Revolution in Military Affairs:
The Wehrmacht
Alexander D McCafferty
5/28/2010
Class of 2011
Prepared for PS 440: Causes and Prevention of War
Table of Contents
Introduction
1
Theory 1: Britain and France’s policy of appeasement caused WWII In Europe
1
Background
1
The Policy of Appeasement
2
Military/Diplomatic Response
2
Counter Argument: War in Europe was Inevitable
2
Appeasement Caused WWII In Europe
Theory 2: The offensive capability of the Wehrmacht caused WWII in Europe
3
3
Background
3
The Wehrmacht and Offensive Warfare
4
Adapting to the Offensive: Rearmament
5
Adapting to the Offensive: New Doctrine
6
Counter argument: Rapid Expansion brings faults
7
Germany’s Offensive Military Caused WWII In Europe
8
Conclusion: Modern Implications
8
Appendix: Theories on the Cause of WWII in Europe
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Introduction:
Can a revolution in military affairs cause a world war? Scholars have debated the origins
of WWII in Europe since it came to a rapid conclusion in 1945. Many have come to accept the
‘Hitler thesis,’ which is that Hitler started the war in Europe and was the sole cause of it. Hitler
certainly had a large role to play in the cause of WWII in Europe; however, other lesser-known
theories still warrant discussion. The first lesser-known theory is that Britain and France’s
policy of appeasement caused the war: at many junctures, Hitler’s territorial grabs could have
been checked early by Britain and France, defeating Hitler and avoiding a war in Europe. The
second is theory is that in 1938, Germany possessed a military that was far better adapted to
offensive warfare, and this had a significant effect on German foreign policy.
Theory 1: Britain and France’s policy of appeasement caused WWII in Europe
BACKGROUND
Starting in 1937, Hitler began his policy of lebensraum (living space) occupying further
lands for Germany. He began by marching a small German force into the de-militarized
Rhineland, facing no resistance. He then annexed Austria, where the Nazis were often
welcomed enthusiastically. After that, Hitler demanded the Sudetenland and negotiated with
Chamberlain to have all German-ethic majority areas turned over to Germany. Czechoslovakia
was then removed of all its mountain defenses and a significant number of its population. After
weakening the Czech state the rest was given away at the Munich Conference and divided up
between Germany, Hungary, and Poland. Not once did the western powers directly challenge
Hitler.
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THE POLICY OF APPEASEMENT
Britain and France’s policy of appeasement was the cause of WWII in Europe. Germany
was left in a much more favorable strategic position and gained a considerable amount of
territory, population, raw materials, and industrial strength, giving Hitler the capacity to wage
war. Because Hitler was allowed to rearm without interference, war in Europe was inevitable.
Many scholars argue that WWII could have easily been prevented. As soon as Hitler
entered the Rhineland, the Western powers had a legal right to remove his troops, according to
the Treaty of Versailles. British historian Lewis Namier sums up,
“At several junctures [the war] could have been stopped without excessive effort or sacrifice, but was not: a
failure of European statesmanship…The rest of Europe had neither the faith, nor the will, nor even
sufficient repugnance, to offer timely, effective resistance…Janissaries and appeasers aided Hitler’s work:
a failure of European morality”1
At each stage in Hitler’s expansion, Britain and France could have resisted, but instead chose the
policy of appeasement. Each stage is widely regarded as a lost opportunity for Britain and
France to prevent war. Under the Treaty of Versailles, Germany was mandated to be a
democracy. Even though the Nazis were democratically elected, soon as Hitler turned Germany
into a single-party state, Britain and France had the authority to expel him from power. Each
time Hitler claimed a new territory the western powers had more rationale for action. Both
military and diplomatic action could have deterred Hitler and prevented the war in Europe.
Military/Diplomatic Response
Before Hitler was able to seize massive amounts of resources and territory, Britain and
France had the military capabilities to bring down the dictator and stave off a wider European
war. This capability was possible well into the later stages of appeasement. Reinstated, the
British and French had many lost opportunities. One of the strongest lost opportunities was seen
1
Bell, P.M.H. The Origins of the Second World War in Europe. 3rd ed. Harlow, UK: Pearson Education, 2007. 46.
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in the German occupation of the Rhineland demilitarized zone in March 1936, when (it was
widely asserted) a mere ‘police action’ was all that was needed.”2 The German force
additionally had orders to withdraw, should any resistance be encountered. Germany was in no
position to stand up to the considerably larger armies of France and Britain, and should those two
nations have determined, swift military action would have ended Hitler’s territorial ambitions.
Britain and France did not even need to use military force to deter Hitler from his
territorial ambitions. The policy of appeasement insisted on open approval of Hitler’s demands;
however, diplomatic pressure would have decidedly diminished Hitler’s power. Even just “[an]
emphatic no from England to Hitler’s aggressive foreign policy would undermine Hitler’s
prestige, precipitate a crisis in the regime, and provide an opportunity to bring down from within
a dictatorship…”3 Simple diplomatic action could have deterred the dictator, not only keeping
him from is territorial ambitions, but perhaps removing him from power altogether. If a simple
‘no’ would have precipitated a crisis within Hitler’s regime, economic sanctions or other
diplomatic measures would have been that much more effective.
Counter Argument: War in Europe was Inevitable
Hitler’s intentions were well known. Years earlier, the dictator had written a book, Mein
Kampf, which clearly detailed Hitler’s ambitions. It did not matter that Hitler’s territorial
conquests were met with no opposition; he was convinced on bringing Germany and Europe into
war. If Britain and France applied diplomatic pressure, Hitler would have still pursued his
territorial aims. If Britain and France used a military solution, there would be war. After a
massive study of How War Came, author Donald Watt clearly affirms Hitler’s dedication to war:
“Always one returns to Hitler: Hitler exultant, Hitler vehement…Hitler willed, wanted, craved
2
Bell, 46.
Von Hassel , Agostino, Sigrid Macrae, and Simone Ameskamp. Alliance of Enemies. New York, NY: St. Martin's
Press, 2006. 39.
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war and the destruction wrought by war.”4 Although Hitler obviously did not get the war he
wanted, it seems clear from his writings, speeches, and policies that Hitler was aiming for war.
For him, Germans were to be the masters of Europe.
APPEASEMENT CAUSED WWII IN EUROPE
Although Hitler’s writings, speeches, and policies inclined towards war, the policy of
appeasement allowed him the capacity to do so. Any other action by Britain and France, whether
it was diplomatic or military, could have stopped Hitler before he had the capacity to wage the
war he sought. With a diplomatic or military policy other than appeasement, “German
rearmament might have been prevented in its early stages, thus depriving Germany of the
military strength on which all else depended.”5 Hitler could not wage a war in Europe without a
powerful military; eliminating or significantly reducing the potential of German military strength
would have certainly prevented war. In his memoirs, Winston Churchill wrote that “once Hitler’s
Germany had been allowed to rearm without active interference by the Allies and former
associated powers…Almost all that remained open to France and Britain was to await the
moment of the challenge and do the best they could.”6 Appeasement was the cause of WWII in
Europe by allowing the aggressor to obtain the capacity needed to wage war.
Theory 2: The offensive capability of the Wehrmacht caused WWII in Europe
BACKGROUND
At the conclusion of WWI the Germany military ceased to be a powerful force. The
Treaty of Versailles limited the Germany army to 100,000 personnel, eliminated its air force, and
prohibited the use of submarines. By 1930, the Treaty had been secretly evaded under the
Weimar Republic, which planned on tripling the size of the Army and trained a small air force at
4
Bell, 50
Bell, 46
6
Bell, 47
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a base in the Soviet Union. Under the treaty the German General Staff was to be dissolved,
which appeared to have happened. Instead, the core group of Generals was reassigned to the
Truppenamt ‘Troop Office’ where they rewrote all doctrinal and trainings of the armed forces.
Among these General Staff officers was Heinz Guderian.7 By 1935 Hitler created the
Wehrmacht, the united armed forces of Germany, consisting of the Army, Air Force, and Navy.
THE WEHRMACHT AND OFFENSIVE WARFARE
Germany’s offensive military capability was the cause of WWII in Europe. The massive
buildup and doctrinal changes enabled the German state to successfully challenge its opponents.
Hitler could not have brought war in Europe without a military capable of the offensive. By
1938, Germany possessed a military force that was far better adapted to offensive warfare and
this had a significant effect on German foreign policy.
While the Weimar Republic took steps to begin German military rearmament, the major
changes did not occur until Hitler came to power. After he claimed the Chancellery in 1933,
German military spending grew rapidly; in each of the 3 branches of the Wehrmacht, massive
rearmament programs were introduced. These rearmament programs brought “Germany from
inferiority through parity to a fleeting superiority”8 when compared to its European rivals Britain
and France. To truly be an offensive force, the Wehrmacht underwent both structural and
doctrinal changes. The German rearmament in each of its three service branches and the
revolutionary doctrinal changes highlight the Wehrmacht’s offensive capability.
7
Heinz Guderian was a military theorist who had a substantial influence on Germany military doctrine. German
panzer forces were organized and trained based on his work, Achtung – Panzer! which detailed his theories on the
roles of tanks and aircraft in modern warfare. Guderian was a career officer and eventually became Chief of Staff of
the Army in 1944.
8
Van Evera, Stephen. Causes of War. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999. 96.
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Adapting to the Offensive: Rearmament
The German Army formed the backbone of the Wehrmacht and thus received the most
substantial increases. In 1932 Germany’s original seven divisions were translated into 21. By
1935, conscription had been reintroduced, further increasing the size of the army. In four years
the army consisted of 103 divisions, including 6 armored divisions.9 Germany was not the only
nation with armored divisions, and in fact, most of these divisions consisted of light tanks instead
of medium or heavy ones. 10 Nonetheless, this was a substantial increase from the Army of the
Weimar Republic. The sheer size of the German Army, par training and equipment, immediately
made it a force to be reckoned with.11
The German Navy was not without a massive rearmament of its own, although Hitler never
thought the navy was as important as the army or air force. Hitler did sign the Anglo-German
Naval Agreement with the British in 1935, however, which allowed “Germany to increase the
size of its navy… additionally, Britain agreed to withdraw its navy from the Baltic Sea.”12 This
removed any threat of British attack on German ports and gave Germany a free hand in the
region. More importantly, this signified the nullification of British support of the Treaty of
Versailles.13 Later in 1939 Hitler signed ‘Plan Z’ which, over a period of years, was to provide
the Navy with a massive battle fleet. Overall, the strategic position of the German Navy was
greatly improved with the British removal from the Baltic and the ability to build a submarine
fleet which greatly improved the offensive capability of the German Navy.
9
Bell, 216
Bell, 217
11
A division is typically 10,000 – 30,000 soldiers. This means the Germany Army by 1935 numbered ~1,030,000
soldiers (under full mobilization), a considerable increase from the 1930 level of 100,000.
12
Axelrod, 35
13
In addition to exceeding total tonnage restrictions, the Germans under the Ango-German Naval Agreement were
allowed to build submarines; these had been forbidden under the treaty of Versailles.
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Under the Versailles Treaty, Germany was prohibited an Air Force. However, the Weimar
Republic clandestinely evaded this provision on a small scale, much like they did with the Army.
In 1932 the German Army possessed a total of 228 aircrafts. By the time the existence of the
Luftwaffe was announced publically in 1935, nearly 2,500 aircrafts had been delivered. 14
Additionally, the equipment in the Luftwaffe’s arsenal proved to be more than capable; “the
principle fighter was the excellent Me109. The medium bombers were the Do17 and He111, the
latter being particularly adaptable and successful aircraft; and the Ju87 dive bomber had been
effective in Spain...”15 With a vastly expanded Air Force and updated equipment, Hitler had an
important tool to exert his foreign policy goals.
Adapting to the Offensive: New Doctrine
It took more than just an enlarged Wehrmacht to adapt to the offensive. Heinz Guderian, a
German General Staff Officer during the inter-war years was an instrumental factor in the new
armored warfare doctrine adopted by the Wehrmacht. General Guderian wrote on his success
during a training event attended by Hitler;
“I was able to demonstrate a motor-cycle platoon, an anti tank platoon, a platoon of Panzer I’s in the
experimental form of the time, and one platoon of light and one of heavy armored reconnaissance cars.
Hitler was much impressed by the speed and precisions of movement with our units, and he said
repeatedly” ‘That’s what I need! That’s what I want to have!’ As a result of this demonstration I was
convinced that the head of the government would approve my proposals for the organization of an up-todate Wehrmacht…”16
Hitler was deeply impressed with the training event held by Guderian, and this translated directly
into the doctrinal changes that were eventually enacted. Guderian advocated for attacking at a
rapid speed, using armor in the front and the infantry in support. This was a revolutionary
concept at the time; the infantry had always been the lead with armor in support. Additionally it
14
Bell, 218
Bell, 219
16
Guderian, Heinz. Panzer Leader. New York, NY: Da Capo Press, 1952. Pg. 30
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provided that “large armored units operating independently should conduct the deep attacks,”17
making penetrations in the enemies front line and then encircling them.
Another doctrinal change was an emphasis on the Air Force. Guderian advocated for a
strong air force to support rapid ground movements. For the Germans, “the Luftwaffe was the
Nazi service par excellence…Hitler grasped both the popular appeal and the potential power of
the air arm.”18 The dive bombers especially provided a powerful offensive striking capability.
Most importantly the armored divisions were to be supplemented by close air support. The
Luftwaffe was an important strategic and psychological element of the Wehrmacht and served a
crucial position in new offensive doctrine put in place by Guderian.
Counterargument: Rapid Expansion brings faults
The rapid expansion of the German Wehrmacht provided many challenges for the
leadership. It took a while for equipment to catch up with the surge of troop numbers; as such,
“the army’s equipment fell short of its commanders’ requirements…”19 To have a successful
offensive force surely proper materials are needed; German industry simply could not keep up
with the expansion programs. General Guderian affirms this, stating, “Practically speaking – at
least so far as the panzer troops were concerned – there could be no question for the time being
of even approaching their standard of equipment either in quality or in quantity.”20 Germany’s
military could not successfully adapt to offensive war with significant deficiencies in its
equipment.
17
Mearsheimer, John J. "Hitler and the Blitzkrieg Strategy." The Use of Force. Eds. Robert J. Art, and Waltz N.
Kenneth. 7th ed. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 157.
18
Bell, 217
19
Bell, 217
20
Guderian, 35
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GERMANY’S OFFENSIVE MILITARY CAUSED WWII IN EUROPE
Although Germany’s armaments industry struggled to keep up with the pace of growth in
some areas, the Wehrmacht remained a military capable of the offense. As mentioned
previously, the fighters and bombers deployed by the Luftwaffe were particularly capable; “For
the Luftwaffe, therefore, 1939-1940 was a favorable opportunity to go to war.”21 The Navy’s
ports were free from harassment and had begun production on a large submarine fleet. With
some elements in the Army lacking proper equipment, Guderian states, “We had therefore to
attempt to make up those deficiencies by means of superior organization and leadership.”22 Even
though the panzer divisions were lacking heavy tanks, the Wehrmacht had the appropriate
offensive doctrine to win quick battles and ignore the gaps in equipment.
The massive rearmament and revolutionary doctrinal changes signify the Wehrmacht’s
offensive capability, significantly affecting German foreign policy. Without a military capable
of the offensive, there could be no war in Europe. With the Allied policy of appeasement, it was
clear that no war would begin without German aggression. The rearmament and doctrinal
changes showed what the Wehrmacht could do: “They had the power to strike terror and win
quick victories; and in the possession of that power, and the will to use it, lies a major
explanation of the coming war in Europe.”23 With the offensive capabilities of the Wehrmacht,
Hitler had the ability to wage war.
Conclusion: Modern Implications
Both theories on the cause of WWII in Europe have modern implications. With the
advent of nuclear weapons the entire international structure changed, and so did the causes of
war. Appeasement still applies to the contemporary age. In today’s MAD (mutually assured
21
Bell, 218
Guderian, 35
23
Bell, 226
22
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destruction) world, “states that are sensitive to costs, clearly perceive other states’ interests and
intentions, and value conquests less than other value their independence…”24 With the
capabilities of nuclear weapons known, states are much less likely to risk their survival over, for
example, territorial claims. This explains the fact that “No major power has shown significant
signs of being nondeterrable since World War II.”25 Appeasement can be effective; states are
unlikely to result to aggression and further risk their national survival.
Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) is a theory about the future of warfare that is a
direct result of technological and organizational changes in military capabilities or the military as
a whole. This theory began in the 1970s by a Soviet general and has spurred academics and
policymakers alike to debate its relevance. Analysts within the US Air Force “concluded that a
revolution in military affairs dramatically increases combat effectiveness by four types of
simultaneous and mutually supportive change: technological change; systems development;
operational innovation; and, organizational adaptation.”26 Modern examples of RMA technology
include the UAV, nanotechnology, and robotics, among others.
The adaptation of the Wehrmacht is precisely an RMA. New technologies and system
development in the form of dive bombers, fast moving panzers, communications equipment, etc.
satisfy the first and second parameters. The operational innovation was clearly the doctrinal
change of a rapid movement combining armor, infantry and air force in a concentrated attack.
The organizational adaptation is the forming of mechanized units – mobile infantry in the
support of tanks in the front. As shown by Figure 3 on the following page, military capabilities
24
VanEvera, 249
Van Evera, 249
26
Metz, Steven, and James Kievet. "Strategy and the Revolution in Military Affairs: From Theory to
Policy." Strategic Studies Institute (1995) Accessed: 23 May 2010.
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/ssi/stratrma.pdf 12.
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skyrocket once an RMA has been achieved, highlighting the offensive Wehrmacht’s capability to
wage war in Europe.
Many scholars of IR argue that the age of conventional warfare is over. With the threat
of nuclear retaliation, offensive doctrines no longer have the attraction they did as before. There
could never be another Wehrmacht in the position of conquering Europe while nuclear weapons
exist. Missile defense would renew the threat of offensive conventional warfare.
The threat of
conventional warfare would return because missile defense would eliminate the deterrent nature
of nuclear weapons; no longer could a state rely on its nuclear forces to act as a credible weapon
to deter aggressors. Conversely, an RMA in missile defense would render the aggressor’s
nuclear deterrent useless, emphasizing the need for a conventional offensive force. With an
RMA in missile defense, the offensive-capable Wehrmacht remains a credible theory with
modern implications.
27
27
Metz, 20
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Appendix: Theories on the Cause of WWII in Europe
T1. The cause of WWII in Europe was Britain and France’s policy of appeasement.
T1A. At each stage Germany could have been checked: Military response.
T1A(1). Remove Germany forces from Rhineland.
T1B. At each stage Germany could have been checked: Diplomatic response.
T1B(1): A public declaration of opposition to Hitler’s foreign policy.
T1C. Appeasement allowed Germany to rearm without interference; war was
inevitable.
T2. The cause of WWII in Europe was the offensive capability of the German Wehrmacht.
T2A. The Wehrmacht underwent massive rearmament.
T2A(1). With conscription, the Army had grown immensely.
T2A(2). The Navy had begun to build a new submarine fleet.
T2A(3). The Air force had state of the art equipment and large amounts of it.
T2B. The Wehrmacht had revolutionary doctrinal changes.
T2B(1).
Armored divisions placed in front, infantry support.
T2B(2).
Large emphasis on air support, favors Luftwaffe.
T2C. The rearmament and doctrinal changes show what the Wehrmacht could do: win
quick battles of the offensive.