INTERNATIONAL :nLrrARY TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FAR EAST
TRANSCRIPT OF
13
pp.
PROC~DINGS
MAJ!._
1947
18,287-18,366
DAVID NELSON
SUTTON
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INDF.:K
Of
.WITNESSES
Deterlse t Witnesses
OKADA, Kikusabura
Direct
OKAMOTO (cont'd)
18289
MORNING RECESS
18304
S. OKAMOTO (cont1d)
18307
bY.Mr. S.
Direct by
Mr~
18289
(resumed)
~OON
RECESS
18321
Direct by Mr. S. OKAMOTO (conttd)
18322
Cross by Brigadier Qui11iam
18325'
Redirect by Mr. S. OKAMQTO
18334
(Witness excused)
18341
18342
ONO, Takeshi
18342
Direct by Mr. SHIOBARA
AFTERNOON RECESS
Direct by Mr. SHIOBARA (cont'd)
(Witness axcused)
MAYAlJIA, Kwanji
Direct by Mr. KAINO
18343
18344
18355'
18357
1835'7
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13 M.A.RCH 1947
I N D E X
Of
EXHIBITS
Doc.
JI.9..:.
708
Def.
Pros.
NOe
No.
For
Ielent.
Description
Affidavit of ONO, Takeshi
In
Evidence
18343
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--,--.
Thursday, 13 March 1947
1
2
INTERNATIONAL MILITARY TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FAR EAST
Court House of the Tribunal
War "Ministry Building
'>,
Tokyo, Japan
3
4
5
6
The Tribunal met, pursuant to adjournment,
7
/
8
at 0Q30.
--
9
10
11
-
Appearances:
For the Tribunal, same as be.:'ore witt: the
12
exception of:
13
Member from the Dominion of New Zealand, not sitting,
14
15
16
HONORABLE 1m. JUSTICE NORTHCROFT,
a s of 10:45 A. M.
For the Prosecution Section, same as before.
For t(he Defense Section,
sa me
a s before.
17
18
19
(English to Japanese and Japanese
to English interpret.ation was made by the
20
Language Section, IMTFE.)
21
22
23
24
25
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18,288
OKADA
DIRECT
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w
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e
n
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D
u
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THE PRESIDENT:
Int~rnational
All the accused are present
except OKAWA, TOJO and ARAKI, who are represented by
their respective counsel.
We have certificates
from the prison surgeon at Sugamo certifying to the
illness of the accused TOJO and ARAKI, and stating
that those two accused will not be able to attend
the trial today_
I
Some time ago we were asked by Mr. Logan,
i
I
111
10
I
12
The
Military Tribunal for the Far East is now in session.
I
&
a
:MARSHAL OF THE COURT:
I
defense counsel, to refer to
the question
of framing rules for the examination of defense wit-
I
13
ch~mbers
n~sses.
Mr. LogEm expressed the hope that an agree-
14
ment might be reached with the prosecution on such
15
rules.
16
adopt Mr. Logan's suggestion.
17
chambers before me and came to an agreement, to which
IS
I did not make one single contribution.
19
I ventured to congratulate the parties on the met-sure
20
of agreement they fwd achieved.
Tho Tribunal without nny dissent agreed to
The parties met in
However,
21
I realize they were called upon to draft
22
a set of rules thGt would insure a just trial, and
23
yet were expected, in the interests of a speedy trial,
24
to depart
from rules shaped to secure a just trial
,
2) I
by some of the ablest legcl nliuds
our respective
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DIRECT
OKADA
countries have produced_
I
We have decided to give a trinl to the rules
2
3
agreed upon by the prosecution and the defense, but
4
with misgivings.
5
such rules must be adopted with misgivings.
(;
we are sure 'Ne will hav,e the cooperDtion of the prose-
7
In the circumstances any set of
However,
cution and the defense 'in endeavoring to make them
8
work successfully.
9
It will, of course, be for the Tribunal to
to
decide whether in any circumstances any adverse
1J
statement has been made by a witness called by one
,
12
accused against another accused.
13
In making such
decision we shall be governed by recognized prac-
14
tices.
15
Mr. OKAMOTO.
16
K I K USA BUR 0
o K A D A, called as a
t7
witness on behalf of the defense, resumed
18
the stand and testified through Japanese
19
interpreters as follows:
20
DffiECT EXAMINATION
21
22
!
BY MR. S. OKA))';lOTO (Continued):
I
!
23 ~
241
2s1
I
\
Q
In continuation I wish to have documents
No. 841 and 842 handed to the witness.
(Whereupon, documents were hended
to the witness.)
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OKADA
DIRECT
... _.----_.. ' - -
- - - - - - _..
MR.
S~
.
~--~-----------------.--­
OKAMOTO:
May I have read the last
question rend answer yesterday.
(Whereupon, the question and answer
3
were read by tho official court reporter as
5
(,
follows:
C~m
"Q
you prove by quoting a passage or pas-
7
sages from the document 841 that those plans were
8
based upon peacetime -- small peaceti":16 budgets?
9
"A
Yes, I cnn.
To begin vlith, under No.4
10
of the preface, these words are given:
'From the
11
standpoint of controlling the pace of its execution,
12
this outline shall depend firstly on the basis of the
13
sixth war budget.'
"Next, on page 3, in the paragraph 'I,
14
15
Policy,
16
with the present situation and to establish tho found-
17
ation of our national dofense poWers accompanying the
18
19
20
I
these words are given:
perfection of armaments'
'In order to cope
~-
"I should li.lte to explDin this in detClil.
In 1936 the [lrmy believed the:; t, j_n order to cope wi th
21
Soviet expansion, it was necessary to complete -- to
22
23
24
25
replenish military preparations in the six years between 1937 and 1942.
I
I
Within the army this was c811ed I
!
'The Six Year Plan for Military Replenishment.'
After I
nGgoti8tions with the Finance Ministry, the amount of
II
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1
2
3
ot"
the budget which the War lII:inistry had originally
planneQ vms cut, and the length of the years was
lengthened by one yerr so that it bocame a seven
4
year plan, and the total budget, thirty-three billion
5
yen, which the Finance Ministry at the time gave in-
6
formRl consent ...... to which.
7
proval was given on the Understanding that -- for the
8
actual spending of this money, discussions will be
9
conducted on tho basis of the actual situDtion year
But this informal ap-
10
by year and after the whole thing had been presented
11
to the Diet for approval. lI )
12
THE PRESIDENT:
The witness should he'. \·0 re-
13
treshed his memory before he came into court.
14
is no impropriety involved in doing
15
16
17
18
19
20
Q
Thore
so~
Are there any points to be corrected or
altered in the questions and answers just given?
A
There cree
According to the record, it
was said that thirty-three billion .. - the budgct
was thirty-three billion yell •. I said thirty billion
yesterday.
And I also said that the metter will be
21
22
presented to the Diet YC'.'.rly.
THE PRESIDENT:
There is no need to reread
23
24
25
the whole of the qU8stionand
f~nswer
to mako those
corrections.
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OKADA
LIRECT
:t wish you to
1
Q
2
A With
respe~t
m~~l\:e
further explanations.
to the 30 billion yen budget,
3
this was to be used in a period of seven years.
4
this was not
5
,~pproved
formall~
But
approved by the - ... officially
by the Ministry of Fina.nce nor officially
6
'\
approved
by the Diet.
7
was taken for granted for the purpose of forfuulating
8
a plan, and on the basiis of this prepared various oth-er
9
plans.
10
11
TEE MONITOR:
In the army, however, this
Correction on the figures:
30 billion should read 3 billion.,
I
12
A (Con~iriuing)
The plan given in exhibit 841
is one of them, and this was also formulated.on the
basis that it would b-e approved -- on the basis of a
15
16
fixed budget.
The passage in exhibit 841 sqying this
outline shall depend, firstly, On the basis 9f the
- 17
18
fixed war budget, points to this very fact.
In the
year 1937 there is no other budget which J'Jas.
considere~
I.
19
to be fixed,
f~nd
it is impossible to think that the
20
21
22
23
24
25
long-range budget covering the yea.rs 1937 and -1943
was
fixed~
Leaving matters with respect to documents at
that p.oint, I should like to refer to the attached
sheet in regard to the matter of fixed budgets.
now refer you to Appendi:x: 3, Pa:('t I.
I
That is page 21
-----------------
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18;293
DIRECT
OKADA
-----
--------------------------~.
I refer to the vears 1936 to 1943
1
of the exhibit.
2
with respect to army aircraft production.
3
observe from the figures that the annual aircraft
4
production in Japan for the army was, in 1936, 522
5
planes; 1937, 745; 1938, 1500; 1939, 1450; 194 0, 1390;
6
1941, 1380; 1942, 1220; and in 1943, 1050.
7
figures cannot by any means represent any idea of
8
world domination.
9
upon a very small budget.
You will
These
It is clear that it is based
10
THE PRESIDENT:
Brigadier Quilliam.
11
BRIGADIER QUILLIAM:
May tt please the Tribunal,
12
it is submitted that the document must speak for
13
itself.
14
15
16
17
18
19
This witness can't interpret it.
THE PRESIDENT:
No.
Practically every day
I state that we will not be influenced by opinions
but only by
f~cts.
I shall continue to state it
every day if necessary.
But the prosecution's
witnesses offended in that regard also, among them
Mr. Liebert, to whom this witness is replying.
But
20
21
oue offense doesn't justify another.
Q Mr. Witness, please do as Mr. President said.
22
23
24
25
Will you please refrain from expressing any opinion
here.
Merely give us facts.
Please continue your
explanation.
A For instance, in 1943 the total annual army
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aircraft production rose to 1505 in the month of
1
August.
2
3
4
5
6
7
THE MONITOR:
Instead of "annua1 1l the witness
said "monthly" production.
A (Continuing)
Correction.
Army aircraft production jumped
in June 1944 to a monthly production of 1505.
Q In other words, vour quotation from court
8
exhibit 841 means that the figures quoted from court
9
exhibit 841 is quite apart frOm the actual figures,
10
the actual production; wartime procuction has no
11
connection, is that 1.lIlhatyou mean?
12
A Yes.
Another point that I vl1isb to state,
13
that in later years the production of aircraft has
14
decreased.
15
Appendix 4 and Appendix
16
I wish to say the same with respect to
5.
Appendix 4 with reference to arms.
Now,
17
taking the year 1936 in arms production as 100, that
18
represents 34 million yen.
19
the highest point was reached in the year 1940 and
20
tqereafter there has been a gradual decrease, and
21
22
23
The index here shows that
when the index for the production of arms reached the
highest point the amount in money was no more than
t\6 million yen.
24
N.ow, referring to Append ix No. 5 with respect
25
to the production of shells, the index reveals that
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1
2
the highest point was reached in the years 1941 and
'42 and decreased thereafter.
Q Mr. Witness, I do not wish to interrupt, but
3
4
I wish to remind you that should you speak a little
5
more softly I think it would be easier to understand
6
you.
7
A With respect to the production of shells as
8
expressed in money, the nighest point showed a cost
9
of not more than 70 million yen annually.
The years
10
1941 and '42 represent the height of the war in the
11
Pacific, and does not
12
production amountw
13
14
15
representD~r
any means a small
Wi th respect to tanks, I sha 11 dispense 11\1i th
details or heavy explanations.
Appendix No. 7 shows the wartime production
16
of various types of arms -- monthly wartime productipn.
17
If you would notice in this chart showing the monthly
18
production of principal arms in wartime, the figure
19
for tanks, including armored cars, is not more than
)
20
21
fifty a month, in spite of the fact that this
included plans for the promotion of tank production.
22
23
24
25
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OKADA
B
~
, 1
a
2
r
t
t
3
&
4
Y
e
5
1
d
e
n
Q
}
Referring\again to court exhibit 841,
do you wish to say -- do you mean to say that this
preparation had no relation whatsoever with future
war~?
THE MONITOR:
That this plan had no relation
wh2.tsoever with any war in the future?
6
TEE PHESIDENT:
7
I.
Here is another opinion.
It
"
8
seems hopeless to try to correct this position.
9
0.0
We
not Imow the opinion is expressed until we hear
10
the translation.
11
all.
12
supppsed to
13
is Sl1.pposed to know everything they are going to say,
14
that is, counsel examining them in chief, and cot'msel
15
should eliminate opinions from the proofs of evidence.
\
{
DIRECT
I do not know ho'w to overcome it at
We must hold counsel responsible.
s~eak
from a proof of evidence.
MR. S. OKAMOTO:
16
These men are
Counsel
Mr. President, it may be a
17
misunderstanding on mY' pa.rtbut I was merely asking
18
~,vhether
19
future; that is, the plans given in exhibit 841 were
20
actually used or not :tn a \var in the future.
this court exhibit 841 refers to wars in the
TIm PRESIDENT:
21
22
day.
23
Incident, as you call it.
24
25
He said they were not yester-
He said they were abandoned after the China
QAccording to the statement given by the
~"ritne$s just nov], the -::igure/ of annual budgets seem
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to decrease towards the end of the fiscal yea:r;
1
why is this?
2
A
3
4
,
6
7
r'
/
It was merely planned in accordance with
the arms replenishment plan and amounted to nothing
more than that.
From court 0xhibit 841, appendix 3, part 1,
Q
we see there seems to be a considerable increase in
emoluments; how do you exp:!-ain this?
,8
I
A
9
10
11
The army pInna
was 700 planes.
production, capacity in 1936
In 1937 the production was 745
planes and in 1938, 1300 planes had to be produced;
and therefore" in 1938 unless the tank capacity were
12
doubled, production of planes of that figure would
13
be impossible •
.
"
~
14
Q
Is your explanation ended?
A
If necessary--
15
16
"
'I do not particularly ask for further ex\
1·7
18
19
20
21
planation.
this word
Should the demand decrease then, I believe, .
Nexpan~io~1
pretat1on.
is liable to cause misinter-
What have you to say to
mean that there is some kind of a
thi~?
Do you
consci~usness
of
war ahead?
22
23
24
25
A
The decrease in use and demand is under due
consideration and this is
this meaning is well
expressed in exhibit 841.
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THE MONITOR:
Should be well expressed.
1
For instance,' in Manchuria there is a plan
2
·3
4
,
\
6
I
to meet depression, that is in the event of decrease
in munitions production.
THE MONI,\,OR:
item
5
in the Japanese text.
THE INTERPRtTER:
7
,
I
It is contained on. page 4,
Will the Tribunal bear with
8
the Language Section?
It is very difficult to find
9
passages, the passage referred to, because the page
/
10
and the lines do not correspond.
THE
11
PRESIDE~~:
The Tribunal is satisfied
I
12
tha t you
, al"e not to blame.
THE INTERPRETER:
13
14
A
(Continuing)
Thank you, sir.
I am referring to exhibit 841
15
under "Outline of Expansion.
16
Continent," an item to the following effect:
1-7
"Countermeasures against depression and development
(1)
Building up on the,
;
18
"9f export measures. tI
depr~ssion
Whereas such countermeasures
19
against
20
measures were
no~
21
was a general
e~pansion
22
that in the ev\'.?nt there should be any decrease in the
23
dema;nd of munitions or war materials the possibility
24
of such depression could be countered by the fact that
25
have been taken :i.n Manchuria, such
taken in Japan inasmuch as there
in the manufacturing industries;
,the general industries in Japan 1,"<;ould be able to
i
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a bsorb the excess power.
1
2
3
Whereas in Nfanch ur:La there
were no government-managed arsenals, in Japan there
were a number of such arsenals and government-o",vned
factories so that in the event production decreased
4
this would not necessarily lead to any reduction in
5
6
,
7
8
civilian demand inasmuch as production by government ...
owned factories and arsenals could be decreased and
protection given to civilian production enterprises.
THE PRESIDENT:
9
Witness, would you speak
10
softly, please?
11
having some difficulty in understanding you.
12
A
Apparently the interpreters are
(Continued)
With the decrease in the use of
13
munitions goods it was anticipated that a depression
14
in this industry uould come around 1941 and 1942,
15
and it is in the light at such an anticipation that
16
in this plan, plans 1,7Gre made, countermeasures were
17
considered insofar as the r'la tter related to Hanchuria.
18
Q
According to court exhibit 841 is there any
19
room for interpretation in this uay that thero was a
20
civil - ... civil organs to supplement any measures T!hich
21
were not actually covered by the military budget for
22
23
24
25
national defense measures?
THE MONITOR:
Correction:
the plan given in oxhi bi t 841?
~;vcrc
With regard to
thero, aside from
the military budget,plans :or state protection of
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18,3 00
DIRECT
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1
civilian production and industrj_es?
2
replied "Yes."
3
A
(Continuing)
The vdtnoss
That was plannod
"~!i th
refer-
4
ence to the aircraft industry.
:>
goal for army and navy aircraft production was 3000
6
but the plan called for plant installations which
7
would have the capacity to produce 10,000 planes and
8
this plan
9
gcvernment measuros.
TIUS
In peace time the
to be furthered through protective
Re:terenco to this matter is
10
found in appendix 3, part 2.
11
plant capacity for peace-time production of aircraft
12
13
14
15
This shows that the
was to be placed at 10,000 planes a year but that
actual production
~as
to be limited to 3000 planes
a year and that the balance of the plant capacity
unr'.sed 'Was to be given government protection.
16
However, this was not carried into effoct.
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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18,3 0 1
DIHECT
OKADA
In so far
Q
1
2
3
thu ;:;ircro.ft ;)roduction 1,s
2.S
concerned ~ it seems that this
taking for Jc.pnn.
W<".S
n very big undl,r-
",Thc.t do you so.y w:..::s the notive for
what purpose?
this
4
A
This was based uron fe2r nnd apprehension
5
of Soviet Gxyo.nsion, c:nc. tho.t it vms the desire
6
thut even
th~ufSh
the budget-allotted for Dilitnry
7
8
9
10
11
purpos e.s wns
8.
senll one that the utrJos t Ja::n:m could
do would be devoted to the pronation of the aircraft
industry; but in thu eVlmt of [m energency all efforts,
however
s!~all,
could be concentrn ted on the single
12
point of incrs.e;'lsing Japanf s cir power in meeting the
13
si tuntion.
Q
14
In saying thGt this C'lircroft industry w[:s
15
projl::!cted o.s n r.182sure of dE::fen38 1..1gainst Soviet
16
Russia, can you point out
17
court exhibit 841 with
18
thnt?
19
....r,
Yes, I can.
C.LY
res~0ct
s)ecific points in this
to this -- to prove
Yes, I refer to appendix No.3,
20
l)art 2:.
21
c.irpl<:me industry based on nCltionc.l policy I:leo.sures.
22
E;s ti:::-:o. tion of wartime producti"70 povv(;r. 1i
23
24
25
IICocput8tion of objectives of Gxpo.nsion for
I should li1m
to give an explanation of this part of the ap,endix.
THE PHESIDENT:
BRIGADIER
Brigadier Quillian.
QUILLIJUVI~
It is SUbr,litted, if it
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18,3 0 2
DIRE;CT
OKADA
,i
1 I
71
ple2se your Honor, that the witness co.nnot explain
the document; the dOC'LUTIent r:.1Ust speak for itself.
The
- I
!
3
words are plain.
THE PR13SIDKNT:
4
This witness, no doubt, acted
I
p~eparing
:,
upon instructions in
this plan.
(j
state the instructions he received.
He can
We do not assume
7
for one moment that he was asked to size up Japan's
8:
pbsition in the world and prepare plans to meet it.
9
He received instructions, undoubtedly.
What wore they?
to
Tho objection is allowed, subject to that.
II
A
12
total plane
THE
13
(Continuing)~
p~oduction
In tho first yeo.r the
goal wns 12,866.
It is suggested by one of
PRESIDENT~
14
my collongues that there was a conversation in
IS
JBpanese which we did not hear.
16
lvhether there was or not.
17
should know what it was.
I could not say
Was there?
If so,. vve
I
,-
18
THE INTERPRETER:
Yes, your Honor.
We were
19
inquiring of the witness to what part of the particular
20
index he
21
chart has been made in such a manner that it is very
22
23
24
25
WI1S
referring to inasmuch as the J8.panese
difficult to locate the particular item.
A
(Continuing)
~
'Hi th respect to the division
or sharing of this production of 12,866 planes, it
vms decided that the division betw80n the o.rmy and
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18,3 03
DIR:B:CT
OKADA
---------------------------------------1
2
the navy would be r:1Dde:in accordance with the armyne.vy mobilization agreE?ment, and then,. tha t with
3
rega::r;d to the method of dividing this amount of
4.
planes, the division would be Dade between the
principnl operating force and the partially operat-
G
7
ing force at the ratio 62 to 38.
BRIGADIEft QUILLIAM:
May it please the
8
Tribunal, I suggest that whnt the witness is dis-
9
cussing at the moment can have no relevance in this
to
case whatClver;.
11
become obvious th2t the witness has taken charge of
12
counsel, Who/is not really examining him at all, and
13
therefore a great deal of time is being wasted over
14
matters that are utterly irrelevant
or, at any rate,
,
15
have a very faint reference to this matter.
16
I respectfully suggest that it has
r,-'!R. S. OKMJOTO:
Mr. President, I wish to
17
add one word.
18
called for becGuse the testimony given by the witness
19
now is in refutation of J.1r. Liebert's very strong
20
21
st~tements
The words of the prosecutor were un-
to· the Court.
Nr. Liebert said that
By court exhibit 841 and 842
~- claim~d
that this was a great
22
preparation for the Pacific War -- for the China
23
Incident and thu Pncific War.
24
25
THE BRESIDENT:
I will tell you agnin,
without hope of achieving anything, that we are
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18,3 04
DIRECT
OKADA
---.---.----------.--~
: disregardin.g Mr. Liebert IS orJinions? ,::mc you need not
cross-examine about them.
2
3
IviR. S. OKAMOTO:
4
what Nr. Prasident has just said.
:>
of the fact thnt the figures and the plc.ns given in
G
court exhibits 841 and 842 involve --
7
THE MONITORg
I understo.nd very well However, in viow
I understand the words of tho
Pr8sidentvery well, but inastlUch as the plans,
9
exhibi ts, 841 and 842, involve very minute figures
to
and detailed plans, I submit that it is necessary
1I
for the formulator and drafter of this plan himself
12
to cone to the Tri bum! 1 and explain the neaning and
13
purpose of some of these items.
1.4
THE PRT!.i'SIDENT:
15
fifteen minutes.
16
17
(~.n!hereupon,
i
18 \
I
'19
20
Po will rocess for
o.t 1045, a recess vms
taken until 1100, nfter which the proceedings wore resumed as follows:)
1
I
I
211
221
231
241
I
?5 \
-
I
j ------- ------------------------_. _._-- ----_.._----..----_._-_.. _-----_ . - - ._----- - - - -
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If ,305
OKADA
G
DIRECT
MARSHAL OF
1
l'
COURT:
The Interna tional
e
e
2
n
3
THB PRESIDENT:
4
LANGUAGE ARBITER (Major Moore):
b
e
Military Tribunal for the Far East is now resl"Jed.
l'
~...
T~
Major Moore.
N~.
Presi.
g
5
dent, with the Tribunal's permission, we submit the
&
6
following language corrections:
G
7
Record page 18,275, line 15, read "1 billion
0
1
8
d
b
57 million. u
9
Line 16, the words of the interpreter should
e
l'
10
g
be corrected according to the above_
11
12
.13
Record
page 18,285, line 2, read "3nO
,
Line- 5, read "1 billion, 400 million."
million. II
Line 7 and 8, read "2
billion.~
14
Record page 18,286, line 12, delete
15
"thirty."
16
ThE i-<liESIDENT:
17
Iiffi. S. OKAMOTO:
18
19
20
21
Mr. OKAMOTO
OUr
On our pnrt, it is not only
intention merely to refute the interpretation of
exhibits 841 and 842 but, on the basis of the figures
given therein, to prove that there was no aggressive
22
intention on the part of
23
China Incident nor
24
Japan ..
25
y
th~
THE PRESIDENT:
J~an
and that neither the
Pecific War was foreseen by
Obj.ection upaeld.
not want opinlons.from the witness.
We do
I do not think
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18,3 0 6
OKADA
DIRECT
you fully appreciate the difference between n state1
ment of fact and a statement of opinion.
Maybe it
2
does not count so much in Japanese courts as it does
3
4
5
6
in other courts.
That is rendily understood.
But
you must acquire that understanding if you are to
efficiently
eX~lmine
In your
7
v:-i tneSSGs before this court.
summ~tion
you can nsk the Court to
8
draw the conclusions which you wont the witness to
9
give.
Th8re will be nothing to prevent you, looking
10
at the figures, from inviting the Court to draw those
11
conclusions.
MIt. S. OKAMOTO:
12
13
~Mr.
Pre sident, even in
Japanese courts there is more emphasis laid on facts.
THE PRESIDENT:
14
In this court emphnsis is
15
Inid wholly on facts unless you h[;ve
16
b ox.
17
An
expert in the
\
1m.
S. OKAMOTO:
Mr. PreSident, if it be
18
permitted to go into further detnils about the career
19
about this 1;,ritness, I believe it can be said that he
20
21:
22
23
is a very authoritative witness.
THE PRESIDENT:
an expert.
We refused to declare Liebert
This subject does not call for expert
testimony, not this particular section of it.
24
MR. S. OKAMOTO:
I will reframe my question.
25
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18,3 0 7
OKADA
1
BY
DIRECT
''lR.
"
Q
2
"1
We are inquiring as to tho
location of that passage referred to.
5
G
Court oxhibi t 841, Appendix 3, part 2.
THE MONITOR:
3
4
S. OKAMOTO (Continued):
NlR.
S~
OKAMOTO:
The part which the vrit-
ness referred to a little while ago.
7
THE MONITOR:
This is with respect to
8
estimation of wartime productive power, Appendix 3,
9
part.2.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
THE PRESIDENT:
to avoid this delbY.
ing was the
\lVO:!.'
Some means Dust be adopted
This is dreadful.
st experience
VIe
This morn-
have he.d.,
We may
have to ask for an amendment of the Ch8rto.r so far
as broadcasting'
J[~panese
is concerned.
It is not
necessary in any trials in our national courts; it
is not necessary in the interests of justice.
It
17
is done for propaganda purposes.
Why couldn:t you
.18
get this witness to SW€Dr an affidavit as you did
19
20
in the case of other witnesses?
hIR. OKAMOTO:
21
22
23
However, we could,not get the translation out in
time.
THE PRESIDENT:
24
25
We did prepare an nffidavit.
Well, wait until you can in
the future.
MR. S. OKAMOTO:
-----
-'------
----------
We are more than- ---half way
---~~-----~--
- - - - --
-~----
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18,308
OKADA
DIRECT
I
1
2
throughl' sir.
in avery short form.
, THE MONITOR:
3
\.
Hereaftor, I shall frame rny questions
Inasmuch as we are more thEm
4
midway in the course of the direct examination, I
5
should like to frame my questipns as briefly as posomitting a number of points that I. had in-
6
sible~
7
tended to ask.
THE PRESIDENT:
9
.. ;.
I hope that you will try
to finish before lunch.
10
MR. S. OKAMOTO:
11
THE
12
evidence is
13
ago.
P.~iESIDENT:
"
S~~~
I shall try.
The range of this man 1 s
that you should havo finished long
OKNvIOTO:
14
MR, S>
15
court exhibit 84-1~ and I
16
842 ..
I was nearing the end of
was
just about to be~1n on
May I continue with the questicr.. L1g'r'
,17
I
THE PRESIDENT:
18
19
The t is wha t I '.vant JTou, to
do.
20
21
22
25
24
/
25
L -_ _ _~_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
J
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18,3 0 9
OKABA
I
I
DIT.ECT
----------------------
BY 1',1}:
0
1
So OEA}'OTO (C or: t inuec1)
referring to the last part of the Appendix
2
3
~
Three,
ca~
you
~0int
out exact]v the passare -- the
4 exac t ras sage
THE MCl'
5
ITo:q~
Carl yeu expJain or preve by
6
the use of figures that the T,lan "JJas dr'acim
7
measure of defense against the Soviet Union?
Yes.
8
9
U'l:"l
as a
Sneating simply) I mav speak cf the
ArD17 as being the nrincipal force to be used in the
10
event of such an errergency ard give the airplane
11
nroductio~
in that conr.-action.
'!e will jump to Court ex:;i bi t 842.
12
I
13
understand that exhibit 842 consists of three parts.
14
Will you explain the relevancy of it?
15
16
THE
19
20
21
Why it is divided irto three
parts?
17
18
r1LrITC~;:
A
Part
T':JO
was a plan drafted by the t:inistry
of Qar and nresented to the Cabinet ryith a desire that
it be materialized.
This "vas the nrepa:,'ation for
the drafting of this was compJeted on
~ay
29th and
was tendered to the Diet the day after or irrJ11 edia tely
22
after.
23
The second part consists of
~aterials
to
24
be used fer reference purposes Dointirg out items
25
which ought to be realized in conrection with Part Cne;
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18,310
OKADA
DIRECT
1
and we,
2
seme of the items set forth therein.
ourselve~,
did rot necessarily agree with
Herice, it is
3 designated as a tentative\ or draft plarj of the
4
Mir.istry of War and has not beer officially subrni tted
:;
and Vlas
~ot
6'
officially
Part
Th]!:~e
su~mitted
to the
Cahiret~
consists of a plan dravm up by'
7
the Cabiret in accordance with the Army draft plan
8
and wa's apnroved and decided upon by the Cabinet
Councilon;J'anuary 17, 1939.
10
11
12
13
14
15
THE MCNITeR:
I
r
I
I
1
I
I
The correction was .made in
Japanese, but it is unnecessary in English.
I
A
(Continuing):
This became a ... - this '.'Jas
given a Cabinet decision a year and half later and
tqis is as a result of the outbreak of the China
Incident.
Although the Army plan called for a
16
five-:-year plan, the Cabinet -- it was une.veidable that
{
17
""
,
-
the Cabinet revised this plan as a four ... Year plan.
18
In addition to these three divisions there was
19
.20
21
22
23
another plan formulated by the General 'Staff Office-another five ... year plan prepared bv the Gelleral Staff
CfJice.
Q
Referring to Part Three concernir,g the
24
expansion of armaments--expansion of production, was
2:>
Mr. YOSHnm, whc testified here yesterday, Minister
of Industry and Commerce at that time?
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18,3 1 1
DIFlECT
01.ADA
-------------
A
1
2
and Industry
!=?eferrin§, to Court exhi bi t 842, Part 01:e,
Sumrrary of Five-Year Program of Important Industries,
5
prepared b'i the War Mirl.stry ,
6
to the Cabinet?
THE MONITOR:
7
8
Cor~e~ce
at the time the Cabinet decision was taken.
3
.4
He was not Minister of
No.
VJRS
this ever
~uhmi tted
VIas it ever submitted
to the I;Cinistry of Commerce and Industry?
9
A
No.
10
Q
Was Mr. YG'SHINO, Shinj i, Einiste:r of
11
Industry and Commerce then?
12
.13
14
This plan was prol')osed to the Cabinet.
A
and
He 'tvas not invested as l\.linister of COIDIJ1erCe
Ir~dustry
Q
at the time this proposal was made.
Heferring to Part Tvw, :Resume of p,olicy
15
Relating to Execution of Essentials of Five Year
16
Program of Important Indus tri@\s, was this ever referred
17
to the Cabinet?
18
19
20
21
22
23
THE J'EmaTOF:
A
Or to the varicus ministries?
This second Dart was not at any time offfci-
ally given -- presented to any governmental departl"1ent;
but I do recall that it nas ShOWL just merely for
reference purnc ses to t1:'\e competent departments in
charge.
24
Q
However, did the
Mini~ter
actually see this
25
or not?
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18,312
OKADA
DIHECT
, ------_._---'--------
1
2
3
4
A
You
Q
Yes, Part Two.
A
1 think that they, the Ministers, have not
the second, Part Two?
seen this plan.
qoncerning' the proposal of the General
5
6
~ean
Staff, what attitude did the War Ministry take?
A
7
At first the General Staff Office's
8
Proprsal for the Expansicn of Important or Essential
9
Industries, the War Mipister gave it the cold shoulder,
10
callinp' it a pJan impossible of realization -- inmos ...
11
sible of execution.
12
ardently and
13
realizing the industrial expansion 1;lan; ard I recall
14
that the time was around Auril, 1937.
15
or three months previous to the Lukouchiao Incident,
16
that is the Marco Polo Bridge Incident.
17
18
19
20
21
~
m.mzu
I wQs the only Derson who
~ervently
advocated the recessity of
That Was two
iNhat interest did Vice-]Cinister of War
1
,.
i
!
take in thi s?
A
r'i th reference to which document?
Q
Will you please state briefly the attitude
of the War ].IinisQy in general concerning the propc sal
22
made by the General
Staf~?
23
A
Of course, the attitude was different
24
dependirg en the time, but when the General Etaff
25
nroposal nas made the entire War Ministry save myself
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18,313
DIRLCT
OKADA
------------1
showed no interest
2
the War Ministry personnel began to realize that tbis
3
was an important measure for the "'0urpose of executing
4
the national policy, the higher cfficials in the War
5
Ministry including UI\!IEZU became very pesi tively
6
interested ir the materialization of the proposal;
!
7
but with reference to exhibits 841 and 842 there is
I
8
a differer:ce ire General
9
~ith
i~
it.
However, later cn, after
urEzut s
respect to 841, ourely military
~t
~atters,
10
he did not show any particular interest.
11
before the outbrec,.k of the China Ir.cident the
12
Ministry offiCials did not have any deep interest
13
in the c.uestioI: of how to guide or
-14
!
j
attitude.
the time
I
j
~-/ar
lead the muni tic,ns
industries.
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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1[,314
OKADA
DIRECT
However, with respect to exhibit 842, inasmuch
M
0
1
as the fact that its subject matter is quite political
r
s
2
in nature it drew the attention of the officials in the
e
3
&
W
0
1
f
War Ministry to the extent that in the end they became
4
,
active supporters of the plan.
Q
6
P1eas~
for~ulatin?
1
A
8
state the reason for the general staff
an industrial plan?
At that time it wa.s the general staff wh1.ch
felt most apprehensive in connection with the national
9
power as well as military strength of the foviet Union ..
10
THE
.. ~
~mNITOR:
Strengthening--
11
THE INTERPRETER:
1Z
power
13
~s
A
14
~trengtheni:lg
of the national
well as the military power of the foviet Union.
(Continuing)
And furthermcre, it was because
modern national defense rested upon a strong industrial
l'
foundation.
16
The intentions embraced by the operational
17
18
authorities vis-a-vis the industrial -- industry
19
the intention or ideas entertained by the operational
20
I
-~
authorities with respect to the expansion of industries,
21
At that time the Chief of the 8econd @ection of the
l2
General
23
later became Director of the First Division of the
241
was
~taff
Office was Colonel
I~HIHARA,
Kanji, who
General Staff and promoted at that time to the rank
I
I
I
2)
of Major General.
General IbHIHARA was what might be
I
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18,3 1 5
OKADA
DIRECT
1
called the first propelling force of the industrial
2
plan and I have been frequently informed as to his
3
intentions, both directly and indirectly.
4
to my knowledge of General ISHIHARA's idea whilst hoping
5
for the general
6
Japan's peace-time economy, he could not escape app-
7
r~hensions
8
Soviet Union and the need for securing the Japanese --
9
the national defense of Japan vis-a-vis that menace;
generally for the
According
construc~ion
of
with regard to the pressure and menace of the
10
and then, furthermorp, that he was very much interested
11
and concerned with preservation of Manchukuo.
In
,
12
accordance with this hope, it was General Il::'HIHARA 1 s
13
idea to replenish the national defense power of Japan
14
as against the $oviet Union in order that that national
15
defense might be secure against that power without
16
fighting.
17
With respect to China it was his hope and desire
18
to every extent possible to promote intimate friendly
19
relations on the basis of the good neighbor principle.
20
That is my understanding, yes, and I have heard him
21
say many times after the outbreak of the
22
Bridge Incident that we Must exercise every patience
23
and restraint with respect to that affair.
24
25
BRIGADIER QUILLIA,M:
l~~ay
~~rco
Polo
it please the Tribunal
it is submitted that this tYPe of evidence is
objectiona~l(
J
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18,316
The general staff
1
plp~
.
-
_ _ •___ ,__ ._ . - - -_ _
~
~
-
-
.
.
• _ _ _ •• _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ .___________ •_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ •• __
-
DIRECT
OKADA
-.-----"
Of
..
has not be produced and we have
been given now an account of General ISHIHARA's alleged
.
.
3 statement with reference to the object of the written
2
document.
4
I
r.IR.
5
b.
OKAMOTO:
I merely went. in very
thoroughl~
6
into the motives and the purpose of the plans given
7
in Court exhibit 842.
THE PREc'IDENT:
8
II
'j
J
The objection is upheld.
9 '
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
18
19
I
I
20
21
22
23
24
25
\-
.-_._-------
., . _ - - - - - - _ . __. _ - -
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18,317
I') KAD A
1
DIRECT
I shelll chc:ngE my question.
Q
How did the
2'
cabinet dispose of the plan submitted by the ['rroy with
3
referencE to the
4
fi~e
yEEr plan?
The or-binet immediatEly g2ve ClOSE' scrutiny
A
5
and study to the plan but the China Incident suddenly
6
brok out ct thc:t time.,
7
unE~oideblynecessEry
81
consideration
9
imports in the light o"f JFD£m I s peculiar <'no. snecipl
At first, howEver, it vias
for the c2binet to give due
~md stu~y
to the mc:tter of
[ldju~ting
I
LO
position with respect to trade.
11
which became nccess[ry, with thei"'crer;se in the number
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Among the items
of forces mobilized 2nd sent t..l1t to mobilize Japanes8
war materials to r VEry grart Extent.
It wes nccessBry
to effect the mobilization of war IDrteric:ls --
f'S F.'
result of this inCrE-DSe in the number of 'Dcrsonnel
mobilization
very voq;UlIlinous materiel mobilizetion
c;
for mili tcry purposes bec[rme necessrry.. When the
demend for matcrir:l wps 'mr:de it was Ground Octobor
or the end of OctGbcr 1937.
At this time it
w~snlt
20
sufficient merely to Bdjust imnorts,.ths volume Qf
21
22
23 .
24
25
imports; the supnly of
to be adjusted
It
m2t·~rit.ls
e s a wholcnf>cded
At th[1t time this W2S cr: J.l(:d the
Mflterie.l Supply Ple.n, ['nd this plc:n, with the; extension of the Incident, develoucd into thE Mc:teriols
Mobilization plan.
-------
Altogether in rel2tion with this
------
-
-----~-
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18,318
DIRECT
,
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
----~,,---- .. -----~.----.----.----.------.- ..
---..,-------------_ .. _---------_.._ - - - - - - - .-._-------- --- ..
mobilizc::tion nlen verious other very conmlicrtcc Dnd
extensive nlens were called for.
-I
,
Such being the
situc:tion, the study end considcrction of the five
yc;c~r
pl[m submitted 'by the ['rmy did not lJrogrE'! 5S.
DE. spite thE fect thLt the army c;skcd thrt the industriGl
EXryrpsion plan be
ste~tcd
from the yc['r 1937,
th~t
yco.r ended without rnything being .done vri th rcstlcct
to thEt plDn end, therefore, the four ycrr plDn went
into effect in the following YCDr, thrt is, 1938, but
evcn
~t
the outset of the yeer 1938 nothing w[s done
8bout thi.s plDn, th2t is, nothing -- rt the' str'rt of
12
the YEar nothing tn s done with r csn,ct to orgcnizing
13
the entire four yepr plEne
14
plan with rCSDcct to the Y2cr 1938 WES st2rtcd only
15
DS
16
being the CEse the entire four yerr DIan WPS not
17
orgrnized r.S [' coord inc ted four
18
end of the: four yecr period, in other words, the 11th
I
19
of July, 1939-- dorrcction:Jcnucry 17, 1939, by a
I
20
cabinet decision.
21
had been r educed to
ancnnua~
Hence, the mobilizetion
plcn limited only to thf't yeer.
ye~r
Such
T)lrn until the
I
I
The fact thrt [' five yeer plrn
four yc[,r T,llBn v!asnot completely orgrnized until the
I
end of thrt four yeer neriod indicctrs how rt the
I
D
four yc['r ulCln end thct this
I
I
I
outset of the plc::n plens were disorgrnized.
25
Q
Is this point mcd,€: clcf.r in rny of thc
- - - - - - _ -------------_._-..
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DIRECT
chnptrrs of Court rxhibit 842?
1
A
Th~
frct thFt
p~rt
one wr'S
compl~tcd
~-
2
the dr+-r, of the completion of m.rt 1 is indicot- d
3
in the exhibit, the dE:tc beinr 29 Mr.y 1937,. rnd P£!rt 3.
4
wes decided on by the cnbinct
5
rlso is'indinEtcd in this exhibit.
6
1939.
And the
This
~nnurl'
!
schEdule is -- of' production 1s indicrtcd in [; chf'rt
7
(
inJr.nu~ry
81
following pq!C 3 in the nthibit, beginning in the yer:r
I
9
1938.
-
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
Rov] wc:.s it in the crst:' of n:r.nchuri8'?
A
Pert 1 is in connectionvdth JClJ£!n' r.nd
Hanchurir. together, ;''lhc-ret.> sport 3 concerns Jenc:m.
.'
only.
when the
Vi~(r
Ninistry med€'
<: rE~qU(:st
Jepancse government with respect to this
of' the
pl~n
it
[:lso mEde the following request ... - gtve the following
instructions to the Kwrntung l':rmy in Hrnchurit.
. oth(:r
1f:T~rd's,
the
\;'~[:r
In
'::.!in:Lstry in Tokyo instructrd the
KVJTntung Army to contt ct Lnd consult with the
Governm(.nt in order to bring r.bout thE:
~\;IC'nchukuo
rH;liz(~tion
of
the plnn.
Q
21
22
Q
Whrt did the
f
NIrnch~~uo
Government do ;$bl9ut
i t·(
The ME nchuku'') GovcrnmE'nt gC'.ve this proposol
23
24
imrr~dir.tc
25
pcculir.r to f,!cnchukuo', it formulrtc·d the: J.Srnchukuo - ...
study [lnd, sup'-lement it w'i th reqUirements
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18,3 20
/OKi)DA
DIRfCT
'~r,nchukuo
1
it formulr.tcd the
2
plc:n v:hich \'[['s initieted, thet is, inaugurE'tcd in
3
1937.
Q
4
five yu'r industriDl
As regrrds the economic exnloitrtion of North
5
C!hino, development of North Chinc. , will you plcrsc give
6
the explonetion so as to cnrble us to
7
whole thing, yes or no?
THE HONITOR:
8
9
10
underst~nd
the
Con you simnly by rnswcring
yes or no tEll us whether these nlrns included the
ec!?,pomic development of North Chino?
A
11
Of course, the obteining of
12
end raw mr t( riD Is
13
the development of thct oreC',
14
side-red ?.n this plan.
Q
15
Vir
n~turGl
s expc ctc!.l from the't
w['S
r-rE
resources
[1,
but
not includEd or con-
I cr:n understrnd thrt by the effect of the
16
China Affo ir the plc:n embodied in Court exhibit 842
17
'Nes dclElyed in its execution, but vilhy w,s its scone
18
reduced?
Prior to the China Incident the rrmy require-
19
20
ment of ordincry steel wes 20,000 tons
21
with the outbrcek of the Chino Incident the require-
22
me~~t
23
of 1937 9nd to over 600,000 tons in 1938.
24
of requirement
25
requirement wo s ret' chcd the figure we s 980,000 tons.
---
---
2
yerr.
However,
jumped to over 200,000 tons in the letter helf
WC'S
The DErk
rerched -- when the ncek of the
--~-------------------------------------------
--------------- ----
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18;321
- OKADA
DIRECT
"
ThE' Nevy demE'nd of this Droduct [Iso increDsed.
1
was also grEctly
2
ne8dd~
Iron
by civilicn industries in
connection with the cohstruction of e. lcrgrr number
3
I-
of fc::ctori tcs in JCDen in aecordDnce 'Hith the demrmds
4
of the c::rmy end nE:vy.
5
Beeeusc of the fr:ct thElt such
e situetion wcs not cnticipcted ct first, the
6
ptl1ef vms thrt no more than 20,000 tons or c few
7
tens of thous.ands of tons WDS nE'cessBry for the ""ur-
8
POs€
9
of mili tcry replenishm(mt.
HoviTever, becE'.use of
the feet thE'.t such le.rge amounts of iron end stes1
10
becDme necessory it wes unevoidf;ble thct
11
E', - sufficient
12
qur-ntity of t9is product aould not be che.nncled into
13
could not be chnnneled for the purnosc of industri['l
14
for the industrial ple.ns in genercl.
15
THE PRESIDENT: -HC've you much'more?
16
MR. S. OKAMOTO ~
I SPQuld think I
17
need 2bout fifteen minutes more.
18
THE PRESIDENT:
recess until half
19
p~st
Fifteen minutes.
wOP 1d
Vire will
one.
C"hereupon, at 1200, E' rCCE::SS WC"S
20
tE'.ken. )
21
22
23
I
24
25
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --
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18,322
DIRECT
OKADA
------------
AFTERNOON SESSION
'AT
It
h
a
1
e
n
&'
D
U
d
a
1
2
The Tribunal m8t, pur!Suant to
3
recess, at 1,330.
4
MARSlffiL OF, THE COURT:
5
6
The International
.
Mil! tary; Tribunal
the Far East is n ow resumed.
~or
THE PRESIDENT:
7
Mr. OKAMOT 0 •
8
9
9 K A D A,
K I K USA BUR Q
called as a
;,.,
witness on behalf of the defense, resumed
10
.'
11
the stand and testified through Japanese
12
inter-preters as follows:
,
•
13
14
15
BY
~i:R.
Q
s.
PIRECT EXAMINATI ON
OKAMOTO (ContinueQ);
.~i
17
. .
",
.
Mr. Witness, will you co.qtlnue to ansvle'"'Jr the
-
16
~.,~
;.
question which was
A This
,
~4~
to you
~efore
the noon
r~cess?
I spoke of the fact that the
morn~ng
18
expansion plan for important industries could not be
19
continued because of the
20
21
22
23
a~trition
in the army and
navy stocks of supplies; and, tnerefore, at the outse
of the execution or the plan, of the original plan,
the goal was either reached -- or the goal was nearly
.
-
approached or surpassed only in connection with specia
24
industries, ligpt metal indUstries, machine tool
25
industry and the automotive industry.
Excuse me
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18,323
DIRECT
OKADA
1
instead of special industry, special steel industry.
2
In connection with the other industries, an incom-
3
parable sacrifice was suffered.
4
was experienced by the synthetic oil industry.
5
electric power industry and the building of train
6
coaches also suffered great
7
handicaps.
8
suffered a great loss.
9
machine industries which have some relationship to
10
11
14
The
unavoidable
handic~p,
The chemical industries also likewise
General speaking, only the
such direct war industries as the manufacture of arms
and planes achieved an.v measure of success.
12
13
The greatest handicap
THE Ii/IONITOR:
Slight correction:
Genera 11y,
only those industries which were closest to the
manufacturing of arms and airplanes
-~
for instance,
15
16
17
18
19
the machine industry -- managed to expand or grow.
A (Continuing)
And, therefore, the original
intention to overcome Japan's most -- the greatest
handicap, that is, the lack in supply of raw
20
materials, the effort to overcome this handicap was
21
in vain.
22
Q I have only one point left..
Can you point out
23
by quoting a passage from exhibit No. 842 that the
24
plan set forth therein Was not in preparation for the
25
Pacific War?
A I can so point out from two points.
------------------
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18,324
OKADA
-----_._----.. -
I
2
I
j
_.
DIRECT
- - ------_._--------------------------------
THE PRESIDENT:
It will save time to
Another opinion, but let it go.
li~ten
to it and then disregard
i
3
4
it.
Q Please try not to express your opinion but
5
point out facts from this affidavit -- from this
G
document.
7
8
9
THE PRESIDENT:
You invited him to express
an opinion.
A One point is the goal in the production of
10
synthetic oil as expressed in figures.
11
is with respect to the speedy and epical efforts to
12
bring about self-supply in raw materials without having
13
to depend upon. impol' :;S, which is so stipulated in
14
15
16
l7
18
19
Another point
this exhibit.
Q Would you add a brief explanation to your
statement, because it does not fully explain what
you want to say.
A In order to prosecute the China Affair to
the extent ·of its scope as of 1941, the consumption
20
of petroleum would be a'S follows:
aviation .gasoline
21
22
23
24
25
and ordinary gasoline, 230,000 kiloliters, and
1,050,000 kiloliters of heavy oil.
The prodl ' ction
goal for gasoline in the last fiscal year of thi~
plan was, for Japan with respect of gasoline,
290,000 kiloliters; Manchuria, 330,000 kiloliters;
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18,325
CROSS
OKADA
1
crude oil in Jap:m, 850,000 kiloliters; and :Manchuria,
2
280,000 kiloliters
Q
3
4
-~
180,000 kiloliters.
What do you meclTI by "try not to depend as nuch
as possible on outside supplies"?
A Which means that even in wartime the necessary
5
6
imports of war materials would be continuec.
That is,
7
to continue imports from the outside but not as
8
to.. continue imports from the outside as rruch as
9
;?ossible, and that is because Japan relied for its
10
supply of these materials to the Anglo-American bloc
11
and,
12
be relied upon for supply from th:'_::j bloc.
13
14
15
therefo~e,
MR.
s.
18
OKAMOTO:
~t~
"~".c-ore
.....;t .... .l..
,
have to
I conclude my examination.
The prosecution is free to cross-examine·him.
THE PRESIDENT:
16
17
materials wO:lld,
Brigadier Quilliam.
CROSS-EXAMINATION
BY BRIGADIER QUILLIAM:
Q Witness, you told us yesterday that the plan,
19
exhibit 841, was not shown to any other ministries.
20
Do you say that it was not shown to any ministry -- any
21
other ministry?
22
A You are referring to exhibit 841, sir?
23
Q 841.
24
25
A It was not shown to other ministries.
BRIGADIER QUILLIAM:
All right.
I ask that
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18,3 26 , ,
.,
OKADA
,
--,-,------.---,-.-.-.----..:::~--..-----.-------.---.- ... -- ...._----_ ..
__
._---_..
.
_ - - ---
1
youi' Honor:.
2
~~hereupcn,
3
THE MONITOR:
5
6
Brigadier Quilliam, can ycu
give us the prcsecution document numbt:lr.on that, sir?
7
BRIGADIER QUILLIAM:
8
THE
Q
9
10
I
111
12
13
1.4
15
I
16"1
17
~mNITOR:
Now-,
20
you~
Witness, you will see that that is a
,
A
This is in reference to exhibit 842
Q
842~
A
The plan which l said tva,s !'lct shown' to other
,
ministries was that given in exhibit 841.
Q You nctice that this is dateCi the
~~ntn of
Do. you hat ice that?
do.
i
'j
Q Do. yau see that it is entitled an "Outline
af Japanese Army's
21
A
22
Thank
exhibit 841.
A I
19 I
2946",
Prosecution No.. 2946.'
kind of summary or extract from the Five ... YeRr Plan,
June 1937?
18
Yes~
Fj)V~~Year
Plan"?
\
I
I
!
II
I
i
\
I
, 23
241
I
!
I
25
handed
to. the witness.)'
4
Ill,'f
w~s
a document
I
---'-------
I
.. _ _ _ _ _ _ _.. _____ .. _ _ _ _ t,.
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18,327
OKADA
CRC~S
Q
1
or summary from exhibit 841, the Army's Five Year
2
Plan?
3
4
A
I do not.
5
Q
Very well G
We
~ill
leave that for the Tri-
bunal to judge.
6
Now, I want you to look at the last page,
7
8
the memorandum to the accused HIRbTA.
9
what I moan?
10
A
11
the pessage.
12
Q
13
No, I do not understand yet.
Do you see
I cannot find
On/the last page, the memorandum signed by
AKIYAlvlA and addressed to HIHOTA.
Have you got i tl?
14
A
Yes, I have.
15
Q
Who is AKIYAMA?
1;.
I do not know.
Q
Now, if this plan is the plan in 841, you
16
./
Do you not agree that it is really a report
,
17
18
will see from this note, will you not, that it was
!
I
19
I
shown to the other ministries?
20
:t will read part of the note before you
21
I
!I
"This report enclosed herei'd th is an extract
!
from the note shovm to me ccnfidentially by the Jirmy
1
reply:
22
23
side.
Every Ministry will set to mako a draft through
241
i
this line.
25
And, as soen as the programs have been
drafted, they should be submitted to the Cabinet
...
_-_._---
._--
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18,3 28
OKhDh
CROSS
------------,----------'--------------
1
4
Now, then, if this plan, if this is an out,line cf the plan in exhibit 84-1, obviously the ministers knevf, didn't they'?
5
A
You have used the word "if,lI assuming that
6
it was done?
7
Q
Yes.
8
A
But wi 11, you be good enough to listen to
9
explanation'?
to
Q
What is your explanation'?
11
A
If you would note the subject matter in
12
13
14
15
-----'---
Planning Board for execution."
2
3
-,--
m;}T
.
,f
tris outline c'f the army's five year plan you will
note that it is an expansion plan for raw materials
vii th respect to autcrIlobiles, machine tools, steel,
petroleum, synthetic oil, pig iron, alcohol, coal,
16
aluminum, magnesium.
,\
'",
17
Q
And are not all those matters covered in
18
exhibit 841?
19
A
20
21
22
23
to aircraft, automobiles, tanks, arms, et cetera.
The
items which you have just mentioned are all mentioned
in exhibit 842.
Th9 five year plans formulated by tho army
24
25
The items mentioned. in exhibit 841 relate
No.
t
are two:
()he, contained in exhibit 841, relates to
purely military items.
----
---------------
Exhibit 842 relates to national
- - - - - - - - - - ----------
~----- --~---
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18,3 2 9
OKADA
CROSS
----------------
--------
-------------------
-- - - - - - - - - - ,
1
defense materiels in genoral, and stretegic materials,
2
and relate principally to raw materials and fuel.
Q
3
4
And you
S2Y
that 842 was shown to all the
ministries, but not 841?
5
A
Yes.
6
Q
I see.
Now, Witness, you said yesterday that
7
the date 1941 in these plans for the end clf the period
8
had no importance o
9
of exhibit 841, appendix 3, which is
Now, will you look at appendix 3
10
English translation?
11
Witness.
U
a t the beginning of the appendix;
13
years
pagE~
21 in the
I am referring to part 1,
Dc Y(JU c,bserve at the tc::; of the poge, or
i:GoD.l to be five
hence~1I
14
A
Yes, I notico it.
15
Q
Later on, leVier down, it refers to total
16
peace time operation capacity.
1,7
see that, do yeu?
<
Do you see that?
18
h
Yes, I notice it.
19
Q
And then below that these words:
20
21
22
23
24
25
an~
You
"1942
thereafter, required war time capacity, first
year?"
A
Yes, I n0tice it.
Q
Does that not indicate that when the plan
was drawn up in 1937 it wos anticipated thet there
would be a
~ar
by 1941?
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18,33 0
CFWSS
1.
A
It does not.
2
Q
It does not"
3
4
Sc when it talks Dbcut the
first year of var time, what do yeu say that means?
A
This means that army Dircraft production
:5
in 1942 -- 1941, the expansion plan 142, the expan-
6
sion plan for the 140 army companies, airplane
7
squadrons, will be completed.
8
companies could be organized, it would be meaningless
9
unless they could be supplied with airplanes.
10
Q
Even though air corps
Witness) ye,u are not snsweI'ing my questiono
n
Den't those words mean plainly
12
upon as being thE:: first ye['r c;Z t:'l3 vmr?
13
A
It does not mean.
14
Q
Very wello
15
t~at
1~42
was looked
I am prepared to leave that to
the Tribunal, too.
16
Novl, will you turn to the part, it is page
17
11 in the English translation, dealing with the ammu-
18
nition industry.
19
20
21
22
THE MONITOR:
25
Mro President, the witness has
the original but we have a mimeographed copy, and the
pages don't seem to match.
May I explDin to him
where to find the place?
23
24
Have you got it, Witness?
THE PRES IDE1\JT :
Q
Cer ta inly •
Let me see if I can help the witness.
yc u look at number tvvc) paragrnph two,
II
If
Arru:l.Uni tion
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18,331
CROSS
--~.--,
1
Industry including Bombs--"
2
A
I have found this passage.
3
Q
That is
-4
"i~mmunition
I want you to go to paragraph
THE INTERPRETER:
5
6
passage, sir
7
Q
Industry including Bombs."
5
o~
that,
5-C.
Yes, the witness has that
0
All right.
Now, at the end of that paragraph
8
are these words:
"Moreover in the event of the out-
9
break of hostilities during that said year, special
10
message for the rapid replenishmont of equipment will
11
be
12
it?
13
devised~!'
j~nd
the said year
r1.(;~':}s
1941, doesn It
This is in reference to 19420
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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18,332
CROBS
.OKADJ1
.. -._----_.
s
1
P
1"
2
Q
&
Y
e
1
d
r
""
'-'
n
Yes, 1942.
3
4
5
6
7
Did I'U!ldcrstand you to say that.
rufers to 1942?
a
t
t
1 942?
Q
I see.
Do you sti.ll say that hostilities
were not (jxpected about 1942?
:::iR. LOG.AN:
If
the Tribunal please, this
wi tness has not been c(',lled as an expert as to his
: I op inion as to when
any
event was to oc cUl', and,
furthermore, I notice a tondoncy on the part of the
LO
11
12
13
14
15
prosecution to stop this witness after being asked a
question to explain why he
r~s
given certain answers.
The prosecution has been shutting him off.
THE PRES I DENT :
This ,merely goes to credi t ..
I
t
1:BE INTERPRETER:, The witness just seid,
IIMay I be permitted to explain?"
16
THE PRESIDENT:
I have not' noticed any
17
tendency to prevent his nnswering in a proper way.
18
BRIG1~DIER QUILLI.fJ~I:
All I want tt:!e w,l tness
19
20
21
22
23
to do is, having seen that reference, to tell the
Tribunal whether he still says that the year 1941
. mentioned .in the plan has no signific[mce.
THE
WITNE£S~
I regret exceedingly· that you
24
are ,as sing such judgment without p(Jrmi tting me to
25
explain just what it lneans.
As a matter of fact, I
have not yet ruplied in respect to this question.
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18,333
CROSS
OKADA
----------
Witness, all I
Q
1
ar,l
.-----~
aslting' you is this:
2
Having scen thut reference there, do
3
that the year 1941 in the plans has no significance?
4
A
yo~
still say
It is l'Jere1y un estinlo.te, and nothing more,
5
whether in this year 1941 in the event hostilities
G
opened between Japan
7
not Japan cou1Q supply sufficient aircraft to 140 air-
8
companies.
9
10
THE PRESIDENT:
BRIGADIER
thinking that;
13
14
15
the Soviet Union whether or
As it goes to credit only,
I think we have heard enough t Brigadier.
11
12
~nd
Witness, I
Q
Q~ILLIJUA:
Yes, I have been
I
V;~lnt
to deal with another subject
Mr. Liebert,in his eVidence, told Us about a
now.
p.umber of meti~ures, "lnws, and ordinances ,relating to
16
industrial rmtters. passed after June, 1937, and I
17
rE)n.in~
you of some of them,
There wns the Inperial
18
Fuel Development Company Law, August,1937; the Iron
19
20
21
I1anufacturing Industrial Lew, August'} 1937-; the Oil
Resour,ces Exploitation Law,
r~brch,
1938; an Act to
~.1inerals,
22
Promote the Product'ion of Important
23
Narch, 1938, and _thercnvar(} mny others, were there not?
Before dealing
24,
25
w~th
of
this question I
should like to settle the question with respect to
I-t h'e- -yE~3r
1942.
.. --,-------~--------------.----------.---
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18,334-,
CROSS _ B.E.DIRECT
OKADA
You answer questions.
THE PRESIDENT:
1
BRIGADIER QUILLIAM:
2
3
Hcmor, I prefer not to
4
kind.
May it ple':'.se your
q1.~3stion
a witness of this
I will conclude lay cross-exn:r:.lim::tion.
'fEE PRESIDENT:
5
L[r. OKAMOTO.
6
7
I
REDIRECT EXAllINATION
BY LR. S. OK1J.10TO:
8
Q
9
Witness, the quc .. tion put to you by the
10
prosecutor just now was a very simple one.
11
nerely nslmd you if the year 1942 wos not considered
12
os the first- yeQr of hostilities, ns it is written in
13
one of those documents; that the year, 17th year of
14
Shown, that is, 1942 is the first
15
BRIGADIER QUILLIAH:
16
year.
May it please your
Eonor? I SUb:r:.li t that is not a proper question in re-
17
direct exnmination.
18
It is
c~n
admonition to the
witness.
19
THE PRESIDENT:
20
It is an appenl to the witness
not to be stupid, but to give to Mr. OK1J\1OTO the
21
22
wQrti~e
He
I
I
:.:mswer he should have given to the
B~igc~d5.eJ:l~
not want to h8ar the answer at this
We do
stn.ge~
The objection is upheld.
24
Q
25
Then I shall refrm1e my quostion and ask you
in this wc..y.
------
--------- - _.-
-.
---
The words
tl the first vear of hostilities ,"i
. '
J
i
._----------"----"--"---
---
--~-----
---
-_..__
._---------.
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OKADA
REDIRECT
~----------------------------
1
does that
2
tonarily for natters relating to operntions?
3
they customarily used for the purpose of formulnting
4
nn operation plan?
~-
do those words mean -- are used cus-
5
THE INrrERPRETER.;
G
BRIGADIER QU!LLIAH:
7
'.
._--------------------_._----- -------------,
THE
And now, may it please
PRESIDEI~:
-I
The chance is it will be
disallowed in any case.
10
11
The 'wi tness replied uYes. JI
your Honor, the question is a grossly leading one.
8
9
Are
THE WITT,IESS:
I feel it is extremely
regrettable that this m6st ioportant question has
12
been disallowed.
13
THE PRESIDENT:
I think we will have to
14
deal with this Japanese Major General.
He is not
15
16
addressing the Japcmese L.rmy _: now.
MARSHAL OF THE COURT:
Order in the court.
17
THE MONI'l'OR:
Before that, the Japane se
18
19
20
21
counsel replied to the witness that the objection
disallowed was not directed against the question but
against the objeotion by the prosecution.
Q
22
23
24
25
Did you write those words yourself, that is,
"first year of hostilities," as appear in this document?
A
Yes, I wrote it myself.
Q.
iUas
it' wri tten in accordance with un
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18,336
REDIRECT
OKADA
1 -- ._-
1
2
.------------------------------- i
instruction thnt you received from your superiors?
A
It was no more than a consideration of
3
whether or not 'When the replenishm(mt of aircrnft
4
the plnns for replenishment of nircrnft was com-
5
pleted whether the air companies could be sufficiently
6
supplied with aircraft.
TEE MONITOR:
7
Slight correction.
y,Then the
8
organization of the aircraft squadrons and such were
9
completed, can the supply be replenished?
10
g
Now, turning to the last fiscal Y8ar of
11
this plan, was it anticipated that this
12
be continuec1I'urther or extended?
13
14
15
16
17
A
Plnns were fornulated,
QS
~lan
would
shown in exhibit
841, to extend to the yecr 1943, and therefore there
is no deep significance with respect to the end of
tho year 1941.
Q
Was a renewal of the plnn expected?
li
Yes.
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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18,337
REDIRECT
OKADA
---
3
..... ---.- ... - ----_.
I do not understand that at
of the witness the explanation of any answer he gave
4
in cross";examinatibn.
5
do not understand that I did.
Mr.
OKA~mTO,
I:~
I did I was wrong bt;tt I
do you understand that I pre-
7
vented you from getting the witness toe4plain any
·8
answer he gave in cross-examination.
9
course, a limit to any such explanation.
10
There
i~,
of
You are not
allowed to explain- the obvious.
s. O~~.';:'C:':O I had thought tho t I vJOuld be
MR.
11
12
permitted to- 6larify certain questions which had not
13
been clarified in the course of the cross-examination;
. 14
15
however, it may have been my misunderstanding.
17 '
THE
20
21
22
23
a~
PRESIDErIT~
Put the question you think
you were wrongly prevented from putting.
18
19
I
not sure whether it is a misunderstanding or not.
16
\·.i "
-- - - --
any stage I refused to allow Mr ~ OKAJmTO to gE:lt out
6
(
------
THE PRESIDENT:
1
2
------_._.- ------- _.-
]JIFf~ ~o OIC\:
.(lTO :, I felt that it was unfair for
the prosecution to point out various passages In the
doctunent which refer to the rtfirst year of war h and
not permit the very man who formulated these plans
to make an explanation of the meaning of thij'se word's."
The
witn~ss
has not yet clarified that
point~
_
I
i
i
I
24
TEE PRESIDENT:
What was the expressibn again?
25
I recollect some of it.
- .. ---~---------
You
sugges~ed
it had a. .
---- - - - - - . - - - - - - -
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-
18,33 8
I
0KAT?A
REDIRECT
)
1
technical meaning, I thought.
It J.-sfers to the
first year of war.
3
4
5
6
:MR. s, OKArOflO; Yes.
All I want to ask
-, of
,this witness is whether 'or not in formulating an
'.
operational plan such wordS as the "first wartime
"
yea~1
is not
customar~ly
used as a technical term with
,respect to the formulation of such plans.
{,-,',
8
THE PRESWENT:
The witness may answer.'
9
There is no objection •.
Q
1
!
Ple;'f,B9 explain.
11
'Ei.!f :,"I\;TERPRETER:
12
13
slowly.
A
" 14
15
. 16
.'
/
of
At nTle'time I was a , Se9I'e :.t~ry in the Board
i
Natural Resources of
th~
Cabinet
whiC~
was the
.I
forerunner of the Planning Board; and at that time I
i7
participated in the drai'ting of the Second Period-
18
National Mobiliza tionPla,ri.
~HE
19 '
20,
1
PRES:LDElIlT·:
Do you regard that as an
answer?
The Brigadier was well within his rights in
21
,
,
22
obj,ecting, in the first !(lace,. to this man r s explaining
23
:terms which have' only ,0ne meaning but he has allowed'
24
this ques tion to be put and not'tt' we have no answer to
25
i t.Ther~ is no attempt to answer the Question.,
THE WITNESS:
(
I am abou,t 00 answer tbat
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18,339
OKADA
1
question; your Hohor:
Q -
2
3
REDIRECT
Then
a.nsir~el:' ,a§brief'ly
and simply as
possible, Mr. \nTitness.
A
4
And at'that
time
the plan was formulated
5
with 193, as the first wartime year and 1911 as the
6
second wlirtiItle ye~j:i.
7
Period N~tional Mobiiiz~tion Plan was drawn up in
8
1933 witiithat yeax' as the first wartime year and
9
1934 as the second wartime year.
rEB
10
11
EVen before that the :8'1rst
PRESIDENT:
We still have no answer;
attempt to answer.
nb
12
13
14
as possible hov.' this particillar word is used in
15
drawing up an ope:cations plano
16
.'!<'
17
18
TI-IE
21
1;;Tha t the technical meaning of
ter~
"war t5_i11e year" is i.n military use.
That is
what I am asking.
BRIGADIER
I
~m
QUILLIAM~
Hay it please your Honor,
very reluctant to interfere -- interrupt Japanese
!
II
I
counsel too much but I submit that this type of
22
questioning is most
23
best.
I
obj~dtionable.
TEE PRESIDENT~
24
25
!
i
I
the
19
21
TTOTI~I'rOR:
II
The counsel 'is doing his
I
The 'I;'7i tness is utterly impossible.
THE WITNr:SS:
I am not impossible; I have, not
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- - "--------,,-----
-----!
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18,3 40
REDIRECT
OKADA
1
even said anything.
MARSHAL OF TEE COURT:
2
THE PREISIDENT:
3
Order in the court.
I do not think vIe should
I think we are well
4
hear this witness any further.
,
warranted -- indeed required -- in the interests of
6
order in this court not to hear tcis man further.
MR~
7
s'
O:(A': '0'1'0;
I will do my very best, your
8
Honor, but will you permit me to ask just one small
9
question, just one short question?
I will d0
10
utmost to have the witness ans'wer as simply as possible.
11
May it be ,ermitted?
It can be
ans~ered
in one word.
,
12
14
''T~r'I'-;-~:::3S
'1
:
Only a
,;;('r;
p -~,
::.SC'::1
of demand
all.
T}::E HJT1I'T:n)BETER =
15
The Japanese Counsel:
16
There is some
17
inasmuch a,s t:1":'
18
meaning,
19
confirming that, asking him
20
balance or comparison of demand and supply, to which
21
the witness ansvJered that it
22
balance
23
be any
24
25
J)";,,3
:J.,'-l,Jers tandi'J.g in tb,e words us ed
.:~ cb18
'!.Tords may have a different
The Japanese counsel was just merely
sup~oly
'rm3
he meant about the
merely an eff10rt to
and d8mand and see 'whether there would
def'icienci'3~3
ore vlay or the other.
BRIGP,:'lE? (WIL,LIAM:
to me"
~hat
It ha ') been pointed out
your Honcr~ that for some time tb,e \'fitness and
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18,3 4 1
OKADA
REDIRECT
1
counsel have been exchanging remarl:s which have not
2
been translated.
TEE PHESIDENT:
3
4
Well, you have asked that
question and you have received an answer, I take it.
5
Ivffi. S. OKAMOTO:
6
I conclude my examination --
re-examination, your Honor.
7
THE PRESIDENT:
8
The witness is excused on
the 11sual terms.
9
(VVhereupon, the witness was excused.)
10
THE PRESIDENT:
11
niffi. SEIOBARA:
12
~!lr.
SHIOBARA.
I am counsel SHIOBARA.
should like to have the witness
13
arm ,Takeshi,
I
called
to the vdtness stand.
14
15
.. ,"'.
16
17
18
19
20
21
I
22
23
241
25
1- -
- - - - - - - - _ . ---_ .._- --
.--
.------------ ... _--_._-----"--------
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18,342
DIRECT
ONA
o N 0, called as
T AKE S H I
1
2
of the defense, being first duly sworn, testified
3
through Japanese interpreters as follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
4
BY ]1R. SHIOBARA:
5
Q
6
Mr. Witness, will you please state your
7
the year in which y6u were born and your present
8
address -- the date of birth?
9
A
My name is ONO, Takeshi.
nam~,
I'was born at
10
Takata-Eachi, Nishi Kunisaki-Gun, Oita Prefecture.
11
graduated fl'on the Imperial University in 1929.
.'
12
graduatE:d
13
Universit:v'
14
year I entered the Ministry of Communications.
In
15
July 1935 I became Director of the }[ercantile
Marin~
the law college of the Tokyo Imperial
in May
1915; and in November of the. same
Bureau of the same ministry and then I vITas appointed
17
Vice-Minister of Communications in January 1938 and
18
19
-~:rcm
I
I
1
16
.,
a witness on behalf
I
left the same post in March 1939.
Q
Nul.', I
wj_11 show you the defense document
20
1;;~;11 ;lOl1
No._ 708,
please examine it and state whether
21
22
23
24
it is
yCQ~
A
affidavit written by you?
Yes, ttl-j ~''iffidavit was vrritten by me.
I.lI}{
·...:;~i :(,£;.'~'-\A ~
I
-:;(nc 8:;:' in evic.ence defense'
25
THE
PR1~E,lDENT:
Admitted on the usual terms.
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18,3 43
DIHECT
ONO
1
CLERK O? TEE COURT ~
Defense document
No. 708 will receive exhibit No. 236S;'.
3
4
5
(Whereupon, the document above
referred to was marked defense exhibit
2369 and received in evidence.)
fTo.
6
7
MR •. SHIOBARA:
exhibit
I should now like to read
2369, omitting such p&ssages as I regard to
be opinions.
(Reading) :
lilt is a well-l\:nown fact that Japan, ever
since the Meiji Restoration, adopted a policy of
encouragement and promotion of
eve~y
phase of her
I
industry in order to catch up, in some way or other,
13
)lith the advanced co.untries in. Europe and America.
Being surrounded by sea on all si-des and favored
15
16
17
wi th othe!" s'li table conditions, Japan had special
ad7E'.r.t'3.30 f:; ~ . c'.,;.:v,~loping her marine transportation
18
I am reading from
19
20
~"
paragraph
':X:l~~'
1 of the affidavit.
I
\f:"~
21
?:'1C;~)mFl·!T:
]1r. SEIOBAHA, we will reCess
23
24
25
were
l' e;:; :.L>E/;
as follows:)
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1f,3 44
ONO
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _.. _ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -----_.-_-----«_.---<-----<- -------- ------------ - - -
E
d
e
r
2
&
3
G
o
1
d
b
NillRSRAL OF THE COURT:
1
Intern~ticnal
THE PRES IDENT :
MR.
I
J
Tili tary Tribunal for the Far East is now resmned.
4
5
The
---
I
Mr. SRI OBARA •
I-shall resume reading the
SHIOBARA~
ast sentence on Page 1.
"However, due to her national isolation
6
duri~g
he TOKUGAWA period,. a policy was adopted to prohibit
e
r
building of larger-type" sea-going vessels and
g
9 oreign navigation so that Japan held the lowest :rank
10
11
12
in this respect.
In other VJords, there
;1J8.S
almost
othing in existence with respect to this field
ms worthy of mention.
~hich
It is only 11a tural, theJ'efore,
13
that the
14
efforts for the new establishment and encouragement
15
of these enterprises.
16
concerning these_ efforts were promulgated and the
17
J~panese
Government should have paid speCial
It was after 1887 that laws
hip-Building :::::ncouragement Law and the Ocean Navi-
18
gation Hubsidy Law came into being.
19
rvere enforced throughout the TAISRC and the early part
20
of the SROVIA periods, 'liJhich encouraged and subsidized
21
the building and commissioning of larger type vessels
22
23
24
, 25
These two laws
vhic11 were considered superior at that time."
We shall now skip eight 1i11es.
liAs a result of such measures .these enterprises developed remarkably and the total gross tonnage
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18,3 4 5'
DIHECT
ONO
1
of vessels at the beginning of SHOV1A (1926) amounted to
2
4,000,000 tons and the volume of foreign goods obtained
3
by these means was so good-as
4
volume
~f
~
come next to the export
raw silk end raw cotton.
nUnder the circumstances as mentioned above,
I
6
the scrap and build system which was
7
October, 1932, and other similar
8
primarily at the promotion of the development of Japan's
9
industries which had so far continued to develop from
LO
into effect in
~ut
~easures
were aimed
the previous period.
11
·'3.
12
"The' worldrJide economic depression after
13
14
15
16
World V/ar I ,affected Japan by degrees.
19
Jnpan t s shipping
and ship .. building industries met with extremely adverse
circumstances from the end of the TAISHO era till
the beginning of the SHOWA era.
17
18
The Scrap and Build System.
"Since the early days, Jnpan's shipping
industry was developed by importing old ships from
ahroad until her shipping came ,to rank third in the
20
world.
Th~
majority of these ships, however, were
21
either outmoded ships or inferior vessels hastily
22
23
24
25
constructed during wo..rtime.
Japan was then called a
country next to Greece in the ownership of outmoded
ships (see the appended Table I).
-IIThis fact not only interfered considerably
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18,3 46
DIRECT
ONO
with the efficiert operation of her shipping, but'also
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
gave rise to
fre~uent
disasters at sea (see the appended
Table II) around the end of the TAISHO era or at the
beginning of the SHOVlA era.
An unusually great loss of
humal1 Ii ves , involved in the'se disasteI's brought about
severe criticisms against the Governmental policy of
employing old ships.
Thus the financial depression
dealt a severe blow on Japan's shipping,
9
If
I will omit reading Tables No. I and No. II
10
and I will content myself by pointing out only the
11
points to which I wish to draw the attention of the
12
Tribunal.
13
14
TE1EPRESIDEHT~
Mr.
'SHIOBA:~A,
we are not
hearing a word in English at present.
THE II]ICIHTOn ~
Mr. President, he is now
commenting, and he is away from his prepared text.
17 .
We are waiting for him to finish his sentence so that
18
we can translate.
19 .
or Table I.
20
21
22
23
24
25
He is referring to Appendix One
i
I\IlIL SHIOBARA (Continuing):
I should like
to point out, if the Tribunal please, just the toi....al
I
figures to explain the volume or the amount of old or
I
superannuated ships in Japan's y)ossession.
II
If you
will refer to the total at the lower right-hand
corner, you will find that the total tonnage of
- ...-_._._--_ .. _._---_.
--~---
..- ..
- - . - - - . _...._----
_..
_-------_ ..
I
!
I
i
_-- .
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18,3 4 7
DEi.ECT
ONO
Japanese ships was 4,186,652 tons; and tVJO columns
1
2
3
to the left of that gives the figure 925,477 tons
showing how
~any
ships Japan owned which were more
4 than tVlenty-five years old.
We return next to Table II-A.
That is
6 the table showing the loss of human lives (dead
7
and missing) due to disasters at sea betDeen 1924
8
and 1930, a period of eight years.
And I refer the
9 Tribunal to the total given at the next-to-the-last
10
line and also to the average total given in the last
11
line lower right-hand corner.
12
in a period of seven years 2,955 lives were lost or
13
an annual average of 422.
This table shows that
Next, Table II-B, showing the percentage
14
15
of total loss of Japanese vessels of over one hundred
16
tons.
I refer the Tribunal to the last line, average,
17 total nurnber of ship losses, average, 39.3 per cent;
18
percentage a2ai:r..st number of ships owned, 1.97 per cent;
19 given in tonnage,
20
total tonnage owned,
THE
21
22
57,126 tons; percentage
the
1.55 per cent.
pnFf:IDE1;T~
That 39.3 is not a percentage
but a total.
23
THE MOFITOI1g
24
]ffi. SHIOBARA:
25
a~ainst
l1,listranslation, your Honor.
We begin at the top of page
4~
-~---~-------~-------- .. -~---
--- ..- - - - -..
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18~348
DIHECT
ONO
IIThus the financial depression dealt a severe
1
blow on Japan's shipping, till the coal freight between
2
Moji and Yokohama was reduced to an unprecedentedly
3
4
5
6
71
"
81
91
low rate of 75 sen, and the lumber freigb.t to North
America to $6.
The nurnb8r of laid-up ships increased
to such an extent (see the appended Table III) that
no other measures could be found.
"In the last analysis the excessive ship
tonnage and inferior quality of ships brought about
10
this condition.
11
tha t the Goverr.J1lent should at c'nce carry cut a thorough-
12
going readjustment of surplus ship tonnage and improve-
13
ment in the grade of ships employed, thereby iwproving
14
the condition of the shipping trade and eradicating
15
the very cause of disasters at sea.
16
Public opinion demanded, accordingly,
"Because cf excess ship tonnage, ship
17
builders received nc orders :for the construction of
18
new vessels.
19
to r8main permanentl;)! idle.
20
21
This caused ship building facilities
The ship builders were
strongly urged to rationalize the industry.
They were
obliged to resort to such tOl:lporizing measures as
22
the construction of steel bridges, (,r in extrsme cases,
23
24
25
the manufacturing of daily necessaries such as furniture, wooden clogs, and other articles.
A large
number of VJorkers lost 8mployn18nt in the ship building
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18,3 49
DIRECT
ONO
.-------------.. -.. . . _-.-. _·_------------_·_------1
and 2,ffiliated industries, and to give ·them relief
1
b@cam~
2
~~cessity.
. ,,:,ut into effect in. viev. of such circumstances, after
4
due consul tation with national ship owners f .. association,
5
·6
ship builders association,
tiohs including C'1earrien's
7
~>t
a~
well
i'The measure aims . at:
9-
If \
10.
a)
a~
labor
organiza~
unions~
8
improvement of the' condi tj.on of the
shipping trade;
11
neb)
12
'rationaliZation of shipping and the
prevention of disas'ters at sea. by the etn:)loyment of
13
. ships of better grade;
14
development of the ship building
Il(C)
15
16
;
liThe measure in .Question·was proposed and
3
o'j:
an urgent
I
industry and g1vipg relief to: the. ;U!letnployed by
additional construction of
I
17
ships~
"V/hen the . measures wer-e ;:put into effect"
18
tbe economic cbjec.tives were attained' and Shipping
19
.. ,
altJd s'hip building ir..dustries gradually I'ecovered from
20
the depression... · The attention of. the powers' was drawn
,.~
21
to Japan-fs success and both.England'hnd Norway adopted
22
similar rr:easures. ti
23
. We
24
25
no~v
skip, five lines to the paragraph
. ·marked ,"A".
\
.
lIA.
.-_.__ ._-"-
A policy 'aiming a·t' the reduction of ship
--- - - ---- -
-
- - - - -----------
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18,350
DIRECT
OKO
1
bottom is rather
2
at the outset, the military was opn.osed to it.
3
measure resnlted in scrapping
4
ships ard buildinG 300,006 gross tons of new ones.
5
In additior to this, importation of foreign vessels
6
was banned in May, 1933.
500~000
In fact,
The
gross tons of old
8
the Government :had intended was an out and out eco-
9
nomic
meE~sure
to improve the shipping trade by
to
getting rid of surplus ship tonnage.
11
ship bottoms were actually reduced by the operation
12
of the ID.p.:lsure' in Question is shown in the appended
13
Table IV.
14
liB.
15
That Japan's
The measure aimed at the improvement
of the grade of ships owned by Japan.
16
,
to war objectives.
IIThese facts demonstrate clearly that what
7
I'
contra~'y
However, what
the Government intended was superior economic
17
formance of
18
ir~dividual
ships according to the manner
of t'eir employment and speed.
19
per~
For instance, the
Government-required full speed for ships of 4,000
20
gross tons or over was usually but 13.5 knots.
21
It
is clear, therefore, that the Government did not
22
have high-grade ships of specially high-speed built
23
24
25
I
..
iT anticipation of a war.
In certain quarters it
}!as been aIle ged that Japan constructed ships for
war purpcses, because a considerable number cf the
I
I,
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18,351
DIRECT
or,TO
newly built shi-0s were of compare.ti vely high speed
1
in comparison with the cargo boats of other countries.
2
"T:1e fact is that Japanese ships carrying
3
silk directly to New York via the Panama Canal were
4
required to have nigh spec 4 s in order to compete with
5
the Americn.n tre.ns-continental railways.
6
Their
having high speed was an economic requirement.
7
8
a
9
poJicy were commissioned for the New York route
ma~ority
That
of ships built in conformity with this
shouJd clarify this point.
10
"C.
11
The rlleasure in question stipulated
that ships should be built at domestic yards, using
12
domestically produced
~aterials.
15
16
17
18
i
19
!
20
21
22
23
1
I
241
')5
i
I
- !
I
I
i
l
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DIRECT
OND
"This is the natuTc,1 result of the fact
1
2
3
that the policy was a measure to relieve unemployment."
We omit the rest of that sentence.
"4.
4
5
6
improved, excess of
enterprises well
remedied and ship building
spac~
un~er
way to recovery.
I
8
(1937) this was abolishect, and the construction of
9
up-to~~ate
srips was resumed.
This, however, was
10
but the materializatlon, with a limited amount of
11
subsidies, of the long
. 12
sustaine~
wisbes of
cerned which had not teen realized.
t~ose
con-
Competition for
13
tl:e Atlartic srin:ing tlJ'l1ong Great Britain, the United
14
Stctes, France, GeJ'Many, Italy and otters, which
15
vied
16
was of common krowledge to
17
the envy of the
18
quite natural for Japan, which was the trire·shipping
19
nation in
20
TI~1c~
21
22
23
24
25
~itt
I
I
"Therefore, afte.r the 12th year of Showa
7
".
As a result, the shipping business was
eact other in building ultra-modern ships
t~e
Japane~e
t~e ~orld
an~
had been
shirring concerns.
It was
world, to attempt tre building of ships
surpassed trep.
"5.
Policy of subsidizing ship bui1dj.ng
urder the Iron I'anufacturing Enterprises Law.
"Steel usee' for ship buildinp. in Japan wes
imported first but later the imported steel was
. replaced by home t1anufacturec steel as iron
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18,353
DIRECT
ONO
-----_._----_._- ---
~anufacturing
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
-------------------------------
industries developed in Japan.
the time imported
s~eFl
At
was used, ship builders
were requested to use steel of approximately the
samp price as that used by foreign ship builders
imported steel was excepted from import Quty to
prevent the comparatively high cost of ships, and
simultaneously home manufacturec1 steel was given a
subsidy of a sum corresponding to the import duty.
8
This
was enforced from the twenties and this
p~licy
9
\.'as stipulated in the Iron
l~anufacturing
R.n.courage-
10
In 1937 this law was abolishee to be
ment Law.
11
12
13
14
replaced by tre Iron
r~anufacturing
Enterrrises Lav",
when the foregoinr proviSions were transferred to
the nevI law anc tre
sa~ne
s tirulat50ns were enforced. tt
Then we omit tre next two lines and two words,
15
16
and begin:
"It
17
of an economic d8mand to lower ship building costs to
18
the level
We'S
prevailin~
notl"'ing more ttan the outcome
in Europe and the United States.
19
"6.
20
'Ihe Iron Manufacturing Enterprise Law
The Iron r.:anufacturing Enterprise Law
'1;171'-
ich
21
was enacted and enforced at thp end of 1939 was
22
passe~
23
pose of preventing the supervision of ship building
24
yards by the Navy.
2S
of ship building, etc., in conformance with the
over the objections of the Navy for the pur-
It stipulates the license system
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18,354
DIRIX;T
ONO
--------.--------- -- - r
rereral rule of supervision of other imrortant
1
indu~tries.
2
of its nature, under control and sims at preventing
3
unnecespary competition anrl confusion among the
4
sh5.r building concerns.
5
tr.Js lavJ, the existing
6
7
Tria is a matter to be placed, because
given licenses and
Alt~oufr
t~us
~r'ip
buiJding ya.rds were
the status quo was maintained.
the provision for tbe fr8nt of subsidies
reF'e ined in the law, no subsidy was given under tb1s
9
law. il
That 1.s all.
11
12
A.t tr'is point I srou10 like to explain Table
III and To_ble IV.
13
14
15
16
17
Table III is a teble srowing topnoge of
vessels
lai~
up.
I sboulf like to cell the Tribunal's
attention to the first line, December 1932, in
resfect of tonnage of vessels laid up.
The figure
is 237,322 tons.
18
19
I
Ur·on the enforcement of
8
10
\
And I also vv"ish to refer the Tr:l.bunal to
the remarks be1ovl, which states:
It am.ounted to
20
33(',000 tons cUTin? the pf'riod betwf'en the end of
21
1930 and the beginning of 1931.
22
And Trb1e IV.
I shou](, like to point out
23
on the basis of this
t~ble
that the
~ercbant
ship
24
tonnsfe
decre&se~
from the years 1931 to '35, and
25
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18,355
DIP-BCT
ONO
the
1
cu~ve
went up slirhtly in 1936 for the first time.
This concludes my expla.nE. tj on of tbe tables
2
appended to tris affidavit.
3
4
I should like to be permitted to supplement
5
this affidavit by this one question afdressed to the
6
V'Jitnes s :
7
BY li!R. SHIOBARA (Continued):
8
Mr. Witness, was the question ever brought
9
up at any conference wbether this maritime -- marine
ro
transportation and shir building policy was in pre-
11
paration for war?
,
12
A
13
Ther~
wes no occasion at which such a
question was brougrt up.
14
~/~.
15
SHIOBARA:
That concludes my examination.
The prosecution may cross-exa.mine tris witness.
16
'THE PRESIDENT:
BrigaC'ier Quilliam.
17
BRIGADIER QUILI,IAM:
r~ay
it plf'ase your
18
P~~or,
webave no questions.
19
THE PRESIDIDTT:
20
the usual terms.
21
(~fhereupon,
22
23
24
25
The wi tnes s is released on
the witness
was excused.)
I
\
I
:MR. KAINO:
I should like to call MAYAMA,
Kwanji.
1-
'liRE
PRES IDENT:
''''ho are you representing?
I
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18,356
·
---_.
1
Iffi. KAINO:
2
TEE PRESIDENT:
3
MR. KAINO:
4
TEE PRESIDENT ~
'tbat is your name?
fry name is KAINO.
Mr. KAINO.
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
- - - ---------------------_._-------_._._--------------
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18,357
DffiECT
MAYAMA
K WAN J I M A YAM A,
1
~itness
on
2
behalf of the defense, being first duly sworn,
3
testified through'the Japanese interpreter as
41
follows:
DIRECT EXAMINATION
:;
BY
6
~m.
KAINO:
is your name?
7
Q
~at
8
A
~ffAYAMA,
9
o
Your personal history?
10
A
Research secretary, Planninp. Board.
A
13
Ward, Tokyo ..
14
Q
15
Numher 584, Kamayama, I Or c,me, Setagaya
What were your functions at the Planning
Bos.rd '?
19
A
17
The establishment of materials, mobiliza-
tion and plans, .and plans for each quarter period of
18
the year.
19
21
What is ycur address?
,
12
20
Kwanj i.
THE PRESIDENT:
11
<I·,
called as a
I
Q
~V,hat
was the material •• what do you mean
by .the material mobilization plan?
A
,
The task entails the
m~king
of an estimate
22
of supply oftnatericls and to ...... on the basis of the
23
·24
25
estimate, to supply them to various quarters requiring them.
n
That is, to allocate the stock on hand.
I shall show you a document.
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18,358
DIRECT
MAYAMA
C'~ereupon,
1
o. document YJas
handed to the witness.)
2
~ill
3
you look at part three of the document,
Outline of
w~ich
5
the plan for the expansion of productive power,
6
decided by Cabinet conference January 1939.
7
is
A
ex~ibit
It is entitled:
4
842?
Yes, I notice those words.
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
I
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18,359
rJAYAHA
'W
1
1
f
2
----~i
Ii
Q
I
I
0
s
e
with
i
)
in the
(;
in that borrd.
Q
7
c_
f[~iliar
with respect to the- expansion of nroductive power I
l~ted
r
Are you
Yes, I know thFt this plcn vms being formu-
1:,
4
1·,1
0
Do you recognize it?
this documEmt?
3
&
DIRECT
Pl$~ning
Borrd when I wps
eng~gcd
in that work
.the 'Tctericl L:obilizrtion Plc:n of which
l1:DS
8
your ere in chrrge mrd€ in order to ettnin the objects
9
2S
set out in this document?
10
~
This requires some
11
Q
PleDse explrin rs briefly rs
12
A
A cpnsidorttion of this docum0nt which gives
exnl~n8tion.
uos~ible.
13
the outline for the wc.r nroduction ulen for eXD2nsion
14
of production, it would bE: thusly from the strnd1"!oint
15
of one such
16
plrn:
17
rnd
18
being crrried into effect it Wes behind by tWt) yeers.
19
Even cftcr two y€rrs there were items imnossible of
20
execution.
21
According to this ch8rt there err the following defects
22
1.
23
year 1939 then in accordrnce with this olen thsre
24
should hrve been [nother plan
25
in the
------
2S
I who
W0S
in chtrge of
D
branch of thrt
Conclusion 1, this p18n is r very loose one
hypothetic~l,
ideclistic.
ThFt is point 3.
As r result of this ulen
Ru'sons therefore:
If this plnn was to trke effect in the fisccl
previou~
.. _--------------
--
. .-----
rlre~dy
yerr, namely, in 1938.
----- -- ---------_._-------------- ---------------
-""-'
in execution
Such· [' pltn
- ------
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18;3 60
I.IAYM·fA
/-----1
I
2.
---------------------~-----------I
does not exist c-nd this plrn
J~nucry
3
4
:5
DIRFCT
8;
9
10
11
12
, 13
14
15
16
17
formulrt(d in
!
of the 1939 fiscrl yerr.
Point 2.
VIi th respect to figures
,'S
indicF ted I
in this pIon there is no distinction made whether the
goel is for plGnt instollptions or for
whether it gives the
7
Wf'S
~roduction go~l
be rchieved with respect to
nl~nt
i
i
I
I
I
i
Dro~uction
or the gool to
instrllntions.
In
order to execute this Dlpn the following
f~ctors
ore
missing, nnmely, immed ic te or direct r(1W
mE! teriels,
subsid iory me teric Is, ['nd tronsDQrtr t ion.
Q
Mrteriol
At ony rtte do you moon to sry thrt the
Mo~ilizction
object of incrersing
PIon W[s enforced not with the
produc~ion,
expanding the nro-
ductive powet'?
A
No, the :-y[:tcricl Nobilizrtton Plen
'v"ll.'S
not
formuloted to this end.'
Q
Th(n vlhe: t wo s the purnosE, if you cr n str te
f
18
19
20
21
!
it br i(~fly?
A
-
The ::irteriols !,Tobilizrtion Pl['n involved
merely. the power of sunnly end involved the rdjustmcnt
end coordin[:tion of the nower of sunnly ['no the rllocc:-
22
tion of the supDly.
23
Q
V.!h~t
were the functions or the power of the
24
Plonning Borrd with respect to the Cillocr-tion plC'n of
25
which you testified?
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18,3 61
DIRFCT
LIAYAHA
A
1
2
3
more thrn coordinetion of this
Q
8
9
10
11
is nothing
rs it rclctcs
Hh,t do you me['n by rllocction -- v.rhrt do
you meen by coordin['tion or rdjustmcnt?
A
6
7
m~tt0r
Bo~'rd
to the verious ministries of the government.
4
5
The business of tj.lC PIL!nning
With resncct to sunnly ryowcr the
v~rious
ministries conc( rned r€'t'ort to thE. Plr:nning Boqrd
[1S
to the schedule of possible sunnly in l'ccordrncG with
their peculier conditions or circumstrnces, end,
depending on the supDly nOwer ps cr-,n 'be estimrtc:<3_ from
the
re~orts
givcn by the vorious ministries, the
PIDnning BOLrd sets un en estir;}ct(, with regrrd to
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
meeting the demends of the vrrious ministries.
Q
V'hrt do you mc[:n by meeting the demrnd?
A
For inst2nce, if cny derynd or request coyp.€s
from the rrmy or nrvy deprrtments it mey be thrt their
demrnds fre fEr beyond the sup1Jly on hend or sun . . . ly
cVDilrble.
the governmc nt rre consulted rnd th(=: [' llocr tion of
the limit€d [mount of sunnly is there Gdjusted.
Q
24
~·-h[
t he pDens if no ogreemc nt or settle;'1.cnt
is rerch€d ['s n result of inter-ministry consultotions?
.h
23
In that cese the vrrious ministries of
No Me: teT iF' Is
estc:blished
2S
long
[S
"_obiliz~
tion PIr n cc-'n be
there is no cgreemcnt {'mnng the
vprious ministries.
25
I
.---------- ----_._----------
- --
---.
----- --------
--------~------------------------
- ---
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18~362
MAYAMA
DIRECT
/"
Q
I
v~r:1ous
ministries m[lde
C1
demend
on [' 110cE,tion to the Planning Bor.rd did these ve.rious
2
ministries cle<:1rly stC'be the purpose to which they"
3
intended to use the PClr'ticulcr m2teriol they desired?
4
A
:5
Yes, det<Jiled ,'explanattons or indice.tions'
are given by all the
G
m~histries
excent the Army 2nd
the Ne.vy DeD2rtments.
7
f. ...
1"hen the
81
Q
ViThy did not the Army 2nd N2VY Ministries stC'te
cl€Drly the re<Jsons?
9
LO
I
A
Because it invoived militE'ry secrets.
Q
1fJc$
III
a cleEr st<JtE?merit of m2tters concerning naval 2nd
13
milit2ry secrets?
12
thsre any legal b<:1sis which prohibited
14
A
There is a militery secrets protection law.
15
Q
WhC't kind of materials did the Meterial
16
Uobilizstion Plen cover?
17
A
18
Q
t
21
22
23
""hC1 t were
thE'~
ma in importDnt i terns?
Whetever the YOer in which any plen is drawn
19
20
Genere.lly Ebout four hundred items.
up the principE'1 item, of course, is iron.
Q
Now, do you recE'll the c::mount of steel' materiDlr .
demsndGd by various ministries
A
II
,-~nd
slloceted to them?
I
I don 1 t. hc:ve emy defini to recollection because
24
the demends of the various ministries were extremely
25
cl")mplex Dnd voluminous.
line of the allocation.
However, I do recall the' out-
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D.IREC'l'
1
2
3
Q
wi th main
A
eTflpr~asis
J).'.mi,.
"'T-._i..h<c - ' l ' l - __ ~'lo1t
).'v1udl1y
on the navy and army a.llo£!ations.
With respect to steel allocatioYls
the C~.Hl'"l1..l.,·... ~
4
were extr{;'1l'.ely C(l"u!DlicatE:d bE:cause of the existence
I
5
of distribution control and it is therE:fore natural
I
6
that there would be differences in the figures, allocated
7
deper.lding on the year in which the allocation is made.
THE MONITOR:
8
91
10
".
T'L'I.'b~":t ... t.l:t~Oo-A
Differences in the nature of the
figures.
A
(Continuing)
The amount of steel allocat.ed to
the army and navy during the 1938 fiscal year was·
12
1,250,000 tons.
13
Q
Do you mean the year 1938?
14
A
Yes.
In 1939 there was an iI"crease of nearly
15
200,000 tons, giving a total of about 'a
16
half tons.
18
19
I
I
11
17
,I
mill~on
and a
The total tonnage allocated in 1940 was
1,650,00 and in 1941 it was approximately 1,850,000 tons
Q
You have testified a while ago that
were different.
circumstan~
Would you explain briefly the
s .
differe1'),~ .
20
of the circumstanc€s?
21
A
First, in mentioning the various different
22
circumstances I would mention the affiltated munitions
23
24
25
industries, which, if I should explain further i means
the construction of roads and sewerage with respect
to the building of aircraft manufacturing plants.
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DIRECT
TEE
1
A
2
3
MaNI'l~R:
(.Cvntimling)
}-s one ~-...£ th.e il.lA.t.II~f.\tlons.
At the outset these materials
were supplied by, civilian sources.
With the advance of
4
each fiscal year the supply became increasingly difficult
5
and therefore the allocations were considered by
6
including all such matters under the general allocations
7
for the army and navv, and the increase of 200,000 or
8
300,OtO each year naturally includes -- and naturally
9
the
increa~e
of 200,000 or 300,000 tons each year in-
10
cluded all civilian supplies which were taken into
11
account, and, therefore, the demand for steel in the
12
various years shows no very noticEable change.
13
there is hard ly any notic.eable
14
of steel each year.
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
Therefore
c.rl.ange it!.. t't t~J s11.p-pl'1 "JX11'R.:l'
THE MONITOR:
Total supply' capacity of each
(Continuing)
Therefore, as a plan the figures
year.
A
generally are around 4,800,000 tons to 5,000,000 tons,
and, with respect to this plan, in the light of various
domestic conditions there was a general ~ecrease of
about 10 to 20 per cent.
And, therefore, this decrease
22
has also affected t;le allocation to the army and the
23
24
25
navy as well -- this decrease in production.
Such being
the conditions the other branches of industry also have
been under considerable restri~tion or limitation of
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18,3 65
DIRECT
MAYAMA
1
material supply.
2
Q
Go ono
3
A
Generally,w1th respect to the army and navy
4
peace-time demand of steel in such years as 1939 to 1941
5
the total demand placed by the army and navy w1th regard
6
to this product was about 250,000,000 tons to 3,000,000 I
7
tons.
THE PRESIDENT:
8
9
Two and a half million to
three million.
10
11
A
THE MONITOR:
Yes, sir.
That is right.
(Continuing)
And for thrse circumstances only
12
about
13
army and navy could be allocated to these two branches,
14
that is, in peace-time.
15
16
17
18
19
5~
Q
to 60 pAr cent of the amcDnt demanded by the
V"a5 the iron to which you rC"ferred all produced
in Ja 'J,q,l.'?
A
No ~
Q
Then, where were they produced, where were they
obtained?
20
21
22
23
A
~nnt
can be produced out of domestic irnn are
is generally not more than 2,000,000 tons annually.
As
to the balance of two to three million tons which was
24
necessary to
25
import from the outside in the form of scrap iron, et
~eet ~omostic
demands, it was necessary to
cptera.
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18,366
DIRECT
MAYAMA
Up to what year -- up to what period had
1
2
the importation been planned?
3
A
Not only with respect to scrap iron, but with
4 respect to all materials, plans were drawn up up to
5
July 7, 1941.
6
7
Do you recall anything with resppct to plans
for fund~ -- importation funds?
8
9
10
11
A
There are two problems
importation funds.
~ith
respect to
At the outset of the Materials
Mohi1ization Plan, because of the fact that Japanese
domestic economy relied upon forejgn trade and on foreign
,
12
countries, the mobilization plan ty this very fact had
13
to consider also the allocation of foreign assets.
14
With respect to the carrying into effect of this Material
15
16
17
18
Mobilization Plan, a very great difficulty was experience
becau~e
and
su(~L
of the decrease in
i~ports
from year to year,
bqort funds were calculated on the basis
19
'I'a:~
20
(~hc~6~pon,
23
24
PRESIDENT:
W2S
Mr" Y.AINO, that is enough
at 1600, an adjournment
Tj1.,.;
_. -l. __ day
~
Marc:h 149 1947 at 0930.)
25
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