonstrated
antipyretic(fever–reducing)activitiesinratsbutsodidwaterbuffaloextractandtheherbal
mixtureusedinQingyingDecoction150withoutrhinohornasanactiveingredient(But1991).
Figure2:Rhinohorngrindingbowls
Source:TakenbytheresearcherduringfieldworkinVietnam
151
Highervolumesofwaterbuffaloandcattlehornhadtobeusedtoachieveantipyreticeffects,
whichisconsistentwithclaimsofChinesedoctorsthatadosageofwaterbuffalohornhadto
beincreasedtenfoldtoachievethesameeffectasrhinohorn(But/Lung/Tam1990:165,
InterviewwithTCMdoctors,HongKongandVietnam,2013).Interestingly,theinjectionsof
thehornofsaigaantelopeintofebrileratsachievedstrongerantipyreticeffectsthanrhino
rhinohorn.MechanicalgrindingmachinesweresoldinmarketplacesinHanoiandHoChiMinhCity–similarin
appearancetomanualmeatgrinders.
150
RhinohornisoftenusedincompoundprescriptionssuchastheQingyingDecoction.FirstmentionedinWu’s
1798classicworkWenbingTiaobian(ItemizedDialecticAnalysisofFeverishDiseases),theprescriptionisusedto
treatfeverishdiseasesandcontainseightherbsandrhinohorn(But1991:46).
151
Thefirstimagedepictsanorganicgrindingbowl,whichcomeswithahigherpricetagthantheconventional
grindingbowlpicturedinthesecondphoto.
126
hornathighdosages(But/Lung/Tam1990:162).Butandhiscolleagues(1990:166)warned
thatfurtherstudieswerenecessarytodifferentiatebetweenthetwohornsastherewere
differingconceptualandsubjectivemeaningsunderpinningtheuseofeachinChinese
pharmacopeia.152Inabidtocurbrhinopoachinginthe1990s,conservationgroups
encouragedsaigahuntinginsteadandpromotedtheuseofitshornasaviablealternativeto
rhinohorn(Pearce2003;Ellis2013:140).Oncenumerousacrossthevaststeppesofcentral
Asia,thenumbersofsaigaantelopedroppedduetoillegalhuntingfrom1.250.000inthe
mid–1970stoanestimated50000mostlyhornlessfemalesatpresent(TheIUCNRedListof
ThreatenedSpecies2014b).Thefateofthesaigaantelopeisdiscussedinmoredetailinthe
chapterdealingwithfakeandersatzrhinohorn(seeChapter8).
AttherequestofboardmemberLucHoffmann(alsoco–founderoftheconservation
organizationWWF),thepharmaceuticalcorporationHoffmann-LaRocheconductedaseriesof
experimentstotestthepharmacologicaleffectsofrhinohornfromAugust1980toFebruary
1981.Aftertheresultsof“thespecialpharmacologicalstudyofrhinohorn”hadbeenreleased
tothepublic,theformerdirectorofconservationatWWF(AnonymousauthorforThe
Environmentalist1983)issaidtohaveremarked:
“Youwouldgetthesameeffectfromchewingyourownfingernails.”
Thenegativetestresultsweredisseminatedtoawideaudience(AnonymousauthorforThe
Environmentalist1983;Nowell2012a;Ellis2013:238).However,thearticlewasneverpeer-
reviewedorpublishedinascientificjournaldetailingfindingsandmethods(thusallowingfor
thereproducibilityandscientificscrutinyoftheexperiments).Thisomissionhasledtosome
actorssuggestingthatthe‘study’mayhavebeenapublicitystunt(Interviews,2013and
2014).153Asitturnsout,scientistsattheRocheBaselandWelwynlaboratoriesdidindeed
conductaseriesofexperiments,testingthepowderedhornofawhiterhinoforantipyretic
andanti-bacterialeffectsinstress-inducedrats.Theresultswerecomparedwiththeeffectsof
152
Rhinohornisthusconsideredsuperiorin“coolingbloodandcounteractingtoxins”whilesaigahornisbetter
suitedfor“coolingliverandquenchingwind”(But/Lung/Tam1990:166).
153
Theexperimentswereportrayedas“aspecialpharmacologicalstudyofrhinohorn”(Anonymousauthorfor
TheEnvironmentalist1983).Suchstudiesareusuallysubjecttoscientificscrutinybypeersandfellowscientists.
127
paracetamol,apharmaceuticaldrugcommonlyusedtoreducefever.Rhinohorntested
inactive(negative)forantipyreticandanti-bacterialactivities(Protocolofexperiments
providedbyRochetotheauthor,2014).Sincetherewerenoplanstodeveloppharmaceutical
drugscontainingrhinohorn,theseriesofexperimentswereatypicalofthediagnosticwork
usuallyundertakenatthepharmaceuticalgiant(Telephonicinterviewwithrepresentativeof
LaRoche,August2014).AstheinitialscreeningresultssupportedHoffmann’shypothesis(that
rhinohornhadnofever-reducingoranti-bacterialqualities),theexperimentswere
abandoned.Allthatremainsisabriefentryofthescreeningresultsinalaboratoryjournalin
thecompanyarchivesofRoche.154
In2012,TRAFFIC-affiliatedresearcherKristinNowellconductedacomprehensiveliterature
reviewandsurveyofNGOinformationonthegeneralpharmacologicaleffectsofrhinohorn
fortheCITESSecretariat.Inrelationtothehandfulofscientificstudiesexamined,155Nowell
(2012a:38)remarked“starkgeographicdifferencesinthepatternofresults”withChinese
researchersdocumentingantipyreticandanti–inflammatoryeffectsofrhinohorn.Twotests
thatwereperformedinSouthAfrica(Laburn/Mitchell1997)andtheUnitedKingdom
(Bell/Simmonds2006)foundnopositiveresults.Thesedifferencesmaybelinkedto
methodologicaldifferencesandperhapstowhatNowell(2012a:38)describedas“publication
biasforpositiveresults”.Itisimportanttonotethatthestudieswerelookingatsubstituting
rhinohornwithotherhornorplant–basedmedicines,thusnotactivelypromotingtheuseof
rhinohorn.Onedouble-blindstudyundertakenatahospitalinTaiwanin1993examined
rhinohorn’santipyreticeffectinhumans(Tsaiquotedin:Nowell2012a),withrhinohorn
154
Theseriesofexperimentswouldnotmeetthemodernstandardsofascientificinvestigationorclinicaltrials
(whichwasnottheintention)buttheywereundertakeningoodfaithtoinformthedebatewithnofinancial
benefittoHoffmann-LaRoche.AccordingtoaseniorWWFrepresentative(Interview,2014),anyeffortstofurther
engagewiththeresultsofthe“study”andclaimsofthesupposedeffectivenessofrhinohornwouldonlyserve
thepurposeof“perpetuatingthemythofitsusefulness”.
155
Ofthesevenstudiesthatlookedintothefever-reducingcapabilitiesofrhinohorn,sixfoundrhinohornto
lowerfeverinlaboratoryanimals.Onlyoneclinicaltrialinvolvinghumansubjectshadbeenconducted,whichis
discussedinmoredetailinfootnote154.Fivestudiestestedforotherpharmacologicaleffects,including
analgesic,antibacterial,sedative,anti–haemorrhagicandanti-inflammatoryeffects(Nowell2012a:16).Astudy
sponsoredbytheUKDepartmentforEnvironmentFoodandRuralDevelopmentandconservationgroup
InternationalFundforAnimalWelfare(IFAW)foundrhinohorntobeinactiveasanantibacterial,antipyreticand
anti-inflammatoryagent(Bell/Simmonds2006).This,however,wastheonlystudytoapplyinvitroratherthanin
vivomethodologies(Nowell2012a:16).
128
achievingastatisticallysignificantreductionoffeverintoddlers15minutesafter
administration.156
Theresultsofthevariousstudiesarecontradictory.Theoutcomeappearstobecontingenton
thegeographiccontextandthechosenmethodologicalapproach.Whenevidence-based
scientificstandardsareappliedtotesttheefficacyofChinesemedicineinspecific,or
traditionalmedicinesingeneral,theytendtofallshortofacknowledgingvastepistemological
andontologicaldifferencesunderpinningthepracticesof‘traditional’versusevidence-based
medicine(Shea2006).Inlightoftheparadigmaticdifferences,Sheawarnsofthedangersof
oversimplificationofanextensiveancientknowledgesystemthroughtheapplicationof
scientificstandardslinkedtothepracticeofevidence-basedmedicine.Forexample,thereare
enormousdifferencesinthepathologiesoffeverunderpinningevidence-basedmedicineand
TCM.FebrilediseasesinTCMcanmanifestwithoutanincreaseinbodytemperaturewhereas
theyarelinkedtoanincreaseinbodytemperatureinevidence-basedmedicine(Patton2011:
4).Itstandstoarguethatperhapsnotonlychemicalsubstancesbutalsootherfactors157
contributetotheputativeefficacyofrhinohornmedicines.
Althoughthissub-sectionhasdifferentiatedbetween‘evidence-based’medicineandTCM,it
needstobepointedoutthatregisteredTCMdoctorsinVietnamundergothesamesixyears
ofbasicmedicaltrainingasconventionalmedicalpractitionersbeforespecializinginthefield
ofTCM.ElsewhereinAsia,traditionaldoctorsalsoundergorigorousprofessionaltrainingof
sevenyearsormore(InterviewswithTCMdoctors,HongKongandChina,2013and2014).
Moreover,TCMequallyreliesonyearsofevidence-basedtrialsandresearchforthe
developmentofTCMpharmaceuticalproducts(InterviewswithTCMandTVMpractitioners,
156
Nowell(2012a:10–11)summarizedthedetailsofthestudyasfollows:142childrenagedbetween3and114
months,sufferingfromfever(averageof39.2°Celsius)weregivenrhinohorn,waterbuffalo,aplaceboor
acetaminophen(ananti–inflammatorydrug)mixedwithwaterbymeansoforaladministration.Acetaminophen
achievedthebestresultswhilerhinohornachievedastatisticallysignificantreductionafterthefirst15minutes
butthereductionstoppedthereafterandendedwitha0.4°Creductionoverall.57%ofthechildrenwhowere
givenrhinohornendedupwithtemperatureslowerthan38.5°Candnofollow-uptreatmentwasnecessary.Tsai
found“sincetheRhinoisgoingtoextinctionandantipyreticefficacyofrhinohornislesseffectivethan
acetaminophen,rhinohornisnotrecommendedforisolateduseinfebrilechildren”(Tsaiquotedin:Nowell
2012a:11).
157
The‘placeboeffect’hasbeendocumentedinscientificliterature,showingthatsomepatients’beliefinthe
therapeuticqualitiesofmedicinemayleadtoanimprovementintheircondition.foraninvestigationofthe
‘placeboeffect’inalternativemedicinessee:Kaptchuk(2002).
129
HongKongandVietnam,2013).TCMdoctorsareprovidingbasicandadvancedhealthservices
toagreatportionoftheSoutheastandEastAsianpopulation.Ridiculingthemas“snakeoil
salesmen”,“quacks”or“charlatans”(excerptsfromsocialmedia)showslittleunderstanding
ofthemethodologiesandancientpracticeofTCM.ItisimportanttonotethatChinabanned
theuseofrhinohornintheTCMpharmacopeiain1993.Thebanisstillinplace.TCMdoctors
andpharmacistsinterviewedinthecourseofthisresearchprojectacknowledgedthecurative
qualitiesofrhinohorn;somewereactivelyprescribingittopatientssufferingfromanumber
ofailments(discussedinthefinalsectionofthischapter).Severalsubstitutessuchasthehorn
ofwaterbuffalo,yakorsaigaantelopeandherbalmedicineswereactivelypromotedinlieuof
usingbodypartsofendangeredanimalspecies.
Inconclusion,thephysicalandchemicalcompositionofrhinohornfailstoexplainits
valuationandthehighprice.Aswillbeshownlaterinthischapter,thescientificproofisof
littleconsequencetopatientswhotrusttheirdoctorsandsupporttheancientpracticeof
traditionalmedicine,orwhoaresimplyseekingamiraclecuretohealorstopthespreadof
cancer,fortheirlovedonesorthemselves.Inaddition,rhinohornuseinVietnamrangesfrom
detoxifier/hangovercuretostatussymbol.Itwillbearguedthatthedifferentusesare
interlinkedbyvirtueofthehorn’svaluationasanextraordinary,sacralgoodtraditionallyused
inmedicinalpreparations.
3.3Aglobalhistoryintothemythologyoftherhino
Ofsignificancetounderstandingthevaluationofrhinohornasasacralgoodistheancient
historyofitsuseasamagicalpotion,linkingtoglobalmythsofrhinos,unicornsandalicorns.
Thefollowingsectionhighlightsbeliefsystemsandculturalmeaningsattachedtotherhino
anditshorn.
Rhinofossilsdatingbackmorethan60millionyearshavebeenfoundinNorthAmerica,
Europe,AfricaandAsia.Theearliestcavepaintingsdepicting53imagesofthewoollyrhino
datebacksome30000yearsagowerediscoveredintheChauvetcaveinthevalleyof
ArdecheinFrance(ClottesOctober2002).TheLascauxcavesnearMontignacinFrancehost
130
anotherimageofthelong-extinctwoollyrhino,alsofromtheUpperPalaeolithicperiod,some
17000yearsago(Kleiner2009:9).Humanremainswerelaidtorestwiththoseofnowextinct
speciesofrhinoinpre–historiccaves(Briggs1931:277).AfterthelastIceAge,therewereno
rhinoslefttohuntorpaintinEurope(Martin/Martin/Amin1982:12)andtherhinoonlyrears
itshornagaininthewritingsofArabtravellerAhmadibnFadlan(towhomIreturnlater)in
the10thcenturyBCE.158Whenrhinohornbecameapopularantidotetopoisoningduringthe
16thcentury,Europeancavesandancientgravesitesweresearchedandemptiedofall
remainingrhinohorn(Briggs1931:277).
OntheAfricancontinent,theSanpeople159leftuniquerock-artdrawingsincavesstrewn
acrosssouthernAfrica,datingbackatleast14000years(Ouzman2001).Comparedtoother
imageryinrockart,thedrawingsandengravingsofrhinosareverydetailed,agreatervariety
ofengravingtechniquesareused,andrepeatedrubbingcanbeobserved(Ouzman2001:
245).160Therhinoandtheelandantelopewereofspiritualsignificance.Therubbingofthe
rockcarryingtheimageryislinkedtotheSan’sbeliefthatsomerocksactedasgateways
betweentheordinaryandspiritworlds(Ouzman2001:244).Archaeologistsattributethe
spiritualsignificanceoftherhinotoitssheerbodysize,itsaggressivenature(inthecaseof
theblackrhino)anditsroleintheSan’simmediateenvironment(Walker/Walker2012:11).
Thegoldenfoilofaone-hornedrhinowasfoundinoneofthreeroyalgravesinMapungubwe
(seeFigure3),aUNESCOworldheritagesiteinSouthAfrica,situatedonthesouthernbanksof
theLimpopoRiverborderingZimbabweinthenorthandBotswanatothewest.Thesmall
rhino(itis152millimetreslong)wascraftedbyanindigenouscivilizationthathaddeveloped
158
AconsciouschoicewasmadetouseaneutralcalendarterminologyinlieuoftheChristian–inspired‘Anno
Domini’and‘BeforeChrist’denotations.TheCE–denotationorCommonEraequatesthesameperiodas
envisagedby‘AnnoDomini’–“intheyearofourLord”andBCEreferstotheperiodbeforethecommon,current
orChristianera.Bothcalendarsomittheyear0andarenumericallyequivalent.
159
Thename‘Sanpeople’isappliedcollectivelyheretorefertotheindigenouspeoplesofSouthAfrica.
DevelopmentworkersandWesternresearchersusedthetermtomoveawayfromthederogatorylabelof
“bushmen”.Dutschke(2015)problematizestheuseoflabelsandnamesdenotingfirstnationpeoplesin
southernAfrica.Forthepurposesofthisdissertation,itisacknowledgedthatindigenouspeoplesreferto
themselvesbytheirchosennames,whichdepicttheirancientcultureandtraditions.Duetotherelianceon
archaeologicalresearchinthissection,therewasregrettablynoinformationavailableastospecificgroup
identities;thecollectivedenotationof‘Sanpeople’wasthusapplied.
160
Itwasbelievedthattherubbingoftheimageswouldallowaccesstothepotencyoftheanimalinthespirit
world(Ouzman2001:245).
131
sophisticatedpolitical,socialstructuresandtraderelationsbythe13thcentury,161morethan
400yearsbeforethearrivalofEuropeancolonizers(York2012).162ArchaeologistHuffman
believesthatthefoilrepresentsablackrhino.
Figure3:ThegoldenrhinocerosofMapungubwe
163
Source:TimHauf/Corbis
Knownforitsunpredictability,pugnaciousnessandpower,theassociationbetweenroyal
Zimbabweanleadershipandtherhinoappearsapt.164Therewere,atleast,anothertworhino
intheroyalgraveyard(Huffman2007:58).Itisnoteworthythattheblackrhinohadsymbolic
161
Mapungubwewasabandonedafter400yearsofsettlementin1290CEduetotheonsetofthe‘LittleIceAge’,
possiblyasevereboutofdroughtandthecentreofregionalpowerhadshiftedtoGreatZimbabwe(Carruther
2006:2).
162
AlthoughthehillofMapungubweanditstreasureswere“discovered”byagroupoffivewhiteAfrikanersin
1932(blackpeoplehadlongreveredthesite),therewasnoroomincolonialorapartheiddiscourseforablack
civilizationthatcreatedsophisticatedandcomplexwalledsitessuchasMapungubweorGreatZimbabwe.The
landaroundthesitewasgiventowhitefarmersandthemilitaryduringtheapartheidperiod.Charactristicofthe
Mapungubwecivilization,thegoldenrhinobecamecelebratedonceapartheidhadbeenabolishedin1994and
theOrderofMapungubwehasbecomeSouthAfrica’shighestnationaldecoration,honouringexcellencein
scienceandcreativity(York2012).
163
Imageavailableathttp://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/aug/17/british-museum-may-seek-loan-of-thegolden-rhinoceros-of-mapungubwe(accessed18August2015)
164
AlthoughtherewerewhiterhinosintheregionsurroundingMapungubwe,theextraordinarilyone–horned
goldenrhinomighthavebeeninspiredbytalesofmerchantsfromChina,IndiaortheMiddleEast,whowere
tradinggold,copper,ivory,hidesandrhinohornalongtheIndianOceancoastlineofsouthernandEastAfrica
(Walker/Walker2012:11–13).
132
valueamongVendaandShona–speakingtribeslivingintheearlyShonastate.Boeyensand
vanderRyst(2014:25),forexample,describethesignificanceoftheceremonialpembera
dance(mimickingthemovementoftheblackrhinoknownaschipembereinShona).Theking
oftheMatupastateandhiswarriorswouldactouttheritualdancetodeterminewhowasthe
mostaccomplishedandcourageouswarrior.Thejuxtapositionofthebehaviouralattributesof
theblackrhino(suchasdangerous,unpredictableandpowerful)withtheleadershipstyleof
theancientleadersofMapungubweandGreatZimbabwehasbeenasserted(Huffman2007:
58).ThesacredpembelaritualorrhinocerosdanceinVendacultureisequallylinkedto
chieftainship(Boeyens/vanderRyst2014:26).TherhinoscapturedinSanrockart,andthe
goldenrhinoofMapungubwesignifythedeepconnection,reverenceandculturalsignificance
oftherhinointhosedays.
ReturningtotheearliermentionedAhmadibnFadlan,whoappearstohavecapturedthefirst
writtenrecordoftherhinobasedonhisjourneyfromBaghdadtotheVolgaregionin922CE.
Heobservedrhinosinthewildernessandfoundthreelargebowlsmadeoutofhorn
(ostensiblyrhinohorn)attheking’spalace(Walker/Walker2012:8).Ctesias,theGreek
privatephysiciantoKingsDariusIIandArtaxerxesIofPersia,givestheearliestWestern
accountoftherhinointhefifthcenturyBCE.165Hisdescriptionoftheone-hornedcreaturesis
widelyinterpretedtorepresentaninspiredcombinationoftheIndianrhinoandIndianass
(Martin/Martin/Amin1982:13).InthewordsofCtesias(quotedin:Shepard1930):
"ThereareinIndiacertainwildasseswhichareaslargeashorses,andlarger.Their
bodiesarewhite,theirheadsdarkred,andtheireyesdarkblue.Theyhaveahornon
theforeheadwhichisaboutafootandahalfinlength.Thedustfiledfromthishornis
administeredinapotionasaprotectionagainstdeadlydrugs.Thebaseofthishorn,
forsometwohands'-breadthabovethebrow,ispurewhite;theupperpartissharp
andofavividcrimson;andtheremainder,ormiddleportion,isblack.Thosewhodrink
outofthesehorns,madeintodrinkingvessels,arenotsubject,theysay,to
convulsionsortotheholydisease[epilepsy].Indeed,theyareimmuneeventopoisons
if,eitherbeforeorafterswallowingsuch,theydrinkwine,water,oranythingelsefrom
thesebeakers.Otherasses,boththetameandthewild,andinfactallanimalswith
solidhoofs,arewithouttheankle-boneandhavenogallintheliver,butthesehave
boththeankle-boneandthegall.Thisankle-bone,themostbeautifulIhaveeverseen,
islikethatofanoxingeneralappearanceandinsize,butitisasheavyasleadandits
165
SomescholarssuggestthatCtesiasgavethefirstWesternaccountoftheunicorn,whichinfluencedmany
artists’renditionsofthemysticalfigmentoftheirimagination.Itis,however,acceptedthattheIndianrhinoceros
(rhinocerosunicornis)inspiredtheGreekdoctor’svividdescription(Nichols2011:128–129).
133
colouristhatofcinnabarthroughandthrough.Theanimalisexceedinglyswiftand
powerful,sothatnocreature,neitherthehorsenoranyother,canovertakeit."
Whiletheaccountisembellishedandmythical,itissignificantinshowingthatrhinohornhas
beenattributedwithspecialhealingpropertiesovermanycenturies(Martin/Martin/Amin
1982:13).Noanimalhasbeenshroudedinasmanymythsandmythcreationastherhinohas.
Adiverseassortmentofone-hornedbeastswassprinkledacrossancientChinese,Egyptian,
Babylonian,IndianandAssyrianmythology,theBible,andGreekandRomanfables
(Prothero/Schoch2002:277).Acrosstheages,therhinohasoftenbeencomparedand
confusedwiththemythicalunicorn.EvenscholarslikeAristotle,PlinyandLeornardodaVinci
firmlybelievedintheexistenceoftheunicorn.Foralongtime,RomansandGreeksupheld
thebeliefthattheunicorn(monocerostotheGreekandunicornistotheRomans)was
differenttotherhinosincetherewasahugemarketforthehornsoftheunicornfromChina
duetoitsmedicinalproperties.BythetimesofthelateAntiquity,theuseofrhinohorn
derivedfromtheone-hornedAsianvarietieshadbeenfirmlyestablishedintheEast
(Prothero/Schoch2002:277),sotheEuropeansmostcertainlywerenotconsumingunicorn.
BeforeEuropeanshadseenactualrhinos,talesofthebeastfedtheirphantasyandledto
bizarremythssuchasrhinosbeingimpartialtomusicandperfume.166Inthe6thcenturyCE,
SaintIsidoreofSevilledeclaredthemonoceros,unicornandrhinocerostobethesame
creature:
“Therhinoceros(rhinoceron)isnamedwithaGreekword;inLatinitmeans‘hornof
thenose’.Thisisalsothemonoceron,thatis,theunicorn(unicornus),becauseithasa
singlefour-foothorninthemiddleofitsforehead,sosharpandstrongthatittossesin
theairorimpaleswhateveritattacks.Itoftenfightswiththeelephantandthrowsitto
thegroundafterwoundingitinthebelly.Ithassuchstrengththatitcanbecaptured
bynohunter'sability,but,asthosewhohavewrittenaboutthenaturesofanimals
claim,ifavirgingirlissetbeforeaunicorn,asthebeastapproaches,shemayopenher
lapanditwilllayitsheadtherewithallferocityputaside,andthuslulledand
disarmeditmaybecaptured(BishopIsidoreofSeville[6thCenturyAD]:252).”
AstherewaslittlecontactbetweenEurope,AfricaandChinaduringthemedievalperiod,the
166
Accordingtothemyth,ifamanweretodressuplike“ahighlyperfumedvirgingirl”hewouldbeirresistibleto
therhino.Shouldthedisguisefail,hethenshouldclimbontotheclosesttreeandurinateintherhino’searto
avertfurthercharges.Suchmythsmayhavebeenbasedontalesbyfellowtravellerspassingthroughcolonial
entrepôts(Martin/Martin/Amin1982:13).
134
classicalknowledgeoftherhinoconvergedwiththeunicornlegend.Itwascommonlyheld
thattheunicornwasendowedwithmammothstrength,whichwasconcentratedinitshorn
(ibid).Contaminatedwatercouldbeclarifiedifstirredwiththehornofaunicorn–amethod
thatwascalled“waterconning”(Mould1996:130).Manyfables,fairytales,paintingsand
tapestries(theMetropolitanMuseumofArtinNewYorkishosttoaseriesofseventapestries
entitledThehuntoftheunicorn)attesttothepopularityoftheunicorn,whichbecamea
symbolofpurityandchastityduringthemedievalperiodandRenaissance.Itisperhapsnot
surprisingthatthehornoftheunicornbecameknownasapowerfulaphrodisiacandwas
usedforvirginitytesting.NoneoftheclassicalmedicalauthorsintheOccidentaltradition
mentionedtheunicornanditscurativepropertiesuntilHildegardofBingeninthe12th
century.Accordingtothemedievalmedicandnun,anointmentmadeofpoweredunicorn
livermixedwitheggyolkscuredleprosy,abeltmadeofunicornhidewornaroundthewaist
protecteditsowneragainstthePlague,feversandsorefeet,anditshoofcoulddetectpoisons
(Throop1998).167Allalong“unicorn”pieces,fragmentsandhornswereusedtotestfoodand
beveragesofthewealthyandroyalsforpoisoning,andabbeys,churchesandprincipalities
werestockpilinghorns,whichweretreasuredpossessions,signifyingstatusandopulence
(Mould1996:130–131).AsnoEuropeanhadseenlions,elephants,panthersorunicornsat
thistimeinhistory,theywereequallycontentandunquestioningintheiracceptanceofthe
existenceofallthesecreatures(Shepard1930:29).
AccordingtoProtheroandSchoch(2002:278),themysticismsurroundinghornsmaybe
linkedtothecurativepropertiesassociatedwiththeimportedtusksofthenarwhal,asmall
articwhale.Thesetuskscanreachalengthofupto3meters168andwerefirstintroducedby
ScandinavianfishermenuponreturningfromexpeditionstotheArctic.WhileArcticwhalers
harpoonedsomenarwhals,mostofthepreciousresourcederivedfrombarteringtradewith
Inuithunters(Ellis2013:83).ApothecariesacrossEuropeproceededtomarketnarwhalhorn
167
HildegardofBingenwroteextensivelyabouttheunicornfable,elaboratingherversionofthevirgin-capture
legendandsuggestingtheunicornwassymbolicofJesusChrist.
168
Unicornwhales(astheyarealsoknown)preferthedeepwatersoftheAtlanticArcticOcean.Whilethe
impactofglobalwarmingandhuntingisnotknown,theIUCNregardstheirpopulationsasstable.Narwhalsare
hunted,andtheirtusksaretradedinGreenlandandCanada.Greenlandhashoweverbannedtheexportofthe
narwhal’sivory(TheIUCNRedListofThreatenedSpecies2014a).
135
asunicornhornandsolditforitssupposedmedicinalproperties.Asnarwhalswererarely
seensouthofGreenland,theirexistenceremainedtheScandinavianseafarer’sbest-kept
secretfornearly500yearswhiletheywereselling‘unicorn’worthseveraltimesitsweightin
gold(Winick2014).Thehornoftheunicorn,oralicornasitcametobeknown,waslikewise
imputedwithmagicalpowerssuchascounteractingtoxinsandcuringmelancholia.
Apothecarieschaineddownthevaluabletusksandsoldshavingstoaffluentcustomers.169
Alicornwasalsoconvertedintocupsthatwerethoughttoneutralizeanypoisonsslippedinto
beveragesconsumedoutofthecups.Othertypesof‘unicorns’usedinEuropeanapothecaries
wereprobablyIndianrhinohorninpowderedform,prehistoricmammothivoryandfossils
(Mould1996:131).Thevalueofalicorndependedonavailablesupplies.Atthepeakofthe
market,piecesandpowderofalicorncouldsellforuptotentimestheirweightingoldwhile
entirehorns(whichwererare)couldbeworthdouble(ibid).Aswastobeexpected,shrewd
entrepreneursforgedtheexpensivecommoditybysubstitutingalicornwiththehornof
domesticatedanimalsandwalrus,whalebones,stalactitesandlimestone.Toprotect
prospectivebuyers,severaltestsweredevisedtochecktheauthenticityofthealicorn
(ibid).170Chapter8discussesthehighincidenceoffakehorninmodernmarketsandnovel
waysoftestingitsauthenticity.
Unicornremainedofficiallyrecognizedasadrugtobestoredinregisteredpharmaciesin
Englanduntilin1741(Mould1996:131–132),171theFrenchcourtusedalicorntotestwhether
theroyals’foodanddrinkshadbeenpoisonedupuntiltheFrenchRevolution,QueenVictoria
IhadanalicornmountedinherbedroomatWindsorandevenPopeGregoryXIVwasoffered
poweredhornonhisdeathbedin1591(hediednonetheless)(Prothero/Schoch2002:278).
Thebeliefinthecurativepropertiesofalicornwassuchthatthesymboloftheunicorn
169
AprinceofSaxonyissaidtohavepaidthesumofonehundredthousandthalersforasinglealicornwhilethe
EnglishKingCharlesVpaidhisoutstandingdebttotheMargraveofBayreuthwithtwonarwhalhorns
(Prothero/Schoch2002:278).
170
Onesuchtestinvolvedthesoakingofthesuspicioushorninwaterandthendrawingacirclearounda
scorpionwiththesamewaters.Ifthescorpionremainedinsidethecircle,thenthealicornwasconsideredtobe
therealdeal(Mould1996:131–132).
171
TheofficialdrugslistofitemstobekeptinstockbyregisteredpharmaciesinEnglandincludedunicornfrom
1651to1741.Itwasdeletedfromthelistin1746(Mould1996:132).
136
becameassociatedwithpharmacopoeiasandapothecariesintheWesternworld(ibid).172
Despitethealicorn’swidespreadpopularity,doubtandscepticismaboutitsefficacybecame
widespreadwhenevidence-basedmedicinebecametheorderofthedayduringtheAgeof
Reason.WhiletheJapanesewereusingalicornforthetreatmentofimpotenceuntilthelate
18thcentury,demandhadtaperedoffbythe18thcenturyelsewhereintheworld(Mould
1996:133).Asthepricedroppedsignificantly,thewealthymovedon,butthepoorcontinued
tobuyalicornforsometimeafterthat(Shepard1930:84).
Therhinowas‘rediscovered’inEuropeaftertheDarkAges.In1292,VenetianexplorerMarco
PolosawIndianrhinosduringhisexpeditionstoAsiaandrelatedthemtothefabledunicorn,
sincerelydoubtingwhetherrhinosandvirginmaidenswouldenjoypropinquity(Mould1996:
130).Finallyin1593,EuropeansgottoseetheirfirstliverhinogiftedtoKingManueltheGreat
ofLisbon,whoupontiringofitsentittoPopeLeoX.Theshipsankenroute,drowning
everyoneonboard,andthepopeeventuallyreceivedthestuffedandskinnedcarcass(an
earlytrophyofsorts)sometimelater(Prothero/Schoch2002:279).GermanpainterAlbrecht
Dürer(seeFigure4)wascrucialindisentanglingtherhinofromtheunicornthroughhis
famouswoodcut,whichwasbasedonadrawingofarhinobyaPortugueseartist(Dürernever
sawaliverhino)(Edwards2008:291).Themysticalelementremained,however,asDürer’s
rhinohadaunicornwithaspiraltwistprotrudingfromitsshoulders.
TherelianceuponhearsayandoraltraditionsisperhapsbestdemonstratedinEdward
Topsell’s‘Thehistoryoffour-footedbeastsandserpents’,anauthoritativenaturalhistory
bookfirstpublishedintheRenaissanceandreproducedinitsoriginalformoverseveral
centuries(Prothero/Schoch2002:279).Amongstthecolourfuldescriptionsofserpents,sea
monsters,unicornsanddragons,Topsellregardstherhinoas“thesecondwonderinnature”
(aftertheelephant).173Topsell(1658)explainsatlengthwhytheunicornandrhinoweretwo
distinctcreatures,alsorefutingthelongstandingmythofthemissingfemalerhino.Early
writersandphilosopherswereofthewrongfulbeliefthatonlymalerhinoswereroamingthe
planet(Keller1909:384).
172
TheBritishpharmaceuticalcompanyBurroughsWellcome,forexample,usedtheunicornasitslogobetween
1908and1995(Dorman2014).
173
Theprofileissprinkledwithcuriousdescriptions,suchas:“Onhisforeheadtheregrowhairswhichseema
littlered”;or:“Hisbackisdistinguishedwithcertainpurplespotsuponayellowground(Topsell1658).”
137
TheuseandtradeofrhinohorninEuropeappearstocoincidewithPortugueseseafarers
returningfromIndia.CasparBartholinusobservedthesaleofrhinohorninseveralItalian
citiesin1620,whereitwasprescribedforthetreatmentofpoisoning,fevers,small–pox,
epilepsy,vertigo,worms,impotenceandstomachache.Initiallyrhinohornwasnotaspopular
asalicornasthehornwastooshortandtheimageryoftherhinofailedtoinspirein
comparisontothemythicalunicorn.Thisattitudechangedoverthenextdecades.By1699,
PierrePometrecountsthatrhinohornwasusedinthebeliefthatitwouldbeaseffectiveas
alicorn(Shepard1930:176).
Figure4:AlbrechtDürer's'Rhinoceros'
174
Source:TheBritishMuseum
Notsurprising,thefirstfewgenerationsofcolonialsettlersattheCapeofGoodHopeinSouth
Africasharedthosebeliefs.BotanistandavidtravellerCharlesThunberg(1793)observesthat
rhinohornswerekeptasrareornamentsandasameanstodetectpoison.Hewrote:
“Thefineshavingsofthehorns,takeninternally,weresupposedtocureconvulsions
andspasmsinchildren,anditwasfirmlybelievedthatgobletsmadeofthesehornsin
aturner’slathewoulddiscoverapoisonousdraughtbymakingtheliquorferment.”
174
Availableat
http://www.britishmuseum.org/explore/highlights/highlight_objects/pd/a/albrecht_d%C3%BCrers_rhinoceros.a
spx(accessed18August2015)
138
Thedifficultiesassociatedwithtranslocatingrhinosinthosedaysprecludedascientific
investigationintothemythicalrhinoanditshornuntilthe19thcentury(Prothero/Schoch
2002:280).Itbearsmentioningthatmanyofthetraitsoftheunicornswouldhavebeen
derivedorembellishedfromstoriestoldbyrhinoceroshunters.Rhinoshavebadeyesight,but
theyhaveanaugmentedsenseofsmell,whichtallieswithelementsofthevirgin-capture
legend(Shepard1930:175).Aswillbeshowninthefollowing,rhinohornhadalonghistoryof
medicinalandalexipharmicuseintheEast.Scholarsoftheunicornlegendtendtoobjectto
thenotionsthattheunicorn,“ananimalofsuchdelicacyandrefinement”wouldbethesame
as“thegross,grunting,slime-wallowingrhinoceros”(Shepard1930:177).Theratherharsh
assessmentintimatescognitiveframesofyesteryear,someofwhichmayhaveaffected
moderndayperceptionsoftheancientcreature.
MuchoftheunicornandrhinomythologyintheOccidentseemstohavebeeninspiredby
talesfromtheFarEast,withtheearlier-mentionedCtesiasbeingthefirstofmanytravellersto
bringbackstoriesandobservations,whichwereeitherassimilated,adoptedorappropriated
intoWesternculturaltraditions.Supernaturaleventsassociatedwiththeunicorndatebackto
2600BCEinChinesemythology(Briggs1931:278).Theearliestrepresentationsoftheunicorn
werefoundonsealsinthenorthernIndusregiondatingbacktothesameeraaround2600
BCE(Abrahametal.2013:107).175TheunicornorsimilarapparitionsalsofeaturedinHindu
andBuddhistwrittenandoraltraditions.TheMahābhārataintroducedthelegendof
Rishyasringa,adeer–hornedanthropomorphiccreaturewhileBuddhistliteraturereferstothe
samecreatureasEkashringa(whichtranslatestounicorn)(Nichols2011:130).The
archaeologistresponsibleforexcavationsthatledtotheunearthingofvastareasoftheIndus
ValleyCivilizationintheearly20thcentury,SirJohnMarshallbelievedthattheunicornand
othermythicalcreaturesderivedfromitwereinspiredbytherhino(citedin:Abrahametal.
2013:122).Indusmerchantswerefrequentandlong-distancetravellers,whomayhave
spreadtheideaoftheunicorntoMesopotamiaandtheMiddleEast.Theoldestunicorn
bronzestatuefoundinthatregiondatesbacktothedaysoftheproto-Iraniancultureof
Amlasharoundthe9thto8thcenturyBC(Tagliatesta2007:176).Fromtheretheideaofthe
mythicalunicornmayhavegraduallydiffusedthroughtheMediterraneanregionfinally
175
Scholarshavelongdebatedwhethertheanimalsdepictedonthesealsareunicornorbicorncreatures.The
debatesareoflittlerelevancehere(Tagliatesta2007:175).ThesignificantaspectisthatSirJohnMarshalland
otherarchaeologiststhoughtthatrhinosinspiredthedepictionofthesecreatures.
139
reachingcontinentalEuropeandbeyond(Abrahametal.2013:122).MedievalMuslim
scripturesalsodescribeawingedantelope-likecreaturewithahornonitsforeheadcalled
karkadan,theArabtermforrhinoceros(Ettinghausen1950:6).AccordingtotheShahnama
(theBookofKings),AlexandertheGreatslayedaunicorn–likecreaturefromthelandof
Habash(Ethiopia).Therearemanyaccountsofheroestriumphingoverwhatisoften
describedasamonstrousapparition,perhapsindicativeofhowhunterswereinaweofthe
rhino(Ettinghausen1950:36)–comparewiththenextsectionofthischapter.Theearliest
accountsofrhinohuntsdatebacktotheearliermentionedArabtravellerIbnFadlanin922
AD,whowastoldthatbowmenwouldclimbontopoftreesandkillrhinoswithpoisoned
arrowswhiletheywereasleep(Ettinghausen1950:45).
Arabwritersmentiondifferentusesofrhinohornduringtheearlymedievalperiod.Chinese
royalty,forexample,adornedthemselveswithgirdlesmadeoutofrhinohorn(Ettinghausen
1950:54)176orworenecklacesmadeofrhinohorntofendoffevilspirits(Ettinghausen1950:
55).Japaneseornamentsandcontainerswerecarvedoutofrhinohorn;throneswerecovered
withrhinohorn(notattachedtoaspecificgeographybutmostlikelyinreferencetoChina),
andthehandlesofmedievalMuslimknivesandswordsweremadeoutofrhinohorn
(Ettinghausen1950:56).Thedemandforhornseemstohavebeenmetbysuppliersfrom
IndiaandAfrica(ibid)withArabmerchantsbeingtheprincipalexporterstoChina
(Ettinghausen1950:101).Thereseemslittledoubtthattherhinoandunicornwereoneand
thesamecreatureinArabwritings.Asofthe1500s,theso–calledkarkadanisoftencompared
tobuffalo’sandthedomesticox.177Interestingly,theearliestreferenceinArabtextsofthe
antidotaleffectofrhinohornappearedtohavecoincidedwiththeEuropeandiscoveryofthe
curativepropertiesofalicorn(Ettinghausen1950:111).Beforethat,thehornofkhutuwas
reputedwithalexipharmicqualities(Lavers2009).Al-Qazwinimakesthefirstexplicit
suggestionoftheusefulnessofrhinohornindetectingtoxinswhilealsonotingitssuitability
176
th
Duringthe10 century,aroyaldecreeabolishedthecustomofwearinggirdlesmadeofrhinohornand
requiredgirdlestobemadeofgoldandothervaluablematerialsinstead(Ettinghausen1950:55).Itisunclear
whatprecipitatedtheroyaldecree;however,itledtoamassivedropinthepriceofrhinohorn(ibid).
177
EvenSindbadtheSeafarerprovidesaninspireddescriptionofthekarkadan,whichheencounteredduringhis
secondvoyage.Successivetranslatorsof‘ThousandandOneNights’appeartohaveembellishedthelengthofits
horntenfold(CompilationoffolktalesofMiddleEasternandIndiandescent1850):“Itisaremarkableanimal
withagreatandthickhorn,tencubitslong,amiddlewarditshead,wherein,whencleftintwain,isthelikeness
ofaman.”
140
forknifehandles.Latertextsconfirmthatifthehandlesofroyalkniveswerepleatedwith
rhinohorn,thentheywould“becomemoistandagitated”whenpoisonedfoodwasplacedon
thediningtable(Ettinghausen1950:131).Itseemssomewhatplausiblethatthismayhaveled
totheuseoftheceremonialdaggersintheArabpeninsula.Thehiltsoftheearliermentioned
jambiyaaremadewithrhinohorn(comparewiththesubsectiononjambiyasinthischapter).
Tothisday,theyareindispensabletothetraditionalattireofmenofNorthernYemenand
equallycovetedinOmanandSaudiArabia(Parker2013:Chapter19:6).
IngreaterIndia,hometotheone-hornedIndianrhino,therearemanyreferencestotherhino
asasacredanimalincludingAsokadeclaringitassuchinhisPillarEdicts,itsperceived
similaritytoGanesha(anIndiandeity)orthefamouschorus“Lethimwanderalonelikea
rhinoceros”fromtheSuttaNipata(aBuddhistscripture)(Briggs1931:280).Therhino
becameassociatedwithvirtueandwisdom(Keller1909:388),anditremainedhighlyvalued
asasacredanimalamongstyogisintothe20thcentury.Duringthepracticeofsunsalutations,
yogiswouldweararingmadeoutofrhinohornontherightindexfingerwhileothersadorned
theirearswithhugeringsmadeoutofrhinohornpulledthroughthecartilage.Yogisalsoused
powderedrhinohidefordustingopenwounds(Briggs1938:131–132).
Unliketheearliermentionedcommunitiesornations,theChinesedidnotconflatetherhino
withthemysticalunicorn.Itiscommonlyheldthattheunicornorki–linoriginatesfroma
distantplace,possiblyheaven,atirregularintervals.Accordingtothelegend,theunicorn’s
appearancecoincidedwiththereignorthebirthofagreatman(Shepard1930:66).The
rhino,ontheotherhand,isaccuratelydescribedasaseparatespecies,andsuppliersand
tradersofitshornneverattemptedtosellrhinohornaski–lin,renderingtheunicorna
mysticalcreatureuncontaminatedbytrade(Shepard1930:69).However,rhinoswererarely
seeninChinabythetimesoftheWesternHandynasty,andperhapstheirraritywouldexplain
whytheyacquiredmythicstatusinChinesesociety.Rhinocerosboneswerefoundatfossil
sitesdatingbacktotheNeolithicera(aboutsixthousandyearsago).VariousAsianspeciesare
believedtohaveflourishedinancientChina(Parker2013:Chapter16).Norhinossurvived
northoftheYangtzeRiverbythetimetheHandynasty(206BCE–220CE).WhentheTang
dynastyruledfrom618CEto907CE,rhinoslivedinanareasouthoftheYangtzeRiverandin
141
theregionsthatareknownasmodern-dayGuangdongandGuangxi(Laufer1914:137),and
mayhavesurvivedinSichuanuntilthemedievalperiod(Laufer1914:118).
Inancienttimes,theprimaryinterestintherhinoseemstohavebeenlinkedtoitshide
(Jenyns1954:39).TheGuoyu(‘DiscourseoftheStates’)recordedthat103,000troopsofthe
StateofWuwereequippedwitharmourmadeofrhinohidesandfish–scalesaround400BCE
(citedin:Parker2013).Whilethisaccountappearseversoslightlyembellished,Parker(2013:
Chapter16:5)interpretsthisasanindicationoftheexistenceofsignificantnumbersofrhino
inthesouthernregionsduringtheWarringperiod.Inthosedays,rhinoswerekilledfortheir
hide.Oncethehidehaddriedout,ithardenedandprovidedprotectionagainsttheweapons
oftheday.Deerantlersandrhinohornwerealsousedtoproducebowsinancienttimes
(Parker2013:Chapter16:5).Parker(2013:Chapter6:6)arguesthatrhinonumberswere
greatlyreducedduringtheWarringperiodduetoincreasingdemandforrhinohidearmour.
Moreover,gradualcoolingoftheclimateaffectedtherhino’shabitatandledtoasouthward
migrationinthedirectionofLaosandVietnam.TherelentlessslaughterduringtheEastern
ZhoudynastyledtothedemiseoftherhinoinChina,anditenteredtherealmoflegendsand
myths(Parker2013:Chapter16:6).
TheoldestChineseartpiecedepictingarhinoisanancientbronzewinevesselintheformofa
two–hornedrhino.Thevesselisbelievedtodatebacktothereignofthelastemperorof
Shangduringthefirsthalfofthe11thcenturyBCE(Sickman/Soper1971:30).Accordingto
Bretschneider(1875:19),Chineseclassicsfrequentlyrefertogobletsmadeoutofrhinohorn
andtherhinoingeneral.178ArthistorianJanChapman179arguesthattherituallibationcups
usedduringceremonieshonouringancestorsmayhavebeenmadeofAsianrhinohornbefore
bronzecameintouseinancientChinaaround2000BCE.Curiously,BronzeAgedrinking
vessels(madeoutofbronze)wereshapedintheformoftheirrhinohornprecursors
(Chapman1999:17).FromthedaysoftheEasternZhoudynasty(770–221BCE),carvers
createdintricatebowls,libationcupsandotherdecorationsoutofrhinohorn(Parker2013:
178
ThesinologistbelievedthattheIndianandChineseuseofrhinohorninthedetectionofpoisonswasa
separatedevelopmentalbeitbothnationsstartedtheusageatapproximatelythesametime(Bretschneider
1875:19).
179
ChapmanhaspublishedaseminalbookontheartofrhinohorncarvingsinChina‘TheArtofRhinocerosHorn
CarvinginChina’,whichdocumentsthehistoryandbeautyofancientcarvingsmadeoutofrhinohorn.
142
Chapter17:2).Unlikeotherhorns(antlersofantelopes,coworsheephorns),rhinohornwas
nothollowontheinsideandthuscouldbecarvedintocupsandbowls(Laufer1914:168).180
Libationcupswereusedfortheconsumptionofricewine(seeFigure5).Thebeliefwasthat
thecurativeelementsoftherhinohorn(analgesicandlifelengthening)woulddissolvefrom
thecupsintothewine.Thetwoancientusesofrhinohorn(decorationandmedicine)thus
wereintertwined(Parker2013:Chapter17:2).
Figure5:RhinohornlibationcuporiginatingintheQingdynasty
Source:Sotheby’s
181
Asmentionedearlier,theofficialgirdlesofroyalmandarinswerestuddedwithpiecesofrhino
hornduringtheTangdynasty,whichlastedfrom618CEto905CE.Officialattireswereranked
intheorderofjade,gold,rhinohornandivoryduringtheKindynasty(1115–1234CE).The
emperorworeahat–pinmadeofrhinohornandagirdleofblackhornwhiletheimperial
saddleswerepleatedwithgold,silver,rhinohornandivory(Laufer1914:143).Thereisalsoa
religiouselementassociatedwithrhinohorninancientChina,asWangMing(33BCEto23CE)
180
Bovineandotherhornshavebeentransformedintodrinkingvesselsacrossdifferentcultures.However,
usuallytheentirehornisused.
181
th
ThelibationcupdepictedintheimageoriginatesfromthetimesoftheQingdynasty(17/18 century).A
dragonisthemainfeatureofthiscup.Thecupwassoldfor8420000HKDataSotheby’sauctioninHongKong.
Theimageandmoreinformationareavailableat
http://www.sothebys.com/en/auctions/ecatalogue/2011/rhinoceros-horn-carvings-from-the-edward-andfranklin-chow-collection-hk0370/lot.2714.html(accessed18August2015).
143
offeredbonesofstorks,tortoiseshellandrhinohorntotheGods(Jenyns1954:45).Jenyns
(1954:45)alsofoundreferencestorhinohornbeads,whichappearedtobelinkedtoholding
animportantofficeinancientChina.Themanufactureofrhinohornprayerbeads(Buddha
beads)andbangleswasobservedinHanoiin2013(Amman2013b),suggestingthatrhino
hornisstillimbuedwithtranscendentalandreligiousvalue.
Theoriginofrhinohorn’sprophylacticvaluationintraditionalmedicineisamatterofdebate.
Huang-tiNeiChing(‘TheYellowEmperor’sClassicofInternalMedicine’),thegenerational
knowledgeoftraditionalmedicinesissaidtohavebeencompiledbyHuang-tiaround2600
BCE.Theancientartofhealingwaspassedonorallyuntilitwasfinallycapturedinwritten
formaroundthe3rdcenturyCE.‘Preventionismoreimportantthancure’wastheunderlying
philosophyoftheNeiChing.Anyhealthissueshadtobeaddressedbylookingatthebodyas
aninterdependentorganicsystem.Itadvocatedtheconsumptionofcertainfoodstoadjust
imbalances;however,noanimalsubstancesorherbswereincludedintheearlyversions(Ellis
2013:35–39).TheChenNungBenCaoChienor‘TheHerbalClassicoftheDivinePloughman’
waspublishedaround100BCE,recommendingtheuseof365differentherbsandanimal
substancesforeachdayoftheyear(Huang1998:3).Itsoriginistracedbacktothemythical
emperorChenNung,whowasbelievedtohavelivedaround2700BCE.Theclassicwork
classifiespowderedrhinohornasacolddrug,whichissuitableforcoolingbloodfromhot
diseases(Parker2013:Chapter17:1)andit“curesthehundredpoisons”(Bretschneider1910:
153).ItisacceptedthattheChineseuseofrhinohornformedicinalpurposesdatesbackto
thetimesofChenNung.Medicinaluseofrhinohornthusdatesbacktoapproximately2700
BCE,renderingitanancientpractiseofmorethan4800years.JeanieParker,theauthorof
‘ThemythicChineseunicorn’,foundmanywrittenreferencesabouttheantidotalpropertiesof
rhinohornduringtheBronzeAgeinChina.Forexample,shenotedthatthezhenbird(the
‘poison–featherbird’)andtherhinolivedinthesamesouthernregionsduringtheSpringand
AutumnPeriod.Poisoncouldbeextractedbypouringricewineoverthefeathersofthezhen
bird.182ThelinkbetweentherhinoandthezhenbirdwasconfirmedinthePiYaduringthe
Songdynasty(960–1279CE),whichstatedundertheentryofthepoison–featherbird:“The
182
AnornithologistconsultedbyParkerbelievesthatthezhenmaybethecrestedserpenteagle,aspeciesthatis
spreadacrosshugepartsoftropicalcontinentalAsia(Parker2013:Chapter18:2).
144
onlythingthatcancounteractthispoisonisrhinoceroshorn(quotedin:Parker2013:Chapter
18:1).”183
TaoistphilosopherGeHong(quotedin:Laufer1914:137–138)providesanintriguingaccount
ofrhinohorninthe4thcenturyCE,suggestingthatthehorncouldcommunicatewiththesky.
KoHungassertsinBaopuzi(‘TheMasterwhoembracessimplicity’)underthesectiondealing
with“Methodtobeusedinordertowalkonwaterorstaylongunderwater”:
“The(rhino)hornismadeintoahairpin.Whenpoisonousmedicinesofliquidformare
stirredwiththehornhairpin,awhitefoamwillbubbleup.Afterthefoamhasbubbled
up,theharmfuleffectofthepoisonisgone.Whennon–poisonoussubstancesare
stirredwiththehornhairpin,nofoamwillrise.Inthismannerthepresenceofpoison
canbeascertained(translatedby:Parker2013:Chapter18:4).”
Whatisofparticularinterestishisexplanationastowhyrhinohorniscapableofneutralizing
poison.Heestablishesalinkofthe“horncommunicatingwiththesky”anditsalexipharmic
propertiesduetotherhino’sdietconsistingofpoisonousplantsandtrees(Jenyns1954:
41).184Thesymbolismattachedtotherhinohorn’scelestialconnection185mayhave
183
TheentryinthePiYadescribesthepoison–featherbirdasfollows:
“Ifthereisazhenbirdwithpoisonedfeathers(becauseiteatspoisonoussnakes),andyoudipthemin
wine,youwillproducepoison.Thezhenbirdlookslikeagoosebutitscolourisdarkpurple.Itsbeakis
7–8cun(Chineseinch)longandcopper–coloured.Iteatssnakeswhichdissolveititsmouth.Ifthe
droppingsofthezhenbirdtouchstone,thenthestonewilldissolve.Thefeathershavepoison.Ifthey
aremixedinwinethenpoisonisproduced.Theonlythingthatcancounteractthispoisonisrhinoceros
horn.Thereforeintheplacewherethezhenbirdlives,therearealsorhinos(Parker2013:Chapter18:
1).”
184
SeveralTCMdoctorsconsultedduringdatacollectioninAsialikewiseexplainedtherhinohorn’salexipharmic
anddetoxingpropertiesinreferencetotheAsianrhino’sdiet.Accordingtotheintervieweddoctors(Interviews,
VietnamandHongKong,2013),Asianrhinoswerefeedingonpoisonousleaves,shrubsandfruitsintropical
rainforests.Unlikecattle,deerorbuffalo,therhinocandigestthesepoisonoussubstances;itshornishence
regardedasanexcellentantidotetopoisons.DoctorspreferAsianrhinohornastheAsianspecies’dietconsists
largelyofmedicinalplantsandherbs,renderingthehornmorepotentandsuperiorintermsofhealing
properties.ThedietsofAfricanspecieswerecheckedforthepurposesofverification.Thewhiterhinoisapure
grazer,survivingongrasswhiletheblackrhino’shookedupperlipallowsittopullofftwigs,branchesandfruit
frommorethan200differentvarietiesoftreesandshrubs(Gibson2015).Manyoftheseplantsareusedin
Africanmedicines(Interviews,2013).Scientistsalsofoundthatdesert-adaptedblackrhinosinNamibiawere
livingonadietrichinthepoisonoussucculentEuphorbiadamaran,alsoknownasmilkbush(Lehmannetal.
2013;Luskeetal.2009).Whiletheblackrhinomayhaveamulti-faceteddietthatincludesmedicinaland
poisonousplants,thetraditionaldoctors’preferenceswerebasedongenerationalknowledgeandtraditions,as
wellastheirenvironmentalmilieu.Otherpreferencesincludedfreshversusoldhorn(butitneedstobe
processedassoonaspossible);thehornoftheIndianrhinospeciesversushornfromtheothertwoAsianspecies
(whicharetinkeringonthebrinkofextinction);ideallythehornshouldbeharvestedatthepeakofarhino’slife
(atmid-agewhentherhinoisabout20yearsold)–preferablyfromaliveanimalastheefficacyofthemedicine
145
contributedtotheunicorn’ssanctityinEurope,wherethehealingpowersofalicornwere
veneratedinchurchesandmonasteriesmorethanonethousandyearslater(Parker2013:
Chapter26:1).
Datingbackfromthe11thtothe7thcenturyBCE,theChijing(theancient‘BookofSongs’)
providespoeticevidencethattherhinowasindeedhuntedinancienttimes.186Laufer(1914:
160)quotesametaphoremployedbysoldierscomplainingabouttheirowncrueltreatment:
“Wearenotrhinoceroses,wearenottigers,tobekeptinthesedesolatewilds.”Oncethe
localreservesofrhinohadbeendepletedduringtheHandynasty(206BCE–220CE),Roman
andArabtradersstartedsupplyingtheChinesemarketswithrhinohorn(Jenyns1954:41).
RhinohorncupshadbecomepreciousartefactsduringtheWesternHandynastyandwere
buriedwiththeirowners.Thoselessfortunatewereburiedwithimitationrhinohorncups
madefromclayorwood(Parker2013:Chapter19:1).Chapman(1999:15)foundevidence
thatChineseentrepreneurscreatedforgeriesofhorncarvings,cupsandgirdlesasearlyasthe
14thcentury,oftensubstitutingrhinohornwiththemuchcheaperhornofthewater
buffalo.187Withthedepletionofrhinonumberscamethesacralisationormythical
transformationoftherhino.Artisticrepresentationsbecamerepletewithimagesofthe
mythicrhinoceros–unicornsandrhinohornwasattributedwithsupernaturalcurative
capabilities(Parker2013:Chapter22).
Thedecimationofindigenousrhinopopulations,aswellasthesouthwardexpansionofthe
empireincreaseddemandforrhinohornduringtheWesternHandynasty.AncientChinese
writingssuggestthatChineseemperorQinShihuang(whoreignedfrom221BCEto209BCE)
decreaseswhenhornisharvestedfromadeadcarcass–;andthetoppartofthehornwasthemostcovetedand
expensivepartofthehornwhenusedformedicinalpurposes.
185
Parker(2013:Chapter26:1–9)alsoidentifiestheconceptofthe“spiritrhinocerosunicorn”,conceivedbyLi
Shangyin,apoetduringtheTangdynasty.Thenotionthatthemythicrhinocerosunicornwasusingitshornto
th
communicatewiththeskywasrepeatedinmanytextsuntilthe18 century.Fromaboutthattime,themythic
creaturesnolongerresembletherhinobutcontinuetogazeupatthemoon.
186
AhuntingexpeditionofKingSuanisdescribedinthefollowingwords:“Wehavebentourbows:wehaveour
arrowsonthestring.Hereisasmallboartransfixed;thereisalargerhinoceroskilled(quotedby:Laufer1914:
160).”
187
Intheirquesttoassemblecuriositiesfromdistantlands,Europeancollectorsoftenfellvictimtofakehorn
sellers.GermanEmperorRudolfII(1522–1612)wasbelievedtohavepaidhighpricesforhiscollectionofrhino
horntrinkets,whichwasfoundtoincludeseveralwaterbuffaloimitations(Chapman1999:15).
146
sentouthisarmytoopensouth-easttradestoacquirerhinohornandelephantivory(AnLiu
citedin:Chapman1999:26).Duetothetropicalclimateinthesouthernregions,demand
increasedforfever-reducingmedicinesthatcouldlowerlife–threateningtropicalfevers.
WhiletheChineseundertheWesternHandynastywerecolonizingthesouth,seafarersand
merchantsfromtheArabpeninsulaandEuropelearnttousethesouthwestmonsoonwinds
tosailtosouthernIndia,resultinginincreasedcommunicationandtradebetweenAsiaand
EuropealongtheAsiansearoutes(Parker2013:Chapter19:2–3).TributestoChinese
emperorsoftenincludedrhinohorn,ivoryandtortoiseshellduringthoseearlydaysofSino–
Arabtrade(Hirth1885:70–71,79,154,222).
Theroutesdidnotonlyservethepurposeofexchangingspices,silk,ivoryandrhinohornbut
storiesandinformationwerealsopassedon,andhencethemythoftheunicornmoved
westwardalongthesilkroute,filteringthroughIndiancultureandrevivingtheancientIndian
storyofEkashringa(Parker2013:Chapter19:5).Inspiredrhinohorntradersfromsouthern
Asiaarebelievedtohavecomeupwiththemyththatrhinohornhadaphrodisiacqualitiesin
ordertomarkettheirproducttoWesternmarkets.Theaphrodisiacorvirilequalitiesarenot
mentionedinanyoftheancientChinesescriptures(Parker2013:Chapter19:6).
Theobjectiveofthissectionwastoshowthemillennia-longquasi-globalappreciationofthe
rhinoasamythicalcreaturewithtranscendentalandsupernaturalqualities.Interwovenwith
talesoftheunicornandothermythicalapparitions,rhinohornwasimbuedwithalexipharmic,
curativeandstatus–elevatingproperties.Itisnoteworthythatincertainculturesthehornwas
seenasaseparateentityfromtheanimal(EuropeandtheArabworld)whereasothers(such
astheChineseandIndians)acknowledgedtherhinoasapowerfulevensacredanimal.
Historically,theuseofrhinohorn(alicorn)appearstohavebeenaprivilegedaffair.Theruling
politicalandmilitaryeliteswereabletoaffordthehighpriceofrhinohornwhereasthepoor
reliedoncheapknock-offs.
3.4.Huntingtalesandmyths
Thevaluationofrhinohornasapreciousandsacralgoodhadnoimpactonthevaluationof
therhinoastheoriginalownerofthehornduringthecolonialperiod.Wildanimals
147
commandednoextraordinaryorintrinsicvalueatthetime.Thesacralisationofrhinohorn
duetoitsascribedhealthbenefits,aswellaslinkstoEuropeanroyalsandAsianemperors,led
togrowthinglobaldemand.Initially,thedemandcouldbemetwithhorngatheredfrom
naturalmortalitiesandthrough(mostly)sustainablehuntingexpeditions.Whatevermystical
linksweresustainedbetweenhumansandanimalsinmedievalEurope,withtheonsetofthe
AgeofReasonwildanimalswereseenasbeastsincapableofsentienceandthecapacityto
experiencepain(Martin/Martin/Amin1982:29).Asthemythologyoftheunicornandother
animalmythologieswanedintoobscurity,openhuntingseasonwasdeclaredonbiggame
animals,includingthevariousspeciesofrhino.AlthoughEasternbeliefsheldthathumans
“shoulddonoharmtobeastnorbug”(Martin/Martin/Amin1982:opcit),therhinoalso
escapedimmunityfromhuntinginAsiaandwashuntedtoextinctioninmostofitsoriginal
Asianrange.
AsidefromtheextinctionofallrhinospeciesinChinabythelateMiddleAges,therewerevast
numbersofrhinosleftelsewhereinAsia.Conquerorsandbanditsstartedtargetedhuntingof
Indianrhinosinthe16thcentury.ThegreatconquerorBabur,wholaidthefoundationofthe
MughaldynastyintheIndiansubcontinent,wasknownforhisbrutalrhinohunts(Kisling
2000:255).Ashumanpopulationsstartedincreasing,theIndianrhinowaspushedoutof
fertilefloodplainsandgrasslands.ThegovernmentofBengalissaidtohavepaidabountyof
20rupeesforeveryrhinokilleduntil1896.SportshuntinggreatlyreducedIndianrhinos
numbersduringthe19thcentury.Bythelate20th-centuryBritishcolonialforceshadbeen
introducedtomodernfirearmsandsportshuntingbecameadeadlypastimeofboredcolonial
troops.Shootingrhinosandotherwildanimalsbecameassociatedwithmasculinity,status
andprestige(Martin/Martin/Amin1982:29).IndigenousroyalssuchastheMaharajahof
CoochBehar(heshotdead207rhinosbetween1871and1907)matchedthecolonialpastime
withequalvigour(Martin/Martin/Amin1982:30).Atthelastcountin2012,about3500Asian
rhinos(Emslie/Milliken/Talukdar2013:12)survivedthedeadlyimpactofsportshunting,
poachingandhumanencroachment.AstheAsianspeciesarenotthefocusofthis
dissertation,sufficetomentionthattheirdecimation(amongstotherfactors)hadadeadly
dominoeffectontheAfricanrhino.
148
Afairamountofrhinoandelephanthuntinghappenedduringtheearlymodernperiodin
Africa.Indigenouspopulationswerenomadichunter–gatherersduringtheStoneAge.Their
frequentmigrationensuredthatnaturalresourceswereusedsustainably.TheSanrock
paintings(describedearlier)attesttotherespect,evenreverencenomadictribeshadfor
wildlifeandhunting(Carruthers1995:7).AstheIronAgeapproached,manyAfricantribes
settledandledanagriculturalorpastoralistlife-style.Conservationstrategiessimilartothose
inMedievalEuropewereemployedtodealwiththedemandsoftradeandcropprotection.
Wealthaccumulationledtosocialstratification,andhuntingbecameapoliticizedmatter
(Carruthers1995:7).HistorianJaneCarruthers(1995:7–8)arguesthattheimpactofpre–
colonialhuntingwassmallinrelationtotheabundantwildlife:
“Desirablewildlifespeciescametobecontrolledbytheelitewhoalonecouldinitiatea
hunt,controltradeinwildlifeproducts,andenjoythespoilofcertainspecies.There
wereevenroyalhuntingpreserves,outofboundstocommoners,thebestknownof
whichwasShaka’sreserveintheUmfolozidistrictofZululand,setasideinthe1820s.
Strictprotectionproscriptionextendedtoclantotems,suchascrocodileorlion,which
couldnotbedestroyed.”
Thisstateofaffairschangedwiththearrivalofcolonialsettlers,whointroducedfirearmsand
astrongmarketeconomy.Ultimatelytheincreasingcommodificationofwildlifeledtoits
overexploitation(Carruthers1995:8).ThefirstsuperintendentoftheSouthAfricanMuseum
ofNaturalHistorySirAndrewSmithcommentedontherelationshipbetweenrhinosand
humansin1838:
“Thepresentspecies,underthenameofRhinoster,hasbeenfamiliarlyknowntothe
colonialistsoftheCapeofGoodHopeeversince1652.Inthatyear,whentheDutch
firstformedtheirsettlementontheshoresofTableBay,thisanimalwasaregular
inhabitantofthethicketswhichclothedthelowerslopesofTableMountain.The
abandonmentbythisanimalasameasureofsafety,probablyconstitutedthe
commencementofaforcedmigration,whichhascontinuedtoextendeversince,and
whichhaslednotonlytothedisappearanceofthespeciesfromthedistrictswithinthe
presentcoloniallimits,butalsoinagreatmeasuretoitsremovalfromcountries
beyondthoselimits,asfarashuntersefficientlyarmedareaccustomedtoresort.Ifa
system,suchashashithertoprevailed,continuestoexist,andthelargeranimals
persevereinflyingtoavoidtheeffectsoffirearm,thetimemayarrivewhenthe
variousspecieswhichformerlymayhavebeenscattered,each,inapeculiarlocalityof
alargecontinent,willbehuddledtogether;andindeedanadvancetowardsthat
periodisinprogress,asmaybeinferredfromtheconcentrationwhichispresent
takingplaceintheinteriorofSouthAfrica(Smith1838:56).”
149
AsEuropeancolonizersandexplorerswerepenetratingmoreremotepartsofAfrica,they
werecommentingontheabundantnumbersofrhinosacrossthecontinent
(Martin/Martin/Amin1982:35).Itisestimated(Martin/Martin/Amin1982:35;Kisling2000)
thattherewerebetween400000toonemillionblackrhinos(theyweremorenumerousthan
thewhitespecies)intheearly1800s.The‘ScrambleforAfrica’wasaccompaniedbythe
colonialarrivalsengagingin‘leisurely’past-timessuchassportsandtrophyhunting.
MacKenziearguesthatthecolonialfrontier“wasalsoahuntingfrontierandtheanimal
resourcecontributedtotheexpansionisturge.”Huntingbecamea“ritualizedandoccasionally
aspectaculardisplayofwhitedominance(Mackenzie1988:7).”
Itisdifficulttoestablishwherethehuntingfraternity’senthrallmentwiththecollectionof
huntingtrophiesoriginates.Thereappearstobeaconfluenceofseveralfactorssuchas
hunterswantingtoshowoffacollectionofwildlifespecimensbackhome,showmanshipand
keepingmementosofspecifichuntingexpeditions.Trophiesalsoservedmorepractical
purposessuchasinteriordecoration,collectingspecimensofspeciesforscientificpurposes
andasproofofbreedingsuccessinlateryears(Mackenzie1988:28–29;Damm2008:6).The
opportunityofbeingintricatelyinvolvedinthewritingofnaturalhistoryofferedhunters,
explorersandcolonialgovernorstheirchanceatfame.Manyhunterscollectedspeciesand
trophiesformuseumsandcollections;afewluckyoneshadspeciesnamedafterthem
(Mackenzie1988:38–39).
Interestinglyintheearlyyearsofthecolonialempire,therhinoinspiredyetanothermyth–a
huntingmyth.Likefiresidetales,huntersareknowntoembellishorromanticisetheirhunts.
Inthecaseoftherhino,colonialhunterswroteabouttheattacksofrhinosoncaravansand
huntingparties,imputingtherhinowithapugnaciousnature.SirAndrewSmith,thefirst
superintendentoftheSouthAfricanMuseumofNaturalHistory,relatedasupposedKenyan
taleofarhinocharge:
“Itsdispositionisextremelyfierceandituniversallyattacksmanifitseeshim.The
usualmethodofescapeadoptedbythenativesistoclimbupahighdensetress,soas
toavoid,ifpossible,beingseen.Iftheanimalmisseshissightofthefugitive,he
immediatelygallopsofftohishaunt;fromwhenceitmaybeinferredthatheisnot
empoweredwiththepowerofkeenscent.Shouldhe,however,espyhisobjectinthe
tree,woetotheunfortunatenative,–hebeginstobuttwithhishorns,–strikesand
penetratesthetree,andcontinuespiercingittillitfallswhenhisvictimseldom
150
escapesbeinggoredtodeath.Unlessthetreeisofalargegirth,heneverfailsin
breakingitdown.Havingkilledhisvictim,heleaveshimwithoutdevouringthecarcase
[spellingoforiginalauthor].Themaleisonlyprovidedwiththehorn.Thefemalehas
notanythingofthekind(Smith1838:42).”
The“chargeoftherhino”becamenotoriousuntilbiggamehunterslaidthemythtorest.A
passionatehunter,formerUSPresidentTheodoreRooseveltdeclaredthatthesupposed
chargewaslittlemorethanthecuriouswildanimalmovingclosertothestrangehuman
apparitiononaccountofitspooreyesight(Hornaday[1922]1979:358).Theblackrhinois
knownforitsaggressivenature,butthereiscertainlynoevidencetosuggestthatrhinos
regularlyattackedcaravansorhuntingparties.HunterssuchasRoosevelt188andtheauthor
ErnestHemingwaywerenonethelessinaweoftherhino(Enright2008:72).Indescribinga
chatwithhissonKermitduringahuntingsafari,Roosevelt(1910:206–208)mayhave
unwittinglyprophesizedwhatlayaheadfortherhino:
“Lookathim,“saidKermit,“standingthereinthemiddleoftheAfricanplain,deepin
prehistoricthought.”Indeedtherhinocerosdoesseemlikeasurvivalfromtheelder
worldthathasvanished;hewasinplaceinthePliocene;hewouldnothavebeenout
ofplaceintheMiocene;butnowadayshecanonlyexistatallinregionsthathave
laggedbehind,whiletherestoftheworld,forgoodorforevil,hasgoneforward.”
Roosevelt’sremarkpointstothefascinationofWesternhunterswiththerhino.Therhino
assumesasymbolicvalueofaneralonggonewherethepre–historiccreaturehadtheupper
handandwasnoteasilyovercome.Onapoliticallevel,Roosevelt’sassociationoftherhino
with“regionsthathavelaggedbehind”isperhapsironicandinadvertentlypointstothe
divergencebetweentheconservationanddevelopmentparadigms(whichareoftenat
loggerheadsandwillbediscussedinmoredetailinthenextchapter).
ThereweremanysimilaritiesbetweenthedemiseofAsianandAfricanspeciesofrhinoduring
the19thcentury.189AswasthecaseontheAsiansubcontinent,colonialhunters,settlersand
188
In1909,RooseveltandhissonKermitembarkedonaone-yearexpeditiontocollectspecimensforthe
SmithsonianInstitute.TheglorifiedhuntingsafaristartedinBritishEastAfrica(modernKenya)throughto
BelgianCongo(modernDRCCongoandRepublicofCongo)andendedinKhartoum(Sudan).Roosevelt‘collected’
morethan1,100specimens(aftershootingandkillingthem)including20rhinotrophies(Anonymouswriterfor
EyeWitnesstoHistory1997).
189
DetailsaboutrhinohuntsundertakenbytheHamranArabsofSudanarenotexplored.Sufficetomention
herethattheyperfectedtheartofhuntingrhinosonhorseback,killingthemwithswords.Hundredsofrhino
th
hornswereshippedoutannuallyfromSomaliportsuntiltheendofthe19 centurywhenrhinosbecamerare
andeventuallyextinctinthosepartsofAfrica(Martin/Martin/Amin1982:36–41).
151
theirindigenouscollaboratorshaddecimatedrhinosacrossAfricabythe20thcentury.The
notoriousBritishcolonialbig–gamehunterandmilitaryofficialFrederickSeloussurmised:
“Therecanbenodoubtthattheblackrhinoceroshasbecomeveryscarceoreven
ceasedtoexistinmanypartsofBritishEastAfrica,whereonlytenyearsagoitwas
veryplentiful,andthereturnsofthoseshotonsportsmen'sorsettlers'licensesdonot
altogetheraccountfortheirdisappearance(quotedin:Casada1998:179).”
LikeincolonialIndia,theimprovedfirepowerandaccuracyofhuntingriflesallowedeven
amateurstoengageinsports-huntingandbig-gamehunting.Thehornsweresoldtoboth
EuropeanandAsianmarketswhilebothAfricansandEuropeansatethemeat
(Martin/Martin/Amin1982:35).Table4(below)providesabird’seyeviewofexportsof
severalwildlifeproductsfromtheporttownofDurbanincolonialNatalduringthe19th
century,includinghighvolumesofrhinohorn.
Table4:WildlifeexportsfromtheportofDurban,1844-1904
Source:extractedfrom:McCracken(2008:27–28)
152
DurbanwasoneoftheseveralAfricanharbours190thatactedasnodalpointsconnecting
wildlifesupplierstonorthernmarkets.ThemajormarketsforrhinohornwereIndia(which
alsoservedasatransshipmentpointforChinaandSoutheastAsia)andEurope,specifically
GermanyandGreatBritain(Martin/Martin/Amin1982:91).ThemassacreofAfricanrhinos
duringcolonialtimeswassodirethattheybecameextinctinmanyoftheirtraditionalrange
states.InEastAfrica,blackrhinoswereconsideredverminundergamecontrolacts,andopen
huntingseasonwasdeclaredinpursuitoflandclearance(Msimang2012:19).Therewere
limitedconservationmeasuresinplace,thevaluationofwildlifeasanaturalheritage
worthwhileprotectingwasinitsinfancyandnocommonsenseprevailedwhenitcameto
limitinghunting(Chapter4explainshowexcessivehuntingeventuallyledtoearly
conservationinitiatives).
Theaimofthissub-sectionwastoshowthathuntingmetmuchoftheglobaldemandfor
rhinohorninthecolonialperiod.Rhinohuntingconstitutedhowevernotonlyamethodof
attainingrhinohorn,huntersalsostartedtovaluetheactofrhinohunting,trophiesandhorn
collectables.Rhinohuntsandtheresultanttrophieswereeconomicallylucrativeanddenoted
symbolicvalue,suchasmasculinity,191triumphovernatureandcolonialempirebuilding.
Rhinotrophyorsportshuntingrepresentedthehigh-endspectrumoftheconsumermarketat
thetime.
3.5TheculturallegacyofthejambiyaanditssymbolicvalueinYemen
The1970soilboomintheMiddleEastledtoanenormousincreaseinpercapitaincomein
NorthYemen,affordingupwardsocialmobilityanddisposableincometoanewgenerationof
Yemenicitizens.Leadinguptotheboomyears,onlyafewYemenimenofhighsocialstatus
couldaffordtheelaboratively-carvedjambiya,atraditionalceremonialdaggerofwhichthe
190
Zanzibar,Mombasa,Mafia,Bagamoyo,PembaandDaresSalaamweremajorIndianOceanharboursservicing
bothEuropeanandAsianmarketsthroughoutthecolonialperiod.WhileundertakingresearchintheZanzibar
archives,EsmondMartinfoundthatZanzibarimerchantsimportedseveraltonsofrhinohornfromtheTanzanian
mainlandannuallyduringthe1800s(Martin/Martin/Amin1982:91).
191
Whilethehuntressplaysanimportantroleinancientmyths,theriseofthefemaletrophyhunterisarecent
phenomenon.
153
hiltiscarvedoutofrhinohorn(seeFigure6).Withitsoriginsdatingbackseveralthousand
years,thejambiyaplaysacrucialroleinYemeniculture.WhiletherearenorhinosinNorth
Yemen,rhinohornhasbeenusedintheMiddleEasterncountryformorethanonethousand
years(Varisco1989a:215).Historically,particulartypesofjambiyasandthewayitwasworn
signalledaman’sstatusinsociety.Thosewhocouldnotclaimtribaloriginsorwereoflow
socialstatuswerenotallowedtowearjambiyas(Martin/Vigne/Allan1997:2).Afterthe
revolutionin1962,jambiyasbecamelessintertwinedwithdeclaringone’sstatus.However,
theyremainedasymbolofYemeniidentity,anexpressionofself-identificationwiththe
dominanttribalcultureandthenewemergingnationalism(Varisco1989a:216).Mostadult
menwerewearingjambiyasforsymbolicratherthanfunctionalpurposesduringtheoilboom.
Thedaggersignifiesthatamaniscapableofdefendinghimselfandhistribe(whichhappens
seldom),andplaysacentralroleofthebar’adanceperformedatimportanttribaland
nationalevents.Itisalsoasymbolofhonourandaman’sword,whichissurrenderedduring
mediationoftribaldisputesasabondtosignalacceptanceofthemediator’sdecision(Varisco
1989a:216).
TheYemeniportofAdenwasasignificantportofcallforArabtradersinvolvedinthetradeof
ivoryandrhinohornfromAfricatoChinaandIndia.Rhinohornmayhaveenteredlocal
YemenimarketsevenbeforetheIslamicperiod(Varisco1989a:opcit).Whatisfascinating
abouttheuseofrhinohorninNorthYemenistheobservationthatitshighvaluationis
directlylinkedtotheculturalsignificanceofthejambiyaandnottotheanimalitderivesfrom
(Varisco1989a:215).WhiletherhinohasnosignificancetoYemenis,rhinohornwashighly
valuedforitsfunctionalvalueasasuperiorhilt.Hiltsmadeofrhinohornaremoreresistantto
wearandtearthanthosemadefromothermaterials,suchascoworbuffalohorn(Varisco
1989b:46).Varisco(1989a:216)explainsthepreferenceforrhinohornoverothermaterials
asfollows:
“Rhinohornisthepreferredmaterialbecauseitissaidtoimprovewithageand
handling.Thereisalsoanaestheticinterest.Afterafewdecadesarhinohornhilt
becomestranslucent,atransformationthattakesnotplacewiththeothermaterials
availabletodaggermakers.Asitagesthehiltmayalsotakeonayellowishhue
resemblingthehighlypizedamberusedinYemenijewellery.Inamaturehilt,after60
–100years,individualhairlinesmaybediscernedmoredistinctly.”
154
Unlikejambiyasmadeofothermaterials,thevalueofrhinohorndaggersincreaseswithage.
Jambiyasthatbelongedtokings,tribaleldersandpoliticalleadersarethemosthighlyvalued
andfamousdaggers.Moreover,whileallYemenimencouldaffordtowearjambiyasafterthe
oilboom,thebestdaggerswereornateandoverlaidwithgoldandsilver,signallingaman’s
highsocialstatusandwealth(Varisco1989b:46).
Figure6:Atraditionaljambiyawithhiltcarvedoutofrhinohorn
Source:OrientalArms
192
Marketexchangesinvolvingrhinohornwerelegaluntilthelate1970s.Martin(1982:92–93)
foundthatrhinohornsoldfor32US$perkgatauctionsinEastAfricain1969.By1978,the
worldmarketpriceforrhinohornhadincreasedtoUS$300perkg.Therhinohorntrade
expertarguesconvincinglythatthepriceinflationwasnotonlylinkedtotheincreased
demandinYemenbutalsotochangesinthestructureandcompositionoftheworldmarket
(Martin/Martin/Amin1982:93).Atthesource(predominantlyinKenyaatthetime),Africans
enteredthetrophiesmarketandbrokethemonopolyoftheGujaratidealers,thereby
introducingcompetition.Moreover,nationalauthoritiesinseveralAfricanrangestatessold
theirstockpilesofivoryandrhinohornatauctions.Protectionistpolicieswereimplemented,
192
th
Thephotodepictsalate19 -centuryjambiyafromOman.Thegripiscarvedoutofrhinohorn,mountedwith
filigreegoldandsilvermountsandadornedwithsilvernailsonthefrontandpommelside.Imageavailableat
http://oriental-arms.com/item.php?id=5248(accessed20August2015).
155
whichdisadvantagedIndiantradersanddisplacedthemonopolisticmarketstructures.Asthe
pricesbegantoincreaseatthesourceinEastAfrica,buyersfromSingapore,Macau,Hong
Kong,Japan,Taiwan,SouthKoreaandlaterNorthYemenhadtoraisetheiroffing,too
(Martin/Martin/Amin1982:93).
Accordingtoofficialstatistics,NorthYemenimportedanaverageof2878kgofrhinohorn
eachyearbetween1969and1977,amountingtoanaverageproductionofapproximately8
750rhinohorndaggersperannum(Martin/Vigne/Allan1997:9).Thewholesalepriceofrhino
hornsurgedduringthe1970sand1980sinYemen,reaching$680perkgin1987.TheYemeni
currencywasdecliningatthetime,renderingjambiyamoreexpensiveinrealterms.Rhino
hornimportsstartedtodropduetothedualeffectsofdecreasingrhinonumbersinAfricaand
theexpansionofEastAsianinterestsinthehorntrade.EastAsianswereabletoofferdouble
thepriceduetothestrengthofAsiancurrenciesatthetime(Martin/Vigne/Allan1997:17).As
aresult,anewrhinohorndaggercostatleast$1500whereasseveralhigh-endspecimens
werevaluedatseveralhundredsofthousandsofDollarsinthe1980s(Varisco1989a:opcit).
Manydaggerswerelockedawayandsafeguardedduetotheirgrowinginvestmentvalue.The
priceofjambiyascontinuedtosurgeafterthegovernmentbannedtheimport,exportanduse
ofrhinohornin1987.Uptothispoint,jambiyaartisanscollectedandsoldrhinohornshavings
totheChinesemarket(Varisco1989b).AftertheMarxistgovernmenthadbeenoustedin
SouthYemenin1990,NorthandSouthYemenbecameonecountry.TheMarxistgovernment
intheSouthhadpreviouslybanneditscitizensfromcarryingweapons,includingthejambiya.
Whiletheunificationofthetwonationsdidnotleadtoanincreaseinthedemandforrhino
horndaggersinthesouthernregions,thecultureofwearingjambiyasinthenorthernpartsof
Yemenremains(Vigne/Martin2008:45).Rhinohornisstillsmuggledintothecountrybutat
much-reducedlevels(Interviews,2013and2014)asYemenibuyersareunabletocompete
withthehighpricesofferedonAsianmarkets.Varisco(1989a:217)warnedinthelate1980s
thatwhilethedemandmightbewaning,arhinohorndaggerpresentedaninvestment
opportunityinaneconomywithhighinflationandfewsafeinvestments.Jambiyashave
becomegenerationalheirlooms,passedonfromfathertoson.Thesonofasheikh,for
example,inheritedajambiyawhichwasvaluedatmorethantwomillionDollarsin2009.193
193
DanielMartinVariscoreferredmetothispressclipping,whichwastranslatedfromArabintoEnglish.
Availableat:http://marebpress.net/mobile/articles.php?id=5305&lng=arabic(accessed12July2015)
156
Irrespectiveofwhetherrhinohornisprocessedintodaggersornot,theinvestmentvalueof
rhinohornisaseriousmatterinlightofdwindlingrhinonumbersandwillbefurther
discussedinthenextandfinalsectionofthischapter.
3.7Currentrhinohornuse,consumerprofilesandproductdifferentiation
Alengthyprocessofsacralisationhasledtothevaluationofrhinohornasa“sacredobject
withpowerfuldetoxifyingqualities”(Focusgroupwithconsumers,2013).Thevaluationof
rhinohornisthuscloselyintertwinedwithculturalbeliefsthatconferarangeoffunctional
andsymbolicpropertiesuponthecovetedanimalpart.Itstranscendentalvaluehasbeen
transferredandreiteratedviaaglobalhistoryofbelief.Whileaminorityofcurrentconsumers
imputerhinohornwithsupernaturalormythicalproperties,keyconsumergroupshave
acceptedandassimilatedthesacredvalueofrhinohorn.Whilethescarcityofrhinoshas
contributedtothehighpriceofrhinohorn,itshistoricalusewasassociatedwithpolitical,
economicandmilitaryelites,aswellasroyalsacrosstheglobewhocouldaffordtopaythe
highprice.Intimesoflimitedsupply(seeearlysections),thepriceofrhinohornwouldsurge
tonewheights,neverrecoveringtoitsmoreaffordablepreviousprice.Similartothemarket
forivory(seeforexample:Gao/Clark2014;Lemieux/Clarke2009;Harvey2015),rhinohornis
adifferentiatedproductwithaheterogeneousconsumerprofile.Thefollowingsection
providesanoverviewoffindingsgatheredduringfieldworkinsouthernAfricaand
southeasternAsia,aswellasinsightssynthesizedfromscholarlyandpolicyliteratures.A
functionaltypologyispresentedwiththeprovisothatsomeconsumersmayuserhinohorn
forseveralpurposesatthesametime,orhornusemaychangeovertime,forexample:rhino
hornmaybegiftedtoapersonwhothenusesgrounduprhinohornforhealthreasons.
3.7.1Rhinohornasaninvestmentandmoneylaunderingtool
Bothlegalandcriminalactorsareusingrhinohornasaninvestmenttool.Theearliersection
ontheuseofrhinohorninYemenijambiyasreferredtotheinvestmentvalueofrhinohorn
daggers.Investmentventuresintorhinohorndaggersorobjetsd’artmadefromrhinohorn
157
(suchaslibationcups)presentoneendoftheinvestmentscaleofrhinohorn.Rhinohorn
daggersareoftenfamilyheirlooms,passedonfromfathertoson.Thisprocessedformof
rhinohornonlyre-enterscirculationoncethedaggeriseitherstolenorlegallysold.Similarto
Arabinvestorsbuyingjambiyasasgrowingassets,Asianbusinessentrepreneursarelikewise
pickingupobjetsd’artsuchastheoften-ornatelycarvedlibationcups(seeFigure5),vasesor
otherartisticcreations.KarlAmmanandhisteam(2015b)identifiedfactoriesinHanoithat
wereproducingreligiousartefactsandsymbolssuchasprayerbangles,braceletsandBuddha
beads.SalesofthesereligiousobjectsweretargetedatvisitingChinesetourists.
Whilesomebuyersarelegitimateartcollectorsandlovers,othersaredrivenbylesscultural
andmoreeconomicprinciples.Themathematicsissimple:Astheliverhinonumbersgrow
fewer,theinvestmentvalueofrhinohornandhornproductsgrowsmarkedly.Sincethe2008
globalfinancialmeltdown,stockmarketorconventionalfinancialinvestmentshavebecomea
lessdesirableinvestmentoption.Rhinohornisdeemedasafeinvestmentoptionintimesof
financialuncertainty:Whereassharepricesmaydrop,thevalueofrhinohornisbelievedto
beincreasingandfoolprooffromfinancialmarketcrashes.AccordingtoanAsianwildlife
traffickingintermediary(Interview,2013):“It’slikepayingwithacreditcard.”Saysasmuggler
(Interviewwithintermediary2,2013):
“TheauctionsareonlyinAsiaandattheseauctions,someofthembuythehornsand
takethemintothehouseandputthemonamantelpieceandthentheymakeitvery
verysecureandthenleaveitthere.Andthenheknowsthat'sthemoneythatIhave
gothere.”
Someofthesetransactionsoccurinthelegalrealmatworld-renownedauctionhouseswith
thecorrectpaperworkandrequiredCITESpermits.However,othertransactionsinvolve
fraudulentactivitiessuchastheprocessingoffreshlyharvestedrhinohorninto“preConvention”libationcupsusinginnovativeagingtechniques(thesectiononfakerhinohorn
providesmoredetail).Apoliceinvestigatorexplains(Interview,2013):
“IfyoulookattheeconomicsofVietnam,theywereverypoor.Sowhenthe
VietnamesecametoSouthAfrica,andyoucanseehowitstartedescalatingin2002,
2003,theywerebuyinguprhinohorncheaply.Sosimilartowhatwashappeningin
theUSAandAustraliaandwithinEurope,rhinohornstartedtosellonauctionsaspre-
158
conventionrhinohorn,aslibationcupsortheychangeitintolibationcups.Withthat
youalsohaveseentheBig5huntersintheUSA,theystartedtosellofftheirtrophies.
Andwho'sthebuyersofthetrophies?InOperationCrash,thattheydidthislastyear,
youstartedseeingthembuyingupthetrophiesandtheywenttoVietnam.Butonly
thehorn.InSouthAfrica,asimilarprocessstartedhappening.Thepeoplethathad
startedtradinginrhinohornapproachedthesemarketsandsaid:‘Iwanttomake
moremoney.’SoalltheseguysthathadaccesstotheVietnamesestartedtobuyall
theserhinohornsfromtheprivatestockpiles.”194
Thepoliceinvestigatoralsotouchesonthediversionoflegalrhinohuntingtrophiesintothe
illegalmarket.Essentially,thelegitimateownerschanneltheirlegallyacquiredandcertified
rhinohorns–thehornsminustherestofthetrophy–intoillegalmarketflows.Thisformof
launderinginvolvesaconversionfromasymbolicvaluationofrhinohorntoaneconomic
valuation,drivenbyprofit-seekingbehaviour.Whereastherhinotrophymayhavebeen
valuedasamementoofahuntingsafariinthepast(seeearliersectiononhuntingtales),
rhinohornsaretransformedintoinvestmenttools,ofwhichthere-sellvalueislikelyto
exceedthecostoftheoriginaltrophyhunt.
Inotherinstances,rhinohornremainsundifferentiated(unprocessed)inbankvaults,strong
roomsorsafelocationsatthesourceinrhinorangestatesorthehornistransferredtosimilar
‘safe’locationselsewhere(predominantlyinAsia).Whilecurrentstreamsofliteraturereferto
the“Asianmarket”asthemainconsumergroupofrhinohorn,rhinohorninvestorscome
fromdifferentculturalandnationalbackgrounds.SouthAfricanlawenforcersbelievethat
roguewildlifeprofessionals(rhinohorn“producers”)presentaportionofthisconsumer
group(Interviews,2013).Upon“harvesting”rhinohorn(dehorning)rhinos,wildlife
professionals(includingprivaterhinoowners)andtheirlocalbuyersstoretheunprocessed
horninasafelocation.195Whileprivaterhinoownersareallowedtoretainrhinohornwhenin
possessionoftherequiredpaperwork–theso-calledThreatenedorProtectedSpecies(TOPS)
194
TheU.S.FishandWildlifeServiceisleadinganon-goinginvestigationentitled“OperationCrash”,which
tacklesillegaltraffickingofrhinohornintheUnitedStates.Severalantiquedealersandillegalhornbuyershave
beenarrested(U.S.FishandWildlifeService2014).TheSouthAfricaninvestigatorreferstohuntingtrophies
gettingexportedtoVietnam;however,manyhornsalsowenttoChina.
195
Becauserhinohornisanaturalmaterial,weevils,mitesanddecompositionmayaffectstockpiles.Zimbabwe’s
5-tonnestockpileofrhinohornhasreportedlybeenaffectedbyweevildamage(EyewitnessNews2014).
Arsenic,dieselandotherchemicalsareusedtopreserverhinohorn(Interviewswithparkauthoritiesandprivate
rhinoowners,2013).
159
regulations,whicharediscussedlater–theyarenotallowedtosellortradeinrhinohornand
theyarerequiredtoregistertheirstockpiles.196Aswillbeshowninlaterchaptersofthis
dissertation,wildlifeactorshavedevisedinnovativestrategiestobypassregulationsand
prohibitions.Awildlifeveterinarianconfirmedthepractice(Interview,2013):“Ifyouhave
rhinohorn,youputitsomewheresafe,it’sagrowingasset.”Theseprivate-owned
unregisteredrhinohornsareeitherkeptinasafelocation(whichcomeswithahighrisk)197or
launderedintoillegalmarketflowsatintervals.Noteworthyofthistypeofuseisthatitisnonconsumptive;inotherwords,rhinohorncanberepurposedforotherusesfurtherdownthe
lineandre-enterflows(circulation).
Criminalnetworksareusingrhinohornandotherwildlifecontrabandasaformofcriminal
currencyoraninstrumenttolaunderill-gottenfortunes.Thedwindlingliverhinonumbers
andthepossibleextinctionofthespeciesformpartoftheeconomicvaluationofrhinohorn
forsuchcriminalnetworkswhomthemselvesareactivelycontributingtothedemiseofthe
rhino.Suchactorsarespeculatingonthepossibleextinctionofrhinos.198AnAsian
intermediaryexplainstheinvestmenthorizonasfollows:
“Whenyoubuyrhinohorn,youputitinthesafe.Aftertenyears,youtakeoutthe
samehorn,yougoingtohaveabiginvestment.Itisdifferentfrommoney.IfyoubuyR
500000ofrhinohorn,thenaftertenyearsitisworthR1million.Youputthesame
moneyintothebankandmaybeit’sgoingtobeworthR600000aftertenyears.”
Rhinohornisalsousedasacurrencyincriminalbusinesstransactions:illegalhunters,for
example,userhinohorntobuyhuntingriflesandweapons.
196
Nationalgovernmentsofrhinorangestates,aswellaszooandsafariparksacrosstheworld,arealso
stockpilingrhinohornalbeitlegally.Theseactorshavemultiplereasonsformaintainingnationalstockpiles,
rangingfrommaintainingageneticdatabasetokeepingtheiroptionsopenforthepossibilityofaregulatedlegal
tradeinrhinohorninthefuture.
197
TheftsandarmedrobberieshaveoccurredatseveralprivateandpublicstockpilesinSouthAfrica.Inone
incident,66rhinohornswerestolenafewdaysbeforenatureconservationofficialswereduetoregisterthe
horns.
198
TwoindependentinformantsinSouthAfricaclaimedthatAsiannationalshadapproachedthemtofindout
whethertheywouldbeinapositiontolocateandkillallremainingrhinosinSouthAfrica.Whilethesupposedhit
appearsfar-fetched,interviewswithcriminalactorsreiteratedtheinvestmentvalueofrhinohorn.
160
3.7.2Rhinohornasastatussymbol
Theearliersectiononjambiyasmadereferencetothelargelysymbolicuseofrhinohorn
daggerstodenotesocialstrataandwealthinYemenisociety.MillikenandShaw(2012)notea
similarpatterninVietnamandChina,whereeconomicaffluenceandupwardsocialmobility
haveledtoanincreaseddemandforrhinohornproductsoverthepastdecade.Rhinohornis
usedinthetreatmentofcancer(discussedbelow),asageneralhealthtonic,asahangover
cureandstatussymbol.Thelatterthreeusesarefrequentlyintertwinedaswealthy
individualsshowofftheirstatusandwealthbyconsumingrhinohornasahealthtonicand
hangovercure.Consumptionofrhinohorninthisinstanceislinkedto‘faceconsumption’.199
ThistypeofconsumptionholdssignificantculturalvaluetocertainstrataofAsiansociety,
whichengageinactsofconspicuousconsumptioninorder“toenhance,maintainorsave
face”(Milliken/Shaw2012:135).Accordingtoastudyontheconsumptionofwildanimal
productsinVietnam(Drury2011:247),thepopularityofsuchproductsislinkedtotheir
functionasamedium“tocommunicateprestigeandobtainsocialleverage.”Drury(2011:
254)alludestothechallengecommunitymembersofcollectivesocietiesmayfaceinnot
conformingtosocialnorms.ThefearofloosingfaceholdsswayinAsiansocieties,where
personalpreferencesmayfallsecondtothoseofthegroup.Thisobservationisimportant
withregardstothenotionofcontestedillegality,theearliermentionedstrategyemployedto
legitimizeillegaleconomicactivities.Enforcingnewrulesorregulationsthatcontradictwellestablishedsocialnormsandpracticesarelikelytoachievelimitedsuccess(thisisdiscussedin
moredetailintheconcludingsectionofthischapter).
ConsumersinterviewedduringfieldworkinVietnamandHongKongconfirmedthese
observationsandthestatus-elevatingpropertiesofrhinohorn.Severalinformants
(Interviews,2013)relatedhowrhinohornfeaturedatexclusiveprivatepartiesandin
executiveclubs.Therhinohornowner(existingresearchsuggeststhatwealthyoldmenare
themainconsumers,womenfeaturehoweverinthepartycontext,too)suppliesshotsof
“rhinowine”,“rhinoalcohol”or“drinkofthemillionaires”–acocktailofgrounduprhinohorn
199
The“lossofface”referstogettingembarrassedinfrontofone’sfriendsandpeers.Accordingtoaresearch
informantinHongKong(Interview1,2013):“Ifyouloosefaceonce,itisdifficulttogetitbackunlesssomeone
grantsyouface-achancetoregainyourhonour.”InkeepingupwiththeJoneses,peoplehaveto“fightfor
face”.
161
andricewineordistilledspirits(seeFigure7).Whileseveralnewspaperarticlessuggestthat
hedonisticconsumerssnortrhinohornuptheirnoses(muchlikecocaine),datacollectionat
thesourceandinterviewswithlawenforcementagentsfailedtoverifytheseclaims.However,
rhinohornisusedinconjunctionwithalcoholandotherillicitdrugs.
Figure7:Rhinoalcohol
Source:PhototakenbyresearcherinHanoi,Vietnam
ThemixingofrhinohornwithalcoholgoesagainstthebasicinstructionsofTCMdoctorswho
warnpatientsnevertomixrhinohornwithalcoholorsalinesolutionsasitunderminesthe
efficacyofthemedicine(InterviewswithTCMdoctors,HanoiandHoChiMinhCity,2013).
Despitethewarning,theunorthodoxapplicationofrhinohornasadetoxificationtonicand
after–partycleanserappearstobethemostpopularuseofrhinohorninVietnam(Interview
withTRAFFICofficer,Hanoi,2015).ThisechoespartiallywithfindingsoftheTRAFFICstudy
(Milliken/Shaw2012),whichidentifiedhabitualmiddle-ageduserswhofrequentlydrink‘rhino
wine’tocountertheeffectsofexcessivedrinking.IntheaftermathoftheinitialTRAFFIC
study,WWFengagedtheservicesofaVietnam–basedmarketingcompanytoassess
162
consumerpreferencesinrhinohornconsumptioninthetwomajorcitiesofHanoiandHoChi
MinhCityinVietnam.Basedonasampleof600people,thestudyfoundthathighly–educated
wealthypeoplewerethemainbuyersandusersofrhinohornforhealthandstatusreasons.
Thestudyalsoidentified‘intenders’,whocurrentlylackedthefinancialmeanstoaffordrhino
hornbutwhowereintendingtobuyitoncetheyhaddisposableincome(IpsosMarketing
2013).Asubsequentstudyfound(PSI/Vietnam2015:7):
“Perceivedhealthbenefits,includingbodydetoxificationand/orhangover
management,werethemostcommonreasonforrecentrhinohornuse.High-income
urbanmenaremorelikelytouserhinohorniftheybelieveitcanachieveshort-term
healthimprovements,increasesocioeconomicstatus,orstrengthenprofessional
relationships.”
Aninterestingsidebaristheuseofrhinohornasagift,whichmaybeofferedtopoliticaland
economicelites,orbusinessassociates.DuetoitssacredvaluewithinAsiancommunities,a
giftofrhinohornreflectsthatthegift-giverholdstherecipientinhighesteem.Thegiftthus
fulfilsthefunctionof‘showingface’,andisinterpretedasatokenofrespectandadmiration.
Whilenodirectreciprocityisexpected,agiftofhorn“mayopenmanydoors.”Aseconomic
andpoliticalelitestendtofallintotheagecategoryofmiddle-agedtoold,thegiftingofrhino
hornsignalsthegiver’swishfortherecipienttoenjoyalong,healthyandprosperouslife
(Interviews,2013).RhinohornalsoservesasacatalysttofacilitatedealsbetweenAfricanand
Asianbusinesspeople.Therarebodypartisusedtoleveragediscountsormaintain
preferentialbusinessrelationships.Itsfunctionisqualitativelydifferentfromprovidingan
altruisticgiftinthatitplaysafacilitativeroleineconomicexchangesbasedonanexpectation
ofreciprocity.Saysanintermediary(Interview,2013):
“TheChinesearebusiness–mindedpeople,sotoattractyoutheyalwayscomewith
gifts.So,me,whenIusedtogothere,theyusedtotellmetheyaregoingtogivemea
hugediscount,butImustgivethemrhinohorn.Imustbringthemzebraskins,also
tigerskins.‘Ifyouhaveit,tellmeandIwilltellmyagentinAfricatobringitthisside’.
Sotheyareusingitasagift.Intheircountry,itissomethingthattheyvalue.Eachand
everyonehashisownpurposeintakingtherhinohornbecausetheygivingitasecond
value.”
Thissectionfocusedontheuseofrhinohornasastatussymbol.Whilethestatus-elevating
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qualitiesconstitutethe‘primary’use,secondaryusesmayentailhealth,entertainment,
detoxification/hangovercureandgifting.Afinalobservationrelatestoanotherconsumer
groupinadifferentculturalandgeographicalcontext:Whenarhinotrophyismountedona
wallordisplayedinshowroomsathuntingconventions,itarguablyalsoservesthepurposeof
astatussymbol.Ahuntingtrophysignalsthattheownerisanaccomplishedtrophyhunter
whohasmanagedtobagoneofAfrica’sBigFive.
3.7.3Rhinohornasmedicine
TheuseofrhinohorninTraditionalChineseMedicinehasbeendescribedatlengthinthe
earliersectionsofthischapter.Theimputedalexipharmicandantipyreticpropertiesofrhino
hornbywayofaglobalhistoryofculturalbeliefhavecontributedtoitssacredvalueinAsian
communities.Theuseofrhinohornasmedicineisfrequentlylinkedtoothertypesofuse.For
example,producersofrhinoartefactssellshavingsofrhinohorntotheTCMmarket.Theissue
offakerhinohornisparticularlywidespreadinthissegmentoftherhinohornvaluechainas
processed(groundup)powderisusuallysoldtoTCMconsumers,whohavelittlerecourseto
qualitycontrolwhenpresentedwithanunidentifiablepowderedsubstance(discussedin
detailinChapter8onfakehorn).
WhereasTCMdoctorsusedtoprescriberhinohornforthepurposesofloweringfeverand
inflammation(itisa“bodycooler”),detoxificationandstabilizationofthecentralnervous
system(ĐỗTấtLợi1962),thehealingrepertoirehasbeenextendedtoincludetreatmentof
cancer,strokeandimpotence.Theapplicationofrhinohorntotreatthishostof‘new’
diseasesstandsatloggerheadswithmedicalmasterworkssuchasProfessorĐỗTấtLợi’s‘The
medicinalplantsandherbsofVietnam’ortheLiShizhen’sCompendiumofMateriaMedica.In
awrittenstatementtotheCITESStandingCommittee,thepresidentoftheAmericanCollege
ofTraditionalChineseMedicine(ACTCM)andPresidentoftheCouncilofCollegesof
AcupunctureandOrientalMedicine(CCAOM),LixinHuang(2011:2)declared:
“AccordingtoTCMtheories,rhinohornswereusedtotreattyphoidfever,convulsions,
macula,carbuncleandotherdisorders,whichwasthetraditionaluseoverthousands
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ofyears.However,someindividualsandorganizationswithlittleunderstandingofthe
essenceandmoderndevelopmentofTCMmisinterpretandexaggeratethemedicinal
propertiesofrhinohorns.SuchmisinterpretationshowslittlerespectfortheTCM
professionandmedicalpractices,andisharmfultorhinoconservationefforts…[…]…
Whilethisincrease[ofrhinopoaching]maybeinpartattributabletotraditional
medicine,theoverwhelmingdemandderivesfromanon-traditionalandunprovenuse
–asacureforcancer.Thereisnoevidencethatrhinohornisaneffectivecurefor
cancerandthisisnotdocumentedinTCMnorisitapprovedbytheclinicalresearchin
traditionalChinesemedicine.”
Curiously,theuseofrhinohornasanaphrodisiacwasaWesternmythuntilfairlyrecent,and
therehadbeennoempiricalormedicalbasisintheancientscripturesforsuchclaims.Since
thelate2000s,theclaimthatrhinohorn“rendersmenvirile”hashoweverbeenusedasa
marketingtoolaimedatthehigh-endsegmentoftheconsumermarket(Interviewwith
enforcementofficial,2013).Theaphrodisiacuseiscloselylinkedtomiddle-agedandolder
men’sappreciationofrhinohornasastatussymbol.AconsumerinHanoi(Interview,2013)
explainedthattheascribedaphrodisiacqualitiesderivedfromtheanimal’slengthyperiodof
copulationandthephallicfeaturesofrhinohorn.
Severalrhinohornconsumerswereinterviewedwhowereusingrhinohornforthetreatment
ofvariousformsofcancer.Thesecancerpatientsconsumedrhinohornpreparations(mixed
withotherTCMingredients)inconjunctionwithevidence-basedcancertreatments.The
daughterofaStage3cancerpatient,forexample,boughtrhinohornregularly(fromawildlife
crimespoliceinvestigator)tocounteractthedebilitatingeffectsofchemotherapyherdadwas
experiencing(Interviewwithconsumer5,2013).Researchreports(suchasthemuch–cited
TRAFFICreport:Milliken/Shaw2012)refertothe‘cancercuremyth’,whichisseenasthe
catalystforthesurgeinthedemandforrhinohorninVietnam.Itisdifficulttoassesswhether
ahigh-levelpolitician’srecoveryfromcancerafterusingrhinohornisasufficientexplanation
fortheincreaseddemandforrhinohorninVietnamduringthe2000s.Structuralexplanations
suchasthemassivegrowthofwealthyentrepreneurswithdisposableincome,thesacral
valuation,thehighpriceandlinkedinvestmentvalueofrhinohornseemtobethemain
driversofdemandinAsia.However,dissectingthe‘cancercuremyth’shedsalightregarding
theimplicitdisconnectbetweenlegalrules,socialnormsandculturalpracticeswhenitcomes
totheconsumptionofendangeredwildlifeproducts.
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SeveralTCMdoctorsandcancerpatients(Interviews,2013)madereferencetothemiraculous
recoveryfromprostatecancerofaformerVietnamesepresidentafterconsumingrhinohorn.
Whentheformerpresidentfellill,hesoughtmedicalattentioninSingaporein2004(Winnick
2007;Aggler2008).200Hereportedlyusedrhinohorninconjunctionwithmoderncancer
treatments(Interviewwithanoncologist,2013).Itremainsunclearwhetherstate-of-the-art
cancertreatmentsorrhinohornledtoremissionatthetime.201Withoutthepresident’s
confirmationordenial,itisalsouncertainwhetherheindeedusedrhinohorn.Irrespectiveof
thepresident’scircumstances,manycancerpatientsuseacombinationofmodernand
traditionalmethods.Accordingtoonedoctor(Interview,Hanoi,2013):
“Forthosewithcancer,orevenforthepatientwithveryadvancedstageofthecancer,
besideswesternmethod,theywanttogetsometraditionalmedicinetotreat
themselvesandinfactthisoneisverycommoninVietnam.Inmyexperiencesthere
aremany,manycancerpatientsthatisonwesternmedicinesandtheyuseherbal
medicine,theyusetraditionalmedicinetotreatthemselves.Weunderstand,weknow
this.Butatthemomenttherearenoevidencetoconfirmthattraditionalorsomething
likethisinVietnamcancurethecancerandcancurethepatients.Forexample,after
chemotherapyorafterradiationtherapy,theygotothetraditionalmedicinehospital
andtheygetmedicationoverthere,traditionalmedicineoverthere.Inprinciple,you
know,traditionalmedicineisok,becauseaccordingtoourtraditionalmedicineand
somemedicationlikethiscanhelp.Forexample,improvingtheimmunesystemor
makethepatienteatbetterorfuelappetite,butactuallyatthemomentwedonot
haveanystudytoanalysethebenefitoftraditionalmedicinetothecancerpatient
whohavegotwesternmedicine.Atthemoment,wedon’thaveanyevaluationabout
this.Butverycommonaftertreatmentherethepatientgotothetraditionalmedicine
hospitalforfurthertreatment,forsupplementarytreatmentoverthere.Iknowthis.”
Therelianceonalternativestrategiesregardingthetreatmentofcancerisnotsomething
exceptionalorspecifictotheVietnamesecase.Cancerpatientsfromaroundtheworlduse
traditionalandalternativetreatmentsagainstcancer.Onedoctorprovidedaninsightful
assessmentofhowthecancercure‘myth’mayhavespread(Interviewwithoncologist,HoChi
MinhCity,2013):
200
AconfidentialcableleakedviaWikileaks(Aggler2008)suggestedthatPresidentNguyenMinhTriet’sprostate
cancerreappearedin2008,leadingtoUSconcernsthattheeconomicreformerandanti-corruptionleaderwould
stepdown.Thediseasehadgoneintoremissionbythetimehewasinitiallyselectedasthecountry’spresidentin
2006.Heservedafullfive-yearterm,onlysteppingdownin2011.
201
SeealsoHamHoaiNhan(2013)
166
“Youknow,manypatientsforexamplehere,afterradiationtreatmentandevenafter
chemotherapy,thetumourorthemelanomawilldisappear,thirtypercent,eighty
percent,butatthetimeofdischargetherewillstillremainasmalltumourhere,very
small,smallerthanbefore.Butthetumourremainsonsite,somethinglikethis.And
thenthepatientgoestothetraditionalmedicinehospitalfortheirsupplementary
treatmentfromthetraditionalmedicineandafteracoupleofmonths,threemonths
later,thetumourdisappearscompletely,andmanypatientsbelievethatinthiscase
westernmedicinedoesnotworkverywell,becauseattheendofthetreatmentthe
tumourisstillonsite.Butwhentheygettraditionalmedicinethetumourdisappears
completely.Theystronglybelievethattraditionalmedicinecouldmakehealthy,could
killthetumour,youknow,inthethinking,inthemindofmany,manycancerpatients
thinklikethis.Butactually,basically,andweunderstand,inthiscasethebenefit
comesfromwesternmedicinebecauseyouknow,afterradiationandchemotherapy
thetumourcellwillbecuredbutnotimmediatelyatthesametime.”
PoliticalelitesarereveredandrespectedinVietnam.Thesuggestionthatthepresidentwas
healedthroughtheconsumptionofrhinohornmaywellhaveledtothedisseminationofthe
‘cancercuremyth’.Thesameoncologistrelatedhowthemajorityofhispatientswereseeking
rhinohornTCMasasecondarytreatment,oftenfallingvictimtofraudsters(seethechapter
onfakerhinohorn).Beyondthenarrativeabouttheformerpresident’srecoveryfromcancer,
researchinformantsspokeaboutthelinkbetweenrhinohornandpoliticalelites.One
informantprovidedinterestinginsightintothoselinks(Interview,Vietnam,2013):
“Youknow,buyingorsellingrhinoisillegalinVietnam,butactuallytherearesome
veryVIPwhogotcancerandtheyalsowanttobuyrhino,orevenfortheCommunist
Party.Ithinktheyhaverhino.TheserhinoswillbeusedforVIP,whentheygota
diseaseorsomethinglikethis. Yeah,theyhaveliverhinos.Andifsomebodygetsa
diseaseforexample,diabeticsorcancer,theywanttouserhinohornandtheywillget
approvalfromtheCommunistPartyandtheycanuserhino.Butit’snotofficial.In
principleaccordingtoVietnameselaw,rhinoisillegal.”
Thelinkofrhinohornconsumptiontopoliticaleliteshasdirectimplicationsregardinglegality
andlegitimacy,andtheprofferednotionof‘contestedillegality’.Ifpoliticaleliteswhoare
responsiblefortheenactmentandenforcementofillegalityarecomplicitthemselvesinthe
tradeandconsumptionofrhinohorn,thenthebanovertlyloosessocialandpolitical
legitimacy.Ifpoliticalleadersfailtoleadbyexample,canweexpectotherstofollowthe
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rules?AresearcherforaHanoi-basedNGOexplains(Interview,2013):“ForpeopleinVietnam,
illegalityisoflittlerelevanceasthereislittlecontrol.EverythinginVietnamisanegotiating
process.”TheheterogeneouscompositionofrhinohornTCMusersandthemassiveamount
offakerhinohornmedicinesincirculationrenderitdifficulttoassessthesizeofthemarket.
Consumerscomefromdifferentsocio-economicstrata.Especiallywhenitcomestothe
dreadeddiseaseofcancer,familymembersarewillingtospendtheirlastVietnameseDongin
ordertolengthenthelivesoftheirlovedones.Interestingly,TCMconsumerspaybetween
$25000to$45000perkilogramofrhinohorn(Interviewswithconsumersandtraders,2013)
whereasotherconsumergroupspayahigherpricerangingfrom$65000to$100000perkg
(Interviewswithconsumersandtraders,2013;feedbackfromKarlAmman,2015).
3.8Concludingremarks:Sacredvalueandcontestedillegality
CulturalbeliefsledtothesacralizationofrhinohorninAsiancommunities;however,therhino
itselfisnotimbuedwithsacredvalue.Thevaluationofrhinohorninconsumermarketstends
totrumpconservationandanti–poachinginitiativesinplacesgeographicallyfarremovedfrom
themarket.Thesanctityofancientbeliefsandsociallyacceptednormsnotonlysupersedes
rhinoconservationinitiativesbutalsointernationaltradebansanddomesticrules.Thehistory
oftheculturaluseofrhinohornwasdiscussedinthischapterwiththeobjectiveof
highlightingthedifficultiesassociatedwithattemptstoreversesocialnormsthatare
supportedbyculturalbeliefs.Whilefewconsumersupholdthequasi-mythicalvaluationof
rhinohornasamiraclecureforabouquetofailments,itstranscendentalandsacredvalue
remains,andexplains,inadditiontotheincreasingrarityofthespecies,thehighpriceof
rhinohorn.Thevaluationofrhinohornasaninvestmenttoolandstatussymbolbyactors
outsideAsiaalsoreifiesitshighprice.Moreover,thecomplicityoftheelite(e.g.politicalelites
andthepolice)intheillegaltrade,distributionandconsumptionunderminethecredibilityof
thecomparablynewtradeban.Incollectivesocietieswheretheeliteholdsconsiderablesway,
membersofsocietyarelikelytoemulatethebehaviourofheroes,businesselitesand
respectedleaders.Withregardstoresolvingthecoordinationproblemofvalue(anessential
conditionformarketstoemerge),itisevidentthatrhinohornishighlyvaluedandcovetedin
consumermarkets.Thevaluationofrhinohornasasacredgoodprovidesconsumerswithan
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exitfrompossiblesocietalsanctionsthatusuallyobtainfrombreakingthelaw.Notonlyisthe
consumptionofrhinohornsociallylegitimateandculturallyacceptedbutimportantrolemodelssupplyandconsumerhinohorntoo.Consumersarecrucialactorsneededto
guaranteethecontinuityofillegalrhinohornflows.Inthisinstance,consumersdonotaccept
thetradebanandlegitimizeillegaleconomicactivitiesinreferencetoancientculturalbeliefs
andsociallyacceptedpracticesthusreiteratingthenotionofcontestedillegality.Thischapter
alsoshowstheinterfacebetweenlegalityandillegalitywherelegalandillegalusesarehardto
distinguish,andbothcriminalactorsandupstandingcitizensofsocietypartakeinillegal
marketprocesses.Criticaltotheanalysisistherecognitionthattrophyhuntersandart
collectorslikewiseconstituteimportantconsumergroups.Thecurrentusesofrhinohornare
not‘newuses’butleanonancientpracticesincludingtheuseofrhinohornasstatussymbols,
objetsd’artandgifting,aswellasforhealthandmedicinalpurposes.Theinclusionofrhino
hornasacancercureandaphrodisiacisaclevermarketingployintendedtogrowthemarket.
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Chapter4:Rhinoprotection:Parks,privatelandandconservation
paradigms
“IntheAfricanversionofwildlifeconservationhistory,theexperiencehas
beenthatgamereservesarewhiteinventionswhichelevatewildlifeabove
humanityandwhichhaveservedasinstrumentsofdispossessionand
subjugation.NoAfricansbecamepartnersintheconservationistenterprise:
eithertheirpresencewassufferedassquattersor‘courageousandloyalnative
rangers’,ortheywerecastintheroleof‘evil,cruelpoachers’whowereableto
staveoffwagelabourbylivingofftheland(Carruthers1995:101).”
4.1Introduction
Theaimofthepreviouschapterwastoprovideahistoryofthedemandforrhinohorn,its
valuationasasacredgoodinAsianmarketsandcurrentconsumptionpatterns.Whileclimate
changeandhumanexpansionimpactthechancesofrhinosurvivalinthewild,therapacious
demandforrhinohornmayleadtothepachyderm’sextinctioninthenearfuture.Although
non-lethalmethodsofdehorningexist,illegalhunterskillanddehornrhinosinordertogetto
thehighly-covetedrhinohorn.Conservatorsandregulatorshavedevisedconservation
measurestoprotecttherhinoanddisruptillegalflowsofrhinohorn.Thischapterstartswith
reasonswhythemillennialgenerationmaywanttocontinuewithrhinoprotectioninspiteof
myriadchallengesaffectingconservationobjectives.Itthencontinueswithanassessmentof
protectiveandconservationregimes,includingcolonialconservationregulations,the
proclamationofgamereservesandnationalparks,theconservationofrhinosonprivateland,
aswellasthecreationoftransfrontierparks.Arguably,theestablishmentandexpansionof
conservationareashaveledtostructuralconditionsthatfacilitateratherthanfightrhino
poaching.Itwillbearguedthattheunderpinningconservationparadigmshaveledtoa
situationofhistoricallock-in,whichimpedesharmoniousrelationshipsbetweencommunities
livinginorclosetoconservationareasandwildlife.Infact,relationshipstendtobe
conceptualizedintermsofhuman-wildlifeconflict–alargelyantagonisticrelationship.The
privatizationandcommodificationofrhinoshavefurtherentrenchedconflict-ladensocial
relationsbetweenregulators,localAfricanpeopleandthepredominantlywhitelandowners.
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4.2Whyshouldrhinosbeprotected?
Avarietyofactorsattributesrhinoswithintrinsicand/orinstrumentalvalue.Theformer
relatestothecontentionthatthewildanimalhasavalueinitsownright(anendinitself)
whilethelatterrelatestothefunctionaluseofrhinos(meanstoanend).Whileadiscussionof
animalethicsisbeyondtheremitofthisdissertation,itsufficestomentionthatthe
instrumentalvalueofrhinosislikelytobeofgreaterinteresttoregulators.Theinstrumental
valueappealstoregulators,whotendtorespondtothevagariesofcostandbenefit
calculationswhenconsideringnewregulationsaimedatdisruptingillegalmarkets.Justusand
colleagues(2009:187)defineentitiesasinstrumentallyvaluable“totheextenttheyareorwill
beconsideredvaluablebyvaluers,suchashumansandperhapsothercognitivecomplex
organisms”.Oneoftheinstrumentalvaluesofrhinosisthatwithinitsimmediateenvironment
therhinohassomeimportantfunctions:Thewhiterhinoprovides“grazinglawns”forsmaller
herbivores(itswidemouthandlipshavelawnmower-likequalities)andallrhinospecies
(includingthe3Asiansub-species)assistinspreadingtheseedsandseedlingsofmanyplants
(AfricaGeographic2012a).Arecentacademicpapersuggeststhattherhino,liketheelephant
orwolf,mightbeamightbeakeystonespecies(Cromsigt/teBeest2014).ASouthAfrican
conservatorexplainsthesignificanceofkeystonespeciesasfollows(Interviewwith
Conservator5,2013):
“Therhinoisakeystonespecies,andwearecustodiansofourbiodiversity.Weare
inextricablylinked.Ifthehoneybeegoes,wearegoneasaspecies.Soweusethe
rhinoasasymbolofthebiggerpicture.”
InthecontextoftheKrugerNationalPark,therhinomayhaveanimpactonthestructureand
compositionofthesavannahgrasslands(Cromsigt/teBeest2014).Itsdemisemaythusaffect
thechancesforsurvivalofotherspeciesoffaunaandflora.CromsigtandteBeest(2014:566)
found:
“[O]urresultshighlightthatthecurrentrhinopoachingcrisismaynotonlyaffectthe
species,butalsothreatenthepotentialkeyroleofthismegaherbivoreasadriverof
savannahfunctioning.”
Iftherhinoweretogoextinctinitshomerange,itsdisappearancewouldnotonlyhavean
emotionalimpactonrhinoadmirersbutisalsolikelytoaffectthelocalecosystemand
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biodiversity.
Thepreviouschaptergaveanoverviewoftheglobalsystemofbeliefleadingtothesacral
valuationofrhinosandrhinohorns.Whiletheanimalrightsmovementfocusesonthe
intrinsicvalueofanimals,culturalbeliefsinsouthernAfricalikewiseappreciatetheanimalper
seasaculturalandspiritualsentientbeing,worthyofreverenceandprotection(seesection
ontheSanandShonatribesinsouthernAfricainChapter3).Jones(1999:298)providesan
example:
“LikemanyWesternersfromdevelopedcountries,manyruralAfricansvaluewildlife
foritsexistenceandwishtheirchildrenandgrandchildrentobeabletoenjoyseeing
wildanimals.”
Therhinobelongstoagroupofanimalspeciesidentifiedascharismaticmegafauna.Animals
liketheelephantorrhinoinvokeempathy,personificationandanthropomorphismamongst
people.Suchsentimentsmayleadtomaterialassistanceanddonationsforconservation
initiatives.Moreover,therhinoisoneofthemaintouristattractionsingameparks.While
trophyhuntingisthesubjectofnormativeandmoralcontestationinmodernnarratives,for
thesakeofcompleteness,theroleoftherhinoinBigFivetrophyhuntingsafarisisalso
acknowledged.Infact,oneobjectiveofearlyprotectionregimeswastheconservationof
wildlifeforthepurposesofsportshunting,apasttimereservedfortheupperstrataof
colonialsocietyinsouthernAfrica.Theremainderofthechaptertouchesonthespecific
motivationsofwhyactorschoosetoprotecttherhino.
4.3ColonialconservationmeasuresinSouthAfrica
AfterJanvanRiebeeckandtheDutchEastIndiaCompanyarrivedattheCapeofGoodHopein
1652,thelivesandfortunesofindigenous202andlocalpeopleandwildanimalschanged
forever.Intheprocessofcolonization,Africanslostpropertyandhuntingrights,andsystemic
exploitationwasinstitutedfirstbycolonialrulers,andsubsequentlyreinforcedduringthe
202
Theterm“indigenous”peopleisusedtodepictFirstNationspeopleinsouthernAfrica(theSanpeople–
comparewithChapter3)whereas“local”peoplerefertootherAfricancommunities,whosettledinsouthern
Africa.
172
apartheidregime.Thescalestippedtowardsoverexploitationofthestillabundantwildlife
shortlyaftertheEuropeancolonizersarrived.ThefirstcolonialadministratorJanvanRiebeeck
decreedthefirstpoachinglawamerefiveyearsafterlandingattheCape.Hedeclaredwild
animalsasresnullius.Accordingtothislegalprinciple,whoevercapturedorkilledawild
animal,ownedit(Couzens2003:4).Theearlycolonialsettlerssurvivedthroughhunting,
whichservedthepurposeoflandclearance,incomegenerationandprovisionofmeatto
avoidslaughteringthesettlers’livestock.Settlersoftenemployedtheservicesoflocalpeople
onwhosehuntingskillstheycametorely(Beinart2003:31;Carruthers1993:6).
In1822,LordCharlesSomersetpassedthefirstpieceofBritishcoloniallegislationthatdealt
withtheprotectionofwildlife.203Ofparticularsignificancewasthedelineationofwhowas
allowedtohuntandwhowasproscribedfromdoingso.Oneoftheproclamationsdeclared
specifically:“[I]tisfoundthatmanyidleanddisorderlypersons,ofinferiorclassesoflife,who
oughttobedependentupontheirindustry,wasteandmisspendtheirtimedestroyinggame
(quotedin:Couzens2003:66).”MimickingBritishanti-poachinglaws,thecolonialrulers
assertedhuntingrightsfortheBritishrulingclasses.TheserightsaffectednotonlytheAfrican
communitiesbutalsotheAfrikanerswhocommencedtheGreatTrektoescapeBritishrule
andfoundedtheBoerrepublicsduringthe19thcentury.UponsettlingintheTransvaal,204the
Voortrekkercommunitydependedon“indiscriminatehunting”.LocalAfricansandthe
Afrikanerscollaboratedinkilling,tradingandclearingofwildlifeuntilitbecamearare
resource(Carruthers1993:12).
In1846,thefirstpieceofconservationlegislationwaspassedintheTransvaal.Thelawwas
ostensiblydesignedtopreventwastage;inotherwords,hunterswereaskedto“killonlywhat
theyneeded”–theamountremainedundefined–(Couzens2003:66).Towardstheendof
the19thcentury,astheherdsofwildlifehadbeenseverelydiminished,theAfrikaners
excludedindigenouspopulationsfromthehuntingoffree-rangingwildlifebywayof
203
Somersetproclaimed,amongstothers,a“closeseason”of5months(nohuntingwasallowedduringthose
fivemonths;thehippopotamus,elephantandbontebokweredeclaredroyalgame(aspecialhuntingpermitwas
required);alicensewasrequiredforhuntingandslaveswerenotpermittedtohunt(Couzens2003:66).
204
TheTransvaalwasoneofthetwoBoerrepublics(theotherwastheOrangeFreeState),whichwereboth
integratedintotheUnionofSouthAfricain1910.Inpost-apartheidSouthAfrica,vastswathesoftheTransvaal
provinceformpartoftheGautengprovince.
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conservationregulations.AsthewhiteAfrikanersstartedtoassertlandandfarmingrights,
huntingandlandrightsbecameintertwined.205Wildlifehadthelegalstatusofresnullius;
hence,privatelandownersstrictlyenforcedtrespassingregulationstohaltAfricansandpoor
whitesfromhuntingontheirland(Carruthers1993:13).Enclosureandboundarydemarcation
oflandfurtherdisownedlocalpeople.TheFencingActsof1883and1910afforded
landownersanotherlayerofprotectionandcontroloverthelandanditsproductivecapacity.
TheselawsledtothefurtherdisempowermentofAfricanpeople,foreverchangingthesocial
relationsofruraldwellers.Inparticular,the1887SquattersLawandtheNativeLandActof
1913206laidthefoundationsofapartheidsegregationandbirthednewlegaldesignationsof
trespass,poachingandsquatting(Meskell2012:16–17).Whileonemightthinkthatthese
conservationregulationssoughttoprotectwildlife,inreality,theycanonlybeunderstoodin
thecontextofcolonialexploitationofAfricanpeople.
Despitetherestrictedaccesstofirearms,huntingdogs,aswellasthewithdrawalofhunting
andlandownershiprights,Africanpeoplereceivedtheblamefortheannihilationofwildlifein
theTransvaal.Withhistoricalhindsight,aconfluenceofdestructiveforcessuchasagricultural
transformation,modernizationandindustrializationseemtohaveplayedtheirrolewhilethe
huntingbythelandownerswasequallydevastatingonwildlifenumbers(Carruthers1993:13).
Anothersignificantaimoftheearlyhuntinglawswasthecreationofanindigenousworkforce
thatwasreliantonincomefromwagesfortheirlivelihoods.ManyAfricanshadmaintained
theireconomicindependencefromEuropeansettlersbyhuntingandtradingwildlifeand
carryingonwiththeirpastoralistandagriculturallife-styles.Throughthehuntingbanand
205
Landownershipandhuntingrightsbecamecontestedissueswiththearrivalofthecolonialsettlers.Local
communitiessuchastheTsongaslivinginthenortheasternpartsofthecountry(inthemodernKrugerNational
ParkandLimpopoProvince)hadadifferentperceptionofprivateownershipofproperty.Chiefsallocatedlandto
anypersonwantingtoliveinthechiefdom,subjecttothatpersonabidingbytherulesofthetribe.Peoplewere
freetochoosewheretoreside,buttheyhadtoaskforpermissionfromthechiefwhentheywantedtomoveto
anotherchiefdom.Accordingtothisunderstanding,thelandwasneverprivateproperty;however,membership
ofthetribeensuredaccesstolandandlanduserights(Nefale2002:19).Peoplecouldnotbeevictedfromtheir
placeofresidenceunlesstheyhadcommittedaseriousoffenceorviolatedarulesetbytheChieforhis
headmen(Nefale2002:12).Thisnotionofcommunallandownershipstoodinstarkcontrasttothecolonial
approachthatpromotedlandappropriationandprivateownershiprights.Insomecases,chiefshadmadeland
‘voluntarily’availabletothewhitesettlers;theyhad,ofcourse,theirconceptionoflandownershipinmind.
Meanwhile,thenewcoloniallandownerswereatlibertytoevictpeopleoftheirlandwiththefullbackingofthe
law(Nefale2002:12).
206
AfricanswereprohibitedfrombuyingorleasingpropertyoutsideareasdemarcatedasAfricanreserves.
174
othercolonialmeasures,thecolonial‘masters’hadcreatedaworkforceconsistingof
individualswhowerenolongerself–sufficientanddependedonincomefromworkingin
minesandotherindustrialendeavours(Carruthers1993:13).
Whiletheearlywildlifeprotectionmeasuresservedthecolonialobjectives,latermeasures
weredrivenbythedesiretopreservewildlifeforsportshunting.Attheturnofthe19th
century,gamereservesweredesignedtoprovide“freefromallhumaninterference,a
sanctuaryinwhichcertainspeciesofwildlifecouldprosper”(Carruthers1993:13).Theearly
gamereservesofTransvaal,forexample,weretobelocatedonlandconsideredbarren,
disease–riddenandworthlesstomininginterests.Eventuallythese“stategamefarming
enterprises”weretobeopenedtosportsmen,whowouldpaythestateforhuntingprivileges
(Carruthers1993:14).Whilethelanddevotedtogamereserveswasuninterestingtoother
industries,nationalandprovincialparkswereestablishedonsought-afterrealestate.These
parksentail“theutilizationofanareathroughactivemanagementforthebenefitofthe
ecosystemandvisitors”.Thus,gamereservesandnationalparkshaddifferentaimsandlegal
foundations.Whilegamereservescouldbeestablishedandabolishedbyproclamation,
nationalparkswerelegallysecureandeconomicallyviable(Carruthers1993:13).Indigenous
andlocalAfricanpropertyandhuntingrights,andancestralburialgrounds(whichare
significantculturalsites)werenotconsideredwhenreservesandparkswereproclaimed.207
Awell-knownexamplerelatestotheKrugerNationalPark,whichwasagamereservebefore
itbecamethesignaturenationalparkofSouthAfrica.ThefirstWardenoftheSabiGame
Reservewasofthebeliefthatpeopleandgamereserveswerealethalcombination.
InfluencedbyhisEuropeanheritage,JamesStevenson–HamiltonhadAfricansevictedfrom
thelandlocatedinthemodernKNP.HisactionsearnedhimthenameSkukuza(hewho
sweepsclean)208amongthelocalShangaancommunity(Carruthers1995:92).Inofficial
narratives,thefirstwardenwaslaudedfor“saving”theAfrican“wilderness”.Africanhistorical
narrativesweresilencedintheprocessofcreatingtheseparksandreserves(Meskell2012:
207
MorethanhalfoftheareaoftheKrugerNationalParkissubjecttolandclaimsbylocalclaimantsinpostapartheidSouthAfrica.
208
Skukuzaisthenameofthemainadministrativerest–campinthepresent-dayKrugerNationalPark.
175
63).OralhistoriesoftheShangaanpeopleandarchaeologicalsitesdocumentthatseveral
thousandindigenouspeoplewerelivingintheareaofthemodernKNPmorethan2000years
beforetheEuropeansettlersarrived.Thesetribeswerescatteredinnumeroussettlements.
TherewerenoboundarieswithMozambique,SwazilandorZimbabweandpeoplemoved
freelyamongstchiefdomsunlesstherewasstrife(Meskell2012;Nefale2002).
Asthereserveswereextendedinsize,thecolonialauthoritiessoonrealizedthatthevast
gamereservescouldnotberunlike“amedievalEuropeandeerpreserve”(Carruthers1993:
14).TheyrequiredAfricanlabourandfundingtorunthereserves.Consequently,thepolicy
wasreversed,andso-calledblack‘tenants’hadtopayrentthroughlabourorcash(Carruthers
1993:14).Inexchangeforanobligatoryperiodofthreemonthsoflabour,tenantswere
allowedtoconductagriculturalandpastoralistactivitiesprovidedthesedidnotcontravene
conservationregulations.Whitegamerangershadthetaskofoverseeingthelabourers,
therebyassertinganotherlayerofcontrol(Carruthers1993:15).Aftertheestablishmentof
theUnionofSouthAfrica,209thepolicyongamereserveswasrevisited.Thelandwasneeded
forAfricanandwhiteagriculturalexpansion,andtosatisfythegrowingdemandsformining
explorationsandindustrialdevelopment.BeforetheproclamationoftheKNPin1926,alarge
areaalongthemodernwesternboundaryoftheKNPwasexcisedfromtheSabiGameReserve
anddeclaredan‘Africanreserve’.210ThelastforcefulremovalfromtheKNPinvolvedthe
MakulekepeoplewhohadbeenlivingbetweentheLevhubuandLimpoporiversinthePafuri
area.TheircommunallandwasincorporatedintotheKNPin1969(Carruthers1995:99)and
becamesubjecttoasuccessfullandclaiminpost–apartheidSouthAfrica.
Whetherbanishedfromthereservesandparksorlivingonitsperipheries,Africanscontested
thecreationoftheseconservationentitiesandassociatedmeasures.Poachingofwildlife
becameameansofexpressingtheirunhappinessasmuchasitbecameanecessitytoprevent
deathfromstarvationafterseveredroughtsandboutsofRinderpest(Carruthers1995:93).
Interestingly,thehistoryofcross-borderpoachingexpeditionslaunchedfromMozambique
canbetracedbacktotheearlydaysofthe20thcentury:
209
In1910,thefourcolonieswereamalgamatedintotheUnionofSouthAfricaunderBritishdominion.
210
DuetotheirproximitytothewesternboundaryoftheKrugerNationalPark,Acornhoek,andmanyother
villagesandtownshipshavebecomethespringboardfromwheremodernpoachingexpeditionsarelaunched.
176
“PoachingpartiesfromMozambiquewerelarge,wellorganizedandaccompaniedby
manydogs.Theyalsohadfirearms,unlikeTransvaalAfricanswhowerenotpermitted
tobeararms,andtheAfricanstaffofthegamereserve,carryingonlyassegais,was
powerlessagainstthem(Carruthers1995:93).”
Fromthe1930sonwardsthedominantpolicyofnationalparksandreserveswastopreserve
the“wilderness”withouthumanhabitation.Underpinningthisendeavourwasthemythical
idealofuntamedwildAfricabasedonfictionsofterranullius(emptylands)priortothe
Europeancolonialarrivals.Essentiallythecombinednotionsofterranulliusandresnullius
(wildlifecouldnotbeowned)createdanoppositionalbinaryofnatureversus(African)
culture.Colonialregulatorsstampedlocalpeopleandtheirculturalheritageasintrusiveand
destructiveandoptedtopreservewhatwasleftof‘wildAfrica’withoutindigenousinfluences
(Meskell2012:117).Tosuittheidealofanuntouched,pristinewilderness,millenniaof
Africanhistorywerewipedclear(Meskell2012:18).Acaseinpointistheneglectof
archaeologicalrecords(especiallyinKrugerNationalPark)thatshowthattheseso–called
‘wilderness’areashadbeeninhabitedbyAfricanminingandtradingcommunities(Cock/Fig
2000:133;Meskell2012).Intheprocessoffencingin“fortressreserves”,anirreconcilable
distancewascreatedbetweennatureand(African)culture.AsMeskell(2012:18–19)
observes:
“Themonolithicdesiretosavewildlife,regardlessoftheharmthateffortmightcause
livingcommunities,hasledconservationiststoidealizenationalparksastheultimate
moralgoodwhileeschewingtheimmoralityofdestroyinghumanlifeways(…)
Connectionstohistoricorancestralsitesandongoingtraditionsareattenuatedand
culturalandnaturalheritagesremainoppositional.”
Africansweremovedtoruralareasontheperipheryofparks,whichwereovercrowdedand
devoidofopportunitiesforsocialmobility.Withtheadventoftheformalizedsystemof
apartheidin1948,Africanpeopleexperienced“doubleexclusion”fromnationalparks.They
weredeniedvisitor’saccesstotheparksandsystematicallyexcludedfromthegovernanceof
parks(Cock/Fig2000:132).211ParkssuchastheKNPcametorepresentanothermechanismof
211
Untilthe1980sblackvisitorstotheKrugerNationalParkcouldonlyovernightattherudimentarilyequipped
Baluletentedcamp.EconomicdeprivationthroughapartheidrestrictedaccessfurtherasfewAfricanshadaccess
tocarsanddispensableincometoaffordvacations(Cock/Fig2000:132).
177
apartheidrule.TheapartheidregimeactivelypromotedtheviewthatAfrikanershadsetup
nationalparksandtheblackpopulationcametoperceiveparksas“manifestationsof
apartheid”.TheterribleironybetweenAfricanshavingtomovetoso-calledhomelandswhile
animalswereprotectedontheirformerlandisstriking.ThegoverningboardoftheKNPdid
littletoelevatethesituation,insteadminutesofmeetingsreflectthatAfricanswerelabelled
as“cannibals”,“bloodthirstybarbarians”and“poachersundoubtedlythemostbloodthirsty,
cruellestandmostruthlessoftheearth’sinhabitants”(citedby:Carruthers1995:100).In
attrition,theKNPalsoservedasaspringboardformilitaryoperationsoftheapartheidregime,
includingthetrainingofSouthAfricanDefenceForce(SADF)soldiers,thecovertsupplyof
militarysupportandsuppliestoResistênciaNacionalMoçambicana(RENAMO)in
MozambiqueandthelaunchofachemicalweaponsattackagainstFrentedeLibertaçãode
Moçambique(FRELIMO),alsoinMozambique(Cock/Fig2000:132).Moreover,boththeKNP
andNdumoGameReservewereconsideredstrategicbufferzonespreventingtheentryof
undocumentedmigrantsandguerrillafighters.TwomilitaryunitswerebasedintheKNP:One
dealtwiththeprotectionofwildlife,theotherwiththedetectionandarrestofundocumented
migrantsfromMozambique(MacKenzie1998).Theapartheidregimeusedso-called
conservationareasthusnotonlyforconservationbutalsoformilitarypurposes.Perhapsnot
surprising,manyoftheformerapartheidmilitarycounter-insurgencyoperativeshavefounda
newhomeinanti-poachingunitsinthenewSouthAfrica,creatingfurtherdistancebetween
localblackcommunitiesandconservation.
TheearlyhistoryofnatureconservationinSouthAfricaisthusdeeplyintertwinedwiththe
colonialprojectandthesystematicexploitationofAfricanpeople,leadingtoland
expropriation,thelossofhuntingrightsandforcedlocalpeopleintoexploitativelabour
relationshipswithcolonialsettlers.Theconnectionofconservation,parksandwildanimals
withstructuralviolenceexperiencedbylocalpeoplerenderswildlifeconservationahighly
contentiousissue,whichrequiresmorethanatacitacknowledgmentthatwrongswere
committed.Thefollowingsectionshighlighthowconsecutiveandparallelsconservation
regimesfollowedasimilarpathway,furtheralienatingandside-lininglocalpeople.
178
4.4Privaterhinos:Thecommodificationandprivatizationoftherhino
Thissectionprovidesabriefbackgroundtotheemergenceofprivateownershipofrhinosand
thewildliferanchingindustryinSouthAfrica,ZimbabweandNamibia212inthe1960s.Wildlife
numbershadbeengreatlydecimatedoutsidedesignatedconservationareasinSouthAfrica
bythe1950s.Farmersperceivedofwildanimals213asvermin,andtheyappearedtoposea
significantthreattodomesticlivestockbycompetingforwaterandgrazingwhilesupposedly
carryingdeadlydiseases.Theunderlyingmantraof“youcan’tfarminazoo”ledtothe
conversionoflargetractsofsemi-aridsavannahintoagriculturallandduringthe1800sand
early1900s.Individualaswellaspubliclandusedecisionswerelargelymotivatedbyshort–
termeconomicplanningandledtoapreferenceforlandusepracticesthatyieldedtradable,
consumableandprofitablecommodities(Krug2001:5).Theapparentadvantagesofthese
conventionalformsofagriculturalproductionwerefurtherreinforcedbygenerousstate
subsidiesprovidedtowhitelandownersinSouthAfricaandNamibia(whichwasadministered
212
NamibiaisthesecondlargestrhinorangestateinAfrica.Asof31December2012,theAfricanRhinoSpecialist
Grouprecorded2274rhinos,ofwhich524weresouthernwhiterhinosand1750wereblackrhinos(CITES
Secretariat2013).WhileIwasconductingfieldworkin2012and2013,onlyisolatedpoachingincidentshad
occurredinNamibiasincethelate1980s.Atotalof6(known)rhinoswerepoachedbetween2006and2012.In
lightofthepoachingcrisishappeninginneighbouringSouthAfrica,thequestionarosewhyNamibiawasbeing
sparedfromrhinopoaching.Expertssurmisedthatthiswaslinkedtorhinosbeingscatteredacrossdry,aridand
far-flungregionsofNamibia,theexistenceofasuccessfulcommunityconservancyprogrammeandlackof
supportinfrastructureforcriminalnetworks.Unfortunately,thestatusquohaschanged:In2014,24blackrhinos
werepoached,andaconsignmentof14rhinohornswasintercepted.Afurther81rhinoswerepoachedinthe
aridcountryin2015.NamibiagaineditsindependencefromSouthAfricain1990.Sincegainingindependence,
theNamibiangovernmentdevelopednewconservationinstitutionsandlaws.Thesenewinitiativesincludethe
famousprogrammeofcommunityconservancies,forwhichreformedpoachersarerecruitedasrhinoguardians.
Thecommunityconservancyprogrammeincorporatescommunitybeneficiationandclosecooperationwith
chiefs,headmen/womenandneighbouringfarmers.Namibianconservatorsdevelopedthenovelandsomewhat
contestedmethodofdehorningrhinosasaconservationmethodinthe1980s.Inlightofthepoachingincidents
during2014,theNamibiangovernmentannounceditsplantodehornallrhinosinnationalparksandprivate
conservanciesduring2015(Njini13October2014).Interviewswithroguewildlifeprofessionalsandconvicted
poachersinSouthAfricaindicatedthatillegalhuntinganddehorningwasalsotakingplaceinNamibia,involving
bothNamibianandSouthAfricanwildlifeprofessionals(Interviews,2013).
213
Alegalandsemanticdifferenceappliestotheterms‘wildanimals’,‘wildlife’and‘game’.Thetermsareoften
usedinterchangeablywithoutregardtothenuancedmeanings.Theterm‘wildlife’isusedforindigenousanimals
while‘game’isusedforanimalsthatarehuntedforamusementorina‘fairchase’(Carruthers2008:162).
AccordingtoSouthAfricancommonlaw,wildanimals(feraebestiae)are:“[T]hoseanimalsthatexistinawild
stateanywhereintheworld.Theseanimalsarewildbynatureandincludenotonlythoseanimalsthatare
savagebynaturebutalsothoseofamorewildandtimidnatureandcannotbeclassifiedasdomesticanimals”
(LAWSA2014b).‘Ordinarygame’and‘protectedwildanimals’aresub–categoriesof‘wildanimals’,whichaffects
propertyrightsandliabilityfortheirbehaviour(LAWSA2014a).
179
bySouthAfrica)aftertheascendancyoftheNationalPartytopowerandtheriseofthe
apartheidregimeinthelate1940s(comparewithTable5).
Table5:Thechangingpoliticalecologyofwildlife
Phase
Economicandpoliticalevents
Wildlifeconservationandutilization
Pre-industrialeconomy
Lowhumanpopulations
Frontiereconomy
Industrialrevolution Europeancolonialexpansion
Wildlifeisnationalized
AgriculturalexpansionafterWorldWarII
UrbanizationofWesternsociety
Landreforminpostcolonialsocieties
Emergenceoftransfrontierconservationareas
• Uselimitedbyabilityorcostsofharvesting
• Institutionsaimedatsharingspoilsofthehunt
• Costsofharvestinggreatlyreducedbytechnology
• Technologyandglobalizationincreasemarketaccess
• Fewrulesornormstocontroluse
• Controlofwildlifecentralizedinthestate
• Commercialusegreatlyrestricted
• Useofwildlifedevolvedtolandholders(andlater,communities)
• Commercialusesencouraged
Sustainableuseapproach
Landreformandetransfrontier
conservation
Source:adaptedfromChild(2012:2)
Commencinginthe1960s,anumberofparallelprocessesresultedinwhatsomehavetermed
“aconservationrevolutioninSouthAfrica”(Bothma/Rooyen/Rooyen2004:840).The
developmentofwildliferanchingcontributedtothecommodificationandprivatizationof
wildlifeingeneral,andtherhinoinspecific;furtherentrenchingpropertyrightsofthewhite
elitewhiledeprivingblackcommunitiesofthesame.Theparallelprocessesincludescientific,
environmental,institutional,legalandbroadersocio-politicalandstructuralprocesses,which
ledtopublicofficials,corporationsandprivateindividualsrecognizingtheeconomicvalueof
wildanimalsthroughconsumptiveandnon-consumptiveformsofwildliferanching.
Essentiallytheseprocessescreatedaformalandlegalmarketforliverhinosandrhino
productsonthesupplysidewhilealsoproducingagrowingpoolofdisenfranchisedblackrural
communitieswithlimitedmeanstogenerateincome.Rhinos(andotherwildanimals)didnot
onlyassistinfillingdepletedstatecoffersthroughthesaleofliveanimalstoconservation
organizationsandprivateinvestors,buttheyalsopresentedalucrativereturnoninvestments
asimmediateprofit–generatingassetstoeconomicelites(Interviewwithwildlifeprofessional,
2013).Inpre-Conventiontimes,thelegalmarketinrhinohorninvolvedthetradeoflive
rhinos,rhinohornsandthehuntingofrhinosforsportstrophies.Aswillbeshowninlater
sections,theearlyyearsprovidedthefoundationsforcertaincriminalactivitiestoflourishand
forgraychannelstodevelopintofully-fledgedillegalsupplychains.
180
Theinstitutionalrecognitionofwildliferanchingasalegitimateagriculturalactivityrequired
boththenationalgovernmentandprovincialpublicservantstoovercomebureaucraticinertia
andpathdependency,whichalsoaffectedtheapartheidbureaucracy.Bureaucratsinthe
nationalMinistryofAgriculturehadrigidideasastowhatconstituted“agriculture”andasa
result,therewaslimitedsupportfortheinclusionofwildliferanchingasaviablelanduse
optioninthe1960s.Moreover,theDepartmentofVeterinaryAffairsconsideredwildanimals
asathreattodomesticanimalsduetothepotentialfortransmissionofdiseases.Scientific
interestingameranchinghademergedintheformerRhodesia(Zimbabwe)andelsewherein
Africainthelate1950sandearly1960s.Possiblyinspiredthroughthediffusionofregional
andinternationaltrends,thethenTransvaalDirectorateofNatureConservation214tookthe
leadandcommissionedseveralscientificstudiestoresearchtheviabilityandsustainabilityof
gameranchingonprivatelandintheearly1960s.Withoutgoingintothefinerdetailsofthe
variousstudies,215scientistscommentedontheunsuitabilityofhigh-intensityfarming
practicesonmarginalfarmland.Whilegameranchingwasneithertoutedasthesilverbullet
tofuturefoodproductioninAfrica,thesustainabilityoftheagriculturalsectornorasawildlife
conservationapproach,itwasperceivedtoofferviablealternativestofailingfarming
enterprises(Carruthers2008:168).Therewasmountingscientificagreementthat“killing
wildlifecommerciallywasecologicallyacceptable(evendesirable)”(ibid).Thepracticeof
cullingandsellingwildlifewasalreadybeingimplementedinSouthAfricannationalparkssuch
astheKNP,wherewildlifemanagersassessedanddeterminedthe“carryingcapacity”ofthe
ecosystem,and“excess”numberswerecroppedtoachieve“acceptable”numbersofwildlife
(Carruthers2008:168).Onaregionallevel,manyconservatorsweremovingfromthe
preservationistconservationparadigmtothesustainableuseparadigm,whichprofferedthe
newmantraof‘useitorloseit’(Child2012:2)orinmodernSouthAfricanparlance‘ifitpays
itstays’(Interviews,2013).Technologicalinnovationssuchasaerialcensusestocountwildlife
214
From1910to1994,theSouthAfricanprovinceofTransvaalwaslocatednorthoftheVaalRiveranditscapital
wasPretoria.Afterthefirstdemocraticelectionsin1994,thecountrywasdividedintonine9provinces,andthe
Transvaalprovinceceasedtoexist.
215
Scientists,forexample,pointedtothesuitabilityofwildanimals(especiallyungulates)togrowingreat
numbersonaridandsemi–aridland,whichotherwiselaybarrenorhadbecomeecologicallyandfinancially
unprofitable,orwherelivestockhadbeenaffectedbydeadlydiseasessuchasthehighlycontagiousherbivore
diseaseRinderpestorbytheTsetsefly(carrierofthesleepingsickness).Wildanimalswereimmunetomany
diseasesafflictingdomesticlivestockwhilealsowell–suitedforprovidinganimalproteinforthegrowing
populationnumbersinSouthAfrica(Carruthers2008:167–168).
181
byfixed-wingaircraftorhelicoptersandthedevelopmentofsedativedartingtechnologies
andopioidtranquilizers,aswellasgamecaptureandtranslocationsmethodsfurtherassisted
theadvancementofwildlifemanagement,whichevolvedinconjunctionwithbiologicaland
ecologicalstudiesintoafully–fledgedfieldofscientificinquiry,conservationapproachand
industry(Carruthers2008:168).Centraltounderstandingwhattheprivatizationand
commodificationofwildlifemeanttolocalcommunitiesisanappreciationoftheresultant
marginalizationandcriminalizationofthesecommunities,whichthefollowingsections
highlight.
4.4.1Privateownershiprights
Theinstitutionalturneventuallyhappenedinthe1970swhenboththeagriculturalandnature
conservationbureaucraciesbegantoappreciatetheprofitabilityofthesector.However,the
issueofproprietyhadtoberesolvedfirst.Itwasalreadymentionedabovethatwildanimals
areconsideredresnulliusunderSouthAfricancommonlaw,meaningthatnobodyowns
them.216Untilthe1960s,twoconditionshadtobemetforownershipofaresnulliustobe
recognized:“[T]heoccupiermusttakecontroloftheobject(occupatio),withtheintentionof
becomingtheowner(animuspossidendi).”(Glazewski2000:opcit).217Theprincipleofres
nulliushadprovidedthebackboneofexpropriationofindigenouslyownedlandandwildlife
duringcolonialtimes.Asanindirectbeneficiary218ofthesaleoflicensesforthehuntingof
wildanimals(vanHoven2015:272),thestatehadlittleincentivetoconvertwildanimalsinto
privatepropertyatfirst.
216
Wildanimalsfallintothecategoryofresintracommercium(objectsthatcanbeowned)asopposedtothings
incapableofprivateownership,whichisconnectedtotheprincipleofresextracommercium(suchastheseaand
seashore)(Glazewski2000:426).
217
Becausewildanimalstendtoroamormigratefreelyacrosstheland,itproveddifficulttodeterminethe
extentofphysicalcontrolnecessarytoestablishlegalownershipofwildanimals.Anotherquestionrelatedtothe
specificpointatwhichanestablishedownerofawildanimallosesownershipshoulditescapeorstray
(Glazewski2000:427).
218
Provincialauthoritieshandlehuntingpermits.
182
However,whiletheprincipleofresnulliusappliedtowildanimals,privatelandowners
showedlimitedinterestinpreservingwildlifewithnotangibleeconomicbenefitsaccruing
otherthantheintrinsic,aestheticandsymbolicvalueofwildlife.Ironically,thelegalprinciple
thathadservedindigenousexpropriationandwhiteappropriationoflandandwildlifeduring
thecolonialperiodfailedtoprotectsufficientlytheinterestsoftheemerginggameranching
industry.Asaresult,therewereabouttenprivately-ownedgameranchesinSouthAfricaby
the1960s(Bothma/Suich/Spenceley2012:147)whilewildlifewasalmostexclusively
conservedonstate–ownedland.Itisparticularlynoteworthythatitwasthestatethat
providedtheimpetustostimulateprivatizationofconservation.Atthetimeconservation
agenciespursuedtheambitiousconservationobjectiveofreinstatingspeciesthathadgone
locallyextinct,totheirhistoricalrangebywayofnewlydevelopedtranslocationmethods.The
rangeexpansionprojectextendedbeyondpublicparksandconservationareas.Especiallythe
formerNatalParksBoard(nowEzemveloKZNWildlife)subsidizedtheprocurementofwild
animalsbyprovidingthemfreeofchargeorbelowmarketvaluetoprivateindividualsinthe
1960sand1970s(discussedinmoredetaillaterinthischapter).Thiswouldnotonlyprovide
speciesteeteringonthebrinkofextinctionwithafightingchanceatsurvivalandrecovery,but
itwouldalsoincreasethetotalareaavailabletoconservationandcreatebufferzones
adjacenttostate-ownedconservationland(Interviewswithconservators10&11,2013).The
TransvaalDirectorateofNatureConservationagaintookupaleadershiprolebyintroducing
the‘certificateofadequateenclosure’in1968,whichwassubsequentlyrolledouttothe
otherprovinces.Thiscertificateexemptedlandownersfromregulationsapplicabletohunting
seasonsandbaglimits,meaningthatwildanimalsthuscouldbehuntedallyearround.
Landownerswereinvitedtoapplyforthecertificateiftheycoulddemonstrateadequate
game-prooffencing(Reilly2014).219Uponprovisionofproofofadequateenclosure,game
rancherscouldalsoapplyforgovernmentsubsidiesintimesofdroughtorothernatural
disasters(vanHoven2015:106).Inessence,gamefarmersweregrantedownershipof
wildlifeandtherighttoderiveincomefromconsumptiveutilization,suchasthekillingofwild
animalsforprofit(Lindsey/Roulet/Romañach2007:463).Beyondfencinginwildanimalsand
claimingownershiprightsbothoverlandandwildanimals,thismovefurthercementedthe
219
Amulti-strandnine-footfencedesignedtokeepwildanimalsinsidethegameranchconstitutedtheminimum
standardofadequateenclosure(Reilly2014).
183
alienationanddeprivationofrural,localcommunitiesfromaccesstolandandresources.
Oncethesepropertyandownershiprightshadbeenasserted,subsistencehuntingongame
farmswasinevitablybrandedaspoachingandaccessingprivatelandforthepurposesof
seekinggrazing,waterormedicinalplantswasdeemedasthecriminaloffenceof
‘trespassing’.TheapartheidregimeemployedthiscategoryofcrimetopreventblackSouth
Africansfrommovingaroundfreelyindemarcated“whites-only”areas,whichincludedparks,
privatelandandtowns.Moreover,thephysicaldemarcationbetweenlandforwildanimals
andhumanbeingsentrenchednotionsoffortressconversation(seeminglyatloggerheads
withsustainableuseapproachprofessedbygamefarmers),whichstresstheincompatibility
ofhumansandwildanimalslivinginharmony.Accordingtothisparadigm,wildanimalsand
humansshouldbekeptapartastominimizehuman-wildlifeconflict.Dangerouswildanimals
weretobecontainedwithingamefences,whicheffectivelydemarcated‘no-goareas’forlocal
communities.Ifafarmerweretofindanunknownblackperson‘trespassing’ontheland,
therewasthedangerofgettingshotonsight(Interviews,2013).Thewaiveroftheresnullius
principleentrenchedbythenewregulationalsostrengthenedtherelationshipbetweenthe
apartheidstateandthewhitefarmingcommunity,oneofitsmainpowerbasesandfurther
contributedtosocialre-orderingandengineeringofruralapartheidSouthAfrica.
Gameranchingderivesincomefromconsumptive(huntingandmeatproduction)andnon–
consumptiveuseofwildlife(eco-tourismandsaleofliveanimalsatauctions).Inthe
aftermathofseveredroughts,theoutbreakofRinderpestandthelinkeddeclineoftheprice
ofmeatinthe1960s,aswellasthechangingpropertyrights,livestockfarmersstartedto
migratetogameranchingor‘mixed’farming.Theculturalsignificanceofhuntingamongst
Afrikaners220furtherassistedtheconversionfromtraditionalfarmingmethodstogame
ranching.Thecommercialtrophyhuntingindustrytookoffinthe1960sashuntersstartedto
paytostalkwildanimals(Scriven/Eloff2003:246).Thenewbrandofgamerancherssoon
realizedtheeconomicvalueofcarryingtrophyanimalsontheirland.High-valuespeciessuch
aselephants,lions,buffalosandleopards(togetherwiththerhino,thesefivespeciesare
220
DuToit(2011:11)explainstheculturalsignificanceofhuntingasfollows:“ThecultureoftheBoeristohunt
andfromtherearethewell-knownwords,“DieBoerensyRoer”(Thefarmerandhisrifle(sic)).Huntingforfood
canneverbeclassifiedasasportsincethisconstitutesaculturalactionratherthanasport.”
184
knownbythehuntingmarketingbrand‘BigFive’)canbehuntedacrosssouthernAfrica.221
Huntingofblackandwhiterhinosis,however,onlypermittedwiththerequiredpaperworkin
NamibiaandSouthAfrica(Lindsey/Roulet/Romañach2007:457).Sincethentrophyhunting
hasbecomeamajorincomegeneratorongameranches(seeTable6).222Aftertheendofthe
apartheidregime,theindustryexperiencedamajorgrowthspurt,223whichispartiallylinked
totheliftingoftheeconomicsanctionsbytheinternationalcommunityandthedepreciating
valueoftheSouthAfricancurrencyoverthepastdecade.Moreover,whitefarmersregarded
gamereservesassecureinvestmentsthatmightbesparedfromlandclaims224andlabour
unrest(Interviewswithjournalist1,2013;rhinoowner3,2013).In2013,huntingtourists
spentanestimated1.072billionSouthAfricanRand(approximately80million€)on7638
hunts(ProfessionalHunters'AssociationofSouthAfrica9December2014).Trophyhunting
proponentsassertthattheprofitmarginsoftrophyhuntingoutperformothertypesofwildlife
use(Bothma/Suich/Spenceley2012:154);however,suchclaimshavebeenquestioned(see
forexample:Joubert2015).Whilethehuntingfraternitymakesclaimstobeneficiationof
ruralcommunitieslivingnearhuntingreservesthroughtheprovisionofjobsandmeat
(Interviewwithprofessionalhuntingrepresentative,2013),thereislittleevidenceofequitable
incomedistribution.Inaddition,aswillbediscussedinChapter6,someofthe(mostlyillegal)
huntingprofitsneverreachSouthAfricanshores.Thislackofequitableincomedistributionis
linked,amongstothers,tothelackofwildlifelegislationenforcingcommunityinvolvement,
communalownershipofwildlifeorskillstransferallowingcommunitiestoruntheirown
huntingoperationsornegotiatefairtermswithoperatorsandhuntingoutfits(Lindsey2008:
45).
221
TrophyhuntingisbannedinBotswanaandSwaziland.
222
Despitethegrowthandinfluenceoftheanimalrightsmovementandtheanti-huntinglobbyinthenorthern
hemisphere,therewaslittledebateabouttheethicsofhuntinginSouthAfricaintheearlyyearsofthegame
ranchingindustry.Thisshortcomingmaybelinkedtothecountry’spariahstatusandisolationfromthe
internationalcommunitywhiletheapartheidregimewasinpower,aswellastheculturalimportanceattached
tohunting(whichisnotspecifictotheAfrikanerpeopleonly).
223
Manyinternationaltrophyhunterswereunperturbedbythepoliticsoftheapartheidregimeandhadalready
movedtheirbusinesssouthonceKenya,theformertophuntingsafaridestinationbannedallhuntingtosaveits
wildlifefromextinctionin1977.
224
Theissueoflandrestitutiontoitsformerowners(whohadbeendisownedduringcolonialandapartheid
times)isacontestedissueandprovidesforon-goingconflictsinpost-apartheidSouthAfrica.Accordingto
interviewswithwhitefarmers,investingingamereserveswasdeemedpreferableovertraditionalagricultural
venturesbecauselocalpeople“wouldnotwanttofarmorliveamongstwildanimals”.Moreover,wildanimals
(themainassetsbeyondthelanditself)couldbemovedorsold(Interviewwithrhinoowner7,2013).
185
Moreover,wherecommunitybeneficiationisaffected,conflictshavearisenoverwhoisin
chargeofequitableincomedistributiontomembersorwhonegotiatesonbehalfofthe
community(seealso:Kahler/Gore2012).Thelocalpoliticaleliteintheformoftraditional
leadersorchiefstendstoactasnegotiatorsbetweenoutsidepartiesandthecommunityin
ruralsouthernAfrica,and“ifyouareonthewrongsideofthechief,thenyouwillseeno
moneyorbenefits”(Focusgroupwithcommunitymembers,2013).
Table6:AnnualincomeoftheSouthAfricanwildlifeindustryin2011
Sector
Value(ZAR)
Value(€)
Percentage
Recreationalhuntingindustry
3,100,000,000
283,300,000
66
Translocation(capture)
750,000,000
68,542,600
16
Trophyhuntingindustry
510,000,000
46,609,000
11
Taxidermy
200,000,000
18,278,000
4
Liveanimalsales(auctions)
94,000,000
8,590,670
2
Meatproduction
42,000,000
3,838,390
1
4,696,000,000
429,168,000
100
Total
Source:adaptedfromduToit/vanSchalkwyk(2011:11)
WildlifehadbeenimbuedwithmonetaryvalueorcommodifiedinMarxianterms,andby
1987,theDepartmentofAgriculturalDevelopmentrecognizedgameranchingasafullyfledgedagriculturalactivity.So-called‘shareblocking’legislation(the1988amendmenttothe
ShareBlockControlActof1980)allowedforthejointacquisitionofagriculturallandforthe
purposesofconvertingitintoprivateconservationareas.Agroupofpeoplecouldbuyblocks
ofsharesinacompanythateffectivelyownedallmovableandimmovableassetsonapieceof
agriculturalland(Hearne/McKenzie2000:427).Thisledtonewopportunitiesforcitydwellers
toowntheirownpieceofland‘outinthebush’andmorebusinesspeoplebecame‘weekend
farmers’.So–called‘chequebookingfarming’involvedwealthyexecutives“shieldingtaxable
incomefrombonusesandshareoptionsbyinvestinginfarms”(Lester2014).Thismovealso
strengthenedtheconservation-businessnexusinasfarasgamefarmsbecameincreasingly
managedasbusinesses.Aswillbeshowninlaterchaptersofthisdissertation,thesmart
partnershipbetweensomeroguewildlifeprofessionalsandbusinessentrepreneursledtothe
establishmentoffrontcompaniesandlegitimatecompanies,throughwhichtrophiescouldbe
186
exportedabroad.Whileconservationobjectiveswereadrawingcardformanygamefarmers,
thebusinessofgamefarminghadtobeprofitabletobesustainableandtointerestpotential
investors.
Thelimitsofthecommonlawpositionthatwildanimalscouldnotbeownedremained
unsatisfactorytoinvestors,especiallysincethewildlifeandhuntingindustrieshadgrown
tremendouslysincethe1970s.Whiterhinos,forexample,weresellingforanaveragepriceof
R34713(about7000GermanMarkatthetime)atgameauctionsin1989.Unlessgame
(rhino)ownershipbecamelegallyprotected,wildanimalsingeneralandrhinosinspecific
posedafinancialliabilitytoowners(SouthAfricanLawCommission1990:5)andthusthe
stateintervenedagain.TheSouthAfricanLawCommissiontackledtheissuein1989.Its
recommendationsledtotheGameTheftAct105of1991(Glazewski2000:428),whichstill
appliestoday.TheobjectiveoftheActistoprotectthelandowner’srightsofownershipof
gamewhenthegameescapesorisluredawayfromthelandowner’s“sufficientlyenclosed”
land(Glazewski2000:ibid).Itisrathercuriousthatthecorollarydoesnotapplytowild
animalsthatcrossfromnationalparkstoprivate,communalorprovincialreservesinSouth
Africa.Uponleavingtheconfinesofnationalparks,wildanimalsreverttothestatusofres
nullius,andnotrespublicae(resourcesownedbythestate)orrescommunis(resources
ownedincommon).Thecategoriesofrespublicae(wildanimalsinUSnationalparksare
categorizedasrespublicae)andrescommunisplacerestrictionsontheruleofcaptureand
reservecertainproprietaryrightstothestateorcommunityratherthantoindividuals
(Wodarski2014).WhileSouthAfricanbiodiversityandconservationlegislationprotects
ownershiprightsoftheprivatecommercialgameranchingindustry,itfailstodealwiththe
acquisition,retentionandlossofwildanimalsthatoccurorescapefrompublicwildlife
conservationareasandnationalparks(Hopkinson/vanStaden/Ridl2008:484).Thisomission
hasledtoheateddebatesamongstopposingcampsinthetrophyhuntingdebate,225
especiallysincesomenationalparkshavedroppedtheirboundaryfenceswithprivatelyownedgamereservesthatallowtrophyhunting.Wildanimalsderivingfrompublicparks
225
Themoralityofsportsortrophyhuntingissubjecttomanynormative,moralandethicaldebates,ranging
fromcontestedissuespertainingtothekillingofanimalsforpleasure,trophiesorsport,andextendingthrough
tobroaderexistentialdiscussionsonwhetheranimalsassentientbeingsshouldenjoythesameinalienablerights
ashumanbeings.
187
mightthusbehuntedforprofitonprivateland(seeBox1).Someconservatorsconsiderthe
state’sdroppingoffencesasanincentiveforprivateoperatorstocarryonwiththeirprivate
conservationendeavours226whilealsoincreasingthetotalsurfaceareaavailableto
conservation(Interviews2013).Therehavebeeninstanceswherehuntingoperatorshave
“removed”gamefencesbetweennationalparksandadjacentgamereservesbythrowing
batteryacidonboundaryfences(Interviewwithconservator13,2013;investigativejournalist
1,2012;investigativejournalist3,2013;ownobservationatboundaryfences).Theacid
speedsupcorrosionallowingbiganimalssuchasrhinosorelephantstobreakthroughthe
fenceandmigratetotheothersideofthegamefence.Therehavealsobeenoccasionswhere
huntingoperatorsluredwildanimals(e.g.lions)fromnationalparksbyhangingbaiton
boundaryfences.Whileprivateownershiprightsofwildanimalsareprotectedonprivate
land,thesameownershipprivilegesdonotaccruetothepublic(state).Trespassingand
huntingareforbiddeninnationalparks;however,thestatehasnorecoursetoclaiming
ownershipoverwildanimalsthathaveescapedfromitsconservationareas.Thestrange
disconnectbetweenthehuntingbaninnationalparksandcommercialtrophyhuntingon
adjacentprivatelandisdiscussedinBox1below.Sufficetomentionherethatthesemuddled
huntingandpropertyrightshaveledtoconfusionandunhappinessamongstlocal
communities.Whereasmembersoftheircommunitiesarebrandedas“poachers”when
huntingonprivateorpublicland,wealthyhuntersareallowedtohuntwildanimalsagainsta
pricetagonprivatelandwheretheprovenanceofsuchwildanimalsisnotclear.
226
Wildanimalsarethusconsidereda‘gift’orincentivetocarryonconservingthesame.
188
Box1:Whitehunterversusblackpoacher?
TheAssociatedPrivateNatureReserves(APNR)isanassociationofprivatelyownedgame
reservesborderingontheKrugerNationalPark.SouthAfrica’snationalparksauthority
SANParksagreedtodropKruger’swesternboundaryfenceswithadjacentprivategame
reservesin1993,whichaddsapproximately200000hectaresofconservationareatothe
so–calledGreaterKrugerNationalPark.Thedroppedfencesallowforthefreemovement
ofwildanimalsintheenlargedconservationareawhilealsocreatingabufferzone
betweenthenationalpark,privateconservanciesandsurroundingland.Thehuntingof
wildanimalsisnotallowedinnationalparkssuchastheKNPwhereastheinternal
constitutionsofindividualprivategamereservesdeterminewhatformsofsustainableuse
arepermissibleintheirconservationareas.TheAPNRallowscommercialhuntingwithinits
protectedarea.Huntingpermitsareallocatedthroughaconsultativeprocess,which
involvestheKNPandtheLimpopoDepartmentofEconomicDevelopment,Environment
andTourism(LEDET)(AfricaHunting.com2010).DavidMabunda,theformerchief
executiveofSANParks,declaredthattheparksauthoritywasnotopposedtohuntingin
bufferareasprovided“itisdonetransparentlyandaccordingtothemanagementplanand
protocolsagreedtobetweenadjoininglandownersandSANParks”(KrugerNationalPark
2009).Accordingtoanimalrightsactivists(Interviews,2013),theincompatibleanimaluse
philosophiesofnationalparksandgamereservesconstituteapotentialconflictofinterest
as“naturalheritageissoldforprofittotrophyhunterswithlimitedbenefittothestateor
community”.AccordingtoAnimalRightsAfrica(2009:22),“[r]hinoceroseslivinginthe
KrugerNationalParkaremovingacrossunfencedboundariesonthePark’swesternborder
intotheAssociatedPrivateNatureReserves(APNR)andonthePark’s[E]asternborderinto
Mozambiquewheretheycanbeprivatelysoldtoforeigntrophyhuntersforexorbitant
sums.”TwoAPNRmemberswereamongstthefirstprivateoperatorstoobtainwhite
rhinosfromtheNatalParksBoardinthe1960sand1970s(Buijs1987:1–2).Unlikemany
otherprivaterecipientsofwhiterhinos(seelaterinthischapter),thesetwooperators
couldaccountforthefateoftheirwhiterhinos,whichincludedtrophyhuntingofrhino
bulls(Buijs1987:29).Whilethereisonlyanecdotalevidencethat‘Kruger’rhinosmayhave
beenhuntedingamereservesadjacenttotheKNP(theirprovenanceisdifficultto
establishaswhiterhinosacrossSouthAfricaaredescendedfromthesamegeneticpoolin
KwaZulu–Natal),trophyhuntingofrhinoscontinuestoconstituteaformofrevenueto
someAPNRreserves(seeforexample:Borchert27February2013).Thismuddledstateof
affairsraisesquestionsofwhytrophyhuntersshouldbeallowedto(potentially)hunt
Krugerrhinoslegallywithlimiteddirectbenefitsaccruingtostatecofferswhilerhino
poachingisanon-goingconcernintheKNP.Moreover,thispointstoaveryfineline
between‘legal’trophyhuntingand‘illegal’poachingandthepolardichotomyof‘black
poacher’versus‘whitehunter’(foranexcellentanalysisofthisdichotomyandthe
associatedmasternarrativeseealso:Steinhart2006).Essentially,thelawsanctionsthe
formerinexchangeformoneywhilethelattercommitsacriminalactandhenceis
penalizedbythelaw.Accordingtoaprofessionalhunter(Interviewwithprofessional
hunter1,2013),huntingandpoachingdifferinthreesignificantpoints.Ahunterishighly
skilled,strivestoachieveaone-shotkill(aso-calledheart-lungshot)andthemotivationfor
thehuntisdifferenttothatofapoacher.AswillbeshowninChapter7,thisdistinction
maybeacademic;inpractice,thesignificantdifference(asperthosenotedbythe
professionalhunter)relatestothemotivationofthehunterversusthatofthepoacher.
Manyso-calledpoachersareequallyhighly-skilledaimingforaone-shotkillasnotattract
theattentionofrangersandothersecuritypersonnel.Thedistinctionthusrelatestohow
thetwoarelegallydefined.
189
4.4.2Large-scaleconversiontogameranchinginthe1990s
Somestructuralchangesfurtherinfluencedtheconversionofagriculturallandintogame
ranchesinthe1990s.CommercialfarmershadbeenoneofthesocialbasesoftheNational
Party’srisetopowerin1948.Theapartheidgovernmentrantheagriculturalsectorthrough
controlboardsandcooperatives;commercialfarmersweresupportedthroughsubsidies,
grants,transportconcessions,favourablecreditfacilities,marketingboardsandcheaplabour
(SouthAfricanHistoryOnline2014).227Overthecourseofthe1980s,therewasagradual
weakeningofthepoliticalandeconomicpowerofcommercialfarmerswithinthepolitical
economyofSouthAfrica,climaxingwiththeremovaloftheNationalPartyfrompowerafter
thefirstdemocraticelectionsheldin1994(Greenberg2013:1).
Inthepost–apartheidera,commercialfarmerswerefacedwithmulti–layeredchallenges,
includingamongstothers,thecontinuedderegulationoftheagriculturalsector(inlinewith
theWorldTradeOrganization’s(WTO)policyontradeliberalization);thelossofpolitical
leverage(thefarminglobbyheldaboutone-thirdoftheparliamentaryseatsduringtheheight
oftheapartheidregime);theintroductionofnewlabourlegislationinpost-apartheidSouth
Africa(introducingminimumwagesforfarmworkers);theimpactofHIV/Aidsandmalariaon
theproductivityoffarmlabourers;stocktheft,livestockdiseases,bushencroachmentand
climatechange,aswellaslandclaimsforillegallandappropriationduringthecolonialand
apartheidregimes(Absa2003:1–8;Carruthers2008).Theconversiontogameranchingwas
appealing:notonlyhadthemonetaryvalueofwildanimalsincreaseddramaticallybutgame
ranchingislessdependentonunskilledlabour(Smith/Wilson2002:11)andfavourable
weatherconditionswhileostensiblypursuingtheloftygoalofachievinga‘sustainableliving
planet’throughgrowingwildlifenumbers(Absa2003:8).Moreover,gamerancheswereseen
asaninvestmentsafefromlandclaimsafter1994.Thegovernmenthadundertakento
preservepublicandprivateconservationareasastoensurethatthetotalareaavailablefor
conservationwouldnotdecrease(Interviewwithgamefarmers8&9,2015).
227
Theapartheidregimeintroducedadualfarmingsysteminruralareas,commercialfarmingbywhitefarmers
andcommunalfarminginAfricanreserves.Agriculturalproductionwassupposedlybasedon“pre-colonial
forms”offarminginthereserves,“meanttoperpetuatethemythofthecontinuityofrurallifewhileinreality
denyingAfricanthemeanstosustainthemselvesofftheland”(SouthAfricanHistoryOnline2014).
190
Theconfluenceoftheseprocesseshasledtohealthygrowthofgamefarmsandreserves:In
theearly1960s,therewereapproximately500,000wildanimalsinthewholeofSouthAfrica
(vanHoven2015:104),includinganestimated840whiterhinos(Collins,Alan/Fraser,
Gavin/Snowball,Jen2013:2).228By2015,therewere11600registeredgamefarmsinSouth
Africaholdingsome21millionhectaresofland(vanHoven2015:101)andbetween16to20
millionwildanimals(Reilly2014).Meanwhile,thetotalsizeofprivaterhinoreservesinSouth
Africastretchesoveranareaofabouttwomillionhectaresincorporatingabout380separate
properties,similarinsizetotheKrugerNationalPark(KNP).ByDecember2014,27%(or
about5000animals)ofthenationalpopulationofwhiterhinosand20%(or450animals)of
blackrhinoswereprotectedonprivatelandinSouthAfrica.
Beyondtheneedfortheprovisionofsupportservicesandgoods(suchasgame-prooffencing,
off-streetvehiclesandranchinginfrastructure),wildliferanchingledtothecreationofnew
semi-skilledandskilledjobcategoriessuchaswildlifeveterinarians,gamemanagersand
consultants,andtothegrowthofthetaxidermy,gamecaptureandtranslocationindustries,
aswellassupplementaryfeedmanufacturersandsuppliers(duToit/vanSchalkwyk2011;van
Hoven2015:102).Theclaimthatthewildliferanchingemploysthreetimesmorestaffthan
livestockfarms(Dry2011;Langholz/Kerley2006)deservescriticalexamination.Whilesome
gamereservesandfarmscontinuedtoemployfarmworkersandtheirextendedfamilies(who
hadbeenliving,workingandfarmingontheland),theservicesoftrackers,guides,drivers,
cleaningandcateringstaffwereneededongamefarms(Hearne/McKenzie2000:426).
Insteadofre-skillingorprovidingtrainingcoursestoresidentfarmworkers,labourwasoften
soughtinnearbycitiesandtown(Helliker2013:17).Theconversionoffarmlandtogame
ranchesthusaffectedhundredsofblackfarmworkersanddwellers,229whoseserviceswere
nolongerrequiredongameranches.Similartowhatplayedoutuponthepromulgationof
nationalparksandgamereserves,manyblackfarmworkerswereeitherpaidoff,retrenched
228
Thereareconflictingnumberestimates.Wildlifecountswerelessreliableintheabsenceofmoderncensus
technologiesnowavailabletowildlifeprofessionals.Thechoicewasmadetogowiththenumberssuppliedby
theNatalParksBoardandDrIanPlayer,whowereworkingintimatelywithrhinosatthetime.
229
ThedisplacementofblackfarmerswaspartofthecolonialprojectinSouthAfrica.Aswhitesettlers
appropriatedland,huttaxeswereimposed,andeconomicpressureincreased,manypeoplelivingonfarms
becamefarmworkers,ortheyenteredintocontractualarrangementswithwhitefarmerstoretainaccesstoland
(Hall2003:2).
191
and/or(andcontinuetobe)evictedfromprivatelyownedgameranchesandreserves.230
Thesepracticeswereparticularlypronouncedbeforetheendofapartheidwhenfarmworkers
enjoyednolegalprotectionfromtheiremployers.Withtheadventofdemocracyandtheend
ofwhiteminorityrule,thefortunesoffarmworkershavechangedonpaperbutfewknow
theirrightsandcontinuetobevulnerabletoevictionandexploitativelabourconditions
(Berger2011;HumanRightsWatch2011).Beyondthesettingupphase,gameranchesareless
‘hard’labour-intensive(Smith/Wilson2002:11)andfarmworkersanddwellers,andtheir
livestockwereexpelledordeniedaccessundertheguiseof“people,livestockandwildlifeare
alethalcombination”(Interviewswithgameranchersandconvictedpoachers,2013).Lester
(2014)putsthisfurtherintoperspectivebyreferringtothelargepercentageofforeign
ownershipofgamereserves:
“GamefarmingusedtobelargelyconfinedtotheLowveldandnorthernpartsofRSA.
ThenwegottothenewSouthAfricaandwecameupwiththewonderfulideathat
gamefarmsbringtourists,foreigncurrency,jobsandawholelotmoretothenewRSA.
And,yes,someoperatorshavemadeahugecontribution.Butlet’sbehonest,many
gamefarmsarepayinglipservicetothetruemeaningofsustainabledevelopment.
AnyolddunnywithforeigncurrencycanswanintoRSAandbuyupwhatwasa
farmingconcern,selloffthelivestock,payofftheworkersandturnthelandintoa
personalprivatezoo.ThenfindaniceAfricannameandcallita‘conservatory’.”
ThetoleranceoftheSouthAfricanstateforabsenteeandforeignlandownershipfurther
exacerbatesthe‘landquestion’,231andtheraciallyskewedlandownershippatterns.There
230
InastudyundertakenonbehalfoftheWildernessFoundation(aprivatefoundationstartedbythelateDrIan
Player),theauthorsfound“noevidenceoffarmworkersbeinglaidoffintheestablishmentofthePGRs”
(Langholz/Kerley2006:10).Theworkerseitherfoundemploymentwiththeprivategamereserve(PGR)or
movedwiththeiroriginalemployers.Approximately52%oftheoriginalfarmworkershadremainedinthe
employmentofthePGR.LangholzandKerley’ssurveydataderivedfromcompletedquestionnairesprovidedby
tenofthirteenIndalo(EasternCapeAssociationofPrivateGameReserves)membersin2006.Thestudyalso
foundthattheaverageannualsalaryoffulltimeemployeeshadincreased4.8fold,whichisattributedtothehigh
salariespaidtoseniorstaff.Interestingly,areportbyalocalNGOprovidesdatathatcontradictsthestudy,
documentingevictionsandcaseswherethefarmworkers’socioeconomicrightswereerodedbynotallowing
themtokeeplivestock,growvegetables,ordeniedthemaccesstotheland(Naidoo2005:28–30).Thereisscant
empiricalevidenceonthefortunesoffarmworkersinprivategamereservesfromothersources.Advocacy
campaignsandreportsbyunionsandothershavealsobeenlesspositiveintheirappraisal(Lester2014;Wisborg
etal.2013;ParliamentaryMonitoringGroup2011).Sentimentsofdissentandunhappinesswerealsoechoedin
interviewsandfocusgroupsundertakenwithruralcommunitiesandconvictedpoachers(someofwhomhad
beenfarmworkersortheirnext-of-kinwere).
231
The‘landissue’ofresolvingthedispossessionandexpropriationofblack-ownedlandduringthecolonialand
apartheidregimesremainsoneofthemostimportantissueswithinthepublicandpoliticaldiscourseinSouth
Africa.
192
hasbeensubstantialforeigninvestmentinsomereserves–suchasRichardBranson’sprivate
lodgeinthewesternSabiSandsgamereserve(heisoneofmanyinternationalinvestorsof
thegamereserveadjacenttotheKNP)or‘DubaiWorld’,theinvestmentarmoftheUnited
ArabEmirates’governmentthatacquiredmajoritysharesintheShamwariGameReservein
theEasternCape(Helliker2013:16).Moreover,thecreationofamalgamatedandcorporateownedgamereserveshaschangedthelandstructuretowardslargertractsofland,which
contradictstheSouthAfricangovernment’slandreformpolicyofpromotingsmallerfarming
units(Wisborgetal.2013:59–60).
Thereisagrowingriftbetweenthestate(whoeffectivelyallowedprivateownershipof
wildlifeforthepurposesofwildlifeconservation)andmembersofthegameranching
fraternitywhohavebranchedoutinto‘lessconservation-orientatedendeavours’.Thisnew
schoolofgameranchershasintroducedexotic(non-indigenous)species,suchasfallowdeer
fromwesternEurasia,Russianwildboar,roanantelopefromWestAfricaandsableantelope
fromZambia.Therealsohasbeenafocusonbreedingtrophyspecimensandthebirthofan
entireindustrybasedonphenotypiccolourvariationswithinaspecies.Thesepractices
concernconservatorsastheselectionofcertaintraitsdepartsfromthenotionofnatural
selectionandfree-rangingwildpopulations(Reilly2014).Theobjectiveofphenotypic
breedingisthediversificationandexpansionofavailabletrophyanimals(Interviewwith
wildlifevet2andfarmmanager1,2013).Thepromulgationoftheearliermentioned
ThreatenedorProtectedSpecies(TOPS)regulations(discussedinChapter5andbelow)were
partiallytriggeredbytheinjudiciousmovementandintroductionofnon-indigenouswild
animals–whichisalsorelevanttotherhinoissueastheTOPSregulationsstipulatethatthe
rhinoshouldnotbemovedtoareasthatfalloutsideitshistoricalrange.
Essentially,theprocessesdescribedaboveledtothesocialre-orderingofruralSouthAfrica,
imbuedwildlifewitheconomicvalue,encouragedtheprivatizationofandthebuy-inof
corporationsinto‘conservation’initiatives,furtheralienatinglocalcommunitiesfromlandand
wildlifeandprovidingtheidealconditionsforpoachingtoflourish(suchasimpoverishment;
lossofagency,landandhuntingrights;unhappinesswiththerules).Italsoledtothe
interdependenceofstateandprivateconservationinitiativesandlaidthegroundworkforthe
lucrativewildlifeindustry.Theprivilegedpositionofobtaininghighlysubsidizedwildlifefrom
193
thestate,assuranceofprivateownershipofthesameandthepoliticalleverageofthefarming
communityduringapartheidledtosomewildliferanchersfeelingunderappreciatedinthe
newdispensation(Interviews,2013).Theincreasedregulationoftheprivatesector(suchas
theTOPSregulations)andtheperceivedthreatofdispossessionoflandandwildlifehaveled
togrowingresentmentamongstwildlifefarmersandlandowners.Insomeinstances,these
feelingsofresentmentandtheperceivedunfairnessoftheruleshaveprovidedfodderto
bendtherules,exploitlegalloopholesorengageinillegalactivities(whichwillbediscussedin
Chapter6).Inpost-apartheidSouthAfrica,thehuntingandwildlifeindustriesarealmost
exclusivelymadeupofahomogenousgroupofwhiteeconomicelites.Attemptstoobtain
statisticsontheleveloftransformationwithinthewildlifeandhuntingsectorswere
unsuccessfulfromimportantgatekeepers(e.g.howmanyblackprofessionalhuntersare
there?Howmanyblack-ownedrhinofarmsandreservesarethere?).Awell-knownexception
isSouthAfrica’scurrentdeputy-presidentCyrilRamaphosawhoisafamouswildlifebreeder
andwhocameinforcritiqueafterhebidona$2millionbuffaloduringawildlifeauction
(Findlay[SAPA-AP]2014).
4.4.3Privatizationoftherhino
Whiletheprivatizationofrhinoshasbeenportrayedasanunqualifiedconservationsuccess
story(‘tSas-Rolfes2012;Bothma/Suich/Spenceley2012),thedarkersideisoftendisregarded.
Byvirtueoftheapartheidracelaws,blackpeoplewerelegallyexcludedfromowninglandand
wildanimalsuntiltheendofthecolonialapartheidregimein1994.Theprivatizationof
wildlifeinclusiveofrhinoscontributedtoanevengreaterdistancebetweenlocalpeople,wild
animalsandconservationendeavours.Beyondthesystematicexclusionofblackpeople,rhino
conservationonprivatelandwasfraughtwithnotionsofprivilegeandentitlementbyrhino
breedersandconservators.Theprivatelandowners’needtogenerateprofitstorungame
farmsandreservesprovidedthepointofentryforillegaleconomicaction,theexploitationof
legislativeandregulatoryloopholes.Thiscriticalassessmentconstitutesadeparturefromthe
grandnarrativeoftheuncriticalrhinoconservationsuccessstoryinSouthAfricaandisfurther
unpackedinthefollowingsection.
194
Therhinoindeedtakescentrestageintheprivatizationandcommodificationofwildlifein
SouthAfrica,enrichinglandownersandfarmerswithlittlebenefittolocal,ruralcommunities.
ThenumberofwhiterhinosintheHluhluwe-iMfoloziParkinKwaZulu-Natalhadbeenreduced
toabout50to70animalsintheearly20thcentury(InterviewwithIanPlayerbyJeffBarbee,
2013)andhadgonelocallyextinctelsewhereinSouthAfrica.Throughsuccessfulbreedingand
conservationprogrammeswithinthepark,whiterhinonumbershadincreasedbythe1960s.
Infact,rhinonumbersstartedexceedingthecarryingcapacityofthepark,andtherewere
fearsthatanoutbreakofdiseasecouldrevoketherecoveryofthewhiterhino.Itwasatthis
pointthattheNatalParksBoard232commenced“OperationRhino”,whichoverthecourseof
the1960sandearly1970ssawmorethan1,200whiterhinosrelocatedfromtheiMfolozi
GameReservetotheKNP,privategamereserves,aswellaszoosandsafariparksabroad.
Newimmobilizationandtranslocationmethodsgreatlyassistedthisproject(Emslieetal.
2009:22).TheNatalParksBoardhadenvisagedthattheprovisionofwhiterhinosatlowcost
toprivatelandownerswouldrenderthemeffectivecustodiansofrhinos.Thefirstwhite
rhinoswerethussoldtoprivatelandownersathighlysubsidizedpricesandpossiblybelow
marketvaluein1963.Themarketvaluewasunknownatthispointastherhinohadnotbeen
economicallyvaluedinSouthAfrica(unlikeinconsumermarketsintheArabpeninsulaand
Asia).AformerofficialofthethenNatalParksBoardpointedoutthatthestatehadto
persuadesomegamefarmerstotakeonrhinosastheywerebynomeanscovetedwild
animalsinthelate1960sand1970s(Interviewwithconservator10,2013).Theformerparks
officialrecountedthestoryoftryingtosellrhinostoanunwillingbuyer(Interviewwith
conservator10,2013):
“Isaidtohim:‘Lookwe’vegotasurplusofwhiterhinoandit’squiteembarrassing
becausetheyareexceedingthecarryingcapacityandwe’vebeenwarnedthatcertain
impoverishmentoftheecologywouldtakeplaceunlesswemovedthem.’Sothe
thoughtofcullingtherhinossosoonafterwe’dsavedthemwasn’tverypalatable.He
said:‘Well,lookthere’snothingIcandowiththerhino.Ifyouaskme,I’mnot
interestedinone.’ThenIsaid:‘LookwetakeoverR200eachtodeliverit.’Andhesaid:
‘I’msorryI’llhavetoputupfences.’Andwesaid:‘Youknowtheyaresobigand
wieldy.’Tothathesays:‘Oncetheybreakthroughthefence,theycancauseenormous
troubleformyneighbors.’…”
232
TheformerprovinceofNatalisknownasKwaZulu-Natalsincetheendofapartheid,anditsparksauthorityis
EzemveloKZNWildlife,theformerNatalParksBoard.
195
Accordingtorhinoowners(Interviews,2013),thestart-upcostsofestablishingagame
reservewithbiganimalslikerhinos,elephants,hipposorbuffaloeswerehigherthanstandard
gamereservesduetothehighercostattachedtoprocurement,translocationand
managementofbiganimals.Thereluctanceoflaw-abidinggamefarmerstokeeprhinosinthe
1970swasalsolinkedtotheblanketbanonthetradeofliverhinosandtheirproducts
imposedbyCITESin1977,showcasinghowthetreatywascounterproductivetoconservation
initiativesintheearlyyears.Asaconsequenceofthetradeban,rhinotrophiescouldnotbe
exportedtointernationaldestinations.Whiletherewasagrowinglocalhuntingindustry(e.g.
culturalhuntingoftheAfrikaners),localhunterspreferredtohuntforfoodorasan
expressionofculturalvalues(duToit/vanSchalkwyk2011).SouthAfricaallowedtheexport
ofhuntingtrophiesofwhiterhinosfrom1979onwardsagain.Asaresultofthehighcost
attachedtokeepingrhinosandlowreturnsoninvestments(initially),rhinoranchingbecame
largelyaneconomicactivityforthewealthyeliteorforrancherswhocouldgainthe
confidenceofforeignandlocalinvestorsortrophyhunters.Oncetheprofitabilityoftherhino
asatrophyanimalbecameknown,theNatalParksBoardstruggledtomeetthedemandfor
rhinos(Interviewwithconservator10,2013)andawaitinglisthadtobeinstituted.Despite
triplingthelistpriceforrhinos,thedemandforrhinosoutstrippedthesupply.Followinginthe
footstepsofaprivateindividualwhoauctionedoffhisrhinos,theNatalParksBoardheldits
firstauctionin1986.Thesixrhinosonauctionachievedmorethandoublethelistprice.In
lightofthesuccessandinresponsetotheBuijsreport(discussedbelow),parksauthorities
startedtobacktheauctionsystem(‘tSas–Rolfes2011:4).
Bythemid–1980s,theNatalParksBoardgrewconcernedoverthelackofgrowthofrhino
numbersonprivateland,andthiseventuallyledtoaninvestigationbyDaanBuijsin1987.The
so-calledBuijsreporttracedandrecordedthehistoriesofalltranslocationsofwhiterhinos
fromNatalGameReserves,BophuthatswanaParks233andprivatesales.Ofthe1,291white
rhinostranslocatedtoprivatelandbetween1961and1987,therewasanunexplainedlossof
510whiterhinosonprivateland.Whilethereweredeathsduringandaftertranslocation,the
annualgrowthrateshouldhavebeenaround6%.Buijs(1987:2)remarked:
233
BophuthatswanawasahomelandinthenorthwesternregionofSouthAfricaduringtheapartheidregime.
196
“Thisdatashowsanunexpecteddecreaseof510rhinosandthelossofallrhinoon45
ranches(includesunknowndestinies)towhichrhinohavebeendelivered.Thefateof
therhinoof21oftheranchescouldnotbeestablishedandoftheother24allthe
rhinoswereshot,lostorsold(notalwaysknowntowhom).”
Whilesomefounderpopulationsweredeemedtoosmallforbreedingpurposes,thehabitat
unsuitableforrhinosurvivalorsingleadultmalepopulationsleadingtonoorlittle
procreation,Buijs’reportpointstotheeconomicvaluationoftherhinoasatrophyanimalas
acauseforconcern(Buijs1987:10–11).As‘tSas–Rolfes(2011:3)explains:
“In1982,theNatalParksBoardlistpriceforalivewhiterhinowas1,000SouthAfrican
Rand(R).Thatsameyear,theaveragetrophypricewasR6,000.Anyprivate
landownerreceivingaliverhinohadaverystrongincentivetosellitasatrophyas
quicklyaspossibletopocketa600percentprofit.Thealternativewasallowingitto
roamonhispropertywheretherewasariskoflosingittoapoacherorneighbour.”
ThevalueofawhiterhinotrophyhadsurgedtoR35,000(about17000GermanMark)while
thestatecarriedonsellingliverhinosathighlysubsidizedpriceswhenBuijswasconducting
hisresearchin1987.DuetothesteadydeclineoftheSouthAfricanRandandtheadvantages
ofobtainingforeigncurrency,thevalueoftherhinotrophywasfurtherenhanced(Buijs1987:
11).Moreover,trophyhuntingofrhinoselsewhereinsouthernAfricawasaffectedbyintraandinterstateconflictsanddiminishednumbersofrhinosavailablefortrophyhuntingdueto
widespreadillegalhunting.ForeigntrophyhunterswereincreasinglydrawntoSouthAfrica.A
drawingcardappearstohavebeenthewell-knownhospitalityofSouthAfricans,whichseems
tohaveextendedtoobligingtrophyhuntersbyallowing‘unconventional’huntingsafaristo
takeplace.234Insomeinstances,rhinoownersfloutedbasicprinciplesofethicalhunting,such
asthetacit‘gentlemen’sagreement’ofnothuntingbreedingrhinocows,rhinocowsandtheir
calvesoryoungbulls(Buijs1987:8–12).Otherssimplyboughttherhinofromthestateand
hadtrophyhuntersshootitsoonthereafter.Thispracticecontinuesintothepresentandis
knownas‘putandtake’:“…buyrhino,killit,replaceit,killit…”(Interviewwithprovincial
governmentofficial1,2013),discussedfurtherinChapter6.
234
Buijs(1987:8)describesonesuchincidentwhereanAmericantrophyhuntershotarhinocow,andhisson
shothercalf.
197
Buijs(1987:14–31)providesadetailedbreakdownofrecipientsofpublicrhinosbyname,the
locationofthereservesorfarmsandthereasonsgivenforthelackofgrowthofrhino
populations.Itiscuriousthatsomeofthesamefamilynamesandgamereservesarelinkedto
irregularorillegalhuntingoperationsclosetothirtyyearslater.Whatalsostandsoutinthe
Buijsreportisthesenseofentitlementexpressedbysomerhinoowners,asentimentthat
cameupduringinterviewsconductedwithwildlifeprofessionalsin2013.SaysBuijs(Buijs
1987:11):
“Manylandownershaveallowedalltheiradultmalestobeshotbytrophyhunters,
andinmanyinstanceshavealsoprovidedbreedingfemalesforhunting.Thishasbeen
inmanycasesjustifiedbytheviewthattheywouldbeallocatedmorerhinobythe
NatalParksBoard.Insomeinstances,safarioperatorsinNatalmaintaineditwasthe
Province’sobligationthattheyshouldbeprovidedwithmorerhinoforhunting.”
AsaresultoftheBuijsreport,theNatalParksBoardreviseditsallocationpoliciesandstarted
sellingitsrhinosatmarket-relatedpricesfrom1989onwards(Emslie/Brooks1999:18).
Conservationeconomist‘tSas–Rolfes(2011:4)arguesthatwiththeintroductionofthe
auctionsystem,thepricingforliverhinosapproachedrealisticmarketvalues.TheBoard’s
auctionachievedanaveragepriceofZAR49,000perrhinoin1989,atenfoldincreaseofthe
listpriceof1986.Meanwhile,trophyhunterswerewillingtopartwithbetweenZAR80,000
tomorethanZAR90,000perrhinotrophyinthelate80sandearly90s(‘tSas–Rolfes2011:
4).Whiletherewereincentivestobreedrhinosinlightofthemassivepriceincreaseoflive
rhinos,thereturnoninvestmentstoavailrhinosfortrophyhuntingremainedequally
appealing.
Animalrightsgrouppickedupontheissueofthe“missingrhinos”tocampaignforahunting
andtradebantobeimposeduponSouthAfricaatCITESCoPmeetingsinthe1990s(Buijs
1998:4).However,subsequentsurveysandassessments(Adcock/Emslie1994;Emslie/Brooks
1999;Buijs/Anderson1989;Buijs1987;Buijs1998;Buijs/Papenfus1996;Buijs2002;
Castley/Hall–Martin2003;Hall–Martinetal.2008;Emslie2008)revealedrealisticgrowth
patternsofrhinopopulationsandfurtherregulatoryrestrictionswerethwarted;infact,the
whiterhinowasdown-listedtoAppendixIIofCITESin1994,whichallowedtrophyhunting
andthesaleofliveanimals(Leader-Williamsetal.2005:4).The1994decisionserved
conservationinitiativesonprivateland,allowingwealthylandownersandhunterstoderive
198
benefitfromrhinos.Meanwhile,localcommunitiesremainedmarginalizedandexcludedfrom
directbeneficiation.
Scientistshavecalculatedanannualrhinopopulationgrowthrateof6,9%forprivateand
state-ownedrhinosinSouthAfricabetween1991and2010(Emslie/Milliken/Talukdar2013:
4).Theaveragepopulationgrowthrateofrhinosincaptivebreedingorintensivefarming
operationsislowerthanthatofrhinoskeptinthe‘wild’;andhence,agrowthrateof5%to6
%wasdeemedasrealisticonprivateland(Interviewswithconservatorsandrhinoscientist9,
2013).Moreover,theannualhuntingratesofapproximately10,5%onprivatelandbefore
1988decreasedrapidly.By1994,theratehaddroppedto3%(Adcock/Emslie1994:1).
4.4.4Thesaleofliverhinosasafundraisingstrategyfornationalparks
ThesurveysconductedbyBuijsandothersareusefultoolstohighlightsomeofthestrengths
andweaknessesofrhinoconservationonprivateland.Aftertheunsubsidizedvaluationof
rhinosatpublicauctions,therhino(andotherwildanimals)becamemajorsourcesofincome
forparksauthorities.Nationalandprovincialparksauthoritieshavebeendealingwith
decreasingbudgetallocationsfromthenationalgovernment(Interviewswithparksofficials
2013),diminishedorinsufficientrevenuestreamsfromothersourcesofincomeincluding
tourismrevenues,subscriptionsandforeigndonations(Jamesetal,2000quotedin:Krug
2001:10),aswellasotherformsofsustainableuse(Interviewswithgovernmentofficialsand
conservators,2013).235
Fromthemid-90s,rhinobreedingintensifiedandrhinopopulationsgrewbothonprivateand
publicland.Parkmanagershadintroduced351whiterhinostotheKrugerNationalPark
(KNP),SouthAfrica’slargestconservationareabetween1960and1972.TheKNPrapidly
becametheworld’sleadingconservatorofwhiterhinosandfromthemid–1980sonwards,
Krugerrhinosweredonatedtootherconservationareasandzoologicalgardens.Asofthelate
235
ThemanagementauthorityoftheKNPhad‘surplus’wildanimalsincludingelephants,buffaloesandhippos
culled,slaughteredandprocessedintotinnedfoodatanabattoirnearSkukuzabetweenthe1960sand1990s.
Theabattoirwaslatercloseddownduetosuccessfulcampaigningbyanimalwelfareorganizations.
199
1990s,“alargefraction”ofwhiterhinosweresoldtogenerateconservationrevenue
(Ferreira/Botha/Emmet2012:5).Scientistsdeterminethe“takeoff”or“management
removals”ofrhinosperannum(Ferreira2013b:3).Thefigureislinkedtoanumberof
variablessuchasgender,age,socialbehaviourandbreedingsuccessofindividualanimals
(InterviewwithKNPofficial,2013).Thesaleofliveanimalstoprivateoperatorsandoverseas
destinationsisbutoneofthestrategiesemployedtomakestate-runparksprofitable,andis
justifiedintermsofthepursuitof“puristbiodiversityconservationobjectives”,wherebythe
rhinoisreintroducedtoitshistoricalrangesonprivateland(Ferreira2013b:3).Followingthe
adventofdemocracyin1994,theformernationalparksboardmorphedintothepara-statal
SouthAfricanNationalParks(SANParks)andactivelysoughtprivate-publicpartnerships236in
lightoftheaugmentedfinancingrequirementsforthegrowingnumbersofnationalparks,
state-rungameandnaturereservesandassociatedcostconsiderationssuchascommunity
resettlementandbeneficiation.Whiletheprivatizationprogrammewasaimedatgenerating
supplementaryfinancingandfillingthegapsofshortfallsinpublicconservationspending,the
parksauthoritynonethelesscontinuedtosellwildanimalsasafundraisingstrategy–initially,
thesefundswereusedtofundlandacquisitiontoextendparks(Ramutsindela2006:86).237
Accordingtotheofficialnarrative,thesaleofliverhinoshasbeenusedtofundanti-poaching
operationssincerhinopoachingescalatedinpublicparks(InterviewwithKNPofficial,2013).
However,thesefundsarenotring-fencedforrhinoprotectiononly.Inresponsetoa
parliamentaryquestion,theMinisterofEnvironmentalAffairs,EdnaMolewaexplainedthat
theincomegeneratedfromthesaleofanimalsaccumulatesinaspecialfundcalledthe‘Park
DevelopmentFund’.SANParksusesthefundfor“acquisitionoflandforinclusionintonational
236
TheprivatizationdriveofconservationareasinSouthAfricafallsundertheambitofthepost–apartheid
neoliberalmacroeconomicpolicyentitledGrowth,EmploymentandRedistribution(GEAR),whichisgeared
towardstheprivatizationofstateassets(Ramutsindela2006:90).Banks,telecommunicationscompanies,
Americanfoundationsandinternationalandnationalcharitableorganizations,forexample,areinvolvedin
public-privatepartnershipswithSANParks.TheSANParksrestructuringandprivatizationprogrammeinKruger
NationalParkisknownas‘OperationPrevail’–aratherinterestingchoiceofnameconsideringthehistoryofthe
park.Privateoperatorshavebeengranted20-yearconcessioncontractstoupgradeexistinglodgesordevelop
newones(Meskell2012:180).
237
SeveralinterviewpartnerssharedthattherevenueofrhinosaleswasusedtobalanceSANParks’overdraft
facilitiesandtofinancebonusesofseniorstaff.SANParksofficialswerenotatlibertytocommentonthis;
however,thenationalparksauthorityattemptedtouseagaggingordertoplugapossibleleakaboutbonuses
awardedtoitsfundraisingmanager.InvestigativejournalistsfoundthattheSANParksemployeetaskedwith
raisingmoneyagainstrhinopoachinghadreceivedheftybonuspaymentsinadditiontohisbasicmonthlysalary
(LegalBrief2014).
200
parks,researchprojectsinthebiophysicalandsocialsciencesrelevanttonationalparks,
scientificreportsandcommunitybeneficiationprojects”(Molewa2014).Parliamentary
representativesofthemainoppositionpartyintheSouthAfricanNationalAssembly,the
DemocraticAlliance(DA)alsorequestedinformationregardingthenumberofwhiteandblack
rhinossoldandtherespectivebuyerssince2007.WhiletheformerMinisterofWaterand
EnvironmentalAffairs(Sonjica2010)providedadetailedlistofrhinobuyers(manyofwhom
wereimplicatedinillegalhunting)in2010,theresponsein2014wasthinonthedetails
stating“namescannotbepublishedduetoexposureandsecurityrisks”(Molewa2014).
NogenderdifferentiationismadeintheaveragepricescitedinTable7;however,rhinocows
aremoreexpensivethanrhinobulls.Twocharacteristicsspecifictorhinocowsexplainthe
pricedifferentials:thehornsoffemalerhinostendtobelongerthanthoseofmales(they
fightless),andthebuyermay“buytwoforthepriceofone”–so-calledcow-calf
combinations–shouldtherhinocowbepregnantorhaveayoungcalf(Interviewwith
SANParksofficial,2013).
Table7:SANParks'rhinosales,2007–2014238
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011–2014
Whiterhinos
87
91
252
138
Blackrhinos
0
0
0
0
Speciesundisclosed
354
Averagepriceperrhino/ZAR
176969
252341
207660
207080
228984
Averagepriceperrhino/€
18355
20978
17816
21369
19172
240
15396280
22963000
52330300
28577071
81060538
1597124
1908305
4489578
2948948
6787009
TotalincomeinZAR
Totalincomein€
241
239
Source:Extractedfromresponsestoparliamentaryquestions(Sonjica2010;Molewa2014)
238
ThepricingexcludesValueAddedTax(VAT).
239
InresponsetoaparliamentaryquestionbyDArepresentativeGarethMorgan,MinisterMolewastatedthat
108rhinoswereallocatedforpotentialsalesin2011(Molewa2011).SANParks’annualreportsfor2011to2014
providenofurtherdetailsonrhinosales;however,theoverallincomefromwildlifesalesislisted(comparewith
Table8).
240
Numbershavebeenroundedupordowntothenextdecimal.
241
TheaverageannualRand/Euroexchangewasused.
201
Whileverifyingthedata,itwasnotedthattherhinosalesnumbersfor2007and2008didnot
synchronizewithdatacollectedfromthe2008surveyofwhiterhinosonprivatelandinSouth
Africa.242Whilethenumberdifferentialsappearcosmeticandcouldbeattributedtoeither
partyattachinganumberofrhinostothewrongyear,itpointstothelargerproblemof
accessingcredibledata.Conflictingdataonrhinosales,poachingincidentsandrhinocensus
numbershavebecomeacontentiousissueincurrentdebatesonrhinoconservationand
scupperattemptstoderivecrediblerhinocontingencyplans.243
Thetablealsofailstodisclosethetotalnumberofbuyers(thenumberandnamesofbuyers
wereonlysuppliedin2010),244whichisrelevantifconservationobjectivesweretoreign
supremeinmakingsalesdecisions.Whilesomeinterviewpartnersclaimedthattheprivate
sectorwasnolongerinterestedinbuyingrhinosduetotherisingcostsofsecuringthem,and
theriskofpoaching,thedatasuggestsotherwise.Moreover,theaveragepriceperrhinohas
remainedatconstantlevelsatgovernmentauctions(thereisaconsiderablepricevarianceat
privateauctions,discussedbelow).AccordingtoeconomistFlippieCloete(citedbyStoddard6
October2014),theaveragepriceofrhinossoldonauctionincreasedbyamere54%between
1991and2013,whereasCapebuffalopricesleaptnearlyfive-foldoverthesameperiod.It
242
Theauthorsofthereportstatedthat81insteadof87whiterhinosweresoldin2007,and96insteadofthe91
soldin2008(Hall–Martinetal.2008:12).
243
Throughouttheprocessofdatacollection,Iwaspresentedwithconflictingdatasets,cherry-pickeddataand
one-sidednarratives.Ichosetopointouttheconflictingdatainthisinstance,asitdemonstratesthedifficulttask
ofsortingthroughverifiableandcredibledata.Inthiscase,itisthestatementoftheMinisterbackedby
protecteddata–usuallyonlyavailabletoselectedstatebureaucrats–againstdataprovidedtoscientistswho
undertookthesurveyfortheWWF-AfricanRhinoProgramme.
244
The2010saleof98whiterhinostoJohnHume,theownerofthebiggestprivatelyownedherdofrhinos,led
toconcernsamongstsomeconservatorswhetheritwasperhapssafertospreadtheriskofpoachinganddisease
amongstagreaternumberofprivateindividualsthanaselectfew(Sonjica2010,Interviews,2013).In2008,
SANParkssuspendedthesaleof200rhinostotherhinofarmeraftertenof72rhinostranslocatedtohisfarming
operationintheNorthwestProvincehaddied(Momberg2009).TheSANParks’habitatassessmentdeemedthe
farmintheNorthwesternProvinceasunsuitablehabitat,andthetranslocationhadhappened“thewrongtime
ofyear”.ThedealwasamendedafterHumeagreedtotranslocatetherhinostohisformerreserveneartheKNP.
ThegamereserveMauricedalehadbeenputonthemarketatthetimeoffieldworkin2013.Bythen,Humehad
translocatedthemajorityofhisherdofrhinostohiscaptivebreedingfacilityintheNorthwestProvince.In2014,
Hume’sherdofmorethan1000rhinoswasaffectedbyanoutbreakofthebacterialdiseaseHistotoxicClostridial
toxaemiaattheNorthwestfarm.About30rhinosdiedduringtheoutbreak,whichwasattributedtoaboveaveragerainfallfollowingaperiodofdrought.Severalotherrhinofatalitieslinkedtothebacterialdiseasewere
laterreportedfromotherregionsofSouthAfrica.Therhinobreederfinancedresearchanddevelopmentofa
Clostridialvaccineforrhinos(GameWarden2014),whichhasbeenmadeavailabletofellowrhinobreedersin
SouthAfricaandabroad(personalcommunicationwithDrMichelleOtto,2016).
202
appearsbizarrethatthesaletrendsofliverhinoswouldnotfollowthesametrajectoryas
thoseoftheCapebuffaloandotherwildanimals.Arhinoowner’sreturnoninvestmentpales
incomparisonunlesssheofferstrophyhuntsinlieuofthesaleofliveanimals.Thus,the
breedingofwildrhinosandtheirsaleremainslargelyafunctionofthestate;however,the
supplyofnewanimalstotheprivatesectorisunderthreatbecausetheillegalhuntingof
rhinosonpubliclandhasreducedthetotalnumberofrhinoavailablefordonationsandsale
(Interviews,2013and2014).Theinterdependentrelationshipbetweentrophyhunting(legal
sector)andpoaching(illegalflows)isnoticeableinthisinstance.
Despitethethreat,thesaleofrhinosremainsamajorsourceofincomeforSANParks.More
thanhalfoftheparkauthority’srevenuefromthesaleofwildanimals(seeTable8)emanated
fromthesaleofrhinosinspiteofthe“escalatingrhinopoachingcrisis”(Interviewwithparks
official,2013).EzemveloKZNWildlife,theparksauthorityresponsibleformanagingprotected
areasintheprovinceofKwaZulu-Natal,alsoliststhesaleofwhiterhinoasitsbiggest
contributoratliveandcataloguegameauctions,accountingfor74.9%oftotalturnoverfrom
2008toJuly2011(Friedmannetal.2011:2).In2013,fortywhiterhinosweresoldforcloseto
10millionRandatEzemvelo’sannualgameauctioninDurban(Mngoma16May2013).One
yearlater,26whiterhinosweresoldfor11millionRandatthe2014gameauctionin
KwaZulu-Natal.Onebuyerpartedwitharecordsumof850000Rand(approximately60660
€)foracow-calfcombination(Bentley29September2014).
In2013,SANParksofficialsnoted“aspikeinthemarketofguysbuyingbig”.Suchprivate
operatorseitherhaveimmensefarmingoperationsorarebackedbycorporateinterests
(Interviews,2013).WhilePelhamJonesofthePrivateRhinoOwnersAssociation(PROA)
estimatedapotentiallossof400000hectaresofrhinohabitatduetoanestimated40
reservessellingtheirrhinos(Jones2014),bigrhinofarmersandcorporateconservation
venturesarefillingthegap.Althoughthecontinuedsaleofrhinostoprivateoperatorsis
toutedasaninsurancepolicyforthesurvivaloftherhino(InterviewwithSANParksofficial,
2013),inadequateattentionispaidtothebuyer’sprofileandtheviabilityoftheirrhino
breedingandfarmingoperations.DespiteBuijs’callonparksauthoritiestoinstitutethesedue
diligenceandbackgroundchecksonrhinobuyersmorethanthreedecadesago,rhinos
continuedtobesoldtothehighestbidderupuntilrecently.TheformerMinisterofWaterand
203
EnvironmentalAffairsacknowledgedinresponsetoaparliamentaryquestionthatSANParks
putnorestrictionsonthesalecontractsrelatingto“huntingandforanyactivitybeyondthe
sale”(Sonjica2010).
Table8:SANParks'revenuefromthetotalsaleofwildlifeversusliverhinosales(2011-2014)
RevenueinZAR
Revenuein€245
2011246
30000000
3140516
2012
43310139
4248299
2013
22701052.49
2105694
2014
38236982
2881620
Totalwildlifesales(2011–2014)
134248173.49
12376129
Totalrhinosales(2011–2014)
81060538
6787009
Saleofotherwildanimals(2011–2014)
53187635
5589120
Source:SouthAfricanNationalParks(2010/2011:12);SouthAfricanNationalParks(2011/2012:12);South
AfricanNationalParks(2012/2013:10);SouthAfricanNationalParks(2013/2014:17)
Oncetherhinoleavesthenationalparks,itbecomestheresponsibilityofprovincial
authorities.Infact,unlessapotentialrhinobuyerhasbeenformallychargedwithacriminal
offence,rhinoscouldbe(andwere)soldtoknownroguewildlifeprofessionalsandrhino
ownersimplicatedinillegalhuntingandpseudo-hunting–anumberoftherhinobuyerson
Sonjica’slisthavebeenchargedwithillegalhunting,racketeeringandrelatedoffencesinthe
interim(Sonjica2010).247AKNPofficialexplainsthedilemma(InterviewwithKNPofficial6,
2013):
245
TheannualaverageexchangerateofSouthAfricanRandtoEuroprovidedbyoanda(www.oanda.com)was
employedtoconvertthesalesnumbersintoEuro.Amountsareroundeduptothenextdecimal.
246
TheauthorsoftheSANParksannualreportfor2010/2011(SouthAfricanNationalParks2011/2012:13)
provideanapproximateamountforthesaleofwildanimals,stating“thetotalincomegeneratedforthe2010/11
financialyearexceededR30millionexclusiveofVAT.”
247
Whilesecurityconcernsmightbealegitimatereasonnottodisclosenamesofrhinobuyers,the2010
disclosurerevealed‘creative’practices,suchaswildlifeveterinariansandgamecapturersbuyingrhinosonbehalf
ofothers(e.g.DrKarelToetboughtrhinosforDawieGroenewald,whohasbeenchargedwithmorethan1,800
crimesinvolvingtheillegaltradeinrhinohorn).
204
“Wedecidedtodopre-tenderqualificationsbecauseatourauctionswehavevery
littlecontroloverwhoyousellit[therhino]to.Sowhenyouputitoutonanadvert
andpeoplebid,andthenyoulookatthebestprices,andweallocateaccordingly.And
thenwehaveahabitatformthatwesendoutandaquestionnaire.Sowedotryand
actresponsiblywithwhomwesellto;butobviouslyit’salittlebitmorecomplexthan
that,becausewhoeverbuysitfromusdoesn’tnecessarilykeepit,hemightselliton.
Youknow.Sowe’reactuallydependentontheprovincialpermitssystemstobe
functionalandIdon’tthinkthat’sthecase.Sothat’swhyweputextrastepsinplaceto
tryandmitigatethat.Likethatquestionnaireandifsomebodywantstobuymorethan
20rhinosheneedstoindicatewhathewantstodowiththemandwheretheywillbe
heldandyouknowifit’sfreerangeorintensiveandallofthosetypesofthings...[…]…
Well,atonestage,wehadasortofapproachthatifthepersonhasn’tbeenformerly
chargedwecan’treallynotsupplytothem,ifthey’vegotalegalpermitandthey’ve
actuallygoteverything.Butwe’veactuallytightenedthatupnow.Ifpeoplearebeing
investigated,wewilltryandnottoselltothemdirectly.Unfortunatelypeopleare
cleverandtheyknowwaysofgettingaroundthings.”
Thedisconnectbetweenrhinoconservationobjectives,transparentadministrativeprocedures
andduediligencecheckscameunderthespotlightinAugust2014.Atthetime,theMinister
ofEnvironmentalAffairsmadeanannouncementthatupto500rhinoswouldbetranslocated
toothernationalparks,privategamereservesandforeignlocationsaspartoftheintegrated
rhinoconservationstrategy.InanexposéandacomplainttoSouthAfrica’spublicprotector
shortlyaftertheannouncement,wildlifeactivistsrevealedthat260rhinoshadalreadybeen
soldtothreehuntingoutfitsintheNorthernCape(Thomson16August2014;MacLeod9
September2014).Atleastoneofthethreeoutfitshadlinkstopseudo-andillegalhunting
syndicates(Thomson16August2014,independentlyconfirmedbyanorganizedcrime
investigator,2015)andapossibleconflictofinterestwasnotedasoneSANParksboard
memberhadinterestsinoneofthehuntingfarmsinthepast(Thomson16August2014).
Subsequenttotheexposé,SANParkscancelledthesalescontracts;thedepositswere
returnedtotheoutfitters,andanofficialwassuspendedpendingtheoutcomeofarbitration
proceedings.Itwasallegedthattheofficialhadsignedoffonthedealswithouttheboard’s
approval,whichhe,inturn,denied(Reinstein21August2014).WhilethePublicFinance
ManagementAct1of1999permitsthedisposalofmoveablestateassets“atmarketrelated
valueorbytenderorauction”(quotedby:Thomson16August2014)andsecurity
considerationsmightlegitimizethemoveawayfromauctions;however,privatedirectsales
andcachedtenderproceduresimpedepublicandmediascrutinyofthesaleofvaluable
speciesofSouthAfrica’snaturalheritagetoprivateandpublicentitiesinSouthAfricaand
205
abroad.Beyondwithdrawingrhinosalesfromthepublicrealmandscrutiny,thesalesprices
areopentopricefixing,manipulationandcorruptactivities.The260rhinosallegedlywereto
besoldfor60millionRand(approximately4213900€),equatingtoanaveragepriceof230
700Randperrhino(approximately16200€)(Thomson16August2014).Rhinosaleshave
beenachievinghigherpricesatprivategameauctions(comparewithTable9)andtheaverage
priceofwhiterhinosattheEzemveloKZNWildlifepublicauctionwasapproximately423100
Randperanimal(approximately29600€)in2014(Bentley29September2014).Theprivate
salesofrhinos,theswappingofrhinosforotherwildanimalsorfarmorenefariousactivities
includingtheswappingofrhinohornforliverhinoswillbediscussedinthenextchapter.After
thebotchedrhinosales,aSANParksspokespersonreleasedasetofcriteria248thatSANParks
employedtodeterminewhetherrhinoswouldbetranslocatedtopotentialbuyers.Itremains
unclearwhetherthesecriteriaareconsideredwhensalescontractsareinitiallysigned.
Whatisparticularlyinterestingaboutmostpublicandprivateauctionsofrhinosisthatthe
animalsaredescribedintermsof“lengthofhornininches”(Interviews,2013).Inthatvein,it
iscuriousthattheVleissentraalauctioneersdescribeoneoftherhinocowsonauctionas
“pregnantofa33“[inch]bull”(seeTable9),which,inthiscase,referstothelengthofthe
bull’shorn.Thepeculiardescriptionsupportsthenotionthatthepriceofarhinois
determinedintermsofthelengthofitshorns(orpotentiallengthoftheprogeny’shorn)
ratherthangender,fecundityorage.Interviewswithwildlifeprofessionals,parkofficialsand
rhinofarmers(Interviews,2013)confirmedtheratherprecariousrelationshipthatemerged
betweenthestateandprivateoperators.Saysonewildlifeprofessional(Interview,2013):
“Sowhatalotofpeoplemissisnotonlytheentitlementthatthefarmerfeelsandthat
heistrulyentitledto.Hejustboughtthis[rhino].Mostofthemcomefromtheparks.
Andtheyboughtthem,eitherbyinchorhornbuttheyboughtthem–notonebut
hundreds.Thelastauctionitwas100inchesoutofHluhluwe.249Soyouaretalking
about200rhinosperyearatleast.Theywerecomingoutinnumbers,asfastasour
truckscouldmovethem.Weweredrivingrhino,youknow.Beforetheban,Iwas
248
Thetranslocationcriteriaincludethehistoricalrangeofhabitats,suitablehabitatpresent,welfare
considerationssuchassufficientspaceforsocialinteractions,safetyandsecurityofrhinos,themanagement
experienceofmanagersand/orrhinos,thelegalhistoriesofmanagersandownersandlogisticalchallenges
(Reinstein21August2014).
249
HluhluweiMfoloziParkisapublicnaturereserveinSouthAfrica.TheParkwasmentionedearlierin
connectionwith“OperationRhino”,thesuccessfulrhinoexpansionprogrammeoftheformerNatalParksBoard.
206
probablydoingabout300peryear.Wewerereallymovingrhinoaround.Therewasa
veryhealthyindustryassociatedwithit.Theyusedtobeamarket,nowit’sonlyin
Namibia.”
Table9:PriceofrhinosatVleissentraalprivateauctionsinSouthAfricain2014
Priceperrhinoin
Rand(March’14)
Whiterhinobull 225000
Pricein€250
Priceperrhinoin
Rand(May2014)
Pricein€
15454
310000
21721
Whiterhinocow 530000
36404
750000
52550
600000
41212
/
/
Whiterhinocow 540000
37091
450000
31530
Whiterhino
26101
/
/
andcalf
Whiterhino
heifer(pregnant
of33”bull)
380000
heifer
Source:extractedfromVleissentraal(2014);Thomson(16August2014);MacLeod(9September2014)
Beyondthesaleofrhinostolocaloperators,rhinosarealsosoldtosafariparksandzoological
gardenselsewhereintheworld.Thesaleofliveanimalsandtheirtranslocationtoforeign
destinationsconstitutesalegalflowofrhinosandtheirhorn,permittedbytheCITES
regulatoryframework.Thislegalflowcameunderthespotlightafterliverhinosweresoldto
rhinohornconsumercountries,includingVietnamandChina.AccordingtotheDepartmentof
WaterandEnvironmentalAffairs,atotalof101rhinoswereexportedfromSouthAfrica
between1January2007and20April2012.30rhinosofthe101rhinosobtainedpermit
endorsementsatORTamboInternationalAirport,SouthAfrica’smajorinternationalairport.
250
Thepricein€wasdeterminedviathehistoricalexchangeconverteronwww.oanda.com.Theamountsare
roundedofftothenextdecimal.
207
TheNorthwestProvincialAuthority251hadinitiallyapprovedthepermitapplicationsofthe
rhinos;however,noneofthepermitapplicationsstatedthenameoftherhinoexporter
(originator)orthefinalrecipientintheimportingcountriesinAsia.Insomecases,theaddress
oftheimporterwasgiven(Molewa2012b).Privateoperatorsincludinggamecaptureand
translocationcompanieswereinvolvedinthesaleofrhinostoAsiancountries.ASANParks
official(InterviewwithConservator12,2013)said:
“Fromourselves,therewasnotdirectlyanyexporttoChina.ItwastakentoAustralia,
toAmerica,andthatwasthroughtheInternationalRhinoFoundation,whichwasa
majorzoo.YouhadtogoandinspectthezoosinthewholeInternationalRhino
Foundationsothosewereaboveboard.Animalsthatwereboughtfromus,wewon’t
beabletosaywhatwentwherebecauselikeIsayifthey’vegotdestinationsthat
we’vegotonourpermitsystem,fromtheretheycouldhavegoneanywherethey
couldhavebeenloadedstraightontotheplaneormaybehunted,wewon’tknow.”
Inresponsetoaparliamentaryquestionregardingtheexportofafurthersevenwhiterhinos
toVietnamin2012(Vietnamhadbeenidentifiedasamajorconsumercountrybythen),the
DEAadvisedthattheCITESmanagementandscientificauthorityinVietnamhadconfirmed
thattheanimalswouldbeusedforzoologicalpurposesonly.Moreover,therecipientwas
“suitablyequippedtohouseandcarefortheanimals”(Molewa2012a).252Atthetimeofthe
parliamentaryquestion,theDEAwasintheprocessofformalizinganadditionalrequirement,
whichhassincethenbeenimplemented.InlinewiththeCITESConferenceResolution11.20
(Milliken/Shaw2012:44),therecipientcaptivefacilityisrequiredtobeaninstitutional
memberoftheWorldAssociationofZoosandAquaria(WAZA)andthereceivingcountry
shouldpossessadequatelegislationtoensurethattheliveanimalsareonlyusedforthe
purposesindicatedontheCITESexportandimportpermitstopreventunauthorizeduse
(Interviewwithgovernmentofficial3,2013).Whileitisamatterofconjecturewhathappened
totherhinosthatwenttoChina,Vietnam,Turkmenistan,JapanandMyanmar–thereis
anecdotalevidencethatsomerhinosweresenttostate-runcaptivebreedingfacilitiesin
China,wherethehornwasharvestedforscientificpurposes(Interviews,2013).
251
OfficialsintheemployofthepermittingauthorityoftheNorthwestProvincehavebeenlinkedtopermitfraud
andattending‘pseudo’huntsinvolvingVietnamesehunterswithoutinvestigatingwhyso-calledprofessional
hunterswereunabletoshootthetargetoftheirtrophyhuntsthemselves(seeChapter6).
252
AttemptsweremadetoestablishdetailsofthefateofthosesevenrhinoswhileonfieldworkinVietnam.
ApparentlyfiveoftheoriginalrhinoshadsurvivedandwerelivinginasafariparknearHoChiMinhCity
(Interviews,2013).
208
Theprivatizationofwildlifeputfurtherdistancebetweenlocalcommunities,landownersand
wildlife,creatingcommunityperceptionsthatwildlifeconservationtrumpedconcernsover
socialandeconomicdevelopment.Thecolonialandapartheidlandgrabscontributedtoa
growingpoolofpotentialwould-bepoachersandsympathyonthepartofthecommunity
whoseepoachingasaformofdefianceandrebellionagainstunfairandsystemicexclusion.
Thenatureconservationbureaucracyfollowedthepathlaidoutbythecolonialrulersin
separatinglocalpeoplefromwildlife.Likethecolonialpoachingregulations,apartheid
conservationmeasurescanonlybeunderstoodinthecontextofbroaderpolitical,economic
andsocialmacro-structuresaimedsystemicoppressionofblackpeople.Conservation
measuresandregulationsservedtoentrenchwhiteminorityrule.Thissectionalsotouched
onconservationinthepost-colonialcontext,pointingtothegrowingnexusbetween
conservationandprivatebusinessinterests.Thefollowingsectionexaminestheriseof
neoliberalconservationinitiatives.
4.5Theascendancyofneoliberalconservation?
ThefirstsectionofthischaptertouchedonthelossoflandandhuntingrightsinSouthAfrica
duringthecolonialperiod,whichwasreplicatedacrossgeographiesinsouthernAfrica
includingSouthAfrica’sneighbourMozambique.‘Fortressconservation’servedthepolitical
eliteduringthecolonialperiod,asitbroughtlargeareasoflandintodirectcontrolofthestate
andledtotheevictionofAfricanpeople.ThemythofwildAfrica,endless‘emptyland’andan
African‘GardenofEden’informedthisanachronisticWeltbild.Thisconservationparadigm
prevailedintothe1960sand1970swiththenextgenerationofpoliticalelitesinsouthern
Africa(mostofsouthernAfricawasstillundercolonialleadership)continuingtoupholdthe
principlesofsegregationandprotectionism.Thisinvolvedfurtherdemarcationof“designated
wildplacesandspecies”protectedfrom“humanpredationatatimewhenhumanactivity
wasbecomingmoreextensiveandpervasive”(Murphree2013:XV).The1980sand1990ssaw
theascendancyofthesustainableuseparadigm.ConservationorganizationsandNGOs
startedtodevelopprogrammesthatpromotedlocalparticipationinandbeneficiationfrom
209
conservation,suchastheCommunalAreasManagementProgrammeforIndigenous
Resources(CAMPFIRE)programme.253
Couchedinthediscourseofsocialdevelopmentandsustainableuse,thetidehasturnedin
favourof‘fortressconservation’,astransfrontierconservationfollowsthetrajectoryof
colonialconservationpolicymaking.Thesignificant‘innovation’oftheoldparadigmisthe
increasingprivatizationofconservationmanagementandareas,aswellastheweightyroleof
non–stateactors,suchasconservationNGOsandcorporations.Theunderlyingconservation
philosophystraddlesthenatureandculturedichotomy.Thediscourseof‘othering’of
indigenousandlocalcommunitiesisstillemployed.Suchcommunitiesareeitherperceivedas
“traditional,livinginharmonywithnatureanddisplayingconservingbehaviour”oras
“modernizedanddestroyingit”(Duffy2001:7).Turnedonitshead,theproclamationofhuge
tractsoflandastransnationalconservationareashasseriouseconomic,socialandcultural
consequencesforpeoplelivinginsideorontheedgeofthesenewmegaparks.Although
claimingtothecontrary,suchparksencroachuponthelivelihoodsandculturalgoodsoflocal
people.Thesetransnationalmegaparksaredesignatedasa“globalenvironmentalgood”,
whichhasledtoprescriptionsofwhatisdeemed“appropriateandinappropriateresource
use”(Duffy2001:7).Communitieslivinginareasdesignatedorproclaimedasconservation
areasareincreasingly‘asked’torelocatebecauseofinappropriateresourceuse,sometimes
onavoluntarybasis,andsometimesonalessvoluntarybasis.
253
ThequotedauthorMarshallMurphreewasoneoftheinitiatorsofCAMPFIRE,aZimbabweancommunitybasednaturalresourcemanagementprogramme.CAMPFIREhasbeenusedasablueprintforsimilarprojectsin
southernAfricasuchasthecommunityconservanciesinNamibiaandMozambique.Community–BasedNatural
ResourceManagement(CBNRM)waspopularwithdonorsinthe1990sduetoitssupposedbenefitsof
combiningecologicalsensitivitywithruralpovertyalleviation,achievedthrougheconomicexpansionand
institutionalgrowth.Perhapsthemostdamningcritiqueofcommunalcommonpropertyproprietorshipsees
CBNRMprogrammesas“creaturesofacommoncolonialheritageoflandandresourceexpropriation”,where
“thepostcolonialstatefindsitselfperpetuatingalegaldefenceofillicitlyobtainedprivaterightsofthelanded
elite(Wilson2005:150).”
210
4.5.1Casestudy:ThecreationoftheGreatLimpopoTransfrontierPark
Chapter7dealswithrhinopoachingintheKrugerNationalPark,aphenomenonclosely
associatedwiththehistoryoftheparkandthecreationofanewtransfrontierpark.
TheformationoftheGreatLimpopoTransfrontierPark(GLTP)servesasacasestudyto
demonstratetheproblematicassumptionsofthe‘new’neoliberalconservationapproach.The
KrugerNationalPark,togetherwiththeLimpopoNationalPark(hereafterLNP)andthe
GonarezhouNationalParkinZimbabweformpartofatransnationalconservationareaor
peacepark254calledtheGreatLimpopoTransfrontierPark(hereafterGLTP),whichwas
formallylaunchedinNovember2001.255ThewealthySouthAfricancigarettetycoonAnton
Rupert256drovetheinitiative,supportedbyPrinceBernhardfromtheNetherlandsandformer
SouthAfricanpresidentNelsonMandela.RupertcreatedtheNGOPeaceParksFoundation
(PPF),whichhasbecomethelobbyingvehiclefordevelopingpeaceparksinitiativesacross
southernAfrica.ThePPFwasinstrumentalincoordinatingtheinstitutionalandadministrative
structuresoftheGLTPwithSouthAfricangovernmentstakeholderssuchastheDepartment
ofEnvironmentalAffairsandTourism(DEAT)andtheSouthAfricanNationalParksauthority
(SANParks),257andobtainingfinancialsupportfromtheWorldBankandinternationaldonor
254
Theconceptofpeaceparksderivesfromtheperceptionthattheamalgamationofnationalparksinseparate
statesbutadjacenttooneanotherwassymbolicofpeace.Thecontentionisthat‘artificial’politicalbordersare
replacedwith‘natural’borders.Theoriginoftheconceptistracedbacktothefirst“peacepark”alongthe
CanadianandUSborder,theWaterton/GlacierInternationalPeacePark,whichwasestablishedin1932
(Ramutsindela2007:29–30).
255
2
Theconservationareaspansaterritoryof37572km acrossthethreecountries.TheNGOPeaceParks
Foundation(PPF),themaindrivingforcebehindtransfrontierconservationinsouthernAfricaisplanningthe
expansionoftheconservationareainto“theworld’sgreatestanimalkingdom”,spanninganareaofalmost100
2
000km .ThisundertakingwouldseeBanhineandZinaveNationalParks,theMassingirandCorumanaareasand
interlinkingregionsinMozambique,aswellasseveralprivately-andstate-ownedconservationareasinSouth
AfricaandZimbabwe,integratedintothetransfrontierpeacepark(PeaceParksFoundation2014a).
256
SpierenburgandWels(2010)shinealightonthedarkersideofthebusinessandnatureconservationnexusin
southernAfricainapaperentitled“ConservativePhilanthropists,RoyaltyandBusinessElitesinNature
ConservationinSouthernAfrica”.ThemainargumentisthatRupertandhisassociatePrinceBernhardfromthe
Netherlandssawintransfrontierconservationanopportunitytofixtheirtarnishedreputations.Rupert,whohad
beenamemberoftheAfrikanersecretgrouping“Broederbond”,hadactivelysupportedtheapartheidregime
whilePrinceBernhardhadbeenembroiledinabriberyscandal.
257
Wolmer(2003:269)arguesthattheSouthAfricanNationalParksBoardwentwiththeideaofestablishingthe
GLTPforanumberofreasons.Theseincludedlegitimizingitsexistencebyadopting“apotentialcausecelebré”
(theapartheideraNationalParksBoardhadbeenanall-whiteensembleofconservators,someofwhomhad
linkstotheapartheidsecurityapparatus).Conservatorswereapparentlyalsoworriedaboutincreasingnumbers
ofwar-displacedpeoplemovingintotheborderareas,sothecreationofatransfrontierparkwouldcreatea
bufferzone.Atthetime,theKNPwasalsodealingwithelephantpopulationnumbersthatexceededitscarrying
211
agencies.TheGLTPhasbeenportrayedasan“unequalpartnership”betweenSouthAfricaas
theregionaleconomicandpoliticalpowerhouse,andMozambiqueandZimbabwe,which
werebothdealingwithdomesticissues(Lunstrum2013;Ramutsindela2007;Wolmer
2005).258TheSouthAfricangovernment,itsprivatepartnersandinternationalfinancierstook
theleadindevelopingthepeaceparksinitiative,whichgainedtractioninMozambican
governmentcirclesinthelate1990s.Theimplementationappearedtorequireminimal
investmentbytheMozambicanstate,259whilesupposedlybeneficialtothecountryasa
whole.Internationaldonorsweregoingtoshoulderthecostofsettingupinstitutionaland
regulatoryframeworks,thecontroversialresettlementofcommunities,aswellasthestart-up
costsofthePark.
Therewasalsothepromiseofeconomicandsocialdevelopmentofruralcommunitiesliving
withinandontheperipheriesofthePark.Duringtheinitialnegotiations,aninclusive
approachtonatureconservationwasprofessed.Projectpartnersweretaskedwithseeking
sociallegitimacyoftheParkbyofferingbenefitstoresidentsinsideandontheedgeofthe
Park(Spierenburg2011:83).Thetransfrontierconservationareawasgoingto‘payforitself’
throughinternationaldonormonies,opportunitiesforprivateinvestments,eco–tourism
initiativesandcommunity-basednaturalresourcemanagement.ApivotalaspectoftheLNP
wasthere-introductionofwildlifefromtheKNP,whichwasgoingtobeprotectedand
conservedthroughthecreationofarangerforceandbyinvestingthecommunityinthegood
fortunesofthePark.ThePPFhadmobilizedagreatdealofinternationalandnational(South
African)funding.Donorfundingseldomcomeswithoutstringsattachedandinthecaseofthe
capacity.Conservatorshadinstitutedelephantcullingwhichhadledtovociferousinternationalcampaigningby
animalrightsgroups.Itwashopedthatdroppingthefenceswouldencourageelephantmigration,andmorethan
1100Krugerelephantswereearmarkedforthenewconservationarea(Magome/Murombedzi2012:124).
258
OneschoolofthoughthasreferredtotheprocessthatledtothecreationoftheGLTPas“Krugerization”
whereby“politicalandeconomicintereststhatarehistoricallyembeddedintheKrugerNationalParkarebeing
extendedbeyondthebordersofSouthAfrica,stillservingaprivilegedgroupattheexpenseofmostlyblack
people”(Ramutsindela2007:2–3).Ramutsindela(2007:2)acknowledgestheprominentroleofAfrikanersinthe
creationoftheGLTPbutpointstotheheterogeneityoftheAfrikanersinSouthAfrica,aswellastheinternational
originsofthenotionofpeaceparks.HeprovidesanuancedanalysisoftransfrontierconservationareasinAfrica
inhisbook“ConservationinAfrica:AttheConfluenceofCapital,PoliticsandNature”.Ramutsindelaandother
scholars(Büscher2010;Büscher/Davidov2013;Büscher/Dressler2012;Büscher/Dressler/Fletcher2014;McFee
1999)exploretheroleofcapitalandprivatizationinconservation.
259
ConsultationwiththecommunitiesaffectedbythecreationoftheParkwasoneofthekeyresponsibilitiesof
theMozambicangovernment.
212
GTFP,boththedonorsandthePPFdeterminedimportantaspectsofthefinalphysical
contoursandoperationalaspectsoftheconservationarea.SouthAfricathroughitsDEATand
thePPFnegotiatedthetermsandconditionsleadingtotheestablishmentoftheLimpopo
NationalParkandtheGreatLimpopoTransfrontierPark.Thesedifferedvastlyfromthe
initiallyagreedtoestablishmentofamulti-useconservationarea“thatwouldallowhuman
habitationandsustainableuseofresources”(Lunstrum2013:4).SANParkswasnotwillingto
considertherelocationofwildanimalsintoahuntingarea,whichwastheofficialstatusofthe
Coutada16260atthetime.Theparksauthoritywasonlygoingtosignoffthedealifthenew
conservationareaguaranteedmaximumprotection(Milgroom/Spierenburg2008:438).
WhentheLPNwasproclaimedasatotalprotectionzonein2001,therewasnowildlifeinthe
areaoftheformerCoutada16;however,27000peoplewereresidinginthearea.These
villagecommunities261hadbeenaffectedbydisplacementduringthecolonialperiodandthe
civilwar.Theyhadreturned,rebuiltandreconstructedtheirlivesandlivelihoodsaftertheend
ofthecivilwar(Lunstrum2010:139).Inaperhapsironictwistoffate,some7,000villagers
havetorelocate‘tomakespaceforwildanimals’thatwerenolongerlivinginthearea
whereasthevillagerswere(Interviews,2012and2013).Inpreparationfortheproclamation
ofthePark,thelanduserightsoftheformerhuntingreserveCoutada16werechanged.In
Mozambique,thestatehastheprerogativetochangeunilaterallylanduserightsifitserves
thepublicinterest(Spierenburg/Steenkamp/Wels2006:94).Inthisinstance,Coutada16was
changedfromamulti-useconservationareatoa“totalprotectionzone”.Accordingtothe
MozambicanLandActof1997,noeconomicactivity,resourceuseoroccupationisallowedin
“totalprotectionzones”(Tanner2002:36–37).ThelegaldraftersbehindtheLandActhadnot
consideredtenurerightsofcommunitieslivinginareasthatweresubsequentlydeclaredtotal
protectionzones(Norfolk2004:13)andasaresultresidentsoftheLNPfoundthemselvesina
stateoflegalambiguityastheirtenurerightsremainedundefined(Witter2013:407).Experts
onbehalfoftheUnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment(USAID)andthePeace
260
TheCoutada16hadbeenahuntingreserveduringthecolonialperiodandbecameahideoutforRenamo
fightersduringthecivilwar.Weaponcachesremainedconcealedinthearealongafterthewarhadended.
Someoftheseweaponshavefoundtheirwaybackintocirculationashuntingriflesofpoachers.Thereservehad
beendepletedofwildlife,servingasoneofthefewavailablefoodsourcesduringandafterthecivilwar.
261
Whiletheterm“communities”isusedthroughoutthisdissertation,thetermisusedwithcaution,as
communitiesarebynomeansahomogenousgroupofpeople.
213
ParksFoundation(PPF)drewupalanduseplanandastudyontourismdevelopment,which
earmarkedtheareasadjacenttotheShingwedziRiverasofferingthebestopportunitiesfor
developingviablepopulationsofwildlifewhileequallyattractivetotheinternationaltourist
market(Milgroom/Spierenburg2008:3).Theexpertsalsodeclaredthattheareawouldbe
moreappealingtoprivatetouristoperatorsifthevillageswereremoved(Spierenburg2011:
94).Asaconsequence,peoplelivingineightvillagesalongtheShingwedziRiverinsidethe
parkweretoldthattheyhadtomovetoareasoutsidethepark.Adisputeensuedbetween
theMozambicanMinistryofTourismandtheconcernedvillagersoverwhetherthey
‘belonged’totheParkandwhattheirrightswere(Spierenburg/Steenkamp/Wels2006:94).
Thestatewonthedisputeandasaconsequenceofthechangedconservationstatusofthe
area,some7,000villagerswouldhavetorelocate“tomakespaceforwildanimals”thatwere
tobereintroducedfromtheKNP.Theoddityofmovingpeopletoaccommodatewildanimals
ledaffectedcommunitiestobelievethatthestate’sprioritieswereskewedinfavourofwild
animalsandtheirbenefactors(SANParks)fromSouthAfrica(Interviews,2012and2013).
NegativesentimentstowardsKrugeranditsabundantpopulationsofwildanimalsstartedto
arisethen,providingamplemotivationstopoachwildanimalsinyearstocome.Aswillbe
showninChapter7,thesemotivationsarenotonlybasedoneconomicneedsand
impoverishmentbutalsoonenvironmentaljusticeprinciples(poachingasanactofdefiance).
TheGermanDevelopmentBank262stipulatedthatallrelocationswouldhavetohappenona
voluntarybasis(Milgroom/Spierenburg2008:3).Unlikeincolonialtimeswhererelocation
wasforcedfromthebarrelofagun,communitieswereincentivized,andthenarrativeof
‘voluntary’resettlementor‘choice’wasemployed(Witter2013:407).Inotherwords,
villagersweresupposedlygivenagencytodecidewhethertostayorgo.Itisamatterof
conjecturewhetherchoosingtomoveoutoftheparktomitigatetheeffectsofhumanwildlifeconflict263andeconomicmarginalization(Lunstrum2013;Witter2013,Focusgroup
withvillagersresettledfromLPNin2013),constitutes‘voluntaryresettlement’oralastresort
262
Asoneofthemainfundersbehindtheestablishmentofthepeacepark,theGermanBankalsocarriedthe
costofresettlingthevillagers.
263
Witter(2013)providesadetailedaccountofhowthere-introductionofelephantsinparticular,andother
dangerouswildlifeincludingrhinosandlions,totheLNPhascausedmajordisruptionsanddamageto
communitiesremaininginsidethepark,andaffectedtheirlivelihoods.
214
toescapethe“diminishedaccesstoculturalandenvironmentalsources”(Witter2013:407).A
focusgroupwithrecentlyresettledvillagers(fromtheParktoMassingir)suggestedthe
heterogeneouscompositionofvillagesandvaryinglevelsofacceptanceoftherelocation.
Whiletheobjectiveofthefocusgroupwastocollectdataonrhinopoachinganditsimpactat
thecommunitylevel,theconversationendedupreturningtotheissueofrelocationseveral
times.Onevillagerexplains(FocusgroupinMassingir,2013):
“Wewerehappywherewecamefrom.There’snopeacehere.Theycangiveyoua
houseandthenextdaytheycanremoveyouandgiveittosomeoneelse,maybethey
willsortthatproblemoutnow.Theyoungonesgotoschool,butitisfar.Wedon’t
haveaschoolhere,andtheyoutharestrugglingtogetjobsinthisvillage.Wehavenot
talkedaboutwhatwewantasacommunity.”
Schmidt-SoltauandBrockington(2007:2196)makeaconvincingargumentthatvoluntary
resettlementsareunlikelyinthepoorerpartsoftheworld,giventhelackofinternational(and
oftenofnational)policiesguidingso–calledvoluntaryresettlementanddivergent
understandingsofdeterminingvolition.TheWorldBank(2001)publishedapolicyfor
involuntaryresettlementsin2001entitled‘OperationalManualOP4.12’,whichhasbecome
theinternationalstandardtoadjudicatethesuitabilityofresettlementschemes.Inlightof
beingrecognizedasaninternationalstandard,thispolicyoninvoluntaryresettlements264was
employedtoguidevoluntaryresettlementsfromtheLNP(Milgroom/Spierenburg2008:437).
TheProjectImplementationUnit(PIU)inchargeofestablishingtheLNPsetupaConsultation
CommitteeonResettlement(CCR),whichincludedrepresentativesofallthevillagesthatwere
toberesettled,anddevelopmentNGOsoperatinginthePark.Initially,electedcommunity
authoritieswithineachvillagewerehopingtocodeterminethelanduserightsandcontours
ofthefinalPark.However,oncetheParkhadbeendeclared,theirrolehadbeenreducedto
negotiatingcompensationfortheanticipatedresettlementofvillageresidents
(Spierenburg/Steenkamp/Wels2006:94)
Communitybeneficiationandprojectswereimportantelementstobeconsideredinthe
creationoftheconservationarea.Communitiesreceivea20%shareintherevenue
264
Thepolicystipulatesthatinvoluntaryresettlementshouldbeavoided,andifunavoidable,thenitshoulduplift
theaffectedpeople’slives.
215
generationofthePark.265Suchrevenuesaresupposedtobenefitthecommunityasawhole;
however,thedistributionandinvestmentofsuchfundsisnotwithoutitsown
complications.266MangomeandMurombedzi(2012:124)pointoutthatacriticalmassof
‘bodiesinbeds’isrequiredtoachieve“significantjobopportunitiesandviablemultiplier
effects”.SufficetomentionherethattherehasbeennotouristboomintheLNPasyet,and
rhinopoachingandthestigmatizationoflocalcommunitiesasrhinopoachersisunlikelyto
alleviatethesituation.MilgroomandSpierenburg(2008:437),forexample,foundthatmost
residentsoftheLNP“begantofeeltheeffectsofeconomicdisplacementsoonafterthepark
wasestablishedin2001,throughtheapplicationofnewparkregulationsprohibitinghunting
andrestrictingextractionofforestproductsforcommercialpurposes”.Foodsecuritywas
greatlydiminishedascultivationinsidetheParkisforbiddenunlesstheareawasusedfor
farmingpriortothedeclarationofthePark.267Accesstoemergencypasturesforcattleinthe
Parkwasforbiddenduringtimesofdrought.Moreover,thereintroductionofpredators
affectedbothcropsandcattle,aggravatinghuman-wildlifeconflict(Spierenburgquotedby:
Aretsetal.2011:58).
Whilemanycommunitymemberswerenolongerabletoekeoutalivingandhadtofind
alternateformsofincome,themajorityofvillagerschosetoremainwithintheLimpopo
NationalParkafteritsinitialinception.Thischoicesignalsthepreferenceofvillage
communitiestostayintheParkandcontinuewiththeirlivesandlivelihoodsuninterrupted.
Duetothediminishedincomeopportunitiesandincreasingpressure(‘carrotandstick’),
villagershavestartedtoaccepttherelocationpackages.Althoughcouchedinthenarrativeof
‘voluntaryresettlement’and‘improvedlivelihoods’,manyvillagersfeelforcedtomove
(Interviewwithacademic2and3,2012;focusgroupwithresettledvillagers,2013).The
resettlementofcommunities,aswellasthosewhochosetostayinsidethePark,hasledto
265
Since2006,theLNPhashandedanamountof€174410tocommunities,whichtheyhaveinvestedinthe
constructionofacraftcentre,therehabilitationofclassrooms,thecreationofpotablewatersupplysystemsand
alivestockassociation(PeaceParksFoundation2014d).
266
Abodyofliteraturespeakstothisissuebutitisbeyondthefocusofthisdissertation(forexample:Fall2002;
Singh,S.2008).
267
Soilfertilityandharvestyieldsdecreasethroughcontinueduseofthesamepieceofland.Italsoleadstoland
degenerationandmassiveerosion,whichcarriessevereenvironmentalimpacts.Essentially,thisrestrictedform
oflanduseisnotonlycontributingtolessfoodsecuritybutalsototheenvironmentaldegradationoftheland.
216
diminishedincomestreamsandchangingsocialrelations.Whiletheresettlementpolicywas
supposedtoenablecommunityempowermentandsocialdevelopment,thetransitionprocess
hasbeenlessthansmooth,andtheresettlementfromacceptancetorelocationhasbeen
slow.Insteadofbeinginchargeoftheirlivelihoods,thenewstatusquohasdeprived
communitiesofagencyasregardstochoosingwheretolive268andhowtoprovidefortheir
livelihoods.
PossiblythesinglemostproblematicaspectofthecreationofboththeLNPandGLTPliesin
theapproachtakentopeoplewhowerelivingwithintheboundariesofthedesignatedparkin
Mozambique.Thechosenrouteisnotdissimilartothecolonialapproachesdescribedinthe
earliersection.Insteadofbuildingharmoniousandbeneficialrelationshipsbetweenlocal
villagecommunitiesandwildlife(assuggestedbytheoxymoron‘peacepark’),thecreationof
theLNPhasledtohuman-wildlifeconflict,impoverishment,aswellaswidespreadcontempt
forconservationinitiativesandthe‘BigBrother’nextdoor–themanagement,rangersand
environmentalcrimeinvestigatorsoftheKNP(Interviewswithconvictedpoachers,2013).A
significantoversightwastheinadequateconsultationwithcommunitiesdirectlyaffectedby
thecreationofthenewpark.Inessence,furthermarginalizationofinsitucommunities(which
arenothomogeneousentities)andindividualscouldhavebeenmitigated.Theestablishment
oftheparkhasledtoagrowingpoolofunhappyvillagecommunities.Inlightoftheabove,it
isnotsurprisingthatmanyrhinopoachersoriginatefromdisplacedandmarginalizedvillage
and/orruralcommunities(Interviewswithorganizedcrime,environmentalcrime
investigatorsandpoachers,2013and2014).
AnimportantelementlinkedtotheestablishmentoftheGLTPwastheremovalofthe
physicalboundariesbetweentheparticipatingcountries.Theabolishmentofartificiallydrawn
bordersofthecolonialperiod(whichwerephysicallyreinforcedwhenthepostcolonial
268
Atthetimeofwriting,120familieshadbeenrelocatedtoBangavillageneartheMassingirdam.Whilethere
arekinshiptiestopeoplealreadylivingsouthoftheMassingirdam,notallresidentswerehappywiththenew
arrivals.Morepeopleleadtomorecompetitiononalreadyscarceresourcesandjobsinthearea.Moreover,the
resettledvillagersareperceivedtoreceiveanunfairadvantageastheyreceivehousing,servicesand
compensationfromthePark(Focusgroupwithvillagers;Interviews;2013).Itneedstobenotedthatbenefitsare
supposedtoaccruetocommunitieslivinginsideandontheperipheryofthePark(PeaceParksFoundation
2014c),signallingincongruencebetweencommunityperceptionsandnegotiatedoutcomes.ByMarch2016,the
remainingfamiliesoftheformer300-familystrongMassingirVelho–avillageabout10kmfromtheKruger
boundary–weremovedabout75kmfromtheborder(encareporter2016).
217
MozambicangovernmentsupportedSouthAfricanliberationmovementsduringthefinal
yearsoftheapartheidregime)renderedtheconceptoftransfrontierparksappealingtomany.
Itwashopedthattheso-called‘peacepark’wouldreconciletheformerapartheidpariahstate
withitssouthernAfricanneighbours,openuphistoricalanimalmigrationroutesandrealize
conservationandsocialdevelopmentobjectives.WhileborderfencesbetweentheKNPand
LNPwerepartiallytakendown(seeFigure8),otherfenceswentuptodemarcatethe
boundariesoftheconservationareawithsurroundingcommunalland(Dzingiraietal.2013:
107).
From2001to2008,closeto5000wildanimals(including12whiterhinos)weretranslocated
fromtheKNPtotheLNPtodevelopthenewconservationarea(PeaceParksFoundation
2014b).One-third(57km)oftheoldboundaryfencehasbeendroppedsincetheinceptionof
theTFCA.Theremainderofthefencewasleftintactduetosafetyandsecurityconcerns.269
ThesectionsofdroppedfencearemostlylocatedinthefarnorthoftheKNP(witha
correspondinglowdensityofvillagersandrhinos)and12kmoffenceweredroppedinthe
middlesectionbetweentheparks.AccordingtothePPF,thefence270wasleftintact“forthe
peaceofmindofcommunitiesresidentintheLNP,especiallytheoneswithcattle”(Wray
2014).ThedroppingofthefenceaffectedthecommunitieslivingintheParkastheyhadto
dealwithunwantedvisitsfromwildanimalsthatdidnotonlyconstituteadangertotheirlives
butalsodestroyedtheircropsandattackedtheircattle.Therewasalsothedangerofthe
communicationofzoonoticdiseasessuchasanthrax,whichafflictsbuffalointheKNPat
regularintervals(Interviewwithwildlifeveterinarian3,2013).
Accordingtotheofficialnarrative,thepartialremovalofthefencedidnotonlyservea
symbolicfunctionofcreatingapeaceparkbutalsothepurposeofencouragingthenatural
migrationofwildanimalstothenewconservationarea.Inlightofrhinopoaching,the
269
Severalsmugglingcorridorsarelocatedalongthe350kmlongborderbetweentheKNPandMozambique.
Cross–bordercrimeincludesthesmugglingofundocumentedmigrants,stolenmotorvehicles,drugs,cigarettes
andcounterfeitgoods,aswellasthetraffickingofendangeredspecies(whichgoesbeyondrhinohorn).
270
Inhisdoctoraldissertation,Kloppers(2005)providesafascinatinganalysisofsocialstructureswithinthe
borderlandsbetweenMozambiqueandSouthAfrica.Thefence(physicalboundary)playsanimportantroleinhis
analysisofwhetherphysicalboundariesbecomeentrenchedinformerlyhomogenoussocietieslivinginthe
borderlands.
218
droppingoftheboundaryfencehasbecomeacontroversialtalkingpointamongst
conservators,lawenforcersandanimalactivists,someofwhommoottherenewederection
ofahigh-securityfenceasastrategytofightrhinopoaching(Interviews,2013).
Figure8:TheborderfencebetweentheKrugerNationalPark,SouthAfrica&Mozambique
Source:Author’sownphototakeninasouthernsectionofKrugerNationalPark
There-erectionoftheboundaryfencemaynotonlysignalaphysicalbutalsosymbolicdefeat
ofthe“borderless”peaceparksproject,whichhadbeenenvisagedasthepanaceatopost–
warreconciliation,wildlifeconservationandcommunitydevelopmentinsouthernAfrica.
BüscherandRamutsindela(2016:1)observethatkeyactorswithintransfrontierconservation
havebeenrespondingtothepoachingcrisis“withincreasingdesperation”tosafeguardthe
peaceparksprojectand,ofcourse,therhinos.
Theprivatizationandacquisitionofformercommunallandalongtheeasternboundaryby
multinationalcorporationsandSouthAfricancompaniesinpartnershipwithinfluentialand
oftenhigh-rankinggovernmentofficialsfromMaputoisnotunproblematic.Rhinopoachers
usesomeconcessionsasaspringboardforpoachingexpeditionsintotheKNP.Thishasledto
219
jointanti-poachingpartnershipsbetweenKrugerandtheforeign-ownedconcessions.While
nottheimmediatefocusofthisdissertation,itneedstobepointedoutthattheestablishment
oftheseconcessionsfromthelate1990sonwardshasledtoyetanotherroundof
displacements,evictionsoflocalseitherlivingorutilizingthelandforcommercialpurposesin
theseareas.Somelocalsare(moreorless)gainfullyemployedontheconcessionsinjob
categoriesotherthananti-poaching(forexampleasconstruction,plantationorasfarm
labourers).Thereareseveralhuntingconcessionsthatoffer‘BigFive’huntsalongtheeastern
boundary,271whichhasledtooutcriesfromenvironmentalactivistsandmediathat“wild
animalsbelongingtotheKNP(andtheSouthAfricanpeople)areappropriatedbygreedy
concessionairesinMozambique”(Interviewwithanimalrightsactivist1,2012).The
reputationoftheconcessionairessufferedafurtherblowafterasafarioutfitwascaught
luringlionswithbaitmountedontheboundaryfence(whichhadbeencut)outoftheKNPfor
“cannedhunting”(Interviewwithconservators,2013).272.Morerecently,themultinational
sugarcorporationTongaatHuletthascomeunderfireafterfourKrugerelephantswerekilled
andslaughterednearitsXinavanesugarprocessingmillinNovember2014(Bloch13
November2014).273Accordingtoanti-poachingandintelligenceofficersoperatinginthearea
(Interviews,2013),thesugarplantationandtwootherconcessionswereinsufficiently
guarded.274DuetotheirstrategicpositionadjacenttothesouthernsectionsoftheKNP(which
arehighrhino-densityareas)andthelackingsecuritydetail,theseconcessionshadbecome
ideallaunchingpadsforrhinopoachingandsmugglingbetweentheKNPandMozambique.275
271
ThereareseveralprivatelyownedreservesalongthewesternboundaryoftheKNPinSouthAfrica,whichalso
offertrophyhuntingincludingBigFivehunts.LiketheirMozambicancounterparts,thesereserveshavebeenon
thereceivingendofmassivecriticism.
272
Cannedhuntingreferstoatrophyhuntwheretheanimaliskeptinaconfinedspace.Thispracticeminimizes
thechancesofa‘fairchase’whileincreasingthesuccessrateofthehunterbaggingakill.
273
TongaatHulettacquiredthe14,000hectaresMassitontoconcessionin1998.TheconcessionborderstheKNP
andMagudevillage,whereseveralnotoriousgangsofpoachersoriginate.Thecorporationownscloseto90%of
thecompanyoperatingthemillwhiletheremainingsharesaccruetotheMozambicangovernment(MacLeod7
November2014).
274
InvestigativejournalistFionaMacLeodreportedthattherehadbeenarapprochementbetweenKNPofficials
andthesugarcorporationin2014.WhileKNPfieldrangershadprovidedtrainingtostaffmembersonthe
plantation,“theirsuggestionsonhowtoimproveanti-poachinginterventionsatMassitontowerenot
implementedwiththenecessarysenseofurgency”(MacLeod7November2014).
275
Inthepast,anti-poachingtrackersdiscoveredspoorofKrugerrhinosthathadcrossedintothesugar
plantations.UnsuccessfulattemptsweremadetogettherhinosrepatriatedtotheKNP,thedehornedcarcasses
werelaterfoundinneighbouringconcessions(Interviews,2013)
220
ThecommercialinterestsofMozambicangovernmentofficialsintheseconcessionsnotonly
suggestsaconflictofinterestasregardsthetransferofcommunallandintostateandprivate
ownershipbutalreadyscarcestateresourceshavebeenpromisedtoprotectandsecurethese
concessions.276
ThecentralroleofthePPFduringtheinceptionperiodoftheGLTPhascarriedthroughtothe
present.TheconservationNGOhastakenonaleadingroleintheday-to-daymanagementof
thePark.Accordingtoitswebsite(PeaceParksFoundation2014e),Mozambique“requested
PeaceParksFoundation’sassistanceinoverseeingitsdevelopmentasaSouthernAfrican
DevelopmentCommunityapprovedproject”.The‘requestforassistance’includestwo
technicaladvisors,oneinchargeofwildlifeconservationandanti–poachingoperations;the
otherisresponsibleforprojectmanagementofcommunityinitiativesanddevelopmentof
parkinfrastructures(InterviewswithPPF,2012,2013and2014).TheMozambican
governmentappointstheparkwarden.Thefundingforthedevelopmentofpark
infrastructures,communityupliftmentprojects,andconservationandanti–poaching
initiativesischannelledthroughanddisbursedbythePPF,indicatingthepowerfulroleofthe
NGO.
4.6Concludingremarks
Theobjectiveofthischapterwastodemonstratethepathdependencydisplayedby
consecutiveconservationregulatorsandtheeffectthishashadonconservation-orientated
initiatives.Wildlifeprotectionwascloselylinkedtocolonialdispossession,subjugation,
exploitationandlossofhuntingrightsoflocalcommunities.Theprivatizationoffarmlandand
wildlifefurtherexacerbatedthealienationandmarginalizationoflocalcommunities.
Underpinningtheseconservationregimesarearchaicandelitistpreservationand
conservationparadigmsthatdiscountthepotentialforharmoniousrelationshipsbetween
276
FionaMacLeod(7November2014)reportedthatTongaatHuletthadrequestedassistancefromthe
Mozambicangovernment,whointurnhadundertakentoassign20anti-poachingprofessionalstothe
concession.
221
localcommunitiesandwildlife.Insteadofincludinglocalcommunitiesinparksand
conservation,wildlifeconservationcontinuesasastateandprivatesector-drivenenterprise.
Parksandgamereservescontinuetopresentmanifestationsofcolonialdispossessionand
apartheidsegregation.Morethantwentyyearsaftertheendofapartheid,conservationareas
arestillseenassymbolsofwhiteeliteinterestsandwealth,inaccessibletothepoormajority.
Theseproblematicconservationapproachesandparadigmshaveledtoahistoricallock-in,
whereromanticandutopiannotionsof‘Africa’sWildEden’continuetounderminesupport
andbuy-inoflocalcommunitiesinwildlifeconservation.Thequestionarisinghereis:What
arewetryingtoprotect?Withoutthebroad-basedsupportoflocalcommunities,illegal
wildlifemarketswillcontinuetoflourish.Aslongascommunitiesareexcludedfromthe
benefitsofwildlifeandparks,adeadrhinowillbevaluedhigherthanaliveone.Inlightofthe
systemicexploitationoflocalcommunitiesduringthecolonialandapartheidperiods,aswell
aseconomicdeprivationbroughtonthroughneoliberalconservationregimesnowadays,itis
notsurprisingthatmanypoachersoriginatefromthesecommunities.Whileatypicalnarrative
portraysrhinopoachersasseekingtofillcookingpotsandpocketbooks(Kahler/Gore2012),
thischaptershowedwhypoachingcouldalsobeconstruedasanexpressionofdissentand
unhappinesswiththesystem,therule-makersandtherules.
Thischapteralsodescribedhowrhinohornsupplieswereestablishedthroughtheeconomic
valuationofrhinos.TwowavesofeconomicvaluationoccurredinSouthAfrica.Thefirst
valuationinvolvedthehuntingofrhinosduringthecolonialperiodwhilethesecondvaluation
relatestothevaluationoftherhinoasatrophyanimalandatradableliveanimalfromthe
1960sand1970sonwards.ToparksauthoritiesinSouthAfrica,thesaleofliverhinos
constitutesamuch-neededcashinjection.Theeconomicvaluationhascreatedamuddled
relationshipbetweenthepublicandprivatesector,whereeconomicnecessityandbottomlinesarepittedagainstethicalconsiderations,duediligence,andconservationobjectives.The
sectionalsobegantosketchtheoutlinesofthegrayareabetweenlegalityandillegalityon
theonehand;andlegitimacyandillegitimacyofthemarketexchangeandrulesgoverningit,
ontheother.
222
Chapter5:Theinternationalpoliticalprotectionregime:Theroadto
extinctionispavedwithgoodintentions
“AndIdreamofthevastdeserts,theforests,andallofthewildernessonour
continent;wildplacesthatweshouldprotectasapreciousheritageforourchildren
andforourchildren’schildren.Wemustneverforgetthatitisourdutytoprotectthis
environment(Mandela2013).“
5.1Introduction
Takenatfacevalue,theprotectiveandconservationmeasuresemployedtosafeguardthe
rhinowouldsuggestthattheanimalshouldbeoneofthebest-protectedandcaredfor
creaturesinSouthAfrica.TheSouthAfricanmilitary,amultitudeofprivatesecurity
companies,publicandprivateintelligenceoperatives,lawenforcementagenciesand
hundredsofNGOshavesteppedupprotectivemeasuresto‘save’therhino.Inspiteofallthe
‘do-gooders’,financialdonationsandthesecuritizationofwhatusedtobeseenasa
conservationissue,rhinodeathshaveescalatedoverthepastdecade.Therhinoprotection
andpoachingeconomieshavebecomethedailybreadandbutterofmanyactors,withthe
boundariesbecomingsomewhatblurred.Thischapterprovidesanoverviewofkeypolitical
actors,theiragendas,andmeasuresassociatedwithrhinoprotectionandconservation.
Thenotionofcontestedillegalityisofpivotalimportancetothischapter,asitconstitutesthe
primarylegitimationdeviceemployedbyvariousactorsalongtheillegalsupplychainin
defenceoftheirillegaleconomicactivities.Contestationoftheillegalityisintricatelylinkedto
acceptanceandsociallegitimacyofthelaw.Chapter4sketchedthehistoricalienationofrural
peoplelivinginandadjacenttoparksandshowedwhytheydonotregardtherulesas
legitimateorapplicabletothem.Thetradebanofrhinohornoriginatesinamultinational
environmentaltreaty,whichoffersinterestinginsightsastohowinternationalbansare
implementedatthelocallevelandwhyitmightbedifficulttogarnerbuy-inofsuchbans
whentheyareimposed“fromtheoutsideworld”.Whilethefocusisonactorsand
relationshipslinkedtotheillegalizationofthetradeinrhinohornandprotectionofrhinos,
manyofthesameactorsarerelevanttothestructureandfunctioningoftheillegalsupply
chainandwillalsobeofimportanceinthefinaltwochaptersofthedissertation.Chapter4
223
highlightedproblematicconservationparadigmsandtheirconversionintopolicyapproaches
andhowthisaffectedlocalcommunities.Similartothefailingsoftheconservationparadigms
andapproachesdiscussedinChapter4,thischapterarguesthattheinternationalpolitical
protectionregimeunderminesratherthanfacilitatesrhinoprotection.CITESproceedsonthe
assumptionthattradebansareappropriatemeasurestodealwithtransnationalwildlife
trafficking.
5.2Theinternationalregulatorybackdrop:CITES
TheUnitedNationsConventiononInternationalTradeinEndangeredSpeciesofWildFauna
andFlora(CITES)providestheinternationalregulatoryframeworkforinternationaltradein
endangeredplantandanimalspecies.Itsstatedaimistoensurethatinternationaltradein
specimensofwildanimalsandplantsdoesnotthreatenthesurvivalofthespeciesinthewild,
anditaccordsdegreesofprotectiontomorethan35000speciesofanimalsandplants(CITES
2014c).Inshort,theillegalizationofthetradeinrhinosandrhinoproductsisintricatelylinked
tothismultilateralenvironmentaltreaty,conversionofitsdeterminationsintodomestic
legislationandimplementationthereof.Seenasthe‘MagnaCarta’ofwildlifebysome(Layne
1973:99),othersregardtheCITESapproachtoconservationasfundamentallyflawed(for
alternativeperspectivessee:Hutton/Dickson2000a).Asmostoftheplanet’sremaining
biodiversityislocatedintheGlobalSouthandnortherncountriesareseenasparticularly
concernedaboutthepotentiallossofbiodiversity,theConventionhasbecomeaplatformfor
North-Southconflict(Hutton/Dickson2000b:XV),anditslegitimacyhassufferedasa
consequence.Asshowninthepreviouschapter,differentparadigms,andconceptionsof
nature,preservationandconservation277determinethetrajectoryandpathdependencyof
regulatoryframeworks.Powerfulalliancesbetweenstateandnon-stateactorshavehada
lastinginfluenceonthecornerstonesofthisconvention.
277
Thepreservationistparadigmreferstoafortress-likeapproachtonature,whichminimizeshumaninfluence
inordertomaintain“pristinewilderness”.Theapproachstandsinstarkcontrasttotheconservationparadigm,
whichallowsforhumansandnaturetoshareacommonspaceandcoexist(Freitag2012).
224
TheCITESwasoriginallysignedinWashingtonin1973andenteredforcein1975.Earlier
regulatoryattemptstodealwiththeinternationalproblemofunsustainableexploitationof
wildlifewereunsuccessfulbecausetheformercolonialpowersstruggledtoreachconsensus
andbroadratificationofvariousinstruments(Sand1997:19).Accordingtoanacademic
specializinginenvironmentallaw(InterviewwithAcademic1,2013),theearlyattemptsat
regulatingdifferentspeciesoffaunaandfloralaidthefoundationsforindividualspecies
protectionandthesystemofnegativelisting:
“Inthe1880s,1890s,youstartedtogetthefirstprotectionandconservationlaws.
Thiswasn’tthesameasitistoday.Shootingwasfortheelite,andtheywantedtobe
theonlyonestoshoot.Isupposethatviewstillexiststoday.Thepoacher’sphilosophy
beingusedtodaycamefromthatperiod.Ifyoulookatthe1900LondonConvention
forBirdsUsefulforAgricultureandthe1902ParisConvention,theybothtakethe
approachofcategorizingspecies,andsowhenwelookatthefinalConvention,ithas
twolists.Itcreateslistsofbirdsthatareusefulandbirdsthatarenoxious,poisonous,
toxic–tobedisposedofonsight.Thebirdsthatwereconsideredusefulweretheones
thatateinsects.Theonesconsiderednoxious,wherethosethatateseeds.Sofor
example,thebeardedvultureisonthenoxiouslist,andtodaytheyarerare.These
Conventionsweretakingtheapproachofsayingthesespecieswillbeprotectedand
thosenot.Inmanyways,thatisstillwithus.Itwentthroughafewincarnationsbut
whenyoulookatittoday,wearestillcategorizingcertainspeciesdeservingof
protection.Mostoftheconventionsdo.Youaredividinganimalsandplantsinsteadof
takingthebroadapproachofprotectinghabitats,theecosystems.”
Theabove–mentionedsystemofnegativelists(CITEScallsthem‘Appendices’)providedthe
firstboneofcontentionduringthedraftingprocessofCITES.TheIUCNhadsuggestedthat
wildlifetradeshouldbecontrolledorbannedonthebasisofgloballistsofthreatenedspecies
tobedrawnandupdateduponadvicebyaninternationalcommitteeofexperts.Acoalitionof
countriesfromtheGlobalSouthwasinfavourofrangestatesdeterminingtheirlistsof
tradablespecies.TheUSsupportedthebidtherebypavingthewayfortheWashington
Conference,whichledtothecreationofCITES(Sand1997:20).ThecoreapproachofCITESis
tosubjectallwildlifeimportstomandatorylicensingwithpermitsissuedbytheexporting
countriesonthebasisofanagreednegativelisting(Sand1997:20).Twenty-onestatessigned
theConventioninitially,whichhadplaced1100speciesontheappendices(seebelow).The
underlyingphilosophywasthatinternationalcooperationwouldpreventinternationaltrade
causingspeciesextinction,asstatedinthepreambleoftheConvention(CITES1973):
225
“Internationalcooperationisessentialfortheprotectionofcertainspeciesofwildfaunaand
floraagainstover-exploitationthroughinternationaltrade”.
Inessence,CITESaccordsprotectiontoabout35000animalandplantspecies,whichare
includedinthethreeAppendices.Speciesareconsideredforinclusioninordeletionfromthe
AppendicesattheConferenceofParties(CoP),heldeverythreeyears.AppendixIprovidesa
listofspeciesthreatenedwithextinctionandthuscommercialtradeinwild-caughtspecimens
ofthesespeciesisillegal(CITES2002).278TheScientificAuthority(afurtherrequirementof
CITES)279oftheexportingcountrymustissueanon-detrimentfinding,assuringthatsuch
exportwouldnotadverselyaffectthewildpopulation.Anyformoftradeinthesespecies
requiresexportandimportpermits.TheManagementAuthorityoftheexportingstateis
expectedtocheckthatanimportpermithasbeensecuredandthattheimportingstateis
capableofprovidingadequatecareforthespecimen(CITES1973).
SpecieslistedunderAppendixIIarenotnecessarilythreatenedwithextinctionbutmay
becomethreatenedunlesstradeissubjecttostrictregulationtopreventextinctioninthe
wild.Internationaltrademaybeauthorizedbythepresentationandgrantingofanexport
permitorre-exportcertificate.Noimportpermitisnecessaryalthoughsomecountriesmay
requireimportpermitsintermsoftheirownstricterdomesticmeasures.Theexportingstate
hastoissueanon-detrimentfindingandexportpermit.AppendixIIIrelatestospecies,which
werelistedafteronestatepartyaskedotherstatepartiesforassistanceincontrollingtradein
aspecificspecies.Thesespeciesarenotnecessarilythreatenedwithextinctionglobally.Trade
isonlyauthorizedbywayofanappropriateexportpermitandacertificateoforigin(CITES
1973).Table10summarizestheconditionsoftradeinrelationtothedifferentCITES
categoriesofprotection.CITESallowsforsomeroomtomanoeuverwhenitcomestothe
listingofcaseswheretheconservationstatusofaspeciesdiffersacrossitsrange.So–called
‘splitlisting’referstocases“wheredifferentpopulationsorsub-speciesareindifferent
278
Thetradeofcaptive-bredanimalsorcultivatedplantsofAppendixIspeciesareconsideredAppendixII
specimenswiththeconcomitantrequirements(CITES2002).Inotherwords,so-calledAppendixIspeciescanbe
tradediftheydonotderivefromwildpopulations.
279
AccordingtoArticleIX,signatorieshavetodesignateoneoformoreManagementAuthoritiesinchargeof
administeringthelicensingsystem,andoneormoreScientificAuthoritiestoadviseCITESontheeffectsof
internationaltradeonCITES-listedspecies(CITES1973).
226
Appendicesandwhereapopulation(orsub-species)maybelistedandanothermaynot”
(Willock2004:15).Rhinosareanexampleofsuchasplit-listing,aswhiterhinosinSouth
AfricaandSwazilandweremovedtoAppendixII(moredetailswillbeprovidedlaterinthis
chapter).
Table10:ConditionsoftradeundertheAppendicesI,IIandIIIofCITES
Appendix
I
Permitconditions
ExportPermit
Re–export
Importpermit
Non–detriment
required?
certificaterequired?
required?
findingrequired?
Notforcommercial
Yes(grantedonlyif
Yes(grantedonlyif
Yes
Yes
trade;tradenot
importpermit
inaccordancewith
detrimentaltothe
alreadyinhand)
CITESandthereisa
Yes(grantedonlyin
No(unlessrequired
Yes
detrimentaltothe
accordancewith
undernationallaw)
species;Tradeis
CITES)
species;tradeis
validimportpermit)
legal;avoidscruelor
injuriousshippingof
livespecimens
II
Tradenot
Yes
legal;avoidscruelor
injuriousshippingof
livespecimens
III
Tradeislegaland
(iftradeoriginates
avoidscruelor
withlistingparty)
injuriousshippingof
Yes
Notapplicable
No(unlessrequired
No
undernationallaw)
livespecimens
III
Tradeislegaland
No(certificateof
No(certificateof
No(unlessrequired
(iftradedoesnot
avoidscruelor
originonly)
originonly)
undernationallaw)
originatewithlisting
injuriousshippingof
party)
livespecimens
No
Source:adaptedfrom:Clarke(2004:11)
Despitethenobleintentions,theinitialsignatoriesoftheConventionhadlittleinformationon
thescaleoftheproblemandhowtooperatetradecontrols(Huxley2000:8).Oryx(citedby:
Huxley2000:)observed,“…whenCITESwasoriginallysetupandsigned,fewadministrators
realizedthatmorethanahandfulofspecieswereinvolved”.Inaddition,fewcountrieshad
experienceinhandlingtradecontrolsofthetypesetoutintheCITES.Thelackof
understandingofhowtooperatethesystemoftraderegulationshaspersistedovertheyears,
andcontinuestoposeproblemsattheConferencesofParties(CoPs).Duringtheearlyyears,it
227
wasrealizedthatthetreatyneededagreatdealofinterpretationandfine-tuningifitwereto
workeffectively.Moreover,acentralissuewasthecriteriatobeusedforincludingspeciesin
theAppendices.TheWashingtonConferencehadneglectedtoestablishsuchcriteria.Itwas
onlyatthefirstConferenceofthePartiesin1976thatexplicitcriteriawereformulated.
However,manystateswerenothappywiththecriteria,andtheyremainacontestedissuein
thepresentcontext(Huxley,2000:8).
AlthoughCITESissupposedtobelegallybinding,itistheprerogativeofindividualstatesto
domesticateandimplementwildlifetraderegulationsatthelocallevel.Asisthecasewith
mostotherinternationalconventions,thereislittlerecoursetodealingwithinfractionsor
non-compliancebywayofinternationalenforcement.Infractionsmayincludenegligencewith
regardstotheissuingofpermits,excessivetrade,laxenforcementorfailuretoproduce
annualreports.Wheninformedofaninfraction,theSecretariatisrequiredtonotifyallother
StateParties.Theoffendingpartyisgiventimetorespondtotheallegationsandmaybe
providedwithtechnicalassistancetopreventfurtherinfractions(CITES1973).280Thereare
180partiestoCITESasofNovember2014,includingalltherhinorange,transferand
consumercountries.281SouthAfricaratifiedtheConventionon15July1975,renderingitone
oftheConvention’searliestsignatories.AstheConventionentersitsforty-firstyearofcoming
intoforce,thepolitical,social,economicandenvironmentaldimensionsofthemodernworld
havechangedsinceitsinception.ItisnoteworthythattheapartheidregimegaveCITESthe
stampofapproval.Moreover,someconsumercountriessuchasCambodia,Laos,Myanmar,
Taiwan,VietnamandYemenonlyjoinedCITESmorethan20yearsaftertheConvention
enteredintoforce,allowingamassivewindowforuncontrolledinternationaltradeinwildlife
intheinterimperiod(seeTable11).Asof2015,theremainingAfricanrhinorangestatesare
Botswana,Kenya,Malawi,Namibia,SouthAfrica,Swaziland,Tanzania,Uganda,Zambia,and
Zimbabwe.ThefollowingsectionswilldiscusstheConvention’slimitedsuccessincurbing
280
TheSecretariatmayalsorulethatallpermitsaretobeconfirmedbytheSecretariat,itmaysuspend
cooperation,issueaformalwarning,visitthecountrytoverifycapacityorrecommendthesuspensionofCITESrelatedtrade,whichwillonlyberesumedoncecorrectivemeasureshavebeenimplementedbytheoffending
Party(CITES1973).
281
SouthernSudan,theneweststateistheonlycountryinAfricanottohavejoinedCITES.Angolaaccededon
31December2013(CITES2014b).
228
exploitativewildlifetrade,lackofacceptanceandlegitimacyandhowthismayhaveaffected
illegalmarketflows.
Whilecivilsocietyorganizationsmightlobbygovernmentregardingtheratificationand
implementationofspecificinternationalconventions(suchastheRomeStatute),
governmentsdonotusuallyconsultaffectedconstituentsonthevirtuesandfailingsof
becomingapartytoaninternationaltreaty.Asaconsequence,localconstituentsmayregard
internationalconventionsas‘alienimplants’whichlacklegitimacyandacceptanceatthelocal
level.Accordingtoaformergovernmentofficial,internationalinstrumentsareroutinely
signedoffinsouthernAfrica,oftencontingentonwhetherthereareperceivedbenefitstothe
signatory,orbecauseotherstatesorinstitutionsapplysomeformofthe‘carrotandstick’
principletogarnerbroad-basedascensionorratification.Insomeinstances,such
internationalinstrumentstravelnofurtherthantheinitialsignature(Interviewwith
governmentofficial6,2013).Inlightofthemanyconventionsandinitiativesincirculation,itis
perhapsnotsurprisingthatpoliticianshavetoprioritizeamongstavastpoolofoptions.
DomestificationofCITEShasbeenriddledwithproblemsandshortcomings,whichrelateto
thecontentsandobjectivesoftheConvention,enforcementmechanismsanditslegitimacyat
thelocallevel,particularlyintheGlobalSouth.
Table11:Whendidrhinorange,transitandconsumerstatesjoinCITES?
Nameofcountry
Relevancetorhinos
Date1
Date2
Angola
FR&T
02/10/2013(A)
31/12/2013
Botswana
R&T
14/11/1977(A)
12/02/1978
Cambodia
FR&T&C
04/07/1997(R)
02/10/1997
China
FR&T&C
08/01/1981(A)
08/04/1981
CzechRepublic
T&C
14/04/1993(S)
01/01/1993
DRCongo
FR&T
20/07/1976(A)
18/10/1976
Ethiopia
FR&T
05/04/1989(A)
04/07/1989
Germany
T
22/03/1976(R)
20/06/1976
India
R&T
20/07/1976(R)
18/10/1976
Indonesia
R&T
28/12/1976(A)
28/03/1979
Ireland
T
08/01/2002(R)
08/04/2002
Japan
C
06/08/1980(Ac)
04/11/1980
Kenya
R&T
13/12/1978(R)
13/03/1979
Laos
T&C
01/03/2004(A)
30/05/2004
229
Lesotho
T
01/10/2003(R)
30/12/2003
Malawi
R
05/02/1982(A)
06/05/1982
Malaysia
R&T
20/10/1977(A)
18/01/1978
Mozambique
FR&T
25/03/1981(A)
23/06/1981
Myanmar
R&T&C
13/06/1997(A)
11/09/1997
Namibia
R&T
18/12/1990(A)
18/03/1991
Nepal
R&T
18/06/1975(A)
16/09/1975
Netherlands
T
19/04/1984(R)
18/07/1984
Nigeria
T
09/05/1974(R)
01/07/1975
Pakistan
R
20/04/1976(A)
19/07/1976
Poland
T
12/12/1989(R)
12/03/1990
Qatar
T&C
08/05/2001(A)
12/03/1990
Singapore
T
30/11/1986(A)
28/02/1987
SouthAfrica
R
15/07/1975(R)
13/10/1975
Swaziland
R&T
26/02/1997(A)
27/05/1997
Tanzania
R&T
29/11/1979(R)
27/02/1980
Thailand
T&C
21/01/1983(R)
21/04/1983
Uganda
R
18/07/1991(A)
16/10/1991
UnitedArabEmirates
T&C
08/02/1990(A)
09/05/1990
UnitedKingdom
T
02/08/1976(R)
31/10/1976
UnitedStates
T
14/01/1974(R)
01/07/1975
Vietnam
FR&T&C
20/01/1994(A)
20/04/1994
Yemen
C
05/05/1997(A)
03/08/1997
Zambia
R&T
24/11/1980(A)
22/02/1981
Zimbabwe
R&T
19/05/1981(A)
17/08/1981
Source:extractedfromCITES(2014b)
282
Date1:
(A)Accession (Ap)Approval (C)Continuation
(R)Ratification (S)Succession Date2:Dateofentryintoforce
Relevancetorhinos:
(R)RangeState
(FR)FormerRangeState
(T)TransitState
(C)ConsumerState
Chapter3dealtwiththelonghistoryofrhinohorndemand.Thetotalnumberofrhinosinthe
1970sand1980sbestdemonstratesthegravityofthesituationinAfricaatthetime.TheIUCN
estimatedthat8,458whiteandblackrhinossurvivedby1990(Cumming/duToit/Stuart1990:
282
Rhinohornsoriginatingfromtheftsoutofmuseumsandprivatecollectionsincountriesoutsidethe
traditionalrangestateswerenotincludedinthistable.Thecategorizationofcountriesisbasedoncurrentdata
collectedbytheauthor.
230
10).ItisthusnotsurprisingthatCITEShasengagedwiththerhinoissuesinceitsearlydays.
WhenCITESenteredintoforcein1975,rhinosandtheirproductswereamongthefirst
speciestobeplacedinAppendicesIandII.AllrhinospecieswereplacedinAppendixIin
1977,effectivelybanninginternationaltradeexceptunderexceptionalcircumstances
(Milliken/Shaw2012:44).Despitethetradeban,thenumberofblackrhinoscontinuedto
plummet,andrhinosbecamelocallyextinctinatleast18rangestatesinAfricaoverthenext
twodecades(Leader-Williams2003:92).ThefailureoftheAppendixIlistingprompted
furtheraction.Resolution3.11of1981calledonstatesthatwerenotpartiestoCITES(Taiwan
andYemenweremajorconsumernationsandnotpartiestoCITESatthetime)totake
preventativemeasurestocurbillegaltrade.Moreover,theResolutioncalledforamoratorium
onthesaleofallgovernmentandpara-statalstocksofrhinohornaswellasthemandatory
annualreportingofhornassetstotheConvention(IUCN2000:47).Thepassiveoppositionof
consumercountries(byinitiallynotjoiningCITES)constitutesasignificanthurdleto
legitimizingandimplementingthetradeban.Essentially,thetradeandconsumptionofrhino
hornwerelegaluntilconsumercountriesascendedtoorratifiedCITES,anddomesticated
localprohibition.
Atthe6thConferenceofPartiesinOttawa,Canada,itwasnotedthattheblackrhino
continuedto“declinecatastrophically”(Wijnsteker2003:198)andthusResolution6.10of
1987calledforimmediate,drasticandevenstrictermeasurestobetakentostoptheillegal
cross-bordertradeinrhinohorn.Alldomesticandinternationaltradewasprohibitedwiththe
exceptionofthemovementofnon-commercialhuntingtrophiesthatneededrequisiteCITES
documentation.Moreover,governmentswereagainurgedtodestroyallgovernmentand
para-statalstocksofrhinohorn(inreturntheywouldbecompensatedwithexternalaidto
assistinrhinoconservation–ostensiblythesefundswouldbemadeavailablebymember
statesfromtheGlobalNorth).Lawenforcementagencieswereinstructedtobeparticularly
alerttothetraffickingofrhinohorn.Partieswereaskedtoincreasepenaltiesforindividual
andcorporateoffendersinvolvedincross-borderpoachingandtraffickingofhorn.Those
countriesthatignoredtheearlierresolutionweresupposedtobepressurizedbywayof
economic,politicalanddiplomaticsanctions(Leader-Williams2003:92–94).Althoughthe
resolutioncharterednewterritorybygoingbeyondtheremitoftraderegulations,thesuccess
wasagainlimited.Manystatesdidnotdestroytheirrhinohornstockpilesnorwasthe
231
promisedcompensationtopromotethedestructionofstockpilesforthcoming(IUCN2000:
47).Inaddition,severalkeyconsumernations283failedtoimplementdomesticlawstocurb
theillegaltrade(Leader-Williams2003:94).ItbearsmentioningthatSouthAfricaallowedthe
exportofwhiterhinotrophiessince1979(Milliken/Shaw2012:44).SouthAfricawassubject
tointernationalsanctionsduetoherracistapartheidregimeduringthefirst20yearsofCITES.
Sincetheadventofdemocracyin1994,theSouthAfricanwildlifehuntingindustryhas
experiencedamassiveboomandbecameatopdestinationfor‘BigFive’hunting(Interview
withJournalist1),284includingtherhino(seealsoChapter4).
Overthecourseofthenextfiveyears,thegovernmentsofSouthAfrica,Namibiaand
Zimbabwebegantoexpresstheirdisenchantmentwiththeinternationalbanonthetradein
rhinoproducts,andproposalsforacontrolledlegaltradeweremade.Allthreecountriesheld
considerablestocksofhornattainedthroughthecollectionofhornfromnaturalmortalities
andconfiscations,andinthecaseofNamibiaandZimbabwethroughdehorningofanimals,
undertakenasaprotectivemeasure(Leader-Williams2003:94).Forallintentsandpurposes,
thisconstitutesthefirstcontestationofillegality(againsttheCITEStradeban)withregardsto
thetradeinrhinohorn.Inotherwords,thedisillusionmentofthethreesouthernAfrican
countriesconstitutesaformofcontestedillegalityatthemacrolevel,whichwasgoingto
influencefuturepolicydirectionsonthematter.Proposalstodown-listrhinosfromAppendixI
toAppendixIIwererejectedattheCoPsin1992and1994.285The9thCoPinFortLauderdale
hadtakenplaceonlysixmonthsaftertheelectionofthefirstdemocraticgovernmentinSouth
Africain1994.SouthAfrica’squestforacontrolledtradecontinuedandinrecognitionofthe
country’ssuccessinrhinoconservationandmanagement,thepopulationsofwhiterhino
weremovedtoAppendixIIin1994.Anannotationconfinedthepermissibletradetolive
rhinosto“acceptableandappropriatedestinationsandhuntingtrophiesonly”(CITES1994).
283
China,SouthKorea,TaiwanandYemen
284
Originallytheterm‘BigFive’wasahuntingterm,whichhasbeenadoptedintocommonparlance.The‘Big
Five’refertofiveofAfrica’sgreatwildanimals:theAfricanlion,Africanelephant,Capebuffalo,Africanleopard
andthewhiteorblackrhino.
285
OutsidetheconfinesofCITES,theUSthreatenedChina,SouthKorea,TaiwanandYemenwiththesuspension
ofanywildlifeandfisheriestradeunderthePellyAmendment(USdomesticlegislationgoverningwildlifeand
fisheriestrade).Thecountriesleaptintoactionbypassingsomedomesticlawsandintensifyingeffortstocurb
illicittrade(Leader-Williams2003:94).
232
Swaziland’swhiterhinopopulationwasalsograntedAppendixIIstatusin2004,tiedtoa
partialannotationforlivesalesandhuntingtrophiesonlyandsubjecttoquotassetas
percentagesofthetotalrhinonumbers(Milliken/Shaw2012:44).AtthesameConferenceof
Parties,Resolution9.14waspassed,whichrepealedtheearliertworesolutions.The
resolutionurged,amongstothers,thosepartieswithlegalstockstoidentify,mark,register
andsecureallsuchstockandtoimplementadequatelegislationincludingdomestictrade
restrictions.286SouthAfricaagainpushedforacontrolledtradeofbothwhiteandblackrhino
speciesatthenextConferenceofPartiesin1997.Bythatstage,SouthAfricawasconserving
some70%to80%oftheworld’srhinos(Leader-Williams2003:96).Thecountryalso
proposedtochangetheAppendixIIannotationtoallowfortradeinrhinopartsand
derivatives(asopposedtothe1994listingwhichonlyallowedtradeinliverhinosandhunting
trophies).Stateofficialsexpressedconcernabouttheincentivesforrhinoconservation,
especiallyforprivaterhinoowners,whoconservedsome15%ofSouthAfrica’srhinosatthe
time.Theproposalwasrejected,astheEuropeanUnion(EU)andtheUnitedStates(US)did
notsupporttheproposal(theEUholdsconsiderableswayatCITESasitsmembercountries
tendtovoteasablock).WhiletheEUdeemedtheproposalprematureasnoadequatetrade
controlmechanismshadbeenputinplace,theUSindicatedthattheamendmentwould
undermineprogresstocurbthedemandforrhinohorninconsumernations(Departmentof
EnvironmentalAffairs2012).
Afterthe1997rejectionatCITESandinlightofitsacceptanceintoregionalbodies,South
AfricagotincreasinglyinvolvedwithrelevantSouthernAfricanDevelopmentCommunity
(SADC)initiatives.287ASADCCoPpreparatorymeetingaheadoftheConferenceofPartiesin
2000recommendedthatacomprehensivetradesystembedevelopedbeforeaproposalwas
submittedattheCoP(DepartmentofEnvironmentalAffairs2012).NamibiaandSouthAfrica
weregrantedanannualexportquotaoffivehuntingtrophiesofadultmaleblackrhinosatthe
13thConferenceofPartiesin2004(CITES2004).SaysaSouthAfricanexpert(Interviewwith
Conservator7):
286
Reeves(2002:189–200)providesafascinatingaccountofthepoliticalmanoeuvringbehindthescenesat
CITESintherunuptotheCoPsin1992and1994.
287
SouthAfricajoinedSADCaftertheapartheidsystemwasabolishedin1994.
233
“In’97weaskedagainfortradeandlostwithoneortwovotes,thenweleftitand
concentratedonourelephants.From2000,elephantswerekeyatCoP12and13,and
afterCoP14wecouldtradeinivory,andthenatCoP15wedidn'ttakeanyproposals
becauseTanzaniaandZambiatooktheirivoryproposals,soit’snotthatSouthAfrica
neveraskedfortradeinrhinohornbefore.”
Thefrequencyofrhinopoachingincreasedduringthe2000s(laterchapterswillarguethatthe
actualnumberofillegalrhinohornsenteringthemarketincreasedmarginallyashornsupplies
derivedfromothersources)andSouthAfricaputthetradeproposalonthebackburneruntil
CoP16heldinBangkok,Thailandin2013.Attheoccasion,EdnaMolewa,theSouthAfrican
MinisterofEnvironmentalAffairsannouncedthatSouthAfricawasconsideringproposalsto
seeklegalizationoftradeinrhinohornattheCoP17tobeheldinSouthAfricain2016.
Molewa(quotedin:Smith2013)explainedtheposition:
"Ourrhinosarekilledeverydayandthenumbersaregoingup.Therealityisthatwe
havedoneallinourpoweranddoingthesamethingeverydayisn'tworking.Wedo
thinkthatweneedtoaddressthisissueoftradeinacontrolledmannersothatwecan
atleastbegintopushdownthispressure."
TherhinoissueatCITEScannotbeseparatedfromparallelprocessesanddebateshappingat
CITESbecausetheyillustratethepolarizationatCITES.Thenorth-southdivide288andthe
perceivedpoliticizationofCITESbecameincreasinglyevidentwhentheAfricanelephantwas
‘uplisted’(movedfromAppendixIItoAppendixI)andthetradebanofivoryproductsentered
intoforcein1989.Theproposalforthecompletebanwasbasedonrecommendationsfrom
theCITESElephantWorkingGroupandastudyundertakenbythespeciallyconvenedIvory
TradeReviewGroup.Thegroupfoundthatneitherthequotamanagementsystemnoranyof
theearlierCITESresolutionshadstemmedthetideagainstillegalpoachingofelephantsand
tradeinivory(‘tSas-Rolfes2000:75).Intherun-uptotheban,WesternconservationNGOs
hadcampaignedinfavourofprohibition.TheCITESproposalwasadopteddespiteobjections
from9southernAfricanelephantrangestates,andJapanandChina.Backthenthepopulation
ofelephantswasconsideredstableorrisinginBotswanaandZimbabwe.Insomerange
288
ThetermisusedwithreservationassomestatesintheGlobalSouth(notablyKenya)havealignedthemselves
withtheanti-sustainableusefaction,whichislargelylinkedtocountriesandconservationNGOsintheGlobal
North.
234
states,notablyKenyaandZimbabwe,expandingelephantpopulationsweredestroyingthe
farmingoperationsofruralfarmers(‘tSas-Rolfes2000:77).Zimbabwebecameparticularly
vocalafterseveralattemptstodown-listelephantswererejectedatsubsequentCoPsdespite
thegrowthofitsherdsandcompetentconservationmanagementprinciplesbeingapplied.
MattersclimaxedwhenagroupofsouthernAfricancountriesthreatenedtowithdrawfrom
CITESatthe8thConferenceofPartiesheldinKyoto.ThesouthernAfricanfactionfeltthat
CITESlistingswereincreasinglyusedforpoliticalpurposes,andlistingdecisionswerenot
basedonsoundscientificdata.289
Thedisputedelephantlistingtriggeredalargerdebateoverwhichconservationparadigmsthe
CITESregimeshouldemploy:thesustainableuseparadigmwaspittedagainstthe
preservationparadigm(Mofson2000:111).ThesouthernAfricanfactionadvocatedthe
sustainableuseofwildlifeasaconservationtool.Bywayofbackground:Itisimportantto
notethatCITEStendstofocusonthegloballevelofimperilmentofaspecieswhen
determiningitslisting.Inessence:regardlessofitsstatusinindividualrangestates,ifa
speciesisdeemedasendangeredatthegloballevel,thenitstrademaybebanned.Through
thisapproach,CITEStreatsnaturalresourceswithinindividualcountriesaspartoftheglobal
commons(Castley/Hall–Martin2003:129).Whenitcomestoshoulderingthecostsof
conservationoflistedspeciesinindividualcountries,nostatecarriesthefinancial
responsibilityforthecosts(financial,administrativeandhumanresources)itmaybeplacing
onanotherstate(Martin2000:131).Inotherwords,therangestatesthemselveshaveto
carrythecostsattachedtothelistingandattemptsatde–listingofaspecies.290Thelisting
processhasbeensubjecttoscathingcriticismbycountriesaffectedbylistingdecisions.
Westernexperts,scientistsandlobbyistsareseenasthemaincatalystsbehindthelistingof
threatenedspecies.Broadconsultationwithcommunitiesthatareaffectedbysuchlistingsis
perceivedtobelacking(InterviewswithConservator3&4,2013).Witheveryadditional
289
Inresponsetothecontestedelephantissue,ZimbabweanditspartnersfromtheSouthernAfricanCentrefor
IvoryMarketing(SACIM)submittedaproposaltolistthenorthernAtlanticherringinAppendixI.Theherringwas
chosenbecauseitwasanimportantcommercialcommodityformanyEuropeancountries,justastheelephant
wasformanyAfricanrangestates.Theproposalwaswithdrawnduetoweaksupportingdata(Mofson2000:
110).
290
Mozambique’sexperiencewithattemptsatgettingcrocodilesdelistedisinstructive.ThesouthernAfrican
nationwasrequiredtospendagreatdealofmoneytoprovethataspecieslocallyconsideredapestwasnot
endangeredinordertotradecrocodileskinsfromabundantpopulations(Huxley2000:9).
235
listingorannotation,theConventionbecomesmorecomplex,difficultandexpensiveto
operate–andnotonlytocountrieslocatedintheGlobalSouth(Huxley2000:9).Moreover,
whileanobjectivescientificassessmentmighttreatallspeciesthreatenedbyexploitative
tradewithequalseriousness,inpracticenotallspeciesaretreatedthesame.Duetocultural,
political,economicandaestheticreasons,somespecieshavebeenaffordedgreater
importance.CITESappearstoprivilegeanimalsoverplants,andcertainspeciesthathave
beendubbed“charismaticmegafauna”(Dickson2003:24).Therhinofallsintothiscategory
(elephantsandtigersareotherdominantrepresentativesofthistypeofanimal).Whilethe
appropriationofcharismaticmegafaunamaybelegitimatefortheattainmentof
conservationistobjectives,conservationNGOshavebeenusingtheconventionasfund-raising
tool.Thetypicaltrajectorywouldincorporatethedeclarationofacrisis,themountingofa
campaigncoupledwithfundraisingto“save”thespecies.Theprocessculminateswiththe
speciesgettinglistedonAppendixI,andtheNGOs’coffersfilledwithdonormonies(Huxley
2000:10).
Inaddition,theconservationideologyunderpinningtheCITESregimeinitsearlydays
excludedthepossibilitythattrademayholdbenefitsforspecies,ecosystemsorpeople
(Martin2000:129).Whiletrademightbetheprincipalthreattothesurvivalofspecies,trade
regulationsmaybeinappropriateindealingwiththreatssuchashumanencroachment,
climatechangeororganizedcrime.Itwasassumedthattraderegulationconstitutedthemost
effectivewayofachievingconservationistgoals(Dickson2003:26).Moreover,listingsdonot
onlyaffectthewildfaunaandflorathatCITESseekstoprotectbutalsothepeoplethatlivein
closeproximitytothem.Theseruralpeopleoftenekeoutalivingfromharvestingortrading
inwildanimalsorplants.Fromonedaytothenext,aformerharvestermaybelabelleda
poacherorcriminal.Asaconsequence,therewerecallsthatCITESshouldconsidertheplight
ofruralpeoplewhenpassingmeasuresthataffecttheirlivelihood(Dickson2003:23).
In1992,CITESrecognizedwithResolution8.3thatthemajorityofspeciesitsoughttoprotect
werelocatedintheGlobalSouth.Italsoacknowledgedthatthesustainableuseofwildfauna
andflora,irrespectiveofbeingconsumptiveornon-consumptive,providedaneconomically
viableoption(CITES1992).Moreover,itwasacceptedthatunlessconservationprogrammes
tookintoaccounttheneedsoflocalpeople,andprovidedincentivesforsustainableuseof
236
wildfaunaandflora,conversiontoalternateformsoflandusemightoccur(Wijnsteker2003:
59).Tothisday,theissueofsustainableuseconstitutesahighlycontentiousissueatCITES
CoPs.Thereisasignificantlobbywithintheenvironmentalmovement(predominantlylocated
intheGlobalNorthwithstrategicpartnersandofficeslocatedaroundtheglobe)thatis
vehementlyopposedtoanytradeinanimalspecies,particularlywhenitispremisedonthe
killingoftheseanimals(Dickson2003:24).ThislobbyholdsconsiderableswayatCITES,
directlyandindirectlyaffectingregulationsthatleadtorestrictionsontradeinwildlife.Some
southerncountriesobjecttothestronginfluenceofanimalrightsandconservationNGOsat
CITES,portrayingtheanti-usestanceas“anillegitimateimpositionofspecificmoralvalueson
thewiderconservationcommunity”especiallysincethesustainableuseofwildlifeisseenasa
meanstoupliftruralcommunities(Dickson2003:24–25).Despitetheapparentconflict
betweenconservationprinciplesasenvisagedintheoriginalconventionandnotionsof
sustainableuseanddevelopment,CITEShasacknowledgeddevelopmentalconcernsofthe
custodiansofmostoftheremainingbiodiversityintheGlobalSouthinitsstrategicplanof
2000:
“TheStrategicPlanconfirmstherecognitionbythepartiesthatsustainabletradein
wildfaunaandfloracanmakeamajorcontributiontosecuringthebroaderandnot
incompatibleobjectivesofsustainabledevelopmentandbiodiversityconversation
(CITESSecretariatquotedin:Dickson2003:25).”
Whathasbeendeemeda“somewhatopaqueendorsementoftherelevanceofsustainable
development”(Dickson2003:25)clearedthepathforcountriesoftheGlobalSouthtoinsist
thatdevelopmentalconcernsshouldbeconsideredinfutureformulationsofwildlifepolicies.
Atthe16thCoP,CITESextendedthevalidityoftheStrategicVisionandActionPlanto2020.In
asignificantmovetobroadenitsrepertoire,appealandimpact,CITESapprovedanew
frameworkforfuturepolicydevelopment.Theframeworkincorporatesnewgoalsand
objectives.TheinternationalbodyaspirestocontributetotheattainmentoftheUN
MillenniumDevelopmentGoalsrelevanttoCITES,the‘StrategicPlanforBiodiversity2011–
2020’,theAichiBiodiversityTargetsandtotheimplementationofrelevantoutcomesofthe
UnitedNationsConferenceonSustainableDevelopmentof2012.Andmostsignificantly,the
newframeworkproclaimstoconsider“cultural,socialandeconomicfactorsatplayin
producerandconsumercountries”,promote“transparencyandwiderinvolvementofcivil
237
societyinthedevelopmentofconservationpoliciesandpractices”andensure“thata
coherentandinternationallyagreedapproachbasedonscientificevidenceistakentoaddress
anyspeciesofwildfaunaandflorasubjecttounsustainableinternationaltrade”(CITES2013a:
2).ThesuggestedinstitutionalchangeisreflectedinthenewCITESvisionstatement:
“Conservebiodiversityandcontributetoitssustainableusebyensuringthatno
speciesofwildfaunaorflorabecomesorremainssubjecttounsustainable
exploitationthroughinternationaltrade,therebycontributingtothesignificant
reductionoftherateofbiodiversitylossandmakingasignificantcontributiontowards
achievingtherelevantAichiBiodiversityTargets.”(CITES2013a:2)
WhetherthechosenpathwillcausemoredivisionamongstpartiesatCITESorassistCITESin
regainingcredibilityandlegitimacyamongstdisgruntledpartiesisamatteroffutureanalysis.
However,datacollectedpriorandduringthecourseofthisprojectrevealedsentimentsthat
reflectednegativelyonCITES,theAppendicesandtheperceivedinfluenceofWestern
conservationNGOsandtheanimalrightsmovementwhereaslocal(African)environmental
justicemovementshadnoorlittlerepresentationatCoPs.FallingshortofcallingCITESaneo–
colonialinstitution,governmentofficialsfromtheSADCregioninterviewedforaprojecton
organizedcrimetrendsinsouthernAfricaportrayedCITESasaninstrumentthatwas
developedandsponsoredbycountriesoftheGlobalNorth.ItisseentoreflectWestern
conservationphilosophiesandanimalrightsethicswhilepaying“littleconcerntotheplightof
Africanruralpeopleandtheirdevelopmentalconcerns”(InstituteforSecurityStudies2009–
2010).Officialsalsopointedtotheuncontrolled“slaughterofwildanimals”duringthe
colonialperiod,questioningwhythenorthernrelativesofthosecolonialhuntersshouldhave
anysayinAfricanconservationmatters.ThequestionaroseofwhyAfricansshouldpreserve
Western-stylesafariparksfilledwithwildanimalswhenEuropeancountrieshadfailedso
dismallyinconservingtheirownwildernessareas.Whilethenorthernlobbywasquickto
criticizeanddeterminethewayforward,theyfailedto“puttheirmoneywheretheremouth
is”intermsofpayingcompensationandimplementationofrules(Interviews,2013).The
perceptionthatnortherncountriesholdswayatCITESissupportedbyvotingpatternsatCoPs
(EUmemberstatesusuallyvoteasablock).Duringinterviewsforthecurrentproject,
conservatorsandprivaterhinoownerssharedthesesentiments.ASouthAfricanlaw
enforcementofficialsaid(Interviewwithlawenforcer3):
238
“Itiscrazythattheseoldcolonialinstitutionsarestillinplace.CITESdecideshowmuch
andwhatwecansell.Westockabout90%oftheworld’srhinos.Sowhoaretheyto
prescribetous?Imeanweareinacontrolledarea,wherewemanagestock.Weknow
whatwearedoingandwearetryingtoprotectthemforourchildren.”
Thesignificanceofperceptionsliketheoneexpressedinthecitationabove,ishowtheyaffect
thediffusionandacceptanceofCITESatthelocallevel.Aswillbeshowninsubsequent
sectionsandchapters,localregulationssuchastheThreatenedofProtectedSpecies(TOPS)
regulationsandthemoratoriumonthedomestictradeinrhinohornlacksupportand
legitimacyamongstkeyconstituenciesinSouthAfrica.Inessence,theperceivedunfairnessof
CITESasaninternationalinstrumentthatimpactsnationaltradeaspirationsalsoaffectsthe
legitimacyofdomesticlaws,ordinancesandregulationsinSouthAfricaandotherrange,
transferandconsumercountries.Thepoliticizationandinfluenceofnortherncountriesat
CITESexplainsinpartwhyrepresentativesofcountriesintheGlobalSouthmusterlimited
politicalwilltoimplementCITESdecisionsandregulations.Moreover,thenormativeagenda
ofCITESemulatestheearlierdiscussedconservationparadigms,whichtendtoemphasizethe
irreconcilabilitybetweenlocalpeople,conservationandwildanimals.Inlightofthe
controversysurroundingCITES,itisnotsurprisingthattheinternationalpoliticalprotection
regimehashadlimitedsuccessindisruptingtransnationalflowsofrhinohorn.
5.3Theinternationalresponse
Theprevioussectionalludedtotheperceptionofunfairnesswhenitcomestolistingdecisions
(illegalization)andshoulderingthecostimplicationsofsuchlistings.Thissectionprovidesa
briefoverviewoftheroleoftheinternationalcommunityinrhinoprotectionintheformof
politicalresponsesandtheirimpact.Animportantaspectoftheinternationalresponserelates
tothelegislativeandenforcementeffortsintransitandconsumercountries.Reprimandsand
thethreatofsanctionsonpartofCITES,aswellaspressurebytheUS(thePellyAmendment),
ledtolimitedactionbythemajorrhinohornconsumercountriesofthe1970sand1980s.
239
China291,SouthKorea292,Taiwan293andYemen294joinedCITES(seeTable11)andpassed
sufficientdomesticlegislation(atthetime)toavertsanctionsandafalloutwiththeCITES
StandingCommittee.
SouthAfricaiscurrentlytheprincipalsupplierofillegalrhinohornthroughpoachingand
pseudo–hunting;however,organizedcrimenetworkshaveengagedinfrauds,burglariesand
robberiesacrosstheworld.Aswillbeshowninlaterchapters,theillicitsupplychainofrhino
horninvolvesnationalitiesfromacrosstheglobe.295Sellar(2014a)arguesthatwhileSouth
Africahasbeenpullingitsweightincurbingpoachingandillegaltrade,transitandconsumer
countrieshavebeenlaggingfarbehind.Interviewswithlawenforcerandconservatorsecho
Sellar’ssentimentsonthedisconnectbetweentheinternationalbanasenvisagedbyCITES,
andpracticalsupportforitsimplementationintransitandconsumercountries.Sellarwho
headedtheCITESlawenforcementarmcommentsonthelacklustrefollowuptoCITES
291
ChinajoinedCITESin1981.Thecountrywastheworld’slargestexporterofpatentmedicinescontainingrhino
hornandagreedtobanallexportsin1992.Chineseofficialswerenotinfavourofbanningdomestictradeatthe
time,claimingthatrhinohornstockhadbeenboughtpriortoChinajoiningCITES.Aspressurewasmounting,the
ChineseStateCouncilbannedwithimmediateeffectthemanufactureofallmedicinescontainingrhinohornand
tigerbones,andalldomesticandinternationaltradeinrhinohorn,tigerpartsandderivatives.Moreover,it
becamemandatorytoregisterallrhinoandtigerstocks,andrhinohornwastakenofftheofficialpharmacopeia
in1993(Reeve2006:191).
292
TheRepublicofKoreaavoidedcertificationbytheUSuponpassingdomesticlegislationandimplementing
effectivemeasurestocurbthesaleofrhinohorn.TheKoreangovernmentpassedadecreein1993that
renderedthesaleordisplayofrhinohornapunishableoffenceofupto6-monthimprisonmentandafineofUS
$1250(whichtranslatedto1millionUS$in2006)(Reeve2006:190–191).
293
TaiwanbecamethelargestimporterofAfricanandAsianrhinohorninthemid-1980s.Abanontheimportof
rhinohornwasinstitutedin1985,butitlackedimplementationandenforcement.Despitetheadoptionofthe
WildlifeConservationActin1989,whichhadbannedthesaleanddisplayofrhinohornwithoutaspecialpermit
in1989,rhinohornremainedopenlyonsale.DuetoincreasinginternationalpressureandNGOcampaigns,the
governmentannouncedafullban,theimpositionoffines,andenforcementoftheWildlifeConservationActin
1992.TheUSnonethelessimposedsanctions,whichwereonlyliftedin1997,oncetheWildlifeConservationAct
compliedwithCITESguidelinesandaspecialinvestigativeunithadbeensetup(Reeve2006:194–196).
294
YemenonlyjoinedCITESin1997,buttheMinistryofSupplyandTradeissuedadecreeprohibitingtradein
rhinohornthathadnotbeenprocessedintojambiyahandlesby1992.Tradershadtwomonthstoregisterstock
ofrawrhinohornandanothermonthtohaveitmarkedbeforeallunmarkedstockwastobeconfiscated(Reeve
2006:191).
295
BeyondtheSouthAfricanrhinoharvestingandsmugglingnetworks,Mozambicans,Zimbabwean,Congolese,
NamibianandSwazilandnationalshavebeenlinkedtorhinopoachingwhileVietnamese,Laotian,Thai,Chinese,
Mozambicansandothersaresmugglingandtraffickingrhinohorn.Thai,Vietnamese,Polish,CzechandUS
nationalswereinvolvedinfraudulenthuntingexpeditions,andinternationalorganizedcrimenetworkssuchas
theinfamousIrishRoverganghaveransackedprivatecollections,museumsandgalleries.
240
RhinocerosEnforcementTaskForce meetings.TheCITESSecretariatconvenessuchmeetings
atregularintervalswiththeobjectiveofbringingtogetherlawenforcementofficialsfrom
rhinorange,transitandconsumercountriesforthepurposeofsharingintelligenceand
designingresponsestrategies.PursuanttoCoP16,theSecretariatarrangedaCITES
RhinocerosEnforcementTaskForcemeetingintheKenyancapitalofNairobiinOctober2013.
Representativesofwildlifeenforcementnetworksandlawenforcementpersonnelfrom21
countries296attendedthemeeting(CITES2013b).Suchmeetingshelptohighlightcomplex
diversityasto“experience,authority,skillsandresources”oflawenforcementofficialsacross
theworld(Sellar2014b).OneoftheoutcomesofthemeetinginKenyawasthedecisionto
createadirectoryofnationalfocalpoints.Theresultantlistwouldprovidethecontactdetails
ofindividualstaskedwithcoordinatingtheinvestigationofrhinocrimesincountriesacross
theworld(Sellar2014a).Countriesweregivenfourmonths(until28February2014)to
providethecontactdetailsoftheirnationalfocalpointstotheCITESSecretariatfor
disseminationtorelevantlawenforcementbodiesandwildlifeenforcementnetworks
(WENs).ByAugust2014,remindershadtobesentasonlyChinaandGreecehadheededthe
request.Ninestateshaddesignatedandcommunicatedtheirnationalfocalpointsupon
publicationofthenationalfocalpointsinOctober2014.Twooftheninestatesthatcomplied
werenotmembersofthetaskforce(GreeceandJapan).Essentially,14statesdeemedas
rhinosupply,transitorconsumercountriesfailedtocomplywithasimpledirective,including
Vietnamwhichisamajortransitandconsumercountryofrhinohorn(CITES2014a).Sellar’s
comments(2014a)onthisstateofaffairsarepoignant:
“Theremusthavebeentimes,probablymanytimesinrecentyears,when
enforcementofficersinSouthAfricahavefelttheyareengagedinalonebattle.At
leasttheycannowtakecomfortfromthefactthatthereare8countriesoutthere
readytobackthemup.Onlyeight?Yes,SouthAfrica’sfocalpoint’sdetailsareinthe
directorysoithastobesubtracted.Intheracetocatchupwithcriminals,ourfeetare
notevenonthestartingblocksyet.”
Notsurprising,membersoftheinternationallawenforcementcommunityhaveexpressed
theirdisenchantmentwiththe‘soft’approachoftheCITESregulatoryframework.Sellar
296
Inadditiontoseveralregionalwildlifeandlawenforcementnetworks,Botswana,Cambodia,China,theCzech
Republic,Indonesia,Kenya,theLao'sPeopleDemocraticRepublic,Malawi,Malaysia,Mozambique,Namibia,
Nepal,thePhilippines,Poland,SouthAfrica,Thailand,Uganda,theUnitedKingdomofGreatBritainandNorthern
Ireland,theUnitedStatesofAmerica,VietnamandZambiawererepresentedatthemeeting(CITES2013b).
241
(2014c:7)argues,thistimeonbehalfoftheGlobalInitiativeagainstTransnationalOrganized
Crime:
“AlthoughPartiesarelegallyboundtopenalizeviolationsofCITES,theConventionwas
draftedin1973and,hence,itswordingdoesnotreflecttheexistingsignificantand
seriouslevelsofsophisticatedandorganizedtrafficking.Itisacceptable,forinstance,
forPartiestorespondtoviolationsbywayofadministrative,asopposedtocriminal,
penalties.”
Accordingtothelawenforcementprofessional,theinternationalcommunityshoulddealwith
“environmentalorganizedcrime”intermsoftheUnitedNationsConventionagainst
TransnationalOrganizedCrimeandrequisitedomesticlawsthatdealwithorganizedcrime,
racketeeringorconspiracy.Theinternationallawenforcementcommunityhasputmeasures
intoplacetodealwithwildlifetrafficking(suchastheInternationalConsortiumonCombating
WildlifeCrime(ICCWC)297andtheINTERPOLWildlifeCrimeWorkingGroup);298wildlifecrime
isnonethelessconsideredthe“Cinderellaofcrimes”(Interviewwithlawenforcer8).299Andin
spiteofbeingbrandeda“prioritycrime”byregionalorganizationssuchastheSouthern
AfricanRegionalPoliceChiefsCooperatingOrganisation(SARPCCO)300anddedicatedwildlife
crimelawenforcementregionalnetworkssuchastheAssociationofSoutheastAsianNations
WildlifeEnforcementNetwork(ASEAN-WEN)301andtheLusakaAgreementTaskForce
297
TheInternationalConsortiumonCombatingWildlifeCrimeisaninitiativestartedbytheCITESSecretariat,
INTERPOL,theUnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime(UNODC),theWorldBankandtheWorldCustoms
Organization(WCO)tobolsterinternationalcooperationregardingthecombatingofwildlifeandforestcrime.
298
Therearenumerousotherinternational,regionalandsub-regionalinitiativeswiththeobjectiveoftackling
illegalwildlifetrade.Itisbeyondtheremitofthedissertationtomentionthemall.Afewinitiativeswerechosen
toillustratemyargument.Thischoiceshouldnotdetractfromthesignificanceandimpactofotherinitiatives.
299
Wildlifecrimeisperceivedasa‘soft’crimeamongstmanyactorsinthelawenforcementcommunityand
beyond.Interviewswithlawenforcementofficialsworkinginthefieldofwildlifecrimeinvestigationsrevealed
thattheyhadtodealwiththeperceptionthatwildlifecrimeswerelessseriouscrimes.
300
Formallyestablishedin1996,theSouthernAfricanPoliceChiefsCooperatingOrganization(SARPCCO)isa
regionalorganizationofChiefsofPoliceforSADCmemberstates.The15SADCmemberstatesarealsoSARPCCO
memberstates(SARPCCO2014).
301
TheAssociationofSoutheastAsianNations’WildlifeEnforcementNetwork(ASEAN-WEN)isaregional
intergovernmentallawenforcementnetworkdesignedtocombatwildlifetraffickinginSoutheastAsia.Brunei,
Cambodia,Indonesia,Laos,Malaysia,Myanmar,thePhilippines,Singapore,VietnamandThailandaremember
countries(ASEAN–WEN2014).
242
(LATF)302,investigationofwildlifecrimecarrieslessprestigeandstatus,andisevenperceived
asa‘careersideliner’inthesouthernAfricancontext(Interviewswithregionallaw
enforcementofficials,2012and2013).Whilerankedasthe4thmostlucrativeillegalmarketin
theworld,303lawenforcementofficerssecondedtowildlifeinvestigationsareperceivedto
drawtheshorterstrawincomparisontogettingcalleduptointernational,regionaldesksor
unitsthatdealwithdrugmarkets,humanandguntrafficking,orother“hardcrimes”that
have“human”victims(forgettingthattherehavebeendozensofhumanvictims–poaching
suspectsandrangerswhohavebeenkilledinthewildlife‘wars’insouthernAfrica).According
tothiscognitiveframing,wildlifecrimeisperceivedasavictimless(andhencelesser)crime
becauseitdoesnotcausedirectharmtohumans.Theframingomitsthatpoachingandillegal
harvestingofwildlifeharmsapublicgood.304Duetotheinvolvementoftransnational
organizedcrimenetworksinwildlifetraffickingwithlinksto“otherhardcrimes”this
perceptionisstartingtochange,aswellasthehighdeathrateofpoachingsuspectsand
rangerskilledinconservationareas(Interviewwithlawenforcers2,8,10;2013).
Itisbeyondthefocusofthisdissertationtoprovideanoverviewofalltheinitiativesand
campaignsoccurringattheinternationallevel.Sufficetopointoutthattheinternational
communityisgoingthroughthemotionsofsettingupinstitutional,regulatoryandlaw
enforcementinitiativestodealwithwildlifecrimesingeneral,andsomeinitiativesthatare
directedtowardsdisruptingthemarket.Whetherthesemeasuresaccruetonoticeable
302
TheLusakaAgreementTaskForceistheenforcementarmofthe‘LusakaAgreementonCo–operative
EnforcementOperationsDirectedatIllegalTradeinWildFaunaandFlora’.Theagreementfollowedworking
groupmeetingsbetweeneightsouthernandeasternAfricancountries,CITES,Interpol,theUSFish&Wildlife
ServiceandlawyersoftheFoundationforInternationalEnvironmentLawDevelopmentandformalinter–
governmentalnegotiationsundertheauspicesoftheUnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramme(UNEP).The
agreementhasbeencategorizedasaUNtreaty(Environment)andenteredforcein1996.Therearecurrently
sevenpartiestotheagreement:theRepublicofCongo(Brazzaville),Kenya,Lesotho,Liberia,Tanzania,Uganda
andZambia.Ethiopia,SouthAfricaandSwazilandaresignatories(LusakaAgreementonCo–operative
EnforcementOperationsDirectedatIllegalTradeinWildFaunaandFlora2014).
303
Researchreportsoftenciteanannualturnoverof8to10billionUS$inillegalwildlifemarkets,afigure
extrapolatedfroma2003mediareport(Colombo6September2003)andinterviewswiththeUSconservation
NGOCoalitionagainstWildlifeTrafficking(CAWT)byJeremyHarkenforareportcommissionedbytheUS
researchandadvocacyorganizationGlobalFinancialIntegrity(Harken2011:11).Whilethefigureappearsto
havenoscientificbase–andadmittedly,illegalmarketsarenotoriouslydifficulttoquantifyandtheannual
turnoverismorethanlikelymuchhigherthanthecitedfigure.Harken’sestimationhasbeenusedwidelyto
underlinetheimportanceandserious‘threatlevel’ofwildlifecrime.
304
Basedondiscussionsandcommentsmadeataworkshopofthe‘illegalmarkets’researchgroupattheMPIfG.
243
changestoactorsontheground–suchasrangersandanti-poachingpersonnel–issubjectof
Chapter7.ThefollowingsectionsexaminethedomesticresponsesinVietnamandSouth
Africa.Thetwocountrieswerechosenduetotheirimportantrolesinillegalmarket
structures.OtherstateresponsessuchasthoseofChinaandMozambiqueareconsideredin
context-specificsectionsofthedissertation.
5.3.1TheVietnameseresponse
Vietnamflewundertheradardespitebeingatransitandconsumercountryintheearlyyears
ofCITES(InterviewsinVietnam,2013)andlackedadequatelegislationuntilTRAFFIC,
conservationNGOsandtheCITESSecretariatidentifiedthesoutheasternAsiannationasa
majorconsumercountry(seeforexample:Milliken/Shaw2012;CITESSecretariat2013;
Nowell2012b).InJanuary2013,thePrimeMinisterofVietnamissuedDecision11onthe
prohibitionoftheexport,import,sellingandbuyingofspecimensofsomewildanimalspecies
listedundertheAppendicesofCITES.Thisdecisioneffectivelybansalldomesticsalesof
AfricanrhinohorninVietnam.Anexceptionexcludes“importsforthepurposeofdiplomacy,
scientificresearch,biodiversityconservation,displayatzoos,exhibitions,non-profitcircus
performances,lawenforcementandexchangeofspecimensamongstCITESmanagement
authoritiesofmembercountriesarestillallowed”(Vietnam2013).Theexceptionsrelatingto
theimportsofrhinohornforthepurposesofdiplomacyandlawenforcementarerather
curious(someresearchinformantsbelievedthistobeadeliberateloophole),asdata
collectedforthisprojectimplicatesbothdiplomatsandlawenforcementofficialsinthe
smugglingandtradingofrhinohorn.WhileHongKonghasreturnedconfiscatedrhinohornto
SouthAfricaforthepurposeofcriminalprosecutions(Interviewwithlawenforcementofficer
1,HongKong;Interviewwithgovernmentofficial3,SouthAfrica),areverseroutingof
‘confiscated’rhinohornintheoppositedirectionofthechainofevidence(toVietnam)seems
odd.Takenatfacevalue,thisdecisionappearstolegitimizetheillegalactivitiesofstate–
sanctionedactorswhohavebeenassociatedwiththeillegalsupplychain.Despitethese
specifiedexemptions,VietnamconfirmedtotheCITESrhinocerosesworkinggroupinJuly
2014thatnopermithadbeenissuedforivoryorrhinohornsincetheeffectivedateofthe
Decisionon24January2013(CITESRhinocerosWorkingGroup2014:5).
244
Vietnamalsobanned“non-commercialimportofhuntingtrophies”unlesscooperation
agreementshadbeensignedbetweentheVietnamCITESmanagementauthorityandthe
CITESmanagementauthorityintheexportingcountry(Vietnam2013:1).Atthetimeof
writing,VietnamesehunterswerestillbannedfromhuntinginSouthAfricaastheVietnamese
authoritieshadmadenofurtherprogressinensuringthatthehuntingtrophiesstayedwith
theoriginaltrophyhunter(Interviewwithgovernmentofficial3,SouthAfrica).Thisloophole
relatestothelackofregulationsandenforcementpertainingtowhathappenstohunting
trophiesoncetheyhavereachedVietnameseshores.Whilerhinotrophyhuntersarenot
allowedtoselltheirtrophies,therearenoregulationspreventingtheownersfromdonating
orgiftingthem.Infact,Vietnam’snationalcivillawpermitsthetrophyownertodecidehow
tousetheirtrophies.Becausehuntingtrophiesarecategorizedaspersonaleffectsinthe
SoutheastAsiancountry,authoritiessaidtheyfounditdifficulttocontrolandmonitorthem.
Inaddition,therearenopunitivemeasuresorpermitregulationsshouldthetrophyowner
decidetocutupthehorn(s)ordisposeofthetrophywithoutpriorauthorization(CITES
Secretariat2013:7–8).305VietnamwasonthereceivingendofagreatdealofcriticismatCoP
16.Vietnamesegovernmentofficialsdeniedthehugeroletheircountryplayedintheillegal
supplychainofrhinohornandpointedtheirfingersattheirneighbour,suggestingthat
VietnamservedasatransitandprocessinghubforrhinohornenroutetoChina(CITES
Secretariat2013,Interviewwithgovernmentofficial6,Vietnam).
Thetideseemstohaveturned:AprogressreportmadetotheCITESSecretariat(Vietnam
CITESManagementAuthority31January2014)onVietnam’scompliancewithdecisionstaken
atCoP16attheendofJanuary2014statesthatthecountry’sCITESmanagementauthority
haddevelopedadditionalenforcementmechanismstoprotect“precious,rareand
endangeredspecies”withaspecificfocusonrhino,elephantandpangolinproductsfrom
Africa.Themanagementauthorityisalsointheprocessofdevelopingacircularonthe
managementofhuntingtrophies.Thecircularisaimedatmonitoringthealterationof
importedhuntingtrophies.Atthetimeofwriting,thecircularhadnotbeenpublished.In
305
InitsSeptember2012reporttotheCITESSecretariat,Vietnamindicatedthatmanyhunterscutuptheir
huntingtrophies(thehorns)andgiftedpiecesofrhinohorntofriendsandfamily.WhentheManagement
AuthorityinVietnamundertook“randomchecks”ofhuntingtrophies,only7outof40trophieswerefoundinan
unadulteratedformwhile11hunterscouldnotbecontacted(CITESSecretariat2013:23).
245
February2014,theprimeministerofVietnamissuedanadditionaldirective“On
strengtheningthedirectionandimplementationofmeasuresforcontrollingandprotecting
endangered,rareandpreciouswildanimals”.Thedirectiveprovidesamandatetorelevant
ministriestotacklewildlifecrime.TheCITESrhinocerosworkinggroupinterpretedVietnam’s
recentactionsasademonstrationofpoliticalwilltotackletheillegalwildlifetrade(CITES
RhinocerosWorkingGroup2014:5).
5.3.2TheSouthAfricanresponse
ThepreviouschapterdealtwithhistoricalaspectsofnatureandrhinoconservationinSouth
Africa,thissectionexaminesthestatusquo.Theapartheidregime’sendorsementofCITESdid
notimpactthelegitimacyofthemultilateraltreatyamongstthefirstgenerationofnature
conservationbureaucratsinthenewSouthAfrica.306Uponelectionofthefirstdemocratic
governmentin1994,anewConstitutionclearedthewayfortransformationoflaws,policies
andtheapartheidbureaucracy.Environmentalrights,sustainabledevelopmentanduseof
naturalresourcesbecameenshrinedinthenewConstitution.Thus,Section24ofthe
Constitution(RepublicofSouthAfrica1996:6)reads:
“24.Everyonehastheright-
(a)toanenvironmentthatisnotharmfultotheirhealthorwell-being;and
(b)tohavetheenvironmentprotected,forthebenefitofpresentandfuture
generations,throughreasonablelegislativeandothermeasuresthat-
(i)preventpollutionandecologicaldegradation;
(ii)promoteconservation;and
(iii)secureecologicallysustainabledevelopmentanduseofnaturalresourceswhile
promotingjustifiableeconomicandsocialdevelopment(author’semphasis).”307
Theprotectionoftheenvironment–andbytheextension,therhino–isthusconsideredand
guaranteedbythehighestlawoftheland.Intheimmediateperiodfollowingtheendof
apartheid,severalsignificanteventsimpactedthestateofnatureconservation,knownas
environmentalaffairsunderthenewdispensation.Ontheeveofthefirstdemocratic
306
Somebureaucratsofthe‘oldapartheid’regime’sDepartmentofNatureConservationsurvivedtheregime
change,andwereco-optedbythenewgovernment.Thisstepassistedthepost-apartheidgovernmentin
utilizinginstitutionalmemorywhilealsomovingforwardwithnewpolicydirectives(Interviewwithgovernment
official3,2013).
307
Itisimportanttonotethatconstitutionalinterpretationmusttakecognizanceofinternationallaw.
246
elections,theformerfourprovincesandhomelands(knownasBantustansinapartheidlingo)
weresubdividedintonineprovinces.Saysagovernmentofficial(Interviewwithgovernment
official3,2013):
“AlthoughtheDepartmentwasthefocalpointforCITESandbecausetherewereonly
fourprovincesintheolddays,thefourdirectorswereattheforefront.Butthenfrom
1994,theroleoftheDepartmentstartedincreasing.Nowthereweresuddenlynine
andnotfourprovinces,therewasalotmorecoordinationtogetuniformsystemsand
trainingofthenewofficials.”
ThenewConstitutionopenedthefloorfortheclearingofanarsenalofdraconianapartheid
lawsandinstitutionsrelatingtoallsectorsofpublicandprivatelife.Concurrently,thewildlife
ranching,safariandgameindustriesexperiencedmassivegrowthastheendofapartheidhad
openeduppreviouslyuntappedinternationalmarketsofhuntersandtourists,whohad
boycottedthecountrypreviously.The1990salsosawsome‘dirtytricks’oftheapartheid
regimeexposed.The“KumlebenCommissionofInquiryintotheAllegedSmugglingandTrade
inIvoryandRhinocerosHorninSouthAfrica”(Kumleben1996)in1996andtheTruthand
ReconciliationCommission(TruthandReconciliationCommission1998)culminatinginthe
publicationofitsfinalreportin1998,revealedanundergroundnetworkofcorruptapartheid
politiciansandmilitaryintelligencepersonnelrunningsanction–bustingtradeofnatural
resourcesincludingivoryandrhinohorninAngola,Namibia(formerlyknownasSouthwest
Africa)andMozambique.Thenewenvironmentalaffairsbureaucracytransformedwithmany
formerpublicservantsfromtheoldregimeoptingoutbyacceptingretrenchmentpackages,
earlyretirementorjobopportunitiesintheprivatesector.Beyondtheinstitutionaland
staffingchangesintheDepartmentofEnvironmentalAffairs(itsnameandscopeofwork
wentthroughseveralchangesinthenewSouthAfrica),thecriminaljustice,security,law
enforcementanddefencesectorsequallyweretransformed.Ofimportancehereisthe
movementofapartheidcontrolagents(soldiers,policeofficers,intelligenceandtheupper
echelonsoftherelevantbureaucracies)intotheprivatesector.Itisperhapsnotsurprising
thatmanyofthe‘apartheiddogsofwar’wouldhaveendedupintheprivatesecurityindustry,
specificallyintheanti–poachingandwildlifeprotectionsectors.Afewoftheseformercontrol
agentshavejoinedpoachinggroups.OneofthemostnotoriouspoachersinKwaZulu–Natal
247
(KZN),forexample,wastrainedbytheapartheidregimetofightinthebushwarinsouthern
AngolaandagainstMKoperativesinKZN(Interviewwithanti–poachingofficial1,2013).308
Whiletheapartheidregimeendorsedthenotionofsustainableuse,thenewdemocratic
dispensationhasputagreateremphasisonsustainableuselinkedtocommunity
empowermentandsocialdevelopmentasenvisagedbytheConstitution.Thebasictenetof
thesustainableuseapproachis“ifitpaysitstays”andinitspureformeverypartofthe
animalisused“fromtiptotoe”(Interviewwithlawenforcer2,2013).SouthAfricaisa
memberoftheGroupofLike-MindedMegadiverseCountries(LMMC),309agroupof18
countriesthatharbourcloseto70%oftheworld’sbiodiversityandsharecommoninterestsin
conservationandsustainableuseofbiologicaldiversity.AfterBrazilandIndonesia,South
Africaranksthirdinbiologicaldiversityworldwide(DepartmentofEnvironmentalAffairs
2014c).Beyondtherhino,therearemanyotherplantandanimalspeciesteeteringonthe
brinkofextinctionlackingcelebritystatusorpublicsupport,310alsoinneedofmaterial
assistancefromgovernment,theprivatesectorandconservationNGOs(Baillie/Butcher
2012).TheSouthAfricangovernmentfindsitselfinaquandary,whenitcomestoassessing
whichspeciesareworthyofprotection.Currentlyalldisposableconservationfundsare
channelledintorhinoandtoalesserdegree,elephantprotection,securityandconservation.
Thesinglespeciesfocusanddevotionofadministrative,lawenforcementandfinancial
resourcescomeatalosstootheranimalandplantspeciesequallyormorethreatenedwith
extinction(Interviewwithgovernmentofficial1,2013).311
308
UmkhontoweSizwe(MK)–Zulufor‘SpearoftheNation’–wasthearmedwingoftheAfricanNational
Congress(ANC)duringtheliberationstruggleinSouthAfrica.
309
ThefollowingcountriesaremembersofLMMC:Bolivia,Brazil,China,Colombia,CostaRica,Democratic
RepublicofCongo,Ecuador,Guatemala,India,Indonesia,Kenya,Madagascar,Malaysia,Mexico,Peru,
Philippines,SouthAfrica,andVenezuela.Togethertheyhold10%oftheglobalsurface(Departmentof
EnvironmentalAffairs2014c).
310
ManyofthespeciesontheIUCNRedListofcriticallyendangeredspecies,aswellasthousandsofother
speciesofvaryinglevelsofimperilment,providenodirecteconomicbenefittopeople,andlittleisknown
whetherorhowtheirdemisewouldaffectsociety.Theseoftenlesscharismaticplantsandanimalsappearto
havelittlevaluetosocietyotherthanrepresenting“culturalorexistencevalue”;inotherwords,“theirvalueto
humanityisunknownortangentialatbest”(Baillie/Butcher2012:16).
311
ThisapproachstandsatloggerheadswiththeConventiononBiologicalDiversity,whichprofessesa
conservationofhabitatapproach.
248
InAugust2014,theSouthAfricancabinetadoptedanewintegratedstrategicmanagement
planforrhinos.Thisplandemonstratestheparadigmshiftfromapureconservationethosto
anessentiallymulti-layeredapproachthatattemptstosubsumerhinoconservation,rhino
management,rhinosecurityandsustainableuseunderonebanner.Theimmediacyofcurbing
illegalpoachingofrhinosinprotectedareasthroughsecuritymeasuresisgivenprominence,
signallingtheincreasingsecuritizationofrhinoconservation.Accordingtotheplan
(DepartmentofEnvironmentalAffairs2014a),thefollowing“integratedinterventions”willbe
adopted:
“Compulsoryinterventionsincludepro-activeanti-poachinginitiatives,the
implementationandimprovementofactionableintelligenceaswellasthe
introductionofresponsivelegislationandpolicyamendmentstoaddressrhino
poaching.Otherinterventionsincludecontinuedeffortstoincreaserhinonumbers
through,forexample,translocationtolowriskareas,range-andpopulation
expansion.Newinterventionsincludestepstodisruptcrimesyndicates.Thesewillbe
implementedbyourSecurityCluster.Long-termsustainablesolutions,toensurethe
futuresurvivalofthiskeyspecies,includethecreationofeconomicalternativesfor
communitiestakingintoaccountthegovernment’ssustainableutilisationpolicy.”
Inpursuitofthestatedlong-termobjectiveofsustainableuse,SouthAfricacontinuesto
campaignforthelegalizationoftradeinrhinohornattheinternationallevel.Keytogarnering
internationalsupportis“puttingSouthAfrica’shouseinorder”(Interviewwithgovernment
official3,2013).AlthoughperceptionsandthelegitimacyofCITESrangefromtacitacceptance
tosilentrebellionontheground,therelevantSouthAfricangovernmentinstitution,the
DepartmentofEnvironmentalAffairs(hereafterDEA)hasputmeasuresintoplacetocomply
withinternationalstandardsasenvisagedbyCITES,andtorespondtocallsfromcivilsociety
toaddresstherhinoissue.312Uponreceiptofawrittencautionfromthe57thStanding
CommitteemeetingofCITESaboutthelackofcompliancewiththeNationalLegislation
Project,313theDepartmentchangedgearsandtheCITESregulationswerepublishedinMarch
312
ASouthAfricancivilsocietygroupcalledAfriforumhasthreatenedtotaketheSouthAfricangovernmentto
courtforitsfailuretorolloutappropriatemeasurestoprotecttherhino(personalcommunication,2014).
313
CITESinitiatedtheso–calledNationalLegislationProjectin1992,withtheobjectiveofreviewingand
evaluatingnationallegislationsofCITESmemberstates,andbringingthemintolinewithCITESrequirements.
Countrieswerelistedinthreecategoriesdependentontheirlevelofcompliance.Category1signifiedfull
compliance,Category2partialcomplianceandcountrieslistedinCategory3failedtomeettherequirementsfor
implementationofCITES(Vasquez2003:64–65).SouthAfricahadbeenplacedinCategory2untilthe
promulgationoftheCITESregulationsin2010.Thecountryisnowfullycompliant(InterviewwithGovernment
Official3).
249
2010(DepartmentofEnvironmentalAffairs2010).DomesticatingtheCITESrequirementshad
beenputonthebackburnerinlieuoftheneedtodraftnewcomprehensivelegislation,
culminatingwiththeenactmentoftheNationalEnvironmentalManagementBiodiversityAct
(NEMBA)in2004,andthepromulgationoftheThreatenedofProtectedSpeciesregulations
(TOPS)in2008.TheTOPSregulationslistprohibitedactivitiesinvolvinglistedspeciesandthey
regulatehuntingandcompulsoryregistrationrequirements.Whiletheseregulationscomply
withthelegislativerequirementssetoutbytheCITES,implementationanddiffusionhave
beenslowattheprovinciallevel.Thereisalsolimitedcongruenceoftheninesetsof
provincialenvironmentallegislation.AlthoughthethenDepartmentofEnvironmentalAffairs
andTourism(thedepartment’snameatthetime)hadconsultedvariousstakeholdersand
localcommunitiesbeforedraftingtheregulations,thefinalversionandlistofprotected
specieswerenotcommunicatedaheadofpublicationandimplementation(Institutefor
SecurityStudies2009–2010,Interviewwithconservator2,2013).SimilartoJohnSellar’s
critiqueregardingtheadequacyofCITESasaninstrumentinthefightagainsttransnational
organizedcrime(comparewiththesubsectionon“Theinternationalresponse”),law
enforcementofficialsinSouthAfricahaveexpressedcontemptuoussentimentsaboutthe
TOPSregulations.Saysonelawenforcementofficial(interviewwithlawenforcer8,2013):
“Theymakeregulations.Whomakestheregulationsregardingenvironmental
affairs...therhinoregulations?Peopleinenvironmentalaffairs,ok.Buttheyhaveno
experienceorknowledgeoftransnationalorganizedcrime.Theyarecompletelyoutof
theirdepth.Andthat’snotbeingarrogant,it’sjustnottheirexperience.”
Moreover,theenforcersoftheregulations–provincialgovernmentofficials–hadneither
beensufficientlyinformedofthenewregulationsnorweretheyprovidedwithadequate
trainingpriortothepromulgation(Interviewwithprovincialgovernmentofficial,2013).
Interviewsheldwithprivaterhinoowners,conservatorsandotherwildlifeprofessionals
revealedwidespreadcontemptfortheTOPSregulationsbutthebruntofcritiquewasdirected
atthenationalmoratorium.MrMarthinusvanSchalkwyk,theformerMinisterof
EnvironmentalAffairsandTourismdeclaredanationalmoratoriumonthesaleofindividual
rhinohornsin2009(DepartmentofEnvironmentalAffairsandTourism2009)–domestic
tradeofrhinohornhadneverbeenbannedandpresentedaloophole,whichcriminalactors
werereadilyabusing.AswillbeshowninChapter6,afewprivaterhinoownersandwildlife
250
professionalsprocuredrhinohornundertheguiseofdomestictradeandsolditillegallyto
Asianorganizedcrimenetworks.Beyondincomegenerationthroughthesaleofliverhinos,
tourismandtrophyhunting,thedomestictradeinrhinohornprovidedanadditionalincome
streamtoprivaterhinoowners.ThereishowevernodomesticmarketforrhinohorninSouth
Africa,suggestingthatsellersandbuyerswereeitherstockpiling,orlaunderinghorninto
illegalsupplychains.Inresponsetothegrowingdiscontentamongprivaterhinoowners,the
DEAagreedtoconductafeasibilitystudytoprobewhethernationaltradeinrhinohorn
shouldbereopenedin2010.Whileacknowledgingthatthemoratoriumfailedtoreducerhino
poaching,thestudyrecommendsthatthetradebanshouldnotbeliftedasyet.Theauthors
(Taylor,Andrewetal.2014:10–11)suggeststhefollowingplanofaction:
“SouthAfricashouldnotliftthenationalmoratoriumatthepresenttime.However,it
shouldimmediatelystartdevelopingasecurenationalelectronicpermittingsystemto
bringnon-complianceissuesundercontrol.Thismustbelinkedtoarhinodatabase
thatincludeshornstockpileandDNAprofileinformation.Privaterhinoownersmust
beincentivisedtocontinueprotectingrhinosduringthisperiod.SouthAfricamust
continuetoshowthatitiscomplyingwithCITESResolutionConference9.14(Rev.
CoP15)toavoidpotentialpunitivemeasuresfromPartiesand,ifaproposalfor
legalisinginternationaltradeistobesubmitted,SouthAfricashouldbeprepared
beforethedeadlineforsubmissionsforCoP17in2016.”
In2012,aLimpoporhinobreederstartedtolitigateagainsttheSouthAfricangovernmentto
havethemoratoriumlifted.JohnHume,theworld’sbiggestprivaterhinoownerjoinedJohan
Krügerin2015.Thepairarguesthatthegovernmentisinfringingontheirconstitutional
rights,astherighttosustainableutilizationisentrenchedwithintheConstitutionofSouth
Africa(Krüger/Hume2015).Thelegalchallengetothedomestictradebanrepresentsalawful
expressionof‘contestedillegality’againstthemoratorium.Inthisinstance,therhinobreeders
arenotusingtheirdiscontentwiththemoratoriumtolegitimizeillegaltradepracticesbut
theycontestthelegalityofthetradebanonthebasisofthehighestlawoftheland.However,
itremainsunclearwhotheirdomestictradepartnerswouldbe,shouldtheywinthecourt
case.314
314
HighCourtJudgeLegodisetasidethemoratoriumduetoinsufficientpublicconsultationinSeptember2015
(Legodi2015).TheMinisterlodgedanoticeofleavetoappealsoonafterthecourt’sdecision,effectively
suspendingthejudgmentuntiltheappealisheardin2016.
251
BecausetheTOPSregulationsapplytoSouthAfrica’snationaljurisdictiononly,CITES
processesareusedtodealwith‘import’countriesandtradethattranscendshernational
borders.ThemarriagebetweentheTOPSregulationsandCITESprocesseshasbeendifficult,
asthechannelsofcommunicationwerepatchyatfirst.Forexample,provincialgovernment
officialsdealwithnationalandinternationalhuntingandtrophyapplicationsandpermits
withintheirprovince,whereasnationalgovernmentofficialscommunicatewiththeCITES
Secretariatanditsvariousenforcementbodiesregardinginternationaltradeandexport.In
lightofthepseudo–huntingphenomenon(whichisdiscussedinChapter6),involvingrhino
‘hunters’fromVietnamandotheratypicalcountriesoforiginfortrophyhunters(suchasthe
CzechRepublicandPoland),allrhinohuntingapplicationshavetobeforwardedtothe
nationaldepartmentforarecommendation.Thisnewprocedurederivesfromthepracticeof
illegitimatehunters“province–hopping”inordertoshootmorethanonerhinoperyear
withoutdetectionbyprovincialpermitofficials,whohaveonlyoversightofwhathappenson
theirowndoorstep(thepermissiblehuntingquotaisonerhinoperhunterwithinacalendar
year).Previously,provincialpermitofficershadnorecoursetodeterminingwhetherahunter
hadshotrhinosinanyoftheothereightprovinces.Oncethenationaldepartmenthasmadea
recommendation,theprovincialpermitofficermaythenissueorrefuseahuntingpermit.
Althoughthenationaldepartmenthasacentralizeddatabaseinplace,itisnotconnectedto
othercrimeorbiodiversitymanagementdatabasesasyet.Atthetimeoftheinterviewinmid2013,seniormanagementhadapprovedthetermsandconditionsfortheprocurementofa
comprehensiveelectronicdatabase.However,thepropersupplymanagementprocedures
andthetenderprocesshadtobefollowedanditwasunclearasofwhenthedatabasewould
bereadyforuse(Interviewwithgovernmentofficial4,2013).315
TheTOPSregulationsandthemoratoriumlacklegitimacyandbuy-infromwildlife
professionalsaswellasprivatelandowners,whofeelthattheywerenotsufficientlyconsulted
aheadofthepromulgationwhilebeingtheonesmostaffectedbythenewstatusquo.In
addition,manyprovincialgovernmentslackthestaffing,fundingandexpertisetoimplement
thecomplexnewregulations(Interviewwithprivaterhinoowners;privatesecurityactorsand
315
By2016,therehadbeennoprogressregardingthecentralizeddatabase.However,lawenforcementofficials
wereintheprocessofstreamliningpermittingprocedures,whicharelikelytobecentralizedandcontrolled
exclusivelybythenationaldepartment.
252
wildlifeprofessionals).Thepermittingsystemdiffersacrossthenineprovinceswithvarying
degreesofefficiency,responsivenessandaccountability.
Theperceivedlackoffollow-upconsultationwithrelevantstakeholderschangedwiththe
appointmentoftheRhinoIssueManager(RIM),MavusoMsimangwhowasassignedthetask
ofconductingaseriesofstakeholderengagementstoaddresstheprotectionandsustainable
conservationoftheSouthAfricanrhinopopulationsduring2012.Theso–calledRIMprocess
entailed16workshopsheldintheSouthAfricanprovincesofGauteng,KwaZulu–Natalandthe
WesternCape.UltimatelytheRIMtalksassistedtheDEAindevelopingtheSouthAfrican
positioninpreparationfortheCITESCoP16heldin2013(Msimang2012:7).Msimang(2012:
9)pointstothediscrepancybetweenscientificdatacollectedoveryears,andpositionsthat
werebasedon“sentimentaloraestheticconsiderations”.Thedistancebetweenhardsciences
andemotionisoneofthekeyelementscausingariftamongdifferentactorswithintherhino
management,conservationandassociatedprotectioneconomies.ThefinalRIMreport
proposesanumberofmeasurestosavetherhino,mostimportantlytheopeningof
internationaltradeinitshorn:
“Theabsenceofasinglestrategytoquellandannulrhinopoachingcallsforthe
judiciousemploymentofseveralcarefullythought–outinterventionsinaportfolio
approach.Intheimmediateterm,therecanbenosubstituteforheightenedsecurity
usingthetriedandtestedrangerbolsteredbythebestavailabletechnologies.
Simultaneously,biologicalconservationmeasures,includingrangeexpansion,should
beinvestigatedandimplemented.Finally,aslongasthereisdemandforrhinohorn,
effectivemeansofsupplyingit,mustbeworkedoutthatwouldhavetheeffectof
savingthelifeoftherhino.Thesestrategiesmustbefinalizedwithurgencyandan
applicationmadetotheConferenceofPartiestolegalizetradeinrhinohorn(Msimang
2012:10).”
IntheaftermathoftheRIMtalksanInter-MinisterialCommittee316wassetuptodeliberate
thepossibilityofalegaltradeinrhinohorn,supportedbyaCommitteeofExperts(CoE).The
CoEcommenceditsworkinApril2014(DepartmentofEnvironmentalAffairs30June2014)
andprovideditsfinalreporttotheMinisterin2015.TheSouthAfricangovernmentis
316
TheMinistersofEnvironmentalAffairs,InternationalRelationsandCooperation,TradeandIndustry,Finance,
ScienceandTechnology,Agriculture,ForestryandFisheries,RuralDevelopmentandLandReform,Economic
DevelopmentandTourism,SafetyandSecurity,JusticeandCorrectionalServicesarerepresentedintheInterMinisterialCommittee.
253
acknowledgingthatprotectivemeasuresarefailing.Whetherareversalofthetradebanis
goingtosavetherhinoisahighlycontestedissueinSouthAfricaandbeyond.Sufficeto
mentionherethatchampionsoftheso-called‘anti-trade’faction(whichisbynomeansa
homogenousgroup)areoftheopinionthattheSouthAfricangovernmentlacksthepolitical
willtosavetherhino,andisintheprocessofsigningofftherhino’sdeathwarrantbyeven
entertainingthoughtsofreopeningthetrade(Interviewswithrepresentativesofconservation
NGOs,2013,2014and2015).Otherthansuggestingsupplementary,somewhatdraconian
security,militaryandanti-poachingmeasures,theanti-tradefactionoffersnoalternative
approaches.Laterchapterstouchonmilitaryandsecuritymeasuresemployedtoprotectthe
rhinos.Sufficetomentionherethattheserhinoprotectioneconomieshavebecomemultimillionenterpriseswiththeinvolvementofmanyactorsfromtheprivatemilitaryandsecurity
sectorsinSouthAfricaandbeyond,themilitary-industrialcomplex,wildlifeprofessionals,as
wellasamultitudeofintelligenceoperatives.
Theinternationalregulatorystipulationshavebeendomesticated;liketheinternational
conventiontheylackbroad-basedlegitimacyandsupportbythosemostaffected.In
conclusion,itshouldbenotedthatillegalflowsofrhinohornhavenotbeendisrupteddespite
theSouthAfricangovernment’smulti-levelandmulti-departmentalapproachtoprotecting
therhino.
5.4Concludingremarks
Thischapterexploredtheinternationalpoliticalprotectionregimethatledtotheillegalization
ofthetradeinrhinohorn.Stateactorsconceivedofthemultilateralenvironmentaltreaty
morethanfortyyearsago.Inotherwords,theillegalizationofthetradeinrhinohorn
commencedin1977.Priortothat,marketexchangesinvolvingrhinohornwereeitherlegalor
undetermined.Inthisinstance,acommunityofstates,theCITESCoP,determinedthetrade
ban.Thebanitselfisambiguousasitonlyconcernsinternationaltradeofrhinohorn,leaving
spaceforillegalmarketactorstomanoeuveratthedomesticlevel.Thepowerdynamicsand
influenceofnortherncountriesandconservationNGOsatCITEShaveledtogrowing
disgruntlementamongstthecustodiansofmostoftheworld’sremainingbiodiversity.
254
Regulatorsandopinion-makersonthesupplysidehavestampedCITESasa‘neo-colonial’
institutionwhileimportantconsumerstatesjoinedCITESonlyyearsafteritsinception.
Irrespectiveofpowerpoliticsandthenorth-southdivide,thediffusionofthetradebanwas
goingtotaketimeinlightofthetransnationaldimensionsofrhinohornflows.Ideally,
illegalizationatthenationallevelwouldencompassaprotractedprocessofconsultationwith
affectedconstituencies.Lawenforcementofficialshaveexpressedconcernsofwhethertrade
bansappropriatearemeasurestodisrupttransnationalorganizedcrimenetworks.
ThechapterexaminedhowSouthAfricaandVietnamdomesticatedCITESobligations,
demonstratingthedifficultiesofimplementinginternationalcommitmentsthatareoutof
touchwiththerealityontheground.Whilemostcountrieshaveillegalizedrhinohorntrade,
hornconsumptioncontinuestohoverinagrayzone.Chapter3pointedtothesocial
legitimacyandculturalsignificanceofrhinohorninkeyconsumernations.Thesacred
valuationofrhinohorninsuchcountriesunderminesthelegitimacyofthetradeban.This
stateofaffairsisaccentuatedbythefactthatpublicofficialsareimplicatedintraffickingand
distributionnetworks,suggestingthatthetradebanhasbeenineffectiveincurbingsupply
anddemand.
255
Chapter6:Ridingontheedgeoflegality:Interfacesbetweenlegal,
grayandillegalmarkets
“Itisoneguyusingitasadoorstopper;thenextguyputsitintohissafewithagold
chainaroundit.Theywantthemoratoriumtohavestartedthepoaching;itmakes
sensefortheirargument.Theywanttoblamesomethingfortherightthathasbeen
takenawaytomakemoney.Theytryandsaythetradewasgoingtomakeusrich.
WhichSouthAfricanisgoingtopay25,000Randforonekgofrhinohorn?Sothat
argumentdoesn'tstickforme(Interviewwithlawenforcementofficial,2013).”
6.1Introduction
Chapter4providesanintroductiontotheprivatizationandcommodificationoftherhinoon
thesupplysideofthemarket.Thischaptercontinueswithanexaminationofrhinohorn
‘production’317onprivateland.Thismodeof‘production’constitutedtheprincipalsourceof
supplyofSouthAfricanrhinohornbetweenthelate1960sandlate2000s.Actorscapitalizeon
theliberalinterfacebetweenlegalityandillegality.Bolsteredbysentimentsofcontested
illegalityandlegality,theseactorshavenoqualmstoexploitregulatoryloopholes.Involved
arewildlifeprofessionals318withintimateknowledgeoftheproduct(rhinohorn)andofthe
institutionalandlegislativeframeworkgoverningtheinternationaltradeofrhinohorn.These
actorsbelongtoinfluentialandtransnationalsocialnetworkswithlinkstopoliticaland
economicelitesinsupply,transitandconsumercountries.Rhinoowners,professional
hunters,wildlifeveterinarians,corruptgovernmentofficials,diplomats(theirroleisdiscussed
inChapter7and8)andothercategoriesofwildlifeprofessionalsaretheprincipalactorsin
thismarketsegment.
Wildlifeprofessionalsarealsoinvolvedintheillegalhuntingofrhinosonprivateandpublic
hunting(suchaschemicalpoaching);319organizedillegalhunting(poaching)isdiscussedin
317
Theterm“production”referstothesupplystageofthemarketandisusedinreferencetomarketstructures
andprocesseshere,andnotasanormativeclaimregardingconditionsonrhinofarms.
318
Theterm“wildlifeprofessional”referstoanyindividualwhoisinvolvedinthetransporting,translocation,
well-being,management,farming,breeding,huntingandsecuringofwildlifeonprivateorpublicland(my
definition).
319
WildlifeprofessionalsuseaveterinaryanaestheticdrugcalledM-99(oritsgenericformulation)during
‘chemicalpoaching’incidents.Poachersdartrhinosanddehornthemwhiletheyareanesthetized(Hübschle
256
Chapter7.Thischapterdrawsondatafromseveralcourtcases,aswellasprimarydata
collectedduringfieldwork.Thefocusisonillegalhuntingwhilealsotouchingonthepractice
ofunregisteredstockpilingandhornlaundering.
6.1‘Putandtake’andotherhuntingtransgressions
TheBuijsreport(1987)referredtoapracticeknowncolloquiallyas‘putandtake’(introduced
inChapter4).Thetermreferstothehuntingofarhinoshortlyafterdeliverytoaprivategame
reserveorgamefarm.Inotherwords,therhinoisliterally“put”intoahuntingreserve,only
tobe“taken”outbywayofhuntingshortlyafteritstranslocationtothehuntingreserve.The
practicecommencedinthe1970sandcarriesoninvariouspermutationstothisday.Forthe
purposesofclarity:trophyhuntingofwhiterhinos320boughtfromthestateisnotillegalper
se;infact,thestateacknowledgestheneedforeconomicincentivesfor“thecontinued
growthandexpansionoftherhinopopulationsandrangethroughtheintroductionofherdsin
newareas”whichare“reliantontheprivatesectorandcommunitiesmakingtheirland
availablefortheintroductionofrhinossourcedfromprotectedareasandprivatelyowned
herds”(RepublicofSouthAfrica2013:6).However,trophyhuntingthatleadstolimitedorno
populationgrowthandrangeexpansioncontradictsandunderminesthespecified
conservationobjectivesofthestate.Accordingtowildlifeprofessionals(Interviews,2013),
somehuntingoutfitterswouldkeepthesamenumberofrhinosintheirreservesand“new
stock”wouldbebroughtinfortrophyhunts.Inessence,thisformof‘putandtake’involvesa
deadlygameofmusicalchairs.Onewildlifeprofessionalrecountedhowheandhiscolleagues
deliveredmorerhinostoaspecifichuntingoutfitinoneweekthananallegedkingpin“didin
hiswholetimeofdoingpseudo-hunting”(Interview,2013).Whilethisformof‘putandtake’
waslegalonpaperatthetime,therhinotrophiesemanatingfrommany‘legalhunts’were
2014:47).Wildlifeveterinariansareusuallycomplicitinsuchpoachingincidents,whichmayalsorequirethe
servicesofhelicopterpilots.Wildlifeinvestigatorshavedubbedtheactas“chemicalpoaching”duetotheuseof
pharmaceuticaldrugs(“chemicals”).
320
“OperationRhino”,theNatalParksBoard’srhinorangeexpansionprogrammecoincidedwiththe
economizationoftrophyhunting;inotherwords,trophyhunterswerewillingtopayforthestalkingofanimals
asofthelate1960s.Whiterhinosbecamesought-aftertrophyanimalsinSouthAfrica.Blackrhinonumbers,
meanwhile,weretoofewtooffertrophyhunting.
257
solddirectlytoAsianbuyersorlaunderedintoillegalflows.Saysthesamewildlife
professional(Interview,2013):
“Wewereshootingtheshitoutofthem,probably100amonthbuteverythingwas
legal.Youknow–that'sthethingifit'slegal,yougetpermitsforitandyouboughtit,
whynot?…[…]…Theminute,theymadeitillegal–I'mnotwillingtotouchitifcan't
getapermit.Idon'tmindmakingabuck,butIdon'tdoillegalshitandgotojail.”
Interviewswithorganizedcrimeinvestigators,formerandactiveconservatorsconfirmedthe
highprevalenceofthepractice.Rhinohornsderivingfrom‘putandtake’operationsfedinto
illegalhornflowsfromelsewhereinSouthAfricaandsurroundingcountries(including
Namibia,Zimbabwe,andMozambique)enroutetoconsumermarkets.Oncethesupplyof
hornshadebbedofffromsourcesnorthofSouthAfrica,SouthAfricanwildlifeprofessionals
steppeduptomeetthesupply.Itisdifficulttoestablishhowmanyrhinoswerehuntedby
wayof‘putandtake’,asexistingofficialdatabasesonthesaleofliverhinos,hunts,and
trophyexportsonlycaptureofficialnumbers.Oneinformantremarked:
“There’samassiveblankfromwhenfuckingTRAFFICstoppedmonitoringstuffuntil
theyrealizedtherewasshit.Andinthatvoidwehaveonlythefarmersandthevets
thatknowwhatweweredoing.Butyoucan’ttellanyonebecauseotherwisetheyare
goingtoputyouintojail.Eventhougheverythingyoudidatthetimewaslegaland
nowtheywanttotryandfuckingcatchsomeone.Theseareguysthatwerelegally
involvedinsomething,whichisnowillegal.Howdoyouwanttoprosecutethem?
Nobodyisgoingtoadmittoanything.Theywillstandtogether.”
Theinformantalludestoasocialbondamongstwildlifeprofessionalswhojustify‘putand
take’anddomestictradeofrhinohornasapracticepermissiblebythelawoftheland.There
isatacitacknowledgmentthattheseunbridledeconomicactivitiesmaylacksociallegitimacy
inbroadersociety.Awildlifeveterinarian,forexample,describedthehunts(including
pseudo-huntingwhichisdiscussedbelow)as“pre-moratoriumlegal(butunethical)hunts”
mainlyinvolving“surplusbullsintheindustry”(Schack2012:1).Empiricalevidenceconfirms
thatbullsweretheprincipaltrophyanimals;however,afewhuntingoutfittersofferamore
exoticbouquetofhuntingsafarissuchashuntingmultiplerhinosononepermit,hunting
younganimals,huntingofrhinoswithrestrictedhuntinggear(includingcrossbowsorbow
andarrows),or“canned”BigFivehuntingfromhelicopters(Interviews,2013).
258
Theknowledgethatsomeactivitiesmightbeconstruedaslegalbutillegitimateorunethical
(thesectionon‘contestedillegality’willdiscussthisinmoredetail)mightexplainwhythe
sectorcontinuestobeshroudedinsecrecy.Consecutivesurveysofrhinosonprivateland
sketchahistoricalnarrative(seealsoChapter4)ofhowconservationauthoritiesexperienced
difficultiesinaccessinginformationonthefateofrhinosboughtfromthestate,andtheir
progenyfromtheearly1970sonwards.Anauthorofthelatestsurveyonrhinonumbersand
stockpilesonprivateland,undertakenbetween2008and2011,remarkedthatthesurvey
obtainedaresponserateof25%fromrhinoowners(JoShaw,personalcommunication,
2015).Earliersurveysachievedevenlowerparticipationnumbers(Hall–Martinetal.2008).
Thequestionariseswhythemajorityofrhinoownersarenotwillingtoprovideinformation
ontheirrhinonumbersorthesizeoftheirrhinohornstockpiles.Naturally,onceproperty
rightswereconferreduponprivateindividuals,rhinosmovedfromthepublictotheprivate
sphere.Thisnewbreedofprivaterhinoownershadbecomesoleproprietorsofrhinoswithno
reportingoraccountabilityfunctionsobtainingfromtheconversionofacommongoodto
privateproperty.Thisstateofaffairsisdifferenttorecentcustodianshipprograms,where
communitiesorindividualsreceiveuserrightswhilerhinosremainthepropertyofthestate.
Insomeinstances,privatesales,translocations,thesaleofgamereservesandfarms,orthe
creationoflargeamalgamatedreservesandbiospheresledtoobfuscationastorhino
ownershiporlocation(Buijs/Papenfus1996:1–2).Thiswasnotnecessarilyapurposeful
attemptatcreatingsmokescreens.Theregulatoryframeworkgoverningmovement,
translocationsandprivatesaleorbartertradeofrhinoscameonlyintoforcewhenthe
NEMBAActwasenactedandtheTOPSRegulationswerepromulgatedin2004and2008
respectively.Yetrhinoownersmaintainthatthestateshouldhavenobusinessastokeeping
trackofthefateofthefoundingpopulationsandtheirprogeny(Interviewwithrhinoowner
10,2013)because“whathappensbehindthisgamefenceismybusiness”(Presentationby
conservator14,2015).ThisattitudeprecedestheperiodofpoliticaltransformationinSouth
Africaanduncertaintyaboutthefutureofthefarmingcommunity.Therewerefewlegitimate
reasonstoconcealsuchinformationintheheydaysofapartheidunlesstherewereindeed
illegal,unethicalorillegitimateactivitiestakingplace.Inpost-apartheidSouthAfrica,the
whitefarmingcommunityremainsdistrustfulofthedemocraticallyelected(mostlyblack)
government.Whilethewhitefarmingcommunityisbynomeansahomogenousgrouping,its
strongpoliticaltiestotheapartheidregime,economicprivilegesandsupport(suchas
259
subsidies,marketingboardsandpropertyrightsofwildanimals)andexploitativelabour
relationsonsomefarmshadcontributedtolarge-scalesocialengineeringinSouthAfrica’s
ruralareas,andupheldthesocialstructureandeconomicpowerbaseoftheapartheidstate
(seealsoChapter4).Thisprivilegedstateofaffairsshiftedtoincorporatetheinterestsofrural
(black)dwellersandcommunitieswiththechangingofthepoliticalguardin1994.
OnceNEMBAandtheTOPSregulationscameintoeffect,wildlifeprofessionalsreportedthat
uponapplyingforpermitstohuntordehornrhinos,ortoregisterrhinohornstockpiles,
poachershittheirreservesororganizedgangsrobbedtheirstockpilesatgunpoint(Interview
withrhinoowner1&6,2013).Rhinoownersfeltthatfulldisclosureputthematriskfor
poaching,farmattacksortheftfromrhinohornstockpiles.Whilesuchfearsarelegitimate,
thepeersofrhinoowners–suchasmembersofthePrivateRhinoOwnersAssociation(PROA)
–struggletogainaccesstothis‘privileged’informationtoo(Interviews,2013).Thislackof
transparencymightultimatelyderailthequestforthelegalizationofthetradeinrhino
horn.321
Dishonestyornon-disclosureispartiallylegitimizedbypointingto“corruptpermitofficers”or
tootherpublicofficialsperceivedasharbouringconnectionstoorganizedcrimegangs.322In
otherinstances,roguefarmersorwildlifeprofessionalsinstigatedrobberiesandtheftas
smokescreenstocacheillegalhuntingordehorningofrhinos(Interviewsandfocusgroups
withlawenforcementofficials,2013).Awarenessof‘foulapples’inthepeergroup,the
associatedfearofstigmaaswellassilentrebelliondirectedatpublicofficialsand“theirnew
regulations”alsoexplainwhynon-disclosure,obfuscation,andsecrecyofrhinopopulations
andstockpilesheldinprivatehand,continuetocharacterizetherelationshipofsomeprivate
rhinoownerswiththestate.Thisenvironmentofdistrustandsecrecyhasallowedrogueand
unethicalwildlifeprofessionalstoflyundertheradar,whoareprotectedthroughamutual
321
TheCITESSecretariathasadmonishedSouthAfricainthepastforfailingtofurnishdetailsonthesizeof
privaterhinohornstockpiles,aswellasexactfiguresofrhinocrashesheldonprivateland.
322
Whileracismandracialdiscriminationarestillwidespreadacrossmanycommunitiesinpost-apartheidSouth
Africa,thewhitefarmingcommunityisrenownedfordiscriminatoryandracistpractices(comparewithChapter
4).Althoughtherehavebeenincidencesofcorruptionwithinthelawenforcementandnatureconservation
bureaucracies,theassumptionthatallpublicofficialsofthenewdispensationarecorruptandcorruptiblehasto
bereadinthecontextofawhitesuperioritycomplexsupportedbyracistapartheidideologiesofyesteryear.
260
distrustbythewhitefarmingcommunityofthenewgovernment,itslandreformprogramme
andbroad-basedblackempowermentpolicies.
Regardlessoftheprevailingsecrecy,‘putandtake’ofrhinobullsboughtfromthestate
happenedwiththeindirectsanctioningofthestate(Interviews,2013);parkofficials,for
example,knewthatarhinobull’slifeexpectancywassignificantlyshortenedwhensoldtoa
huntingoutfitteroragamereservethatofferstrophyhunts.ScientistsarguethattheSouth
Africannationalherdwasonlyabletorecoverandincreasetoitscurrentsizebecauseprivate
andcommunalfarmersmadefarmlandavailableforrangeexpansion(Emslie/Brooks1999:
33).The‘carryingcapacity’ofnationalparksandnaturereserveshadbeenreached.Scientific
studieslegitimizethehuntingof“surplusbulls”or“problembulls”bywayofdemonstrating
aninherentmalegenderbiasinrhinopopulations.TheSADCRhinoManagementGroup
(RMG)foundthattherewasa53%malesexratioofblackrhinoatbirthinthesouthern
Africanregion.Someblackrhinopopulationshavehenceapronouncedmalebias
(Knight/AfricanRhinoSpecialistGroup2013:2).Abehaviouralstudyofwildblackrhino
populationsinNamibia(Berger1995:1–2)suggestshoweverthatsecondarysexratios323
favourfemaleblackrhinos,asmalerhinosaremorepronetohumanpredation,afinding
consistentwithdatafrom12blackrhinopopulationsacrossAfrica.Themalebiasappearsto
beofgreatersignificancewhenitcomestosemi-wildorcaptivebredrhinopopulations.Few
rhinobullsarerequiredtoachieveidealbreedingconditionsandsignificantpopulation
growth.Aranchingmanualsuggestsaratioof2maleto4femalewhiterhinos(duToit1998:
11).Breedingbullsshouldbereplacedeverysixyears“beforetheystartbreedingwiththeir
ownoffspring”whileagevariance,amongstotherfactors,canaffectdominancepatterns
amongrhinobullswhichinaworstcasescenariocanendinthedeathofmalecompetitors
(duToit1998:29).
Blackrhinosareknownasthemoreaggressiveandsolitaryoftherhinospeciesthus“problem
bulls”havebeentraditionallyassociatedwiththeblackspecies,whereasthemorenumerous
whiterhinostendtobeassociatedwiththemanagementissueof“surplusbulls”.Bothof
323
Theprimarysexratioreferstothesexratioatthetimeofconceptionwhereasthesecondarysexratioisthe
sexratioatthetimeofbirth.
261
theserhinomanagementissuesareconflatedinpublicandpolicydiscourseonthematter.
Whiletheonedoesnotprecludetheother,theyshouldbeseenastwodistinctmanagement
issueswithseparateoutcomes,dependingonthespecies,habitatandbreedingformat.
Governmentauthorities(theNamibianandSouthAfricangovernments)employtherationale,
whichlegitimizesthetrophyhuntingorsaleof“problembulls”and“surplusbulls”324at
intervalstomaintainthehealth,longevityandsocialstructureofrhinoherds.325Animal
activistshavesuggestedthattranslocating“problemanimals”tootherlocationscouldsave
theanimal’slife(Fears[3January2015]2015).Suchtranslocationscomehoweveratahigh
price.326Movingsurplusorproblembullstootherrhinopopulationsmaybeequally
problematicastheseherds“donotwantadditionalmales”(Knight/AfricanRhinoSpecialist
Group2013:2).Inlightofseverelyconstrainedconservationbudgets,governmentauthorities
cannotaffordtotranslocate“problemanimals”(Interviews,2013).Meanwhile,animal
activistsarenotfrontingthemoneytoundertakethesuggestedtranslocations,whichinvolve
findingsuitableland,capture,translocationandon-goingmanagementandmonitoring
(Knight/AfricanRhinoSpecialistGroup2013:5).Whiletherearenoreliablestatisticsabout
thepercentageof“problembulls”inrhinoherds,327someconservatorsandanimalactivists
324
AstatewitnesscalledonbehalfoftheStateinaggravationofsentenceduringtheLemtongthaitrial(the
linkedphenomenonofpseudo-huntingisdiscussedinthenextsection)concededthattherhinosthatwere
huntedandkilledduringthepseudo-huntingexpeditionshadbeensurplusbulls“thatweredestinedtobeshot
bytrophyhunters”(Navsa/Wallis/Swain2014:12).TheappellatejudgerulingonbehalfoftheSupremeCourtof
Appealsregardedthisconcessionasadistinguishingfeatureofthiscaseofpseudo-huntingfrom“thoseofthe
conventionaltypeofpoacher,namely,apersonwhokillsindiscriminatelywithoutanypretenceoflegality”
(Navsa/Wallis/Swain2014:12).
325
TheNamibiangovernmentisallowedtosellfiveblackrhinohuntsperannum.Thefullquotahasneverbeen
exploited.In2013,theDallasSafariClub(DCS)auctionedoffablackrhinohuntingpermitonbehalfofthe
Namibiangovernmentfortheheftysumof$350000.Animalactivistshavecriticizedtheauctionandpetitioned
theUnitedStatesFishandWildlifeServicetopreventtheimportofthehuntingtrophy.
326
ConservationorganizationRhinoswithoutBordersisplanningtomove100whiterhinosfromSouthAfricato
Botswanaatacostof$45000peranimal(approximately40266€peranimal)(Paul2014).Thetranslocationof
desert-adaptedblackrhinosinNamibiacostsanestimated$10000peranimal(approximately8940€)involving
theuseofhelicoptersinremoteareas(Fears[3January2015]2015).
327
InresponsetothefalloutaftertheDCSauctionintheUS,theAfricanRhinoSpecialistGroup(AfRSG)provided
thefallingdata:
“Basedonextensivemonitoringofthespeciesinitskeyrangestatesoveranextendedperiodweknow
thatsomeblackrhinosarebeingkilledinfightswithaggressivebullsandthatvaluablebreedingfemales
andtheircalvesaresometimeskilled.Thisismorelikelytobethecasewhendensitiesbuilduprelative
tocarryingcapacityinanarea,andwherebreedingpopulationshaveamarkedlymalebiased
population.(SADCRMGdatashowsthatfrom2007-2011fightingdeathswerethesinglegreatest
knowncauseofknownblackrhinodeathsinNamibia(31%)withfemalesandsub-adults/calvesmaking
262
havequestionedtheperceivedhighincidenceof“problemanimals”(Interviews,2013).There
havebeensuggestionsthatthenotionof‘problembulls’isexploited(personal
communicationwithconservator,2014)328tosell“surplusbulls”forprofittohunting
outfitters.Rhinobreedersalsousethelackofbreedingsuccessasalegitimationdeviceto
allowtrophyhuntsofnon-breedingrhinocows(Interviews,2013).
Whilethestate’sadoptionofthenotionof“problembulls”and“surplusbulls”isembeddedin
scientificdiscourse,criminalactorshaveabusedthenotionof“problemanimals”tolegitimize
illegalhuntingofrhinos.TheUSindictmentofDawieGroenewald329chargesthatthealleged
rhinohorntraffickersoldillegalrhinohuntstoAmericanhuntersatgunandhuntingshows
(thenextsectionprovidesmoredetailsontheGroenewaldgang).TheownerofOutofAfrica
AdventurousSafarisandhisUS-basedbrotherJannemanGroenewaldclaimedallegedlythat
particularrhinoshadtobehuntedbecausetheypresenteda“problem”,werea“nuisance”,a
“menace”,“aggressive”and“dangerous”or“mean”(TheGrandJuryfortheMiddleDistrictof
Alabama2014:8–14).TheGroenewaldbrotherstoldtheirAmericanclientsthatbecausethe
deadordartedrhinos330were“problem”animals,theirremains/hornscouldnotbeexported
asatrophy.Inlieuofreturninghomewiththehuntingtrophy,thehunterscouldtake
measurementsoftherhinohorns.Theycouldalsotakephotosandvideosofthehuntand
themselvesposingwiththedeadanimal.Accordingtotheindictment,Groenewaldsoldthe
up26.7%and35%ofallfightingdeathsrespectively)(Knight/AfricanRhinoSpecialistGroup2013:1).”
328
ASouthAfricanprofessionalhunter,hisUSclientandconservationofficialslinkedtotheNamibianMinistryof
theEnvironmentandTourism(MET)wereinvolvedinablackrhinobulltrophyhuntin2013,whichledtothe
wrongfulkillingoftheonlyblackrhinocowinMangettiNationalParkinNamibia.Thequartetallegedlythought
thattheywerestalkingarhinobull.Thetrophyhunterclaimedthatheshottherhinocowafteritchargedthe
huntingparty.Thecasehasbeenmiredincontroversywithanecdotalevidencesuggestingfoulplay,bribesand
expirationofhuntingpermits(personalcommunicationwithprofessionalhunterandconservator,2014).
329
Theallegedrhinopoachingkingpinfaces1736countsofracketeering,moneylaundering,fraud,intimidation,
illegalhuntinganddealinginrhinohornsinSouthAfrica.TheprovisionaltrialdatewassetforAugust2015butis
likelyonlytogoaheadin2016(Rademeyer2014a).
330
TheSouthAfricangovernmenthasbannedso-called‘greenhunts’or‘dartingsafaris’whiletheSouthAfrican
VeterinaryCouncilhasdeclaredtheman“unethicalprocedure”in2010(SouthAfricanVeterinaryCouncil2010).
Originallyconceivedas“auniquesynergybetweensportshuntingandconservation”(SouthAfrica.info2005),
greenhuntsinvolvethetemporaryimmobilizationofwildanimalsforresearchormanagementpurposes(South
AfricanVeterinaryCouncil2010).Unscrupulouswildlifeoperatorsexploitedgreenhuntsbydartinganimalstoo
frequentlywithoutconsiderationfortheanimal’swell–beingorthelong-termeffectsofrepeatedanaesthesia
(Interviews,2013).
263
rhinohornsobtainedfromthesehuntstocriminalnetworks(TheGrandJuryfortheMiddle
DistrictofAlabama2014:8),thusprofitingfromboth:theillegalhuntstolegitimatetrophy
hunters,andthesubsequentillegalsaleofrhinohornstocriminalactors.TheAmerican
hunterswereallegedlynottoldthatthesehuntswerenotpermitted(lackedtherequired
paperwork)andwereinviolationofSouthAfricanlaws.Itisnonethelessrathersurprisingthat
thehuntersboughtGroenewald’sfabricationsandrelinquishedthecollectionoftheirhunting
memorabilia.
‘Putandtake’transactionscouldalsoinvolvetheexchangeofrhinosforotherspeciesof
wildlifeorrhinohornwithoutanymoneyexchanginghands.Arhinobreedercould,for
example,exchangetwoyoungrhinobullsforafixednumberofwildanimalswithanother
farmer.Thebreedercouldalsoswapthesametwoyoungrhinobullsformultiplesetsofrhino
horn.Breederswerealsopayingwildlifeprofessionals(e.g.wildlifeveterinariansorwildlife
capturers)withunregisteredrhinohorn.331Thestatewouldhavenorecordofthese
transactionsbecausetherewerenoofficialpapertrailsnorwasthereanyexchangeofmoney
perse.Awildlifeprofessionalexplains(Interviewwithwildlifeprofessional2):
“…inthatprocesstherewasthedeadlytimingofotherguysrealizing:wecansell
theselegallytoguysthroughhunts.Therewereseveralguystryingtojumpontothe
bandwagon.ThefirstguytodoitproperlywasoldMrSmithandtherewasawholebunch
ofothersthatyouhaven'theardofbecausetheywerethecleverguys.Theidiotsgot
caught.Theguysthatbehavelikeidiots,theyaretheonesthatcomeinwithorganized
crimeconnections.Withthestartingofthepseudo-hunts,guysgotawobblethatwecan't
shootrhinosanymore.IthinktheshitstartedatoldTimBartonnearStevenvander
Merwe.Hewasalsobuyingquitealotofstuff[rhinohorn]fromSteven.Theguyswere
doinghuntsatTimBartonandwewoulddropofflittlerhinos–twoorthree-year-olds.
Theywouldshootthoseandleavewithbigrhinohorns,whichcamefromSteven.Hesaid
331
WildlifetransportersandgamecapturershavesmuggledrhinohorninsidetranslocationcratesfromSouth
AfricatoAsiancountries(Interviewwithroguewildlifeprofessional2;lawenforcementofficial2;rhinofarmer
12;2013).Accordingtoawildlifeprofessional(Interview;2013):
“Atthesametimewewerestartingtosendallourrhinoout–shipmentstoChina–youknowandwhen
weweresendingourshipmentstoChina,therewerelotsofhornsgoingwiththoserhinos.Soeachbaby
rhinohadabigrhinohornlyinginitscrate.Ifanybodysaidanything,thenthisallhadjustbroken
off…[…]…thesewerenotsmugglingnetworks,organizedcrime–thesewerejustguysthathavemade
theconnectionandwhosaid:“Let'sdothisaswell".Inthatprocess,everybodystartedtorealize:
“Wow,lookwhatwecangetforthestuff."
264
hehadsomanyrhinos,whatishesupposedtodowithit.Then,whentheyputthe
moratoriumon,that'swheneverythingchanged.”332
Regulatorshavetriedtoaddressthepracticeof‘putandtake’.Regulation24ofthe
ThreatenedorProtectedSpeciesRegulations(TOPS)directsthatrhinosmayonlybehunted
24monthsafterintroductionintoanareatoallowthemtoestablishageneticline(Friedmann
etal.2011:3).Inpractice,thisregulationisdifficulttoenforce–andoperatorshavealready
devisedamechanismtobypasstheregulation,the‘swapandtake’method.Inthisinstance,
therhinoownerswapsthenewlyacquiredrhinowithanextantrhinoonthefarm,whichis
thenmadeavailableforatrophyhunt.Both‘putandtake’and‘swapandtake’areonthe
borderlinesofwhatconstituteslegalityandillegalityandwithoutscrutiny,thelineiseasily
crossed.Moreover,‘putandtake’enabledotherformsofillegalhunting,dehorning,andhorn
launderingonprivateland.
6.2Permitfraud
Allmodesofhorn‘production’onprivatelandsharethecommonalitythatperpetrators
displaydetailedandextensiveknowledgeoftherulesandhowtobypass,floutorbreakthe
same,orexploitlegalloopholes.Whilewildlifeprofessionalsandrhinoownerstendtoregard
thelaw(NEMBA),theregulations(TOPSregulations)andthemoratoriumondomestictrade
asresponsibleforthesurgeofpoaching,theregulatoryframeworkdidnotemergefroma
vacuum.Infact,asdocumentedinpreviouschapters,thefirstrulesgoverningthe
managementandspecificallythehuntingofwildlifewerepassedduringcolonialtimes.The
breakingorfloutingofhuntingruleswasseenagentleman’sderelict(unlessitinvolved
indigenoushuntersorAfrikaners)and,insomecases,itwasariteofpassage.Adouble
moralitylegitimizesmodernrulebreaking,partiallylinkedtoasenseofentitlementand
privilege,andtheearlieraverredto‘silentrebellion’tothenewrule–makersand“theirrules”.
Awildlifeprofessionalexplains(Interview,2013):
332
Thenamesofindividualsmentionedinthecitationhavebeenchangedtopreservetheanonymityof
respondents.
265
“Thewayitusedtowork,thelawwasalwaystherebutnobodyeverpushedit.Within
48hoursoftheguygettingthehorn,youhadtogotonatureconservationandgeta
chipin.Andthenyoucouldapplyforapermitandsellit.Asyouhadapermittosell
andtrade,theyneverkepttrackofanything.Youcouldsellwithoutanyonenoticingor
caring.Andbecauseitwasn'treallycheckedon,ifyouhadapermitforonehorn,you
coulduseitforweeksormonths.Sowhatalotofpeoplemissisnotonlythe
entitlementthatthefarmerfeelsandthatheistrulyentitledto.Hejustboughtthis,
mostofthemcomefromthepark.”
Thequotationabovereferstothemostcommonformofpermitfraudbeforethe
implementationofstricterregulationsandenforcement(Interviewswithlawenforcement
officialsandconservators,2013).Wildlifeprofessionalswouldusethesamepermittoshoot
anddehornmultiplerhinos.Or,aswasthecaseinsomeprovinces–mostnotablyinthe
northernLimpopoProvince,wildlifeprofessionalscouldusea“standingpermit”forwhite
rhinohuntsoncertainproperties.Inotherwords,huntingoutfittersappliedforablanket
permitonceandafterthattheyhuntedwithoutfurtherpermitsandstatesupervisionon
thesepropertiesuntilAugust2008(Milliken/Shaw2012:38,Interviewswithwildlife
professionals,2013).
6.2.1TheGroenewaldgang
Theprevioussectionreferredtothealleged“rhinohornsyndicatekingpin”Dawie
Groenewaldandhisaccomplices,knownastheGroenewaldgangorthe“Musinagroup”.333
Therhinopoachingsyndicatefaces1736countsofracketeering,moneylaundering,fraud,
intimidationandillegalhuntinganddealinginrhinohornsinSouthAfrica(Rademeyer2012)
whiletheUSindictmentallegesthattheGroenewaldsiblings(seeearliersection)soldillegal
huntstoUStrophyhunters.AccordingtotheSouthAfricancriminalindictment(compare
with:NationalProsecutingAuthority2011),Groenewaldandhisaccompliceswereinvolvedin
intricatescams,rangingfromfalsepermitapplicationsthroughtoillegaldehorningofrhinos
andthelaunderingofunregisteredrhinohorns.Rhinosandrhinohornswereacquired
333
MusinaisabordertownintheLimpopoProvince.DawieGroenewald’sfarmcalledPrachtigislocatednear
MusinaandmostoftheSouthAfricanwildlifeprofessionalswithdirectlinkstohiscriminalnetworkliveinthe
townornearby.
266
throughavarietyofgrayandillegalchannels.Thecourtcaseislikelytoresumein2016after
severalpostponementssincetheinitialarrestsofgangmembersin2011.334Amongst
Groenewald’sco-accusedarewildlifeveterinarians,professionalhunters,apilot,farm
labourersandtwowives(hisownandthewifeofwildlifeveterinarianKarelToet),335who
assistedwiththepermitapplicationsandotheradministrativetasks.TheGroenewaldgang
enteredintobusinessventureswithrhinofarmersandwildlifeprofessionals,manyofwhom
wereunawarethattheywerebreakingthelawatthetime.Whatrendersthiscaseinteresting
isthedemonstrableinterfacebetweenlegalityandillegality.Thefollowingsectionprovidesa
fewexamplesoftheGroenewaldgang’sactivities.
GroenewaldhuntednumerousrhinosillegallyonhisfarmPrachtiginthenorthernLimpopo
Province(theindictmentallegesthathekilled59ofhisownrhinos)andprocuredliverhinos
andrhinohornsfromotherrhinofarmers.Itisallegedthathedehornedrhinosandsoldat
least384rhinohornsoverafour-yearperiod(Jooste2012).Theroleofprofessionalhunter
NardusRossouwiscentraltoillegalandpseudo-huntshunts(seealsonextsection)conducted
onPrachtigandotherhuntingreserves,aswellasobtainingrhinosandhornsonbehalfofthe
gang.Groenewald’slistofrhinoandrhinohornsuppliers,andserviceproviders(game
capturers,transporters,hunters,butchers,etc.)readslikealistofthe“who’swhointhe
wildlifeindustryofSouthAfrica”–includingthenamesoftheworld’sbiggestrhinobreeder
JohnHume,MarnusSteylwhocollaboratedwiththeLaotianXaysavangnetwork(discussedin
detailbelow)andtheKrugerNationalParkassupplierofliverhinos(comparewith:National
ProsecutingAuthority2011).IntermsoftheNationalEnvironmentalManagementof
BiodiversityAct(NEMBA),separatepermitapplicationshavetobetenderedtodehorna
rhino,totransportrhinohorns,aswellastopossessrhinohorn.AccordingtoColonelJooste’s
affidavit(Jooste2012:14),336theGroenewaldgangfloutedtheserulesonnumerous
334
Thecourtbidtogetthedomesticmoratoriumonthetradeinrhinohornlifted(seeChapter5)ledtolatest
courtpostponementintheGroenewaldcase.Prosecutorsbelievethatthemerits(orlackthereof)ofthatcase
arelikelytoimpacttheoutcomeoftheGroenewaldcase.
335
WhileSarietteGroenewaldandMarizaToetweretheadministratorsandbookkeepersofthegang,thefact
thattheyarethewivesoftwocentralplayersinthenetworkisemphasizedherebecausetheirfamilytiesrender
themtrustworthy,andimportantassets.
336
ColonelJohanJoosteheadstheEndangeredSpeciesUnitattheDirectorateforPriorityCrimeInvestigations
(DPCI),SouthAfrica’sorganizedcrimefightingunit.
267
occasions.Thecarcassesofrhinosthatwereallegedlyillegallyhunted,killedanddehornedon
Prachtigwereeithersoldtoalocalbutcher,337buriedorburnt(Jooste2012:11).
Aninnovativemethodinvolvedthere-saleortradeexchangeofdehornedrhinos.JohnHume,
forexample,accepted14dehornedrhinosinrespectofadebtowedtohimbyGroenewald
(Jooste2012:76-77).KarelToet,Groenewald’sveterinarian,dehornedtherhinosbeforethe
livebutdehornedanimalsweresoldtofellowrhinobreeders.Hewasalsoinchargeof
translocatingandsellingrhinosthathadbeendehorned.Severalhundredrhinoswere
allegedlydehornedandtheresultanthornswerelaunderedintolegalorgraysupplychains.
GroenewaldandToetdidnotonlydehornrhinosonGroenewald’sfarmPrachtigbutare
believedtohaveoffereddehorningservicestofellowrhinobreedersacrossSouthAfrica.
Toet’swifeMarizaandGroenewald’swifeSarietteappliedandfalsifiedpermitsfor
translocationsanddehorningofrhinos(e.g.usingthesamemicro-chipnumbersagain,using
expiredpermitsorswappingpermits).338TheirrolesintheGroenewaldsyndicateshouldnot
beunderestimated,astheywereallegedlyresponsibleformultiplefraudulentpermit
applications.Thesealsoincludedapplicationsforrhinotranslocationsthatneveroccurred
(withtheobjectiveofhidingillegallydehornedrhinos)throughtoapplicationsfor
translocationsofdehornedrhinoswithoutseparatepermitsfor‘missing’rhinohorns,which
shouldhavebeenregisteredaspartofGroenewald’sprivatestockpile.Thetwowivesare
heavilyinvestedinthebusinessventuresoftheirhusbandsasshareholders,bookkeepers,and
administrators.339DirectfamilytiestocentralfiguresintheGroenewaldgang,aswellasthe
women’sfinancialandcriminalinvestment(culpability)helptoresolvethecoordination
problemofsecurity.Throughtheclevermanipulationofpaperwork,thewomenwere
responsibleforthesafeand‘legal’transferofillegallyobtainedrhinohornfromlegitimate
rhinobreedersandwildlifeindustryplayerstoAsianmarkets.Theadageof‘bloodisthicker
thanwater’isofimportancehere.
337
39carcassesweresoldtoalocalbutcherbetween2008and2010.
338
Whenarhinoisdehorned,thehornhastobemicro-chippedandregisteredwithnatureconservationofficials.
339
SarietteGroenewald,forexample,holdsa50%stakeintheprivatecompanyCatfishInvestments59.Sheis
theonlymemberoftheclosedcorporationValinorTrading142CC.ThegangusedValinorforthefinancial
aspectsof‘OutofAfricaSafaris’andValinorTrading.
268
Insomeinstances,Groenewaldandhiscolleaguesfailedtonotifynatureconservationofficials
beforemovingrhinostootherpropertiesdespitebeingexplicitlyorderedtodoso,thus
bypassinginspectionsthatwouldhaveidentifiedfraudulentpermitapplications.Inanother
incident,theGroenewaldgangallegedlytriedtoobstructthecourseofjusticebyoffering
bribestoaninvestigatingofficertolooseacasedocketregardingtheunlawfulpossessionof
elephanttusks.OneofGroenewald’sassociateshaddeliveredthetuskstotheVietnamese
ownerofawarehouseattheChinaMallinJohannesburg(Jooste2012:66-67).When
fraudulentpermitapplicationsfailed,thegangwouldthusattempttocorruptrelevantpolice
ornatureconservationofficialsasacontingencyplan(anothersecurityprecautiontoresolve
thecoordinationproblemofsecurity).Groenewaldwasarrestedforanillegalleopardhunt
andexportoftheleopardtrophyintheUSin2010.WhileunderhousearrestintheUS,he
allegedlyinstructedfellowsyndicatememberTielmanErasmustostageahousebreakingon
hisfarm.Hesuspectedthatenvironmentalmanagementinspectorswouldinspectthefarmin
hisabsenceandfindnumerousdehornedrhinosbutnorhinohorns(Jooste2012:12).
Groenewald’sattempttocachehisillicitactivitiesthroughstagingahousebreakingfailed,
andformspartofthestate’sindictmentagainsthimandhisgang.
Groenewaldhadstrongsocialnetworkswithfellowmembersofthewildlifeindustryin
southernAfricaandbeyond(includingtheUS)whowerewillingtoconductbusinesswithhim.
Theexistenceofsocialtiesthatstretchedbeyondhisimmediatesocialnetworkgave
Groenewaldthecompetitiveedge(comparewith:Morselli2001:228).Sociallyembeddedin
thesouthernAfricanwildlifeindustrywithstrongbusinessconnectionstotheconsumer
market(Vietnam),aswellasextensiveknowledgeofthetricksofthetrade,Groenewaldwas
inanexcellentpositiontoprocurehighvolumesofrhinohornthroughgrayandillegal
channels.Manyhornprocurementmethodscrossedthefinelinebetweenlegalityand
illegality.Whilefellowwildlifeindustryplayersoftenthoughtthattheywereactingwithinthe
ambitofthelawwhentransactingwiththegang,Groenewaldandhisassociateswerefully
awareoftheregulationsandhowtobypassthem.Althoughitwasillegaltohuntanddehorn
rhinoswithouttherequiredpaperwork,thegangmanagedtoselltheircriminalandgray
activitiesaslegitimatebusinessenterprises.Tosomebusinesspartners,tradingrhinoorrhino
hornswithGroenewaldatthedomesticlevelappearedtobelegitimate.Moreover,the
privatizationofrhinosandtheentitlementtodo‘asyoupleasewithyourownproperty’
269
allowedmanycriminalandgrayactivitiestogoundetectedforseveralyears.Itisparticularly
surprisingthatGroenewaldconductedbusinesswithagentsofthestate(heboughtrhinos
fromtheKNP),evenaftertheDirectorateforPriorityCrimeInvestigations(DPCI)had
commencedwithProjectCruiser,aninvestigationintohisfraudulentandcriminaloperations.
Thecomplicityofwildlifeprofessionalssuchaswildlifeveterinarians,helicopterpilots,
professionalhuntersandfellowrhinobreedersfacilitatedthegang’sactivities.
6.2.2Thepseudo-huntingphenomenon
AnothercreativewayofsupplyingAsianconsumermarketswith‘legally’attainedrhinohorn
involvedhuntersoriginatingfromcountriesthathavenotraditionorcultureofsports
hunting.Incontinuationofcolonialbiggamehuntingandsafaris,themajorityoftraditional
rhinohuntersheraldfromEuropeandNorthAmerica(Interviewwithprofessionalhunter,
2013;datasuppliedbyPHASA,2013).Asoftheearly2000s,anewbreedofhuntersarrived
onSouthAfricanshores(seeGraph4).YoungVietnamesenationalswithnooralimited
(sometimesfalsified)trackrecordoftrophyhuntingbookedwhiterhinohuntswithSouth
Africanoutfitters.IntermsofCITESstipulationsanddomesticlawsinSouthAfrica,huntersare
allowedtoshootonewhiterhinopercalendaryearwhiletheannualquotaforblackrhinosis
restrictedtofiveanimals.Thesehuntingtrophiesmaybeexportedashuntingmemorabiliafor
non-commercialuse.Vietnamesecrimegroupstogetherwiththeirlocalintermediaries
recruitedVietnamesecitizensasstand-introphyhunterstobypasstheruleof‘onewhite
rhino,perperson,perannum’.Theirrolewashencetoposeastrophyhuntersforthe
purposesofcompliancewithpermitregulationswhileaSouthAfricanprofessionalhunter
wouldshoottherhinoontheirbehalf.ItismandatoryintermsofSouthAfricanlawthata
SouthAfricanprofessionalhunterandanofficialfromnatureconservationaccompanyeach
rhinohuntingparty.Theprofessionalhunterisonlysupposedtodispatchtheso-called‘kill
shot’ifthehunterasperthehuntingpermitfailstokilltherhinowithhisorherfirstshotand
theanimaliswounded.Knownas“pseudo-hunting”,alawenforcementofficialexplainsthe
phenomenonasfollows(Interview;2013):
270
“Whenthedemandgrew,theydecided:let'sgoandhuntrhinos.AsaPH[professional
hunter]andanoutfitter,youneedtosellyourhuntsasapackage.Itisacontractwith
requirements.ThereisnohuntingofferedinVietnam.Theydonothavefirearmsand
theydonotbelongtoahuntingfraternityandthereisnohuntingfraternityin
Vietnam.SowhythehellwouldyoucometohuntarhinoallthewayfromVietnam?
Withalltheseguidelinesthatyouhave,theyarenothunters.Icanshowyoupictures
ofpeoplethatsupposedlygohuntinginhighheels.Andifyoucheckallthesehunters
involvedinthesetrophyhunts,theyarebetweentheagesof26and32.Ifyou
comparethattotheirincome,thenyouaskyourselfwhatdoesitcosttobeahunter?
Whatdoesitcosttohuntarhino?Theyareshotinlessthanhalfanhour;theypay
cash.Theypayforthathuntbetween500,000and1millionRand340–onlyforthe
horn.Whathappenstothosetrophies,theysupposedlygotothetaxidermist.And
thentheygetlostinthesystem.Loadsoftaxidermistsarecomplicit.Theyusethe
systemtodefraudthestate.Ahunterhuntsformemorabilia.Butwhatdotheseguys
do?Theyhuntforcommercialexploitation,whetheritisforlibationcuporforstatus
inthecountry.Iftheyareinvolvedinpseudo-hunts,thefarmersbuyrhinosatauctions
andinlessthan48hourstherhino'sshot,fromauctiontograve.”
TheCITESregulationsbanthecommercialexploitationofrhinohorn;rhinotrophieshave
hencetobeexportedandstayintact(asopposedtotheexportofthehornsonly,piecesof
hornorpowderedhorn)andtheymaynotbetradedcommercially.
Graph4:Nationalityofhuntersapplyingforwhiterhinohuntsjuxtaposedagainstthe
averagepriceoftrophyhunting,2004-2011
Source:GraphextractedfromMillikenandShaw(Milliken/Shaw2012:53);datacompiledbyMichaelKnight(No
huntingpermitdatawasavailablefor2008)
340
Thisamountsto47420€to94950€.
271
Theonlypermissibleuseofarhinotrophyisthusashuntingmemorabiliainthetrophy
hunter’sprivatecollection.
Whilerhinohornobtainedthroughpseudo-huntingpassedasalegalflowoutofSouthAfrica
initially,lawabidingwildlifeprofessionalsandconservationofficialsbecamesuspiciousonceit
becameapparentthattheyoungSoutheastAsianhunterswerestand-in’stoobtainrhino
hornthroughlegalchannels(Interviews,2013).Theafore-mentionedTOPSregulationsalso
targetedthisillegalpractice.Theresilienceandcreativityofrhinotraffickersisapparentinthe
employmentofnewstrategiestobypassregulationsandthelaw(seenextsection).
Officialrecordsshowthattheexportationof‘legally’attainedrhinohornfromSouthAfricato
Vietnamwasprevalentthroughoutthe2000s.TheCITESTradeDatabase(Graph5)providesa
registeroflegallyexportedandimportedrhinotrophiesandotherrhinoproducts(suchas
rhinotailsandgenitalia)fromSouthAfrica.VietnamesehornimporterswereusingCITES
exportpermitstoimportmultiplerhinohornsonthesamesingle-useexportpermitto
Vietnamuntilitsexpirationdatewasreachedaftersixmonths(Milliken/Shaw2012:58).
Graph5:SouthAfrica'sofficiallyreportedexportdataversusVietnam'sofficiallyreported
importdataofrhinohorn(2003-2010)
Source:CITESAnnualReportDataprovidedin(Milliken/Shaw2012:59)
AccordingtoannualexportandimportdataprovidedtoCITES,Vietnamacknowledgedreceipt
ofabout25%ofthelegallyimportedrhinohorntrophiesbetween20003and2010.This
272
discrepancysuggeststhatapproximately487of657‘legal’rhinohornsenteredtheillegal
marketinVietnam(Milliken/Shaw2012:58).Asrecentas2012,SouthAfricareportedthe
exportof16rhinohornsand13rhinotrophiestothesoutheasternAsiancountry.Aboutthe
former,Vietnameseauthoritiesconfirmedtheimportof28horns(adifferenceof12
additionalrhinohorns)andinreferencetothelatter,ofthe13trophiesonly1wasregistered
forimportationuponarrivalinVietnam(CITESTradeDatabase2012).Directexportsofrhino
trophiesfromSouthAfricatoVietnamstoppedentirelyby2013(CITESTradeDatabase2013).
Inexcessof400rhinotrophies(800horns)were‘legally’exportedtoVietnamfrom2003to
2012(Carnie2013).
6.2.3Thaisexworkersastrophyhunters
UnliketheVietnamesepseudo-hunterswhohadtobeflowninfromtheirhomecountry,a
Laotianwildlifetraffickingnetwork,usingafrontcompanycalled‘XaysavangTradingExportImport’,341employedaclevercost-savingmeasure.TheThairepresentativeofXaysavangin
SouthAfricarecruitedThaisexworkerswhowerealreadybasedinSouthAfricatoaccompany
himandhisSouthAfricanintermediariestoprivatehuntingreservesandfarmstoactas
stand-insfortrophyhunters.Thewildlifetraffickersthussavedonfinancingtravelcostsfrom
SoutheastAsiatoSouthAfrica.Alocalhenchman342trawledthroughJohannesburg’sstrip
clubsandbrothelsinsearchofThainationals343withvalidtraveldocuments,whichwere
341
InvestigativejournalistJulianRademeyer(2012)providesadetailedaccountoftheXaysavangwildlife
networkinhisbookKillingforProfit.ChumlongLemtongthaiwasrunningtheSouthAfricanoperationofthe
networkuntilhisarrestin2011andsubsequentconvictionin2012.Hewassentencedto40yearsimprisonment,
whichwasreducedtoa30-yearsentenceonappealin2013(Tsoka/Levenberg2013).TheSupremeCourtof
Appealheardthecasein2014andshortenedLemtongthai’ssentencetoaneffective13-yearprisontermandaR
1millionmonetaryfine.Failingpaymentofthefinewouldleadtoaneffectiveperiodofimprisonmentof18
years(Navsa/Wallis/Swain2014).
342
JohnnyOlivierthelocal‘handlanger’(helper)ofChumlongLemthongthaiturnedagainstthewildlifecrime
networkandbecamethestarstatewitnessagainsttheThainational.Hispolicestatementandvariousinterviews
withjournalistsprovidedinsightintotheinnerworkingsofthenetwork.Hismotivationtoturnagainstthe
networkisdiscussedlaterinthissection.
343
JohnnyOliviersuggestedthattheThaiwomenmighthavebeentraffickedtoSouthAfrica(Olivier2011:2).
AnothercriminalactorlikewisemaintainedthattheXaysavangnetworkwasalsoinvolvedindrugandhuman
trafficking(Interviewwithsmugglingintermediary,2013).
273
neededfortheapplicationforhuntingpermits.TheXaysavangwildlifetraffickingnetworkhad
initiallyextendeditsoperationstoSouthAfricainabidtosourcelionbones,teeth,andclaws,
whichweresoldassubstitutesfortigerbonesintraditionalChinesemedicinepreparations.344
UponarrivalinSouthAfrica,thetransnationalcoordinatorandtransporterofthenetwork
ChumlongLemthongthaisawadvertisementsforBigFivehuntsincludingrhinoandinformed
hisbossofthis“businessopportunity”.Keentofund“anytradeinrhinohorn”,theLaosbasedkingpinVixayKeosavangorderedLemthongthaito“makeinquiries”
(Navsa/Wallis/Swain2014:9,Interviews,2013).ThenetworkfirstappearedontheSouth
Africanpolice’sradarwhenfivemembersofferedtensofthousandsofDollarsforthreerhino
hornstoanundercoverpoliceofficerin2008(Connett2014).TheXaysavangnetwork’s
infamouspseudo-huntingschemecommencedinlate2010.Ofsignificancewasaclear
separationofduties.ThesyndicatesoughtoutSouthAfricanwildlifeprofessionalsand
conservationofficialswithapenchantfor“dodgydeals”thatwouldfacilitatetheirnefarious
activitiesbyavailingtheirservicesandprovidingunhinderedpassageofrhinohornoutofthe
country.Tothewildlifenetwork,cooperationwithSouthAfricanwildlifeprofessionals
involvedlittleeffortandoperationalrisk.However,the‘legal’exportofhuntingtrophies
involvedcomparablymoreadministrativeandorganizationalfootworkthanapoaching
excursionintoaprotectedareawould(Interviews,2013).
Thelocalorganizerofthesepseudo–huntswasaSouthAfricangamefarmerandsafari
operatorwhoemployedtheservicesofaprofessionalhuntertoshoottherhinosonbehalfof
theThaipseudo–hunters.MarnusSteylfirstsuppliedlionbonesandlaterprogressedto
rhinos,arrangingrhinohunts,theremovalandweighingoftherhinohorns.Theliverhinos
werepurchasedatdiscountedpricesatauctionsasrhinofarmerswerestartingtooff-load
rhinosinthefaceoftheescalatingpoachingcrisis.Hewouldalsofindfarmersandoutfitters
344
CriminalsyndicatesselllionboneastigerbonetounsuspectingconsumersinSoutheastAsia.Traditionally
tigerboneiscookedupintoajelly-likesubstanceknownas‘tigercake’orimbibedas‘tigerwine’(Interviews
withTCMpractitioners,HongKong,HanoiandHoChiMinhCity,2013).Whiletheillegalsupplychainoflion
bonewasnotthefocusofmyresearch,interviewswithrhinohornsmugglersandtradersindicatedthatwildlife
traffickerswereseldomspecies-specificbutincludeanumberofendangeredorthreatenedspeciesandother
contrabandintheirsmugglingbouquet.ThearrivaloftheXaysavangnetworkinSouthAfricacoincidedwitha
drasticincreaseoftheofficiallyrecordedexportdataoflionbonesontheCITESdatabase,with386and645sets
ofbonesexportedfromthecountryin2009and2010respectively,whereasonly89setsoflionboneshadbeen
exportedbetween2000and2008.Ofthosesets,75%wenttoAsiawiththe‘lion’shareof67,7%destinedto
Laos(Lindseyetal.2012:13),thehomebaseoftheXaysavangnetwork.
274
whowerewillingtohosttheThaipseudo–huntingparty.UponreceivingtheThainationals’
passports,Steylwouldforwardthenecessaryinformationaswellascopiesofpassportstothe
outfittersorlandownerswhothenappliedontheirbehalfforthehuntingpermits
(Navsa/Wallis/Swain2014:9).TheThaisexworkersandstripperswouldaccompanythe
syndicatememberstogamereservesandhuntingfarmstoposenexttothedeadrhinos(see
Figure9)inexchangeforfreefoodanddrinksandR5000(475€)forthe“job”(Kvinta2014).
TheprofessionalhunterHarryClaassenskilledtherhinos,andSteylandhisfarmworkers
woulddehorntherhinosandtakecareofthecarcasses.OccasionallyLemthongthaioroneof
hisfriendswouldposeashunters(Olivier2011:6).SteylwaspaidR60000(6135€)per
kilogramofrhinohorn;thepricewentsubsequentlyuptoR65000(6646€)perkilogram
(supportingevidenceattachedtoOlivierpolicestatement).
Figure9:Thaipseudo-hunter
Source:providedbyPaulO’Sullivan
Accordingtothehuntingregulations,natureconservationofficialsoughttobepresentand
monitorallrhinohunts.TheDepartmentofEnvironmentalAffairsfailedtoprovideproper
supervisionofthesehunts(Navsa/Wallis/Swain2014:12–13)andLemthongthaiandother
membersofthesyndicateboastedlater“everyonehasapriceinSouthAfrica”(Interviews,
275
2013).Inhisrulingduringtheappealhearingstheappellatejudgecommentedonthe
incompetenceandpossiblecollusionofthenatureconservationofficials:
“Equally,therelevantgovernmentdepartmentcanrightlybecriticized,notonlyfor
lackofpropersupervisionoftheauthorizedhunt,but,ifthephotographsthatform
partoftherecordareanythingtogoby,itappearsthatatleastsomeoftheofficials
involvedprobablyknewthatthetermsofthepermitwerenotbeingmetandthatthe
statedpurposeofthehuntwasfalse.Fromthephotographsitappearsthatthese
officialsshouldhaveknownthatthepersonspresentduringthehuntwerenotthe
personstowhomthepermitstoshootandkillrhinohadbeengrantedandwerenotin
truthgenuinetrophyhunters.”
Olivier’spolicestatementwasmoredamninginprovidingalistofcontactsoftheXaysavang
networkwithintheNorthWesternnatureconservationdepartment,thecustomsandairports
authority,aswellaspliabletaxidermists(Olivier2011:9).Thesamenatureconservation
officialwouldbeon‘standby’tocometoSteyl’sfarmtobepresentduringthehunt,measure
thehorn,scanthechipinsidethehornandputthedetailsofthehuntintotheProfessional
HuntersRegister.Olivierwitnessedtheexchangeofbribemoneyoncebutthoughtthatthere
wasastandingarrangementinplace(Olivier2011:7–8).Theprovincialconservationofficial
appearstohaveassuredthenationalofficialsofthelegitimacyoftheapplications(Interview,
2013).
Lemthongthai’sThaiassociateinSouthAfrica,“themanontheground”ChunchomPunpitak
(Olivier2011:6)oversawthehuntingpartieswhileLemthongthaiwouldmonitorthehorn
shipmentsbetweenSouthAfricaandLaosandtheironwardjourneytoconsumermarkets
(Olivier2011:5).Thesyndicatereceived26permitstoshootandkillrhinosofwhichmost
hornswerefraudulentlyexported(Navsa/Wallis/Swain2014:4).Ataxidermistmountedthe
hornsondecorativeshieldstogivethemthesemblanceofrealhuntingtrophies,whichwere
thenshippedtoLaos.Lemthongthaifalsifiedthecustomsdocumentsbychangingthe
consigneeandcountryofdestination(Navsa/Wallis/Swain2014:4);thehuntingtrophies
shouldhavebeenshippedtothepermanentaddressoftheThaisexworkersandexotic
dancersinThailand.In2011,SouthAfricaninvestigatorsclosedinontheSouthAfrican
operationofXaysavangTradingExportImportCompanyLimited.Lemthongthaiandhis
associateswerearrestedandchargedwithtransgressingtheCustomsandExciseAct,and
276
contraveningagainsttheNEMBA,andabouquetofcrimeslinkedtothetransgressionofthe
PreventingofOrganizedCrimeAct(POCA)(TheRegionalDivisionofGautengKemptonPark
2012).
6.2.4TheresilienceoftheXaysavangnetwork
Astheleadresearchquestionofthisdissertationaskswhytherhinohasnotbeenbetter
protectedinspiteofmyriadmeasurestodisrupttheillegalmarketinrhinohorn,thearrest
andconvictionofLemthongthai,onthefaceofit,wouldsuggestthatthisisindeeda
successfuldisruptionofanillegalrhinohornsupplychain.WhywasLemthongthaiarrested?
Anddidhisarrestandhissubsequenttrialandthatofhisco-accused(whichincludedthe
gamefarmerSteylandprofessionalhunterClaassens)successfullydisruptthemarketforany
lengthoftime?Inresponsetotheformerquestion:JohnnyOlivier,theSouthAfrican
associatewhowasresponsibleforthe“administrativego-betweenactivities”(hewaspaidR
5000–475€perrhino)allegedlygotscrupleswhenhediscoveredanorderfrom
LemthongthaitoSteylforafurther50rhinos(100rhinohorns)and300setsoflion
skeletons.345Theteamwassupposedtokillanddehorn15rhinospermonth;theywould
receiveR65000(6646€)perkilogramofrhinohornandR10000(1022€)forlionskeletons
weighingmorethan10kg(Olivier2011:10).Olivierturnedstatewitnessandhisstatementto
privateinvestigatorPaulO’SullivanledcustomsinvestigatorstotheheartoftheXaysavang’s
SouthAfricanoperationbutleftthetransnationalsmugglingoperationandsupplychain
virtuallyundisturbed.Olivierandhisgirlfriendreceivedimmunityfromprosecutionand
enteredbrieflyawitnessprotectionprogrammebuthisbetrayaldidnotgounnoticed.
LemthongthaiallegedlyputoutanR100000(10225€)bountyontheirheadsandthecouple
startedreceivingveiledthreatsonsocialmediaandsuspiciousphonecalls.Apparently
Lemthongthaihadtakeneveryone’sphotoatapartyafewmonthsearlier.Shouldanyteam
member‘snitch’,thentheirphotowouldbesenttopeoplethatknewhowtotakecareof
345
Oliviermadetheclaimaboutscruplesand“bloodmoney”toprivateinvestigatorPaulO’Sullivanandlaterin
hispolicestatement(Olivier2011:10).InvestigativejournalistJulianRademeyerrelatesthatOlivierhadarather
murkypastanddubiousreputation(Rademeyer2012).HismotivationtoinformonthedealingsofXaysavang
remainsunclear;however,thesuddenconcernforrhinoappearsoutofplaceaftersourcing100sofrhinosfor
thenetwork(Interviewwithintermediary,2013).
277
snitching(Kvinta2014).WhilethedigitalcapturingofconspiratorssuggeststhatLemthonghai
triedtoresolvethecoordinationproblemofsecuritybywayofaninsurancepolicy,an
intricateandcomplexsecuritysystemappearstoprotecttheXayasavangnetwork.Asit
turnedout,ChumlongLemthongthaiwasassignedasthe“fallguy”whotooktheblameasthe
“director”oftheimportexportcompany;Olivierhadhisdayincourtandlivedtotellthetale.
ChargesweredroppedagainstallofLemthongthai’sco–accused346afterhepleadedguiltyand
claimedthattheothershadnoknowledgeofhisillegaldealings.Lemthongthai’sfateandthe
consequencesofhisarrestassistinrespondingtothelatterquestion,whichrelatedto
whetherthearrestshadledtoasuccessfuldisruptionofthemarket.
Lemthongthai’sco-accusedgotoffscot-freetodeflectfromotherXaysavangdealings.
Theriskof‘gettingcaught’isconsideredanoperationalrisktowildlifetraffickersand
successionplanningandsecuringthecontinuityofthesupplychainisinherenttoany
successfultransnationaloperation,thusresolvingthecoordinationproblemofsecurity.The
networkhadseveralfallbackscenariosincaseofdetectionanddefectionofkeyplayers.
Lemthongthaihadleftanimpeccabledigitalrecordofhisbusinessdealings,347whichhad
assistedinvestigatorsandprosecutorsinputtingtheircasetogether.WhileLemthongthaimay
havebeenthedesignatedasthe‘fallguy’(andmoresobyvirtueofhisdigitalrecordkeeping
suggestingthathethoughthisapproachwasfailsafe),someofSouthAfrica’sfinestlegal
346
TheNationalProsecutionAuthority(NPA)reinstatedthechargesagainstgamefarmerMarnusSteylin2012.
Hefoughtforapermanentstayofexecution,whichwasgrantedinJune2015.
347
ItwouldappearrathernaïveofLemthongthaitoleavebehindsuchdetailedaccountsofhisbusinessdealings.
Hewas,however,sureofthelegitimacyofhisdealingsinlightofhimattainingthe“right”paperworktomove
therhinohorns‘legally’outofthecountry.HebelievedthathewasactingwithinthelimitsoftheSouthAfrican
law,whichpermittedThainationalstohuntrhinosandexportthehornstotheirhomecountry.Whilehewas
payingR60000toR65000perkgofrhinohorn,poachedrhinohornwouldenterthe“blackmarket”atacostof
R200000tothepoachingorganizer.AlthoughLemthongthai’sallegedprofitmarginwaslessthanR100000per
rhinohunt,poachingintermediarieswouldmakeaprofitofR450000perhunt(Interview,2013).Thepayment
structuresarediscussedinmoredetailbelow.Itisnoteworthyhowpseudotrophyhuntingwaslegitimizedasthe
lesseroftwoevils.Moreover,whilethedigitalrecordonLemthongthai’slaptopprovidesinsightintothe
‘pseudo-legal’dealingsoftheXaysavangnetwork,therewasnopapertrailoftheovertlyillegaltransactions.
AccordingtosourceswithinthecriminalunderworldthatcooperatedwithLemthongthai(Interviews,2013and
2014),thenetworkhadbeeninvolvedintheillegalkillinganddehorningofatleast700rhinosinsouthernAfrica.
ThecourtcasesagainstLemthongthaiandassociates,however,dealtwithafewdozensofpseudo-trophyhunts
(TheRegionalDivisionofGautengKemptonPark2012).
278
mindswereassignedtohiscase.348ThelawyersfirstfoughtintheHighCourtandlaterinthe
SupremeCourtofAppealforreductionstoLemthongthai’sprisonterm.Theinitial40-year
sentencewasfirstreducedtoa30-yearterm,andthentheSupremeCourtofAppealtookoff
afurther17yearsin2013.Lemthongthaiistoservea13-jailsentenceandpayafineofR1
million.Accordingtolawenforcementsources(Interviews,2013),Keosavangistakinggood
careofLemthongthai’sfamilyinThailandintheinterim,andhewillbegenerouslyrewarded
uponhisreleasefromprison.Byexoneratingtheothers,Lemthongthaiensuredthatnoneof
theotherco-accusedwouldreleaseprivilegedinformationaboutthenetwork’soperations
andthattheycouldcarryonwiththeirnefariousactivities.Thenetworkmanagedtoresolve
thecoordinationproblemsofcooperationandsecuritysuccessfullythroughLemthongthai’s
roleasintermediaryand‘fallguy’.Theseroleswerebasedonhisreputationasatrustworthy
criminalassociateandmutualtrustthatbothLemthongthaiandthenetworkwouldhonour
theirrolesinthe‘security’agreement(non-disclosureofoperationalsecretsversussupportof
next-of-kin).
Thesignificanceoftheresponsibilitiesandfunctionslinkedtotheroleofthelocalorganizer
needstobeunderscored:SteylisbutoneexampleofahandfulofsouthernAfrican
organizers349whoactasintermediariesbetweenthesupplyanddemandsideofthemarket.
TheseorganizershaveaccesstoinfluentialpoliticalandeconomicelitesinsouthernAfricaand
SoutheastAsia;Steyl,forexample,travelledtoThailandonseveraloccasions.Moreover,
SouthAfricanlawenforcementauthoritiesandtheirAsiancounterpartshaveevidencethat
SouthAfricanwildlifeprofessionalsandtheirrepresentativeshaveundertakenseveral
“marketingtrips”toVietnam(Interview,2013).Inessence,Steyl’sroleandfunctionasthe
localorganizerwithadirectconnectiontothesource(rhinohorn,lionboneandotherwildlife
products)isfarmorevaluabletotransnationaltraffickersthantheroleoftransnational
transporters(inthiscaseLemthongthai’srole).WhileLemthongthaiwastheperson
responsibleforthetransnationaltransport(export/import)ofrhinohorn,lionboneandother
348
AccordingtokeyinformantsinterviewedinsoutheasternAsia,thenetworkfinancedLemthongthai’slawyers.
JulianRademeyer(pers.communication,2016)believesthatgamefarmerMarnusSteylandassociatesfooted
thelegalbillbutcouldnofindcorroboratingevidence.
349
Accordingtopoachers,lawenforcersandintelligenceoperators(Interviews,2013and2014),Groenewaldand
Rasarealsoorganizers.Thereisalsoanecdotalevidenceofthreewhiteexecutivesintheimport-exportbusiness
(twoofSouthAfricanandoneofZimbabweandescent)operatingfromMozambique.
279
wildlifecontrabandfromSouthAfricatoSoutheastAsiauntilhisarrestandsubsequent
conviction,hisfunctionsanddutieswererapidlymovedtosomeoneelse.350
ThearrestandconvictionofKeosavang’s“deputy”(Rademeyer2014b)alsofailedtodisrupt
themarket.WhileitputanendtotherecruitmentofThaisexworkersastrophyhunters,
other‘legal’andillegalflowsofrhinohorncontinuetofeedthemarket.Aseparatecasein
KenyahaslinkedtheXaysavangnetworktoivorytrafficking(Fuller2013)351whileinterviews
indicatedthatthenetworkswereinvolvedinanumberofotherlegalandillegalflowsofrhino
horn,ivory,lionboneandotherwildlifeproductsoutofSouthAfrica,Namibia,Mozambique,
andTanzania(Interviews,2013).TheprimarymodusoperandioftheXaysavangnetworkis
theconversionofillegallyobtainedwildlifeandwildlifepartsintoseeminglylegalwildlife
commodities.Thenetworksmuggles1000sofwildanimalsandanimalpartstoLaoseach
year.KeosavangmaintainsanumberofcaptivebreedingfacilitiesandfarmsinLaos,from
whereillegallyobtainedwildanimalsoranimalpartsareexportedwithofficialLaotian
governmentpaperworkstatingthattheanimalsderivefromcaptivebreedingfacilities(Fuller
2013,InterviewwithStevenGalster,FreelandFoundation,2013).Dubbedthe“PabloEscabar”
ofillegalwildlifetrade(Rademeyer2014b),VixayKeosavanghaspowerfulnetworksextending
tothepoliticalandmilitaryeliteofthesoutheastAsiancountry(Gosling/Reitano/Shaw2014:
24).Theformersoldierturnedbusinessentrepreneurremains“untouchable”inhishome
countryofLaos(Gosling/Reitano/Shaw2014:23)despitetheUSissuinga$1millionreward
forinformationleadingtothedismantlingoftheXaysavangnetworkin2013.Evidenceat
Lemthongthai’strialhadincludedairwaybillsshowingthatsomerhinohornshadbeen
shippedtooneofKeosavang’saddressesinLaos–yet,thisevidencedidlittletodismantleor
disrupthiswildlifebusiness(Fuller2013).
350
TheFreelandFoundationbelievesthatLoyChanthamvonga,ayoungwomanwhofrequentlytravelsto
Mozambique,isLemthongthai‘ssuccessor.ShewasimplicatedinarhinohornshipmenttoThailand,whichalso
involvedaVietnamesenationalandtwopoliceofficers(Rademeyer2014b).
351
TheKenyaWildlifeServiceandcustomsofficersseized260kgofelephantivoryand18kgofrhinohornat
Nairobiairportin2008.TheshipmentwasregisteredtoXaysavangImportandExportandboundforLaos
(Connett2014).
280
6.2.5“Round–tripping”:Rhinohornintransit
Bythetimethelegalloopholehadbeenpluggedandatemporarybanhadbeenimposedon
Vietnamesetrophyhuntersin2012,anewbreedof“non-traditional”huntershadalready
slippedintotheregion.Czech,PolishandUkrainianhunterswerenowposingas“proxy”
huntersforcriminalgroupings;their‘huntingtrophies’were‘legally’exportedtotheirhome
countries.Fromthere,thehornswerepilferedintoillegalsupplychainstoVietnam
(Interviewswithlawenforcementofficialsandconservators,2013).InJuly2013,24rhino
hornswereconfiscatedand16suspectsarrestedintheCzechRepublic;anadditionaleight
hornswereseizedinSlovakia.Czechauthoritieschargedthegroupof16includingthree
Vietnamesenationals,withbeingmembersofaninternationalcrimesyndicateinDecember
2014.ThesyndicateisallegedtohavemovedrhinohornfromSouthAfricaviatheCzech
RepublicandSlovakiatoVietnam.Thispracticehasbeendubbed“round–tripping”(Bloch
2014).In2012,theCzechRepublicinformedCITESthatintermediarieswithcontactstothe
localVietnamesecommunityhadrecruitedCzechcitizensfromaspecificareainnorthern
BohemiatoactinstagedtrophyhuntsinSouthAfrica.LiketheVietnamesepseudo–hunters,
thesehunterswerenotregisteredmembersofanyhuntingassociation,possessednohunting
licensesorriflesandhadnoprevioushuntingexperience.Therecruiterspaidthetravel
expensesoftheCzechhunterstoSouthAfrica,contingentonthehuntersigningadeclaration
thatthehuntingtrophieswouldbesurrenderedtotherecruiteruponreturntotheCzech
Republic(CITESSecretariat2013:6).TheSouthAfricanpartners–Czechnationalslivingin
SouthAfricaandroguewildlifeprofessionalsassociatedwiththeearliermentionedDawie
Groenewald–arrangedthepermitapplications,huntsandexportoftherhinohorns.East
EuropeancustomsofficialshavelimitedexperienceinidentifyingAfricanwildlifecontraband,
aweaknesseasilyexploitedbywildlifesyndicates.TheCzechauthoritiesbecamesuspicious
uponinspectingrhinohornsthatwerenotmountedonatrophybutindividuallywrappedin
clearplasticandpackedintowoodshippingcratesandstampedwithanofficialSouthAfrican
CITESexportapproval.Anothershipmentofhornswasconcealedincustom-mademachine
parts(pers.communicationwithJulianRademeyer,2016).Accordingtotheairwaybills,the
hornsweretopassthroughtheCzechRepublicenroutethefinaldestinationofVietnam
(Bloch2014).TheCzechnetworkisallegedlyconnectedtoDawieGroenewald’s“Musina
group”aftermicrochipsinsomeoftheconfiscatedhornsweretracedbacktoseveralfarmsin
281
theLimpopoProvinceandhisnameandthenamesofhisco–accusedappearedonpermit
applications.
Morerecently,therehavebeensuspicionsthat‘traditional’hunters(notablyUSandRussian
nationals)werealsohuntingonbehalfofVietnamesegroups(Interviewswithwildlife
veterinarian3,2013).TheUSindictmentofDawieGroenewaldconfirmedthatUStrophy
huntershadindeedcollaborated(albeit“unknowingly”)withtheGroenewaldsiblings.
6.2.6Theimpactofpseudo–huntingonpricestructuresandtrustissues
Thepriceof‘legalhunts’surgedafteritbecameapparenthowlucrativethiseconomic
exchangewas.AccordingtoAdriKitshoff,formerchiefexecutiveofficer(CEO)ofthe
ProfessionalHuntersAssociationofSouthAfrica(personalcommunication,2015),352theprice
rangedbetweenUS$40000andUS$50000perhuntin1995to2000,andfrom2001to
2005itcostbetweenUS$50000and$65000perhunt(comparewithGraph4).Pseudo–
huntingincreaseddrasticallyfrom2008,andsodidthepriceforlegalrhinohunts.Atypical
rhinohuntwouldcostbetweenUS$90000toUS$110000attheheightofthepseudo–
huntingphenomenonbetween2008and2011.TheentryoftheVietnamesehuntersintothe
trophyhuntingmarketalsoledtoashiftinpricevaluationbyrhinoownersandoutfitters,
whostartedchargingperinch,andinsomecases,perkilogramofhorn.Thelengthorweight
oftherhinohornhenceaffectedthetotalpriceofrhinohunts.OncetheTOPSregulations
werepromulgatedandadjustedtoaddress,amongstothers,theissueofpseudo–hunting,the
pricecamedownslightlybeforesurgingagain.Mostrhinoownersandoutfitterscontinueto
chargeperinchinlieuofquotingforarhinohuntirrespectiveofthelengthorweightofthe
horn.In2015,huntingoutfitterswhodidnotownlandorrhinoswerecharging$3500(3125
Euros)353perinch,whichincludesthetotalamountdisbursedtotherhinoowner.Typicallya
352
AdriKitshoff,theformerCEOoftheProfessionalHuntersAssociationofSouthAfricamadeavailablethe
quantitativedataprovidedinthisparagraph.
353
TrophyhuntsareusuallyquotedinUSDollars.ThisispartiallylinkedtothehighnumberofAmericantrophy
hunterssupportingtheSouthAfricanhuntingindustry,andmajorhuntingexhibitions,showsandauctionssuch
astheDallasSafariClubhappenonUSsoil.
282
hunterwouldpay$91000(81250Euros)toahuntingoutfitterforarhinothatcarries26inchhorns.354Wildlifeprofessionalsinvolvedinthehuntingindustryhavetakentodefining
rhinosintermsofthelengthoftheirhorns–typicallyarhinothatcarriesa26-inchhornis
describedasa“26-inchrhino”(Interviewswithwildprofessionals,2013;seealsoChapter4on
thesaleofliverhinos).
Whilethenewpricestructurebasedoninchesofhornbecameamarket-relatedstandardin
thewildlifeindustry,trustissuesledtoafurtheradaptationofremuneratingfarmersand
outfittersforrhinohuntsaccordingtotheweightofhorn.Somecriminalactorsinsistedon
dispensingpaymentonlyoncetherhinohadbeenshot,dehornedandthehornshadbeen
weighed.Interviewswithwildlifeprofessionals,rhinoownersandaprominentintermediary
ofarhinotraffickingsyndicaterevealedgreatlevelsofdistrustbetweenrhinoownersonthe
onehand,andlocal“handlangers”355andtheirAsianconnectionsontheother.Farmerswho
hostedpseudo-huntsandengagedinhornlaunderingknewthattheyhadnorecoursetolegal
protection,shouldtheircriminalassociatesdecidetodefaultonpayments,defraudor‘rat’on
them.IntermediariesandtheirAsianassociateswereconcernedaboutgettingrealhorn(as
opposedtofakehorn,whichisprevalentandwidespreadbothonthesupplyanddemand
sideofthemarket)andgettingsufficienthornforthepricetheywerepaying(Interviewswith
hornsmugglersandintermediaries,2013).Intheaftermathofthefirstpseudo–hunt,
Lemthongthaiexpressedbuyer’sremorseforhavingpaid“toomuchmoney”forthetworhino
hunts.Hethendecidedthat“weshoot,wecut,weweigh,thenpay”(Olivier2011:4).Infact,
Lemthongthaiwouldonlypaythemoneythreetofourdaysaftertherhinohadbeen
dehornedtoensurethattheweightofthehornhadstabilizedfrom“moistureloss”(Olivier
2011:6).
Itisinterestingthatillegalmarketpricingstructuresaffectedthelegaltrophy-huntingsector.
Legalactorsfollowedsuitbyvaluingrhinosintermsofinchesandgramsofrhinohorninstead
ofsellingrhinohunts.Offurtherinterestistheagencyofhornsuppliersinco-determiningthe
354
Thepricemayalsovaryaccordingtothelocationofthehuntingreserveandthesizeoftheland(theappealof
theexperience).Somerhinohuntsin“premierareas”whererhinosare“wild”or“freeranging”willsellformore
than$150000(AdriKitshoff,personalcommunication,2015).
355
Afrikaanswordforhelperor‘hangers-on’.
283
priceofrhinohorn,suggestingthatnotonlythesacredvaluationofrhinohorninconsumer
marketsbutalsothesecuritypremiumassociatedwithsecuringthesupplychain(converting
illegallyobtainedrhinohornintoseeminglylegalrhinohornthroughpermitfraud)and
disbursementstolegitimatewildlifeprofessionalsplayaroleinthehighpriceofrhinohorn.
Lawenforcementofficialsandpolicereports(Interviews,2013;documentsinthepossession
ofresearcher)confirmthat“rhinotrophies”exportedfrompseudo-huntsandillegalhunts
consistedofthehornsonly.Thesaleofrhinohuntsperinchorkilogramrevealsyetanother
expressionofcontestedillegality,wherewildlifeprofessionalsandtheirclientsdisregardthat
rhinohornisnotatradablecommoditypermissiblebythelawoftheland.Therhinoisvalued
intermsoftheweightorlengthofitshorns,effectivelyrendering“arhinoworthmoredead
thanalive”(Interviews,2013).
6.3Cooperation:TheAfrican-Asianconnection
Wildlifeprofessionalsincludingjobcategoriessuchaswildlifeveterinarians,professional
hunters,gamecapturersandtransporters,natureconservationofficialsandhelicopterpilots
actedonoccasionasthe‘go–between’orintermediaryofrhinofarmersandAsianbuyers.
Thisintermediaryfunctionwasnotonlyimportantinconnectingpotentialbuyers(Asian
networks)withsuppliers(rhinofarmers),butitalsoputdistance(anadditionalnode)
betweendifferentstagesofthesupplychain.Theintermediarywasthe‘fallguy’should
‘somethinggowrong’duringabusinesstransaction.Inessence,theintermediaryprovides
protectionforboththesupplierandbuyerthusresolvingapotentialfalloutduetodistruston
eitherside.Asianbuyerswerecarefultochooseintermediariesthateitherhadagood
reputationandsocialcapitalwithintherhinoownercommunity,orwildlifeprofessionalswho
wereknownasmavericks,therebyresolvingthecoordinationproblemsofcooperationand
security.Whererhinoownersoroutfittershadtheirdedicatedbusinessconnectionsto
consumermarkets(discussedinmoredetailbelow),theroleoftheintermediarywas
superfluous.ASouthAfricanwildlifeveterinarianwhohadbeenrecruitedtoidentifyrhino
farmerswillingtohostwhiterhinohuntswithVietnamesepseudo–huntersontheirlandsaid:
284
“The discussions [the informant refers to a meeting with an alleged rhino poaching
kingpin]centredaroundthepossibilityofacquiringwhiterhinofor“legal”huntsand
helpingthemtogetintouchwiththerightpeople.Ihadtosourceplaceswherethe
Vietnamesehunterscouldhuntrhino.Theidealrhinohadtobeolderrhinobullswith
bigbackhornsandthefronthornsneededtohavebigbasescontributingtoaheavier
weightandlargerprofit.Itwasallabouttheweightandnotaboutthelengthofthe
hornsorthetrophies.ThepurchasepriceatthattimewasbetweenR40000-00toR60
000-00perkilogram[4120Eurosto6175Eurosperkilogram].356Thiswasonlyforthe
horns.Thehuntingpricewillbedeterminedbytheweightofthehornsafterthehunt.
Iwouldhavereceived3%to5%commissionbasedontheweightoftherhinohorns
after the hunt. The payments would have been in cash. I was only to source rhino.
[NameofSouthAfricanintermediary]usedhisownProfessionalHunters...[…]…These
rhino hunts were only for the rhino horns and not for the trophy. [Two Vietnamese
gentlemen]wereresponsibleforgettinghuntersfromVietnamandtheyactedasthe
link between South Africa and Vietnam. [The South African intermediary] was also
responsibleforobtainingthepermitsinSouthAfrica.”
Incaseswherethestatehasnoorlimitedknowledgeastoactualrhinonumbersinareserve
oronafarm,therewas(andcontinuestobe)noneedforrogueoperatorstoapplyfor
huntingpermitsorcommitpermitfraud.Thesecrecygoverningrhinonumbersandreserve
locations(seeearliersectionon‘putandtake)allowssuchoperatorstogoabouttheir
businesswithnodetection.Thisbreedofrhinofarmersandwildlifeprofessionalstendsto
havetheirown‘pipeline’toAsianmarkets,andintermediarieswereinfrequentlyused
becausetherewasnoneedforthem.Lawenforcementofficialsregardtheseoperatorsas
“particularlyclever”astheydidnotgetinvolvedwith“organizedcrime”(Interviews,2013).357
TheinitialconnectiontoAsiantradersandconsumershappenedeitherthroughhistorical
tradeconnections,358marketingtripstosoutheastAsiaorexistingoremergingbusiness
relationshipswithnationalsordiplomatsofconsumercountriesresidentinSouthAfricaor
oneoftheneighbouringrhinorangestates(Zimbabwe,ZambiaorNamibia).Theadvantageof
356
Theinformantwasreferringtoeventsthathappenedin2010.
357
Arguablythecriminalactorsinvolvedinthisspecificflowconstituteanevolvedformoforganizedcrime
wherepossibleinterruptionofthesupplychainiskepttoanabsoluteminimum.Thelevelofsophisticationis
achievedbyinvolvingafewtrustedactorsonlywhohavethemeansandcontactstosupply,procureand
transportrhinohornatlowcostandminimumrisk.
358
ConsumermarketsinAsia,MiddleEastandNorthernAmericahavereceivedrhinohornsourcedfromAfrican
rhinosforseveralcenturies.Historicaltradeconnectionsinthisinstancerefertotheestablishmentoftrade
relationsbetweensanctionbusters(theinternationalcommunityimposedeconomicsanctionsonapartheid
SouthAfrica),apartheidmilitaryintelligenceoperativesandroguewildlifeprofessionalswhotradedivoryand
rhinohornforweaponsandammunition.
285
thedirectconnectionbetweentherhinoowner,orthewildlifeprofessionalwithaccessto
rhinohorn,andtheAsianconsumeristhatthesupplychainoutofthecountryis
comparativelyshorterthanintheothersetups.Theserelationshipsarebasedonmutualtrust
involvingactorsofsimilarsocio-economicbackground,socialcapitalandaccesstoinfluential
andpowerfulpoliticaloreconomicelitesatthesourceandinthemarket.
6.4Contestedillegality:Legitimizingregulatorybreaches
Thenotionofcontestedillegalityisarecurringfeatureintherhinohornsupplychainacross
differentflows,wherethelegitimacyoftherulesand/orrule-makersisquestioned,orcultural
frameslegitimizeillegalorgrayeconomicactivities.Thelackofacceptanceofillegalityor
whatisreferredtoasthenotionofcontestedillegality–inthiscase,non-acceptanceofthe
tradebananddomesticregulationsgoverningthehuntingandmanagementofrhinosand
theirhorn–isemployedasalegitimizationdeviceforillegalorgrayeconomicactivities
involvingrhinohornintheprivatesector.Wildlifeprofessionalswhoareinvolvedintheillegal
rhinohornsupplychainexpressedsentimentsofunfairness,impracticabilityandhostilitywith
regardstotheCITESandTOPSregulations,aswellasthemoratoriumonthedomestictrade
ofrhinohorninSouthAfrica(seealsoChapter5).Inessence,thenarrativerelatingtothe
regulationoftheindustryhasbecomea‘chickenandegg’debateofwhether(over–)
regulationledtoillegaleconomicactivitiesinvolvingrhinohornorviceversa.Asexplainedin
Chapter4,stateauthoritiesprivatizedrhinosinordertoincreasethetotalconservationarea
inSouthAfrica,tocreatemultipleviablerhinopopulationsandtospreadtheriskofdisease
andextinction.Thefirstrhinosweresoldtoprivateindividualsandcorporateentitiesinthe
late1960s.CITESinstitutedtheinternationaltradebanonrhinosandtheirproductsin1977.
Asoneoftheoriginalsignatoriesofthetreaty,SouthAfricawasrequiredtodomesticateand
implementthetradeban,whicheffectivelyhappenedinthelate2000s.CITESgrantedsome
leewayasprovisionsweremadeforthenon-commercialexchangeofwhiterhinotrophiesin
theearlyyearsofthemultilateralenvironmentaltreaty.TheConvention,thelinkedtradeban
anddomesticregulationsbecameathornintheeyeofmanyrhinoownersandwildlife
professionalswhowantedfreereignandagencytodeterminewhathappenedtotheir
286
“property”and“investment”,especiallyoncepropertyrightshadbeenconferredandclearly
articulated(Interviews,2013).
Inessence,theCITEStradebanwasinterpretedasadeliberatestumblingblock,whichwas
“outoftouchwiththerealitiesoftheAfricanbush”(Interviewwithconservator3,2013)and
“dictateduponAfricanconservatorsbypowerfulanimalrightslobbiesandgreenieswithin
CITES”(Interviewwithrhinoowner11,2013).Interviewswithroguewildlifeprofessionals
(includingrhinoowners)portrayedtherhinohorntradebanasoneofmanyprohibition–
basedsystemsthatfailedtoenforceitsstatedobjective–inthisinstance,theregulationof
wildlifetradeandavoidanceofspeciesextinction.Theargumentprofferedisoneof“where
thereisademand,thereisasupply–andifit’snotthefarmerwhoconservesandhelpsthe
rhino,thenitwillbethepoacherthatmeetsthedemand”(Interviewswithwildlife
professional3,2013).Theroleofthestateisminimalinthisnarrativeastoallowfor
‘unfetteredmarketexchanges’inwhichself-interestedindividualsrealizetheirfulleconomic
potential,andwhere‘theinvisiblehand’ofthemarketdeterminessupplyanddemandbyway
ofpricingmechanisms.Thenotionofcontestedillegalitybecameanimportantelementof
legitimizingillegaleconomicactivities,assoonastheCITEStradebanwasinstituted,and
continuestolegitimizeunderhandandillegaleconomicactivities.
OncetheSouthAfricanstatehadidentifiedirregularnon-conservationorientatedactivitieson
privateland,piecemealregulatorycontrolswereintroducedinthelate1970sand1980sin
preparationofSouthAfrica’sbidatCITEStogetrhinosdown-listedfromAppendixI(total
tradeban)toAppendixII(partialtradeban),andsubsequentattemptstoallowforcontrolled
legaltrade.TheSouthAfricangovernment’sleadingargumentwastoincentivizeprivaterhino
ownerstocontinuebreedingrhinosonprivateland.CoPdecisionsallowedtheexportof
whiterhinotrophiesasof1979;whiterhinoswerethenmovedfromAppendixItoAppendixII
in1994,andby2004,NamibiaandSouthAfricaweregrantedanannualhuntingquotaoffive
blackrhinos.
Chapter5andearliersectionsofthischapterreferredtotheTOPSregulations.The
regulationswerenotonlyaimedatbringingSouthAfricannormsandstandardsintunewith
therequirementssetoutbyCITESbutalsotocloseloopholesthathadbeenpreviously
287
exploited.Originallytheregulationswerepromulgatedin2008;however,duetothe
phenomenonofpseudo-huntingandtheidentificationofadditionalloopholes,theregulations
wereamendedandupdatedin2013(Interviewwithgovernmentofficial5,2013).WhileDEA
officialsmaintainthatprivaterhinoownersweresufficientlyconsultedaheadofthe
promulgation,privaterhinoownersfeltthattheirconcernsandcomplaintswerenot
sufficientlyconsidered.Thesentimentsexpressedbytherhinoownerbelow(Interviewwith
rhinoowner2,2013)mirrorthenarrativeofmanywildlifeprofessionalsinterviewedforthis
research:
“Oneofthethingsisyou’retheowneroftherhino.Thatmeansyouowneverything
onit,thehornorthebodypartsbelongstoyou.Butifthatrhinodiesandyouobtain
thehorn,thenyouneedthepossessionpermitwhichisfinebyme.Youcannotpassonthehorntosomeoneelse,notevenyourchildren.Sowhatmustyoudowithit?
Youarenotallowedtodonateit,youarenotallowedtosellitandyouarenotallowed
tokeepitinyourhousewithoutapermit.Soitisaworthlessthing.Whymustyou
protectaworthlessthing?WhenIdie,itwillbeaproblem,itwontevenbepartofmy
estate.”
Priortotheendoftheapartheidregime,thestate’smainfocuswasaimedatassistingprivate
rhinoownerswhereastheattentionhasshiftedtoincludetheinterestsoflocalcommunities
livinginoradjacenttoconservationareasinthepost–apartheidregime.Commercialfarmers
–rhinoownersareincludedhere–wereapowerfullobbywithintherulingNationalParty
duringtheapartheidregime.Farmershaddirectconnectionstotheprovincialnature
conservationbureaucraciesandrepresentativesinparliament,therebyinfluencingdecisions
pertainingtotheirinterests.Theirstatusasmembersorassociatesofthepoliticaland
economicelitebegantochangeduringthe1990s.Strongpoliticaltiestotheapartheid
regime,economicprivilegesandsupport,andexploitativelabourrelationsonsomefarmshad
contributedtolarge-scalesocialengineeringinSouthAfrica’sruralareasandupheldthesocial
structureandeconomicpowerbaseoftheapartheidstate.Thechangeinthepoliticaland
economicstatusoffarmerswasnotonlylinkedtothepoliticaltransformationinSouthAfrica
butmacro-economicchangesintheglobalarenasuchasmarketderegulationandthe
weakeningoftheSouthAfricanRand.Largergamereservesandgamefarmsthatoffertrophy
huntingandecotourismwerelargelyunaffectedbybroaderpoliticalandeconomicchangesas
SouthAfricahadmorphedintoatopdestinationfortrophyhuntingandecotourismafterthe
288
endofapartheid.Foreignhuntersandtouristsprovidedreadyaccesstoforeigncurrencyand
contributedtothegrowthoftheeconomy.
Interviewsheldwithabouquetofwildlifeprofessionals(farmers,gamecapturers,wildlife
veterinarians,taxidermists,anti-poachingpersonnel)revealedacontradictoryandparadoxical
relationshipwithstateactorsaftertheendofapartheid.Ontheonehand,thesupportofthe
statewasneededtomaintainlandandrhino(andbroaderwildlife)ownershipprivileges;on
theother,thechangingoftheguardsignalledthatitwasnotgoingtobe‘businessasusual’
andthatpoliticaltransformationmightleadtothelossofatleastsomeprivileges.
Interestingly,gameandhencerhinofarmingofferedanescapeclausefrompossibleland
claims359andtrickylabourrelations(seealsothesectiononprivatizationinChapter4).
Moreover,sincerhinoshadbeendeclaredaprivateproperty,theycouldbetranslocatedto
othergamereservesorfarmsthatwerenotsubjecttolandclaimsorcomplicatedlabour
relations.Insomeinstances,wildlifeprofessionalslegitimize‘offthebooktransactions’and
thecircumventionofregulationsasaformofresistancetothenewpoliticaldispensation.
Resistancetothenewregimeislinkedinparttoperceptionsofincompetenceandcorruption
ofthenewelite,“unfair”labourlawsandregulations(farmworkersenjoyednolabour
protectionduringapartheid),thethreatoflandclaimsandtheincreasingincidenceoffarm
attacks.Onerhinoownersaid(Interviewwithroguerhinoowner6,2013):
“Iwanttoaskyouanotherquestion.TheMinisterofHealthofanycountry–whomust
thatbe?Youthinkitcanbeafarmerordoyouthinkitmustbeadoctor?Astupid
farmerlikemeknowsthattheMinisterofHealthmustbeadoctorforhe’sgotallthe
knowledge.Howcansomebodythatdoesn’tevenownabloodylizard,canmakelaws,
canorganisetheenvironmentandtelluswhattodo?”
Theresistancetoregulation(portrayedas“over-regulation”bymanywildlifeprofessionals)is
alsolinkedtoasenseofdeprivationofagency.Increasedstateinterventionbywayofrule–
making,strictorpartialimplementationandenforcementoftheruleshasaccentuated
tensionsbetweenthewildlifesectorandthestateinthepost-apartheidperiod.Theapartheid
statehadfacilitatedtheestablishmentofgamereservesandfarmsbyprovidingfarmersand
wildlifeentrepreneurswithsupport(e.g.subsidiesandpropertyrights).Wildlifeownershad
freereignovertheirmovableandimmoveableassetswithlittleregulatoryinterferenceor
359
TheSouthAfricangovernmenthasopenedalandclaimsprocessforpeopleandcommunitiesthatwere
dispossessedtheirlandafter1913(CommissiononRestitutionofLandRights2015).
289
disruptiontoeconomicexchanges.Inadditiontootherexistentialthreatstotheformerstatus
quo,thepost-apartheidstateisassociatedwithintroducingnewrules,whicharebelievedto
aimatdispossessingandemasculatingthewhitefarmer(Interviews,2013).Sentimentsofa
lossofprivilege(therighttodeterminewhathappenstotheirproperty),deprivationand
entitlementwereexpressed:“thegovernmentisouttogetus”.Agovernmentofficial
(Interviewwithintelligenceofficer2,2013)recountsanencounteratameetingofrhino
owners:“Youaremakingusallpoor.Wenolongerhaveincomefromharvestingthehorn.”
Whilethemajorityofthearound400rhinofarmersandrhinoreserveownersappeartobein
favouroflegalizingthetradeinrhinohorn360andhenceconformtothenewrules(Taylor,
Andrewetal.2014,personalcommunicationwithPROA,interviewswithprivaterhino
farmers,2013),thereareaselectfewrhinofarmersandassociatedwildlifeprofessionalsthat
continuetofloutregulationsandengageinillegalandsemi-legaltransactionsinvolvingrhino
horn.Thoseinfavouroflegalizationcite,amongstothers,therisingcostsofsecuringrhinos
onprivatelandandtheprivatesector’s“enormouscontributiontorhinoconservation”.The
costofsecuringrhinoshasindeedsnowballedandislikelytosurgefurtherascriminalactors
canvasnewmethodsandsecurityactorsconceiveofnewcountermeasures.Buijs(2002:37;
1996)hadpointedtothelackofsecuritymeasurestosafeguardmanyprivaterhinoowners’
“goodinvestment”inthe1990sand2000sbeforepoachinghadbecomeanissueofconcern.
Bytheendof2014,privaterhinoownerswerespendingaround272millionSouthAfrican
Rand(20millionEuros)perannumonrhinosecurityinadditiontothecurrentgovernment
expenditureinexcessof1billionSouthAfricanRand(75millionEuros)(Jones2014).Rhino
ownersarenowcallingonthegovernmenttoassistwiththeprotectionofrhinosonprivate
land.Smallergamefarmsandreservesthatdonotattractsufficientinternationaltrophy
huntersortouristsstruggletomeettherisingsecuritycosts.Thelegalizationnarrativefurther
suggeststhatrhinofarmersshouldberewardedbyallowingthemtoreapfinancialrewards
fortheireffortsthroughthere-openingofthetradeofrhinohorn.
Inconclusion,contestedillegalityintheseflowsoftherhinohornsupplychain,ontheone
hand,relatestodissatisfactionwiththeinternationalregulatoryregimeandnational
regulationsinSouthAfrica;andontheother,thereiscontemptandlackofrespectforthe
360
Iinterviewedafewrhinoownerswhoopposetradeproposals.
290
rule-makersandenforcersoperatingbothattheinternationalandnationallevel.The
perceivedillegitimacyoftherulesandrule-makersfunctionsasalegitimizingmechanismthat
permits(providesagencyfor)actorstobreakorbendtherules.Asubsetofthislegitimizing
mechanismrelatestothenormativeaspectsoftherules.Totheroguewildlifeprofessional
(usedasanumbrellatermhere),thecontestationofthebanalsorelatestothevaluationof
rhinohornasahighlyprofitablecommodity.Theintrinsicvalueoftherhinoasawildanimal
worthyofprotectionforthecommongoodissecondaryinthisinstance.Inborrowingfrom
theconservationdiscoursethatportraysprivateownershipofrhinosasaconservation
strategy,theroguewildlifeprofessionallegitimizeshisorherillegaleconomicactivitiesin
termsofcontributingtoconservation.Whathappensbehindhisorhergamefenceshould
escapefromthestate’sscrutinyandinterference,whichiscontingentuponthecommunityof
privaterhinoowners(thosethatfollowandthosewhoflouttherules)keepongrowingthe
numberofrhinosconservedonprivateland.
6.5Conclusion
Akeyfeatureofthesegrayflowsistheexploitationoflegalandregulatoryloopholesasactors
rideontheedgeoflegality.SouthAfricanwildlifeprofessionalsandrhinobreederswhoform
partofthecountry’swhiteeconomicelitearetheprincipalactors.Regulatorybreachesand
theexploitationoflegalandregulatoryloopholes,includingillegalhuntinganddehorningof
rhinos,aswellasthestockpilingandlaunderingofillegallyharvestedrhinohornintolegal
tradeflowsconstitutemodesof‘production’.Whatrenderstheseflowsparticularlyefficient
andsafeistheearlystageconversionofanessentiallyillegalgoodtolegalstatus(the
launderingofillegallyharvestedhornintolegaltradeflows),andcontrariwise,theconversion
ofalegalproduct(thehuntingtrophy)intoanillegallytradedgoodinconsumermarkets.The
earlyconversioncurtailsopportunitycostsandrisksfurtherdownthesupplychain.Froman
illegalmarketactor’sperspective,thismodeofobtaininghornisnotonlythesafestand
modestexpedientmethodbutitalsominimizesthenumberofintermediariesrequiredfrom
thepointoforigintotheconsumermarket.Thisbringsdownoperationalcostsandincreases
theprofitlikeinotherlegalandillegalbusinesses.Italsoallowsalargelyunhinderedpassage
ofthehornthroughtheminimalexposuretosocialcontrolactors(nationalandinternational
291
lawenforcementagents)andmeasuresaimedatdisruptingthemarket.Moreover,thehorn
staysinitsoriginalstate,meaningitisnotprocessedintosmallerpiecesorpowderform
beforereachingtheconsumermarket.Thisissignificantwhenitcomestoqualitycontrol,
valuationandpricingofthehornontheconsumermarket(seeChapter8).
Thesignificantroleofwildlifeindustryplayersinrhinoextinction(asopposedtorhino
conservation)isnoteworthy.Whilepublicattentionhasbeendrawntorhinopoachingin
publicparks,rogueelementswithinthewildlifeindustrywerethecatalystforpoachingto
increaseinnationalandprovincialparks(discussedinmoredetailinChapter7).Itis
importanttonotethatgrayflowsarenotseparateanddisconnectedfromotherlegaland
illegalflows(seealsoChapter7).Thesameactorsand/ortheirsocialnetworkshaveavested
interestinorinfluenceonotherflows.
292
Chapter7:Poachingrhinos:Illegalflowsofrhinohorn
“I’mshootingforthemoney”(Poacher,Cubovillage,2013)
“YouknowIwasn'tborntohuntarhino.Inthevillage,wehuntthesmallanimals.You
knowtheguysinthevillages;theydon'thuntthebiganimals.Theywantfreshmeat.
Theyonlyhuntfortheday.Normally,theykeepbiganimalssafe.Thereisnofridge.
Andthelandusedtobefreelongago,nowthelandisnotfree.Ican’tjustgo
anywhere;otherwisetheguywillstartfightingwithme.Andhewillsaythisismyland
andwewillstartfighting.Governmentcanstopthisthing;theyjustmustgivepeople
jobs.Crimeiseverywhereandthepoliceisshootingusall.”(Poacher16,SA
correctionalcentre,2013)
7.1Introduction
ThischapterdrawsoninsightsfromChapter4,whichdealtwiththehistoryofconservation
andassociatedprotectionparadigms.Theearlierchapterservedthepurposeof
demonstratinghowthesocialarchitectureandengineeringofthecolonialandapartheid
dispensationsledtothelossoflandownershipandancestralburialgrounds,aswellas
propertyandhuntingrightsoftheindigenousandlocalpeoplesofSouthAfricaand
neighbouringcountries.TheKrugerNationalPark(KNP),SouthAfrica’sflagshipnationalpark,
otherpublicparkslikeHlhuluwe-ImfoloziandMkuzeintheprovinceofKwaZulu-Natal,and
privately-ownedreservesandfarmsacrossthecountryhavebecomethesettingofwhatis
oftendescribedas“awartosavetheworld’slastrhinos”(Interviews,2013and2014).Ofthe
approximately21000remainingrhinos361inSouthAfrica–19300arewhiterhinosand
approximately1700animalsbelongtotheblackspecies(Milliken2014:15).Between8394
to9594whiteand343to487blackrhinosremainintheKNP(Ferreiraetal.2014:1).362
Rhinonumbershavebecomeacontestedissue,tyingintopublicpolicydebates,and
conservationandfundraisingagendasofvariousconservationNGOsandprivateoperators.
361
MillikencollatedrhinonumbersfromIUCN/SSCAfRSGdatathatwaslastupdatedon13October2013.In
2015,conservators(personalcommunication,2015)estimatedthatthetotalnumberofrhinoshaddroppedto
19700animalsofbothspeciesinSouthAfrica.
362
Thefiguresrelatetoapopulationsurveyundertakenin2013.Surveyorsusedhelicopterstocountrhinosin
878randomlyselectedblocksofthreesquarekilometresinsize(Ferreiraetal.2014:1).Afollow-upsurveywas
undertakenin2014.The2015surveydeterminedthattheKNPishometo8,400to9,300whiterhinos,according
tonumbersreleasedbytheSouthAfricanMinisterofEnvironmentalAffairsEdnaMolewaattheendofJanuary
2016.TheMinisterdidnotprovidenumbersforblackrhinopopulationshousedintheKNP(Molewa2016).
293
ThefactthattheKNPishometothegreatestnumberofrhinosinSouthAfricaremains
uncontested.RoughlythesamesizeasWalesorIsrael,theKNPstretchesacrossanareaof
closeto20000squarekilometres.TheParkextends350kilometresfromnorthtosouthand
about60kilometresfromeasttowest(KrugerNationalPark2015).Itsharesitsnorthern
borderswithZimbabwe,andMozambiqueextendsalongitseasternboundary.Since2001,
theKNPformspartoftheGreatLimpopoTransfrontierPark(GLTP),whichjoinsKrugerwith
GonarezhouNationalParkinZimbabweandtheLimpopoNationalParkinMozambique
(KrugerNationalPark2015).FlankingthewesternboundaryoftheKrugerParkandcovering
closeto2000squarekilometresareprivategamereserves(knownundertheumbrellaterm
ofAssociatedPrivateNatureReserves(APNR),comparewithChapter4).363Anotherlayerof
privategamereserves,aso-called‘bufferzone’islocatedalongtheeasternboundaryofthe
KNPandsouthoftheLimpopoNationalPark(hereafterLNP)inMozambique(discussedinthe
casestudyontheLNPinChapter4).SouthAfricancorporates,privateindividualsand
shareholdingcompaniesleasetheseconcessionsfromtheMozambicangovernment.364
ThecreationoftheLNPiscontextualizedasapost-colonialconservationinitiativethat
perpetuatesthesocial,economicandpoliticalalienationandmarginalizationofrural
communitieslivinginandthenearthepark.Asaconsequence,theperceptionhasemerged
thatwildanimals,andtherhino,inparticular,arevaluedhigherthanlocalpeople.Moreover,
thechangedconservationstatusoftheLNP(frommulti-usetototalprotection)hasledtothe
furthereconomicmarginalizationofvillagecommunitieslivinginsideorontheedgeofthe
Park.Withoutanyeconomicallyviablealternativeavailabletothem,thisconstellation
providesanever-growingpoolofvillagerswillingtorisktheirlivestohuntrhinosontheother
sideoftheinternationalboundaryseparatingSouthAfricafromMozambique.Whilethe
363
Groupsoffreeholdlandowners,corporateandindividualconcession–holdersownthesereserveswith
traversingrights.Animalsareabletofollownaturalmigratoryroutestoalimitedextentasfencesbetweenthe
privatereservesandKrugerhavebeentakendown(Frommer2015).
364
AlllandinMozambiquebelongstothestateandthuscannotbeownedorsold.However,the“rightofuse”of
thelandcalledthe“direitodeusoeapproveitamentodaterra”(DUAT)titlecanbeacquiredfor50yearsandis
renewableforanother50.Theinfrastructureandbuildingshencecanbeownedandresold.Mostforeign
investorsseeklocalpartnershipsorregisteralocalcompanyinMozambique(Wester2015).Thegamereserves
locatedalongtheKNP/MozambicanborderarepredominantlyownedbySouthAfricancorporatesor
shareholdingsinpartnershipwithMozambicancitizens.Thesepoliticallyconnectedgeneralsandpoliticians
asserttheirinfluenceinMaputoshouldconflictarisebetweentheconcession-holdersandlocalcommunities
(Interviews,2013).
294
dominantconservationnarrativefocusesonWesternconservationideals,whichassumea
tensionbetweenwildanimalsandlocalcommunities,theearlierchapterhadcalledfora
nuancedreflectiononhowtheframingofconservationmightcarryitsownseedsof
destruction.Thenarrativeof‘human/wildlifeconflict’hascreatedanenvironmentthatis
conducivetotheriseofself-styledRobinHood-typesocialbanditswhoseillegaleconomic
activitiesarebothsociallysanctionedandembeddedwithinvillagecommunities.TheKNPas
theepicentreofthe“poachingcrisis”,andtheLNPandMozambicanvillagesimmediately
adjacenttotheKNP,whicharethe“springboard”forthemajorityofillegalhuntingparties
intothePark,servedasthemainresearchsitesforthischapter.Itisagainstthisbackground
thatthefollowingchapteranalysestheroleofkeyactors,theirroleandfunctionintheoverall
marketstructure.Itwillbearguedthatrhinopoachingisnotonlyacrimedrivenbygreedand
impoverishmentbutalsomotivatedbyenvironmentalandsocialjusticeprinciples.The
facilitationroleofkingpinsandsmugglingintermediariesenablesthecontinuityofthis
particularillegalflowofhorn.Thechapteralsodrawsondatacollectedatotherpublicparks
andreserves,aswellasprivategamereservesandfarmsforcomparativeandillustrative
purposes.
7.2Diffusion,expansionandadaptationofflowsfrom2008onwards
Thefollowingsectiondealswiththeemergingsupplystructuresandflowsofrhinohornfrom
thelate2000sonwards.Thepreviouschapterprovidedinsightintoflowsofrhinohorn
locatedattheinterfaceoflegalityandillegality.Bundledtogetherwiththeillegalpoachingof
rhinosinrangestatesnorthofSouthAfrica,thesesub-legalflowsconstitutedtheprincipal
supplyarteriesofhorntonorthernandAsianmarketspriortothelate2000s.Whilegray
channellingcontinues,currenthornsuppliesderivepredominantlyfromtheillegalhunting
anddehorningofrhinosinnationalparksandprivategamereservesinSouthAfrica.The
transformationfromgraychannellingtoillegalhuntingoccurredin2008whenpoaching
statisticsspikedfrom13rhinodeathsin2007to83in2008(seeTable1).Thesurgein
poachinginSouthAfricacamelaterthanZimbabwewherethefirstsignsofthecurrent
poachingcrisisappearedin2003when44rhinowerepoached.Thatcoincidedwiththeland
reformprogrammeandmayhavealsocontributedtothespilloverintoSouthAfricalater.
295
ThespikeappearstohavecoincidedwiththepromulgationoftheTOPSregulationsinthe
sameyear.WildlifeprofessionalshencecorrelatethespikeinillegalhuntingwiththeTOPS
regulationsandthesubsequentmoratoriumonthedomestictradeinrhinohorn(which
becameeffectivein2009,seeChapter6)andsuggestthat“organizedcrime”enteredthefray
once‘legal’actorswerepreventedfromtradinginrhinohorn.Asdemonstratedinthe
previouschapter,theseso-calledlegalwildlifeactorsbearallthehallmarksoforganizedcrime
agentsandcertainlymeetthedefinitionalcriteriasetoutinthePalermoConvention
(discussedinChapter1).Asamatterofempiricalevidence,‘organizedcrime’(intheformof
wildlifeprofessionals,militaryandpoliticalelites)hasbeenpartandparceloftheillegaland
graysupplychainsofrhinohornsincethebushwarsofthe1980s.
Thesuggestedcorrelationtallieswiththenotionofwhatlawenforcersandcriminologistscall
the“ballooneffect”.Thetermreferstothegeographicdisplacementofcriminalmarketsasa
reactiontopolicyorlawenforcementinterventions(Windle/Farrell2012:868).Accordingto
themetaphoremployedhere,oncethestatesqueezesoneendofalatexballoon,itwillbulge
elsewhere(TransformDrugPolicyFoundation2011:4).Infact,SouthAfricanpolice
investigators(Interviewwithlawenforcer5,2013)employthemetaphoroftheballoon
effect:
“WeallknowabouttheVietnameseconnection,peopleusingdiplomaticvehicles…
Thesmugglingrouteschangedwhenweputpressureontheairports.Itisexactlythe
sameastheballooneffect.Ifyousqueezeoneside,theballoonisjustgoingtopop
somewhereelse.Krugerstartedsqueezingtheirpoachers,andthentheypopupbyme
orinLimpopoandelsewhere.Themomentwestartsqueezing,theymoveback.When
youputpressure,theywilllookforeasiertargets.Mozambiqueisaneasiertarget.
Namibiaisanopenquestion.”
Thenotionofaballooneffectfeedsintoanumberofparadigmsandnarrativesincluding
critiquesofdrugprohibition,notionsofhow‘organizedcrime’isstructured,andhowit
operates.Proponentsofdruglegalizationpointtothegeographicdisplacementofcannabisor
cocaplantationsinSouthAmericawhenanalysingthelackofsuccessincurbingdrugsupplies
intheinfamous“WaronDrugs”(TheEconomist2014).Insteadofcurbingacriminalactivity
andillegalmarkets,lawenforcementmovescriminalactorsandillegalmarketselsewhere
(TransformDrugPolicyFoundation2011:4).Theliteratureonorganizedcrimepointstothe
adaptability,planningandforesightoforganizedcrimeactors.Thelawenforcementadageof
296
“organizedcrimeisalwaysastepaheadofthepolice”referstoaproverbialgameof‘catand
mouse’inwhichthecat(lawenforcement)isrelegatedtoacatch-22situationandis
ultimatelydestinedtofail.Thus,thesuggestedcausalrelationshipofthestate’sintervention
versusanon-stateactor’spre-emptiveevasionofsuchinterventionssuggeststhe
hypotheticalinvincibilityandsuperiorityofthenon-stateactor–inthiscase,thenon–state
actorreferredtoisorganizedcrime.Organizedcrimemovesonto“weakerjurisdictions”even
beforetheballooniseffectivelysqueezed(TransformDrugPolicyFoundation2011:869).
Accordingtothisparadigmandassociatedpolicynarratives,365thereislittlehopeforthe
effectivedisruptionanddismantlingofillegaldrugmarkets,andhence,legalizationor
decriminalizationisofferedasanappropriatepolicyframework.Criminologistshaveoffered
nuancedviewsontheballooneffectdemonstratingbothnegativeandpositiveimpacts(see
forexample:Windle/Farrell2012).Moreover,agrowingbodyofscholarlyliterature
(Nadelmann1990;MacCoun1996;Raymond/Raymond2004)pointstothemeritsand
weaknessesofprohibition–basedsystems.
Withregardstothecurrentinquiry,ashortcomingrelatestothedeterministicand
paradoxicalassumptionsunderpinningtheparadigm.Tosuggestthatthethreatofstate
interventionandtheexecutionthereofleadstodefectionordisplacementoforganizedcrime
equatestothedenialofotherpermissivefactors–environmental,structuralandactor–driven
–leadingtothesameorasimilaroutcome.Itishenceimperativetoinquirewhycriminal
actorschoosetomoveoperationsorareswayedupontheproverbial“squeezingofthe
balloon”.Thefirstlineofinquiryrelatestowhetherthesameactorsareinvolvedorwhether
adifferentsetofactorsseizesaformofcomparativeadvantagebyoperatingfromadifferent
location.Ifitwerethesameactors:Aretheypushedorpulled?Doesthemoveconstitutea
‘causeandeffect’scenarioorisitachoicetheymake?Afurtherlineofinquiryrelatestowhy
thismovewasnotmadeearlier–especiallyinreferencetothesuggestionthatcriminalactors
onlymoveto“weakerjurisdictions”oncetheystarttofeeltheheat(Windle/Farrell2012:
365
Thereareempiricalstudiesthatdisputetheinvincibilityoforganizedcrimeanddemonstratethatspatial,
temporalortacticaldisplacementcanleadtopositiveoutcomesincludingdeterrentandcascadingeffects
(Windle/Farrell2012:871).Moreover,amulti-pronged,transnationalandmulti-sectorialapproach,which
incorporatescooperationwiththosenegativelyandpositivelyaffectedbyorganizedcrime,hasbeenshownto
disruptillegalmarkets(Interviewwithwildlifecrimeinvestigator,2015).
297
869).Moreover,canthedisplacementbepinpointedtoaspecificpointintime,wasit
staggeredoveraperiodoftime,ordiditleadtoaprocessoftransformation?
Thepreviouschapterexaminedwhythedomesticandinternationaltradebanslacksocial
legitimacyamongstrhinofarmersandwildlifeprofessionals.Thelegitimationdeviceof
“contestedillegality”hasbeendiscussedthroughoutthedissertation.Callsfortrade
legalizationcommencedshortlyaftertheinceptionoftheCITESbanontheinternationaltrade
inrhinohorn.Curiouslyupuntil2009,legaldomestictradewaspermissibleinSouthAfrica.
Theratherliberalinterpretationofwhatconstituted‘legal’economicactionssuchasthe
exploitationoflegalloopholesandunder-ornoreportingofstockpiles,werealsohighlighted
intheearlierchapter.Thedomesticmoratoriumhasledtoacrescendoofprotestagainst
boththeinternationalanddomesticban,occasioningtheSouthAfricangovernment’scurrent
investigationwhethertoconsideraproposaloflimitedtradeattheCITESCoP17in2016.
Proponentsoftradelegalizationarguethatoncefarmerswerebannedfrom‘legally’tradingin
rhinohorn,thetrademovedunderground,effectivelyaidingandabettingillegalhunters
ratherthan“rhinobreedersandconservators”(Interviews,2013).366Thisviewignoresa
numberofotherfactorsthatinfluenceddiffusionanddiversificationofhornsuppliesand
traffickingroutes.Whilethestrengtheningofregulationsledtothedefectionofsomerogue
rhinoownersandwildlifeprofessionals,367organizedillegalhuntingdidnotemergeoutofa
vacuumleftbythedefectors.Rogueelementswithinthewildlifeindustrywerethedirectand
indirectcatalysts(‘firemakers’)forafewearlypoachinggroupstoemergeinMozambique
andSouthAfrica.Insomeinstances,poachinggroupsemulatedillegalpracticesofthewildlife
andconservationindustry(e.g.farmlabourersandrangerswholefttheirformeremployers
pickeduponthetricksofthetrade,andforgedtheirownbusinessconnectionstoAsian
markets).Or,roguewildlifeprofessionalsrecruitedpoachersbyprovidingtoolstohunt
366
TheSouthAfricangovernmenthassetupaCommitteeofEnquirytolookintotheviabilityofalegaltradein
rhinohorn.PublichearingswereheldattheendofMarch2015.Amotleycrewofrhinofarmers,conservators
andactivistsreflectedonthestrengthsandweaknessesofaregulatedtradeinrhinohorn.Theirpresentations
canbefoundat
https://www.environment.gov.za/event/deptactivity/committeeofinquiry_rhinopoaching_workshop#workshopa
genda(accessed26March2015).
367
Oncethestatehadspelledoutthatitwasillegaltotradeinrhinohornorallowsuspicioushuntingparties
ontoone’sproperty,lawabidingactorswerenolongerwillingtocooperatewithhornintermediaries.
298
(huntingrifles)andconnectionstohornbuyers(explainedinmoredetailbelow).Thecausal
inferenceof“over-regulation”or“tradebans”leadingtoanescalationofpoachingthusneeds
tobecriticallyinterrogatedasitdisregardsanumberofparallelprocesses.
Firstly,theideathatpoachersfilledavoidsuggestsnaivelythattherewereeithernoother
illegalmarketparticipantspriortotheregulations,orthatrogueelementswithinthewildlife
sectoracceptedstateinterventionandceasedallillegalorsemi–legalactivities.Inessence,
thenotionof“fillingthevoid”orthe“trademovedunderground”suggestsmarketfailureand
terminationofgrayflows;inotherwords,thestatemanagedtosuccessfullydisruptthe
marketandformermarketparticipantswereeither“neutralized”(arrested)orceasedall
illegalorsub-legalactivities.Moreover,thereisalsoanassumptionthatallrhinosuppliers
werecompetinginanopentransparentandlegalmarket,onlysellinghorntoSouthAfricans.
Thisviewdiscountsthatillegalhunting,stockpilingandhornlaunderingwastakingplace
despitedomestictradebeingpermitted.Asdemonstratedinthepreviouschapter,illegal
hunting,dehorning,stockpilingandhornlaundering(whichwasillegalbefore)continuesin
theprivatesectorregardlessoftheregulationsandthemoratorium.However,anorganized
crimeinvestigatorconcedesthefollowing(Interviewwithlawenforcer14,2013):
“Well,theywillratherdothebusinessinMozambiquebecausethereisnolegislation.
Itisbettertobecorruptthere,it'sbettertoexportthere.Andcomingbacktothe
rhinohornstocksoftheprivaterhinoowners,someofwhomarefacingcriminal
chargesnow.Theyareabitreluctanttoparticipatebecausetheydon'tknowifthese
guysaregoingtosayweknowtheseguys,we'vetradedwiththem.It’slikeopeninga
canofworms.”
Secondly,thereisanimplicitassumptionthatafewwildlifeprofessionals,rhinofarmersand
AsianwildlifetraffickersheldmonopolycontroloverrhinohornsuppliesoutofSouthAfrica,
benefittingallthosewillingtodobusinesswiththem.Wasthereaquasi-verticalintegrationof
legal,semi-legalandillegalflowsofrhinohorn?Hypotheticallyspeaking,ifahierarchical
structurewereinplacewithahandfulofactorspullingthestringsinahighlyconcentrated
market,thenlawenforcementcouldhaveeasilydisruptedillegaltraffickingofrhinohornand
dismantledthemarketbynow.368Ifonlyafewactorsweretocontrolthemarket,theywould
368
Thisdiscountsthepossibilityofcooperativealliancesbetweenlawenforcementandillegalmarketactors.
299
havetoenforcemarketcontrolbywayofassertingcoercivepowers,ortherewouldhaveto
beinsuperablebarrierstoentry,whichexcludepotentialcompetitorseitherstructurallyor
economically(Steinberg2005a:9).369Followingthislogicandconsideringthehighprofits
associatedwithrhinohorn,newmarketentrantswouldhavetocompeteforapieceofthe
“rhinohornpie”.Noevidencecouldbefoundsuggesting‘turfwars’betweentheAfrikaner
cliquesofrhinocriminals(theso-called“boeremafia”),the‘newbreed’ofpoaching
syndicatesactiveinnationalparksandgamereserves,andrhinohornthieves.Infact,aswill
beshowninthischapter,therewerehighlevelsofcooperation.
Insteadofmarketcaptureoftheonegroupofactorsandmarketexitoftheother,
cooperativeallianceswereformed(thesectionontheroleofkingpinswilldiscussthe
pathwaystocooperationinmoredetail);andwhilesomealliancesweatheredthetestoftime
andpossibleconflictduetoheterogeneoussocialstructuresandweaklinks,othersdissipated.
InadditiontotheentryofMozambicancriminalentrepreneursandtheirhuntingcrews,other
AfricanhuntingteamscrossedintoSouthAfrica,andcriminalactorsactiveinotherillicit
marketsdiversifiedtheirbouquetofcriminalactivitiestoincluderhinopoaching.SouthAfrica
offeredopportunitystructurestoforeignhuntingcrews,andmoresoasrhinonumberswere
beingdepletedintheircountriesoforigin.ApoacherfromZimbabweexplains(Interview,
2013):
“Itwasnotmentionedtome,itwasarumour.Thereweresomepeoplethatknewthis
item.Weusedtokillthembutwedidnotknowwheretosellthem.Peopleusedtoget
themfromusfornexttonothing,forafewdollars–youknow.Thatwasin2007.Then
wecontinued,weusedtobargainwiththosebuyersandtheyusedtohiketheprice
bitbybitinordertolureusintothis.ThebuyerswereChinese–ofcourse.NoEnglish,
noGerman,noanyothernation.Vietnamese,wehavejustheardaboutthembutwe
havenotsoldanytothem.MostofthemaretheseChineseguysinJohannesburgthat
orderhorninChinatown,inJoburgthere.WewereinBeitbridge370then.Iusedto
369
Inhisanalysisofillicitabalonemarket,Steinberg(2005a:9)suggeststhatillicitmarketmonopolyisasserted
bywayofcoercivepowerorthrougheconomiesofscale.Inthelattercase,entrytothemarketislimiteddueto
thehighcostsassociatedwiththemarketentry.Marketpioneersarehencelikelytodominatethemarketfora
longtime.
370
BeitbridgeisaborderpostbetweenZimbabweandSouthAfrica.Therearetwosmalltownsbothnamed
Beitbridgeonbothsidesoftheborder.Likeotherbordertownsintheregion,thereisalotof‘wheelingand
dealing’happeninginthetwotowns.WhilethepoliticalborderbetweenZimbabweanandSouthAfricais
regardedasporous;traffickersandsmugglerspreferpassagethroughtheofficialborderposttominimize
300
workinZim371then.Ipoachedthere.Thesecuritybecametightandtighter.People
werekilled;morepeoplewerekilledingameparks.InSouthAfrica,thesituationwas
quitelax.Thesecurityisnotgood,thegameparksarequitesmall–theyarelikezoos,
theyarenotlikeourareasinZim.Theyarejustverysmall.Youcanevenhuntinthe
darknessofthenightandgetthatthing.Sowedecidedtomovethatside.HereinZim
thenumbersofrhinosarelow,notlikeinSouthAfrica.Heretheyaremanyin
Mokopane,Lephalale,Thabazimbi372–butinZim,theyareselectedandonlyinsome
areas.Thegameparksarenotprivatelikehere,wheretheyareownedby
individuals…[…].373Securityisnowverytightalthoughwecangetin,eventhough
securityisverytight.WefounditisnotaseasyashereinSouthAfrica.No,hereitisso
easy.Gettinginandall…Youcananytimegetintothissmallareaandfindthetracks.
Itiseasytotrackandthenyoufindthem.”
TheinformantmakesreferencetothedwindlingrhinonumbersinZimbabwe.Accordingto
theAfricanRhinoSpecialistRhinoGroup’s(AfSRG)lateststatistics(providedin:Milliken2014:
15),lessthan700whiteandblackrhinosremainedinZimbabweasofOctober2013.374
Noteworthyisthehighmobilityofillegalhuntingcrews;inotherwords,foreignhuntingcrews
werewillingtomovetheiroperationsacrosstheborderandthebarrierstoentryintothe
SouthAfricansupplystructuresappearedmarginal.Thisspecificinformanthadhistorical
connectionstoaChineseintermediaryinJohannesburg,whichcancelledouttheneedto
identifyanewbuyerandsupplychain.Otherssoughtoutallianceswithlocalcriminalgroups
(Interviews,2013).Insteadofcompetition(so-called‘turfwars’),thereisaformofmutual
‘criminal’assistanceamongstsouthernAfricanhuntingcrews.Forexample,theZimbabwean
crewshadaccesstohuntingrifles,whichtheyeitherwerewillingtoleaseoutortheyoffered
dangersassociatedwithillegallycrossingagainstthepaymentofabribe(seeforexamples:Hübschle2010).The
informantreferstotheZimbabweanbordertownofBeitbridgeinthecitationabove.
371
‘Zim’isthecolloquialreferenceforZimbabwe.
372
ThethreenamesrefertosmalltownsinthenorthernprovinceofLimpopoinSouthAfrica.
373
RhinopoachingoccurspredominantlyinthenationalparksofZimbabwe.Asaconsequence,mostofthe
remainingrhinosarefoundinlessthantenprivately–managedconservancies(Duffy/Emslie/Knight2013a:4).In
starkcontrasttoprivateownershipofrhinosinSouthAfrica,rhinosfoundonprivatelandaremanagedundera
privatecustodianshipprogrammeforthebenefitofallZimbabweans(Saxton2007:10).
374
Zimbabweexperiencedapoachingspikeinthemid-80s,whichwasattributedtotheattritionofblackrhinos
inZambia’sLuangwaValleyinthe1970s.LusakatheZambiancapitalwasthemajorwildlifetraffickinghubatthe
time.Bythe1980s,ZambianintermediariesdirectedtheirpoachinggroupstoZimbabwetosupplementthe
diminishinghornsuppliesinZambiawithpoachedrhinohornfromitssouthernneighbour(Millikenetal.1993:
21).TheZimbabweanDepartmentofNationalParksandWildLifeManagement(DNPWLM)gainednotoriety
duringtheso–called“RhinoWars”inthe1980sthroughitssystematicanddeadlyanti-poachingeffort,which
alsoincludedthedehorningofrhinosasaconservationmethod(Millikenetal.1993:2).
301
theirservicesasseasonedrhinohunterstothehighestbidder(comparewiththesectionon
theroleofkingpinsinthischapter).Thecompositionofhuntingcrewsisoften
heterogeneous,375meaningthatmenofdifferentagegroups,ethnicitiesandnationalities
cooperate.Deploymentintoahuntingcrewdependsonanumberoffactorssuchasthe
locationofthereserveorpark,priorknowledgeof,orintelligenceregardingthecontoursof
thepark,aswellastheskillssetsrequiredforaplannedhunt(Interviewswithpoachers,
2013).376WhereasZimbabweanpoachinggangsadaptedthecompositionoftheirgroupsand
modusoperandiinthepast,377thenewgenerationappearsmoresecurityconsciousand
convenience–orientated.Thesubtextofthecitedinterviewunderlinesthemotivationclearly:
Whywasteone’stimeandpotentiallyone’slifewhenSouthAfricaoffersrhinosona“golden
platter”?Criminalactorsactiveinviolentcrimessuchascash-in-transitheistsorarmed
robberiesalsojumpedshipbecause“rhinopoachingismucheasier”(Interviewwithprivate
securityactor3,2013).
Thirdly,buyers,intermediariesandlawenforcementofficials(Interviews,2013)citethe
increasingpriceof‘legal’or‘gray’rhinotrophyhuntsasasignificantcostconsideration
leadingtotheescalationofillegalhunting.Itwascheaperandlesscomplicatedtoundertake
businesswithlocalhunterswhowerepaidcomparativelylittle.Whenpseudo-hunting
commencedintheearly2000s,atrophyhuntwouldcostintheregionofR150000toR200
000(19370€to25770€–comparewithGraph4).OneMozambicankingpin(Interview,
2013)waspaid1900€/kgwhenhestartedillegallyhuntingintheKNPin2009.Theratesfor
SouthAfricanillegalhuntingteamswerelowerthanthatoftheirMozambicancounterparts.
SomehunterswerepaidaslittleasR80000toR250000(8300€to26000€)perhuntatthe
time(Interviewswithconvictedpoachers,intermediariesandtransporters,2013).Bythe
375
Heterogeneityofhuntingcrewsdoesnotextendtoquestionsofgender.Whilewomeninvolvedwere
involvedinlaterstagesofsupplychains,noevidencecouldbefoundofwomenparticipatinginhuntingcrews.
376
ZimbabweansandMozambicanpoachinggroupsarenotpioneersintraversinginternationalbordersin
pursuitofhigh-valuewildlifecontraband.SouthAfricanprofessionalbiggamehuntersoperatedinZimbabwein
thepast(duToit2013,Interviewwithconservator,2013);asrecentas2April2015,twosuspectedpoachers
wereshotdeadintheprivateconservancyofMalilangweinsoutheasternZimbabwe.Oneofthesuspectswasa
SouthAfricancitizen(EyewitnessNews2015).
377
PoachingexpeditionsintoZimbabweannationalparkscouldtakeuptotwoweeksduringthelate1980sand
early1990s.Thegroupsincorporatedagreaternumberofmemberstoassistwithcarryingprovisionsinand
rhinohornandivoryout(Millikenetal.1993:26).
302
timetheXayasavangnetworkgotinvolvedthecostofattainingasetof‘gray’rhinohornshad
morethandoubled.ChumlongLemthongthaiwaspaying6135€/kgforpseudo-huntedrhino
horn.Atanaverageweightof5,88kgpersetofwhiterhinohorn,378apseudorhinohuntcost
closeto€36000ormore.Additionalcostsassociatedwithtransportation,permitsandtaxes
andcooperationpremiums(bribespaidtosocialcontrolagents)increasedthetotalcostof
pseudo-huntedrhinohorn.
Pseudo-huntinghadlostitsappealbythetimeofLemthongthai’sarrestin2011.While
huntingregulationshadbeenadjustedtodealwiththephenomenon(albeitnottoo
successfullyasEastEuropeanhunterstookoverfromtheirAsiancolleagues),thereasonsfor
supplydiversificationseemtohavebeendrivenbyefficiencyandsecurityconsiderations
(comparewith:Morselli/Giguère/Petit2007),aswellasopportunitystructureslinkedtothe
geographiclocationoftheKNPanditscloseproximitytomajortraffichubs(discussedbelow).
Becausethecostof‘legal’orgrayrhinohuntshadescalated,poachinghadbecomean
attractivealternativethatcoulddeliverhighervolumesofhornatlowerpricesandthrough
lesscomplexsupplychains.Asattractiveasthesemblanceoflegalitymayhavebeento
organizers,transportersandconsumers,theoperationalfocusshiftedtoorganizedpoaching
expeditionsintotheKrugerNationalPark,provincialparksandprivategamereserves.While
there-focusingfrompseudo-huntingtoorganizedpoachingdidnotconstitutemarketfailure
ordisruptionperse,itdoessignaltheadaptabilityofwildlifetraffickersandtheprimacyof
costsaving,efficiencyandsecurityconsiderations–“thedollarsignrules”(Interviewwith
transporter,2013).
Fourthly,themigrationtoorganizedpoachingandthecontinuedlaunderingofstockpiledor
illegallydehornedrhinohornwasfurtherassistedthroughthebythenfirmlyestablishedand
secureillegalandlegalsupplychainsoutofSouthAfricaandneighbouringcountries
(Interviewswithintermediariesandlawenforcementofficials,2013).Intermediarynetworks,
378
Theaverageweightofthefronthornofarhinoisbetween5to9kg,andthebackhornweighsupto1,5kg
(deWet2013:4).BasedonastudyconductedintheKNPandcrosscomparisonswithdatafromelsewherein
Africa,formerNationalParksBoardscientists(Pienaar/Hall–Martin/Hitchens1991:6)peggedtheaverageweight
ofhornsofwhiterhinoslivinginthewildat5,88kg(forboththeanteriorandposteriorhorn)whereasthe
averageweightofblackrhinohornswere2,65kgforanimalslivingintheKNPandKZNnationalparks(slightly
lessthantheEastAfricanspecies).TheaverageweightproposedbyPienaarandhiscolleagueshasbecomethe
acceptednorm,frequentlycitedinrhinoresearch(seeforexample:Milliken2014).
303
traffickingchannelsandallianceswithstateactorshadbeenfirmlyestablishedbythelate
2000s.WhilesomesouthernAfricantraffickersmayhavehadhistoricaltradeandsmuggling
connectionsthroughapartheidmilitaryintelligencestructurestoAsia(Interviews,2013,
2014),newbusinessopportunitiesandroutesemergedinthemid-tothelate2000s.
Historically,Asiancriminalgroupshavebeeninvolvedinanumberofcooperativealliances
withlocalactorsinbothlegalandillegalmarkets.Forexample,thehistoricalbarteringtrade
ofmethaqualoneandlater,precursorchemicalsusedintheproductionofcrystal
methamphetamines(locallyknownas‘tik’),inexchangeforhigh-valuemaritimeresources
suchasabalone379hadledtocriminalalliancesbetweenlocalgangsfromtheCapeFlats380
andChinesecriminalgroups(comparewith:Steinberg2005a).Initiallyinterestedinabalone,
lionbonesandivory,Asiancriminalsbranchedoutintothemorelucrativerhinohornmarket
whileAfrikanerkingpinsstartedactivelymarketingSouthAfricanrhinohorntoAsianbuyersin
Asiancountries(seethepreviouschapter).Wildlifetraffickers‘piggy-backed’ontoexisting
traffickingandintermediarynetworksandroutes,expandingandentrenchingthemfurther.In
someinstances,symbioticrelationshipsemergedwhichfacilitatedcheap,reliableandspeedy
transportationofwildlifecontrabandtogetherwithotherlicitorillicitcommoditiesfrom
sourcetodestination.Smugglerswereinapositiontomovegreatervolumesofhornasmany
morerhinoscouldbeshotdeadanddehornedthan‘pseudo’or‘proxy’hunted.Therearealso
anumberofopportunitystructuresthatrenderillegalhuntingonpublicorprivateproperties
anattractivebusinessproposition.TheKNPislocateda5-hoursdrivefromORTambo
InternationalAirportinJohannesburg,andMaputocanbereachedbycarinabout6hours.
Moreover,Swazilandisincloseproximity,asisDurbanharbour,SouthAfrica’sprincipalport,
whichprovidesaccesstointernationalmaritimeroutes.LocatedinthehinterlandsofSouth
AfricaaresmugglingcorridorsbetweenSwazilandandMozambique.Thesecorridorswere
usedtomoveanti-apartheidactivistsandfighters,weaponsandammunitiontoSouthAfrican
liberationmovementsduringtheanti-apartheidstruggle.Aftertheendofapartheid,the
corridorsmorphedintotraffickingarteries,alongwhichcannabis,guns,cigarettes,stolen
motorvehicles,othercontrabandandlegalcommodities(toavoidtaxation)weresmuggled
379
AbaloneisamaritimesnailfoundpredominantlyinthecoldwatersalongtheWestandOverbergcoastlines
borderingtheAtlanticOcean.AbaloneishighlycovetedinAsianmarketsforitsaphrodisiacqualities.
380
TheCapeFlatsreferstoanareaofCapeTown,towhichpeopleofmixedracewereforciblymovedduringthe
apartheidregime.
304
fromandtoSouthAfrica,anditsneighbours.Theyalsousedtomovewildlifecontraband
includingrhinohornfromthesource(predominantlyfromtheKNP)totranshipmenthubsin
EastAfrica.
Finally,thecreationoftheLNPhasledtotheeconomicmarginalizationofvillagecommunities
livinginsidetheareaoftheparkoronitsedge.Theseven-yearperiodfromtheproclamation
oftheParkin2001totheescalationofrhinopoachingintheKNPin2008sawvillage
communities’livesandfortuneschangefrombadtoworse.Theresettlementofcommunities
(seeChapter4),aswellasthosethatchosetostaybehind,hasledtodiminishedincome
streams,andchangedsocialrelationswithinthevillageunit.Theseimpoverished
communitiesprovideareadypoolofvillagerswillingtorisktheirlivesinpursuitofthe
‘golden’horn.
Inconcludingthissection,itisimportanttonotethatanumberofparallelprocessesledto
themigrationfromlegalandgrayflowsofrhinohorntothetimeexpedient,costefficient,less
complexandsecureflowofillegallyhuntedrhinohornfromnationalparksandgame
reserves.Thefollowingsectionswillanalysethecrucialroleofkingpinsandintermediariesin
thesupplychain.
7.3Kingpins,intermediariesandsmugglers:Thelocalstronghold
Localkingpins,381intermediariesandtransportersaretheanchoranddrivingforcebehindthis
illegalflow.Theroleoftheseactorsiscentraltothecontinuityofhornsupply;however,actor
constellationsarecomplexandmulti-layered,andeconomicrelationshipsarefrequently
dropped,reinventedordiscontinued.Whileorganizingandcoordinatingillegalhuntinggroups
takesupagreatpartoftheeverydayresponsibilitiesofarhinokingpin,theirfunctionsalso
includequalitycontrol,conflictresolution,liaisonandcooperationwithlocalauthoritiesand
381
TheSouthAfricanorganizedcrimeunitwithintheSAPS,theHawks,employtheterm“kingpin”toreferto
localcrimebosses.Forthesakeofconsistency,thecontroversialtermisemployedinthisdissertation.Itis
acknowledgedthat‘queenpins’doexistandtheterm“kingpin”couldbeconstruedassexistandgender
insensitive.However,thoseinterviewed(bosses,poachersandinvestigators)usedthetermfrequentlyandfelt
comfortablewiththelabeling,associatednarrativesandmeanings.
305
villageelders,horntransporters,competitorsandsocialcontrolagents,aswellassecuring
continuityofthesupplychain.ThesectiondrawsondatacollectedintheMozambican
borderlandsandSouthAfricanprisons.
7.3.1Thesocialeconomyintheborderlands:Whatdoesittaketobecomearhinokingpin?
Whiletherehavebeenafewcasesofsocialupwardmobilityandrankadvancementfrom
poachertokingpin,themajorityofkingpinshavepriorexperienceincross-bordercrime,382
lawenforcementcareersorconservationbackgrounds,383ortheywererunningsuccessful
legitimatebusinessessuchastaxiortransportationcompaniesintheirpreviouslives.Once
rhinopoachingemergedasalucrativeeconomicopportunity,theseactorsdiversifiedinto
rhinopoaching.Accordingtointelligencereports(Interviewwithintelligenceofficers,
MozambiqueandKNP,2013),a“groupoffourteen”384ranthefirstpoachingcrews“intheold
days”of2008.Knowledgeoftraversingroutesthroughthepark,locationofwaterholesand
biganimals,aswellasbushnavigation,military385andtrackingskillsrenderedthemideal
recruits.WhiteSouthAfricansinvolvedingrayandillegalflowsofhornrecruitedtheGroupof
14,whobecamethemainhornsuppliersandpoachingintermediariesinsubsequentyears.A
Massingir-basedkingpinrevealed(Interview,2013):
382
AnotoriousrhinokingpinwhogoesbythepseudonymofMrNavarawastheorganizerofacross-bordercar
theftsyndicate.ThesyndicatewasimportingstolencarsfromSouthAfricatoMozambique.MrNavara’spassion
forstealingluxurySUVNissanvehiclesofthe‘Navara’brandhasearnedhimhisnickname.Thekingpiniswanted
fortheabductionandmurderofawildlifeveterinarianinSouthAfrica’sLimpopoProvince.Intheabsenceofan
extraditiontreatybetweenMozambiqueandSouthAfrica,SimonErnestValoi(hisrealname)remains
untouchable(Interviews,2103).JusticeNgovene,anotherkingpinrunsaDVDcounterfeitingbusinessand
‘jailbreaks’(cracks)securitycodesofstolenmobilephonesandcomputerequipment.Hewasbuilding
Massingir’sfirsthotelduringthelastfieldvisittoMassingirinAugust2013.Justiceisalsoknownbythename
“Nyimpini”whichistheShangaanwordforcentre,coreorfoundation,orthehandleofanaxe–illegalhunters
useeitherax,pocketknivesormachetestoremoverhinohorns.
383
SeveralrangersandfieldguidesfromtheKNP,LNPandHlhuluwe-Imfolozi(someofwhomarenolongerin
theemployoftheseparks)arerunningtheirhuntinggroups(Interviewswithkingpin1andintelligence
operatives,2013).
384
Theoriginofthenumberisunclear,perhapsevenmythical.Empiricalevidenceconfirmsthattherewerea
numberofpoachingpioneerslivinginproximityoftheKNPontheSouthAfricanandMozambicanside.
385
Thedecades-longcivilwarinMozambiqueequippedmostMozambicansovertheageof40withbasicmilitary
skills,whichwereneededfordailysurvival.
306
“ThiswholethingstartedwiththepeoplefromSouthAfrica.Theycameto
Mozambiqueandintroducedthisbusinesstousandtheypaidusalotofmoney.They
basicallyrevealedthesecret.ThentheChinesesawtheopportunitythentheystarted
comingtousforbusiness…[…]…TheSouthAfricanwhitemanopenedoureyes,then
mostofussawthepotentialofthebusinessandthenwestartedtodoitonourown
andweintroducedmorehunters.”386
TheSouthAfricanrecruitersprovidedhuntingrifles,ammunitionandcashforthehorns.Early
transactionsalsoinvolvedthebarterofhuntingriflesforrhinohorn(Interviewwithkingpin,
2013).Theearlypoacher-kingpinsfulfilledorganizational,operationalandlogisticalfunctions.
OnceillegalhuntingcrewshadpoachedanddehornedrhinosintheKNP,rhinohornswere
takentoMozambique.FromtherethehornwouldbetakenonfootthroughtheGiyaniborder
posttoJohannesburg(backtoSouthAfrica)ortranshipmenthubsinBeiraandMaputo.The
SouthAfricanrecruitershadbusinessandfarminginterestsinMozambique,whichprovided
themwithlegitimatereasonstoseekout‘partnerships’withlocals.Twoindividualshavebeen
linkedtoivoryandrhinohornsmugglingduringtheborderwarsofthe1970sand1980s.The
existingexportandimportbusinesseswereusedasafronttoconductillegaldealsandexport
wildlifecontrabandtoconsumermarkets.ThegroupofwhiteSouthAfricansisstilloperating
outofMozambique;thelocalkingpinsarehoweverdealingwithbuyersandtransporters
directly.Atleasttwooftheoriginalkingpins(whowerestillactiveinMarch2016)andone
intermediarywereinvolvedincross-bordersmugglingoperationsinvolvingstolenmotor
vehicles.387TheMozambicankingpinsandpoachersinterviewedfortheresearchhad
traversedtheKrugerNationalParkonnumerousoccasionstosearchforemploymentinSouth
Africaandtovisittheirfamiliesinthevillages.388
386
Otherkingpins,poachersandintelligenceoperatorsconfirmedtheunlikelyalliancebetweenwhiterhino
criminalsandblackcriminalentrepreneurs(thebackgroundtopoachingkingpinsisdiscussedbelow).
387
Knownasthe“WildWestofcardealingandwheeling”inlawenforcementcircles,thesmalltownofChokwe
islocatedabout120kmsouthfromMassingirand225kmnorthofMaputo.Itisbelievedthatthemajorityof
SouthAfricanstolenmotorvehiclestransitthroughChokwe(Interviewswithregionallawenforcementofficials,
2013).Chokwewasalocalmarketwhererhinohorntransactionswouldtakeplaceupuntil2012/2013.
388
Asmentionedinearlierchapters,colonialbordersweredrawnwithlittleregardforindigenousAfricanpeople
andtheirspheresofinfluence.TheShangaanpeople,forexample,liveinMozambiqueandSouthAfrica.The
politicalandeconomicsituationinMozambiqueledtomenseekingemploymentinSouthAfricanminesandon
farms.PathwaysthroughtheKNPwereoftenthemostconvenientandeasyroutetoSouthAfricaandviceversa
(Interviews,2013).
307
7.3.2Need,greedandenvironmentaljusticeprinciples
Whatmotivateskingpinsandtheirhuntingcrewstokillanddehornrhinos?Lawenforcement
andconservationofficialsportraycommunitieslivinginsideorontheedgeoftheLNPasa
homogeneousgroupofpeoplethatconsistsofpoachers,andvillagerswhobenefitfromrhino
poaching(Interviews,2013).389Itissuggestedthatruralpoverty,opportunitystructuresof
livingclosetothepark,andgreedarefeedingthepoachingcrisis.Thesefactorsconstitute
sufficientdriversofpoaching;however,therootcausesofpoachingtouchonthehistoryof
conservation,huntingrightsandlandownershipinsouthernAfrica(comparewithearlier
chapters,especiallyChapter4).Theeffectsofstructuralviolencearevisibleinthevillage
communitieswhonotonlyliveontheedgeofparksbutalsoontheedgeofsocietywhenit
comestosocialandeconomicupliftmentinitiatives.Thecontinuedeconomic,politicaland
socialmarginalizationofvillagecommunities(unpackedinChapter4)hasgivenriseto
environmentalandsocialjusticeconcerns.Whiletherhinohasabountyonitshornthatfar
outweighstheaverageannualincomeofaruralvillager,poachingisnotjustabouttheprice
ofthehornbutalsoaboutclaimingreparationsforthelossofland,huntingandlanduse
rightsanddemandsforeconomicopportunitiesandagencytoco-determinethefutureand
goodfortunesofvillagecommunities(Interviews,2013).Itisagainstthisbackdropthat
kingpinsandhuntershaveemergedasself-styledRobinHoods,whouserhinopoachingfor
socialandeconomicupwardmobility.SaysonekingpinbasedinaMozambicanvillage
community(Interviewwithkingpin3,2013):
“Weareusingrhinohorntofreeourselves.”
Mozambicanvillagers,rangers,poachersandkingpins,aswellasconvictedrhinocriminals
servingprisonsentencesinSouthAfricancorrectionalcentresexpressedtheirannoyancewith
thestateforvaluinganimalsoverhumanlives(Interviewsandfocusgroups2012,2013).A
hornsmuggler(Interviewwithintermediary1,2013)explainedtherhinoissueasfollows:
389
Thebombingofallvillageswithin30kmradiusoftheKNPontheMozambicansidehasbeenmootedasan
anti-rhinopoachingstrategyinanonlinediscussiongroup.Whilethisisanextremeproposalofaradical
minority,itshowshowstigmatizationofvillagersasahomogenousgroupofpoachersisincreasinglyentering
mainstreamthinking.
308
“This[rhinoproblem]isbecauseofconservation.Theysaythatweneedthosethings
[rhinos].Theyarenice.Someofthewhitepeopleheretreatthemliketheirfriends.
Theyvaluetherhinomorethanblackhumanbeings.Andnowtheyseeitasa
business,ifyouhavetworhinosyouarerich.”
Therhinohasbecomethelucrativescapegoatfortheongoingrelativedeprivationand
economicmarginalizationofvillagecommunities.Unliketheslowtrickledownlinkedto
communitybeneficiationinitiativesofthestateandprivateoperatorsinandaround
conservationareas,communitymembersobservetheupwardsocialmobilityofkingpins,
poachersandtheirfamilies.Theinfluxofhardcashintovillagecommunitieshascreatedthe
perceptionthatallvillagersbenefitequallyfromrhinopoaching,theso-called‘RobinHood
effect’(InterviewswithKNPofficials,2013).ThesocialbanditryassociatedwithRobinHood
capturesanimportantaspectofkingpins’andpoachers’assertedidentitiesinthecontextof
villagecommunities.Therole,functionsandidentitiesofkingpinsandpoachersarehowever
farmorecomplex,multi-layeredandcontingentonthegeographiccontext.Whilemany
poachersoriginatefromvillagecommunities,othersjoinhuntingcrewsfromcommunities
elsewhere,evenforeigncountries(usuallyconnectedtovillagecommunitiesviakinshipties).
Thelevelofsocialembeddednessofkingpinsandpoachersvariesandcarriesstructuraland
logisticalimplicationsfortheflowofrhinohorn.Ofimportancearecommunityperceptionsof
whethertheirfortunesandlivelihoodsareimproving.Thecommunityappearstobenefit
largelyindirectly,asthereareveryfewdirecthand-outs.Directhand-outsarerelegatedto
certainkingpins“throwingavillageparty”byslaughteringafewcowsandproviding
traditionalbeeruponthereturnofasuccessfulpoachingexpeditiontotheKrugerNational
Park.Othersconstructservitudes,waterwells,spazashops390andshebeens,391and
occasionallyafewcowsaredonatedforslaughteringtothebenefitofthecommunity
(Interviewsandfocusgroup,2013).Comparedtothemeagrelivelihoodsofvillage
communities,kingpinsandpoachershavepurchasepower,allowingthemtobuygreater
volumesofgoodsandservices,whichindirectlybenefitcommunitymembers.Oneyoung
poacher(mid-20s)relatedhowhewasbearingtheriskwhengoingonhuntingexpeditionsin
theKrugerParkandthuswasnotpreparedtosharehisprofitswiththecommunity(Interview
390
Aspazashopisasmallneighbourhoodgrocer.
391
Ashebeenisapub.
309
withpoacher15,Massingir,2013):“Itbenefitsme,Idon’tgivetothecommunity.”Notall
poachersarepaidequallywell.AcrimeinvestigatorintheKNP(Interview,2013)recounted
thestoryofinterrogatinga17-yearoldpoacher,whoseteammatewaskilledduringa
shootoutwiththeKNPanti-poachingunit:
“Whatthehellareyoudoinghere?Didtheypromiseyoumoney?Yes.Butthemoney
isnottheissue.Theypromisedtogiveme12,5kilosmieliemeal.392Theyarefour–
threekids[andhim],hisfatherpassedawayatthemines.He’saveewagter.393He's
lookingaftercattleforsomebodyelse.Heistheonlyonethatearnsmoneyinthat
house.Forabagofmieliemeal…”
Foreignorout-of-townpoachingcrewsrelyonlocalaccommodation,foodandlogistical
assistancefrommembersofthecommunity.Itis,however,incorrecttoassumethatthe
entirecommunityiscomplicitorbenefitsinequalmeasures.
Poachingprofitsarepredominantlylaunderedintotheproperty,luxurygoodsandautomobile
sectors.TheMozambicantownofMassingirexudesanaurasimilartoshort-livedboomtowns
duringanapparent‘GoldRush’.Ithasbecomeamagnetforbusinessentrepreneursfrom
otherprovincesoracrosstheborder,keentoseizenewopportunities.Youngmenfrom
elsewhereinMozambiqueandSouthAfricaarriveinMassingirseekingrecruitmentinto
poachingcrews.Onekingpinisbuildingahotelcomplex;othershaveinvestedinholiday
housesatthecoast–thecoastaltownofBelene,forexample,islocateda5hoursdrivefrom
Massingir.394Manypoachersarebuildingmoderntownhousesinthevillages,replacingthe
traditionalclayandreedhutscommonintheregion.Thepropertyboomhasalsoledtoan
influxofskilledartisans,labourersandbusinesspeopleworkingintheconstruction,building
materialsandretailsectors.Theyoungergenerationinveststheirrhinoprofitsintooff–street
vehiclesandluxurycars(Interviewswithpoachersandkingpins,2013;fieldobservation)while
theoldergenerationisbuyingheadsofcattlewhichsignalaffluenceandstatusinvillage
communities.Whilerhinopoachinghasbecomethemainsourceofincome,somerhino
392
‘Mieliemeal’referstomaizemeal,acoarseflourmadefrommaize.Itisastaplefoodacrossmostofthe
southernAfricanregion,ofteneatenasporridge(pap).
393
‘Veewagter’istheAfrikaanswordforcattleherder.
394
Rhinohornprofitshavebeeninvestedintoseveralluxuriousseasidevillasinthesmallcoastaltown.
310
kingpinsareastutebusinessentrepreneurs,runninganumberoflegalandillegalside
businesses.Thereisawarenessabouttheceilingtotherhinohornfortunes;inotherwords,
kingpinsacknowledgetheexistentialthreattorhinosthroughpoachingandthattheywill
havetoseeknewsourcesofincome,orreturntotheoldonesoncetherhinosaregone
(Interviews,2013).Fastmovingconsumergoods(designerclothing,shoesandsunglasses),
off-streetvehiclesandfacebrickhouseshavebecomesoughtafterconsumerproductsand
statussymbolsamongstkingpinsandpoachers.Insteadofacceptinghardcashforrhinohorn,
somepoacherschoosetopayoffmotorvehicles395,constructionmaterialsforbuildingface
brickhouses,realestateorconsumergoodsinstead.Rhinokingpinsthroughtheirbusiness
connectionsareabletoprocureorassistwiththeprocurementofsuchconsumergoodsand
constructionmaterials(whicharemostlyimportedfromSouthAfrica).Theyalsocontrolthe
debteconomiesemanatingfromthisbartertrade,whichprovidesthemwithanotherlayerof
controlandaninformaleconomicleadershiprole.Inessence,indebtedpoachershaveto
supplyrhinohorntoaspecificcreditorkingpin.However,thisdependenttypeofrelationship
isnotwidespreadasmostkingpinsareconsideredabenignpresencethatupliftsthefortunes
ofvillagecommunities.
Inlinewithenvironmentalandsocialjusticearguments,kingpins,poachersandsmugglers
portrayedtheircriminalcareersaslegitimatelivelihoodsthroughouttheprocessofdata
collectionintheborderlandsandSouthAfricanprisons.TwocharismaticMozambican
kingpins,forexample,haveconstructedtheiridentityas“economicfreedomfighters”396that
fightfortheeconomicandenvironmentalrightsoftheirvillagecommunities.Othershave
labelledthemselvesas‘businessmen’,‘developers’,‘communityworkers’or‘retiredhunters’
(Interviewswithkingpin1and2,2013).Aconvictedpoacher(Interviewwithpoacher16,
2013)stated:
“Youseeinaruralarea,theyusedtocalleachandeveryonethatstayedthereand
theytalkedwithustodecideaboutthingsthatconcernedus.Nowthingsaredifferent.
395
Crimeintelligenceofficersverifytheregistrationnumbersofvehiclesdrivenbypoachingsuspectsatintervals.
Themajorityofvehicleswerereportedasstolenornopublicrecordisavailable(Interviews,2013).
396
TheEconomicFreedomFighters(EFF)isasplinterpartyoftherulingAfricanNationalCongress(ANC)inSouth
Africa.DispelledformerANCYouthLeague,commander-in-chiefJuliusMalemaformedthesocialistparty.Its
policyplatformoflandreformandwealthredistributionisreceivingwidespreadsupportinSouthAfricaand
beyond.
311
Andtheyputthepresidentonthechair,theydon'taskusanymore,theydothingson
theirown.Itisthemthatbehaveliketheyarecrooks.That’swhyweendupkillingthe
rhinos.”
Kingpinslayclaimstofulfillingimportantsocialwelfare,communitydevelopmentandpolitical
leadershipfunctions.Rhinohornisinstrumentaltoachievingtheseovertlyaltruisticgoalsin
anenvironmentwherethestatehasfailedtoprovidesuchfunctions(seenextsection).The
actualrepresentativesofthestateandtraditionalleadersfulfilceremonialduties,often
heavilysubsidizedbyresidentkingpins(Interviews,2013).Similarlegitimationstrategiesare
employedinothernaturalresource-dependenteconomieselsewhereinthesouthernAfrican
region.AbalonepoachinggangleadersintheWesternCapeProvinceofSouthAfricahavealso
madeclaimsaboutthesociallegitimacyofabalonepoachinginlightofcommercialfishing
quotas,whichareperceivedtobeunjustandunfairtostrugglinggrassrootsfishing
communitiesalongtheSouthAfricancoastline(Hauck1997;Hauck/Sweijd1999,Interviews
withconservationofficials,WesternCape,2014and2015).Inthecaseofrhinopoaching,
legitimationstrategiesalsoincludetheappropriationofjoblabelsfromthe‘legal’hunting
sector.Rhinopoachersregardthemselvesas‘professionalhunters’or‘hunters’(Interviews
withconvictedpoachersandactivepoachers,2013).Thepositionofahuntercomeswith
statusandprestigeinvillagecommunitieswhereayoungboy’sfirsthuntisariteofpassage
and“youactuallybecomeamanwhenyouhunt”(Focusgroup,2013).Thepoacherisclaiming
backhisrighttohuntbypoachinginmoderndayconservationareas,whichwerethe
traditionalhuntinggroundsofhisforefathers.Colonialanti-poachinglawsandtheirmodern
incarnationintheformofhuntingregulationsrequirepaymentforhuntingpermits.Total
protectionzoneswhichbanhuntingandotherlanduseshaveledtotheeconomicand
geographicexclusionofruralcommunitiesfrom‘legal’huntinginareasclosetotheirlocation.
Rhinopoachingthuswasinitiallyalsoaformofprotestagainstthehuntingban–another
expressionofcontestedillegality–allowingactorstoprotestagainstunfairandeconomic
exclusionaryrulemaking.Whatstartedasanillegaleconomicactivitybornoutofneedand
protestagainstunfairruleshashoweversnowballedintogreed-basedaccumulationfurther
exacerbatedbythehighvalueofrhinohorn.
312
7.4Feedbackloopsofrhinopoachingandanti-poachingmeasures
Theprevioussectiondealtthesocialembeddednessofrhinopoacherswithinvillage
communitiesandthelegitimationstrategiesemployedtojustifyillegaleconomicactivities.
Thissectionlooksintothenegativeimpactsandtheirsocietalrelevance,aswellasfeedback
loopstiedtothemilitarizationandsecuritizationofresponsesagainstpoachingandthesocial
embeddednessofpoachersandrangers.Severalfocusgroupsandindividualinterviews
exposeddeepriftswithinvillagecommunities;especiallymothersandwivesweredeeply
concernedaboutthepoachingphenomenonfearingfortheirchildren’sorhusband’slives397
andthepotentiallossofabreadwinnershouldtheygetkilledorarrested.Farfrombeing
supportiveofpoaching,theysharedhowpoachinghadaffectedthesocialfabricofvillagelife,
mostlytothedetrimentofwomenandchildren.398AconvictedMozambicanpoachershared
(Interviewwithconvictedpoacher2,2013):
“Theparentsgetveryangrybutthere’snothingtheycandoaboutit.There’sno
employmentinthearea.Ourparentsworrythatrangerswillkillus.Theydowarnus
butwedon’tlisten.SometimesonFridaysandSaturdays,theyhavecommunity
meetingstotalktousaboutthedangersofpoaching.”
397
Whilewomenareinvolvedfurtheralongtheillegalsupplychainofrhinohorn,Ihadnotcomeacrossfemale
poachersinthesouthernAfricancontextatthetimeoffieldwork.However,twoyoungmotherswereconvicted
ofconspiracytohuntrhinosandpossessionofanunlicensedfirearmandammunitionintheLadysmithRegional
CourtinMarch2016(Skinner2016).Italsobearspointingoutthatwomenwerecombatantsduringthe
Mozambicancivilwar.Aninterviewwitharesearcherworkinginthefieldofdisarmament,demobilizationand
reintegration(DDR)inMozambique(Interviewwithresearcher1,2012,2013)revealedthatmanyMozambican
womenovertheageof30knowhowtohandlegunsanddefendthemselvesbyusingsuchguns(whichhad
becomeanecessityduringthecivilwar).Theabilitytousefirearmstodefendone’slifedoesnotnecessarily
correlatewithawillingnesstogopoachingintheKrugerNationalPark.However,therecentcaseinthe
LadysmithRegionalCourtraisesinterestingquestionsastothepoachingmotivationsofthetwoyoungmothers
andwarrantsfurtherinquiryintopathwaystopoaching.
398
WhilewalkingthroughoneofthevillagesIcameuponanoldwoman,whowaslookingafteragroupofeight
childrenoutsideahut.Fourofthekidsweretheoldwoman’sgrandchildren,whohadbeenleftinhercare.Her
daughterhadleftthefatherofherchildrenforarichpoacherinthevillage.Thegrandmotherwasdisgruntled
aboutthestateofaffairs,asshereceivednofinancialsupportfromthedaughterorthedesertedhusband.One
ofthechildrenhadtobehospitalizedasaconsequenceofsevereburnsfromashackfirethenightbefore.The
familycouldnotgetholdofthemotherbecause“whentheboyscomebackfromSkukuza,thenthereismoney
andcelebration”(Interviewwitholdwoman,Massingir,2013).Accordingtothegrandmother,themother
lookedafterthechildrenwheneverherboyfriendwentoffonanotherpoachingexpedition.Thedaughter
broughtnomoneyhome,asthehornprofitsarespenton“womenandbooze”.
313
Afewhalf-builthousesinthevillagesareastarkreminderofthestarkrealitythatmany
poachersdonotreturnfrom‘Skukuza’.399AccordingtoMozambicansources(Mabunda
2012),400closeto400poachingsuspectsfromMozambiquehadlosttheirlivesbetween2008
andearly2014.SouthAfricanofficialsareapprehensivetosharethestatistics(seeTable12)
forfearofbadpressandretribution(Interviews,2013).Atthetimeofwriting,poachershad
notkilledrangers;however,onerangerwaskilledandanotherseriouslywoundedin‘friendly
fire’(personalcommunicationwithKNPofficials,2015).
Table12:ArrestsanddeathsofpoachersintheKrugerNationalPark,2010-2014401
2014
2013
2012
2011
2010
Neutralized
174
133
73
82
67
47
17
21
4
Killedinaction
45
402
Source:SuppliedbyKrugerNationalParkon25August2014
Focusgroupswithcommunityrepresentativesintheborderlandsrevealedthatthedeathsof
poachingsuspectshadledtofurtheralienationandoutrightantagonismofcommunity
memberstowardsthePark.Communitymembersrecountedthatmanyvillagerstraversedthe
KNPinsearchofworkortovisitfamiliesinSouthAfrica.Asshownearlier,colonial-era
politicalbordersremainacrossmostofsouthernAfrica,whichsuitedcolonialinterestsatthe
timebutoftenseparatedlocalcommunities.AccordingtointerviewswithKrugerofficialsand
399
SkukuzaisthemainrestcampandadministrativeheadquartersoftheKNP.Whenapoacherannouncesthat
heis‘goingtoSkukuza’,itindicatesthatheispreparingforapoachingexpeditionintotheKNP.
400
InvestigativejournalistLazaroMabundaundertookfascinatingresearchintopoachingcrewsinthe
Mozambicanborderlandin2012.AccordingtooneofhisconfidentialpolicesourcesintheMozambicanpolice
(pers.communicationin2015),363MozambicanpoachingsuspectshadbeenshotdeadintheKrugerbetween
2008andearly2014.FormerMozambicanPresidentJoaquimChissanoannouncedatapressconferencein
September2015thatSouthAfricanrangersandsecurityforceshadkilled476MozambicansintheKruger
NationalParkbetweenJanuary2010andJune2015(AIM2015).ItisunclearwhytheMozambicanandSouth
Africanstatisticsdonottally,whichmightbelinkedtoSANParks’useofterm‘neutralized’(comparewithnext
footnote).Deadbodiesorthedisappearanceofacommunitymemberarecertainlydifficulttoconceal.
401
Explanatorynote:TheKNPenvironmentalmanagementinspectorateemploystheunfortunateterm
“neutralized”toreflectthetotalofsuspectedpoacherskilledandarrestedinsidetheKNP.
402
By25August2014,23suspectedpoachershadbeenkilled.Thefigureof45deathsderivesfromamedia
briefing.AttemptstoconfirmthestatisticswithKNPofficialswerenotanswered.
314
oldervillagecommunitymembers(Interviewsandfocusgroups,2013),somevillagerscarry
dualcitizenship.
PeoplelivingonbothsidesoftheborderarehighlymobileandmovebetweenSouthAfrica
andMozambiquefornumerousreasons.Intheeyesofthecommunity,Krugergamerangers
killtheirfellowvillagersonthesuspicionthatalltrespassersarepoachers.Theincreasing
militarizationofresponsestorhinopoachingispittingthemagainstparkauthorities,rangers
andrhinos.Moreover,theseresponseshavefurtherexacerbatedthesentimentthatwild
animalsarevaluedhigherthanblackpeopleinconservationandgovernmentcircles.Onthe
otherendofthespectrumaretheKrugerrangerswhorisktheirliveseachdaytoprotectthe
rhino(seeGraph6).WhiletherehasbeenpoachingofwildlifeeversincethePark’sinception,
thedutiesofarangerusedtoentailconservation-orientatedendeavoursandtodealwith
delinquenttourists.Nowadays,rangersreceivequasi-guerrilla-style,anti-poachingtraining,
andspendmostoftheirtimedefendingrhinosandtrackingthespoorofsuspectedpoachers
(InterviewwithKNPofficial,2013).
Anothercleavagearisesfromthesocialembeddednessofpoachersandrangerswith
consequencesforharmoniousrelationsandsociallifeatthevillagelevel,andthe
effectivenessoflawenforcementdisruptions.ManyLNPemployees(includingtheranger
corps)andtheworkforceonprivately-ownedconcessionsarerecruitedfromlocalvillage
communitieslivinginsideorontheedgeoftheParkandprivateconcessions.Theoriginal
rangercorpsintheLNPconsistedof45guardsand55fieldrangers,whowereresponsiblefor
wildlifeconservationandlawenforcement.Thenumbersoftherangercorpshavebeen
augmentedbytheadditionofanelitespecialanti-poachingunitof30men,whowere
deployedinmid-December2013.Membersoftheunitreceivedspecializedtraining,three
LandCruiservehicles,rifles,radiosandpatrolequipment(PeaceParksFoundation6January
2014).Mostoftheprivately-ownedhuntingandtouristconcessions403southoftheParkhave
403
SouthoftheLimpopoNationalParkandalongtheeasternboundaryoftheKrugerNationalParkareseveral
huntingandtouristconcessions.TheseconcessionsarepredominantlyownedbySouthAfricancorporates
(includingforexampleSingita’sTwinCity,andHulettTongaat),huntingconcessionssuchasSabieParkor
ecotourisminitiativesliketheXhongileGamePark.AlloftheseconcessionaireshaveMozambicanshareholders,
asforeignnationalsarenotallowedtoownlandinMozambique.TheMozambicanshareholdersarepolitically
connectedindividualsinMaputo,whoasserttheirinfluenceshouldproblemsarisebetweenconcessionairesand
communities(Interviewsin2013).Interviewswithcommunitymemberslivingontheedgesoftheseconcessions
315
employedtheirownrangercorps,sometimesevenspecializedanti-poachingandintelligence
gatheringunitsaredeployedthatworkcloselywiththeanti-poachingforcesintheKNP.
Curiously,Mozambicangovernmentforcessuchasthe“ForçadeGuardaFronteira”(border
guards)defertosecurityofficialsemployedbytheseprivateoperators.
Graph6:Anti-poachinginterventionsintheKrugerNationalPark
Source:SamFerreira(2015:slide3)
Ininstanceswherelocalsareemployedasrangersorguards,familyorcommunitymembers
maybepittedagainstoneanotherduringanti-poachingambushesonprivateland,orwhen
poacherstraversepublicorprivatelandenroutetotheKNP(Interviews,2013).An‘anti
revealedthatwhileconcessionaireswereinvestingmoniesintocommunitydevelopmentinitiatives(aspartof
thedeal),thecommunitiesperceivedtheseprojectsasaformofplacationtomakegoodonanotherroundof
displacement.Someconcessionairesareseenasthenew‘colonialmasters’,whoarefencingofftheirproperties
andbarringaccesstovillagers(Interviews,2013).Labourers,rangersorguardsfromthevillagecommunities,
workontheseconcessions.Theyareoftenseverelyunderpaidandnotallowedtobringtheirfamiliestostay
withthemontheconcessions.
316
poachingambush’isapreventativeattempttoeitherstoppotentialpoachersfromcrossing
intotheKNPortopreventwildlifepoachingontheconcession.404Whiletheterm‘ambush’is
appropriatedfrommilitaryjargon,manyoftheanti–poachingunitsoperatingintheareado
nothavepermitstocarryweapons,405andhence,theelementofsurpriseisusedinsteadof
themilitaryvariantofa“shoottokillapproach”.
Insomeinstances,concessionairesareequippingtheirstaffwithweapons,ascarrying
weaponsmayconstituteagreaterrisktorangerswhostruggletomatchtotheprowessof
theirwell-trainedandbetter-equippedopponents.Moreover,theseweaponscouldgetlost,
stolenorrentedouttopoachers(Interviews,2013).Oneconcessionairesaidforexample:“I
onlytrustmyrangersasfarasIcanseethem”(Interview,2013).Typically,suchambushesare
launchedclosetotheboundarywiththeKNP(theconcessionsserveasabufferzone)andin
concertwiththeanti-poachingoperationsintheKNP.Concealedatstrategiclocationsinthe
bush,agroupofrangers(sometimesincollaborationwithborderguardsorthepolice)will
awaitthearrivalorreturnofsuspectedpoachersandstopthemfromprogressingfurther,and
handthemovertorelevantlawenforcementagents.TheKNPandconcessionairesregard
suchambushesasaproactivestrategy,406asriflesandvehiclesareregularlyconfiscated.
However,poachersarelikelytochooseadifferentroute,gatherintelligenceonstandard
operatingprocedures,orpayabribetoavoiddetectioninthepreparationofthenexthunting
expedition.Onseveraloccasions,fieldrangersfoundthemselvesface-to-facewithfamily
membersenroutetotheKNP,ortheworst-casescenario(Interview,2013):
“Myheadranger–wetrackedhisson.WetoldKrugeraboutthegroup.Theyclimbed
overthefence,allthreeofthem.Andheheardontheradiothathissonwaskilledina
shootout.”
404
KrugerrhinosregularlycrossintotheLNPandontoprivatelandinMozambique.Asthechancesoftherogue
rhinosurvivingforanylengthoftimearesuboptimal,rangerswalktherhinobackacrosstheborderandreturnit
tothecareofKNPrangers(Interviews,2013).
405
ThereisadueprocesstoapplyforfirearmsinMozambique,whichcanstretchoverseveralmonths.
406
Obviously,thisappliesonlytothescenariowherepotentialpoacherswerestoppedbeforeshootingarhino,
inwhichcasetheonlychargeablecrimewouldbetrespassingonprotectedlandandcarryinganillegalfirearm(if
thatwerethecase).
317
Anti-poachingoperationsandambusheshaveledtoseveralrevengeattacksanddeath
threatsagainstanti–poachingstaffandconcessionaires.Someconcessionaireshaveresorted
torecruitingrangersandsecuritystafffromotherpartsofthecountrytocircumventthe
possibleconsequencesofthesocialembeddednessofpoachersandrangers.Astheheadof
ananti-poachingunitinMozambiqueexplained(Interviewwithanti-poachingoperative6,
2013):
“Imeanwehaveanobligationtoemploycommunitymembers,butit’simpossiblefor
acommunitymembertobeaneffectivefieldrep.Hecannotfromalawenforcement
perspective,becausehe’sgottogohome.Andwhatmanisnotgoingtoprotecthis
ownfamily,whatmanisnotgoingtoplaythegameifsomebodycomesandsays
listen,bestyoulooktheotherwaybecauseIknowwhereyoulive.Iknowwhereyour
kidsare,whatmanisnotgoingto…youcan’texpecthimto.”
Fieldrangersandscoutswerepaidanaveragewageof3000to4000Metical407permonth
amountingtoabout75to100Euros(Interviews,2013)atthetimeoffieldwork.408
Concessionairesprovideanadditionalbonuscontingentonthesuccessofanti-poaching
operations(Interviewswithconcessionaires,2013).Acommunityleaderputthiswagein
perspective:a50kgbagofricecostabout900Metical(23Euros)atthetime(Interview,June
2013).Incomparison,apoachingteamcouldearn200,000to300,000Metical(5,125to
7,700Euros)perhunt.409Whilethe‘bounty’forrhinohornsappearsrelativelyhighin
comparisontotheminimumwage,itisnegligiblewhencomparedtothepriceofrhinohorn
onconsumermarkets.However,rangersareeasilyswayedtolooktheotherdirectionor
assistwithoperationalintelligence,especiallywhenrelativesareinvolvedinhuntingcrews
(discussedinmoredetailbelow).Inlightofthelowwagesforanti-poachingpersonnel(which
appliestoparksandreservesinSouthAfrica,too),itisalsonotunexpectedthatrangers,field
scoutsandotherstaffinparksstarttheirownhuntingcrews,orbecomeinvolvedinpoaching
tosupplementtheirmeagreearnings.
407
TheMeticalistheMozambicancurrency.InNovember2014,oneEurocouldbeexchangedforabout40
Metical.
408
Theminimumwagewasabout2500Meticalpermonthatthetime.InApril2014,theminimumwageof
workersintheagricultural,livestockandforestrysectorswasincreasedto3,100Metical(AgenciadeInformacao
deMocambique30April2014)
409
PoachersoperatingfromtheSouthAfricansideofthebordergetpaidless.Thegoingratein2014was
between30,000to50,000Randforapairofhorns(2,200to3,700Euros).
318
Turningtothemacro-level:Mozambiquedoesfindherselfinaprecariouspositionwith
regardstotherhinoissue:Ontheonehand,itsneighbourandtransfrontierparkspartner
SouthAfrica,CITESandtheinternationalcommunityarepushingforadequateconservation
laws,acomprehensiveanti-poachingstrategyandatougherstanceagainstpoaching.Onthe
otherhand,thesouthernAfricancountryisfacingincreasingcriticismfromitsowncitizenry
overMozambicannationalsgettingshotandkilled,orarrestedinsidetheKNP.Essentially
rhinopoachingandthemilitarizedresponsestoitarereinforcingthe‘fortress’conservation
paradigmdiscussedinChapter4.Whilevoluntaryresettlementfromconservationareaswas
employedwhentheLNPwasinitiallyestablished(seeChapter4),theMozambican
governmentemploysnowthesupposedthreatofrhinopoachingfromvillagecommunities
livinginsidetheLNPtoextenditscontroloverthePark.Governmentofficialsandintelligence
actorshavestigmatizedvillagecommunitiesas‘rhinopoachers’.Thestigmatizationservesthe
prioritizationoftheresettlementofvillagecommunitiesbeyondtheboundariesofthe
LimpopoNationalParkasananti-poachingmeasure,reflectingtheoldconservationadage
thatlocalcommunitiesandwildanimalsaresupposedlyanoxiouscombination.Inaddition,
concessionairesalongtheeasternboundaryareseeingtheirlandtenurerightsprotected
(whichhadbeentenuous)astheirconcessionshavebeendeclaredasbufferzonesinthe
nameofprotectingrhinos.410Accordingtoarezoningbriefingdocument(SANParks9July
2012:4–5),theGreatLebomboConservancyistobecome“thefirstshieldofdefenceagainst
rhinopoaching,provideecotourismdevelopmentopportunities(ontheMozambicanside)for
theprivatesectorinvestorsandcreatealogicaldeterrenttopoachingactivitiesthrough
tourismactivities.”Thedeclarationofadditional“intensiveprotectionzones”alongthe
easternborderoftheKrugerNationalParksignalsapotentialreturntoforcedremovals
ratherthan‘voluntaryresettlement’.ItremainsunclearhowtheMozambicangovernment
planstomoveentirevillages,anditbogglesthemindastohowthegeographicdisplacement
ofsuchvillagescouldbeconceivedasanappropriateanti-poachingmeasure.Intelligence
operativesactiveintheborderregionssharedthissentiment(Interviewwithintelligence
operative8;Interviews2013):
410
MasséandLunstrum(2015)havedevelopedtheconceptof“accumulationbysecuritization”tocapturethe
nexusbetweenconservation-securitization,capitalaccumulationanddispossession.Theresearchersdiscussthe
increasingprivatizationandsecuritizationofresponsestorhinopoaching,whichalsoincludeslandgrabs.
319
“YoumightbemovingpotentialpoachersfurtherawayfromtheParkbutwherethere
isawill,thereisaway.Youhavebasicallyjustaddedanother40kmforthemtowalk
extraandthattheywillandyouhavemadesomevillagersveryangry.”
Moreover,thegovernmentsofSouthAfricaandMozambiquesignedaMemorandumof
Understanding(MOU)inApril2014toenhancebilateralcooperationwithregardstotherhino
issue.TheMOU,amongstothermeasures,pavedthewayforacontroversiallawenforcement
measurethatallowsforcross-border“hotpursuits”totakeplace.Essentially,thismeasure
allowsSouthAfricanlawenforcementofficialstochaseapoachingsuspectacrosstheborder
withoutawarrantorofficialpermission.ThismeasurehasanastyconnotationintheSouth
AfricancontextasSouthAfricanSpecialForcescrossedintoneighbouringcountriesto
apprehendorevenkillsuspectsduringtheapartheidregime(Orkin/CommunityAgencyfor
SocialEnquiry1989:127–128).Rhinoprotectionstrategiessuchastheresettlementof
“problemvillages”,thecreationof“totalprotectionzones”and“hotpursuits”signalareturn
tofortressconservationinazerosumgame,whichseeswildlifeconservationpittedagainst
theinterestsofruralvillagecommunities.The‘quasi’waragainstpoachingappearstobe
strengtheningthesymbolic(anddeadly)messagethatpoachingofrhinosisillegalintheKNP;
however;ontheground,thereareperceptionsthatthestatehasinstituted“shoottokill”
policiestoprotectrhinos(wildanimals)andkillvillagers.
Whenaskedwhethertherhinocarriedculturalsignificanceorsymbolicvalue,convicted
poachersandkingpinsobservedthattherhinowas“feared”,“admired”and“respected”but
nothunted.Kidswerewarnedtostayclearoftherhinobecauseitwasan“angry”and
“dangerous”wildanimal(Interviews,2013).Inthecurrentcontextofexpandingtransfrontier
conservationinitiatives,the“white”rhinohastakenonasymbolicmeaning,representingthe
continuedmulti-layeredmarginalizationofvillagecommunities.Eachfallenrhinowhittles
awayfromthenotionof‘peaceparks’andthelong-termsustainabilityofconservationareas.
Poachersarekillingthe‘whitemen’s’naturalheritage,whichwassociallyconstructed
throughsuccessiveregimesofexploitationanddispossessionoflocalpeoplelivingnearparks.
Rhinosarenotonlykilledforprofit,buttheyarealsokilledfortheirsymbolicvalue.The
deadlyanti-poachingmeasuresandthevillagecommunity-unfriendlyexpansiondrivesof
conservationareasareexacerbatingtherhinoproblembyturningvillagecommunitiesagainst
320
wildanimals.Meanwhile,thedeadlyroleof‘white’rhinopoachingsyndicates(seediscussion
inChapter6)indestroyingthesamenaturalheritageisdownplayedinthemainstream
discourse,suggestingthereturntotherace-basednormativecategoriesof‘blackpoachers’
(badhunter)versus‘whitehunters’(goodhunter).
7.5Rolesandfunctionswithinpoachinggroups
Interviewswithkingpins,intermediaries,smugglersandpoachersandtheirlawenforcement
nemeses(Interviews,2013)revealedthathuntingexpeditionsintoparksandreservesrange
fromhighlyorganized,well-plannedandexecuted,toopportunistic,andsometimeschaotic
operations.Tidingsofthehighearningsattachedtorhinopoachinghaveledtoamateurs
seizingtheopportunity,andembarkingonchaoticbadlyplannedincursionsintoreservesand
parks.Whilesomeopportunistsarecaughtandarrested,otherssucceed.411Kingpinsusually
coordinatehighly-organizedoperations,whichcomewiththepromiseoffringebenefitsto
poacherssuchas“lifeinsurance”inthecaseofdeath,andlegalsupportandaccesstotop
criminallawyersinthecaseofcapture.412Theytolerate‘unattached’orindependenthunting
crews,manyofwhomultimatelychoosetocooperatewiththekingpinsastheyhaveready
accesstobuyers,huntingrifles,ammunition,andtheyprovidelogisticalsupportbeforeand
afterhunts.Whiletherewasnoevidencethatkingpinsorcompetingpoachingcrews
informedonunattachedorlessexperiencedhuntingcrews,therewasasense413thatthe
unluckyonesservedascannonfodderor“deadcowsforpiranhas”(seenextchapter).A
kingpinexplainedthatthe“bosses”hadapreferenceformultiplerhinohuntstotakeplace
concurrently.ThePark’ssecurityforceshaveonlythecapacitytodealwithalimitednumber
411
Ananti-poacher(Interview,KZN,2013)relatedhowanobeseteacherfromanurbancentreinSouthAfrica
hadjoinedaspontaneouslyconstitutedpoachinggroup.Thequartetjumpedintoasaloon(aninappropriate
vehiclewhendrivingonsandroadsinthebush),stoppedontheroadnexttoarhinoreserve.Afterscalingthe
gamefencewithdifficulty,ananti-poachingunitinterceptedthem.Theunfitteacherwasapparentlystruggling
tokeepupwiththerestofhiscrew.
412
Thesefringebenefitsmayormaynotmaterializeasinterviewswithseveralconvictedpoachersrevealed.The
“boss”hadarrangedforlegalrepresentationinafewcases.Ahandfuloflegalteamsappeartodefendthese
rhinocriminals;inotherwords,thesamecriminallawyersappearonbehalfofallegedrhinocriminalsinSouth
Africancourts(Interviewwithprosecutors,2013).
413
Someconvictedpoachersclaimedthattheywereunluckyandgotcaughtduringtheirveryfirsthunt.While
fewcriminalswouldadmittoanycrimesbeyondthecrimeathand,somemighthavebeen‘unluckyfirst-timers’.
321
of“trespassing”incidents–“maybeoneortwo”whiletheothers“willstillbringbackthe
horn”(Interview,Cubo,2013).Somehuntingexpeditionsarechoreographedinsuchan
efficientmannerthattheoutgoinghuntingcrewwillswaphuntingriflesandintelligenceon
freshrhinotracksandthepositionofanti–poachingunitsastheypasstheincomingcrew.
Originallykingpinsrecruitedtheirownhuntingteamsfromlocalvillagerswhowerefirmly
embeddedintheircommunitiesandcouldbetrustedtobringbacktherhinohorn.However,
newsofthegoodfortunesofrhinopoachershastravelledbeyondthevillagecommunitiesin
andaroundtheparks.Manynewhopefulsarrivedailyinthehopeofgettingrecruitedinto
poachingcrews.Initially,kingpinswereseekingtorecruitmenwithhuntingorbushtracking
skills.Intheaftermathofthedecades-longcivilwarinMozambique,manymen(andwomen)
possessmilitaryandtrackingskills,andsomehaveaccesstooldweaponsfromcaches
situatedintheborderareas.414IntheearlyphaseofpoachingintheKNP,Portuguesecolonial
huntingriflesandoldriflesdatingfromtheCivilWarwereusedtokillrhinos,fittedwith
homemadesilencers.Astherhinofortunesgrew,kingpinsandhuntersinvestedin
sophisticatedhuntingriflessuchasCZ-550s,aswellasMauser.458’s,.375’s,typicallyusedby
trophyhunterstoshootrhinosorelephants.Onekingpinsaidthatheandoneofhisclose
associateswouldalsoprovideweaponstrainingtonewrecruits.Anotherkingpinaccepted
newrecruitsoncetheyhadpassedatest,whichcouldrangefromhuntingbushmeatthrough
toacquiringhuntingriflesthroughaholduporrobbery.415Kingpinssetupthepoachingcrews,
whichwillconsistofahunter,atrackerandafoodandwatercarrier(whomayalsocarrythe
horns).Thenumberofparticipantsinhuntingcrewsis,however,variabledependingonthe
projecteddurationofthestayinsidethepark.Inlightofdecliningrhinonumbersand
increasingpressurefromanti-poachingunits,poachingcrewsspendlongerperiodsoftime
trackingrhinosandevadingdetectioninthePark.Thedurationofthehuntingexpeditionis
contingentonthereliabilityofthegroup’sintelligence.Thischangedstateofaffairshadledto
theenlargementofsomehuntingcrews.Additionalmembersareenlistedtocarryextra
414
Trainedinlowintensitywarfare,ex-soldierswithbush-trackingskillsfromthedaysoftheapartheidbushwars
wereconnectedwithanumberofpoachingincidentsingamereservesandparksinKwaZulu-Natal.
415
Gameandcommercialfarmersarereputedtoholdhuntingriflesandotherhighcalibreriflesontheir
properties.Organizedcrimeinvestigators(Interviews,2013)pointedtothepossibleconnectionbetweenfarm
attacksandrhinopoaching;however,onlytenuouslinksweremadebetweenballisticsatrhinocrimescenesand
stolenhuntingrifles.
322
provisionsforlongerstaysintheparkandtoprovideprotectionincaseofdetection.416Larger
groupsmaysplituponcetheyareinsidethePark.SomehuntingcrewsentertheParklegally
andbookintosafaricamps;othersuseoneofthemanyfootpathsandanimalmigration
routestraversingparks,reservesandwildernessareas.Whenrhinopoachingincreasedin
frequencyinthelate2000s,poachingcrewsconcentratedonareaswithhighrhinodensities
inthesouthernpartsofthePark.WhenenteringKrugerfromtheMozambicanside,poachers
aredroppedoffascloselyaspossibletothefenceline.Anoff-streetvehicle(aso-calledfourby-fourdrive)isneededtodrivealongtheotherwiseimpassablesandroads.Anotheroption
furthersouthisthehiringofaboattorowacrosstheCorumanadam,orsimplytowade
acrosstheSabiRiver.
AccordingtoKNPanti-poachingofficials(personalcommunication,2015),therewasan
availablepoolof2500to3000poachersinandaroundthenationalpark417andanaverageof
tentofifteenhuntingcrewsweretrackingrhinosatanygivenpointintimein2015(seeGraph
6).WhenillegalhuntingintotheKNPcommencedinthelate2000s,huntingcrewswerestill
learningtheropesandmistakesweremade,butthecrewslearntrapidly,adaptedtheir
modusoperandiandupgradedtheir‘toolbox’.Aninvestigator(InterviewwithKNP
investigator,2013)pointstotheinferiortypesofgun,ammunitionandsloppyexecutionof
earlypoachingintheKNP.SomepoachersusedAK-47’sandmultipleshotsinlieuofthe
professional‘one-shot-kill’totheheartorlungs.Inthemodernpoacher’stoolboxare
sophisticatedhuntingrifles,machetesoraxes,satellitenavigationsystemsormobilephones
(sometimesevenGPS-enabledsmartphones).Whilethereisnonetworksignalinmanyparts
oftheKNP,Movitel418cellphonetowersaresprinkledacrosstheMozambicanborderlands,
whichfacilitatecommunicationbetweenkingpinsandpoachersoncetheygetclosetothe
Mozambicanborder.Theterm“poacher’smoon”usedtobesynonymouswithahigherrate
416
ThehighrateofpoacherfatalitiesintheKNPhasledtosomegroupscarryinghandgunsforself-defence
purposes.
417
Thisnumberhadgrownto6000poachersinandroundtheParkby2016(pers.communicationwithJulian
RademeyerandKNPofficials,2016).
418
MovitelisajointventurebetweenViettelGlobal,aVietnamesetelecommunicationscompanyownedbythe
VietnameseMinistryofDefence,andMozambicanpartners.ThefirstcellphonetowerswereerectedinOctober
2011,andthecompanylaunchedofficiallyinMay2012.Movitelwasthefastestgrowingtelecommunication
companyintheMiddleEastandAfricain2014(ITNewsAfrica2014).
323
ofrhinoattrition.Thenaturallightofthefullmoonlightshinesthepoachers’pathduringthe
fullmoonperiodhencetheterm“poacher’smoon”.Whilerhinopoachingisstillrifeduring
poacher’smoon,illegalhuntersaretraversingtheparkdayandnightinsearchoftheir
bounty.KrugerofficialsalsofoundthatpoachingratesspikedbeforeEastAsianholidays419
andduringtheChristmasholidayseason.420
Kingpinswereinitiallyinvolvedinillegalhuntingexpeditionsthemselves;nowadaysthey
executemultiplefunctionsessentialtothecontinuityoftheflow.Itisimportantto
differentiatebetweenhuntersandkingpinswithintheoverallstructureoftheflow.Although
poachinggroupsdisplayaflatstructurebyvirtueofrelationshipsbeingreliantonreciprocal
trustand“everyonefacesthesamefearsandrisksinthebush”(Interview,2013),theposition
ofthehunterisattributedwiththehigheststatusandcommensuratewiththemost
rewardingremunerationwithinpoachinggroups.Thehunteristhustheunofficialleaderof
thegroupinthebush.Oncethehuntingcrewleavesthebush,thebuckstopswiththe
kingpin,whowearsmanydifferenthatsbutmostimportantlyhehastoassurethatthehorn
movesfurtheralongtheflow.Whatdifferentiateskingpinsfrompoachersandothermembers
ofvillagecommunitiesistheirsocialcapital,whichincorporatestheabilitytocommunicate
andtradebeyondtheconfinesofvillagecommunities.Ontheonehand,kingpinsare
competenteconomicactorsthatholdthekeytolocalhorntransactions;ontheotherhand,
thesekingpinsexudehighlevelsofsocialandcross-culturalmobilityenablingthemto
undertakebusinesswithcriminalactorstranscendingboundariespresentedbyethnicity,
languageandnationality.Kingpinsrecruit,mobilizeandmotivateotherstopartakeinhunting
expeditionsthatinvolvetheillegalkillinganddehorningofrhinosinprotectedareas.They
ensurethathuntsgoaheadwithoutdisruptionsbythegovernmentortraditionalauthorities;
inotherwords,standingarrangementsexisttoensuretheundisturbedflowofhornfromthe
parktothebuyer(discussedinmoredetailbelow).Oncethekingpintakesreceiptofthehorn,
aprocessofqualitycontrolcommences(seeChapter8).Uponconfirmingweight,provenance
419
Nosupportingdatacouldbeprovidedforthisclaim.However,severalrangersandsecuritypersonnel
suggestedthatAsianintermediarieswerereturninghometospendholidayswiththeirfamiliesandcapitalized
onthereturntripbytransportinghornbackhome.
420
CrimestatisticsconfirmaspikeinpropertycrimesduringthefestiveseasoninSouthAfrica(Lancaster2014).
Thereisnoempiricalevidencetoexplainthephenomenon.Accordingtoanecdotalaccounts,thievesseize
opportunitieswhileholidaymakerslettheirguarddown.Withregardstospikesinrhinopoaching,anti-poaching
operatives(Interviews,KNP,2013)suggest,“PoacherscelebrateChristmastoo”.
324
andauthenticityofthehorn,thekingpin‘secures’thehornfromdetectionthroughlaw
enforcementforitsonwardjourney.Kingpins,poachersandsmugglersconfirmedthatthe
hornisleftintact;inotherwords,itisnotprocessedintodisks,piecesorpowderatthe
source.Asananti-poachingmeasure,somerhinoscarrysatellitetrackersintheirhorns.
Poachingcrewsuserubbertubesofcartirestodisruptthetrackersignalenroutetothe
kingpin(Interviewwithpoacher15,2013).Thekingpinwillboilthehorntostoporganic
materialfromreleasingputridsmell,421whichcouldattracttheattentionofsnifferdogs.To
permanentlydisruptthetrackingdevice,kingpinsputthehornintoanoven,‘baking’the
trackingdeviceatextremelyhightemperaturesforseveralhours.Thisprocessdestroysthe
signalpermanently(Interviewwithkingpin2,2013).Thesesecurityandqualitycontrol
measuresshowcasesophisticatedplanningandforesightofwildlifetraffickinggroups.
Kingpinsalsoprovidetheimportantbridgebetweenpoacherandbuyerbyfacilitatingthesafe
andspeedypassageofhornfromtheparktothebuyerorsmuggler.Thisprocessearnsthem
doublecommission;theythusprofitfrom“buying”thehornfromtheirownorindependent
poachingcrews,andfromsellingthehorntothesmugglerorbuyer.Initially,rhinohornwas
suppliedtoSouthAfricanbuyers,whoarrangeditsintegrationintograyandlegalflows.The
migrationtonewbuyers(ChineseandVietnamesebuyers),localmarkets(Chokwe,Maputo,
Beira)androutes(fromMaputo,Nairobi,LusakatoMiddleEasternandAsianentrepôtsor
directlytothemarket)appearstohavebeentriggeredbyopportunitystructurespresentedby
thegeographiclocationofMozambique,thehighpresenceofrhinosclosetotheMozambican
borderintheKNP,andthestateofthecriminaljusticesysteminthatcountry.Inthelate
2000s,kingpinsandindependentpoacherssoughtoutnewbuyerstointroducecompetition
andnegotiatebetterpricesforthehorn.Therapprochementbetweenkingpins,poachersand
Asianbuyerswasactivelypursued,andbusinessconnectionswereestablishedthrough
opportunisticmeetingsorreferrals.Inthisinstance,thekingpin’sworldlinessandsocialskills
facilitatedtheestablishmentofnewcriminalconnections.Asonekingpinputit:“Ifyouwant
tosellarhinohorn,yougotoAsianmarketsorChinatownandspeaktoanyone”.Manyofthe
extantkingpinshaveworkedandtravelledbeyondtheirvillagecommunities,whichallowed
421
Thehornisusuallyremovedascloseaspossibletothegrowthpointtomaximizeweightandprofit.Hacking
orcuttingclosetothegrowthpointinevitablyinvolvesbloodandgore,whichdecomposeandrotoncetakenoff
arhino.
325
themtoreachoutandestablishbothstrongandweakconnectionsinSouthAfricaand
beyond.
Whilebusinessalliancesarefluidandreinventedfrequently,thedemandhasgrowntothe
extentthathornispre-orderedand,insomecases,adepositispaidtoensureexclusive
deliverytotheorderingparty.Thetime-spanbetweenplacingtheorderandreceivingthe
hornplaysasignificantrole,especiallyincaseswherecouriersarealreadyawaitingtheir
consignment.Transportersandbuyers(Interviews,2013)henceprefertoengagewith
kingpinswhohaveareputationforspeedydeliveryofthegenuineproduct.Thereare
howevernoexclusiverelationships;inotherwords,kingpinsengagewithanumberofbuyers
andviceversa.Moreover,somekingpinscombineintermediaryandtransportfunctions.In
suchcases,thekingpinoratrustedassociatetransportsthehorntothebuyerorcourier,or
thelatterundertakesthejourneytofetchthehorn(whichhappensonrareoccasions).
Althoughtheinitialprocurementofrhinohornisessentialtoinitiatingthisillegalflow,
securingitsonwardjourneyisequallyimportantandnavigatedthroughrelationshipsbuilton
trustandthereputationofthoseinvolved.Kingpinshavestruckupdealswithlaw
enforcementofficialsinsomeinstances,wherebyapoliceofficertransportsrhinohorntothe
buyerorensuresitssafepassage(morebelow).Anorganizedcrimeinvestigator(Interview,
2013)describesthenextlevelofsophistication:
“Andthenyougetsituationswherethepoacherspay30,000Randdangerpaytohunt
arhino.Theyshootarhinoandtheyimmediatelygetpaid25,000to30,000Randper
kilo.Nowtheycanaffordit,likethebigJoealso.Heknowsthatthenextlevelisthe
market.Thegoodthingabouthisoperation,hedoesnotstandtherisktobeshotor
apprehended.Heminimisesriskbytransportingitinataxi,transportitinaprivate
vehicle,aslongasIkeepontheroad,getthehorntomymarketsandsellitoff.And
youseethecurrentcaseinSkukuza:atrafficcopfromtheKruger,agamerangerand
anotherstaffmember.Thegamerangershootstherhinoandthetrafficcop
transportsthehornoutsidetheparkandthenaskedhiswifetotransferitfurtherto
themarket.Howyougoingtostopatrafficcop?Heisapoliceofficer.Organizedcrime
atitsbest.ThewifesoldittothemarketinJohannesburg.”422
422
25000Randwasworth€1870and30000Randwas€2240atthetimeoftheinterview.
326
Themostcommonformofhorntransportationfromthebordervillagesinvolvesacloseand
trustedassociateofthekingpintransportingthehorntothebuyerortransnationalcourier.
Theselocalhorncourierstendtousepublictransport–busesandminibustaxis–commuting
betweenGazaProvinceandMaputo(oroneoftheothertranshipmenthubs,seebelow).
Publictransportprovidesanotherlayerofprotectiontothecourier.Inthecaseofdetection,
thecouriercaneasilyshifttheblametothedriverorfellowpassengers.Localcouriershave
trust–basedrelationshipswithkingpinsanchoredthroughfamilial,kinshiporpastcriminal
relationships;kingpinsseldomuseso-called“runners”,astheriskofdetectionanddefection
istoouncertain.Onesmugglersaid(Interviewwithsmuggler4,2013):
“Ican’tseesomeonetrustingarunnerinthestreettotransportarhinohorninataxi.
Maybetheystoleitsomewhere.I,asasupplier,wouldnotdothat.Iwouldwantto
haveacleandeal.LikeaguylikeMrBig,whereIknowifhedoesn’tpayme,Ikillhim.
Simplebecausethatisthedeal,youtakethisfrommethisismymoney.Ifyoudon’t
doit,Iknowwhereyoulive.Ikillyou.Withsmallrunnersyoudon’thaveit.Itislike
drugs.Youknowwheretheguylivesandifhedoesn’tpay,thenthereisanaccident.”
Theroleofthetraditionalintermediarywhointeractswithpoachersonbehalfofbuyersis
morecommoninrhinohornflowsoutofSouthAfrica.Inthisinstance,theintermediary
constitutesanothersegmentornodalpointintheflow.Ontheonehand,theintermediary
negotiatestheprice,providesbothpoacherandbuyerwithanonymityfromoneanotherand
henceanadditionallayerofprotectionfromdetection;ontheotherhand,thisadditional
segmentrenderstheexchangelessefficientbutmoresecureandcreatessocialdistance
betweenpoacherandbuyer(thesecurity/efficiencytrade-offisdiscussedinmoredetail
below).Othertasksincludequalitycontrol,moneylaunderingandoff-shoreinvestments,as
wellasthecoordinationoflocalandinternationaltransportlogistics.Unlikethekingpins,the
traditionalintermediaryneedsnocharismaorsocialskills.Goodcontactsinthecriminal
underworldandlawenforcementare,however,obligatory.Thistypeofintermediaryhas
well-establishedlegitimatebusinessorinvestmentlinkstoSouthAfricanorAsianbuyers,
whichjustifyclosetiesintheeyesoftheoutsideworld.Sheistheknown‘go-to’personwhen
poachersarelookingforabuyer.Duetotheexpediency,efficiencyandsecurityofflowsout
ofMozambique,theroleofthetraditionalintermediaryislargelyobsoleteordiminished.As
327
poachingcrewsgetbetterfinancialrewardsinMozambique,SouthAfricanpoachersare
increasinglymovingtheirhornsuppliestoMozambique(Interviews,2013and2014).423
7.6Cooperation,securityandcompetition:Howkingpinssecurethecontinuityofthe
flow
Akingpin’ssphereofinfluenceisspatiallyconfinedtohisgeographiclocationandreach.The
leveloftoleranceandindependencebetweenthedifferentMrBig’sisremarkable;however,a
formofhegemony(‘peggingorder’)wascarefullynegotiatedintheMozambicanhinterlands
basedonseniority,popularity,thenumberofteamsandthedurabilityandstrengthof
networkconnections.Areasofinfluencearefluidandhenceopentonegotiation.One
Massingir–basedkingpininformsonhiscompetition(‘rats’themout)whentheiractivities
leadtobotchedhorndealsortheyundercuthisprice;hethusassertshisinfluenceand“puts
thembackintheirplace”(Interviewwithanti-poachingofficial,2013).Anotherkingpinis
reputedtohaveapenchantforviolenceandcoercion(Interviews,2013);however,turfissues
andcompetitionaremorepronouncedontheSouthAfricansidewhereaformerpolice
officerrantheBushbuckridgeandHazyviewareaswithanironfistuntilhisarrestin2012
(Interviews,2013).424AconvictedpoacherfromMozambiqueexplainsthedifference
(Interviewwithpoacher3,2013):
“ItissafertodealwiththeMozambicansthanSouthAfricans.Theycanpayyouand
thengetsomeonetokillyouafterthedeal.Thentakebackthemoneythey’vepaid
you-andthathappensalot.AndthebossesfromMozambiquepaymorethanSouth
AfricanbossesbecauseitiseasiertotransportfromMozambique.Theycangetatruck
fulloflogsorwoodsandtheycanputthehornsunderneath.Theyeventransportthe
gunsthatway.”
423
Theygetintroducedtokingpinsorintermediariesthroughkinshiptiesorcriminalconnections.
424
AllegedSouthAfricanrhinokingpin“BigJoe”Nyalunga,aformerpoliceofficer,wieldedconsiderable
influenceoverpeopleandauthoritieslivingintheBushbuckridgeareaneartheKNP.Healsohasareputationfor
violence,andthereareanecdotalclaimsthathemurderedandtorturedaman.
328
Atthetimeofdatacollection,therewaslittlecompetitionorconflictamongstpoaching
groupsorpronounced‘turfissues’.Pressedaboutcompetitionorthepotentialforconflict,
onekingpin(Interview,2013)explainedhowhuntingcrewsdealwithoneanother:
“Itdoesnothappen.NooneownstheKrugerandevenwhenwemeetwejustgreet
eachotherandit’snotoftenthatweseeeachother.”
Thestructureandcompositionofhuntingcrewsminimizetheriskof“takingout”another
groupwhileonthehunt.Thereisahighlikelihoodthatthehuntersknoweachother,they
mighthavehuntedtogetherinthepast,maydosointhefuture,ortheymightbetiedtoone
anotherthroughkinshiporfriendshipties.Severalkingpinsandpoacherstalkedaboutthe
potentialforconflictandcompetitiononcerhinonumbersgrewless;highdemandonrare
resourcesislikelytoleadtoconflict-ladensocialrelationsanddiversificationintoother
covetedwildlifeproductslikeivory(Interviewwithkingpins,2013).
Kingpinsareconfrontedwiththepotentialdefectionoftheirhuntingcrews.Severaltypesof
defectionaretheoreticallypossible,someofwhicharelinkedtothedangersandchallenges
ofillegalhuntinginprotectedareas.Therearenaturaldangersassociatedwithhikingthrough
thebush,suchasrunningintodangerousanimals425orexposuretotheelements.426Poachers
alsofacethepotentialdetection,arrestordeathsbysecurityforcesdeployedinconservation
areas.Asmentionedinearliersections,kingpinsandtheirnetworkconnectionsensurelegal
representationforpoachersandsmugglers;finesandbailaretakencareof,especiallyincases
wherethearresteemighthaveaccesstoprivilegedinformationthatcoulddisrupttheflow.
Thelongerittakestotrackandshootarhino,thehigherthelikelihoodofdetection,andthe
longeruntilthebuyertakesreceiptoftheorderofrhinohorn.Timeandspeedofexecution
arehenceimportantelementsintheplanningphaseofahunt.Actionableintelligenceor
425
KNPrangersranintoanownotoriouskingpinwhowasahunterafewyearsback.Hehadbeenmauledduring
alionattackwhileonarhinohunt.Whentherangerscameacrosshimandhisteammate,theyclaimedtobe
lookingforworkinSouthAfrica.Thepairwastakentothenexthospital,treatedandreleased.Rangersfoundthe
huntingriflesafewdayslater(Interviews,KNP,2013).
426
LargepartsoftheKNParemadeupofdry“bushveld”(SouthAfricantermfordrysavannahs).Temperatures
rangeinthelate30stoearly40sinthesummermonths,andthemercurydropscloseto0degreesinwinter
nights.Floodsareacommonoccurrenceduringtherainyseason,whenotherwisedryriverbedsswelltofull
capacityandbeyond,sometimessweepingawayrestcampsandparkinfrastructures.
329
knowledgeofrecentrhinosightings,tracksorlocations,andthepositionandmovementsof
securitypersonnelshortenthedurationintheparkandthusminimizetheriskofdetection.
Suchintelligenceiseithergatheredproactivelyorboughtfromso-called“spotters”,whowork
inparksorreservesandarehencewell-acquaintedwithstandardoperatingprocedures,shift
rostersandrhinosightings(Interviewswithanti–poachingofficials,2013).Anorganizedcrime
investigatorputitlikethis(Interview,2013):
“Thefieldrangersgetpaid5,000Randnow,sowhenoneoftheseguyscomewith
50,000Randtoshowthemtherhino,whatisyourchoicegoingtobe?Doyou
rememberwhentheyhadtheillegalstrikeinsidethepark?AndalltheRangersparked
outhere.Theywereouthereforaboutamonth.Itwassoeasytomakecontactwith
theseguysandgivethemacellphonenumberthattheycancontacttheseguys.You
know–attheendofthedayweallhaveaprice.Syndicatebossespayonehundred
thousandRandsothatadocketislost.”427
Paymenttomembersofpoachinggroupsisdisbursedonaslidingscalelinkedtofunctions,
responsibilitiesandgunownershipofindividualgroupmembers.‘Payments’(bribes)togame
rangers,lawenforcementofficialsandothersocialcontrolagentsarestandardpracticeand
consideredoperationalcosts(Interviewwithkingpin,2013).Incaseswherenostanding
agreementexists(securing“freepassage”ofpoachinggroupsformspartofthekingpin’s
coordinationrepertoire),poacherswillcarrymoneyonthem“tofreethemselves”shouldthey
“runintotrouble”(Interviewwithkingpin2).The‘bounty’ontherhinoandthelowwages
paidtogamerangers,aswellassituationalinsiderknowledge,standardoperatingprocedures
ofanti–poachingunitsrenderstaffentrustedwithprotectingrhinosparticularlyvulnerableto
acceptingbribesorrecruitmentintopoachinggroups.SaysaMassingir-basedkingpin
(Interview,2013):
“Wearescaredoftherangers.Iamsoscaredofthem.SouthAfricanrangerswillkill
youbuttherangersinMozambiquetakebribes.Therearerangerswhoworkwiththe
hunters.There’sarangerwhohashisowngroupofhunters.He’sgotahighposition
there, and if he finds a hunter that is not in his group he will shoot him, and most
huntersknowhim.”
427
5000Randwasworth427€and50000Randwas4275€atthetimeofdatacollection.
330
FieldworkundertakenintheborderlandsadjacenttotheKNP(alsoknownasthe“eastern
boundary”)foundanetworkofborderprotectionstaff(ForçadeGuardaFronteira),rangers
fromtheLNPandtheKNP,privatesecurityandintelligenceoperatorsandpoachersthat
directlyaffecttheprotection(orlackthereof)oftherhino.Theofficial‘protectors’(game
rangers)andtheborderguardsareimportantelementswithintheillegalflowastheyprovide
protection,information,andinsomeinstances,gunstothepoachers.Aconservatorin
Mozambiquerevealed(Interviewwithconservator8,2013):
“Theguardiansoftheparkarecomplicit.Weconfiscatedthesamegunthreetimes
andweconfiscategoodhuntingriflesfrompoachersallthetime.Theyrentitfrom
rangersintheLimpopoNationalPark.Oneofthemainrangershadallthemainguys
underhisprotection.Noonecoulddoanything.Sowehadthismassiveeventandgot
thegovernortotalkaboutanti-poaching.Soinfrontofthisguy,wegaveabigspeech
withtheGuardaFronteira.Thentherewaspoliticalpressure,andtheyremovedallthe
GuardaFronteiraandthentheyphonedmeandsaidtheyhadjustgoneintoalittle
villageandhadconfiscated42rifles.Asitturnsout,theyconfiscatedallofthe
LimpopoNationalPark’sgunsbecausetheywerecorruptandhadnocontroloverwho
hadaccesstotheguns.Theywererentingouttheguns.Itwasanabsolutedogshow.
Foroneyear,theLimpopoNationalParkdidn'thaveanyAK-47s.”
Thedefectionofpoachingcrewrepresentsanotherrisk.Thiscantaketheformofsellingthe
orderedrhinohorntoahigherbidderorthetheftoffreshlyharvestedhornbycompetitors.428
Failingtodeliverorderedrhinohornorrenegingonpaymentforhorncanleadtonegative
sanctionsandconsequencesforthepoacherortheirfamilies.“Igetmyboystogetthem”,
saidonekingpin,alludingtotheuseofforceincaseofdefection.However,theneedfor
directenforcementorcoercionappearstoberareontheMozambicanside,asthekingpin
knowsandrecruitshispoachingcrewspersonallyandoftensharesstronglinkswiththemand
theirextendedfamilies.
Criminalandterroristnetworksusetrustandsecrecyasmechanismstoconcealcriminal
activitiesandassociations(Morselli/Giguère/Petit2007).Atthevillagelevel,itisdifficultto
hideclandestineactivitiesorliaisons,becauseboundariesbetweenpublicandprivatelifeare
fluid.Inotherwords,thereislimitedroomforanonymityandprivacy.Illegaleconomic
activitiesareembeddedinvillagecommunitiesandhaveledtochangesinthesocial
428
Aconvictedpoacherrelatedanincidentwherepoachersworkingfortwodifferentbossesattackeda
returninghuntingcrew,stealingtheirbounty.Thetwokingpinsresolvedtheturfissuepeacefully.
331
stratificationofthecommunity.Asarguedinearliersectionsofthischapter,thecommunityis
notcomplicitinrhinopoachingperse;communitymembersdo,however,knowwhothe
bossesandpoachersare,andareawareoftheotherconnectionstheycultivate.Whilethe
compositionofvillagesisheterogeneous,communitymembersareboundtogetherbytheir
sharedexperienceofeconomicdisplacement,marginalizationandexclusion.Thetraditional
notionofsecrecy(keepingcertainfactshiddenfrompublicview)isnotrelevanttovillage
communities;thebindingmechanismpreventingvillagers(includingcriminalactors)from
divulginginformationtounknownentitiesorpersonsisbasedonsolidarityandethical,
culturalandcommunitybuildingmechanisms,whichpreventvillagersfromstigmatizingtheir
owninfrontofothers.Irefertothismechanismas‘villagekinship’,whichextendstheideaof
socialembeddedness.Kingpinsandpoachersthusresolvethecoordinationproblemof
securitythroughvillagekinshipatthevillagelevel.Thevillagewillkeepthe“secret”untilit
becomesuntenableoraffectsthewell-beingofthecommunity.Inthecurrentdispensation,
rhinokingpinsandpoachersappeartoactintheinterestofthecommunitywhiletheParkand
rangershavebeenunderminingtheinterestsofthecommunity.
Oncerhinohornmovesbeyondtheconfinesofthecommunity,othermechanismsbecome
relevant.AnearliersectionofthischapterdescribedhowkingpinsmigratedfromSouth
AfricanbuyerstoAsianbuyers.Thiswasaproactivebutdangerousmoveatthetime.At
present,kingpinscollectintelligenceaheadofmeetingwithpotentialfuturebusiness
partners.Onekingpinrelated(Interview,2013):
“Iknowthecustomersfrommypast,butifpeoplecallmeforthefirsttimeIdon’tgive
themthecorrectinformation.Igivethemthewronginformation.ThenIsendmyguys
togoandcheckwhoarrivedattheplace.Maybeoneguyortwoguys,andifwedon’t
suspect anything, my guys will bring the people to me. I make sure there’s no
police.”429
Beyondtraversingdifficultterrain,poachersfaceamultitudeofdangersandrisksforwhich
theyhavedevelopedinnovativeprotectivemeasures.Brotherhoodexistsbetweenpoaching
429
Thesameprocedurewasfollowedaheadoftheinterviewwithme.Iwasaskedtomeetthekingpinata
specificrestaurantinMassingir.Theinterviewwasscheduledfor12o’clock.Severalpeoplepassedthroughthe
restaurantduringthecourseofthenextthreehours.AftermycompanionandIhadpassedmuster,thekingpin
andhisassociatearrivedfortheinterview.
332
crewsfromvillagecommunities:Informationonrhinosightingsandrangerpresenceis
shared.AnearlywarningsystemhasbeendevisedinMassingir:differenttypesofcooldrink
cansontheroofrackofkingpin’soff-streetvehiclesignalwhetheritissafetoheadintothe
KNP.Poachersalsoconsultwithtraditionalhealers(so-calledsangomas)aheadofpoaching
expeditions.Asangomawilladviseastowhenitwouldbesafeforpoacherstoslipthrough
thefencelineandhuntrhino.Theyalsoprepare‘muti’(traditionalmedicine)toprotect
poachersduringthehunt.430Somesangomasrecommendtheremovaloftheeyesandearsof
thedeadrhinoaftertheanimalhasbeenkilled.Accordingtopoachers(Interviews,2013),
“therhino’ssoulcan’thearorseeyou[thepoacher]andcan’tshowwhoyou[thepoacher]
are.”Anti–poachingofficialsconfirmedthattheyencountercarcassesofrhinoswherethe
eyeshavebeencutoutwithmachetesorhandknives(Interviews,2013).Anewtrendrelates
totheremovalofrhinofeetandgenitals.431Theroleofthesangomaisattributedtohigh
statusandinfluenceinvillagelife.Manypoachersrelatedhowthesangoma’ssanctioningofa
plannedhuntwasasimportantasleasingthegun.Inessence,thesangomalegitimizedthe
illegalexpeditionintheParkbyprovidingprotectionandthego-ahead.AccordingtoKruger
officials(Interviews,2013and2014),therewereacoupleofMozambicansangomasrunning
poachinggroups.
7.7Smugglingthehorn:Efficiencyversussecurityconcerns
Theheterogeneousprofileoflocalandinternationaltransportersandtheirstrategic
deploymentisnoteworthy.Transportintermediariesactingonbehalfoftheinternational
buyer(predominantlyAsian)areindividualswithlegitimatebusinessinthevillage
communitiesorinlocalmarkets,suchasrunningalocalretailbusinessorinvolvementinthe
telecommunications,constructionoruniversitysector.Themodeofinlandtransportationand
transhipmenthubchangesfrequently,contingentonthechoiceoftranscontinental
430
Oneanti-poachingofficial(Interview,2013)recountedthathefoundraweggsinthepocketofapoacher.The
sangomahadtoldthemanthathewouldhavetoturnaroundassoonastheeggbrokebecauseitwouldno
longerbesafeinthePark.Theeggwasintactatthetimeofthepoacher’sarrest.
431
SouthAfricanconservators(personalcommunication,2015)believethatthesebodypartsaresoldtothelocal
mutimarket.
333
transportation.Researchelsewhere(Milliken2014:20–21)andempiricaldatacollectedfor
thecurrentstudyatbothendsofthesupplychain432suggestthatmosthornleavesthe
Africancontinentbyplane,itsonwardjourneyfromentrepôtsdependsontheconnectedness
ofintermediaries.Kingpinsandtheirminionsthusferrythehorneithertothelocalmarket
(whichusedtobebasedinChokwe,BeiraandMaputo)433ordirectlytothebuyer’stransport
intermediarywhowouldbelocatedinMaputoorJohannesburg.434Thelatteroptionofthe
kingpinorthelocaltransportertransferringthehorntothebuyer,orthetranscontinental
transportintermediary,isthepreferredchoiceasitisfastandefficient.Whiletheprevious
chapterpointedtocomplexsystemsandrelationshipsinvolvingwildlifeprofessionalsand
organizedcrimegroupsinvolvedingraychannelling,illegalpoachingintheKNPhasallowed
criminalactorstopursuedecentralized,straightforwardanddirectroutesduetothe
opportunitystructures(discussedabove)presentedbyMozambiqueborderingthePark.The
simplest,mostdirectandefficientroutefromtheKNPtotheinternationaltranshipmentpoint
wasalsothemostsecureandhasbeentriedandtestedbyorganizedcrimegroupsinvolvedin
abouquetofcriminalmarketsforseveraldecades.
SouthAfricanauthoritieshavesuccessfullyinterceptedseveralhugeandmultiplesmaller
consignmentsofrhinohornoftensmuggledintandemwithotherprohibitedwildlifeproducts
passingthroughOliverRTamboInternationalAirport(InterviewswithSARSofficials,2013).
PrinceManyathi,amagistratepresidingovercasesofwildlifetraffickinggoingthroughthe
airportprovidesanuancedprofileofthesmugglers(quotedby:Trung/Huong2013):
“Since2008,morethan30rhinohornsmugglingcaseshavebeenseizedin
Johannesburg.Duringtheperiodof2010-2012,therewere132peoplefromvarious
432
AccordingtointerdictiondataofVietnam’sCITESScientificAuthorityprovidedin2013(personal
communication,2013),allinterdictionsinvolvingrhinohornhadoccurredatthetwomaininternationalairports
inHoChiMinhCityandHanoi,exceptforoneinterdictionalongamajorhighwayin2004.
433
AcuriousadaptionwastheuseofwhiteMozambicansofPortugueseextractiontotransporthornfrom
MassingirtoMaputo.Theserunnerssupposedlycarryanauraofprivilegeandstatus,whichallowsthemto
navigatethroughroadblockswithoutbeingstoppedorsearched(Interviewswithintelligenceofficers,2013).
434
RhinohornhasalsobeensmuggledviaCapeTownInternationalAirportoutofthecountry.Policeand
intelligencedatasuggeststheuseoftheinternationalairportsinManzini,SwazilandandMaseru,Lesotho.Due
tothehighnumberofpilotsinvolvedinrhinopoachingsyndicates,organizedcrimeinvestigatorsbelievethat
organizedtraffickinggroupsusesmalllightairplanesandtransportrhinohorntoneighbouringcountriesfrom
themanyunregisteredlandingstripssprinkledacrossSouthAfrica.
334
countriesparticipatinginandsmugglingrhinohorns,wereunderarrestinSouth
Africa,ofwhichVietnamesenationalsaccountedformostofthedetainees.On
average,every10detectedcases,therewouldbe9casesconductedbyVietnamese
people,andtheotheronehastheinvolvementofVietnamesenationals.Mostofthe
detaineesadmitinthecourtthattheycanreceiveUSD8,000forapairofrhinohorn,
smugglerscanhaveUSD15,000totakethemouttheSouthAfrica,butthereisno
specificamountforthepaymentbythefinalconsumer”…[...]…4monthsago,we
detained2Vietnamesestudentssmugglingrhinohorns,eachofthemcarried10
horns.Inthecourt,theyadmittedthattheywerehiredtotransportasealedpackage
thattheydidnotknowwhatwasinside.Thecourtfoundtheywereguiltyand
sentencedthemwithamonetarypunishmentof1millionRand(aboutUSD90,000)for
eachofthem.Theypaidtheamountrightaway.Thisistoconfirmthatthereissurelya
verystrongorganizationbackingthemup,willingtopayincashforthetransportersif
theyareunderarrest.Mostofthehiredtransportersofrhinohornsarepoororare
havingfinancialdifficulty.”
WildlifetraffickingnetworkswereusingVietnamesestudentsenrolledatSouthAfrican
universitiesandtechnikons435ashorncouriersuponreturningtotheirhomecountryforTet
celebrations436andotherholidays(Interviewwithorganizedcrimeinvestigator,2013).There
werealsocaseswheretraffickingnetworksrecruitedpeopleinHanoiandotherVietnamese
citiestocollecta‘package’inSouthAfrica.Theywouldflytothecountry,collecttheparcelat
theairportandflyoutthesameornextday(pers.communicationwithJulianRademeyer,
2016).Similartodrugtraffickingnetworks,theprofileofcouriersandthepointofdeparture
andarrivalarehighlyadaptable.Decoysareusedtodistractlawenforcementofficials(see
nextchapter).Accordingtolawenforcementsources(Interviews,2013and2014),
VietnamesenationalshavebeensmugglingrhinohornfromotherairportsinsouthernAfrica,
withtheinternationalairportsinNairobiandMaputofrequentlyfeaturingastranshipment
nodes.AirlineswithdirectorindirectflightstoVietnamandotherSoutheastAsiandestination
suchasBangkokandHongKongarepreferred.Europeanairportsalsoserveastransithubs
(An2015).AfricantranscontinentalsmugglersareararitybecauseAsianlawenforcement
agentsarereputedtoscreenpeopletravelingonsouthernAfricanpassports(Interviewsin
HongKongandVietnam,2013).
435
Theterm‘technikon’referstoatechnicalandvocationaltrainingcollegeinSouthAfrica.
436
Tet,the“FeastoftheFirstMorningoftheFirstDay”referstoVietnameseNewYear.Thedateofthemost
importantculturaleventinVietnamcoincideswiththeChineseNewYear,withthedateusuallyfallingbetween
JanuaryandFebruary.
335
WhilerhinohornisstilltransitingthroughORTambo,MaputoInternationalAirporthas
becometheairportofchoicefororganizedcrimegroupsasstafffromthehigherechelonsof
airportmanagementthroughtocustomsandcleaningstaffhaveareputationforassisting
withthesafepassageofcontrabandagainstasmallfee.Thisassessmentcorrespondswiththe
observationofanairportexecutivebasedatMaputoInternationalAirport,whostatedthat
wildlifecontrabandwasonlydetectedandconfiscatedwhentherelevantgatekeepershad
notreceivedtheirbribe.Theymayalsobeunhappywiththeamountpaid,orthehornswere
“supposed”tobeconfiscatedasatokenofpoliticalwill(Interview,Maputo,2013).
Competitionbetweendifferentwildlifetraffickinggroupsincreasesasrhinohorntravelsalong
theillegalflow.Accordingtoahornsmuggler(Interview,2013),severalmajorseizuresin
Asiantranshipmenthubsweretheresultoftip-offsbycompetingorganizedwildlifetrafficking
groups:
“Yesitwascompetition.IunderstandChineseandthewayIseethemoperate.They
wanttoprovetooneanotherwho'sthebiggest,whoisthegreatest.IfIammorethan
you,Ihavetooppressyou.Youcan’tdoanything.Theymakeitlikeamafia–way,you
understand.Theylikeitthisway,thesekingpins.Becausetheinformationwasspot-on.
Itwasexact.”
Rhinohornisalsosmuggledon-boardofshippingvessels,concealedinsidecontainerscarrying
avarietyofnaturalresourcesfromsouthernandEastAfricanportcitiesincludingCapeTown,
Durban,Beira,MombassaandDaresSalaam.Smugglersremarkedthatairtravelwasthe
preferredmodeoftransportationduetotimeandefficiencyconcerns.
ThepreviouschaptertouchedontheroleofVietnameseembassystaffintheprocurement
andtransportationofrhinohornfromthesourcetotheirhomecountry.437Thedubiousrole
ofembassystaffcameinitiallyunderthespotlightafterenvironmentaljournalistsfilmedthe
embassy’sformerfirstsecretaryreceivingrhinohornsfromaknowntraffickeronthestreet
outsidetheVietnameseembassyinPretoriain2008(50/502008).438SouthAfricanpolice
437
AninformantinVietnam(Interview,2013)equallyfoundevidencethatdiplomaticstaffattheSouthAfrican
embassyinVietnamwasinvolvedinrhinohornsmuggling.ThematteriswithSouthAfricanauthorities.
438
VuMocAnhwasrecalledaftertheincident.Lawenforcementinvestigators(Interviews,2013)believethat
shehasbeenpostedtotheVietnameseembassyinMaputo.Thiscouldnotbeindependentlyconfirmed.
336
officersalsofoundevidencethattheformereconomicattachéwasusinghisdiplomatic
immunitytotransportandsmugglerhinohornsindiplomaticvehiclesandbags(Rademeyer
2012:257).ApoliticalcounsellorattheembassyandthedeputyheadoftheVietnamese
‘GovernmentOffice’wereequallyimplicatedinrhinohornprocurementandtransport(ibid).
Morerecently,NorthKoreandiplomatshavebeenlinkedtorhinohorntrafficking.TheSouth
Africangovernment,forexample,expelledaNorthKoreandiplomatinDecember2015.The
diplomatabusedhisdiplomaticimmunityandtheembassy’sdiplomaticpouchtosmuggle
rhinohornoutofSouthAfrica.HewasarrestedintheMozambicancapitalofMaputoinMay
2015after4.5kgofrhinohornandcloseto$100000werefoundinavehicleinwhichhewas
traveling.ThecarhaddiplomaticnumberplatesandwasregisteredtotheNorthKorean
embassyinPretoria.Thediplomatandhiscompanionweresubsequentlyreleasedonbailof
$30000andreturnedtoSouthAfrica(Rademeyer2015).439
FieldworkinVietnamrevealedthatbuyersandconsumerstrustedtheprovenanceand
authenticityofrhinohornwhenprocuredfromorviadiplomatsandgovernmentofficials(see
Chapter8onfakehorn).Disruptingillegalflowsofrhinohorn(oranyillegalsubstanceor
commodity)becomesamatterofhighpoliticsandquietdiplomacywhencriminalactorscan
claimdiplomaticimmunityfromprosecution.Byvirtueoftheirdiplomaticstatus,Vietnamese
diplomatsandtheirpouchesareuntouchableliketheMozambicankingpins.Thesmugglingof
anycontrabandthroughdiplomaticchannelsisthemostsecureflowbecauselaw
enforcementbodiesholdnojurisdictiontoopenandsearchdiplomaticpouches(compare
with:UnitedNationsConferenceonDiplomaticIntercourseandImmunities1961:Article27
oftheViennaConventiononDiplomaticRelations).
439
JulianRademeyercompiledatimelineofNorthKoreandiplomaticinvolvementinrhinohorntraffickingthat
datesbacktothe1980s.Inhisbookon‘OperationLock’(acontroversiallawenforcementoperationtodisrupt
rhinohorntraffickinginthe1980s),JohnHanks(2015:104-107)arguesthatNorthKoreanembassieswere
notoriouslyunderfunded.Diplomatswereexpectedtoraisetheremainderofthefundsintheirhostcountries.
HankssuggeststhatNorthKoreandiplomatsfinancedtheembassyintheZimbabweancapitalofHararethrough
“thepurchase,smugglingandresaleofrhinohorn(Hanks2015:104).”Theembassyhadbeenopenedin1981,
andconsecutivecouncilorsandembassystaffwereallegedlyusingtheirdiplomaticprivilegestosmugglerhino
hornoutofthecountry.TheformerheadofWWF-SouthAfricastatesthat“irrefutableevidenceduringa
numberofstingoperations”wasmadeavailabletoZimbabweanministers(Hanks2015:105).However,the
Zimbabwepoliceandconservationagencieswereallegedlyinstructedtoleavetheembassystaffaloneinthe
early1990s(ibid).TheNorthKoreanembassyinHarareclosedinthelate1990s.
337
Illegalmarketactorsconfirmedthattheriskofdetectionwashigherinsourcecountries
wheresnifferdogsandcompetentborderstaffknewhowtoidentifyrhinohornwhereaslaw
enforcementstaffintransitanddestinationcountrieshavenotbeensufficientlytrainedto
identifyillegalwildlifecontraband(comparewith:Sellar2014a;Sellar2014b).Similartothe
graychannelsdescribedinthepreviouschapter,theshorterthesupplychain(thefewer
segmentsornodalpoints),thefasterandmoresecuretheflow.Whilegraychannelling
involvesmoresegmentsandactorsinthesupplychainasaprecautionarysecuritymeasure,
actorsinvolvedinthisillegalflowcommentedontheirpreferenceforshortersupplychains
withafew“triedandtested”intermediarieswhoarenonethelessswappeddependingonthe
finaldestinationofthehornandthemodeoftransportation.Afewstrategicactorssuchas
governmentofficialsandlawenforcementagentsreceiveregularpaymentsto“clearthe
coast”(Interviews,2013).Theintermediaryandtransportrolesarehenceofparticular
significanceinshortflowsasanywrongmovecouldleadtodetectionordefection.
Existingliteraturesuggeststhatcriminalnetworksfaceanefficiency/securitytrade-offand
securityconcernsappeartoreignsupremeinoperationaldecision-making
(Morselli/Giguère/Petit2007;Lindelauf/Borm/Hamers2009).Trustandsecrecyarethetwo
bindingmechanismsthatensureandfacilitatecollaborationbetweennetworkmembersand
enableflows(Morselli/Giguère/Petit2007:144).Empiricalevidencecollectedforthisproject
suggeststheneedforamorenuancedinterpretationwhenitcomestoillegalrhinohorn
supplychains.Whilesecurityconcernsappeartoplayastructuringroleingrayflowsofrhino
horn,theyappearsecondarytoefficiencyandqualitycontrolconcernsinillegalflows.Whyis
thisthecase?WhenseenthroughaSouthAfricanorinternationallens,theillegalhuntingand
killingofrhinos,thedehorningandsubsequentsmugglingofrhinohornfromthebush
throughtotransithubsandthefinalconsumermarketsconstituteanunambiguousillegal
flow.Actorsdonotbendtherulesorexploitloopholesinthisinstance;theybreakthe‘lawof
theland’onseveralcounts.Thisincludes,butisnotlimitedto,trespassinginaprotected
area,huntingwithoutapermit,illegalhuntingofrhinos(andcalves),illegalpossessionof
rhinohorn,illegalpossessionoffirearmsandammunition,dealinginrhinohorn,theft,illegal
immigration,racketeeringandmoneylaundering(Interviewwithprosecutors1and2,2013).
338
Illegalmarketactorsandmarketdisruptors(lawenforcementandgovernmentofficials)cited
theillegitimacyofthehuntingandrhinohorntradebanandthevaluationofrhinohornasa
legitimatetradablecommodityaslegitimationdevicesfortheirillegalactivities.Likeother
importantactorsintheoverallmarketstructure,theseactorsinvokethenotionofcontested
illegality.Thecrimeofrhinopoachingandrhinohorntraffickingwasinterpretedinaless
seriouslightthancrimesthataffectedthecommunityorfellowhumanbeingsdirectly.
Poachersandkingpinsappeartousethisformofreasoningtobypasslawenforcement,and
theyfeelsecureanduntouchableontheirhometurf.Moreover,afewmarketdisruptors
wereco-optedintopoachinggroupsorstartedtheirownhuntingcrews(severalrangersfrom
theKNPandLNPruntheirownhuntingteams–seesectiononcooperation).The
participationofsocialcontrolagentsinpoachinggroupsdoesnotonlysecuretheflowof
rhinohorn,butitalsolegitimizesthecriminalactivitiesassociatedwithobtainingand
traffickingofrhinohorn.Theargumentgoesthatifamemberofthepolitical,economicor
socialeliteisinvolvedintheflow,thenitcannotbeagainstthelaw(Interviews,2013).Their
participationmayrendertheflowmoresecure,butthisdoesnotequatetothecoordination
problemofsecuritybeinglessofconcern.
SeenfromaMozambicanperspective,rhinopoachingwasnotspecifiedasacriminaloffence
intheMozambicancriminalcodeuntilApril2014.AccordingtoPortuguesecoloniallaws,
poachingofwildlifewasindeedaminortransgressioninMozambiqueobtainingdiscretionary
fines,exceptfortheoccasionalheavy-handedactionagainstvillagerssuspectedof
subsistencepoachinginnationalparks(Witter2013).Rhinokingpins(Interviewsin
Mozambique,2013)justifiedillegalhuntingbystatingthatrhinopoachingwasnotevena
crimeinMozambique(atthetime).Moreover,huntingofwildanimalswasariteofpassage
foryoungboysgrowingupinvillages,andboysandmenhadbeenhuntingintheformer
Coutada16(nowdesignatedastheLNP)formanygenerations.Poachers(Interviews,2013)
referredtothedouble-edgedmoralityofallowing“whitemen”tohuntrhinolegallywhilethe
“blackman”isguiltyofacriminaloffenceandstigmatizedasa“poacher”becausehecannot
affordthepricingofcommercialsportshunting.
TheMozambicanparliamentpassedtheConservationAreasAct(RepublicofMozambique
2013)inApril2014,whichprovidesforcustodialsentencesofbetweeneightandtwelveyears
339
forindividualswhokillanyprotectedspecieswithoutalicenseorusebannedfishinggear
suchasexplosivesortoxicsubstances.TheActalsopenalizesindividualsfoundusingillegal
firearmsorsnareswithaprisonsentenceofuptotwoyears.Anyonefoundguiltyoftheillegal
exploitation,storage,transportorsaleofprotectedspecieswillbefinedbetween50and1000
timestheminimummonthlynationalwagepaidtopublicofficials440(CITESSecretariat
2014:8–9).Rhinopoachingandthetraffickingandpossessionofrhinohornthuswere
criminalizedinMozambiqueinApril2014.However,thecountry’slegislationiscurrently
beingrevisedtoimposestifferpenaltiesfortraffickers.Atthisstage,smugglersusuallyreceive
afinewhereaspoachersgetjailtime.Implementation,diffusionandcomplianceofthenew
lawhastoinvolvetrainingandcapacitybuildingoflawenforcementandjudicialofficers,as
wellasawarenessraisingandeducationamongstthoseconstituenciesaffectedbythenew
law.
Graph7:Mozambicanarrest,rifleconfiscationandfinesdata,2011-2013
Source:ReportonRhinoceroses,CITESSecretariat(CITESSecretariat2014:8)
Asshowninthegraphabove(Graph7),therehasbeenasteadyincreaseinarrests,rifle
confiscationsandfinesissuedbetween2011and2013.Theproofisinthepudding:Those
arrestedareoftenreleasedwithinafewhours(Interviewwithpoachingkingpins1and2,
Massingir,2013),riflesfindtheirwaybackintocirculationandonlyasmallpercentageoffines
arepaid.
440
ThisamountstoUS$4425andUS$88500atthecurrentexchangerateinNovember2014.
340
7.8Conclusion
Thischapterhasdealtwithstructuresandprocesseslinkedtothegreatestsourceofrhino
horn,theillegalhuntingofrhinosinSouthAfricanconservationareas.Whilethisformofhorn
‘production’constitutesanillegalflowfromthebushtothemarket,itisconnectedtogray
channelling(Chapter6)assomeofthesameintermediaries,transportersandroutesareused.
Thischapteralsodemonstratesthehistoricallock-inlinkedtoconservationparadigms,which
rendersdisruptionoftheseflowsadifficultifnotimpossibleundertaking.Theincreasing
militarizationofanti-poachingoperationsiscontributingtothefurtheralienationoflocal
communities,whichunderdifferentcircumstances,couldactasthefirstlineofdefence
againstrhinopoaching.Actorsinthisflowhavemasteredthecoordinationproblemsof
competition,cooperationandsecurity.
341
Chapter8:Fakerhinohorn:Trustandtheissueofqualitycontrol
“Youcanfeelit;youcanseeitifyoureyesareopen.Normally,especiallywhenyou're
African,youwillknow.Youknowtherearesomepeopleherethatdon'tknowabout
rhinos,they'vejustheardaboutrhinos.They'veneverseentherhino.Maybeonlyin
thezoo(Interviewwithconvictedpoacher16,2013).”
8.1Introduction
Chapter3focusedonthedemandandvaluationofrhinohorn.Aparallelmarketforfake
rhinohornhasexistedeversincerhinohornbecameahigh-endtradablegoodseveral
millenniaago.Theissueoffakehornisrelevanttotheoverallmarketstructureduetoits
incidencealongtheentiresupplychainanditsimplicationforvaluation.Thenormative
perceptionsofregulatorsandillegalmarketactorsregardingthelegalityoffakeor‘Ersatz’441
horn,forexample,providefascinatinginsightsonthevaluationofrhinohorn.Tiedtothe
coordinationproblemofvalueistheissueofqualitycontrol.Howdomarketactorsensure
thattheydonotbuy,tradeorconsumefakerhinohorn?Thechapterbeginswiththe
differentiationofdifferenttypesoffakerhinohornbeforelookingatactorsinvolvedinthe
productionanddistributionofsuchhorns.Theresearchidentifiedtheroleoftherhinohorn
assessor,whofulfilsthefunctionofqualitycontrolandriskmitigation.
8.2LegalactorsandErsatzhorn
Bothlegitimateandcriminalactorsareinvolvedintheproductionoffakeor‘Ersatz’rhino
horn,whichdiffersregardingquality,purposeandfunctionality.Taxidermists,manufacturers
andscientistsbelongtothecategoryoflegitimatehornreplicaproducersalthoughrogue
taxidermistshavealsobeencomplicitincriminalconspiraciesinvolvingfraud,theftand
launderingoforiginalandfakerhinohorn.Taxidermistsproduceareplicaofhuntingtrophies
andrhinohornsformuseums,galleries,zoosandprivatecollectionsinordertopreventtheft
oftheoriginalsortoreplaceoriginalsthatwerestolenpreviously(seeFigure10).The
441
TheGermanword“Ersatz”hasbecomeususforsubstitutehorns.
342
productionofsuchhornreplicasrequiresaspecializedartisanalprocess.Taxidermistsusea
varietyofmaterialstorecreaterhinohornincludingJesmoniteacrylicresin,glassfibreor
silicone(Natural–History–Conservation.com2015).Suchhornreplicacanlooksurprisingly
authenticasagangofthievesfoundoutwhentheybrokeintotheNaturalHistoryMuseumin
theBritishcountyofHertfordshire,andstolereplicasmadeofresinfromstuffedrhinosin
2011(StaffreporterforCanberraTimes2011).
Figure10:RhinotrophywithErsatzhorn
Source:PhototakenbyJensBeckertinParis,France
Thesehigh–quality‘Ersatz’hornshavebecomeanareaofconcerntoCITESauthorities,which
foundthatthequalityoffakerhinohornsusedtodeceiveenforcementauthoritieshad
improvedmarkedly.TheCITESSecretariat(2013:6)andlawenforcementofficials(Interviews,
2013)reportedahighnumberofincidentsinvolvingprofessional,pseudoandproxyhunters
whoremovedrhinohornsfromtheirhuntingtrophiesandreplacedthemwithfakehorns
uponreturningtotheirhomecountries.Intermediarieslaundertherealhornsintotheillegal
market.Suchfakerhinohornscouldbeeasilyidentifiedinthepastastheywereshapedinto
hornmouldsusingfiberglassorplastic;however,recentsampleshavebeenmadefromhighqualityresinwithamoresolidstructurethanrealhorn.Thisimprovementrendersvisual
identificationofthishorn‘Ersatz’difficult.Asaconsequence,CITESofficialsburnasmall
quantityofdustfromthehorn,whichshoulddeliveradistinctivesmelldependingonwhether
keratinbiomassorsyntheticmaterialsarepresent(Carnie2012).Duetothereplacementof
343
realhornanditslaunderingintoillegaltradeflows,theCITESSecretariathascalledon
membercountriestoimplementadequatelegislationandenforcementcontrolstoprevent
hornsoflegallyobtainedhuntingtrophiesfromenteringillegaltradeflows,andtoensurethat
thetrophies“remaininthepossessionoftheirownersforthepurposeindicatedintheCITES
exportpermit”(CITESSecretariat2013:6).Thequalityandauthenticityofreplicahornsare
hencedependentonthetrophyowner’srationaleforreplacingthehornwithareplica.It
couldbeasafetyprecautiontoaverttheft.Dependingonwhethercloseorcorruptibletiesto
publicofficialsareinplace,themountingofcheapplasticreplicamaybesufficienttokeepup
asemblanceoflegality.Thisfaçademayalsoapplytoscenarioswherethechancesofatrophy
auditareunlikely.442
Inthehopeofmanufacturingafacsimilerhinohornthatcouldactasaviablesubstitutefor
theoriginalmaterial,443severalteamsofscientistsandengineersareintheprocessof
“bioengineering”syntheticrhinohorn(Zak2015;Aulakh2015),attemptingto“clone”rhinos
andrhinohorn(SullivanBrennan2014;Speart1994),orinvestigatingthepotentialfor
growingrhinohorninvitro(Yang2011:8).444Sincerhinohornwasstruckofthelistoff
permissibleingredientsintheChinesepharmacopeiain1993,governmentandtraditional
medicineauthoritieshaveencouragedthesubstitutionofrhinohornwiththehornofwater
buffalo,saigaantelope,cattleandyaktoachievesimilarresults.Such‘Ersatz’hornsare
legitimate,viableandmoreaffordablethanrhinohorn;offeringthemasthe‘realdeal’
442
In2014,SouthAfricaninvestigativejournalistSimonBloch(personalcommunication,2015)contactedthe
CITESmanagementauthorityinPolandtoverifywhetherPolishauthoritiesweremonitoringtheinfluxofhunting
trophiesfromSouthAfrica.AfteraCzech-Vietnamesetraffickingnetworkwasbusted,suspicionsarerifethat
PolishhunterswerealsocollaboratingwithAsianwildlifetradingnetworks.BlochwastoldthatthePolish
authoritieswere“struggling”todocheckup’sonPolishtrophyhuntersduetocountry’sprivacylaws.
443
ConservationNGOssuchastheWWFcontestthelegitimacyofproducinglegalhornsubstitutestoprevent
poaching.SaysWWFwildlifetradeexpertColmanO’Criodain(quotedin:Aulakh2015):
"ThereisalreadyahugequantityoffakehornincirculationinVietnambutthatisn'tdentingthe
poachinglevels.Ingeneral,wefavourtryingtochangeconsumerbehaviourratherthanpanderingtoit.
Thatiswherewearecurrentlydirectingourefforts."
444
Yang’sarticlereferstoscientificresearchintotheself-healingnatureofrhinohorn.Whilerhinohornis
considereddeadtissue,scientistshavecapturedimagesthatshowapolymersubstitutefillingcracksofrhino
horn.Twohypothesesmightexplainthisphenomenon:eithertherearelivingcellsinthehorn(andthusrhino
horncouldbegrowninvitro)ortheremightbeatransportsysteminsidethehornthatcarrieslivingcellsto
affectedareasofthehorn(Yang2011:8).Chapter3discussesthechemicalcompositionofrhinohorninmore
detail.
344
constitutes,however,fraudanddeception(Nowell2012a:2).Theproposedsubstitutionof
rhinohornwiththehornofotheranimalsmayhaveledtosomeunintendednearcataclysmic
consequencesforthesaigaantelope(comparewithChapter3).Inthe1980s,theWWF
suggestedtheuseofsaigahornasaviablealternativetorhinohorn.SaysaWWFofficial
(personalcommunication,2014):
“…yesitistruethatinthe1980s,whilesaigawasstillcommonandillegalhunting
wasn'taproblem,wedidtoutitasanalternative.Thatwasbeforethecollapseofthe
SovietUnion,whichledtotheexplosioninpoachingthatcausedpopulationcrashes.”
SaigahornisusedalmostexclusivelyinTCM.WildlifemonitoringnetworkTRAFFIC
corroboratesthatthepriceforsaigahornshasincreasedsignificantlysincethemid–1990s
(vonMeibometal.2010:34).Highlyorganizedpoachinggangspushedtheformerlyabundant
populationsoftheAsianantelopetypicallyfoundinthesteppesofKazakhstan,Uzbekistan
andtheRussianFederationintoastateofsignficantpopulationdeclinethroughillegal
hunting.445Chinaisthelargestimporterandconsumerofsaigahorn,followedbySingapore
andJapanwithSingapore,HongKongandMalaysiaasimportanttradeentrepôts(von
Meibometal.2010:V).ATRAFFICresearchprojectseeking,amongstothers,alternativesto
theuseofsaigahorninTCMfoundthatfewTCMtraders446recommendedrhinohornasa
viablesubstituteforsaigahorn(vonMeibometal.2010:27);inotherwords,thecorollaryof
replacingsaigawithrhinohornwasnotendorsedorrecommendedtotheTRAFFIC
researchers.
TheofficialChinesepharmacopeiarecommendstheuseofwaterbuffaloinlieuofrhinohorn
(Nowell2012a:33),andthisappearstohavehadnoimpactonwaterbuffalopopulationsin
Asia.Thissubstitutionisnotentirelyunproblematicasrhinohornisperceivedasasuperior
445
Thenumberofsaigaantelopesdecreasedfromapproximately1250000animalsinthemid–1970stoless
than60000antelopesby2010(vonMeibometal.2010:33).Becausemalesaigaantelopesfashionthecoveted
hornsonly,thesexratioofpopulationsissignificantlyskewedtothepointwhereroughly7%ofpopulationsare
adultmales(vonMeibometal.2010:33).
446
Fivestaffmembersoutofasampleof52TCMshopssuggestedreplacingsaigahornwithrhinohorn(which
wasdeemedimpossibletoobtain)inMalaysia.TCMtradersinSingaporeandChinadidnotrecommendrhino
hornasErsatzhornforsaigahorn(vonMeibometal.2010).
345
healthtonicandcoolingmedicinetosomepractitionersandtheirpatients.Asatraditional
doctorinHongKongdisclosed(Interview,2013):
“Intraditionalmedicinetherhinohornisveryimportantandthemedicaleffectisvery
good.Ifweusethebuffalotoreplacetherhinohorn,wewilluse10or20timesmore.
Itishardtoreplaceit.Whenweboilthemedicine,wewilluselotsofbigpiecesof
buffaloanditisinconvenient.Themedicaleffectmaybenotverygoodsosome
peopleinChinastillusetherhinohornillegally.”
8.3CriminalactorsandfakeorErsatzhorn
Whilelaw–abidingdoctorsandpatientschoosewaterbuffalo,otherhorn‘Ersatz’andherbal
tinctures,gullibleTCMtraders,doctorsandconsumershavefallenvictimtofraudsterswho
peddlewaterbuffaloandhornreplicaasifitwererealrhinohornwiththeconcomitant
pricingofbetweenUS$25000toUS$45000perkilogramofrhinohorn.447Roughlybetween
70to90%448of“rhinohorn”purchasedfrommarkets,traditionalapothecaries,andmedical
practicesoron–lineisbelievedtobeeitherfakeorahornsubstituteinVietnam(Instituteof
EcologyandBiologicalResourcesquotedin:Anonymous2013,Interviewwithconservation
geneticist,Hanoi,2013;Nowell2012a;Amman2013b;Kvinta2014).WhileVietnamese
nationalsarelargelyunfamiliarwiththe‘lookandfeel’ofrhinohorn(Interviewwith
representativeofTCMauthority,HCMC,2013),449waterbuffaloisdistinctiveandrecognizable
duetoitsconcentric-shapedfibresanditsdistinctyellowishcolourwithawhitecorewhereas
rhinohornconsistsofkeratintubulesandisdarkbrown.Thetipofthewaterbuffalohornis
447
AtthetimeofmyfieldworkinSoutheastAsia,TCMtraders,doctorsandconsumerspaidbetweenUS$25000
toUS$45000perkilogramofrhinohorn.Assmallamountsofhornwererequiredformedicinalpurposes,rhino
hornwasdispensedindisksorpowder-form,renderingitsidentificationtricky.ThepriceofAfrican‘rhinohorn’
waslowerthanAsianrhinohorn,whichisbelievedtobemorepotentthantheAfricanvariant.
448
TheoverallmarketshareoffakeandErsatzhorninVietnamisdifficulttoassess.Vietnamesegovernment
authorities(Interviews,2013)tendtostressthehighincidenceoffakehorninordertodeflectfrominternational
datasuggestingthatVietnamisthemainconsumerof‘real’rhinohorn(Milliken/Shaw2012;Rademeyer2012).
DrCindyHarperfromtheVeterinaryGeneticsLaboratoryattheUniversityofPretoriatestedsamplescollected
frommarketsandtradersinVietnam.InvestigativejournalistKarlAmmanandhisteamhadcollectedthe30
samplesfromTCMoutlets.90%werefakes.AVietnameseconservationgeneticistwhotestsrhinohornon
behalfoflawenforcementauthoritiespeggedthemarketshareoffakeandersatzhornat70%.Hebasedthe
assessmentontheDNAanalysisof300hornsamplescollectedbetween2003and2013(Interview,Hanoi,2013).
449
PoacherskilledanddehornedthelastJavanrhinoinVietnam’sCatBaNationalParkin2010.
346
solidbutitbecomeshollowtowardstheend–unlikerhinohorn,whichissolidthroughout.
Duetothefamiliarityoflocalswithwaterbuffalohorn,thehornisblackenedand“rhinofied”
(madetolooksimilartoAsianrhinohorn)todeceiveprospectivebuyers.Criminalsalso
peddlethehornofAfricanoxconsideredasuperior‘Ersatz’asitisanunknownentityin
Vietnam.ThetipandcolourofcattlehornlooksurprisinglysimilartoAfricanrhinohorn
(InterviewsinHanoiandHCMC,2013).Thesearchforanever-improvedversionoffakerhino
hornhasledcriminalentrepreneurstoinvestinhighlysophisticatedhornforgeryequipment
andtosetupfakehornmanufactories.450Accordingtotheheadofmolecularsystematicand
conservationgeneticsattheInstituteforScienceandTechnologyinHanoi,thesophistication
ofcounterfeitingtechnologieshasimprovedtosuchadegreethatonlyexpertscandistinguish
realfromfakerhinohorn(InterviewinHanoi,2013).Professionalfraudstershavemastered
theartoffakingrhinohornbyusinghumanandanimalhairtogetthedistinctivesmellof
burntkeratin,shouldtheabove-mentionedtestofburninghorndustbeemployedtoverify
theauthenticityofthehorninquestion.Imitationhornis‘cloned’tonearperfection
mimickingthenaturalcharacteristicsofhornsuchascolour,odour,hair,density,hardness,
contoursandtheunevennaturalgroovesalongthesurfaceofthehorn(InterviewsinHanoi,
HCMCandJohannesburg,2013).Thosecheatedhavenorecoursetothelawasitisnotonly
illegaltosellbutalsotobuyrhinohorninVietnam,HongKongandChina.451
CuriouslyitisnotonlyunsuspectinghornconsumersinVietnamorChinathatbuytainted
hornbutthereareothersthatknowinglyandwillinglybuyErsatzhorn.WhilecommonvarietiestypeoffakehorncanbeprocuredforaslittleasUS$200inVietnam,sophisticated
typesofErsatzhorncomeatapriceandareessentiallyvaluedasa“second-best”alternative
orascrediblereplicaoftherealthingwithassociatedfunctions.Consciousbuyersof
“superior”replicaorErsatzhornpayuptoUS$10000perhorn(Interviewswithsmugglers
andintermediaries,2013).Inanattempttoimpresstheirpeers,aspiranthornconsumersbuy
450
KarlAmman(2012:36)hascollectedfilmfootageofafactorywherethetipsofwaterbuffaloarereshaped
andpolishedtolooklikerhinohorn.DatacollectedinHanoiunveiledsmallfactoriesthatwereconvertinghuman
andanimalhairaswellasfurintofakerhinohorn.
451
Thefocusofthisresearchwasinthesethreecountriesduringdatacollection.Thetransnational/international
tradeanduseofrhinohornisinprincipleillegalinallCITESmembercountries;however,international
regulationsanddeterminationsconcerningthebanandauthorizedusehavenotbeendomesticatedinall
jurisdictions.
347
fakehornbecausetheycannotaffordrealhorn.AninformantinHanoiexplains(Interview
withrhinoscientist2,2013):“Somepeoplewanttobuyandkeepthehorneven,whenthey
knowitsfakeathomefordecoration.”
Wealthybusinessentrepreneursandpoliticians,ontheotherhand,buyfakehorntoprotect
theirinvestment.ThefakeorErsatzhornisshow-casedinlieuofrealhorn(similartothe
ErsatzhornemployedinmuseumsandcollectionsinEurope,NorthAmericaandsouthern
Africa),whichisstowedinasafelocation.Whileshowingoffone’swealthandstatusis
integraltoconspicuousconsumption,itwouldbe“stupid”nottoprotectone’s“very
expensiveinvestmentandgrowingasset”(Interviewswithintermediariesandconsumers,
HanoiandJohannesburg,2013).Theneedtoprotectrhinohornisnotonlylinkedtoitshigh
valuebuttotherealthreatoftheft(theftofrhinohorniswidespreadacrosstheworld).This
becameapparentafterthevicepresidentofSarcombankhadarhinohornvaluedatan
estimated4billionVietnameseDong(134530€)stolenfromhismansionintheMekongDelta
(StaffreporterforThanhnienNews2012).452
8.4Trust,qualitycontrolandtheroleofthehornassessor
Duetothehighincidenceoffakehorn,criminalactors,tradersandconsumersemploya
numberofmeasurestoensuretheauthenticityoftheiracquisition.Criminalgroupsinvolved
inshamorillegalhuntingexpeditionsensurethatatrustedallysuchasthehornorganizeror
smugglingintermediaryattendsthehuntorreceivesthehornimmediatelyafterthehunt,
withoutthepreciousgoodchanginghandsintheinterim.Bybeingpresentduringthehunt
andthesubsequentdehorningoftheanimal,rhinotraffickingintermediariesand/ortheAsian
associatesensurethequalityandtheprovenanceofthehorn,therebyresolvingthe
coordinationproblemsofvaluation,cooperationandsecurity.Thismechanismisanimportant
aspectofvaluationofrhinohornwhenitlandsinAsia.Smugglingintermediarieswho
coordinatebothlegalandillegalflowsofrhinohornensurethatthehorndispatchedatthe
452
ThecaseisofTramBeisalsoofinterestasthebankerwasguiltyofcontraveningCITESrules,namelythe
illegalpossessionofrhinohorn.TherhinotrophywasregisteredtoaVietnamesetrophyhunterwhohadlegally
huntedtherhinoinSouthAfricaandgavethehorntoBeasagift(StaffreporterforThanhnienNews2012).The
giftingoftrophyhornwasnotacriminaloffenceatthetime.
348
pointoforiginisthesameastheonethatarrivesontheotherside.Thesesmuggling
intermediariesarecloselyconnectedbywayofcommunicationdevicessuchasmobilephones
orinstantmessagingonelectronicdevices,orthehornismarkedwithconcealedsignsonly
knowntotheintermediaries.Thereceiverwouldthusknowwhethertheoriginalhornhas
beentampered(Interviewswithintermediaries,2013).Ofsignificanceisthechosenroute,
modeoftransport,thelengthoftheflow(howmanysegmentsorintermediariesare
involved),andwhoreceivesthehornontheotherside.Theshorterandmoredirectthe
route,thelessertheriskoftamperingwiththeexpensiveillicitcommodity.Shoulddiplomats,
lawenforcement,customs,portorconservationofficialsbeinvolvedinthetransportationor
facilitationthereof,thentheriskofdefectionisreducedastheperson’spositionorstatus
holdsswayand“opensdoors”(Interviewswithsmugglers,2013).
Consumers,dealersandsmugglers(Interviews,2013)articulatedapreferencefortrophy
horn.Consumersanddealers,inparticular,trustedtheprovenanceofthehornifthedealer
couldprovideproofofthehuntingpermit,theCITESimportorexportpermit,oraphotoof
thesupposedtrophyhunt.Thiscorrespondswiththepreferenceforwildratherthanfarmed
rhinohorn.Whenrhinohornwasemployedformedicinalpurposes,consumersanddoctors
alikesuggestedthathornfromwildrhinoswasmorepotent453thanthatoffarmedanimals.
Huntingpermits,photosandotherofficiallookingdocumentation,ofcourse,canbefalsified.
Ifthedealerhasapermanentaddresssuchasashop,stallorresidencefromwhereshe
trades,thenconsumerstrustsuchdealersandtheirproductmorereadily(Interviewwith
Chineseintermediaryandconsumers,2013).Agoodreputationiscultivatedovertimeand
withsufficientexposuretotherightclientele,whichaccentuatestheimportanceof
reputationandtrustinresolvingthecoordinationproblemofcooperationandsecurityin
illegalmarkets.Wordofmouthadvertisingthroughsocialnetworksallowscredibleand
trustworthyhorndealerstostayinbusiness(InterviewwithChinesesmuggler,2013).Similar
tothedrugtrade,thereputationofthedealerrisesorfallswithhisorherlastdeal.Moreover,
453
Thepreferenceforwildrhinosislinkedtothebeliefthatthecurativeandespeciallydetoxifyingpropertiesof
rhinohornarelinkedtotherhino’sdietofpoisonousplants,thornsandbramblesinAsia(Interviews,2013).The
preferenceforwildoverfarmedanimalproductsisnotspecifictotherhinomarket.Researchelsewherehas
shownapreferenceforbearbileandtigerbonefromwildpopulations(EconomistsatLarge2013:11).
349
“scoring”rhinohorn454involvesapatternofinteractionssimilartothatofastereotypicaldrug
dealinvolvingwealthydrugusersfromtheupperstrataofsociety.Rhinohorncannotbe
procuredontheopenmarket,especiallybyunknownentities(comparewithsectionon‘Fake
hornproductionandqualitycontrolatsource’).Onlylawenforcementofficials,journalistsor
touristswouldattempttobuyhornfromrandompeoplethattheyhaveostensiblyprofiledas
possiblehorndealers(Interviews,2013).Atrustedmemberofone’ssocialnetwork(suchasa
familymember,friend,colleagueorlawenforcementofficial)introducesanaspirantbuyerto
thedealer.Thedealeremploysanumberofsafetyprecautionstominimizesecurityrisks(e.g.
thepersonresponsibleforthereferralhastoactasa‘go-between’orbufferbetweenbuyer
anddealer)anddefection(suchasadvancepayment).
Dealersprefertoenterintobusinessarrangementswithindividualswhomtheytrusttopay
theaskingpricefortherightamountorquantityofhorn–thepreferenceistosellwhole
hornsorlargequantitiesofhornasopposedtogramsorpiecesofhorn(Interviewswith
intermediaries,2013).Thehornisusuallypre-ordered,andasdescribedelsewhere,theprice
ofthehorniscontingentonitsweight,whichisusuallynotavailableatthetimeofordering.
Immediateavailabilityandlowpricesareviewedwithsuspicion;inotherwords,thereshould
beawaitingperiodtoallowthesellertosourcethehornandthepricehastobepegged
accordingtotheknownstreetvalue(Van/Tap2008:7,Interviewswithconsumers,2013).The
dealorexchangedoesnothappeninabackalleyor‘badpartoftown’butatthebuyer’s,
referentordealer’sresidenceorworkplace(Interviewswithconsumersandintermediaries,
2013).Thelocationofthedealservesthefunctionofnormalizingthetransactionasit
happensinrespectfulsurroundingssuchastheprivateorpublicsphereofthetransacting
parties.Italsoprovidesanotherlayerofsecurity455andlegitimizesthedealasabusiness
454
Itisimportanttodifferentiatebetweentheprocessofactivelyseekingtoprocureorobtainrhinohornas
opposedtotheprocessofreceivingrhinohornasagift(thenotionofgift-givingisexploredinmoredetailin
Chapter3).Theformeractionassumesagencyonthepartoftheactorwhereasthelatterreferstoanactof
givingwheretherecipientisassumedtobeapassiveactorunlessheorsheweretorejectthegift.Inthis
instance,theactormovesfrombeingapassiverecipienttoassumingagencyandcontrolovertheexchange.
455
Illegalbusinesstransactions(includingdrugdeals)arecommonlybelievedtotakeplaceatlocationsthat
appeartoguaranteetheanonymityofthemarketparticipantssuchashotelrooms,restaurants,andbusyor
isolatedpublicspaces.Thecorollarysuggeststhatthedividinglinesbetweenpublicandprivatelivesandwork
andleisureareblurred.Thisprovidesafurtherlayeroflegitimacytothehorntradeasmarketparticipantsallow
thelinesofdivisiontobebroken.
350
transactionthatcanbesafelyandlegitimatelydonefromone’splaceofresidenceorwork.
Thissuggeststhatmarketparticipantsarenotconcernedaboutthepotentialfall-out,stigma
orsocialsanctionsthatmightobtainfromdealingorconsumingrhinohornbytheirinner
circleoffamily,friendsorcolleagues,astheseactionsarenotperceivedasillegitimate.These
dealsneverthelessformpartofaninformalundergroundeconomyinbigurbancentresand
standindirectcontrasttotheopentradeofwildlifecontrabandinperipherallocations
removedfromthepryingeyesoftheinternationalcommunityandlocallawenforcement.456
Unlikedrugusers,rhinohornbuyersareusuallynotreturningcustomers.457Unlessthe
456
Reports(Amman2012;Amman2015b)andinterviewswithrepresentativesofconservationNGOsinVietnam
(Interviews,2013)suggestthatwildlifecontrabandincludingrhinohornistradedopenlyintownsandvillages
closetoVietnam’snorth-easternborderwithChina.Iwasunabletotraveltothenorthernregionsduetotime
constraints.However,IundertookdatacollectionandobservationsinthesouthernregionsoftheMekongDelta,
wheresmugglingactivitieswererifeandlawenforcementlimited.Theopentradeofwildlifecontrabandin
bordertownscorrespondswithresearchelsewhere(Nijman2010;Nijman/Shepherd2014;Nijman/Shepherd
2015;EnvironmentalInvestigationAgency2015)onthelawlessnessandthrivingillegalwildlifetradein
neighbouringcountriessuchasLaos,ThailandandMyanmar.SituatedinaSpecialDevelopmentZoneand
adjacenttoChina’sYunnanprovince,thetownofMongLainMyanmarhasgainednotorietyastheAsian
responsetothe“sincity”ofLasVegas(EnvironmentalInvestigationAgency2015).Thetax-freezonecaters
almostexclusivelytoChinesetouristswhoarrivetoenjoyleisurelypursuits,forbiddenorillegitimateintheirown
countrysuchasgambling,prostitutionandtheconsumptionofendangeredwildlifeproducts(Environmental
InvestigationAgency2015:3).AnEIAinvestigationfoundthatshavingsofrhinohornweresoldinMongLa
(EnvironmentalInvestigationAgency2015:10);however,thereisahighprobabilitythattheseshavingsmightbe
counterfeitorErsatzhorninlightofthefindingsofthecurrentstudy.Basedonregularsurveysofmarketsin
TachilekandMongLa,NijmanandShepherd(2015:5)observe:
“ThetradeinTachilekandMongLaoccursinopenly,withprotectedwildlifeopenlydisplayedforallto
see.Largecatskinswereprominentlydisplayedandmanyofthetigerbonewinevatshadtigerskin
hangingabovethem.Duringourninevisitswedidnotonceexperienceanyevidenceoflaw
enforcementwithrespecttoprotectedwildlife.Tradersweregenerallyfrankwhendiscussingthetrade
withoutexpressingfearforprosecution.”
Thesefindingssuggestacoreversusperipherybiaswithregardstolawenforcementandsocialacceptanceof
opentradeofendangeredwildlife(drugandhumantraffickingisalsorifeintheregion–astheareaispartofthe
infamousGoldenTriangleregion).Thisbiasisnotuncommon:somebordertownsandregionsoperate
differentlyfromthelawsandnormsestablishedinthecore–theurbanpoliticalandbusinesscentresofpower,
authorityandinfluence–andthestatemaydirectlyorindirectlysanctionthisstateofaffairsduetothehigh
economicreturnsandtaxes(thepreviouschapterdealswiththesuspensionoflegalrulesandregulationsin
villagesalongtheMozambicanborder,immediatelyadjacenttotheKrugerNationalPark).Thelongarmofthe
stateisbendable,opentomanipulationandcriminalalliancesinborderregions,whicharedifficulttopatroldue
togeographicalcharacteristics(Nijman/Shepherd2015)ortheirspecialpoliticalandeconomicstatus
(EnvironmentalInvestigationAgency2015).
457
Thisexcludesthecategoryofinvestorswhostockpilerhinohornasagrowingassetwithhugegrowth
potential.
351
purchasedhornservesthefunctionofagift,consumersprocurehornonthebasisofneed
andaffordability.458
Peopleincertainpositionsareassumedtobeworthyoftrustandrespectbyvirtueoftheir
statusandroleinsociety,aswellastheaccess(tohornsupplies)andinfluencetheposition
confersuponthem;consumersthustrusttheprovenanceandauthenticityofrhinohornifthe
supplieriseitheralawenforcement,customsorconservationofficial,oradiplomatwith
legitimateconnectionstothesource(Interviewswithintermediaries,Johannesburgand
Massingir,2013;consumers,HanoiandHoChiMinhCity,2013).Lawenforcementand
customsofficershadeasyaccesstoconfiscatedrhinohornwhilegovernmentofficialsand
diplomatswhohadbeenpostedtoSouthAfricainthepast,orfamilymembersofdiplomats
onmissioninSouthAfricawerealsoperceivedascrediblesuppliersofrhinohornwithdirect
linkstothesourcecountry(Interviewswithconsumersandsuppliers,2013).459Aforensic
scientistinHanoisupportedthisassumption,statingthathornconfiscatedattheairportand
broughtinfortestingbythepolice,customsorCITESmanagementauthoritywasusuallythe
‘realthing’(Interview,Hanoi,2013).460Lawenforcementofficialsarealsoknowntoexercise
458
InhistheoryofconspicuousconsumptionVeblensuggeststhatconsumptionofvaluablegoodscorrelates
withthereputabilityof“agentlemanofleisure”(Veblen1899:123).Competitionbetween“gentlemenof
leisure”mayleadtomassaccumulationofvaluablegoodstoupstageoneanother.Veblenarguesthat
competitionextendstoarangeofgifts,feastsand“costlyentertainments”(Veblen1899:ibid).Itisthusnot
quantitybutqualityanddiversityofvaluablegoodsthatmatters.Thisassumptionisconsistentwithmyfindings:
Ifoundnoempiricalevidenceintheliteratureorduringdatacollectionthathornconsumershadmultiplehorns
ondisplay.Thisseemstoindicatethathornfulfilsasymbolicfunctionofsignallingthatitsownerholdsacertain
positionandstatusinsociety.Inthisinstance,thequantityofrhinohornisirrelevant.However,possessionof
thisvaluablegoodservesasa‘placeholder’fortheownertoasserthisorherrightfulplaceinsociety.Inessence,
hornconsumersareunlikely‘returncustomers’unlesstheyarebuyinggiftsforfriendsorbusinessassociates.
459
Amman(2015b)madeasimilarobservationaftertalkingtoahorndealerinthenorthernpartsofNorth
Vietnamwhohadhishornstocksconfiscatedbymembersofthedrugenforcementunitclaimingthattheywould
paythedealerlater.
460
IwasofferedandshownrhinohornonmanyoccasionsinHanoiandHoChiMinhCity.Interestinglypowdered
rhinohornhadfallenoutoffavour,largelybecauseitwassodifficulttodistinguishitfromanyotherpowder.
Moreover,theprimaryuseofrhinohornhadshiftedtostatus-upliftingandinvestmentpurposes.Tradersand
consumerswereofferingpieces,disksorentirehorns.TherewaslittledoubtthatAsiansampleswerefake
becausetherearesimplynotenoughAsianhornsinexistencetotradeinthe‘open’market.Withouthavinga
DNAkitavailable,thechutzpahtosmugglesamplesoutofVietnamtohavethemtestedlaternorbeingan
expertinidentifyingrhinohorn,Iwouldnonethelesssupportthenotionthathornsoldontheopenmarket(i.e.
inTCMorTVMapothecaries,medicinestallandwholesalers)islargelyfakeorErsatzwhereashornderivedfrom
socialcontrolagentsanddiplomatsisauthentic.ThedaughterofStage4prostatecancerpatientrelatedhowher
fatherobtainedaprescriptionforrhinohornfromthesamedoctorwhotreatedformerPresidentNguyenMinh
Trietforprostatecancer(seealsothesectiononthecancermythinChapter3).Sheobtained50gramsofrhino
hornfromatrustedsourcethatworksfortheanti-smugglingauthorityinHanoi.Sheexplained:
352
theirpositionofpowertoseizeillegalhornstocksthatneverenterthelegalchainofcustody
butarelaundereddirectlyintoillegalmarketflows(InterviewwithTCMtraderand
intermediary,2013).
Forthosewithnoprivilegedaccesstorealhornsuppliers,thefallbackoptionistoobtainan
independentassessmentofhornauthenticity.Aslaboratorytestsareexpensiveandcarrythe
riskofdetectionandhornconfiscationbylawenforcementauthorities(Interviews,HongKong
andHanoi,2013),anewrolehasemergedforpractitionersofTVMorTCMinthecitiesofHo
ChiMinhCity,Hanoiandotherurbancentres:theroleofthehornassessor.TVM/TCM
doctorsstillfulfiltheroleofprimaryhealthcareprovidersinVietnamesesociety(Drury2009).
Inadditiontoassuminganimportantroleinthehornvaluationchain,thejudgment,
sanctioningandassessmentofTCMdoctorsisvaluedintrinsicallyduetotheirstatusand
positioninsociety.Moreover,acodeofhonoursimilartowesternnotionsofdoctor-patient
privilegesobtainstotherelationshipbetweenthehornassessorandclient.Anassessorthus
wouldnotreportaclient(usuallyalsohis/herpatient)forpossessionofrhinohorntothe
authorities.Despiteitsillegalstatus,theuseofhornisdeemedalegitimatepracticeand
morallyacceptabletoabroadsectorofAsiansociety(Drury2009;Milliken/Shaw2012;
Nowell2012b),includingtheTVM/TCMdoctorsturnedhornassessorswhomingleamongthe
upperstrataofsociety.
Consumerswhoareunsureoftheprovenanceorqualityoftheofferedhorncantake
samples,disks,piecesorpowderedrhinohorntothesehornassessorstotestwhether“it’s
therealthing”.FraudulentorscamingredientsarenotuncommoninChinesemedicine.A
wholebodyofliteraturespeakstothephenomenonandassistslaypersonsbyproviding
pictorialdepictionsanddiagnostickeystodistinguishtherealfromthefake
(Nowell2012a:33).Threehornassessors(independentofeachother)invitedthisresearcher
toattendhornassessments.Whiletherewereslightnuancestotheindividualassessments,
theassessorsalltestedthecolour,smell,taste,densityandcompositionofthehorn.These
testsinvolvednoDNA-analysisormoderninstruments;instead,assessorsreliedontheirfive
“Igotitfrommycustomerwhousuallystayatmyhotel.Heworksforthesmugglingdepartment.
Normalpeoplecannotbuyit…Igotthegoodpricefromhimbecauseheismyregularcustomer.”
353
sensesandauxiliarytoolsliketorchesandscales.Duetostrongsocialnetworklinksandthe
perceptionofdoingaservicetosociety,theseassessorsexpectednopaymentfortheir
services.Theassessorisrewardedgenerouslyinkind(i.e.withrhinohorn)ifthehornisfound
tobegenuine.Hornassessmentscanleadtoconflictbetweensellerandbuyer(Anh2014).
Thisisespeciallythecasewhensellersrealizethattheyhavefallenpreytofraudstersfurther
upthesupplychain,andtheywillnotbeabletorecouptheirmoney.
Anoticeablesideeffectofthehighincidenceoffakehornandassociatedfraudisthatfew
TCMorlife-styleconsumersarewillingtobuyprocessedpowderedhorn(exceptrhinopills–
seebelow).Potentialbuyersinsistonproofofprovenance.Incaseswherethepaperworkis
non-existentormissing(liketheabovementionedhuntingpermits),consumerswanttosee
andexaminethefullhorn,andwhenitisfinanciallyaffordabletheentirehornispurchased
(Interviews,2013).TCMdoctorscorrelatetheincreasedincidenceofillegalrhinokillingswith
thehighnumberoffakehornsinthemarket.Whereasconsumersusedtobuysmall
quantitiesofrhinohorninthepast,theyhavetodigdeeperintotheirpocketstobuyawhole
horn,whichisaformofqualitycontrolandinsurancepolicy.SaysaTCMdoctorsinHongKong
(Interview,2013):
“Onereasonthatrhinoarekilledmoreisbecausewhenpatientswanttogetthereal
rhinohorn,theymustgetthewholehorntoensureitisreal.Theyuseverylittle,the
restofthehorniswasted….[…]…Ifweuserhinohornwejustuse3to5gramsper
day.Wecan’ttakeitforalongtime,notlongerthantwoweeks.IfyoubuyinChina,
youshouldgototheverybigpharmacyshop.Someofthemhavegoodcreditbecause
theyareoperatedbyverybigmedicalgroupsotheycanbetrusted.”
Whilethecitationreferstothemedicinaluseofrhinohorn,datacollectionontheAfricanand
Asiansideconfirmedamarketpreferenceforwholehornsofotherusergroupstoo.Those
seekingtoshowofftheirwealthbydisplayingrhinohorns,investorsandgift–giverspreferred
wholerhinohornstohorndisksorpowderforobviousreasons.Qualitycontrol,financialas
wellasaestheticconsiderations,explainthismarketpreference.
Theconstructionoftrustbetweendifferentactorswithinthistypeofmarketexchangeis
linkedtoanumberoffactors,ofwhichatleastoneisnecessaryforanexchangetooccur.Key
factorsincludethereputationandstatusofthedealerandwhethertheinitialintroduction
354
betweendealerandbuyerisachievedthroughcloseorweaksociallinks.Moreover,location
(businessorprivateresidence),timeconsiderations(speedofhorndelivery)andintegrityof
thehorn(wholehornversushornpowderordisks)areimportant,aswellasthechoreography
ofthedeal(doesitfollowexpectationsandculturalnorms?).Shouldthesefactorsfailto
impresstheprospectivebuyer,thefallbackoptionistoemploytheservicesofahorn
assessor.Thereputationandsocialpositionoftheassessoraredeterminingfactorswhether
hisorherrulingisaccepted.
8.5Rhinohornpills:Trustinfactory-producedmedicines
ThecitationoftheHongKong-basedTCMpractitionerinthepervioussectionmakes
referencetothetrustworthinessofChinesepharmaceuticalcorporations,461whichisa
significantobservationperseandworthyoffurtheranalysis.Similarly,otherTCMwholesalers
andsomeconsumersinferredthattheingredientsoffactory-producedmedicineswere
superior,credibleandgenuinewhereassmalltradersanddoctorshadtoimproviseor
substituteshouldaningredientbeunavailable(Interviews,2013).Trustinmedicinesthatare
pre-packaged,carryavisible(notnecessarilyknown)logoisconsistentwithconsumer
461
Thebusinessconceptandapproachofmultinationalpharmaceuticalcorporations(bigpharma)are
progressivelyviewedasunsustainableinWesternsocieties(Hunter/Stephens2010).Theoperationalfocuson
chronicdiseasesandmedicinesthatpromisehugeprofitmarginsisseenasmisplacedifnotinhumane.Start-ups
andcorporationsareincreasinglymovingintonichemarketsinanattempttosecure“nichebusters”asopposed
to“blockbustermedicines”(Dolgin2010).Asdistrustofcorporationsisgrowing(especiallyintheantiglobalizationandOccupymovements)acrossmanypartsoftheworld,segmentsofWesternsocietiesareturning
tonaturalorcombinationtherapies.Theinabilitytocuremajordiseases,thehugeprofitmarginsandthesideeffectsof“blockbuster”medicationsandfailuretorollthemoutataffordablepricestopatientsintheGlobal
Southhaveinvokedcriticismandquestionsasregardsthemotifsdrivingpharmaceuticalcompanies(Barsh
2001).ItwouldthusappearcounterintuitiveforAsianconsumerstotrustfactory-producedmedicationover
medicinesdispensedbyknownfamilydoctorsorpharmacists.Whenaskedaboutthisapparentdisconnect,
consumersrelatedhowAsianpharmaceuticalcompaniesmanagedtocombinethe“old”withthe“new”;in
otherwords,companiesweredistributingtraditionalmedicinesusingmoderntechnologiestogrowingnumbers
ofconsumers.TherehasbeenarenaissanceoftraditionalmedicineinlargepartsofAsiaincludingVietnamand
China,encouragedandsupportedbythepoliticalelite(Drury2009:44–46).Inthewakeofthisrenaissance,
pharmaceuticalfactoriesandcorporationshavemushroomedacrosstheregion,specializingintheproductionof
wholesaleingredientsorprocessedtraditionalmedicines.Inlightofthehighincidenceoffakeingredientsin
TCM(notonlyinrhinohornmedicines),butitisalsoreasonabletoassumethatsomeconsumerswoulddisplaya
marketpreferenceforfactory-producedmedicinesbasedontrustinthereputationanddeliveryofgenuine
productsofsuchcompanies.Interestingly,manymedicinesstallsandpractitionerscarrybothfactory-produced
TCMproductsandrawingredientsofmedicinessothatdoctorsandpatientscanpreparemedicalpreparations.
355
researchintocounterfeitpharmaceuticalselsewhere(comparewith:Hornberger2010;
Hübschle2010-2011).462
TCMtradersandconsumersreferredtoarhinohornpillproducedinChina,whichsupposedly
containspowderedrhinohorn.Vietnameseshopkeepersandstallholdersrevealedthatthe
rhinohornpillscontainednotonlyrhinohornbutalsogoldandotherherbalingredients.One
dealerexplainedtheuseofthepillasfollows:
“Itisrecommendtodrinkthreepillsaday.Itisverygoodforpeoplehavingadisease
likestroke,highbloodpressure,andithelpswithhangovers.Whensomeonegets
drunk,youtakeapill,thenextmorningyouwillfeelcompletelynormal.”
UponcloserinspectionofthepillsonsaleinthebackchamberofaTCMwholesaler,the
Mandarindosageformindicatedwaterbuffalohornasthemainactiveingredient.When
askedaboutthis,theshopkeeperexplainedthattheform“lied”toconcealthereal
ingredientsbecauseitwasforbiddentosellrhinohorn(Interview,2013).463Sheandother
TCMdealersexpressednoreservationsorscruplesasregardsthesaleofanillegalcommodity
(rhinohorn)orafakesubstitute(waterbuffalopills).Thepriceofthepillsrangedbetween
250000to700000VietnameseDong(8.90€to24.80€),whichinitselfwasanindicationthat
theratherlargepills(2cmindiameter)wrappedinintricatelycarvedwoodenboxesmight
containnorealrhinohorn.Thedealerexplainedthatthepricerangewaslinkedtothe
amountofrhinohorncontainedinsideindividualpills.Itisdoubtfulthatanyregistered
pharmaceuticalcompanywouldproduceillegalmedicinesinthecurrentregulatory
462
Whilehealthpractitionersandpatientssupportedfactory-producedmedicinesinsouthernAfrica,theprice
wasasignificantconsiderationinchoosingmedicines.Thisisparticularlypertinentinlightofthenotionof
intellectualpropertyrightsindebatesgoverningtheuseoforiginalversusgenericmedicinesandthehigh
incidenceofcounterfeitmedicineswithunknownhealthimpacts(Hübschle2010-2011).
463
Researchintocounterfeitpharmaceuticals(UNODC2009;UNODC2010)hasshownthatitisveryhardto
distinguishthepackagingoforiginalsandcounterfeitmedicines.Somepharmaceuticalcorporationshave
introducedbarcodestoprotectconsumersagainstthepurchaseofcounterfeitmedication.Theconsumer
verifiestheauthenticityofthepillsbycheckingthecodeviatextmessageorthroughabarcodescannerontheir
mobilephone(WorldHealthOrganisation/InternationalMedicalProductsAnti–CounterfeitingTaskforce2012).I
triedtoestablishwhethercounterfeitrhinopillswereaproblemandwhatrecourseconsumershadshouldthey
buy‘fake’pills.Thestated“true”ingredientsofthepillswereofnoconsequencetosellersandconsumers.This
findingappearstosupportdatathathornconsumptionandpossessionincreasinglyfulfilsstatusupliftingrather
thanhealthfunctions.
356
environmentunlessitwerestate–sanctioned.Waterbuffalowasthelikelymainactive
ingredientinthepills.
OneChinesepharmaceuticalcompanyhashoweverbeenontheradarofconservatorsand
journalistsalike(Beech/Perry2011;Cota-Larson2013;Nowell2012a)duetoitsprofessed
objectiveofproducingpillsfromrhinohornshavings.In2006,theLongHuiPharmaceutical
Companyannouncedplanstofarmrhinoswiththeobjectiveof“rhinopropagationand
scientificresearch”(LongHuiCorporation2006:1).The“Shavingaliverhinohorntechnology
andrhinohornpharmacologicalstudy”wouldseehornshavedoffliveanimalsbymeansof
“self–suctionlivingrhinoceroshornscrapingtool”formedicinalpurposes(LongHui
Corporation2006:4;Beech/Perry2011).Thebusinessplan(translationbytheRhinoResource
Centre:LongHuiCorporation2006)stated:
“RhinohornisveryimportantintraditionalChinesemedicinefieldduetoitsfollowing
effects:detoxificationandanti-cancer,eliminatingpathogenicheatfromtheblood,
removingeczema.RhinohornresourceisrarebecauserhinoareprotectedbyWorld
Organizationandnobodyshallcatchandkillthemordotradeactivitiesonrhinohorns.
Chinesegovernmentencouragespeopletodevelopnewsubstituteforit,butno
substantialprogresshasbeenmade.Therefore,rhinohornmarketdemandwillbe
great.”
Thecompanyproposedtheproductionofseveraltypesofpillsandtonicscontainingrhino
horn.Thebusinessplanhasbeentakenoffthecompany’swebsiteintheinterimasitclashes
bothwithCITESrulesandChinesedomesticlaws,whichbananyuseofrhinohornunlessits
purposeistoresearchviablesubstitutesforuseinmedicines(ThePeople'sRepublicofChina
1993).ATimeMagazineexposésuggeststhatLonghuiisasubsidiaryoflargeweapons
manufacturer–theHawkgroup–withstronglinkstothehighestechelonsofthepolitical
eliteinChina(Beech/Perry2011).EnvironmentalactivistsclaimthatLonghuihasestablished
tworhinofarmsinChinastocked“withdozensofrhinosimportedfromSouthAfrica”(Welz
2012).ParliamentaryrecordsconfirmthatatleastfourSouthAfricanwhiterhinoswere
exportedtoaLonghui“breedingfacility”in2010(Molewa2012b)andofficially,afurther68
whiterhinoswereexportedtoChinaintheperiod2007toearly2012(Molewa2012b).464It
464
ChinaandSouthAfrica’sofficialimportandexportnumbersofliverhinosdonotcorrespond(alsocompare
withChapter4),whichledtoabriefmoratoriumonthesaleofliveanimals.AccordingtoCITESdata,South
357
remainsunclearwhetheranyhornharvestinghastakenoristakingplaceatanyChinese
breedingfacilities(Milliken/Emslie/Talukdar2009:7).465Chinesestateofficialsvehemently
denyanyextracurricularactivitiesinvolvingthedehorningorshavingofimportedrhinosat
theCITESCoP15inQatar(Beech/Perry2011).Conservatorshavehoweverqueriedthehigh
numberofAfricanwhiterhinosexportedtoChinaforthepurposeofrangeexpansionwhen
theregionisclimaticallydifferentfromthewhiterhino’snaturalhabitat(Cota-Larson2013).
8.6Fakehornproductionandqualitycontrolatthesource
Accordingtolawenforcementofficialsandcriminalactors(InterviewsinMozambiqueand
SouthAfrica,2013),thereis“willingseller,willingbuyer”foreveryrhinohorninsouthern
Africa;inotherwords,horn‘producers’donothavetosearchforbuyersasthehornispreorderedanddemandoutstripssupply.Theonlyhorn“floatingaround”is“aguylookingfora
buyerwithafalsehorn”(Interviewwithlawenforcer4,2013).Greedyindividualshopingto
“makeaquickbuck”havefallenvictimtofakehorndealers.AsisthecaseinAsia,cheated
individualshavenorecoursetothelawastheyweredabblingonthewrongsideofthelaw.A
biodiversityinvestigatorwithasleighofSchadenfreudesaid(Interview,2013):
“Wehavegotguysherethatwentandgotbankoverdraftstobuyrhinohornand
whentheygotit.Itwasfalsehornandtheyarestillpayingofftheirbankoverdrafts.”
Hornbuyersandintermediariesfulfilasimilarroleatthesource.LiketheirAsian
counterparts,theyuseagooddoseofcommonsenseandthemantra“ifyouareAfrican,you
willknow”(Interviewwithconvictedpoacher16,2013).Atransporterexplains(Interviewwith
intermediary2,2013):
“Rhinohornisverytoughmaterial,evenhowmuchyoutrytocrushitdown,you
cannotcrushit.Evenhowmuchyoutrytohititonthefloororonarock,youcannot
Africaexported193rhinosbetween2006and2009whilerecipientcountriesreportedtheimportof235rhinos
(Milliken/Emslie/Talukdar2009:7)
465
Aresearchinformantvisitedastate-runbreedingfacilityin2013.Thedelegationwasreportedlyshown
healthyrhinosbutnoneoftheirprogeny.Therewerenosignsofhornharvesting;itwouldappearunlikelythat
foreignvisitorswouldbegivenprivilegedaccesshoweverpositivelyinclinedtheymightbetowardsthefarming
orharvestingofrhinos.
358
crushit.Butwithfakehorn,itbreaks.Hornmaterialiseasytoidentify.Forme,Igrew
upintheruralareasandIalmostknowallkindsofhorns.Gamehorns,domestic
animalhorns,horns–IknowanumberofthemsoIcaneasilyidentifythem:thisone
isahorn,thisoneisarock…Thearticle,howmuchyoucangetforit…”
ThequalityoffakehornvariesfromintricatelycutwoodenhornreplicastoErsatzhornmade
outofresin.African-basedscammershavetodealwiththefamiliarityofbuyersand
smugglerswithhorn,finerdetailssuchasthesmelloffreshly-harvestedhorn(withallthe
bloodandgore)havetobeconsideredintheproductionprocess.Aconvictedhornsmuggler
relatedasfollows(Interview,2013):
“Theyputsomeotherbloodofwhatitsmellslikebecauseithasasmell.Very,very
badsmell.ThatsmellIknowit.Ifitisanothersmell,Iknowit'snottherealone.You
knowthethingis,theyusedtoputshampooorColgate–ifyoumixit,ittakesaway
thesmell.Ifyoutaketheshampoo,youcan'tsmellit,noteventhedogs.466Sowhenit
comesforustotest,weuseahammer.Youmusthitit,almost3times.Veryhard.You
hititinthemiddle.Therealrhinohornwillneverbreak.Butifitisafakeone,itwill
break.”
Sophisticatedfraudstersalsodressupintheuniformsofactorswhowouldhavelegitimate
accesstorhinohorn;uniformsofKNPrangersandtherequisiterangerregalia,forexample,
carry“streetcred”467andpersuasivevaluebecausethecarrierofsuchauniformis
recognizedassomeoneworkingintheKNPwithdirectaccesstorhinohorn.Whilesome
rangersarecomplicitintheillegalsupplychain(comparewiththepreviouschapter),theyare
nottheprimaryscammers.Theseuniformsmaylandupinthehandsofscammersthrough
indirectfamily,communityorfriendshipnetworks.
Roguewildlifeprofessionalsandrhinoownerswhosellrhinohornillegallyfromstockpiles
onlytransactwithknownandtrustedpeers.Severalwildlife‘kingpins’andintermediaries
fulfiltheroleofqualitycontrol,transportationandotherfunctionslinkedtothisillegalmarket
exchange.Farmersandwildlifeprofessionalsaresociallyembeddedwithinasmall
homogeneouswealthygroupoflandownersthataretiedtogetherbyacommonpolitical
466
Shampooortoothpasteisusedtoconcealthesmellofrhinohornfromsnifferdogsspecificallyemployedto
searchforrhinohornandwildlifecontrabandontravellersorintheirbelongings.
467
Alsoknownas‘streetsmart’,‘streetcred’iscolloquialforacceptanceofsomeoneamongstyoungpeoplein
urbansettings.Italsoreferstoanactor’sabilitytointeractatstreetlevel.
359
outlook,cultureandtraditionandagooddoseofsurvivalinstinctinlightofpolitical
transformationandthechangingofthepoliticalguard,whichcarrieduncertaintyastothe
questionoflandownershipandrestitution.
8.7Cooperationbetween‘con-men’anddealers
Rhinohorn“con-men”468and‘real’horndealerstendtoco-existinharmony,mutually
benefitingfromeachother’sbusiness.AccordingtoaformerAsianintermediarycurrently
incarceratedinaSouthAfricanprison(Interview,2013),criminalactorsonbothendsofthe
supplychainwouldknowinglybuyhigh-qualityfakesfrom‘con-men’.Criminalactorsprocure
fakerhinohornfortwopurposes.Thefakehorn469iseitherusedasadecoytodistractlaw
enforcementofficialsfrombigconsignmentsof‘real’hornpassingthroughaportofentryor
entrepôt,ortoreplacerealhorntakenfromgovernmentstockpilesandpolicesafes(where
confiscatedhornfromcustomsinterdictionsandcriminalcasesisstored).Inthelattercase,
SouthAfricanlawenforcementorconservationofficialswouldswapthehornwithfakesand
sellittorhinohorntraffickers.Criminalactors(InterviewsinSouthAfricaandVietnam,2013)
confirmedthatlawenforcementofficialsalsolaunderedconfiscatedhornintoillegalmarkets
onthedemandsideofthemarket.Asobservedearlier,confiscatedhornfrominformal
marketsorTCMapothecariesseldomenterstheofficialchainofcustodyandthusofficials
wouldnotneedtoprovide‘Ersatz’horns.470
Theuseofdecoys,ontheotherhand,issimilartothe‘deadcowsforpiranhas’ployin
transnationaldrugtraffickingoperations.Alargenumberofdrugmulesareearmarkedto
serveas‘deadmeat’thrownto‘piranhas’(lawenforcementofficers)todiverttheirattention
468
“Con-men”isshortfor“confidencemen”,atricksterwhomanagestowinsomeone’strusttodeceivethem.
469
Criminalactorsmightalsoemployoneortwosmall‘real’hornstodistractlawenforcement.
470
Thehighincidenceofcorruptandillegalactivitiesoflawenforcementofficialspartiallyexplainswhyrhino
horninterdictionratesareparticularlylowincomparisontoactualrhinoskilledfortheirhorn.Thesectionon
smuggling(seeChapter7)providesfurtherdetailsonthesophisticationofhornsmugglingoperations.Itbears
mentioningthatanunknownnumberofillegallyharvestedrhinohornneverentersillegalsupplychains.Such
hornisstockpiledforitsrarityvalueandkeptasaninvestment.
360
fromdrugsmugglingprofessionals.471Rhinosmugglersusefakerhinohorntodistractlaw
enforcementofficials(Interviewwithsmugglingintermediaries;MozambiqueandSouth
Africa,2013).Itwouldappearcounterintuitiveforcriminalnetworksandtransportersto
sacrificerealrhinohornhoweversmallthequantitybecauseofitshighstreetvalueandthe
sophisticatedtransportmethodsemployedtoshiphornfromsupplytoconsumermarkets.
Vietnameseauthoritiesreportedseveralinterdictionsofcomparativelysmallquantitiesof
rhinohornrangingfrom0,55to0,95kgin2013(Interviewwithgovernmentofficial,Hanoi,
2013;dataprovidedbyCITESmanagementauthority,Vietnam),whichsuggeststhatthe
smugglerswere“rookie”rhinomules,472opportunistichornbuyersor“sacrificiallambs”.The
smugglingoffakerhinohornisregardedafarlessseriousoffencethansmugglingrealrhino
horninAsia.On-linesearchesandinterviewsidentifiedtwocasesoffakerhinohornreported
tolawenforcement:asuspectedsmugglerwasreleasedafterarhinohorninhispossession
turnedouttobefakeinChitwanNationalParkinIndia(HindustanTimes2013)andan
Indonesiancourtsentencedamanto18monthsinjailafterhesold70fakeSumatranrhino
horns(DeutschePresseAgentur2004).InSouthAfricaandneighbouringZimbabwe,the
smugglingorpossessionoffakerhinohornalsoobtainspenalties(Muleya2014;Hosken/SAPA
2012).
8.8Fakeantiquelibationcupsandthenotionof‘pre-Convention’rhinohorn
Anotherformofdeceptioninvolvestheconversionofreal‘raw’hornintofakeantique
libationcupsandotherornamentalcarvings.Theseobjetsd’artaresoughtafterartefactsin
Asianmarkets,theUSandamongstartcollectorsandconnoisseursofAsianantiquecarvings
(UnitedStatesDistrictCourt2013:2).473A2013courtcaseheardbytheUnitedStatesDistrict
471
Typicallythedrugsyndicatewouldtip-offlawenforcementaboutanexpecteddrugdelivery.Whilelaw
enforcementdealswiththetipoffandissufficientlydistracted,otherdrugcourierswithlargerquantitieswill
passthroughportsofentryundetected(Hübschle2008).
472
‘Rookie’isacolloquialtermusedforapersonthatisinexperienced,afirst-timeroramateur.
473
Libationcupshavebecomehighlyvaluedandcovetedartefactsoverthepastdecade,spurredon,amongst
otherreasons,bythehighpricesachievedatauctionsofrenownedinternationallyrecognizedauctionhouses
th
(seealsoChapter3).Astorythatachievedworldnotorietyinvolvedananonymouscollectorpickingupa17 centuryChineselibationcupfor$4(Australian$)ataSydneycharityshopandsellingitfor$75640through
Sotheby’sAustraliaafewmonthslater.TheChinese‘Ding’bowlsoldforUS$2.225atSotheby’sNewYork
361
CourtinthedistrictofJersey(UnitedStatesDistrictCourt2013)involvedtheownerofan
antiquebusinessinChina,ZhifeiLiwhohadprocuredandsmuggledrhinohornandobjets
d’artmadeoutofrhinohornandivoryfromtheUSthroughHongKongtoChina.Thecaseis
noteworthyasitillustratesfirstly,theglobalnatureofrhinohorntrafficking,andsecondly,
thesophisticationandinnovativetechniquesofthoseinvolvedintheprocurementand
smugglingofprocessedandrawrhinohornacrosstheworld.Liadmittedtosellingand
smuggling30rawrhinohornstofactoriesinChinawhererawrhinohornsarecarvedintofake
antiquesknownaszuojiu(Mandarinfor“tomakeold”).Theextraordinaryvaluationofrhino
hornwasevidentwhenthescrapsfromthecarvingprocessweresoldontheillegalmedicines
market(USDepartmentofJustice2013).Asringleaderofatransnationaltraffickingoperation,
LialsoreceivedandsoldartefactsmadeoutofrhinohornorivoryfromaccomplicesinEurope
andtheUS,andprocuredartobjectsonaninternetauctionwebsiteandthroughphone
bidding.LiwouldprovidephotosoftheartefactstoagroupofwealthyChinesenationals.If
theywereinterestedinpurchasingtheoffering,thentheywouldhavetomakeanadvance
payment(UnitedStatesDistrictCourt2013:8–9),suggestingthattheysharedthesamesocial
network.Accordingtothecourtpapers(UnitedStatesDistrictCourt2013:16),Lialsomade
claimsthat“hedidnotbuy“freshhorns”butonlyhornsthatwere50yearsold”,andthatno
CITESpermitswererequiredforpre-Conventionhorns.Bothclaimswerenottruebutpointto
anotherformofdeceptionandfraud,namelythesaleofpre-Conventionhorn.Thisployhas
beenusedtosmuggleandtraderhinohorn(andivory),ostensiblyattainedfromhunting
trophiesandartefactspre-datingCITES.
8.9Conclusion
Thischapterillustrateshowactorsbridgeseveralcoordinationproblems,ofimportancetothe
unhinderedflowofrhinohorn,namelythecoordinationproblemsofvalue,cooperationand
security.Inlightofthehighpriceofrhinohorn,itisnotsurprisingthatcriminal
entrepreneurs,aswellasactorsfromthelegalsector,haveseizedathrivingbusiness
auctioninMarch2013.Thesellerfoundthefamousbowlataneighbourhoodtagsalein2007.Unawareofthe
potentialvalue,thebowlwasboughtfor$3(Cockington2013).
362
opportunitythroughtheproductionoffakerhinohorn.Thehighincidenceoffakehornin
circulationposesaproblemtohornsuppliersandconsumersalike.Bothactorgroupshave
developedmechanismstoensurequalitycontrolandproofofprovenance.Intermediariesand
smugglersdonotonlyensurequalitycontrolbutalsothesecuretransferofprecioushorn
consignments.Thelevelofcooperationiscomplexaswellassophisticatedasitlinkssuppliers
toconsumers.Thoseconsumerswhocannotrelyontrust-worthyreferralsfromwithintheir
socialnetworks,hiretheservicesofhornassessors.Whatiscuriousaboutcertaintypesof
fakerhinohornisitshighstreetvalue,furtheraccentuatingthesacredvalueofrhinohornin
consumermarkets.Thefactthatconsumersarewillingtopaygoodmoneyforfakerhinohorn
reinforcesthatmanyconsumersappreciaterhinohornasastatussymbol.
363
Conclusion:Howcantherhinobebetterprotected?
“Idon’tbelievethatwecanstopthehuntingaslongastherearerhinos,thehunting
will continue. And as long as Chinese are still here, it’s impossible to stop (Interview
withpoacher,Massingir,2013).”
“Theonlythingthatcanstophuntingisifthegovernmentspeakstopeoplelikeme,
theexperiencedandthebigbossesbecauseweknowthebusiness,andwhogoesto
hunt where and when, we also know the buyers. We can help the government to
arrestallthosewhodorhinopoaching(Interviewwithkingpin3,Massingir,2013).”
“Idon’tthinkthatgivingrhinostofarmersandcommunitieswillbethesolution.The
demandistoobig.SayyoucuttwohornsfromyourrhinoandtheChinesehave
orderedfivehorns,soyouwillbeforcedtogoandhuntforthreemorehorns
(Interviewwithrhinokingpin1,2013).”
Whyhastherhinonotbeenbetterprotected?
Theleadingresearchquestionofthisdissertationaskedwhytherhinohasnotbeenbetter
protecteddespitethemyriadmeasuresemployedtodisruptthemarket.Atheoretical
frameworkgroundedinthesociologyofmarketswasusedtoexplainthestructureand
functioningoftheillegalmarketinrhinohorn.Itwasarguedthatasociologicalstudyof
valuation,competition,cooperationandsecurityintheillegalmarketforrhinohorncould
assistinunderstandingthereasonswhyitissodifficulttodisruptthevariousflowsofrhino
horn.Centraltotheanalysiswastheideaofahistoricallock-inandtheconceptof“contested
illegality”,alegitimizationmechanismemployedbyactorstojustifyillegaleconomicactionin
contraventionofthelawonthebooks,orusedtodefendtheexploitationoflegalor
regulatoryloopholes.Thefollowingsectionssummarizethefindings,endingwithan
assessmentoftherhino’slong-termchancesofsurvival.
Thesacredvalueofrhinohorn
CulturalbeliefsledtothesacralizationofrhinohorninAsiancommunities;however,the
animalitselfisnotimbuedwithsacredvalue.Thevaluationofrhinohorninconsumer
marketstendstotrumpconservationandanti–poachinginitiativesinplacesgeographicallyfar
364
removedfromtheconsumer.Thesanctityofancientbeliefsandsociallyacceptednormsnot
onlysupersedesrhinoconservationinitiativesbutalsointernationaltradebansanddomestic
rules.Thehistoryoftheculturaluseofrhinohornhighlightsthedifficultiesassociatedwith
attemptstoreversesocialnormsthataresupportedbyculturalbeliefsbutoutofsyncwith
modernregulations.Whilefewconsumersupholdthequasi-mythicalvaluationofrhinohorn
asmiraclecureforabouquetofailments,itstranscendentalandsacredvalueremains,and
explains,inadditiontotheincreasingrarityofthespeciesanditsuseasastatussymbol,the
highpriceofrhinohorn.Thehighpriceontheconsumermarkethasledtocomparativelyhigh
disbursementsforrhinohornonthesupplyside,facilitatingtheentryofnewhornproducers
(rhinopoachers).Thedissertationarguesfurthermorethattrophyhunterswerecrucialtothe
economicvaluationofrhinosonthesupplyside.Inthisinstance,rhinohornisappreciatedfor
itssymbolicvalue.Boththeeconomicandculturalvaluationhaveledtothehighdemandfor
rhinohorn,thusresolvingthecoordinationproblemofvalue.
Historicallock-in
Thedissertationshowedthatrhinoconservationandprotectionhavebeencloselylinkedto
coloniallandappropriation,subjugation,exploitationandlossofhuntingrightsoflocaland
indigenouscommunities.TheprivatizationoffarmlandandwildlifeinSouthAfricaheightened
thealienationandmarginalizationoflocalcommunitiesfurther,creatingahugeriftbetween
localpeopleontheonehand,andconservationareasandwildanimalsontheother.
Exacerbatedbythehighnumberofdeathsofpoachingsuspectsinparks,theprevalent
sentimentamongmanylocalsisoneofthewildanimalsgettingvaluedmorethanblacklives.
Thissentimentisalsoemployedasalegitimizationtool.Rhinohornisnotonlyhuntedforits
financialbutalsoforitssymbolicvalue.Thesymbolicvalueofrhinohornislinkedtothe
historicallock-inandsystematicdisenfranchisementoftheruralcommunitieslivingaround
protectedareas.Underpinningtheseconservationregimesarearchaicandelitistpreservation
andconservationparadigmsthatdiscountthepotentialforharmoniousrelationships
betweenlocalcommunitiesandwildlife.Inthemoderncontext,parksandgamereserves
continuetopresentmanifestationsofcolonialdispossessionandapartheidsegregation.
Conservationareasareseenassymbolsofeliteinterestsandwealth,inaccessibletothepoor
365
majority.Theseproblematicconservationapproachesandparadigmshaveledtoahistorical
lock-in,whereromanticandutopiannotionsof‘Africa’sWildEden’continuetoundermine
thesupportandbuy-infromlocalcommunitiesinwildlifeconservation.
Contestedillegality
Thenotionof‘contestedillegality’wasintroducedasalegitimationstrategyofimportant
actorswhojustifytheirparticipationinillegalorgrayflowsofrhinohornbasedonthe
perceivedillegitimacyoftherhinohornprohibition.Theprocessofillegalizationofthetrade
inrhinohorncommencedinthelate1970swhenthemultilateralenvironmentaltreatyCITES
enteredintoforce.Priortothat,economicexchangesinvolvingrhinohornwereeitherlegalor
undetermined.Thediffusionofthetradebanatthedomesticlevelinrange,transitand
consumercountrieshassucceededtovaryingdegrees.Thedissertationhighlightedimportant
actorssuchaspublicofficials,lawenforcementofficials,wildlifeprofessionals,local
communitiesandcriminalactorswhodonotacceptthelawonthebooksforavarietyof
reasonsincludingtheperceivedunfairnessoftheban,divergentsocialorculturalnormsthat
clashwiththeban,orforpolitico-historicalreasons.Contestedillegalityislinkedcloselytothe
coordinationproblemofvaluation.Forexample,consumerswhovaluerhinohornasasacred
goodareunperturbedaboutbreakingthelawwhenpurchasingrhinohorn.Inaddition,both
suppliersandconsumersdisplayasenseofentitlement.Theseactorsfeelthattheyhavea
righttousenaturalresources,whichthelawprohibits.Thereisthusacognitivedissonance
betweenthelawonthebooks,culturalpracticesandsocialnorms.Whileruralcommunities
continuetofeelthatthestateandothernon-stateactorsvaluerhinosmorethanthelivesof
blackpeople,poachingislikelytoobtainlimitednegativesanctionsandcontinueunabated.
Thenotionofcontestedillegalityalsofacilitatedthisresearchprojectgreatly.Actorswhodo
notbelieveinthelegitimacyofthetradebanhadnoqualmstosharetheirinsightsonillegal
economicaction.
366
Theinterfacebetweenlegalityandillegality
Oneofthekeyfindingswastheinvolvementofactorsfromthelegalsectorsuchaswildlife
professionalsandpublicofficialsintheillegalandgrayflowsofrhinohorn.Bolsteredby
sentimentsofcontestedillegality,suchactorshavenoqualmstoexploitorbypassregulatory
loopholes.Theseactorsbelongtoinfluentialandtransnationalsocialnetworkswithlinksto
politicalandeconomicelitesinsupply,transitandconsumercountries.Whileconventional
narrativespointtotheinvolvementoforganizedcrimeintransnationalrhinohornflows,this
labelisonlycorrectifwildlifeprofessionalsandstateofficialsaresubsumedunderit,andthe
dominantroleoflocalactorsisacknowledged(asopposedtotheotheringofforeigncriminals
–organizedcrimeasan‘alienconspiracytheory).Thedissertationshowedthatstateactors
facilitatedtheeconomicvaluationofrhinohornonthesupplysidebyprivatizingrhinos.The
internationalregulatoryprotectionregimeisriddledwithambiguitiessuchasallowingthe
trophyhuntingofrhinos,whichusuallyleadstoahuntingtrophy(astatussymbol)while
prohibitingothernotdissimilarusesofrhinohorn(suchasobjetsd’artorstatussymbols).The
juxtapositionofwhitetrophyhunter474versusblackpoacheriseyeopening.Whilewealthy
trophyhuntersareallowedtokillrhinosforafee(ostensiblyhuntingprofitsareemployedto
serveconservationobjectives),localswithnoeconomicresourcesarestigmatizedaspoachers
whentrespassingandhuntingwildanimalsonlandthatwasformerlytheirs.Theinterface
betweenlegalityandillegalitythusrelatestoagentsofthestatefacilitatingillegalflows,the
existenceoflegalandillegalmeansofhorn‘production’andlegitimateandillegitimateuses
ofrhinohorn,aswellasanarmsracebetweenstateactorsandtheircloseanti-poaching
associatesontheoneside,andpoachersandlocalcommunitieslivinginclosevicinityorin
parks,ontheother.Thisinterfacebetweenlegalityandillegalityhasledtoambiguityasto
whatislegalorillegal.Thegrayareahasledtoampleopportunitiestobypassformalrules,
aidingandabettingillegaleconomicaction.
474
Therearealsopoachinggroupsconsistingofwhitepoachers.Forexample,incidentsofso-called“chemical
poaching”involvedwildlifeveterinarians,gamecapturers,helicopterpilotsandprofessionalhunterswhouse
veterinarydrugstoanaesthetizerhinos.Theanimalisdehornedonceitissedated,andthehornissoldto
buyers.
367
Theresilienceofflows
Themetaphorofflowswasemployedtoshowtheadaptabilityandresilienceofflows.
However,thehistoricallock-increatedthroughtheimplementationofarchaicconservation
paradigms,theregulatorybackdropandtheresultantexpressionofcontestedillegalityhave
createdfavourableconditionsfortheillegalmarketinrhinohorntogrowandflourish.Rhino
poachingdidnotemergefromavacuum,factorssuchasthehistoricallock-in,thesacred
valueofrhinohornandcontestedillegalityfacilitatetheresilienceofrhinohornflowsand
undermineprotectivemeasures.Variouschaptersshowedhowactorsmanagedtoresolvethe
coordinationproblemsofvalue,cooperation,competitionandsecurity.Byresolvingthese
issues,actorscreatedabridgefromAfricansavannahstoAsianmarkets.Whileanalysesof
legalorformalmarketsfocusonthecoordinationproblemofvalue,cooperationand
competition,itisarguedherethatactorsinillegalmarketshavetodealwithanadditional
coordinationproblem,thatofsecurity.Althoughactorsinlegaltransnationalmarketsmay
likewiseinstitutesecurityprecautions,theneedtoexercisecautionandimplementasecurity
planismorepressinginillegalmarkets.Notonlyisthesecurityofillegalmarketparticipants
atstakebutalsothecontinuityofthesupplychain.Especiallyincaseswherehigh-value
contrabandsuchasrhinohornistransported,actorsneedtoensurethatthegoodisnot
interceptedenroutetothemarket.Usually,thesafestandmostexpedientmethodinvolves
facilitationand/ortransportofrhinohornbyuntouchableagentsofthestate,including
diplomatsandlawenforcementofficials.Beckert’stheoryofsocialorderinlegalmarkets
stressesthatactorswanttocreate“stableworlds”byresolvingthecoordinationproblemsof
value,cooperationandcompetition(Beckert2009).Itisarguedherethatactorsinillegal
marketsthriveonchaosandunpredictability.Whiletheyreduceuncertaintybyaddressing
securityconcerns,collaborators,flowsandrouteschangefrequently.Itstandstoarguethat
illegalmarketsthriveinastateofdisorganizedcrimeororganizedchaos.Manyoftheillegal
activitiesdescribedinthisdissertationflourishbecauseillegalmarketactorsareadaptable
andresilient,andnothamstrungbybureaucraticrulesofengagementthatslowdownlaw
enforcementresponses.
368
Thestructureofthemarket
Thedissertationhasfocusedonlegal,grayandillegalflowsofrhinohornwhilealso
presentinganoverviewoftheproductionandfunctionoffakeandErsatzrhinohorninthe
overallmarketforrhinohorn.Theseflowswerepresentedasdistinctentitiesforthepurposes
ofanalyticalclarity.However,thesefourflowsareinterconnectedandformacomposite
whole.Inessence,themarketinrhinohornisconstitutedofhybridcomplexflowsthat
involverecurringactorswhoholdsocialcapital.Thedissertationstressedtheroleof
intermediarieswhoplaytheroleofconnectingproducerstoconsumers.Intermediarieshave
accesstotransnationalsocialandcriminalnetworksandknowledgeofthe‘product’and
regulatoryloopholes.WhileAsiannationalswereofteninvolvedintransnationaltransport
facilitation,localintermediariessuchasthepoachingkingpinsandwildlifeprofessionals
providethemostcrucialbridgebetweenAfricaandAsia.Whilehornproducersaremostly
closedhomogeneousgroups,theselocalintermediariesareworldly,connectedandproneto
takingcalculatedrisksthatopennewopportunitiesandbusinessventures.Asmentionedin
theearliersectionontheinterfacebetweenlegalityandillegality,thedissertationcautiously
appliestheideaoftheinvolvementoforganizedcrimeduetoitstraditionalassociationwith
foreignmafia-typegroups.Itstandstoarguethatbothlegalandcriminalactorsconstitute
organizedrhinocrime.ItisacknowledgedthatseveralpipelinesoutofAfricainvolve
professionalsmugglerswhohaveexpertknowledgeofsmugglingbothlegalgoodsand
contrabandalongtransnationalflows.Pivotaltounderstandingthearchitectureofrhinohorn
flowsisanuancedawarenessofhowtheeconomicvaluationofrhinosbywayofprivatizing
ownershiprights(theconversionofapublicgoodtoprivateownership),thecolonialhistory
oflandappropriationandconversionofindigenously-ownedlandintoconservationareashas
openedtheproverbialcanofwormsintheSouthAfricancase.
Theoreticalcontribution
ThedissertationcontributestoBeckert’stheoryofcoordinationproblemsbyintroducingthe
coordinationproblemofsecurity,whichisofrelevancetoactorsintransnationalandillegal
markets.Whilevariousscholarshavewrittenaboutthenotionofcontestedillegality,itis
369
introducedasamechanismemployedtolegitimizeillegalandgrayeconomicaction.Whileit
isdifficulttogeneralizefromonecasestudy,theillegalmarketinrhinohornappearsto
presentanidealtype.Structuralconditionstiedtothehistoricallock-in,contestedillegality,
theparticipationofactorsfromthestateandlegalsector,andtheinterfacebetweenlegality
andillegalitycreatetheperfectenvironmentfortheillegalmarkettoflourish.
Partingwords
Inconclusion,thetitleofthisdissertationisborrowedfromapopularTVseriesthat
dramatizesconflictbetweenrulingroyalelitesinamedievalphantasyepic.Sinceembarking
onthejourneyofresearchingrhinos,Ihavebeenamazedbytheemotions,conflictandmoral
panicthismajesticcreatureinspiresamongstaratherdiversegroupofpeople.OnceIwasin
thethickoftheresearch,itfeltlikeIwasobservingadramaunfoldinginfrontofmyeyes:
Tuggedawayintheirfortresseskings,queens,scribes,advisorsandcompanionswerepitted
againstconquerors,reformersandthepeople–allsurvivinginaratheruncertain
environment.Thedissertationtouchedbrieflyontheroleoftheinternationalcommunity,
conservationNGOsandprivateindividualswhoarefundraisingtosavetherhino.Thesefunds
seldomreachtheplaceswheretheycouldachievetangibleresultsthataffectchangesonthe
ground.Insteadofdedicatingmoniestothemilitarizationofanti-poachingmeasuresor
payinginflatedsalariestoNGOstaff,thestate,theconservationcommunityandinternational
donorsshouldsupportinitiativesthataffectpositivechangesforlocalcommunitiesliving
closetoparks.Consultationshouldbedoneinabottom-upfashionsothatthevoicesof
marginalizedpeoplearefinallyheard.Localcommunitiesneedtobegivenagencytocodeterminetheirlivelihoods,theoutlookforconservationareasandthewildanimals
containedwithinthem.Onlyoncegainsfromwildlifeandparksenhancethewell-beingof
localcommunities,liveanimalsandparkswillbeattributedwithvalue(beitintrinsicor
instrumental),andrhinoswillhaveafightingchance.Unfortunately,thisdissertationtopic
doesnotexamineagameoradramaseries;itdealswiththereal-lifeissueofthepossible
extinctionofawildanimal.Unlesswechangecourse,therhinoandothercreatureswillbe
relegatedtonaturalhistorybooks.
370
AppendixA:Researchsitesandmaps
Thefollowingplaceswerevisitedduringthecourseofthisresearchproject:
• KwaZulu–Natal(KZN):Thesouth-easternprovinceofKwaZulu–Natalishometothe
portcityofDurban,severalnationalparksincludingHluhluwe–iMfolozi,Mkuze,
iSimangalisoWetlands,ThembeElephantParkandtheprivategamereservePhinda,
allofwhichwerevisited.
•
LimpopoProvince:ThenorthernprovinceofSouthAfricasharesborderswith
Zimbabwe,BotswanaandMozambique.Manyprivategamereservesandfarmsare
locatedinthisprovince,whichisalsohometoaportionoftheKrugerNationalPark
andtheUNESCO–recognizedWaterbergBiosphereReserve.
Map2:MapofSouthAfrica
Source:http://www.safaribookings.com/parks/south-africa(accessed2July2014)
•
MpumalangaProvince:TheeasternprovinceofSouthAfricabordersSwazilandand
MozambiqueandholdsthesouthernsectionsoftheKrugerNationalPark.Thecapital
371
cityMombela,formerlyknownasNelspruit,andthetownofWhiteRiverwere
importantpit–stops.
•
Gauteng:Johannesburg,SouthAfrica’sbusinesscentreandtheadministrativecapital
ofSouthAfrica,Pretoria,arebothlocatedintheGautengProvince.National
departments(ministerialoffices),lawenforcementagencies,thenational
prosecutorialauthority(NPA),NGOsandprofessionalassociationsarealsohousedin
thisprovince.
Map3:MapoftheKrugerNationalPark,LimpopoNationalParkandMassingir
Source:MapprovidedbyBrianSandberg
475
•
KrugerNationalPark(KNP):TwotripsweremadetoSouthAfrica’sflagshipsafaripark,
theKrugerNationalParkwheremostoftheworld’sremainingrhinosliveandare
poached.AttheinvitationoftheUniversityofPretoria,ajointpresentation(witha
475
Adetailedmapisalsoaccessibleat:https://goo.gl/maps/um6ky(mycreation)
372
formercolleague)onresearchingsensitivesubjectswasgivenattheOneHealth
Conferenceduringthefirstmonthoffieldwork.Theconferenceandsubsequent
networkingopenedmanydoorstoengagewiththeconservationcommunity,KNPand
Mozambique.Uponreceiptoftheresearchpermission,afurther3weeksofintense
fieldworkwereundertakeninthePark.
•
Mozambique:Manyrhinopoacherseitheroriginateorcommencetheircross-border
huntingexpeditionsfromsmallvillagessituatedincloseproximitytotheMozambican
borderwiththeKrugerNationalPark.ThebiggestvillageofMassingirwasvisited
twice,andseveralsmallervillageswerealsofrequented.Ialsospenttimeinthe
LimpopoNationalPark,Chokwe,BeleneandthecapitalcityofMaputo.
•
Swaziland:UponcompletingfieldworkintheKrugerNationalPark,aroadtripwas
takenthroughSwazilandenroutebacktoCapeTown.Thecountry’sGameActisboth
laudedasanexemplarypieceoflegislationbecausepoachingcarriesaminimumjail
sentenceoffiveyears(Ramsay2014)andcontestedasdraconian
(Werksman/Cameron/Roderick2014:193).
•
Namibia:NamibiaisoneofthefourmajorrhinorangestatesinAfrica
(Duffy/Emslie/Knight2013b).Thecountry’scommunalwildlifeconservancieshave
becomeamodelforcommunity-basedconservationandsustainablelivelihoods.
Historically,elephantsandrhinoswerehuntedandtradedbytheSouthAfrican
DefenceForceanditsaffiliatesduringthebushwarsinnorthernNamibiaand
southernAngola(Reeve/Ellis1995).Atthetimeoffieldwork,nopoachingincidents
hadoccurredinrecenthistoryandthequestionarose,whyNamibiawasspared.Since
then,poachingnumbershavesoaredandtheoriesthatitwasamatteroftimefor
rhinopoachingtosweepacrossSouthAfrica’snorthernbordershaveindeed
materialized(Duffy/Emslie/Knight2013b:6).
•
HongKong:SeveralconsignmentsofsmuggledrhinohornfromSouthAfrica(together
withotherwildlifeproducts)wereinterdictedinHongKong.Thecitywhere‘east
meetswest’offersmanyfascinatingavenuesfortheinvestigationofculturalmeanings
ofwildlifeconsumption,theuseofanimalproductsinTraditionalChineseMedicine
(TCM)andenforcementefforts.TheRegionalOfficeofTRAFFICandWWF-HongKong
hostedme.Thisofferedafootinthedoor,asdidtheinvitationtoprovideaseminar
onmyprojectatthePolicingStudiesForumoftheUniversityofHongKong.
373
Map4:MapofSoutheastAsia
Source:http://webspace.webring.com/people/mj/james_shum/sin-hkg/(accessedon4July2014)
•
Vietnam:Accordingtotheliterature(Gwin2012;Milliken/Shaw2012;Rademeyer
2012;Nellemannetal.2014;Gosling/Reitano/Shaw2014;IpsosMarketing2013)rhino
hornisdestinedforbothVietnameseandChinesemarkets.Duetotimeandlanguage
constraintsandtheinnatelimitationsofPh.D.research,Ichosetoundertakeresearch
ofthemarketstructuresandconsumerpreferencesinVietnam.WhileIwasnotable
todofieldworkinChina,IwasabletointerviewChineserespondentsandexpertson
wildlifetradeinChinainSouthAfrica,HongKongandon–line.Ihadidentifiedkey
informantsaheadofthefieldtriptoVietnamandemployedtheservicesoftwo
interpretersinthemajorurbancentresofHoChiMinhCityandHanoi.Severaltripsto
ruralareas,includingtheMekongDelta,wereundertaken.
•
Correctionalcentres(prisons)inSouthAfrica:Thefinalmonthoffieldworkentaileda
roadtriptocorrectionalcentresstrewnacrossfiveprovincesofSouthAfrica.30
inmatesconvictedforrhino-relatedoffenceswereinterviewedin15maximum-and
medium-securitycorrectionalcentres.476
476
TheDepartmentofCorrectionalServices(DCS)differentiatesbetweenminimum–,medium–andmaximum–
securityfacilities.Offenders(astheyarereferredtoinDCSparlance)aresenttothesecorrectionalcentres
374
AppendixB:Indemnityformforinterviewswithoffenders
TheresearchguideoftheDepartmentofCorrectionalServicesgavemetheformbelowwith
therequesttohaveallprisonresearchinformantssignitpriortoconductingtheinterview.
PARTICIPATION IN INTERVIEW
Indemnity form
I ………………………….………………………………………………………..…,
Registration number ………………. hereby declare that I am in custody at
…………..…………………………………. Center.
\
I hereby agree/do not agree to be interviewed by …………………………..
I do so entirely at my own will and I do not hold the Department of
Correctional Services or any of its members, responsible for anything that
might transpire from the interview.
I do not want any or expect any reward of any nature for partaking in the
interview.
I certify that I make this statement out of my own free will and understands
the contents thereof.
SIGNED: ……………………………………
WITNESS: …………………………………
DATE: ……………………
WITNESS: …………………………………
dependingontheseriousnessoftheircrime,thelengthoftheirprisonsentenceandconductduringtheirprison
term.
375
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