VOLGEO-04278; No of Pages 13
ARTICLE IN PRESS
Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research xxx (2009) xxx–xxx
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Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research
j o u r n a l h o m e p a g e : w w w. e l s e v i e r. c o m / l o c a t e / j v o l g e o r e s
Improving communication during volcanic crises on small, vulnerable islands
W.J. McGuire a,⁎, M.C. Solana a,b, C.R.J Kilburn a, D. Sanderson c
a
b
c
Aon Benfield UCL Hazard Research Centre, Department of Earth Sciences, University College London, Gower Street, London WC1E 6B, UK
School of Earth and Environmental Sciences, Burnaby Building, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth PO1 3QL, UK
Centre for Development and Emergency Practice (CENDEP), Oxford Brookes University, Gipsy Lane, Oxford OX3 0BP, UK
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Article history:
Received 6 February 2009
Accepted 23 February 2009
Available online xxxx
Keywords:
communication
volcanic crises
vulnerability
volcanic islands
a b s t r a c t
Increased exposure to volcanic hazard, particularly at vulnerable small islands, is driving an urgent and
growing need for improved communication between monitoring scientists, emergency managers and the
media, in advance of and during volcanic crises. Information gathering exercises undertaken on volcanic
islands (Guadeloupe, St. Vincent and Montserrat) in the Lesser Antilles (eastern Caribbean), which have
recently experienced – or are currently experiencing – volcanic action, have provided the basis for the
compilation and publication of a handbook on Communication During Volcanic Emergencies, aimed at the
principal stakeholder groups. The findings of the on-island surveys point up the critical importance of (1)
bringing together monitoring scientists, emergency managers, and representatives of the media, well in
advance of a volcanic crisis, and (2), ensuring that procedures and protocols are in place that will allow, as far
as possible, effective and seamless cooperation and coordination when and if a crisis situation develops.
Communication During Volcanic Emergencies is designed to promote and encourage both of these priorities
through providing the first source-book addressing working relationships and inter-linkages between the
stakeholder groups, and providing examples of good and bad practice. While targeting the volcanic islands of
the eastern Caribbean, the source-book and its content are largely generic, and the advice and guidelines
contained therein have equal validity in respect of improving communication before and during crises at any
volcano, and have application to the communication issue in respect of a range of other geophysical hazards.
© 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
A critical problem facing the successful management of volcanic
crises arises from difficulties faced in translating expert information
from monitoring scientists into appropriate and timely action. The
development of an effective warning system depends, to a high
degree, on avoiding misunderstanding and confusion in the messages
relayed between monitoring scientists, providing the raw data, and
those groups responsible for management of the crisis and disseminating warnings to communities at risk, namely the emergency
managers and the media. The UN (1995) recognises that a hazard
early warning system comprises three elements: (i) the detection of
the hazard and assessment of the risk it presents (by the monitoring
scientists), (ii) communication of hazard and risk information to those
responsible for crisis management (e.g. emergency managers,
politicians, government agencies), and (iii) conveyance of warnings
to those likely to be affected (the public).
For a few hundred of the world's c. 1500 (Simkin and Siebert, 1994)
active volcanoes, the first element is reasonably well developed (e.g.
WOVO, 2005), the remaining two, however, are often inadequate, or
effectively absent. For many, if not most, potentially-active volcanoes,
communication between scientists, emergency managers and the
⁎ Corresponding author. Tel.: +44 20 7679 3449; fax: +44 20 7679 2390.
E-mail address: [email protected] (W.J. McGuire).
media, and between these groups and the public, is rudimentary at
best, and exemplified by the situation that prevailed on the Caribbean
island of Montserrat, prior to the start of the continuing crisis brought
about by the eruption of the Soufriere Hills volcano in 1995 (Fig. 1)
(e.g. Druitt and Kokelaar, 2002). Here, despite, the publication of a
report for the Government of Montserrat highlighting the potential
risks to the island, and to the capital, Plymouth, of a future eruption
(Wadge and Isaacs, 1987), and increased levels of seismicity beneath
the volcano in the early 1990s, there was no anticipation of a future
eruption and no action taken to put in place measures to handle such a
crisis (Sanderson, 1998; Clay et al., 1999). Most crucially, a new
‘disaster action plan’ prepared just two years before the start of the
eruption in 1995, in response to the impact of Hurricane Hugo on the
island in 1989, failed to acknowledge that a volcanic threat existed
(Clay et al., 1999). Even once the eruption had begun, both the
Government of Montserrat and the UK Government proved themselves to be unprepared for the communication and public information roles that managing the emergency required (Clay et al., 1999),
although this situation did progressively improve, from October 1995,
following the first explosive event, and again from August 1997, after
lives were lost (Clay et al., 1999).
In many ways, the Montserrat volcanic crisis is not typical, in that
its drawn-out nature provided a breathing space in which to develop
and improve communication between the main stakeholder groups.
Fresh magma did not breach the surface until four months after the
0377-0273/$ – see front matter © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.jvolgeores.2009.02.019
Please cite this article as: McGuire, W.J., et al., Improving communication during volcanic crises on small, vulnerable islands, Journal of
Volcanology and Geothermal Research (2009), doi:10.1016/j.jvolgeores.2009.02.019
ARTICLE IN PRESS
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Fig. 1. Pyroclastic flows from the Soufriere Hills volcano, Montserrat (Lesser Antilles) enter the sea on 17 September 1996, prior to the first explosive eruption later the same day.
Courtesy: Bill McGuire.
start of activity, while major pyroclastic flows associated with dome
collapse were not evident for another four months. Most volcanic
eruptions proceed at a far faster pace, however, with 30% of the c.
3200 eruptions recorded worldwide over within two weeks, and 53%
lasting less than two months (Simkin and Siebert, 1994). Consequently, at currently inactive volcanoes where there are no existing
communication systems, the chances of being able to put successfully
in place such systems, once activity has started, are slim. The most
lethal outcome of a serious failure of communication during a volcanic
crisis is exemplified by the 1985 Nevado del Ruiz disaster (Voight,
1989), which led to 23,000 deaths (Witham, 2005) – the worst
volcano-related disaster since 1902. Simkin et al. (2001) report a
significant rise in the number of fatal eruptions over the last seven
centuries, which they attribute to global population increase. With an
estimated 500 million people (Tilling and Lipman, 1993) or 9% of the
global population (Small and Naumann, 2001) at risk from volcanic
hazards, and with increasing urbanisation (Chester et al., 2001; Ewert
and Harpel, 2004), exposure and vulnerability – particularly in
developing countries – making the picture worse, a failure to address
communication problems, in respect of volcanic crises, is certain to
lead to the loss of many more lives.
The communication issue is particularly pertinent to volcanic
crises on small islands, where most, if not all, of the population may
live within range of potentially lethal hazards, and where the only
‘safe-zone’ may be off island. In such circumstances, organised, rapid,
evacuation may be the only response to elevated activity, but is likely
to be hindered by limited or inadequate air and sea transport links,
and by the population's reluctance to leave the island as opposed to
simply their homes. Furthermore, the cost of off-island evacuation
may prove prohibitively large, with the result that the government
may take a calculated risk to keep its citizens on the island and ‘hope
for the best’ – a recipe for potential catastrophe. Other concerns that
may act against evacuation include the length of time that the
population will remain off-island, and a fear that many citizens will
never return. In the case of Montserrat, for example, thousands of
citizens have not returned following the evacuation and resettlement
of around two-thirds of the population (Clay et al., 1999) between
1995 and 1997. Even if off-island evacuation is not felt to be necessary,
it is likely that a significant portion of the population will require
evacuation from the vicinity of the volcano to more remote zones of
relative safety. This will be accomplished far more speedily and
effectively if a communication system has been in place prior to signs
of volcanic unrest, so that the local population is educated with
respect to the threat, essential protocols and procedures are known
and understood, and the responsibilities of the main stakeholders
(those individuals, groups and organisations likely to be involved or
impinged upon) are thoroughly ingrained. Given the rapidity with
which unrest may escalate to full eruption, the absence of such a
system may leave insufficient time to develop one, with potentially
lethal consequences.
The small sizes of the island volcanoes of the eastern Caribbean,
combined with the high level of activity, make them especially
vulnerable. Between 1600 and 1899, volcanic activity is estimated
(Blong, 1984) to have taken 186,617 lives, while during the 20th
century, Witham (2005) has determined a best-estimate death toll
total of 91,724. Of the latter figure, fully a third resulted from explosive
eruptions on small Caribbean islands – c. 29,000 during the 1902
eruption of Mont Pelée (Martinique), and 1565 at the Soufriere (St
Vincent), just a few hours earlier on the same day in May 1902. In
addition, the 1976 volcanic crisis on Soufriėre (Guadeloupe) resulted
in the temporary evacuation of 73,500 citizens, while most recently,
the continuing activity at the Soufriere Hills volcano (Montserrat)
took 19 lives in 1997, and led to the long-term displacement of c. 7500
of the islands ~ 12,000 inhabitants. The Lesser Antilles volcanic arc
hosts 21 volcanoes that show more or less convincing evidence of
activity during the Holocene (Fig. 2) (Lindsay et al., 2005), and seven
of which have been active in historic times (post-early 16th century).
Discounting the submarine volcano, Kick 'em Jenny, nine eruptions or
episodes of minor activity occurred at five volcanoes during the 20th
century (Table 1), giving a time-averaged return period of a little over
11 years.
2. Background
In light of the worryingly short return period for volcanic activity in
the Lesser Antilles, and with failures of communication in the early
stages of the Montserrat crisis all too apparent (Sanderson, 1998; Clay
et al., 1999), a proposal was submitted to the UK Government's
Department for International Development (DFID), with the aim of
improving the effective management of forecasting and warning
information for small islands vulnerable to volcanic crises. The main
objective was the development of a single, integrated, handbook on
communication during volcanic emergencies, based upon lessons
learnt from recent and continuing volcanic crises in the region. The
Please cite this article as: McGuire, W.J., et al., Improving communication during volcanic crises on small, vulnerable islands, Journal of
Volcanology and Geothermal Research (2009), doi:10.1016/j.jvolgeores.2009.02.019
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Fig. 2. Active volcanoes of the Lesser Antilles volcanic arc (eastern Caribbean), showing the locations of the volcanic islands of St Vincent, Guadeloupe and Montserrat.
proposed handbook would focus, in particular, on communication
between the monitoring scientists, the emergency authorities and the
media, both prior to and during volcanic crises, and would be
designed as a user-friendly tool for use by all three stakeholder groups.
DFID agreed funding and the project started in August 1999, with the
Table 1
Volcanic activity in the Lesser Antilles during the 20th century. Data from Simkin and
Siebert 1994 and Lindsay et al., 2005. Economic cost estimates from the University of the
West Indies, Seismic Research Centre http://www.uwiseismic.com/General.aspx?
id=19.
Volcano
Year of
Nature of
eruption or
start of
activity
eruption
or activity
1997
Valley of
Desolation
(Dominica)
Soufriére
1956
(Guadeloupe)
1976
Pelée
1902
(Martinique)
1929
Soufriere Hills
(Montserrat)
Soufriere
(St. Vincent)
1995
1902
1971
1979
Volcano
Economic
Deaths
(Witham, Explosivity cost
2005)
Index (VEI) (million
US$)
Phreatic
0
?
Phreatic
0
1
0
29,000
2
4
0
3
19
4
N500
1565
4
200
0
0
0
3
100
Phreatic; lahars
Dome-forming
and explosive;
pyroclastic flows;
lahars
Dome-forming
and explosive;
pyroclastic flows;
lahars
Dome-forming;
pyroclastic flows
Explosive
magmatic;
pyroclastic flows
Dome-forming
Dome-forming
and
phreatomagmatic
1000
1000
handbook completed and available in February 2003. The study
focused on the east Caribbean islands of Guadeloupe (Fig. 3). St
Vincent (Fig. 4) and Montserrat, where memories of volcanic crises
were either still fresh (Guadeloupe 1976; St. Vincent 1971, 1979) or
where an emergency was still in place (Montserrat 1995–present).
Phase I of the study involved an information gathering exercise,
conducted through desk-top surveys, literature reviews and internet
searches, focusing on scientific, social and political aspects of volcanic
crises at the three islands. Key ‘informants’ were identified and
questionnaires drafted for elicitation purposes.
Phase II involved field work on the selected islands with the
purpose of eliciting responses from key players on their personal
experiences with respect to the strengths and weaknesses of
communication during past volcanic crises and on their suggestions
for improvements and modifications. Elicitation was undertaken
through a combination of meetings and semi-structured interviews,
with indicators in the following key areas being compared, contrasted
and evaluated: forecasting methods; warning messages; warning
dissemination; information flow; investment in forecasting and
warning; effectiveness of forecasting and warning; organisational
culture; coverage of forecast and warning (geography and population); legal background; public education; dissemination of lessons
learnt, and; performance targets. Key players from whom information
was elicited included staff at both the Guadeloupe and Montserrat
Volcano Observatories, representatives of the civil authorities (government, the police and the emergency agencies), NGOs, and the
media (press and broadcast), and members of the local population.
Analysis of elicited data made possible, for each island, identification of:
(1) The strengths and weaknesses endemic in existing communication strategies for volcanic emergencies.
(2) Lessons learnt and forgotten from previous crises.
(3) The current perception of the volcanic threat.
Please cite this article as: McGuire, W.J., et al., Improving communication during volcanic crises on small, vulnerable islands, Journal of
Volcanology and Geothermal Research (2009), doi:10.1016/j.jvolgeores.2009.02.019
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W.J. McGuire et al. / Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research xxx (2009) xxx–xxx
when and if a crisis situation develops. Phase III of the project,
involved compilation of its main output – the handbook, Communication during Volcanic Emergencies, designed to promote and encourage both of these priorities through providing the first sourcebook
addressing working relationships and inter-linkages between the
three, principal stakeholder groups, and providing examples of good
and bad practice. We do not view the handbook as a complete and
comprehensive solution to the communication issue; we do not argue
for it possessing any uniqueness in addressing risk communication in
respect of volcanic crises, and we appreciate that adopting the
recommendations contained therein is a matter of choice, both of
individuals and stakeholder groups. Based as it is, upon the feedback
of key players with a strong vested interest in improving communication during volcanic crises, we do, however, hope that the
handbook may prove helpful in tackling this difficult and important
problem.
Phase III of the study also involved extensive review of a draft
version, and the collection and analysis of feedback on content,
language, presentation and layout, as well as on strategies for the
dissemination, usage and further refinement of the handbook. In
collaboration with the Caribbean Disaster Emergency Response
Agency (CDERA), a draft version of the handbook was presented to
the key players on St. Vincent, Guadeloupe and Montserrat, to selected
players on other volcanic islands in the Lesser Antilles (St. Lucia and
Dominica), and on the non-volcanic island of Antigua, which is
exposed to volcanic activity on neighbouring Montserrat.
Phase IV focused on preparation and printing of the final version of
the handbook, and its dissemination. Copies have been produced as
required for distribution to project collaborators, key players on the
volcanic islands of the Lesser Antilles, and to appropriate organisations including PAHO (Pan American Health Organisation), IAVCEI
Fig. 3. Phreatic eruption at La Soufrière (Guadeloupe) in August 1976. Courtesy:
National Geophysical Data Centre, NOAA.
(4) Positive actions that have been shown to be effective on one
island and possibilities for exporting these to other islands.
(5) Specific complaints among key stakeholder groups about one
another, and possible solutions.
The key findings of the elicitation process can be summarised as
follows:
(1) Communication and protocols between emergency managers,
monitoring scientists and the media were generally not
adequately developed to maximise effective management of
future volcanic crises.
(2) Structural weaknesses in stakeholder organisations were
recognised to be just part of the problem.
(3) Low perception of the need to establish effective communications before the development of a crisis was recognised as a
more significant issue.
(4) The media, as a group, were perceived by both scientists and
emergency authorities as – to varying degrees – untrustworthy,
and reservations were expressed about its ability to behave
responsibly during a crisis situation.
(5) Lessons learned during volcanic emergencies as recently as
1976 and 1979 were rapidly forgotten or disregarded.
(6) Key players both recognised and welcomed the need for
improved communication between stakeholder groups and
indicated their enthusiasm for the development of an accessible and usable product that addressed this issue.
The findings point up the critical importance of (1) bringing
together emergency managers, monitoring scientists, and representatives of the media well before the onset of a volcanic crisis, and (2)
ensuring that procedures and protocols are in place that will allow, as
far as possible, effective and seamless collaboration and coordination
Fig. 4. A six kilometre eruption column at St Vincent's Soufriere volcano generated
during the 1979 volcanic crisis. Photo credit: F.C. Whitemore, USGS.
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(International Association for Volcanology & Chemistry of the Earth's
Interior), and WOVO (World Organisation of Volcano Observatories).
Professionally produced and packaged E-versions are available on CD,
and can be supplied at cost. The handbook is also available in html
online, and can be downloaded as a pdf from the Aon Benfield UCL
Hazard Research Centre website at:
http://www.abuhrc.org/research/volcanic-activity/Pages/project_view.aspx?project=7.
A Japanese version of the handbook, translated by Yasuhiro
Ishimine of Japan's National Research Institute for Earth Science and
Disaster Prevention, can be accessed online at:
http://www.bosai.go.jp/library/pub/pdf/caribbean.pdf.
The launch of a Spanish version is also planned for 2010.
emergency, however, it is important that monitoring scientists
express observations, findings and forecasts in plain language. A
trade-off is thus often needed between technical precision and general
accessibility. Qualitative, non-technical statements yield more positive reactions among non-scientists – although they must always be
based on sound technical analysis. During a crisis, it is important for
the scientific team to be clear, to be patient, and to learn from previous
mistakes. If a message is not understood, it should be repeated in
alternative terms, and as often as necessary, until its meaning has been
made clear.
3. Communication during volcanic emergencies
Confusion with terminology is one of the main reasons why nonscientists misunderstand a forecast. Three problems are especially
common:
Recommendations made in the handbook are consolidated and
presented in the following sections, with respect to the three main
stakeholder groups – the monitoring scientists, the emergency
managers, and the media. Each section incorporates advice on good
practice, on relations with the other stakeholder groups, and on a
range of specific, pertinent issues.
4. Monitoring scientists
Monitoring scientists are responsible for detecting those geophysical, geodetic and geochemical pre-cursors that might provide
warning of a coming eruption, for assessing the probable timing,
nature and course of activity, should an eruption be forthcoming, and
for providing information on the likely impact of such an eruption.
This input is fundamental in relation to determining how emergency
managers respond to a crisis situation as it emerges and develops, and
it constitutes the first stage in the information chain during a building
volcanic emergency. It is thus critical for monitoring scientists to
explain their observations, findings and forecasts in plain, unambiguous, language that can be understood by emergency managers, the
media and the local population. While scientists may feel tempted, or
may be pressured, to issue warnings directly to the public, it is vital
that they adhere to a remit that involves the straightforward provision
of information to those involved in the management of the
emergency. Any initiatives that sidestep or short-circuit this link in
the information chain may lead to a loss of credibility as impartial
advisors, and unwelcome involvement in the political process. If, on
any occasion, a representative of the monitoring team is required to
talk to the media, or to make statements or comments related to the
crisis, this should be with the full agreement of those involved in the
management of the crisis, who should have a dedicated science liaison
officer, whose role it is to work closely with the monitoring team.
During previous volcanic episodes in the Caribbean, states of crisis
have been worsened by misunderstanding of scientific advice and
apparent disagreement and conflict amongst the scientists themselves
(e.g. Fiske, 1984). This posed a particular problem during the 1976
crisis at Guadeloupe, when up to four independent scientific research
teams, were offering contrasting and conflicting advice to the civil
authorities (Chester, 1993). To avoid similar problems, an ethical
protocol has evolved within the volcanological community to
constrain the role and responsibility of scientists during a crisis
(IAVCEI Subcommittee for Crisis Protocols, 1999). Although details of
the protocol may have to be adjusted on a case-by-case basis, its key
features remain unchanged and underpin these guidelines.
4.1. Issuing forecasts
Most scientists spend their careers communicating with their
peers, and the use of specialised terminology and nomenclature
during discussions amongst themselves is natural. In times of volcanic
4.2. Understanding forecasts: problems that non-scientists face when
dealing with scientists
(1) The ability to distinguish between terms used in common
language that have a different meaning for scientists: especially
the difference between hazard (the probability of a natural
event occurring), risk (the probability of a loss caused by the
hazard) and danger (a situation that can cause damage, injury
and/or loss of life). It is important to explain and familiarise the
audience with these terms before an emergency arises.
(2) A limited public understanding of scientific jargon (e.g.,
technical terms for volcanic processes, such as “pyroclastic
flow”) and concepts such as probabilities in the forecasts.
(3) A false understanding of scientific jargon (e.g. Solana et al.,
2006). On Montserrat, for example, terms such as “pyroclastic
flow” soon entered the public vocabulary, giving the impression
that their significance had also been understood. Many times,
however, the terms had been learned through repetition by the
media, while the true nature and scale of the associated hazards
had not been appreciated. Indeed, a false familiarity with the
terms may even have lowered the public's perception of danger
by inducing an unrealistic sense of security.
It is therefore essential for monitoring scientists to explain key
technical terms at the start of an emergency (or, if possible,
beforehand) and to ensure that non-scientists have properly understood
the associated hazard implications. These requirements cannot be
understated – a misunderstood message may be more dangerous than
no message at all.
4.3. Conveying information effectively
With respect to conveying information effectively, most of the
elements that make up good practice seem both obvious and selfevident. Nevertheless, many have gone unheeded in previous volcanic
emergencies, both in the Caribbean and elsewhere, so need to be
highlighted. Messages should be short and simple, and if conveyed
verbally through the broadcast media or to the press, should be
presented slowly and clearly. If at all possible, the monitoring team
should dedicate an experienced individual to all interactions with the
media.
Only essential information should be imparted. Too much irrelevant scientific data are likely to confuse the audience and obfuscate
the basic message. For example; “Earthquakes tell us that…” is more
effective than “More than 530 VT earthquakes and near-continuous long
period tremors in the last 8 hours mean that …”. Jargon should only
be used where essential, and even then should be explained in simple
terms. As much as possible, pictures, drawings, graphics, and videofootage should be used to explain concepts, observations
and volcanic phenomena. New concepts are best introduced through
comparison with an exemplar that is likely to be more familiar
with the audience. In this respect, the weather forecast analogy is
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always a useful one to use when explaining uncertainties in eruption
forecasts. Units of measurement that are not in common public use
(e.g. Joules, Newtons or Bars) should be avoided, while all numbers,
percentages or proportions should be used carefully and sparingly,
and backed up by a more general statement. For example; “The
probability of Y happening is X %. This means that Y is very likely/unlikely
to occur.q Finally, it is vital to confirm that a message has been fully
comprehended. To make sure, repeat the message as often as
necessary, and in as many guises as possible, until such confirmation
is apparent.
Bad practice cannot only severely hinder effective communication,
it can also build bad feeling towards the monitoring scientists and
dangerously sour relationships between the scientists, the emergency
managers, the media and the local population. Practices that have
been shown to cause problems include:
(1) The cultivation of a superior attitude when dealing with groups
that are perceived, inevitably, to be less knowledgeable about
volcanoes.
(2) Condescension to emergency managers. This can rapidly result
in the breakdown of working relationships and the potentially
fatal collapse of communication and information flow.
(3) Adoption of an unnecessarily obtuse or evasive manner. This
promotes misunderstanding and leads to fears that something
is being hidden.
4.4. The transition from forecast to warning
The critical step of transforming a forecast (to advise how a
volcano may behave) into a public warning (to advise how a
vulnerable community should react) is the responsibility of the
authorities. As instigators of the forecast, however, the monitoring
scientists are inevitably involved in the transformation process, and
have an important role to play in support of the civil authorities. At the
height of the continuing activity at the Soufriere Hills volcano on
Montserrat, for example, the close link between scientists and
emergency managers raised public confidence and improved the
response of the population. Most importantly, however, the warnings
and instructions were issued by the civil authorities, with the
scientists acting only in an advisory capacity.
5. Monitoring scientists and the EMC
Scientists provide the information that guides the entire emergency response. This information is then presented to an emergency
management committee (EMC), or its equivalent, whose role is to
determine the appropriate emergency strategy. From the monitoring
scientists' perspective, the clear focus has to be the assessment of the
volcano's behaviour. The necessary, frequent, interaction with the
EMC can prove a serious distraction and may prove to be counterproductive. In order to minimise this potential problem, it is
recommended that a single scientist be given responsibility for
liaising with the EMC. Under ideal circumstances, this individual
should be part of the committee and work particularly closely with the
EMC's science liaison officer, should such a position have been
established. This arrangement will allow the core of the scientific team
to concentrate on monitoring the volcano.
To be most effective, it is imperative that protocols and procedures
designed to foster good communication and a strong working
relationship between scientists and emergency managers be in
place far in advance of a crisis developing. Prior to any sign of
activity, it should be decided which scientist will liaise with the EMC
or its equivalent. Responsibilities should be agreed with the civil
authorities, and the manner and format of information presentation
to the EMC should be clarified. Emergency managers should be
familiarised with possible eruption scenarios, and aid be offered in
designing basic plans that can be activated rapidly once a crisis starts
to develop. The scientists should work with the EMC to develop
hazard and risk maps and an appropriate system of alert levels, and
offer to take a pro-active role in helping to educate the local
population about the nature of the volcanic threat. This is likely to
include supplying individuals to talk at public meetings, to schools
and other institutions, and on radio and television. Expertise should
also be offered in relation to the preparation and dissemination of
literature, while scientists should encourage and take a full part in
regular exercises and simulations. In order to minimise risk, scientists
should also provide prior advice on the safest evacuation routes,
making the points that such routes may be affected by precursory
activity, including landslides triggered by seismic activity that may
block roads and damage bridges, and poor weather, such as the heavy
rainfall common in tropical locations.
Following the first signs of activity with the potential to build into a
crisis situation, priority should be given to ensuring that secure,
effective and reliable means of communication are established with
the EMC or its equivalent. Bearing in mind that eruptive activity may
make travel difficult and damage exposed phone lines, alternative
means, such as pagers and VHF radios, should be made available and
used. At the earliest opportunity, a timetable for regular meetings
with the EMC, or its dedicated scientific liaison officer, should be
drawn up. These should take place at least on a daily basis, and more
frequently during periods of elevated activity or eruption. The EMC,
should be offered the services of the scientists' media spokesperson
for press conferences and announcements, for drawing up information releases to the media and the public, and for making presentations to stakeholders such as aid agencies and chambers of commerce.
It is imperative that this representative restricts his involvement to
explaining the scientific basis for an emergency response and takes no
responsibility for emergency management decisions. In order to
minimise the potential for a breakdown in the working relationship:
(1) Any concerns voiced by the EMC should always be listened to
and acted upon as a matter of utmost urgency.
(2) Under no circumstances should information be with-held from
the EMC.
(3) No decisions that might affect the welfare of the local
population should be taken without the explicit agreement of
the EMC.
(4) Anger or frustration with emergency managers should be
avoided at all costs; it should always be remembered that they
are required to make crucial, life-or-death decisions under
conditions of extreme pressure.
6. Monitoring scientists and the media
Media attention is commonly a major distraction for the scientific
monitoring team, so it is vital that a member of the team is given sole
responsibility for liaising with the media. This individual should have
good communication skills and previous experience of involvement
with the media. Even so, it is likely that individual journalists and
broadcasters will still attempt to approach and interview other
members of the monitoring team, in part to obtain extra information,
but also to find new and different ‘angles’ or to tease out an ‘exclusive’
story. In the latter cases, careless comments can be exaggerated to
form the basis of a ‘scoop’, the gist of which is almost always negative
and unhelpful, and sometimes dangerous. For example, comments
about a population being threatened, even if only theoretically, may be
published under the banner headline ‘Population doomed?’, or an
apparent lack of consistency about the scientific analysis of the
situation may provoke a story with the headline ‘Eruption crisis: what
the scientists don't want you to know’. Once such stories have been
published, not even later retractions will prevent public doubt about
how well a crisis is being managed.
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6.1. Reducing opportunities for the dissemination of misinformation
Appointing a dedicated spokesperson for contact with the media
will have the additional benefit of repeat contact with the same
scientist encouraging media trust and allowing the core team to
concentrate on monitoring the volcano. In order to reduce the chances
of media representatives seeking alternative sources or making an
independent evaluation about the state of the volcano, the spokesperson should be approachable and media ‘savvy’.
To help educate the media, a media pack should be put together, in
consultation with the EMC, containing information about the history
of the volcano, its activity and its style of eruption. Additionally, the
pack should address monitoring methods, contingency plans and
appropriate contacts. In collaboration with the EMC, regular, well
thought-out and carefully considered press releases about the activity
should be issued – even if conditions have not changed since the
previous release. Agreement should be reached with the EMC about
form and content, prior to making any statements or announcements
to the media. Typically, the local media are usually the most effective
in informing the population at risk, so giving priority to more
glamorous foreign agencies needs to be avoided. It is vital that the
same information is released to local and foreign media. Local
populations are likely to have friends and relations living abroad
with whom they may be in touch during the emergency, and it is
imperative that the vulnerable community feel that they are being as
well – or better – informed than foreign groups.
If the civil authorities have made a specific request that the
monitoring scientists should refrain from addressing the media, this
should be explained openly to the latter and enquiries redirected to
the EMC. If a scientist is required to speak to the media, they should
ask, in advance of interview, about the type of information required, so
that a general context for the answers can be prepared. In order to
minimise opportunities for misinterpretation, the answers themselves should be simple, short, direct and focused.
No member of the monitoring team should refuse to reply to a
journalist's enquiry without justification or explanation, as this will be
interpreted as evasive behaviour that will raise suspicions. Spontaneous, ‘off-the-cuff’ remarks that might be open to misinterpretation
should be avoided, while comments should never be made ‘off-therecord’. Above all, the media should never be underestimated or
patronised.
7. Communication amongst monitoring scientists
It is vitally important that the professional conduct of scientists
during a volcanic crisis is impeccable. This is as applicable to
relationships between scientists as it is to interaction with emergency
managers and the media. Friction between monitoring scientists must
be avoided as it will inevitably detract both from the scientific and
humanitarian efforts (IAVCEI Subcommittee for Crisis Protocols,
1999). In particular, scientists should never be seen to disagree in
public. During the 1976 Guadeloupe crisis, argument and rivalry
between research teams on the volcano led to bewilderment amongst
the population and confusion amongst the civil authorities (Chester,
1993). Whatever the merits of an argument, open disagreement feeds
general distrust and diminishes the authority of the scientific team as
a whole. Any contrary points of view should be resolved internally.
A number of initiatives can be taken in advance, in order to
minimise friction between individuals during a future crisis. Mutually
preferred working conditions can be established and protocols agreed
for dealing with different opinions within the team, for example
adoption of an expert elicitation methodology for forecasting future
events during an ongoing crisis (e.g. Aspinall and Woo, 1993; Aspinall
and Cooke, 1998). Measures to be enacted once an emergency starts
can be rehearsed well in advance, and specific responsibilities
allocated. Protocols can be put in place for visiting scientists, defining
7
their tasks and ensuring that they comply with agreed measures for
communication with the EMC, the media and the public. For their part,
visiting scientists need to be aware that – even if officially invited –
they may be regarded as interlopers by some. Potential friction arising
from such attitudes can be defused if visitors make a point of deferring
to members of the permanent monitoring team and are supportive
rather than obstructive at all times. It should be made clear to visiting
scientists that they must not engage in tasks or issue statements
without the express agreement of the monitoring scientists and the
EMC, nor must they make announcements that contradict those of the
monitoring team, even if the messages are directed to a foreign
audience. Any disagreements need to be resolved internally and in
advance.
8. Summarising the roles of the monitoring scientists
To optimise its contribution to the successful handling of a crisis,
the monitoring team has a responsibility to ensure that relationships
with key players and stakeholders are established, and essential
protocols and procedures are in place, before the onset of the
emergency. These measures should be sufficiently rigorous to operate
effectively and with little or no modification as the crisis develops. In
summary, they should encompass:
(1) Allocation of individuals on the monitoring team to liaise with
the Emergency Management Committee, or its equivalent, and
the media.
(2) Building and fostering strong and supportive working relationships with the EMC and media representatives.
(3) Ensuring that the EMC is familiar with possible eruption
scenarios.
(4) Developing hazard and risk zonation maps based upon the
aforementioned scenarios.
(5) Working with the EMC and other stakeholders to develop a
volcanic emergency plan and ensure that it is regularly and
appropriately updated and revised.
(6) In advance of the crisis, putting together a checklist of tasks and
key personnel to contact.
(7) In cooperation with the EMC, planning the means and format of
information releases and announcements.
(8) Taking a pro-active role in helping to educate the public and the
media about the volcanic threat.
Should there be no formal relationships between the monitoring
team and key players and stakeholders at the start of unrest, the proactive development of such links must form the immediate and urgent
priority of the team.
9. The emergency management committee
In most, if not all circumstances, the group responsible for
managing a volcanic crisis will be the Emergency Management
Committee, or its equivalent, whose brief is likely to include the full
range of potential technological and natural disasters. Given this broad
remit and bearing in mind that volcanic action may not, as at
Montserrat in 1995, have occurred within living memory, the first step
towards the effective management of a future volcanic crisis must
involve the EMC developing a more detailed understanding of the
volcanic threat, in the first instance through improved links with the
scientific team responsible for volcano monitoring.
While every state has its own strategy in place to deal with major
emergencies, lessons learned from recent and ongoing volcanic crises
in the eastern Caribbean (Guadeloupe 1976; St. Vincent 1971 and
1979; Montserrat 1995–present) can help to improve plans for
communication and response. Based to a large extent on the
experiences of these islands, this section contains advice on the
handling of information during a volcanic emergency and how liaison
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between the primary stakeholders can be made more effective. It is
assumed here that the body responsible for management of the crisis
and – thereby – for information handling, will be the EMC. In most
Caribbean volcanic island states, this is made up of representatives of
key advisory and decision-making bodies, and typically comprises the
Prime Minister or Chief Minister, other ministers (as appropriate), the
Heads of Police and Civil Defence, a representative of the scientific
monitoring team and a spokesperson. This group has ultimate
responsibility for decisions impinging upon the welfare of the affected
population, including those relating to declaration, changes and
cessation of states of alert and/or emergency, evacuation, prohibition
of movement and resettlement. Inevitably, an EMC is required to
assimilate large amounts of information upon which it is required to
act, often rapidly and under considerable pressure. The recommendations that follow are designed to make information handling and
communication with other stakeholder groups more effective under
these difficult circumstances.
9.1. Investing in community preparedness
Community preparedness involves pre-crisis investment in measures designed to minimise the risk of future disaster, and as such
forms a critical element in an EMC's planning portfolio. A major
complaint of inhabitants living in the danger zones around active and
potentially-active volcanoes is that they ‘do not know what is going
on’, particularly when the volcano is inactive. The EMC has a key role
to play in keeping the local population fully informed before an
emergency. This both educates the public with respect to the nature of
the threat and improves its response during a crisis. School
programmes are a particularly effective way of raising hazard
awareness among children and their families, and the EMC should
aim to ensure that teaching about the volcanic threat forms a part of
school curricula. Other effective awareness-raising initiatives include
involving the local population in periodic exercises designed to
acquaint the public with procedures and to test and refine emergency
measures, and the production and dissemination of educational
materials about volcanoes and volcanic hazards.
9.2. Information management during a volcanic crisis
Volcanic eruptions in the Caribbean are often not sudden events,
and typically the passage from the onset of unrest to the critical stage
when they become a serious threat to life, property and general
infrastructure, may take months. Such a long build-up should ideally
be used by the EMC to activate pre-determined action plans, to ensure
that effective links with the scientists and the media are in place, and
that the mechanisms for communication of alert levels and warnings
are operational. During this build-up phase, the EMC will also have a
duty to provide information on the developing crisis to other affected
groups such as chambers of commerce, port and airport authorities,
airlines, ferries and other transport bodies, and other NGOs.
In the months of escalation prior to an eruption, some signals of
volcanic unrest (e.g. felt earthquakes or steam outbursts) will,
inevitably, become apparent to the population. These are likely to
promote some public unease and raise pressure on the EMC to provide
more information on the volcano's behaviour. To establish and
maintain the public's trust it is imperative that the EMC responds
quickly, positively and openly to such requests. Even so, opinion and
rumour will feed confusing and conflicting messages, many of which,
in the absence of appropriate measures, may be taken up and widely
disseminated by the media. Once an eruption starts, there will be little
or no time to organise how information is released and communicated
or to establish necessary contacts among key stakeholders. It is
therefore essential for the EMC to have prepared in advance an
effective plan for managing the flow of information during a volcanic
crisis.
The names, contact details (telephone, fax and e-mail – at home
and at work) and individual responsibilities of the EMC should be
known by all committee members. The EMC should meet regularly,
even at times of no emergency, to establish close working relations
and a shared appreciation of group tasks during a crisis.
9.3. The volcanic crisis information plan
Disseminating emergency information is a full-time occupation.
During a crisis, the EMC itself will be too busy to pursue this task
directly. Through an information liaison officer, the EMC should
delegate responsibility for disseminating information to a dedicated
information team. Ideally, this would comprise individuals who
understand how the government works and are respected and trusted
by the public and the media. Candidates with good communication
skills are frequently found amongst those with experience as teachers,
journalists and media presenters, religious leaders and senior
members of government departments. The information team should
provide dedicated liaison officers to work closely with the scientists
and the media.
A ‘cascade’ structure provides for the most effective flow of
information. Within this structure, the information team informs a
small number of key contacts that in turn pass information to their
colleagues and other contacts, with some overlap ensuring that no
link in the information flow is broken. In this way, information spreads
rapidly, even though the information team spends only a small
amount of time alerting their key contacts. Accordingly, a crisis
information plan must incorporate a database of the key contacts to
alert in case of emergency. This should include reserve names in case
the primary contacts are unavailable. The information team should be
based at a safe distance from the volcano and within range of the EMC.
To avoid unwanted media intrusion at the EMC, it is probably best that
the two are lodged in separate buildings, with the location of the
information team being public knowledge.
9.4. Disseminating warning messages
Warning messages need to be related to a pre-established system
of alert levels and should describe both the level of alarm and the
required response (e.g. USGS, 2006). Messages must be clear and
unambiguous and phrased so as to avoid causing panic or engendering
a false sense of security. They should be simple, colloquial, and
respectful rather than patronising. It is particularly crucial that
warning messages adopt the style of language appropriate to the
group being addressed. Use should be made of locally respected
leaders, such as mayors, teachers and religious representatives, to
spread and reinforce warning messages. Relief agencies may also
prove to be useful allies in ensuring effective communication with the
public. The message content should be short, simple, and straightforward, include the level of alarm, a description of the expected hazard
(s), and instructions about how to respond. The use of pictures and
graphics, for example to show evacuation routes, can be highly
effective if presented appropriately for the user.
Even when there is no change in alert level to be flagged, information
should be issued at regular intervals, as a paucity of information may
engender unease while frequent updates present an image of awareness,
understanding and control. Warning messages need to be consistent,
however they are issued, for example whether via radio, the press,
disseminated literature, e-mail or dedicated web-sites. Arrangements
should also be made so that warnings reach expatriate communities
abroad, who are likely to have friends and family under threat. During
the first four years of the Soufriere Hills eruption on Montserrat (1995–
1998), the absence of such arrangements presented a particular problem
for those Montserratians relocated to the UK, who were largely reliant
on informal contacts with friends and relatives still on the island to keep
track of the situation (Clay et al., 1999). In order to maximize impact and
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avoid over-exposure, monitoring scientists and politicians of senior
status should be ‘reserved’ for the delivery of warnings that require a
major response.
Warning messages should avoid difficult concepts and jargon, and
should be designed and disseminated so as not to exclude minorities,
for example, different versions should target all relevant languages
and dialects. Arrangements should also be made to reach those with
poor literacy or who are visually or aurally impaired.
10. The EMC and monitoring scientists
It is imperative that the EMC creates the conditions that permit the
monitoring scientists to focus on their tasks without distraction from
other groups, particularly from the media, who may use leaks and
incomplete information to create an ‘exclusive’ story. It is equally
important, however, that the EMC avoids isolating the scientists from
the public, as this can foster a degree of frustration and a feeling that the
‘true facts’ are being with-held as part of a perceived hidden agenda.
Well in advance of a crisis developing, the EMC should allocate a
science liaison officer from the information team (ideally an
individual with some scientific background or knowledge) and ensure
that a stable and good relationship is built up with the monitoring
scientists. The fact that regular contact between the EMC and the
scientific team is being maintained should be publicised, partly to help
reduce media pressure on the scientists and partly to strengthen
public confidence that preparations for future volcanic emergencies
are being taken seriously. Discussion with the scientific team of
possible eruption scenarios and their impact, should be used to design
a series of basic plans that can be implemented rapidly at the start of
an emergency (although these may have to be modified later to
account for specific conditions during a crisis). Similarly, hazard and
risk zonation maps, developed in collaboration with the monitoring
scientists, should form the basis of plans for emergency evacuation
and resettlement measures. The sort of information that will be most
useful in preparing an emergency plan, should be established with the
scientific team, together with the form in which this information will
be provided. Prior to a crisis, monitoring scientists will be most
amenable and available for involvement in hazard and risk awareness
initiatives. Consequently, the EMC needs to use this time to make
maximum use of their expertise in helping to educate the local
population about the volcanic threat, via public meetings, radio
interviews, talks to schools and other institutions, exercises and
simulations, and by seeking their involvement in the preparation and
dissemination of literature.
During a crisis situation, maintenance of effective and secure
communication with the scientific team will be paramount. In
addition to ensuring that the physical means for such communication
are in place, there might also be benefit in basing the EMC science
liaison officer at the volcano observatory. A timetable of regular and
frequent meetings with the monitoring scientists will also help to
maintain the information flow, as will the involvement of the
nominated spokesperson of the scientific team in all press conferences, and in preparation of media releases and public announcements. So as to ensure coherence of message, the nature of the
information to be released should always be agreed, in advance, with
the nominated science spokesperson. Most importantly, the EMC
should be responsive to varying circumstances; taking account of
scientific advice about the changing behaviour of the volcano and
being ready and willing to modify risk maps, the system of alert levels,
and evacuation and resettlement plans as and when appropriate.
The difference between a well-managed emergency, with no loss
of life, and a catastrophe, may lie in the maintenance of a sound and
close working relationship between emergency managers and
monitoring scientists. To ensure that this relationship is not soured,
the EMC should never ignore the advice of the scientific team, nor
should it take decisions, without consultation with the scientists, that
9
may impinge upon the welfare of the local population. Members of the
monitoring team should not, themselves, be expected or required to
produce and/or issue warnings to the public, and should not be
pressured into providing forecasts of the timing, style or duration of
activity that are beyond current capabilities. Any contacts with
external scientists should be conducted through, and with the support
of, the monitoring team, in order to avoid friction. Finally, frustration
should not be expressed if the scientists cannot guarantee whether or
not a period of unrest will culminate in a magmatic eruption. As
demonstrated by the 1976 Guadeloupe crisis (Fiske, 1984), this is a
notoriously difficult call that, in some circumstances, cannot be made
with any degree of certainty.
11. The EMC and the media
During a volcanic crisis, the maintenance of good relations
between the EMC and the media is vital. Without this, messages can
quickly become confused or misrepresented, and considerable effort
may need to be expended to ensure that conflicts of interest do not
create barriers between the two, which may hinder effective
communication and ultimately result in increased risk to the public.
Effective collaboration with the media depends to a large extent, upon
the EMC – prior to the development of a crisis situation – appreciating
how the media operates, understanding the methods it uses to extract
and process information, and identifying potential causes of friction.
11.1. The media agenda
The ultimate object of any journalist during a crisis situation is to
find a ‘good’ story. Typically this will focus upon an ‘angle’ so as to
distinguish it from other stories relating to the same event.
Investigative journalists, in particular, are instinctively wary and
suspicious, and are constantly in search of a ‘cover-up’ that they can
address, highlight and try to unravel. They are also notoriously
competitive and often attempt to out-do one another. In a crisis
situation this can result in increasingly speculative stories based upon
ever-more unreliable evidence. In seeking the ‘personal touch’,
journalists will consult individuals within the affected population,
asking their opinions and extracting information about their experiences. Inevitably, the end-product is often a melange of poorly
informed comment and criticism that may reflect badly on the EMC.
To validate information, conscientious journalists will cross-check
with a number of sources. While increasing accuracy, this also has the
potential to highlight differences of opinion and inconsistency of
message. A dramatic story is sought after as it captures greater
audience interest. Inevitably, something going wrong will be highlighted at the expense of an otherwise flawless operation. Journalists
often find it difficult to appreciate levels of scientific (un)certainty,
and try and present stories in black and white – thereby highlighting
extreme scenarios. In any crisis, they will also seek scapegoats to
blame and heroes to praise. In either case this may be entirely
unjustified, but it may colour the manner in which the EMC, in
particular, and the civil authorities in general, are viewed.
Relationships between the EMC and the media may be helped if
emergency managers seek to become more aware of how they are
viewed by the media. Whether justifiable or not, common media
complaints in relation to dealings with emergency managers include
suspicions that they are not being kept fully ‘in the picture’, that other
journalists are being favoured at their expense, and that the speed of
decision-making processes and the paucity and timing of media
releases make it difficult to ‘hit’ deadlines.
11.2. Dealing with the media
Prior to a crisis developing, the EMC should dedicate a media
liaison officer from the information team and ensure that a stable and
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strong relationship is built up with the local media. Periodic press
releases about the state of the volcano – even if nothing is happening –
can help maintain links with the media in quieter times. Regular
media events, such as visits to the volcano observatory or launches for
new monitoring systems or receptions for the arrival of new staff, can
all help to build trust and a good working relationship. Advance
contact can usefully be made with appropriate journalists (typically
science or environmental correspondents) in the regional media and
in the major global players such as CNN and the BBC. These are likely
to be the first external journalists on the scene when a crisis begins to
develop. A database of relevant journalists should be constructed to
aid information dissemination during a future crisis, with entries
updated as contacts move on and are replaced. Media representatives
always appreciate a well put together media pack, which should
include information on the history of the volcano, its activity, and its
style of eruptions, together with a terminology section. The pack
should, in addition, contain information on monitoring, contingency
plans for a future eruption, and appropriate contacts.
At the start of a crisis, it is recommended – to ensure consistency of
message – that a single individual be responsible for all contacts with
the media, preferably the aforementioned media liaison officer. All
journalists on the database should be contacted immediately, briefed
with regard to the situation, made aware of procedures for future
dissemination of information, for example the frequency and timing of
news conferences and media releases. At an early stage, it is useful to
determine which journalists intend to visit and to request details of
their travel plans in advance. Suitable facilities should be organised for
the media – ideally a room with internet facilities and sufficient e-mail
and phone links to allow them to file their stories – and a media pass
system organised for journalists who wish to attend news conferences
and avail themselves of other official sources of information. This will
allow the number and affiliations of visiting journalists to be
efficiently tracked and recorded. The media pack should be updated
to take account of the changed state of affairs – incorporating
information on the volcano's activity, modifications to the monitoring
situation, science staff changes, and other relevant circumstances.
To ensure that the correct message reaches the media, a regular
programme of news conferences and media releases is paramount.
The timing of both should be determined at an early stage in the crisis
and widely circulated. Under normal circumstances, media releases
are best issued at the start and end of the day, with a daily news
conference – perhaps during the middle of the day – to allow
journalists time to formulate their questions in response to the
morning release. Provision of material early in the day is particularly
important as it will provide the media with items for their ‘news of the
day’ and place journalists under less pressure to hunt for material
from unofficial and less informed sources. During periods of elevated
activity, after an actual eruption, or following an unusual event – such
as a series of notable earth tremors – additional releases and
conferences should be arranged. Even if nothing has happened in
the preceding 24 hours, the timetabled programme of releases and
conferences should be adhered to. With respect to the latter, such
circumstances could be used to provide opportunities for addressing
specific themes, providing journalists with additional information on
certain aspects of the crisis – such as the mechanics of the alert system
or the state-of-the-art with regard to eruption forecasting. Members
of the monitoring team and other appropriate experts should be
utilized at such times.
As a matter of course, the monitoring scientists should be
consulted in order to make certain that the message the EMC is
passing on to the media is concordant with their view. Ideally, a
representative from the monitoring team should attend all news
conferences, so permitting journalists to acquire first-hand knowledge
and reduce suspicion of with-holding of information. Organised visits
for registered media representatives to the volcano observatory and
into any exclusion zone – when conditions are deemed (relatively)
safe by the monitoring scientists – are useful in that they help to limit
unaccompanied, unauthorised, and potentially dangerous, visits. In
order to cut short rumour and innuendo, it is important that – as much
as is feasible – the media output should be monitored. Inaccurate or
malicious reporting should not be ignored, and instead the true
situation should be clarified as soon as possible. It may be worthwhile
to use news conferences – or specially arranged discussion meetings –
to ask journalists for their opinions on how the crisis is being managed
and for their impressions about public reaction. Having probably
interviewed many individuals across the social range, journalists may
be able to provide valuable insights into the public's perception of the
crisis and how it is being handled. Above all, bad practice should not
be allowed to lead to a deteriorating relationship with the media, so
off-the-cuff, off-the-record, and ‘no comment’, responses to requests
for information should be outlawed as a matter of course.
12. Summarising the roles of the EMC
Effective management of a volcanic crisis depends crucially upon
accurate foresight and adequate preparedness and should involve, at
the very least, those actions making up the checklist in Table 2.
13. The media
The media have a critical role to play during an emergency
situation when the unimpeded and effective flow and management of
information can literally mean the difference between life and death.
In this context, the media's task should be to provide an effective
conduit for the transmission of warnings from the EMC to the public,
without confusing, complicating, or changing the message. Accurate
and responsible reporting is vital if rumour and hearsay are not to lead
to unwarranted fear and panic. In the heat of a volcanic crisis, the
media's priority should be to fully support emergency managers and
monitoring scientists in seeking successfully to handle the situation.
13.1. How others view the media
Particularly if no effort has been made to develop a working
relationship prior to the crisis, it is likely that emergency managers
and monitoring scientists will lack trust in the media and its
representatives and have reservations about its reliability as a conduit
for information dissemination. Much of this will arise from a general
Table 2
Summary of actions that should be taken by an EMC to ensure effective management of
a volcanic crisis.
• Ensure that a comprehensive disaster management structure forms part of
development planning.
• Compile a comprehensive checklist of all the steps to be taken as a crisis develops.
• Clearly define the duties and responsibilities of key players and groups.
• Earmark a single physical base for the management of a future crisis and build an
inventory of the equipment, facilities, and services that will be required, including
adequate phone lines and other means of communication.
• Make sure that a volcanic emergency plan is developed and regularly updated, and
made available to all decision makers and stakeholders (e.g. school teachers, local
councils, hospitals, chambers of commerce, port and airport authorities, airlines).
• Build and foster strong and supportive links with the monitoring scientists and the
media.
• Update a key contact list regularly and meet frequently and face-to-face with key
personnel before a crisis situation arises.
• In collaboration with the security authorities, clearly define evacuation protocols,
procedures and routes.
• Conduct periodic exercises to test and refine emergency procedures.
• If the volcanic threat is forecast to impinge upon other states (for example, ash clouds
affecting adjacent islands), coordinate information strategies – in advance – with the
EMCs of those countries.
• Once a crisis has ended, use the experience gained to improve capacity for coping with
the next one. Compiling and sharing the lessons learnt, reviewing problems
encountered and drawing up solutions for the future.
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perception of a conflict of interest between the media and other key
players in managing a crisis situation, but probably also as a result of
previous unsatisfactory contacts with elements of the media.
Whether justified or not, journalists are commonly viewed, at least
by the public, as being wary and suspicious and always on the look out
for a 'good' story, whatever the cost and collateral damage. They are
perceived – as a group – as having little regard for accuracy, and for
highlighting the theatrical and speculative at the expense of the hard –
if less dramatic – facts. Expectations are such that involvement of the
media in a crisis situation is widely held to result in antagonism to
managers and scientists, with the hunt for stories leading to
unwelcome pressures on other key players and the filing of material
based upon rumour, innuendo, and unreliable information.
It is never going to be easy to overcome this widespread, negative
image, but if the media is to play a useful and effective role in the
management of a volcanic crisis it needs to work to build trust with
other key stakeholders. Ideally, this should begin prior to the
development of a crisis situation, although for regional or global
players this is unlikely to be a realistic option.
13.2. Good practice in warning dissemination
Inevitably, the media will play an important role in warning
dissemination during a volcanic crisis – via the press, radio and
television and (ideally) the internet. The responsibility of the media
can be thought of as being two-fold. First, raising general awareness of
the volcanic threat, both prior to and during the crisis, and second,
transmission of specific warnings issued by the EMC in response to
changes in the behaviour of the volcano and in alert level status. The
first point will be of most relevance to the local media, but all media
stakeholders are likely to be involved in the latter.
Prior to a crisis developing, local press and broadcast media can
help raise awareness by working with the EMC and the monitoring
scientists to regularly publish or transmit information about the
volcano and its status, even when nothing is happening. They can also
keep the volcano in the spotlight by writing or broadcasting pieces
about the volcano observatory and its work, including new staff
arrivals, the applications of new monitoring equipment, open days
and public lectures. Similarly, the regular dissemination of information about the alert system, how warnings will be issued at time of
crisis, and how the public should respond, would prove useful in
terms of maintaining awareness. This is also a good time for the media
to (i) decide with the EMC and the monitoring scientists the style that
warnings will take, focusing on a simple and straightforward style, the
use of pictorial material, and the need to reach all sections of the
community, (ii) perfect effective and rapid lines of communication
with the EMC and monitoring scientists – via their media liaison
representatives – to be utilized at time of crisis, and (iii) develop and
update web pages focusing on the volcano and its activity, the
warning systems, and how information will be disseminated during a
crisis.
In a crisis situation, the local media should ensure communication
links with the EMC are maintained via its media liaison officer and
with the monitoring scientists' spokesperson. Sufficient airtime and
column space should be allocated to incorporate new information
about the developing crisis, with provision made to break into
scheduled programmes for urgent announcements. In order to attract
listeners' attention, broadcast media may consider adopting an
immediately recognizable jingle or ‘intro’ for all announcements
related to the crisis. In the press, an instantly recognisable logo can be
used to attract attention in a similar way, linked to news about the
volcano that always occupies the same space – preferably on the front
page. Web pages developed by local media at the pre-crisis stage need
to be updated, while the regional and global media might be
persuaded to build new ones from scratch. Of particular importance
is consistency of message, and this should be maintained both off the
11
island as well as on, and – for multi-media organisations – should be
uniform across all channels. Bad practices may sour relations with the
EMC and the monitoring scientists, and may ultimately result in lives
lost. In this regard, the following should be avoided:
(1) Issuance of any announcements related to the volcano's
behaviour or to alert levels or warnings without the express
agreement of the EMC.
(2) Embellishment of messages with unnecessary information.
(3) Broadcasting or printing of information or opinion from
unofficial sources without prior consultation with the EMC.
(4) Failing to issue warning messages immediately they are
received.
14. The media and the EMC
During a volcanic crisis, the EMC – or its equivalent – will have one
priority, to limit injury, loss of life, and damage to property and
infrastructure. All else will be secondary. Once a crisis begins to
develop the EMC and its individual members will be under extreme
pressure. To avoid being intrusive and distracting, media representatives should restrict day-to-day contact with the EMC to the media
liaison officer. As appropriate, he or she may be able to arrange
interviews with other members of the EMC. Media representatives
should be aware that many politicians and senior administrators –
who are likely to be key players during the emergency, and some of
whom will undoubtedly sit on the EMC – will have misgivings about
liaising with the media. Typical concerns voiced by those involved in
emergency management include the following:
(1) Answers will be misinterpreted or twisted.
(2) Vital parts of the message they are trying to present will be
omitted, modified or confused.
(3) The message will be made incoherent and inconsistent.
(4) False information will be released to the public.
(5) The situation will be over-dramatised.
14.1. Establishing effective working relations with the EMC
Overcoming the aforementioned preconceptions is an essential
pre-requisite for developing an effective working relationship with
the EMC. For the local media, this can be accomplished by liaison
before a crisis develops. At this time, the material in media packs
should be digested and used, and a good relationship built with the
EMC media liaison officer. The local media should endeavor to work
with the EMC in advance of a crisis so as to design a plan for the
dissemination of warning messages, and to clearly define the role of
the media in this critical aspect of emergency management. Regional
and global players arriving on the scene once a crisis has already
started to develop need to inform the EMC of their arrival and proceed
via formal channels and with the knowledge and agreement of the
EMC and its media liaison officer. All media representatives should
make a point of attending official news conferences and joining
organised events such as visits to the monitoring observatory or into
exclusions zones. Bad practices that are likely to lead to friction in
relationships with the EMC are to be avoided, and include:
(1) Arriving on the scene unannounced.
(2) Shunning contact with the EMC and its media liaison officer.
(3) Short-circuiting official routes of information. This can sow bad
feeling and mistrust and confuse or damage warning messages.
It may also distract scientists and emergency managers from
their primary tasks.
(4) Looking for hidden agendas that are not there or inventing
scapegoats that may hinder the effectiveness of crisis management.
Please cite this article as: McGuire, W.J., et al., Improving communication during volcanic crises on small, vulnerable islands, Journal of
Volcanology and Geothermal Research (2009), doi:10.1016/j.jvolgeores.2009.02.019
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(5) Inventing, encouraging or spreading, rumour or innuendo.
Unofficial views should always be cross-checked with official
sources.
15. The media and the monitoring scientists
In an emergency situation, members of the monitoring team will
be fully occupied and under considerable pressure. Consequently
most will rarely be able to spare the time for lengthy interviews with
the media. It is likely, however, that – in order to limit interference
with the work of the team as a whole – an individual will have been
given the role of liaising with the media.
15.1. Establishing effective working relations with the
monitoring scientists
In order not to interfere with the monitoring effort, all approaches
for information and comment should be made through the monitoring team's media spokesperson. Bearing in mind that they must first
clear statements and announcements with the EMC, they should not
be pressurised for comment in advance of this. To speed up the
procedure, the gist of a proposed interview should, wherever possible,
be provided in advance. Verity and accuracy in reporting a scientist's
replies can benefit from the interviewer being familiar – in advance –
with the local volcano, its behaviour and history, so as to be able to ask
sensible and valid questions, and comprehend the replies. If an
interviewer does not understand something that a scientist has said or
written, they should ask for clarification. Misinterpretation could have
serious implications for management of the crisis. A strong, working
relationship will be helped if media representatives are straightforward and open with the scientists, rather than seeking to trick them
into revealing information that could harm management of the
emergency. The science team will be hindered by harassment, by
attempts at pursuing disagreement or fomenting dissent amongst the
scientific community, by seeking ‘off-the-record’ comment, by
deliberately misinterpreting, modifying or embellishing the message
provided by a member of the monitoring team, and by promoting the
views of scientists who are not team members and who may hold
maverick views.
16. Relations within the media
The jockeying for competitive advantage that often characterizes
interaction between media players has no part in an emergency
situation. Impeding the functioning of rivals, attempting to with-hold
significant information and spreading misleading messages to put other
media players off 'the scent', may compromise the effective dissemination of warnings and thereby increase the threat to the local population.
A possible problem lies in the potential for contradictory
information to be issued by different media sources, leading to
confusion, doubt and even fear amongst the public. To minimize this
all media players should focus on the core message as presented to
them via the Emergency Management Committee, without embellishment, modification or interpretation.
17. Summarising the roles of the media
To an important degree, the media are in a position to make the
difference between an effectively managed volcanic crisis and a
catastrophe in which many lives are lost. Ensuring the former rather
than the latter requires that the local media, in particular, take those
actions summarised in Table 3.
Notwithstanding these actions, it has to be recognised that the role
of the media is inevitably a complex one. While perhaps wishing to be
supportive, journalists will also rightly feel that they have a duty to
investigate and report how effectively the situation is being handled,
Table 3
Summary of actions that should be taken by the media to ensure effective management
of a volcanic crisis.
• Become familiar with the volcano in question and the community or communities
likely to be affected.
• Ensure that trustworthy working relationships are developed with the EMC and the
monitoring scientists before a crisis develops, or as soon as feasible during its early
stages.
• Use all available means (press, television and radio and the internet) pro-actively to
promote the work of the monitoring team and the EMC contingency plans amongst the
affected population.
• Together with the EMC and the monitoring team, decide on the form and style of the
warnings to be issued during a crisis situation.
• Make certain that provision is made for effective and robust lines of communication
with the EMC science liaison officer and monitoring team spokesperson.
• Devise protocols to ensure consistency of message.
• Ensure that pride of place – in terms of both airtime and column space – is devoted to
information about the crisis and associated warnings.
• Formulate and use an instantly recognisable ‘brand image’ for crisis information
dissemination (a logo or ‘theme’ tune).
• Promote vigorously, the warnings provided by the EMC, without embellishment,
modification or dramatisation.
• Avoid the short-circuiting of official routes of information.
• Work with the emergency managers and the monitoring team – be a help not a
hindrance.
and should be free to hold the EMC to account if there is poor or
ineffective management.
18. Discussion
Population rise and increasing urbanisation are driving a marked
upward trend in the incidence of natural disasters. This trend is
already being reflected in the numbers of lethal volcanic events
(Simkin et al., 2001), and in a rise in the number of volcano-related
deaths. Tilling (1990) estimates that the average number of deaths per
year due to volcanic activity, in the 17th–19th centuries, was 315,
while Witham (2005) shows that this figure has climbed to 917 for the
20th century. Witham (2005) reports 491 volcanic ‘events’ during the
20th century, in which people were killed, injured or affected in some
way, and more than half of which resulted in loss of life, while Chester
et al. (2001) and Ewert and Harpel (2004) draw attention to increased
exposure and vulnerability arising from the continued growth of
urban centres close to active volcanoes.
At least 500 million people currently live within the danger zones
of active volcanoes, and this number is certain to climb substantially.
Despite the threat they pose, volcanoes have always attracted
settlement due to characteristically fertile soils. With global average
temperatures set to rise significantly this century and beyond (IPCC,
2001), volcanoes located in the tropics will also provide increasingly
appealing havens for those seeking the cooler conditions brought by
higher altitude. Elsewhere, and particularly in the Caribbean,
attractive volcanic islands will bring in increasing numbers of tourists.
The pattern of volcano-seismic crises at Montserrat's Soufriere
Hills volcano suggests an elevated risk of another eruption (assuming
a prior cessation in current activity) around 2025 (Clay et al., 1999),
while seismic swarms beneath the island of Dominica between 1998
and 2000 – along with a small phreatic explosion in 1997 – have led to
a probabilistic estimate of a magmatic eruption as high as 1 in 5
between 2000 and 2010 (University of the West Indies, Seismic
Research Unit, 2000). Certainly, the time-averaged frequency of
eruptions and minor activity during the last century, of a little over
11 years, demands immediate action on the communication issue,
rather than once a future episode of unrest has begun.
19. Conclusions
As populations rise on the flanks of active and potentially active
volcanoes, so procedures and protocols to deal with future volcanic
Please cite this article as: McGuire, W.J., et al., Improving communication during volcanic crises on small, vulnerable islands, Journal of
Volcanology and Geothermal Research (2009), doi:10.1016/j.jvolgeores.2009.02.019
ARTICLE IN PRESS
W.J. McGuire et al. / Journal of Volcanology and Geothermal Research xxx (2009) xxx–xxx
crisis must be better thought out and increasingly stringent. Most
importantly, emergency plans must address the issue of seamless
communication between the main stakeholder groups, and ensure
that the mechanisms that underpin effective communication during a
volcanic crisis are in place long before a volcano shows signs of unrest.
This is particularly critical for small, volcanic islands, where the
options for managing a volcanic crisis are more limited than for
mainland volcanoes. For the island volcanoes of the Caribbean, where
eruptions are frequent, such measures need to be in place now or in
the very near future. Messages from all the stakeholder groups must
be as simple and concise as possible and must address instructions
and recommendations on what to do next as well as inform of the
prevailing situation. All efforts need to focus on the building of trust
between stakeholders, the maintenance of good working relationships, and the safeguarding of an open and continuous information
flow between all key players.
We hope that the advice and recommendations presented in this
paper and in the handbook for Communication during Volcanic
Emergencies, will help improve the management of volcanic crises in
the Caribbean and on other small volcanic islands. As the source-book
and its content are largely generic, we also feel that the suggestions
and guidelines contained therein are equally valid in terms of
improving communication before and during crises at any volcano,
and have application to the communication issue in respect of a range
of other geophysical hazards.
Acknowledgments
This research was funded by the UK Department for International
Development; Project No. R7406 Protecting vulnerable small islands
by improved forecasting and warning. The following are gratefully
acknowledged for their invaluable contributions to the project:
Nichola Brichieri-Colombi, Myrium Lubino-Bissante, Charles van
Oppen, Jeremy Collymore, Noemi D'Ozouville, Eviann Inniss and Olly
Willetts. David Chester and Angus Duncan are thanked for their
helpful and insightful suggestions during the review process, which
have greatly improved the paper.
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