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Electronic Theses, Treatises and Dissertations
The Graduate School
2011
The Demise of Patronage: Garfield, the
Midterm Election, and the Passage of the
Pendleton Civil Service Act
Kevin A. Uhler
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THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
THE DEMISE OF PATRONAGE:
GARFIELD, THE MIDTERM ELECTION, AND THE PASSAGE
OF THE PENDLETON CIVIL SERVICE ACT
By
KEVIN A. UHLER
A Thesis submitted to the
Department of History
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts
Degree Awarded:
Fall Semester, 2011
Kevin A. Uhler defended this thesis on 26 October 2011.
The members of the supervisory committee were:
James P. Jones
Professor Directing Thesis
Jonathan Grant
Committee Member
Neil Jumonville
Committee Member
The Graduate School has verified and approved the above-named committee members,
and certifies that the thesis has been approved in accordance with university
requirements.
ii
For my parents
iii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
List of Tables ...................................................................................................................... v
List of Figures ................................................................................................................... vi
Abstract .............................................................................................................................vii
Preface ...............................................................................................................................ix
Introduction .........................................................................................................................1
1. Incessant Gnawing ..........................................................................................................4
Patronage from 1828 to 1881
2. Prerequisite for a Federal Appointment: .......................................................................22
The Assassination of President Garfield
3. “The Cry of the People”: .............................................................................................. 49
Civil Service Reform and the Midterm Election of 1882
4. “Motives of Self-Defense or Self-Aggrandizement”: .................................................. 78
The Passage of the Pendleton Civil Service Act
Conclusion ....................................................................................................................... 94
A. Diagrams of Air Conditioning Schemes .................................................................... 101
B. Midterm Election of 1882 Selected Returns ............................................................. 105
C. The Pendleton Civil Service Act …........................................................................... 108
Bibliography …................................................................................................................113
Biographical Sketch …....................................................................................................121
iv
LIST OF TABLES
B.1. Ohio Returns for the House of Representatives ......................................................105
B.2. Massachusetts Returns for Gubernatorial Race ...................................................... 107
B.3. Pennsylvania Returns for Gubernatorial Race ........................................................107
B.4. New York Returns for Gubernatorial Race ............................................................. 107
v
LIST OF FIGURES
A.1. Diagram 1 ............................................................................................................... 101
A.2. Diagram 2 ............................................................................................................... 102
A.3. Diagram 3 ............................................................................................................... 103
A.4. Diagram 4 ............................................................................................................... 104
vi
ABSTRACT
This study explores the role of the assassination of President James Abram
Garfield and the midterm election of 1882 in compelling the 47th Congress to pass the
Pendleton Civil Service Act in January 1883. Relying on the manuscript collections of
major Gilded Age political figures and contemporary newspapers/periodicals, this thesis
showcases the rapid changes in public opinion regarding the civil service reform
movement, specifically from the inauguration of President Garfield in 1881 to the
passage of the Pendleton Act. During his few short months as president, Garfield, like
most presidents of the late nineteenth century, became consumed with distributing the
spoils to his supporters. Unfortunately, Garfield, a Republican, faced the growing divide
of two factions in his party: the Stalwarts and the Half-Breeds. Garfield's actions in the
spring and early summer of 1881 demonstrated his alliance with the Half-Breeds, led by
his Secretary of State, James G. Blaine, a group that opposed the Stalwarts, led by
Senator Roscoe Conkling of New York.
By early July 1881, Garfield defeated Conkling, who resigned from the Senate in
protest; however, Garfield's short-lived victory ended when Charles Julius Guiteau, an
assassin, shot the president in a Washington train depot on 2 July 1881. Garfield lingered
along for almost three months, until his wounds finally overpowered him on 19
September 1881. During the eighty days that he struggled to survive, the public closely
followed their chief executive's condition and frequently suggested various treatments to
aid in Garfield's recovery. After Garfield's death, his vice-president, Chester Alan Arthur,
assumed the presidency amidst the skepticism of many Republicans and reformers.
Arthur, a longtime friend and crony of Senator Conkling, attempted to remain neutral
during his first months in office, primarily in an effort to calm the public's tensions.
As the summer of 1882 approached, the civil service reformers continued
vii
whipping up public outrage toward patronage. The political dealings of Representative
Jay A. Hubbell of Michigan, who chaired a committee that asked for voluntary
contributions from government employees, provided additional fuel for the public's
anger. As the election season began late in the summer of 1882, widespread disapproval
toward the spoils system began influencing the campaigns in many critical states. After
the November elections, the majority in the House of Representatives shifted from the
Republicans to the Democrats.
Meeting in December 1882, the Republican-controlled 47th Congress began
seriously considering legislation to reform the civil service before their terms expired.
Senator George Hunt Pendleton of Ohio, who a year earlier introduced his bill to the
Senate, once again put his measure on the floor. Over the course of two weeks, the
Senate debated and amended various aspects of the bill, which they passed in late
December. A few days later, in early January, the House passed the bill and sent it off to
President Arthur. On 16 January 1883, Arthur signed the Pendleton Civil Service Act into
law, the first major piece of civil service reform legislation.
viii
PREFACE
A combination of unrelated factors in the spring semester of 2009 forms the
foundation for this thesis. In January 2009, as an eager undergraduate history major, I
entered my “U.S. Political History Since 1877” classroom, a course that has since defined
me as a scholar. I quickly became fascinated with the powerful personalities of Gilded
Age politicians and the rapid changes of party hegemony in Washington. Later that term,
a trip to New York City's Birdland, a preeminent jazz club, reacquainted me with Pandora
Radio, a service that tailors stations to its listeners musical interests. After shuffling
through some stations on the musicians I heard at Birdland, Pandora eventually loaded
“The Ballad of Guiteau,” a song that became a bedrock through the many months of
research and writing. The ballad, a track from Stephen Sondheim's Assassins, a musical
that explores the American dream from the vantage point of presidential assassins and
would-be assassins, described Charles Julius Guiteau's final moments of life. This song,
as well as the musical's other numbers, became an obsession for almost an entire year.
One year after these odd, multifarious events, a link finally formed when I selected my
research topic: the role of both the assassination of President Garfield and the midterm
election of 1882 in the passage of the Pendleton Civil Service Act.
The research I conducted over the past two years has not only reaffirmed my
belief in the importance of political history, but strengthened it. Of all the eras in
American history, the Gilded Age best demonstrates the necessity of this field. The
continual changes in presidents (excluding President Woodrow Wilson, who remained
gravely ill during most of his second term, no president served two complete consecutive
terms from Ulysses S. Grant to Franklin Delano Roosevelt), the shifts in power between
factions among both the Republicans and the Democrats, and the volatility in majorities
in the House all contributed to political chaos in the 1870s through 1890s. Nevertheless,
ix
eligible American voters went to the polls to cast their ballots in huge numbers (upwards
of seventy percent in some elections). Simply put, the Gilded Age, perhaps better
phrased as the Age of the People, included widespread political involvement and frequent
responses from politicians.
Like all works, this one owes many thanks to those that assisted in their own ways
throughout its growth. A thousand thanks to my parents, Moris and Sheree, for not only
bringing me into this world, but for listening to my frequent rants and tirades about
research, writing, graduate school, and life in general. Although outsiders may disagree,
they both know that I rely on them more than I care to admit. I also owe a debt of
gratitude to my three brothers, Jonathan, Richard, and Michael, for their support
throughout this long, but enjoyable endeavor. For my good friend Justin, I am grateful
for our conversations, especially those on cereal, which provided a much needed relief
and break from my academic pursuits. To my friend Sandy, how you remained sane over
the course of a year where I exclusively listened to, and sang, terribly, music from
Assassins continues to perplex me, but I am thankful for your input during the process.
I am indebted to my many friends and colleagues in the department, notably
Barry, Matt, Jared, and Jessica. Our weekly gatherings over delicious meals relieved my
abundant stress and provided me with new insights in different fields and areas of history.
I wish you the best of luck in your academic pursuits and expect that our friendships and
gluttony will continue for many years! I owe a special thanks to Dr. Kris Harper for her
helpful suggestions regarding this thesis as a whole, as well as her thorough input on the
technological history surrounding the Garfield assassination.
Drs. Jonathan Grant, Neil Jumonville, and James P. Jones, I am honored that you
are all serving on my committee. Dr. Grant, even though my debt to you continues to
grow, I am thankful for your help and support over the course of my undergraduate and
graduate studies. Dr. Jumonville, your “Historical Methods” course proved beyond
crucial for the success of this thesis. Everyday of research and writing, I continued to
contemplate the “so what” question regarding my topic. Dr. Jones, I am unable to find
x
the proper words to express my thanks and gratitude for all your help and assistance over
the past three years. As a professor, your classes, specifically those on political history,
developed my passion for the field and contributed to my interest in the Gilded Age. As
an academic mentor, your direction of both my senior honors thesis in undergraduate and
my master's thesis in graduate school helped mature my writing, which now exhibits both
style and flair.
For those individuals not acknowledged, I apologize in advance for the oversight,
unless it was intentional. As is customary among scholars, I accept full responsibility for
any mistakes in research, analysis, and writing that may appear in this thesis.
xi
INTRODUCTION
“Like a cancer gnawing at the vitals of our very beings, the Spoil[s] System must
be absolutely eradicated,” wrote Isaac M. Seligman in November 1906. Seligman, a
wealthy German-American, continued this eulogy by describing the passionate efforts of
his deceased friend, Carl Schurz, and the civil service reformers of the 1870s and 1880s.
The “uplifting and purifying” pursuit of destroying patronage, Seligman articulated,
prevented the continual suffering of “public and private morals” in the United States.1
More than thirty years before Seligman penned his tribute to Schurz, the
reformers succeeded in dealing the first substantial blow to patronage politics when
Congress passed, and the president signed, the Pendleton Civil Service Act into law in
January 1883. This “act to regulate and improve the civil service of the United States”
established the United States Civil Service Commission, an entity which implemented
competitive examinations for the appointment of public servants.2 This new legislation
grew out of the political aftermath of both the assassination of President James Abram
Garfield and the resounding defeat of Republicans in the midterm election of 1882.
Following the death of Garfield at the hands of an insane man, who the public perceived
as motivated by his desire for the spoils, the civil service reform movement and its
supporters gained momentum and ultimately transformed the 1882 election into a
referendum on the issues of patronage. Immediately after suffering from the cry of the
people, the Republican-controlled 47th Congress quickly responded to the call by
beginning the process of dismantling the decades old patronage system.
Since the passage of the Pendleton Act in 1883, only three scholars, two historians
and one political scientist, have published major explorations of patronage, the civil
1 Isaac M. Seligman, “On Carl Schurz,” Reel 110, Carl Schurz Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of
Congress, Washington, D.C.
2 The Statues At Large of the United States of America, Vol. 22 (1883), 403.
1
service system, and reform. In 1904, Carl Russell Fish, a Professor of American History
at the University of Wisconsin, published The Civil Service and the Patronage, the first
extensive historical study produced after the passage of the Pendleton Act. Throughout
the book's eleven chapters, Fish surveys the American civil service system from the birth
of the United States through the turn of the twentieth-century. Structured to reflect
different aspects of the public service during American periods, notably the Federalist
Era, the Age of Jackson, and the Gilded Age, Fish devotes only one sentence to the
importance of the 1882 midterm election, in addition to two cursory paragraphs on
Garfield's death.3
A half-century later, political scientist Paul P. Van Riper released History of the
United States Civil Service, his 1958 tome that surveys the entire chronology of the
American public service up until the 1950s. The book's seventeen chapters, relying on
political science theories, builds on Fish's work by analyzing an additional fifty years of
the civil service (approximately 1900 to 1950), as well as further substantiating many of
Fish's claims. Similar to Fish, Van Riper's survey only includes a handful of pages to
evaluating the role of both Garfield's assassination and the 1882 election in motivating
Congress to implement reform.4
In 1961, three years after the publication of Van Riper's book, historian Ari
Hoogenboom released Outlawing the Spoils: A History of the Civil Service Reform
Movement, 1865-1883. As his title indicates, Hoogenboom's work, unlike Fish's and Van
Riper's, focuses exclusively on the rise of the civil service reform movement after the
Civil War through the passage of the Pendleton Act. Hoogenboom's study, the most
recently published book-length work on civil service reform history, approaches the study
of civil service reform through its major actors: the reformers. The fourteen chapters of
this thorough piece cover the key events of the movement during the twenty years after
3 Carl Russell Fish, The Civil Service and the Patronage (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920),
217-218. Originally published by Harvard in 1904, the university republished Fish's book in 1920, the
edition which this thesis refers to.
4 Paul P. Van Riper, History of the United States Civil Service (White Plains: Row, Peterson, and
Company, 1958), 89-94.
2
the end of the Civil War, but provides an adequate examination of neither Garfield's
assassination nor the 1882 election. Devoting only a few pages, Hoogenboom's coverage
of the assassination of President Garfield neglects to demonstrate the widespread public
interest with the president's deteriorating condition during the summer of 1881.
Hoogenboom's four pages on the midterm election of 1882 follows suit with the scope of
his book by analyzing the major reformers during this time, thereby overlooking the
critical importance of political developments in Massachusetts, New York, Ohio, and
Pennsylvania during the election, which all directly contributed to the passage of the
Pendleton Act.5
Excluding the three aforementioned books, the majority of works on the Gilded
Age, including biographies of President Garfield, overlook the importance of his
assassination in bringing about civil service reform.6 Unfortunately, only one piece exists
on the midterm election of 1882, but focuses on the Virginian Readjusters, not the role of
civil service reform.7 Not only does this gap in the literature represent a major problem in
the historiography of civil service reform, but also in understanding the political
developments of the 1880s, including the defection of the Mugwumps and Grover
Cleveland's victory in the presidential election of 1884, one of the only two Democratic
presidents from 1860 through 1932.
5 Ari Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils: A History of the Civil Service Reform Movement, 1865-1883
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961), 209-212, 230-235; in regards to the election, Hoogenboom
indirectly mentions the role of political assessments, discussed later in Chapter 3 of this thesis, in the
Republican defeat.
6 For the four major studies on Garfield, see Allan Peskin, Garfield (Kent: The Kent State University
Press, 1978); James C. Clark, The Murder of James A. Garfield: The President's Last Days and the
Trial and Execution of His Assassin (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Inc., 1993); Kenneth D.
Ackerman, Dark Horse: The Surprise Election and Political Murder of President James A. Garfield
(New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2003); Candice Millard, Destiny of the Republic: A Tale of
Madness, Medicine, and the Murder of a President (New York: Doubleday, 2011); for the discussion of
these books, see this thesis's conclusion.
7 For this article, see Brooks Miles Barnes, “The Congressional Elections of 1882 on the Eastern Shore of
Virginia,” The Virginia Magazine of History and Biography, Vol. 89, No. 4 (October 1981): 467-486.
3
CHAPTER 1
Incessant Gnawing:
Patronage from 1828 to 1881
Appearing on a wide variety of items, the portrait depicted a calm, yet proud man.
While an assortment of fine silk cloths all showcased his image, many Americans simply
showed their support by gathering up hickory wood. These supporters also honored Old
Hickory by planting young hickory trees on the days that commemorated his many
victories, including the famed Battle of New Orleans during the War of 1812. One item
read “Old Hickory Forever,” a sentiment that grew as the 1828 election neared.1
The Civil Service from Jackson to Hayes
When Andrew “Old Hickory” Jackson defeated incumbent President John Quincy
Adams in the 1828 presidential election, a radical change in the civil service occurred.
Before Jackson's administration, presidents did not enact widespread removals of
government employees when they assumed office, rather they made some changes,
primarily with cabinet-level positions. From the inception of the United States to the late
1820s, presidents tended to base appointments on competency; however, party allegiance
played a role during the selection process. In 1801, President Thomas Jefferson
encountered the first civil service hurtle when he developed a policy of distributing
appointments to both parties. Jefferson, a Democratic-Republican, entered Washington
after more than a decade of Federalist rule. During the Jacksonian Era, the 1830s, the
shift to the spoils system, according to historian Leonard D. White, established a national
precedent for over fifty years of office rotation and partisan appointments.2
1 Roger A. Fischer, Tippecanoe and Trinkets Too: The Material Culture of American Presidential
Campaigns, 1828-1984 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 9, 15-16.
2 Leonard D. White, The Republican Era: 1869-1901 (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1958), 278;
for the most thorough study available on civil service history, see Paul P. Van Riper, History of the
United States Civil Service (White Plains: Row, Peterson, and Company, 1958), which appears in later
citations throughout this chapter.
4
Although President Jackson removed between one-tenth and one-fifth of the civil
service for partisan reasons over his eight years in the White House, his opponents
spewed up rumors in an attempt to convince the American people that the new
commander-in-chief radically altered the make-up of the civil service, which helped
solidify the association of the spoils system with Jacksonian politics. This system, also
known as patronage, consisted of victorious politicians, mainly on the national level,
using their powers of appointment to fill government offices with their supporters. Party
patrons demonstrated their loyalty in a variety of ways, including campaigning in election
years and paying political assessments, requests for funds from politicians levied on
members of their party in the civil service. During the Jacksonian Era, most men sought
public office for both the salary and the power it afforded in local, state, and national
governmental matters. According to historian Paul Van Riper, “from an administrative
point of view, the spoils system was primarily designed to man, finance, and control the
political machines of the new [Jacksonian] democracy.”3
During his first inauguration address, Old Hickory called for shuffling civil
service positions to include more democratic men, compared to, in Jackson's eyes, the
aristocratic employees of his predecessors, while also shrinking the size of this
government apparatus. Even though, according to Van Riper, the new chief executive
“did not even come close to overturning the federal civil service” during his two terms,
his time in the White House established the idea of using the spoils as a political
instrument, since President Jackson himself viewed the removal of government
employees as a tool of the people who voiced their opinions in elections.4
During the twenty-five years leading up to the American Civil War, the two major
parties, the Whigs and the Democrats, employed the practice of the spoils system,
including the redistribution of offices during new presidential tenures. The frequent
changes of the majority party in Washington during the antebellum period helped ingrain
3 Van Riper, Civil Service, 33, 35-36, 44, 46-47.
4 Ibid., 30-31, 37-38.
5
the idea of patronage as a means among politicians. During this same time, “the
extension of the spoils system accompanying the rise of democracy was popular and was
even regarded by man as reform.” Patronage, permeating the Executive Branch, also
influenced the Senate by solidifying the unofficial policy of “senatorial courtesy,” a belief
that appointments in a given senator's home state would generally heed the wishes of that
senator. During the Civil War, President Abraham Lincoln used patronage to strengthen
both the Republican Party and unity within the North.5
With the end of the Civil War in 1865, three factors contributed to the growth of a
viable civil service reform movement: the end of the slavery issue allowed abolitionists
to focus their efforts on other tasks; the growth of the public service and its corruption
began receiving additional publicity; and the increasing strength of political machines
started to whip up anger. Even though many Americans “accepted the spoils system as
right and proper,” seeing no errors or shortcomings with removals of office based on
partisan lines, the three aforementioned elements, especially the former abolitionists,
helped the issue gain prominence during the 1870s. During this time, patronage largely
became a tool for presidents and politicians to ensure their supporters' loyalty by
threatening them with removals or awarding them with appointments.6
Throughout the late 1860s, 1870s, and 1880s, three reformers led the movement
to eradicate patronage and implement changes to the civil service. Recognized by his
peers as the definitive leader, George William Curtis commanded the crusade against the
5 Van Riper, Civil Service, 41-43, 48-49; Ruth McMurry Berens, “Blueprint for Reform: Curtis, Eaton,
and Schurz” (Master's thesis, The University of Chicago, 1943), 2-3; Ari Hoogenboom, Outlawing the
Spoils: A History of the Civil Service Reform Movement, 1865-1883 (Urbana: University of Illinois
Press, 1961), 7. Hoogenboom's Outlawing the Spoils represents the best history of civil service reform
following the Civil War through the passage and implementation of the Pendleton Civil Service Act.
Written in the early 1960s, Hoogenboom rebukes the earlier Progressive Era historians who tended to
view the late nineteenth century as rampant with corruption, fraud, and graft. Hoogenboom's title
speaks well to the scope of his book, which primarily focuses on the reform movement in relation to the
various events, rather than detailed public reaction.
6 Carl Russell Fish, The Civil Service and the Patronage (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920),
187-189; Berens, “Blueprint for Reform,” 11-14; Van Riper, Civil Service, 61-63. For a detailed,
although dated, overview of the history of patronage, see Fish's The Civil Service and the Patronage.
Fish's work chronicles the spoils system from the inception of the United States through the reform the
1910s.
6
spoils system. Curtis believed that the rampant corruption in politics grew from the evils
of the patronage system, which motivated him to bring about reforms to rid the nation of
the spoils ideology and instead implement a merit-based system. While some patronage
supporters argued that the removal of the spoils system would bring about the death of
political parties, Curtis asserted that reform would instead strengthen these organizations.
Dorman B. Eaton , the “practical genius of the movement for civil service reform,”
penned the stipulations of the Pendleton Civil Service Act, thus shaping the “structure of
the reformed system set up in 1883.” A Harvard Law School graduate and New York
City attorney, Eaton originally fought at the front lines of the movement, but after a
violent clubbing attack, possibly intended as an assassination, in early 1870, he began
reflecting and writing on reform rather than directly participating in the movements. Like
Curtis, Eaton sought to kill corruption in politics. German-American Carl Schurz, the
third major reformer, wanted to remove favoritism from politics and establish a
nonpartisan public service to administer the nation. His consistent support for civil
service reform, which aided in keeping the issue in the spotlight, aimed at forming a
powerful civil service commission that would regulate government appointments and
minimize corruption.7
Republican Congressman Thomas A. Jenckes of Rhode Island introduced the first
post-Civil War civil service reform bill in late 1865. Jenckes, an attorney and intellectual,
became the de facto leader of the civil service reform movement in Congress during the
late 1860s. A graduate of Brown College, Jenckes focused on patent law during the
Antebellum period before serving in the House. Historian Ari Hoogenboom argues that
Jenckes introduced his bill in 1865 to prevent the new president, Andrew Johnson, from
abusing his powers and challenging the Radical Republicans by distributing appointments
to his supporters. After analyzing the civil service systems of many European countries,
including Great Britain, France, and Prussia, Jenckes pushed for introducing
7 Berens, “Blueprint for Reform,” 29, 115-118, 201, 256-258; Gerald W. MacFarland, “Partisan of
Nonpartisanship: Dorman B. Eaton and the Genteel Reform Tradition,” The Journal of American
History, Vol. 54, No. 4 (March 1968): 806-812.
7
examination-based appointments. His legislation called for open competitive
examinations, primarily based on the British system, administered by a civil service
commission. Throughout the late 1860s, Jenckes introduced various versions of his bill
to reform the civil service, seeing little success. Even though some news organizations,
such as The Nation and The North American Review, and leading political figures picked
up on the bill, Jenckes's measures amassed no major following or support. Even so, Van
Riper argues that his efforts provided fuel for George William Curtis's and Carl Schurz's
efforts.8
Representative Jenckes competed for the spotlight that shone on Johnson's battles
with Republicans, including his impeachment trial, and Republican campaign efforts, all
of which contributed to preventing a major following. In 1867, when Jenckes introduced
his civil service reform bill to the House again, sixty-six representatives supported it and
seventy-two opposed it at one point. One of Jenckes's aids, Julius Bing, argued that
although civil service reform may institute a “permanent bureaucracy,” it posed no
danger since the examinations would ensure competent and responsible men in position,
compared to the unqualified and corrupt men that filled offices in the late 1860s. Around
the same time, Jenckes faced opposition from Illinois Representative John A. Logan who
asserted that the bill violated the Constitution and the spirit of the nation. The Rhode
Island congressman's efforts continually failed; however, by the early 1870s, Jenckes's
bill garnered increased support, primarily in New England, but lacked the numbers to
successfully influence Congress.9
Other reform bills, advocating proposals similar to Jenckes's, also appeared in the
early 1870s, but Congress failed to pass any of these measures. Ulysses S. Grant, the
acclaimed Civil War general who became president in 1868, addressed Congress in
December 1870 and called for measures to reform the civil service. Illinois Senator
8 Fish, The Civil Service, 210-212; Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils, 13-17; Van Riper, Civil Service,
65-66
9 Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils, 43, 73; White, Republican Era, 280, 291; Ari Hoogenboom and
Olive Hoogenboom, eds., The Gilded Age (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1967), 163.
8
Lyman Trumbull, in March 1871, introduced a rider to an appropriation bill that would
fulfill Grant's wishes. Congress passed the appropriation bill, with the attached rider,
which provided the president with the ability to “prescribe such rules and regulations for
the admission of persons into the civil service...as [would] promote the efficiency” of the
system.10
Three months after Congress passed the rider, President Grant formed the Civil
Service Commission, chaired by George William Curtis, and included Joseph Medill,
Alexander G. Cattell, Dawson A. Walker, E.B. Elliott, David C. Cox, and Joseph H.
Blackfan as commissioners. Chairman Curtis endorsed open competitive examinationbased appointments, but other commissioners disagreed with this practice. These
opponents reasoned, among many factors, that examinations would conflict with the
president's constitutional power of removal and appointment. As the commissioners met
in the summer and fall of 1871, they debated various points and policies for reforming the
civil service, including competitive tests, and in December 1871, the Civil Service
Commission “formally submitted its recommendations” to President Grant. The chief
executive approved the standards, which allowed candidates of legal age with fluency in
speaking, reading, and writing English to apply to the lowest grades of the civil service,
after completing an open competitive examination. In 1872, with the support of some of
the spoilsmen, Grant's Civil Service Commission received additional appropriations that
allowed its continued functioning. Hoogenboom reasons that this brief acquiescence
from some of the patronage supporters occurred because of the presidential election later
in the year.11
Although the commission succeeded in implementing competitive examinations
in various departments, after the 1872 election, the spoils-friendly Republicans opposed
the commission and convinced Grant to side with them. In March 1873, New Yorker
George H. Sharpe received an appointment to a vacant office that fell under the purview
10 Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils, 86-87; Van Riper, Civil Service, 68; White, Republican Era, 281
11 Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils, 91-95, 106-107; Van Riper, Civil Service, 69.
9
of the Civil Service Commission, which Grant did not consult during the process. This
failure to embrace reform led Curtis to resign from his position as chairman on 18 March
1873. Dorman B. Eaton succeeded Curtis after receiving the appointment from Grant,
which Hoogenboom argues “proved that [Grant] had not abandoned reform completely,”
because of Eaton's well-known support of civil service reform.12
Later in 1873, Congressional attempts in both the Senate and the House failed to
provide the commission with additional appropriations. President Grant addressed
Congress in December 1874, threatening “to abandon competitive examinations if
Congress failed to act [and provide funds].” In early 1875, Congress destroyed the Civil
Service Commission by simply doing nothing, an outcome Grant allowed, thereby
permitting the commission and its policies to fade away. The lack of money forced
Grant's Civil Service Commission to fizzle into a limbo, unable to operate without funds,
but still legally in existence. Leonard D. White argues that Grant did not pressure
Congress into approving funds because he believed “that his main duty was to execute
the law as Congress enacted it...” In Grant's eyes, Congress's failure to provide for
appropriations spoke to their opposition of civil service reform, which led Grant to
“discontinue the system.” As Grant's second term came to a close, the opponents of civil
service reform successfully entrenched themselves in his administration and established
the legacy of “Grantism,” a series of lucrative political scandals that ran rampant during
Grant's tenure; however, this corruption also served to nurture the civil service reform
movement throughout the 1870s.13
In the 1876 presidential election, Grant's decision to forgo a third term satisfied
many Republicans who became disillusioned and dissatisfied with Grantism. By this
point, both the Grand Old Party and the Democrats had adopted civil service reform
planks in their respective platforms. With Grant out of the election, James G. Blaine of
12 Fish, The Civil Service, 213; Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils, 123; MacFarland, “Partisan of
Nonpartisanship,” 814; Van Riper, Civil Service, 69-71.
13 Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils, 133, 135-137; Van Riper, Civil Service, 71, 74; White, Republican
Era, 283, 286; Peter W. Schroth, “Corruption and Accountability of the Civil Service,” The American
Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 54 (Fall 2006): 560.
10
Maine, a Half-Breed Republican, amassed the largest following. During the 1870s and
1880s, the Republican Party split into two main factions: the Stalwarts and the HalfBreeds. The Stalwarts, led by boss politician and New York Senator Roscoe Conkling,
opposed the Half-Breeds, commanded by Blaine, the senator from Maine.14
Divided primarily over personality rather than policy, according to historian H.
Wayne Morgan, animosity between Blaine and Conkling, two former friends, began in
1866 when Blaine ridiculed the New Yorker during a minor House debate, something the
latter did not forget.15 Conkling and the Stalwarts, which also included John A. Logan of
Illinois and J. Donald Cameron of Pennsylvania, believed in the older agenda of the
1860s and early 1870s, while also supporting Grantism. These Republicans waved the
“bloody shirt,” a practice that rallied citizens against the Democrats, the party of treason
in the opinion of this camp. The Half-Breeds, rather than looking backwards, worked
toward the future of the nation and shaped their goals around the needs of
industrialization. Carl Schurz, writing in the early 1880s, described the bitterness
between these factions as exceeding their hatred and hostility towards the Democrats.
Schurz argued that political camps formed, in both parties, because of the “gradual
disappearance of the issues which originally divided the parties,” namely disagreements
created during the Civil War era.16 This disunion included a viable risk for a complete
Republican Party schism in presidential elections between 1872 to 1884. Thriving in
large, urban cities, such as Chicago and Philadelphia, the Stalwarts, on average and when
compared to the non-Stalwarts, appeared “distinctly less educated, somewhat less British,
14 Van Riper, Civil Service, 75; George H. Mayer, The Republican Party 1854-1966, 2nd Edition (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1967), 189-190.
15 H. Wayne Morgan, From Hayes to McKinley: National Party Politics, 1877-1896 (Syracuse: Syracuse
University Press, 1969), 69-71; for a detailed account of this feud, see the opening pages to Kenneth D.
Ackerman, Dark Horse: The Surprise Election and Political Murder of President James A. Garfield
(New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2003). Unfortunately, Ackerman's popular history piece lacks
crucial citations, thereby diminishing the book's scholary merits.
16 Lewis L. Gould, Grand Old Party: A History of the Republicans (New York: Random House, 2003),
96; Carl Schurz, “Party Schisms and Future Problems,” The North American Review, Vol. 0134, No.
306 (May 1882): 431-432.
11
and considerably more Southern and more urban,” according to historian Allan Peskin.17
In 1876, a series of letters implicating Blaine in questionable financial activities,
known as the Mulligan Letters, damaged his candidacy. Entering the Republican
National Convention in Cincinnati, Ohio's governor, Rutherford B. Hayes, sparked the
interest of some delegates due to his relatively neutral and mild position on key issues.
Conkling and the Stalwarts moved their men to support Hayes, since they refused to see
Blaine on the ticket, adding additional “fire to the feud between Blaine and Conkling.”
On election day, the Democratic candidate, Samuel J. Tilden, received 184 electoral
votes, one short of the necessary 185. A scandal erupted in the South over the counts in
three states still under the control of federal troops: Louisiana, South Carolina, and
Florida. During the election crisis, both parties attempted to win the presidency through
technicalities, with the Republicans focusing on the aforementioned states and the
Democrats working on gaining a final vote in Oregon. The governors of the southern
states eventually certified their numbers, which produced a victory for Hayes and led to
widespread Democratic outrage. With the threat of violence ensuing, Congress formed a
special commission, composed of five senators, five representatives, and five Supreme
Court justices, to investigate and determine the election. The commission agreed with the
governors and to placate the South, Republican and Democratic leaders forged the
“Compromise of 1877,” an unofficial truce that ended the North's Reconstruction policies
in return for the Democrats ceding the presidency to Hayes.18
After his victory, “Rutherfraud” B. Hayes announced his support for civil service
reform that would include “nonpartisan appointments [and] discouragement of political
activity by officeholders.” The new president did pursue some actions that benefited the
17 Allan Peskin, “Who Were the Stalwarts? Who Were Their Rivals? Republican Factions in the Gilded
Age,” Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 99, No. 4 (Winter 1984-1985): 704-706, 713-714; in his article,
Peskin argues that shallow interpretations and acceptance of historical fallacies developed the concept
that the Republicans of the Gilded Age, for the most part, fell into either the Stalwart or Half-Breed
camp. This conclusion undermines the importance of the personal hatred between Blaine and Conkling,
including how this rivalry affected Republican politics. Unfortunately, excluding Peskin's article, no
major work exists that properly surveys and analyzes the Republican factions in the Gilded Age.
18 Mayer, The Republican Party, 189-197; Mark Wahlgren Summers, The Era of Good Stealings (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1993), 290-291.
12
civil service reform movement, including selecting Carl Schurz as his secretary of the
interior, a position that allowed Schurz to institute minor policy changes in regards to
appointments in his department. Hayes also tasked Dorman B. Eaton with writing a
comprehensive study on the British civil service system, especially as it applied to the
American public service. Completed in 1880, in his study Eaton argued that British
society represents the closest model to American culture and the adoption of merit-based
appointments in the former improved the efficiency and stability of Great Britain's civil
service. Eaton recommended a similar set of reforms that collectively would destroy the
patronage system and institute a fair and efficient government bureaucracy, independent
of party politics. Eaton further espoused the elimination of the spoils system, which
would help combat rampant corruption in American politics by freeing politicians of their
obligations in appointing their supporters, who sometimes acted in their own self-interest
rather than the public's. Competitive examinations, Eaton reasoned, would guarantee the
selection of competent individuals in the various government offices, while preventing
unqualified candidates from receiving positions. A merit system, in his opinion, would
transform the atmosphere of the civil service into one of “intelligence, thoughtfulness,
and independence,” thereby weakening political parties' hold on the offices.19
In late 1877, Hayes moved to challenge Conkling and the Stalwarts by removing
one of their cronies, Chester Alan Arthur, from his position as Collector of Customs at the
Port of New York. Arthur's discharge whipped up anger among Conkling and his
associates, a group who benefited from machine politics and patronage. Hayes's attack
pleased the civil service reformers, but started a battle between Conkling and himself, as
well as the Senate and the chief executive over the power of appointment. Hoogenboom
describes Hayes's appointments to vital New York offices as a “struggle between two
Republican factions,” “not one of reform versus the spoils system.” According to Mayer,
though, “Hayes believed he was advancing the cause of civil service by contesting
19 Berens, “Blueprint for Reform,” 9; Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils, 148; Mayer, The Republican
Party, 197; Dorman B. Eaton, Civil Service in Great Britain: A History of Abuses and Reforms and
their Bearing Upon American Politics (New York: Harper & Brothers, Publishers, 1880), 361-429.
13
congressional control over appointments.” Since the senators originally blocked his
nominees, Hayes waited until their recess and appointed Edwin A. Merritt to replace
Arthur as collector, thereby winning the battle.20
The Election of 1880 and President James Abram Garfield
After the election in 1876, President Hayes announced his lame-duck intentions to
serve only a single term, which led the various Republican factions to put forth their
candidates throughout Hayes's term and as the June 1880 Republican National
Convention in Chicago neared. The Stalwarts pushed for Grant to resume his old office,
which Senators Conkling, Logan, and Cameron, all Stalwart leaders, desired. The HalfBreeds put their weight behind Senator Blaine, who amassed a sizable number of
delegates to challenge Grant's early lead. Described by Peskin as a “crossroad,” the
Republicans needed to determine whether or not they would move forward with Grant's
old policies or adopt a new standard. In addition to the two leading candidates, many
favorite sons rallied around the support of their home states, notably John Sherman of
Ohio. Many reformers preferred Sherman over Grant and Blaine, but the Ohioan did face
some opposition. Sherman's monotony and lack of charisma, demonstrated during his
time as a meticulous public administrator, earned him the nickname the “Ohio Icicle.”21
Sherman's floor manager at the convention, Representative James Abram Garfield
of Ohio, gained popularity and notoriety for his nominating speech for Sherman. Many
Republicans preferred Garfield over Sherman, evident in a March 1880 letter from
Charles E. Henry, one of Garfield's old friends, who wrote to tell Garfield that many
businessmen in Norwalk, Ohio, would support him if nominated by the Republicans for
the presidency. During the convention, Grant remained politically strong, due in part to
the “Immortal 306,” a group of delegates that continued to support the Stalwart nominee.
20 Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils, 156-157, 161-162, 167; Mayer, The Republican Party, 197; Van
Riper, Civil Service, 75-76.
21 Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils, 179-180; Mayer, The Republican Party, 198-201; Peskin, “Who
Were the Stalwarts?,” 706-708; Robert D. Marcus, Grand Old Party: Political Structure in the Gilded
Age 1880-1896 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971), 37-39; Allan Peskin, “The Election of
1880,” The Wilson Quarterly, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Spring 1980): 179.
14
In addition to border states in the South, Grant received the majority of his support from
bosses Cameron, Conkling, and Logan of Pennsylvania, New York, and Illinois,
respectively. As the balloting continued, neither Grant nor Blaine received enough votes
to win the nomination. The Half-Breeds, aware of the deadlock, began moving their
delegates to support Garfield, after Sherman continued to remain weak in the convention.
On the thirty-sixth ballot, James A. Garfield of Ohio received the Republican nomination
for president. Sherman biographer Theodore E. Burton concludes that Sherman “clearly
absolved Garfield” for his actions during the 1880 Republican convention. During the
proceedings, many politicians suspected that Garfield, as Sherman's floor manager, did
not do enough to support his nominee, and instead moved through the system to place
himself in a better position for the presidency.22
Born in a log cabin in Ohio in 1831, the public knew Garfield “as a classic
success story,” in part due to the awe surrounding presidents born in log cabins and the
hardships he faced as a young child. As an infant, Garfield's father died, but the young
boy persevered, eventually completing seven years of university education. A religious
man and a teacher, Garfield embraced the Republican Party's ideology and campaigned
for John C. Fremont in 1856 as the issue of slavery gained importance in the 1850s. In
early 1860, Garfield formally entered political life as an Ohio State Senator, but once the
Civil War broke out, Garfield entered the military to fight in the “moral crusade,”
eventually rising to the rank of general. During the hostilities, the people of Ohio elected
Garfield to the House of Representatives, a position he, after being urged by President
Lincoln, began in 1863. Garfield's House career progressed as he gained prestige by
serving on and chairing various committees throughout the 1860s and 1870s, partially
due to his success in the art of compromise, thereby allowing him to prevent complete
alienation from the rivaling Republican factions. During President Hayes's
22 Mayer, The Republican Party, 198-201; Peskin, “Who Were the Stalwarts?,” 708, 710; Theodore E.
Burton, John Sherman (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1906), 304; James D. Norris and Arthur
H. Shaffer, eds., Politics and Patronage in the Gilded Age: The Correspondence of James A. Garfield
and Charles E. Henry (Madison: The State Historical Society of Wisconsin, 1970), 276; Burton's
biography on Sherman, although dated, represents the only major study on this Gilded Age politician.
15
administration, as the the leading Republican House figure, Garfield frequently met with
the commander-in-chief to discuss political matters. Prior to the 1880 convention,
Garfield's eyes looked toward John Sherman's Senate seat.23
After receiving the Republican Party's nomination, “Garfield sat white and silent
amid protecting friends, then rose, pulled down his hat and made a hasty exit through a
side door.” Recognizing the need to appease Conkling and the Stalwarts, Garfield's men
selected Chester Alan Arthur, the former customs collector, as his running-mate. Arthur,
after serving in the Union Army during the Civil War, moved through the ranks of the
Republican Party, gaining favor with Conkling and the Stalwarts, who made him the
Collector of Customs at the Port of New York. During his time at the customhouse,
Arthur raked in a handsome salary, earning $80,000 in one year. Upon hearing the offer,
Arthur met with Conkling for advice and support, but the New York Senator urged his old
crony to decline. Defying the Stalwart boss, Arthur accepted the position and became the
Republican vice-presidential nominee. To the additional disappointment of many leading
reformers, Garfield's acceptance letter for the nomination barely mentioned civil service
reform.24
During the campaign, Garfield's major hurdle concerned receiving the support of
Conkling and his Stalwart cronies. After their failed bid to secure the nomination for
Grant, the Stalwarts pouted throughout June 1880. Later in the summer, Garfield
traveled to New York City to meet with Conkling and other leading Republicans at the
famed Fifth Avenue Hotel. Upon arriving, Garfield saw Stalwart Senators John A. Logan
and Thomas “Me Too” Platt, a nickname Platt earned for following Conkling's lead, HalfBreed leader James G. Blaine, and Republican reformer George William Curtis, but
Senator Conkling did not attend. Angered over Conkling's lack of respect, Garfield
23 Morgan, From Hayes to McKinley, 84; Norris and Shaffer, Politics and Patronage, x-xvi, xxvi-xxvii;
for the definitive biography on Garfield, see Allan Peskin, Garfield (Kent: The Kent State University
Press, 1978),
24 Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils, 183-184; Morgan, From Hayes to McKinley, 93-94; Sybil
Schwartz, “In Defense of Chester Arthur,” The Wilson Quarterly, Vol. 2, No. 4 (Autumn 1978): 181182.
16
proceeded with the conference, which produced the “Treaty of Fifth Avenue,” an informal
agreement. Both sides believed they won, with the Stalwarts expecting to reap patronage
benefits from Garfield who in return required their support in the campaign.25
During the campaign, Garfield remained at home in Mentor, Ohio, where many
Americans from across the nation visited and badgered him with their views on various
topics. Since Americans frowned on candidates traveling around and making speeches
for themselves, Garfield developed the concept of the “front-porch campaign,” which
allowed him to espouse his views on different topics, while not deviating from the
accepted campaign practices of the era. Delegations visited the nominee as he spoke in
Mentor, including Conkling and the Stalwarts, which led to the “Treaty of Mentor,”
another unofficial truce that essentially reinforced the earlier Fifth Avenue Hotel
compact. Following this meeting, Conkling began openly campaigning for the ticket,
thereby increasing Garfield's strength in New York. The election, with seventy-eight
percent of eligible citizens voting, secured Garfield as president and the Republicans
control of the House. After the final counts, the Senate remained equally split between
the Democrats and Republicans, with two independent senators, that the Republicans
attempted to court.26
Following Garfield's victory, Democrats in Congress began frequently calling for
civil service reform, possibly to weaken the Republican position. As office-seekers
overwhelmed the president-elect, Senator George Hunt Pendleton of Ohio condemned
them for attempting to benefit from the spoils. In December 1880, Pendleton introduced
a bill that he designed to reform the civil service. He sought to “find and place qualified
people in government positions rather than continue the spoils system whereby the
winning party used government offices as political payoffs.” Pendleton realized that the
Republicans' continual failure throughout the 1870s to secure civil service reform could
25 Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils, 184; Mayer, The Republican Party, 202; Peskin, Garfield, 485,
489; Zachary Karabell, Chester Alan Arthur, (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2004), 48-49.
26 Karabell, Chester Alan Arthur, 50; Mayer, The Republican Party, 203-204; Morgan, From Hayes to
McKinley, 111-112; Peskin, Garfield, 500-501; Peskin, “The Election of 1880,” 174-177, 180.
17
serve as a rallying call to help unite the Democrats for future elections. According to
Pendleton biographer Thomas S. Mach, Pendleton understood that by destroying the
patronage system, the Republicans would lose a major source of revenue, political
assessments, which they relied on for elections. After the New York Civil Service
Reform Association, established in the late 1870s, analyzed Pendleton's legislation, they
drafted a new bill, primarily penned by Dorman B. Eaton, which Pendleton accepted and
introduced to Congress. This action led these reformers to support Pendleton's legislative
efforts. The new measure included stipulations for competitive examinations and a new
civil service commission, showing similarities to Congressman Jenckes's earlier efforts.27
As Pendleton pursued his legislative agenda, Garfield began working on
appointments, hoping to form a balance between the various Republican factions. During
the Gilded Age, presidents spent the majority of their first years distributing offices
among party supporters. Allan Peskin asserts that Garfield intended to establish himself
as the moderate voice of his party's two leading factions, but Senator Conkling's
recalcitrant attitude eventually pushed Garfield into the Half-Breed camp. Early on,
Blaine received the upper-hand in the “symbolic duel to determine the destiny of the
Republican party” with Conkling when Garfield selected the senator from Maine to
become his secretary of state. Blaine attempted to convince the newly elected chief
executive to forge a cabinet exclusively composed of Half-Breeds, but Garfield's policy
diverged. Although the commander-in-chief did not heed the wishes of Conkling and the
Stalwarts and nominate Levi P. Morton as secretary of the treasury, Garfield did offer
Conkling a position in his cabinet, but the New Yorker turned him down.28
On 20 March 1881, shortly after his inauguration, President Garfield met with
Roscoe Conkling at the White House. During the conference, the commander-in-chief
27 Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils, 199-203; Thomas S. Mach, “Gentleman George” Hunt Pendleton:
Party Politics and Ideological Identity in Nineteenth-Century America (Kent: The Kent State
University Press, 2007), 174-175, 177-178.
28 Karabell, Chester Alan Arthur, 52; Morgan, From Hayes to McKinley, 122-123; Peskin, Garfield, 517,
557; Worth Robert Miller, “The Lost World of Gilded Age Politics,” The Journal of the Gilded Age and
Progressive Era, Vol. 1, No. 1 (January 2002): 53-54; Allan Peskin, “President Garfield Reconsidered,”
The Hayes Historical Journal: A Journal of the Gilded Age, Vol. 3, No. 1, 2 (1980): 37.
18
explained that he needed to reward William H. Robertson, “Conkling's most virulent
enemy in [New York]...a rabid partisan of Blaine,” since Robertson helped with Garfield's
victory. By the end of the meeting, Conkling acquiesced and agreed to discuss with
leading New York Stalwarts about securing an appointment for Robertson. Upon hearing
of the meeting, Blaine also spoke with the president, who seemed receptive to the
secretary of state's opinions. Garfield, though, appeared to side with Conkling when he
submitted the names of Stalwarts to fill federal offices in New York.29
Fear spread over the face of Vice-President Arthur as he passed a note, from
Garfield, along to Conkling as the Senate convened. The new president blindsided
Conkling by nominating William H. Robertson for the position of Collector of Customs
at the Port of New York. Donald Barr Chidsey, a Conkling biographer, argues that the
New York Stalwart understood that Garfield needed to nominate Robertson for a federal
position, but did not believe that he deserved the powerful collectorship, a position that
facilitated control of much of New York and directly challenged his hegemony. In order
to place Robertson in the customhouse, Garfield needed to shuffle around other federal
appointments to prevent alienating certain factions in the party. “It was musical chairs to
put Robertson in New York's citadel of influence and patronage,” as described by H.
Wayne Morgan. If appointed, Robertson would succeed Edwin A. Merritt. Garfield also
appointed William E. Chandler, an ally of Blaine, to the position of Solicitor General,
further angering Conkling.30
Within days of the nomination, a truce seemed to develop between Garfield and
Conkling; however, after Conkling once again failed to show up to a special meeting with
the president, similar to the Fifth Avenue Hotel conference, Garfield's “patience finally
snapped,” pushing him to support Robertson regardless of the costs. When presenting his
case, Garfield argued that he selected Robertson not for political reasons, but rather to
29 Reeves, Gentleman Boss, 223; Peskin, Garfield, 558-559; David M. Jordan, Roscoe Conkling of New
York: Voice in the Senate (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971), 380-381.
30 Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils, 204-205; Morgan, From Hayes to McKinley, 132; Reeves,
Gentleman Boss, 223; Donald Barr Chidsey, The Gentleman from New York: A Life of Roscoe Conkling
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1935), 331-332.
19
determine whether the president or Congress controlled appointments. The president did
realize that an alliance with Robertson would strengthen his position in his “struggle to
smash Conkling's authority and win control of the [Republicans] in New York.”
Conkling, on the other hand, asserted that the president ignored the long-established
tradition of senatorial courtesy and shamelessly violated the earlier treaties.31
Garfield, who remembered Conkling's previous failure when challenging Hayes
over appointments, received the favor of many newspapers across the nation. While
Conkling spoke out against the president in heated speeches during April, Vice-President
Arthur, Postmaster General Thomas L. James, and Senator Me Too Platt all attempted to
convince Garfield to budge from his position, which the commander-in-chief refused to
do. Many senators supported Conkling not due to their affinity of the New York boss, but
rather because they believed in senatorial courtesy, a standard that Garfield disregarded
when he selected Robertson without Conkling's and Platt's consideration. During the
battle between Garfield and Conkling, some of the New Yorker's key Stalwart allies,
including Senators Logan and Cameron, remained relatively quiet. Logan, whose
aspirations included a future presidential run, believed that the feud would destroy
Conkling and Blaine, two potential rivals for the Republican candidacy, thus clearing the
way to the White House. Some reformers viewed Robertson's nomination as stalling the
civil service reform movement, since Garfield removed Collector Merritt, an individual
that showed no inefficiencies, to institute Robertson for what they believed to be political
purposes.32
In May 1881, Garfield withdrew all other nominees from consideration, thereby
leaving the Senate “hostage” with only Robertson to fill the collectorship. By this point,
it became apparent that the Senate would approve Robertson leading Conkling and Me
Too to resign from the Senate in protest of Garfield's actions. After hearing Conkling's
31 Jordan, Conkling, 388; Karabell, Chester Alan Arthur, 56; Peskin, Garfield, 562-563; Reeves,
Gentleman Boss, 223, 225.
32 Chidsey, Conkling, 335-336; Jordan, Conkling, 384-385; Reeves, Gentleman Boss, 224-225, 227-228;
James Pickett Jones, John A. Logan: Stalwart Republican from Illinois (Tallahassee: University
Presses of Florida, 1982), 148.
20
resignation letter on 16 May, many senators and reporters in Congress became
dumbfounded over this unusual and unexpected political development. Both men
expected to win reelection in the state legislature, which, in their minds, would strengthen
their position and allow them to return to the Senate and succeed in removing Robertson,
who the Senate confirmed. When Conkling and Platt returned to New York and began
campaigning, with the support of Vice-President Arthur, for their old positions, the
Stalwarts and their followers realized that their position had weakened. Throughout the
balloting, conducted over two months, both men's positions became weaker and weaker,
until their defeat became inevitable. As late as 2 July 1881, Conkling's and Platt's folly
remained in the headlines.33
33 Chidsey, Conkling, 343-344, 350-351; Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils, 206; Miller, “The Lost
World,” 54; Reeves, Gentleman Boss, 230-232.
21
CHAPTER 2
Prerequisite for a Federal Appointment:
The Assassination of President Garfield
The jovial two-hundred pound man quietly crept through the hallway. The man,
President James Abram Garfield, began his charge into his son's bedroom, laughing
during the impromptu wrestling match. Eager to depart Washington, D.C., and begin his
trip to the Northeast, Garfield completed his final preparations and awaited the arrival of
his secretary of state, James G. Blaine, who described the president as cheerful and
jocular.1
As Garfield enjoyed his time with his son Harry, Secretary of State Blaine
traveled to the White House to escort President Garfield to the train station. Blaine, upon
hearing that Garfield planned to walk to the train station alone, informed the President
that he would pick him up and ride with him, in a State Department carriage, to the depot.
Blaine arrived shortly after 9:00 A.M. on the morning of 2 July 1881, leaving the
president approximately thirty minutes to reach the station and board the train for its
scheduled 9:30 A.M. departure.2
After boarding the carriage, both men traveled to the Baltimore and Potomac
Depot, located at the southwest corner of the intersection of B Street and Sixth Street.3
The station, a large red brick building with towers and steep roofs, included public sitting
rooms, private rooms, and a restaurant on the first floor, while the accommodations on
the second floor primarily served railroad employees.4 Four members of Garfield's
1 “Mr. Blaine's Story of It,” Washington Post, 3 July 1881.
2 Kenneth D. Ackerman, Dark Horse: The Surprise Election and Political Murder of President James A.
Garfield (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2003), 375-377.
3 William Tindall, “Echoes of a Surgical Tragedy,” Records of the Columbia Historical Society, Vol. 23
(1920): 148.
4 James C. Clark, The Murder of James A. Garfield: The President's Last Days and the Trial and
Execution of His Assassin (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, 1993), 56.
22
cabinet, Secretary of War Robert Todd Lincoln, Secretary of the Treasury William
Windom, Secretary of the Navy William H. Hunt, and Postmaster General Thomas L.
James, waited for the President near the entrance to his special Pullman car.5
The itinerary of Garfield's summer trip included stops in New England, the
Midwest, and the South. Garfield first planned to meet with Cyrus W. Field, a
millionaire, in New York, and then travel to his alma mater, Williams College, in western
Massachusetts. Following his visit to Williams, Garfield expected to spend some time in
New Hampshire before traveling to his farm in Mentor, Ohio, for an extended vacation.
His summer journey would conclude in Atlanta, Georgia, before returning to the White
House.6
Charles Julius Guiteau, a Renaissance man – in his mind – purchased an ivoryhandled British Bulldog, a .44 caliber revolver, which he planned to use to shoot
President Garfield. At the time of purchase, Guiteau decided to splurge and paid an extra
dollar for the ivory-handled revolver, rather than the cheaper model with wooden
handles, which he believed would look nicer on display in a museum exhibit chronicling
his historic act. After a handful of previous attempts, all of which Guiteau halted due to
minute details, such as warm weather or the weakened appearance of President Garfield's
wife, Lucretia (whom Garfield lovingly referred to as Crete), Guiteau arrived at the
Baltimore and Potomac Depot shortly after 8:30 A.M. to complete his task. About fortyfive minutes later, Guiteau hovered near the ladies' waiting room on the station's first
floor to watch the B Street entrance to the station, thereby allowing him an opportunity to
shoot President Garfield as he walked to the train platform.7
Walking through the ladies' waiting room in the depot arm-in-arm, President
Garfield and Secretary Blaine began heading to Garfield's special Pullman car; however,
the sound of a sudden bang interrupted the gentlemen, followed by second boom.
5 “A Great Nation in Grief,” New York Times, 3 July 1881.
6 Clark, Murder of Garfield, 52-53.
7 Allan Peskin, “Charles Guiteau of Illinois: President Garfield's Assassin,” Journal of the Illinois State
Historical Society, Vol. 7, No. 2 (May 1977): 136-138.
23
Charles J. Guiteau succeeded in shooting President Garfield, who exclaimed, “My God!
What is this?”8 The immediate injury and impact of the two .44 caliber bullets threw
Garfield to the ground, as the masses in the train station began realizing a “half-crazed,
pettifogging lawyer” had succeeded in shooting their commander-in-chief.9 One of the
bullets pierced Garfield's right arm, causing only a minor flesh wound; however, the
second bullet entered the president's back, and within moments blood covered the depot's
floor.10
Medical Developments till Early September
Patrick Kearney, the police officer on duty at the train depot, apprehended Guiteau
and quickly moved him to the nearby police station, hoping to prevent angry mobs from
lynching him. As the two men hurried down the street, Guiteau spoke his notorious
phrase: “I am a Stalwart. Arthur is now President of the United States.”11 The prison
officials placed Guiteau into a secure cell, which military units guarded to prevent any
possibility of either a lynching of the suspect or an escape attempt facilitated by Guiteau's
compatriots.
At the train station, chaos ensued. The attendant of the ladies room, Ms. Sarah V.
E. White, tried to make the president more comfortable by placing a pillow beneath his
head. Secretary of War Lincoln, upon hearing the news from a station employee, ordered
a carriage to locate Dr. D. Willard Bliss, a respected D.C., physician, and placed military
units on alert.12
William Tindall, a minor associate of President Garfield, originally heard that
Guiteau assassinated Vice-President Chester Alan Arthur, but after briefly speaking with
8 Peskin, “Guiteau of Illinois,” 138-139.
9 “A Great Nation in Grief,” New York Times, 3 July 1881.
10 Robert Reyburn, Clinical History of the Case of President James Abram Garfield (Chicago: Journal of
the American Medical Association, 1894), 7-8.
11 Peskin, “Guiteau of Illinois,” 139.
12 Clark, Murder of Garfield, 59-62; D.W. Bliss, “The Medical Report of the Case of President Garfield,”
October 8, 1881, History of the Case Pamphlets, Vol. 1, Box 142, Lucretia Rudolph Garfield Papers,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited LRG MS); “Mrs. White
Interviewed,” Washington Post, 3 July 1881.
24
Guiteau at the prison, Tindall hastily departed for the depot. Tindall, who years earlier
had worked as a physician, went to the second floor room where depot employees and
patrons had carried Garfield. As the first individual with any medical experience to
arrive, Tindall noted that Garfield complained about a “tingling” sensation in his feet, but
that the initial nausea “was relieved by the vomiting.” About twenty minutes later, Dr.
Bliss, a man Tindall respected due to his reputation as a physician, arrived.13
After a brief conversation with Tindall, Bliss began probing the entry point of the
wound, in an effort to locate the bullet. Tindall, witnessing Bliss's examination, observed
Bliss's “face [bearing] puzzled expression,” since his probing failed to ascertain the
course of the bullet. Writing nearly ten years after the case, Dr. Robert Reyburn noted
that “the technique of antiseptic, or more properly speaking, aseptic surgery was not so
thoroughly appreciated or carried out by operating surgeons in 1881 as it [was] in
1892.”14 Reentering the wound with his probe, Bliss succeeded in moving the instrument
to the right, inadvertently causing a second wound by breaking through connective tissue,
and leading Bliss to mistakenly conclude that the bullet traveled to the right side of
Garfield's body.15
Bliss consulted with the other physicians in the room, many of whom arrived
during Bliss's probing, and they all concluded that an ambulance carriage should bring
the injured president to the White House. The transport arrived and began moving
Garfield, who did not complain of the “motions of the carriage” during the ride,
according to Dr. Bliss. Reserve police officers escorted the transport, a police ambulance,
from the depot to the Executive Mansion.16
Prior to the president's arrival at the White House, Joseph Stanley Brown, James
A. Garfield's private secretary, ordered police to guard all the entrances to the grounds,
13 Tindall, “Echoes,” 151-152.
14 Reyburn, Clinical History, 25.
15 Ibid., 152-154; D.W. Bliss, “The Medical Report,” History of the Case Pamphlets, Vol. 1, Box 142,
LRG MS.
16 D.W. Bliss, “The Medical Report,” October 8, 1881, History of the Case Pamphlets, Vol. 1, Box 142,
LRG MS; “Removal of Mr. Garfield,” Washington Post, 3 July 1881.
25
which he locked down after hearing the shocking news. On 3 July, the day after the
assassination attempt, the New York Times compared the crowd outside the Executive
Mansion to the people that gathered on the day that John Wilkes Booth assassinated
President Abraham Lincoln. Upon arriving at the White House, President Garfield
briefly “raised his right hand and gave the military salute” to the crowd.17 Garfield's
medical team placed their fallen chief executive in the “President's room,” a suite in the
southwest chamber of the White House regularly occupied by sitting presidents.18
Along with the crisis of saving Garfield's life, the medical community itself faced
an internal battle between traditional allopathic care and the developing homeopathic
approach. When compared to allopathic treatments, homeopathic care focused on closer
relationships between doctors and patients. The majority of the physicians, including Dr.
Bliss, practiced allopathic medicine, “but two of the physicians...were homeopaths,
whose methods were often at odds with the allopaths.” Crete's preference for the novel
homeopathic approach led President Garfield to support this branch of medicine, evident
in his previous employment of Silas Boynton and Susan Edson, both homeopathic
physicians.19
Once President Garfield “formally placed himself under [Bliss's] consultation,”
Dr. Bliss began reducing the number of physicians and surgeons on the case.20 Bliss's
team consisted of three physicians, Surgeon General Joseph Barnes, Dr. Robert Reyburn,
and Dr. J.J. Woodward. Bliss sent for Doctors David Hayes Agnew and Frank H.
Hamilton, the chair of surgery at the University of Pennsylvania Medical School and a
professor of military surgery at New York's Bellevue Hospital Medical College,
respectively, to help consult the team on surgical matters. Once assembled, Bliss
assigned Surgeon General Barnes to examine President Garfield twice a day, Dr. Reyburn
to maintain the medical records and press releases, and Dr. Woodward to measure the
17
18
19
20
“A Great Nation in Grief,” New York Times, 3 July 1881.
“In The Room With Mr. Garfield,” Washington Post, 3 July 1881.
Clark, Murder of Garfield, 73-76.
D.W. Bliss, “The Medical Report,” October 8, 1881, History of the Case Pamphlets, Vol. 1, Box 142,
LRG MS.
26
president's temperature and prepare the daily bulletins. Dr. Bliss delegated nursing duties
to Doctors Boynton and Edson, the two aforementioned female homeopathic
physicians.21 Although designated with nursing duties, Doctors Boynton and Edson did
not face an easy task, since over the course of his struggle, Garfield's nurses moved him
up to one hundred times per day to prevent bedsores. Furthermore, these nurses tended to
the president during his bowel movements, similar to, according to Dr. Reyburn, the
“attendance bestowed upon a young infant.”22 Unsurprisingly, some physicians suspected
Bliss of taking control of the case to increase his chances of being named Surgeon
General, while simultaneously criticizing Bliss's selection to lead the case because of his
acceptance of homeopathic practices.23
The doctors who originally probed Garfield agreed that the bullet fractured the
ribs before traveling into the pelvis, and to these same physicians, “[l]ocating the bullet
seemed more urgent than avoiding infection.”24 Throughout the case, Dr. Robert Reyburn
maintained two sets of bulletins: one for the press, which greatly exaggerated the
stability of Garfield's condition, and one accurate set, which listed Garfield's actual ailing
condition. Dr. Bliss encouraged this scheme, primarily because Garfield requested that
his staff read newspaper reports, especially those detailing his condition, to him.25 Dr.
Reyburn described this entire process as a difficult dilemma that the team faced: on one
hand, they recognized their responsibility to the American people with providing accurate
intelligence concerning the president's condition, but, on the other hand, they did not
want to worsen Garfield's mood by issuing bulletins with negative information that he
would read.26
Leading political figures received direct telegrams updating them of any medical
changes in Garfield. For instance, John A. Logan, the Republican senator from Illinois
21 Clark, Murder of Garfield, 68, 77; Ackerman, Dark Horse, 403.
22 Reyburn, Clinical History, 18.
23 George Paulson, “Death of a President and his Assassin – Errors in their Diagnosis and Autopsies,”
Journal of the History of the Neurosciences, Vol. 15 (2006): 80.
24 Ibid., 80-81.
25 Clark, Murder of Garfield, 77.
26 Reyburn, Clinical History, 19.
27
and former Civil War general, remained in constant communication with Secretary of
War Lincoln, who informed Logan of the “very alarming” condition of the president.27
Over 2 July and 3 July, Postmaster General Thomas L. James communicated with Carl
Schurz, describing Garfield's condition as “not so favorable” at the time. Telegrams also
went out to update the newspapers across the country and many cities began setting up
bulletin boards. Citizens remained informed about Garfield's condition, which at times
rapidly changed, by following the town boards. These bulletins boards posted notices
from the first set of Reyburn's reports, which as previously mentioned, included
“fraudulently optimistic” outcomes. Just as the doctors became focused on locating the
bullet, the general public quickly became fixated with its location as well.28
Similar to the day before, 2 July, during most of 3 July, doctors noticed
“evidences of internal hemorrhage,” but Garfield remained conscious and aware. As the
public bulletins noted, the president's condition began to stabilize on 3 July, but Garfield
did complain of some pain in his feet.29 The public began writing letters to both President
Garfield and his wife, Lucretia, to express their sympathies and prayers over what they
viewed as “the vile and cowardly attempt made to take his valued life.”30 Rhetoric that
described the president as “just the man the nation needs, talented, noble, generous,
brave, and true,” became a common theme in many of the letters.31 One extreme letter
went so far as to warn Crete to watch out for Chester A. Arthur and Roscoe Conkling,
both who might attempt to “remove the bandages” stabilizing the wound, thereby killing
President Garfield. This same letter described Guiteau's “insain [sic] business [as] made
up buy [sic] conkling [sic] and arthers [sic] friends.”32
During the ordeal, even the youngest of citizens wrote to the president to express
27 Secretary of War Robert Todd Lincoln to General John A. Logan, telegram, 2 July 1881, Box 3, John
Alexander Logan Family Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
28 Richard Menke, “Media in America, 1881: Garfield, Guiteau, Bell, Whitman,” Critical Inquiry, Vol. 3,
No. 3 (Spring 2005): 644-646.
29 “Official Bulletins,” History of the Case Pamphlets, Vol. 1, Box 142, LRG MS.
30 Jas. S. Hook to Lucretia Rudolph Garfield, 4 July 1881, Box 68, LRG MS.
31 Geo. H. Ball to Lucretia Rudolph Garfield, 4 July 1881, Box 68, LRG MS.
32 J.M. To Lucretia Rudolph Garfield, 4 July 1881, Box 68, LRG MS.
28
their sorrow. Edith Stone, a young girl, told President Garfield that upon hearing the
news of the attempted assassination, she “had a good cry.” Little Letta Reeves, a six-year
old girl, hoped that by her seventh birthday in mid-August, that Garfield would feel well
again. Young Frank O'Brien, age twelve, told the president how “God [had] heard [his]
prayer,” since the news over the early days included speculation of the chief executive
surviving.33
Over the eighty days – 2 July to 19 September – that Garfield struggled to survive
the physicians encountered many medical obstacles. While the doctors continually
attempted to locate the bullet, they also employed various machines and apparatuses to
cool the president's room in the White House. With average temperatures over 90ºF
(32ºC) for most of the summer, the doctors hoped by cooling the room they could
increase Garfield's comfort level, as well as minimize any further complications, such as
malaria. On top of these two issues, the doctors also monitored the pus that leaked from
the wound. In late July and early August, the surgeons performed minor operations that
formed auxiliary openings, which they hoped would aid in the draining of the wound.34
On 26 July, Dr. Agnew increased the drainage opening over the rib and extracted some
bone, muscle, and connective tissue fragments, including a single piece of bone
approximately one inch in length. On 8 August, Agnew again performed another surgery,
this time introducing two tubes to aid discharging the infected injury.35 Even with these
extra exits, the pressure from the build-up of the pus led to “a number of pustules of
suppurating acne [forming]…and later, four or five on the surface of the body,” including
a “a free discharge of pus from the external auditory canal [and the mouth].”36
The public, upon hearing of the need to cool the White House, began mailing
suggestions to those close to Garfield. Most of their schemes focused on directing an air
33 Edith Stone to James A. Garfield, 4 July 1881, James A. Garfield Papers, Manuscript Division, Library
of Congress, Washington D.C. (hereafter cited JAG MS); Letta Reeves to James a. Garfield, 5 July
1881, JAG MS; Frank O'Brien to James A. Garfield, 8 July 1881, JAG MS.
34 “Official Bulletins,” History of the Case Pamphlets, Vol. 1, Box 142, LRG MS.
35 Reyburn, Clinical History, 43, 53.
36 D.W. Bliss, “The Medical Report,” October 8, 1881 History of the Case Pamphlets, Vol. 1, Box 142,
LRG MS; Reyburn, Clinical History, 72.
29
current, normally supplied by a fan, over blocks of ice to inject the room with cool air.37
Some of the letters included elaborate plans, such as one suggested by Ms. Susan J.
Bixby in a letter to Lucretia Garfield. Bixby recommended placing “a long lump of ice in
a tub, [while] having a small faucet near the bottom from which the water melting from
the ice [could] trickle into a deep unpainted tin can.” The dripping of the water,
according to Bixby, would help soothe the nerves, encourage regular kidney functions,
and lower the temperature of the room.38
W.F. Wallace, writing to Dr. Bliss, sent a pamphlet explaining the functions of his
air fountain, which Wallace claimed would greatly improve the air quality in the White
House. Another citizen sent Dr. Bliss a diagram that would produce a “cool, pure and
healing atmosphere” to help precipitate the president's recovery. This diagram showed air
pushed, by a fan mechanism operated by some men, through ice, which allegedly
removed the moisture and purified the air. To regulate the temperature, the air traveled
into a steam tunnel and finally through the final chamber that invigorated the air with
oxygen and any antiseptic needs.39
John A.B. King wrote to Colonel A.F. Rockwell to inform him of his machine that
would cool the president's room. King noted that he wrote after hearing press reports
describing Garfield's physicians in need of equipment to lower the temperature; King
humbly claimed that he only wanted to aid in the recovery of the president, not gain any
prestige. An anonymous writer wrote to Dr. Bliss describing his time as a worker in a
meat-packing factory. He described how tons of blocks of ice maintained the necessary
temperature and in turn suggested that the doctors employ one ton of ice per day to help
lower the temperature in the Executive Mansion.40
After attempting to cool the room using different machines, the doctors turned to
37 Henry W. Negley to D.W. Bliss, 11 July 1881, Reel 102, JAG MS; Willie Gray to D.W. Bliss, 11 July
1881, Reel 102, JAG MS.
38 Susan J. Bixby to Lucretia Rudolph Garfield, 10 July 1881, Box 69, LRG MS.
39 W.F. Wallace to D.W. Bliss, 4 July 1881, Reel 100, JAG MS; R. Creuzbaur to D.W. Bliss, 5 July 1881,
Reel 100, JAG MS
40 John A.B. King to Colonel A.F. Rockwell, 7 July 1881, Reel 101 JAG MS; Anonymous to D.W. Bliss, 8
July 1881, Reel 101 JAG MS.
30
the U.S. Navy for assistance. Professor Simon Newcomb, of the U.S. Navy, reviewed
many of the plans submitted to cool the room and concluded that only three of them
“demanded serious consideration.” The Rand Manufacturing Company of New York sent
a large air compressor, but Newcomb noted that it would take considerable time to set up
the machine and they might not find an engine powerful enough to drive it. Newcomb
discarded the idea of using “a large ice-box, which had been placed in the Executive
office, and was expected to cool the air by a downward current through the ice,” since it
“produced no appreciable cooling effect.” The third plan, a machine devised by Mr. R.
S. Jennings of Baltimore, cooled the air by wetting thin cotton screens with water, which
dripped from melting ice above the screens, but Newcomb dismissed the idea since the
ice melted before it could successfully cool the room.41
Newcomb, working with Professor John Wesley Powell, the Director of the
Geological Survey, devised a new system to cool the air by forcing the untreated air, by a
fan, through a large ice chamber (which contained approximately three to four tons of ice
per day). Tested on 11 July, Newcomb found that the system supplied the room with an
ample supply of “cool, dry” air, but caused an annoying noise due to the engines, which
he corrected through a minor modification. By this point, Newcomb placed the operation
under the charge of three active-duty assistant engineers, W.L. Bailie, R. Inch, and W.S.
Moore, of the U.S. Navy.42
The engineers discovered that if a breeze from the south blew into the chamber,
the effectiveness of the machine dropped, but after further review and changes to the
apparatus, they succeeded in keeping the temperature at “the desired point during the
extremely hot weather which prevailed on August 13 and 14…” Although their tests
revealed the machine only cooled the air by approximately 5ºF (-15ºC), they did notice a
huge change in the humidity, which allowed President Garfield to cool his body quicker,
41 “Reports of Officers of the Navy on Ventilating and Cooling the Executive Mansion During the Illness
of President Garfield,” History of the Case Pamphlets, Vol. 1, Box 142, LRG MS.
42 Ibid.
31
since the drier air aided in the evaporation of his perspiration.43
Similar to the air conditioning schemes, the public wrote to officials with methods
and suggestions for locating the elusive bullet. One writer suggested sending a locket of
Garfield's hair to a specialist who would use it to determine the bullet's location.44 A
German newspaper advocated shooting Guiteau twice, in a manner similar to President
Garfield, with a .44 caliber British Bulldog pistol to ascertain the location of the bullet.
This paper went so far as to claim that “99 percent of the American people” would agree
with their method.45
Rather than heeding the suggestions of the masses, Dr. Bliss and his team began
working with Alexander Graham Bell, the renowned American inventor. Bell, who spent
considerable time perfecting the telephone, noticed that pieces of metal disturbed the
telephone; these fluctuations produced sounds.46 Using an induction balance and a
telephone, Bell planned to move metal coils over Garfield's body to measure differences
in frequency (or disturbances), which would allow him to locate the bullet. Prior to using
the machine on Garfield, Bell tested his apparatus on “bullets buried in sand...bullets
[shot] into carcasses of meat and even with veterans of the Civil War who had shrapnel
[lodged in their body].”47 On 24 July, Professor Bell performed a short demonstration of
his induction balance at the White House and explained how his invention would locate
the bullet.
On the evening of 26 July, Bell moved his machine to the Executive Mansion to
attempt to locate the bullet; however, “a balance could not be obtained, and the results
were therefore uncertain and indefinite.” Nevertheless, Bell requested a second attempt
on 30 July, after he reviewed the science behind the invention.48 Bell suspected that metal
43
44
45
46
47
“Reports of Officers of the Navy,” History of the Case Pamphlets, Vol. 1, Box 142, LRG MS.
W.M. Bedford to Lucretia Rudolph Garfield, 10 July 1881, Box 69, LRG MS.
“How To Locate the Bullet,” 8 August 1881, Reel 103, JAG MS.
Menke, “Media in America,” 647.
Dean Zollman and Johannes v.d. Wirjawan, “Alexander Graham Bell & the Assassination of President
Garfield: Teaching the Physics of Early Attempts at Medical Imaging” (conference paper, GIREPEPEC & PHEC Conference, Leicester, United Kingdom, August 2009).
48 Alexander Graham Bell, “Upon the Electrical Experiments to Determine the Location of the Bullet in
the Body of the Late President Garfield; and upon A Successful Form of Induction Balance for the
32
in the room interfered with his invention, thus leading him to request the removal of all
metal. Garfield's attending physicians complied, but they did not inform Bell that
Garfield's bed, a new technological invention known as the innerspring mattress,
possessed a set of metal springs under the padding.49
The New York Times reported that the experiments showed the bullet on the right
side of the body, above Garfield's groin. Bell, like Garfield's physicians, did not check
the left side of the body, leading him to explore the “pus-filled canal created by the
president's physicians.” By the time Bell learned that the metal springs produced the
fluctuations he detected, not the bullet, an illness in his family had called him away,
preventing him from re-conducting the experiments.50
As previously mentioned, Bliss and his team continually encountered pustules
caused from widespread infection in the president's body. The masses responded in the
usual fashion by offering their input. One writer sent the president two bottles of wine to
aid in his recovery, while another citizen sent a pamphlet that documented the success of
her medical ointment in curing wounds and sores. In addition to telling the president that
the people of America wanted nothing more than him to recover, R.F. Maenice sent to the
White House his “Elixir of Life,” to quicken the convalescence.51
Political and Legal Developments till Early September
While the medical and technological developments of the president's case
captivated the nation, political and legal situations also grabbed the interest of the people
during the eighty days crisis. Vice-President Arthur received suggestions and ridicule
from the people, while newspapers and intellectuals speculated on the constitutionality of
Painless Detection of Metallic Masses in the Human Body,” History of the Case Pamphlets, Vol. 1, Box
142, LRG MS, 20, 26.
49 Zollman, “Bell and Garfield,” 3.
50 “The President's Wound,” New York Times, 2 August 1881; Bell, “Upon the Electrical Experiments,”
History of the Case Pamphlets, Vol. 1, Box 142, LRG MS, 32-34; Menke, “Media in America,” 647;
Reyburn, Clinical History, 46-47.
51 H.C. Moore to James A. Garfield, 4 July 1881, Reel 100, JAG MS; R.F. Maenice to James A. Garfield,
5 July 1881, Reel 100, JAG MS; Johanna Green to James A. Garfield, 31 August 1881, Reel 103, JAG
MS.
33
Arthur taking the Oath of Office. Senator Roscoe Conkling, as well as the Stalwart
faction as a whole, faced the brunt of newspapers for both their action and inaction. Also
during the situation, the civil service reformers realized that they could capitalize on the
developments and increased their activities during the summer of 1881.
Vice-President Arthur, enjoying his summer in New York City, received official
confirmation of the assassination attempt on President Garfield's life from Secretary of
State James G. Blaine.52 Arthur initially concluded, after spending some time with his
friend Senator Conkling, to remain in New York until he heard of Garfield's death;
however, later in the day, Blaine telegraphed Arthur informing him that the entire cabinet
agreed that the vice-president should return to the capital immediately.53 According to a
contemporary Washington Post article, Secretary Blaine requested Arthur's presence in
the capital to prevent a state of anarchy, since the House of Representatives had not
elected a speaker nor had the Senate selected a pro tempore.54 Taking the train from New
York City to Washington, D.C., Arthur went to see his commander-in-chief, but Bliss and
the other physicians forbade it. During his time in D.C., Arthur stayed at the residence of
his colleague John P. Jones, a Republican senator from Nevada. At Senator Jones's home,
the cabinet met with Arthur and remained cordial, demonstrating to the American people
that their government, although divided into factions at times, remained stable during this
terrible crisis.55
Throughout the eighty day period, Arthur remained terrified at becoming
president under these circumstances, since it seemed that Guiteau attempted to
assassinate Garfield specifically to propel Arthur to the presidency.56 Some of those in
correspondence with the vice-president did not ease his situation, as evidenced by a letter
52 James G. Blaine to Chester A. Arthur, telegraph, 2 July 1881, Reel 7, James Gillespie Blaine Papers,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
53 “Gen. Arthur’s Movements,” New York Times, 3 July 1881; James G. Blaine to Chester A. Arthur,
telegraph, 2 July 1881, Reel 1, Chester Alan Arthur Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress,
Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited CAA MS).
54 “The Vice-President's Arrival,” Washington Post, 4 July 1881
55 Ackerman, Dark Horse, 403-405.
56 “The Vice-President's Position,” Washington Post, 5 July 1881
34
sent to Arthur in late August 1881, from Ms. Julia I. Sand. Sand directly stated that on
the day Guiteau attempted to remove Garfield, “the thought rose in a thousand minds that
you might be the instigator of the foul act (emphasis in the original).” Sand suggested that
Arthur not resign from office amidst those calls, but rather accept the presidency, if
Garfield died, and make efforts to implement reforms and act in the best interest of the
American people.57
Ms. Sand's letter corresponded to the period in late August where President
Garfield's health rapidly deteriorated, leading many to suspect his imminent death. A
month prior, Arthur returned to New York City and essentially holed himself up in his
home, attempting to stay out of the newspapers. The New York Times published an article
that cited one of Arthur's friends as stating “that the Vice-President was averse to going to
Washington at this time [late August 1881] as though to sit in waiting for President
Garfield's death and eager to assume the vacant office.” Since Garfield's death seemed
near, E.D. Morgan, a friend of Arthur, wrote to him and advised retaining the cabinet
selected by Garfield, at least initially. Charles J. Guiteau even prepared a letter for
Arthur, which included his personal picks for various cabinet positions.58 Arthur, though,
faced a doubtful press that both felt him unable to satisfactorily fill the presidency and
remarked that “even becoming President does not change a man.”59
In addition to berating and chastising the vice-president, the circumstances of
Garfield's situation placed Arthur in a unique situation. Unlike the assassination of
President Abraham Lincoln fifteen years earlier, Garfield remained alive and cognizant
throughout the affair. Speculation began on whether Garfield's status provided
constitutional means to inaugurate Arthur, even though the chief executive remained
57 Julia I. Sand to Chester A. Arthur, 27 August 1881, Reel 1, CAA MS; Thomas C. Reeves's 1975
biography of Arthur, Gentleman Boss: The Life of Chester Alan Arthur, also draws attention to this
letter. According to Reeve, the message of this letter intrigued Arthur so much that he checked the
return address and found that it belonged to Theodore V. Sand, a local New York City banker. Ms. Sand
continued to write to Arthur for the remainder of the eighty days period as well during his presidency.
58 “Vice-President Arthur,” New York Times, 17 August 1881; E.D. Morgan to Chester A. Arthur, 22
August 1881, Reel 1, CAA MS; “A Great Nation in Grief,” New York Times, 3 July 1881.
59 “If Arthur Becomes President,” New York Times, 20 August 1881.
35
alive. To add to these already muddled circumstances, an issue arose that no President of
the Senate existed, since Arthur vacated the position, as was customary at the time, and
that as previously mentioned, no pro tempore nor Speaker of the House of
Representatives existed. Confusion arose as to who would lead the country, assuming
Arthur did not accept his succession to the presidency, if Garfield died.60
This line of thinking continued during Garfield's final weeks, with some
advocating future congressional action to provide clarity on this matter, even though the
Constitution provided the vice-president the powers and abilities to act in the president's
place, if Garfield became extremely incapacitated. This degree of inability to govern
provoked debate among many, even leading Senator George F. Hoar of Massachusetts to
state: “I do not think the framers of the Constitution meant that a temporary illness,
however severe, should constitute such an inability as would warrant the Vice-President
in taking possession of the office.”61
The delicate situation of the events of 2 July, placed obstacles in front of Senator
Roscoe Conkling and the Stalwarts, similar to those encountered by Arthur. The
Washington Post, two days after the attempted assassination, asserted that most public
men believed that Garfield's final breath would bring about the beginning to the end of
the Republican Party. Furthermore, they suspected that if Arthur became president, he
would fill his cabinet with members of the Stalwart faction, an act that would surely
alienate the Half-Breeds.62
A 5 July letter written to Roscoe Conkling cited some statements by the senator
that revolved around the theme of forgoing “bitterness” and “cultivat[ing] peace.” The
letter continued by claiming that Conkling's status as de facto leader of the Stalwarts
placed him in the best position to bring about this change; however, according to the
message, Conkling failed to heed his own advice.63 Many people recognized that this
60 “The Presidential Succession,” New York Times, 8 July 1881.
61 “The Vice-President Question,” New York Times, 15 August 1881; “The Disability Discussion,” New
York Times, 5 September 1881.
62 “The Political Consequences,” Washington Post, 4 July 1881.
63 J.H.C. Nevins to Roscoe Conkling, 5 July 1881, Reel 34, Carl Schurz Papers, Manuscript Division,
36
same status placed Conkling in a bind: by inquiring about the status of Garfield, he
appeared motivated by selfishness, but by remaining silent on the matter, people could
surmise that he held malice toward the president.64
The third political development during the eighty days period concerned the civil
service reformers. Gilded Age historian Ari Hoogenboom succinctly, as well as
accurately, states: “Guiteau's bullet advanced the civil service reform movement.”65 As
Garfield struggled to survive, many members of his cabinet began realizing the need to
reform the patronage system and the National Civil Service Reform League began
discussing ways to push through the Pendleton Bill as the crisis situation in Washington
ensued. During the entire summer of 1881, various civil service reform associations
attempted to convince the masses that a direct correlation existed between the
assassination attempt on Garfield and the evils of the spoils system.66
Carl Schurz, one of the movement's prominent leaders, received many letters
discussing the matter. Most emphasized that “[r]eform in the Civil Service is a thing
which [they] need[ed] very badly.” One letter from Silas W. Burt, another reformer,
cautioned Schurz to closely watch Postmaster General James's plan, since Burt suspected
ulterior motives in the postmaster's scheme, namely to strengthen James's relationship
with Congress to better his own department.67 Another message to Schurz included a
newspaper clipping that described the new attention civil service reformers received from
the attempted assassination, as well as a reference to the “opinions of a large number” of
people that implied that the corrupt spoils system facilitated the assassination attempt on
President Garfield. Interestingly, this same paper put forth the idea that at the time of
publication, civil service reform would benefit Republicans, because their cronies filled
Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited CS MS).
64 “Mr. Conkling's Delicate Position,” Washington Post, 5 July 1881.
65 Ari Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils: A History of the Civil Service Reform Movement, 1865-1883
(Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961), 209.
66 Ibid., 210-212; Charles E. Rosenberg, The Trial of the Assassin Guiteau: Psychiatry and Law in the
Gilded Age (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1968), 7.
67 W.F. Haenseler to Carl Schurz, 9 July 1881, Reel 34, CS MS; Silas W. Burt to Carl Schurz, 20 July
1881, Reel 34, CS MS.
37
the offices and by removing patronage, they would essentially protect their people from
termination if a change in leadership occurred.68
George H. Pendleton, the sponsor of the bill, even attempted to establish a causal
link between the problems of patronage and the assassination attempt on Garfield.
Pendleton, in Columbus, Ohio, stated:
The desire for office is ruining the country. Guiteau believed that he had
earned an office. This is the brutality of our politics. The desire for office
is what made this crime possible. We must by law abolish the whole
system of office-giving and office-seeking. The reward of men by office
for personal service is corruption, fraud, and brutality....We must supplant
it by a better system. Offices should be given to men according to their
merit. Offices filled by the people must remain with the people. The
spoils system must be eliminated. The brutality which now characterizes it
must be stamped out....[Civil service reform] is for the good of the country.
[Patronage] has debauched the postal service of the country. It has caused
two Senators of the United States to resign. The Collectorship of the port
at New-York occupied the attention of the Senate for days. It has caused
corruption, bribery, and espionage at Albany for weeks.69
The Death and Autopsy of President Garfield
In mid-August 1881, President Garfield began requesting that his doctors move
him to New Jersey, but based on his condition, they did not agree. During the morning of
25 August, Garfield's physicians seriously discussed the possible relocation and after the
president's condition stabilized, they moved him to Long Branch, New Jersey, on 6
September.70 The doctors did not believe that the train ride would agitate Garfield's
condition, but did object to any large crowds in major cities gathering around the rail line.
68 John C. Pratt to Carl Schurz, 13 August 1881, Reel 35, CS MS.
69 “Pendleton on Office-Seeking,” New York Times, 16 July 1881.
70 “Official Bulletins,” History of the Case Pamphlets, Vol. 1, Box 142, LRG MS; the train Garfield
traveled on brought him to Long Branch, but the President stayed in cottages in nearby Elberon, New
Jersey.
38
The rail company provided a temporary auxiliary line that would greatly decrease the
distance from the White House to the entrance of the train. When the physicians began
moving the president to the train, a large, but silent, crowd formed outside of the
Executive Mansion. A calm, hopeful feeling resonated through the gathering as they
witnessed the physically full and stable appearance of the chief exeutive.71
From 6 September through 15 September, the official bulletins reported that
Garfield's condition remained relatively stable and that he “made some progress towards
convalescence.”72 After 15 September, though, Garfield's condition began to rapidly
deteriorate, evident in the physical appearance of the pus.73 During the morning hours of
19 September, sporadic chills furthered Garfield's “unfavorable condition,” which doctors
attributed to suspected blood poisoning. Around 10:00 P.M. that evening, Garfield
complained of “severe pain above the region of his heart…[but] almost immediately
became unconscious…” and finally succumbed to his wounds at 10:35 P.M.74
The next day, 20 September, at 4:30 P.M., doctors began the autopsy of the late
president. Prior to making incisions, the doctors observed the external attributes of the
body and concluded that it looked “considerably emaciated,” and that an “oval ulcerated
opening” appeared a little behind Garfield's right ear. Doctors noted that his back had
both bed sores and acne pustules, as well as “a group of hemorrhoidal [sic] tumors, rather
larger than a walnut, protrud[ing] from the anus.” Upon opening the cadaver, doctors
discovered black coagulated blood covering the spleen; an abscess, containing “two
ounces of greenish-yellow fluid,” under the surface of the liver; and that the bullet
fractured the right eleventh rib, but traveled to the left, not the right.75 The official bulletin
regarding the autopsy explained how the bullet became lodged and encysted below the
pancreas and attributed a secondary hemorrhage, which caused blood to leak into the
71 “Arranging for the Journey,” New York Times, 4 September 1881; “A Busy Day at the White House,”
New York Times, 6 September 1881; “Taken from Washington,” New York Times, 7 September 1881.
72 “Official Bulletins,” History of the Case Pamphlets, Vol. 1, Box 142, LRG MS.
73 “A Change for the Worse,” New York Times, 17 September 1881.
74 “Official Bulletins,” History of the Case Pamphlets, Vol. 1, Box 142, LRG MS.
75 “Full Official Report of the Autopsy,” History of the Case Pamphlets, Vol. 1, Box 142, LRG MS.
39
abdominal cavity, as the cause of death.76 Dr. Robert Reyburn, writing nearly ten years
later, explained how a “traumatic aneurism [sic]” served as the immediate cause of death,
but the septic poisoning would have eventually taken Garfield's life. Reyburn also noted
how the bullet entered the body and followed an “S” shaped route, which contributed to
the confusion of the ball's location.77
Once the news reached Washington late on 19 September, Garfield's cabinet
members sent a telegram to Vice-President Chester Alan Arthur, recommending he take
the Presidential Oath of Office immediately, as well as return to Washington. This
official verification caused great distress to the vice-president, but his assistants began
looking for a judge to perform the oath. At approximately 2:10 A.M. on 20 September,
Judge John R. Brady, of the New York Supreme Court, administered the oath at Arthur's
Lexington Avenue residence in New York City, and the Vice-President then became the
President of the United States of America. Arthur's first act as president consisted of
remaining awake for the rest of the night and pondering his new position.78
Charles Julius Guiteau
The “stalwart of the Stalwarts,” Charles J. Guiteau, worked as “a lawyer,
theologian, and politician” over the course of his life, according to Guiteau.79 Guiteau's
life began forty years before the assassination, 1841, in Freeport, Illinois, and at the age
of seven, his mother died. Although many members of his family faced mental problems,
leading to institutionalization, his father became a well-known local politician and
demanded the best from young Charles. Throughout his youth, arrogance and egotism
alienated him from his peers and Guiteau continually jumped from career to career. He
tried his luck as an attorney, bill-collector, politician, theologian, and even as a member
of the Oneida Community, but none of them retained his interest and devotion.80
76
77
78
79
“Official Bulletin of the Autopsy,” History of the Case Pamphlets, Vol. 1, Box 142, LRG MS.
Reyburn, Clinical History, 97, 99-101.
“The President Dead,” New York Times, 20 September 1881; Ackerman, Dark Horse, 429.
Charles Guiteau to William T. Sherman, n.d., circa June 1881, Box 1, Charles J. Guiteau Collection,
Georgetown University Libraries Special Collection, Georgetown University, Washington, D.C.
(hereafter cited CJG MS).
80 Peskin, “Guiteau of Illinois,” 130-132.
40
Jumping onto the bandwagon of excitement that the 1880 presidential election
provided, Guiteau wrote “Garfield Against Hancock,” a speech which he believed
catapulted James A. Garfield to the White House. The speech, originally designed for
Ulysses S. Grant, whom Guiteau believed would lead the Republican ticket, received a
minor change once Garfield earned the nomination. Following the election, Guiteau
expected that the spoils system, partially controlled by the new president, would provide
him with the ambassadorship to Austria-Hungary as payment for his political loyalty.
After hearing that the administration selected another candidate for the position, Guiteau
turned his sights toward the less desirable, but still prestigious, consulship in France.81
At this point, Guiteau began stalking the political leaders of Washington,
barraging Secretary of State Blaine, Senator John A. Logan of Illinois, and President
Garfield with appeals for support for his application. After months of failure, which
corresponded to the highly publicized resignation of Senators Roscoe Conkling and
Thomas “Me Too” Platt of New York, Guiteau realized in mid-May 1881 that by
removing the president from the Executive Mansion, the two major factions of the
Republican Party would unite, thus strengthening the nation. This inspiration, divine
according to Guiteau, led him on a path of preparation during which he purchased the
famed British Bulldog, revised and expanded his theological treatise, The Truth,
inspected the D.C., jail, and wrote a letter that explained his actions.82
Following the shooting and Guiteau's arrival at the jail, authorities came across
some personal writings of the assassin. Guiteau wrote a letter to William T. Sherman, the
Commanding General of the United States Army, informing him that he shot President
Garfield, an act that he referred to as a “political necessity.” About two weeks prior to
the shooting, Guiteau wrote a letter to the people of the United States, further elaborating
on this “necessity,” by arguing that Garfield betrayed the men that had led him to the
81 Peskin, “Guiteau of Illinois,” 133-134.
82 Charles Guiteau, “Personal Mention,” Box 1 CJG MS; Peskin, “Guiteau of Illinois,” 134-136; in this
1977 article on Guiteau, Peskin, one of the leading Garfield historians, shuns the notion that Garfield
assassinated Garfield over political disappointment, while showing great dismay that this idea stuck to
the pages of history.
41
presidency. Guiteau continued by espousing his belief that the president's misconduct,
namely his efforts to “crush” Ulysses S. Grant and Roscoe Conkling, alienated the entire
nation from his administration. By killing Garfield, Guiteau reasoned that Arthur would
become president and “save the Republic.”83
During the initial days of his incarceration, Guiteau showcased a happy and
satisfied demeanor, most likely due to the notoriety his name finally received, according
to historian Charles E. Rosenberg.84 The Washington Post featured a story on 4 July that
included the assassin's explanation, namely that he shot Garfield “because it was so
ordained by God.” This same article included a modicum of regret on Guiteau's part for
not shooting Garfield a third time, since he speculated that an additional bullet would
have certainly killed the president, thereby avoiding his suffering.85 Also during these first
few days, regular citizens and reporters crowded outside the D.C., jail that housed
Guiteau; however, strict orders, ensured by a detachment of troops, prevented him from
seeing any visitors. District officials interviewed Guiteau to rule out any larger
conspiracies and after these initial talks, Washington District Attorney George Corkhill,
who eventually led the prosecution against Guiteau, blocked any visitation or verbal
communication with the prisoner, as well as halting the delivery of any newspapers.86
Throughout the eighty days period, Guiteau's safety remained of paramount
importance for D.C., leaders. During the period in late August when Garfield's death
seemed imminent, jail officials doubled the number of guards, in addition to adding a
small military force. These new troops, allegedly allowed Guiteau to deduce Garfield's
critical condition, since the extra troops would protect Guiteau from rioting and lynching
mobs should the president expire. One newspaper described Guiteau as “living in
constant fear that a mob will move on the jail if the President dies.”87 On 11 September
83 Charles Guiteau to William T. Sherman, n.d., circa June 1881, Box 1 CJG MS; Charles Guiteau to The
American People, 16 June 1881, Box 1 CJG MS.
84 Rosenberg, The Trial, 45; “Capture of the Assassin,” 3 July 1881, Washington Post.
85 “Guiteau's Explanation,” 4 July 1881, Washington Post.
86 Rosenberg, The Trial, 43, 44, 47.
87 “Guiteau's Fear of Violence,” 18 August 1881, New York Times.
42
1881, Guiteau received confirmation of these fears when Sergeant William Mason, a
guard at the D.C., jail, attempted to assassinate Guiteau, because according to Mason, he
became tired of guarding “such a dog as Guiteau.”88 Once news reached Washington of
the death of Garfield in late September, more troops and guards maintained the jail's
security and protected the prisoner.
While Guiteau remained behind bars during the eighty days period and the weeks
leading up to the trial, many people speculated on Guiteau's sanity.89 Early on, the New
York Times suggested that Guiteau's detailed plans to shoot the president provide proof
that courts should hold him responsible for his actions, regardless of his sanity. The
Times also featured the opinion of Dr. W. Guiteau, a cousin of Charles J. Guiteau, who
unequivocally asserted that insanity plagued the mind of Charles, in part due to the
assassin's views that “he was as great a mas as Christ.”90 George F. Shrady, a respected
physician, argued that if convicted, it would be “unjust, wrong, and politically speaking,
futile to execute Guiteau if he is insane.” Based on Guiteau's life, Shrady concluded he
suffered from monomania, a psychological condition that contemporaries described as
causing its victims to suffer from delusions, depression, and irritability, even though they
seem intellectually average. Shrady noted, though, that many people demonstrated these
symptoms.91
Recent scholars tend to conclude that Guiteau did suffer from insanity. In his
1968 influential book on Gilded Age psychiatry, historian Charles E. Rosenberg advances
88 Rosenberg, The Trial, 51.
89 In 2007, Carter Hovland successfully defended his master's thesis, “America's Forgotten Assassination:
A Second Look at President Garfield's Murderer Charles Guiteau,” at California State University, Long
Beach. In his thesis, Hovland sets out to disprove the belief that Guiteau suffered from insanity, as well
as his status as a disappointed office-seeker. Hovland argues that Guiteau's meticulous preparations and
plans for the assassination serve as evidence to counter the insanity claims. Rather, Hovland suggests
Guiteau's misguided actions stemmed from patriotic fervor. While the chronology and narrative of his
thesis remain acceptable to the established standard, his analysis and interpretation leaves the realm of
reason and enters a fantasy world where Mr. Hovland, alone and without allies, can remove the
inaccuracies presented by earlier historians and restore Guiteau's image.
90 “Was There a Conspiracy,” 4 July 1881, New York Times; “Guiteau’s Insanity,” 13 July 1881, New York
Times
91 George F. Shrady, “Is Guiteau Insane,” 22 October 1881, The Medical Record: A Weekly Journal of
Medicine and Surgery in History of the Case Pamphlets, Vol. 1, Box 142 LRG MS
43
that “there is no doubt that Guiteau suffered from mental illness; this much [was]
unquestionable.”92 In the early 1980s, political scientist James W. Clarke described
Guiteau as “clearly psychotic,” due to the assassin's belief that divine intervention
compelled him to remove Garfield, a plague to society, in Guiteau's eyes. Using a
classification system, Clarke places Guiteau in the psychotic category, which includes
characteristics such as hallucinations, delusions of grandeur, and severe emotional
problems.93
Virtually from the moment that Guiteau arrived at the D.C., jail, prosecutors
began working on establishing their case. The prosecution worked tirelessly, sorting
through biographical materials of Guiteau and statements from potential witnesses, with a
full understanding that they needed to guarantee Guiteau's trip to the gallows. The
district attorney's office, as well as most Americans, realized that if determined insane,
Guiteau would possibly escape standing trial, as well as execution if found guilty. To
lessen the chances for this possibility, law enforcement officials continually cited
Guiteau's cognitive abilities and attempted to defuse any speculation of mental illness.94
On 8 October 1881, Charles J. Guiteau received an official indictment for the
assassination of President James A. Garfield. George M. Scoville, Guiteau's brother-inlaw, represented Guiteau at his arraignment on 14 October and requested a continuance
so that the defense could prepare for the trial, which the judge granted. As the sole
member of the defense team, Scoville petitioned the judge to appoint additional legal
counsel. Judge Walter S. Cox approved Scoville's request and appointed Leigh Robinson
as co-counsel for the defendant.
As the pre-trial procedures continued, Dr. Noble Young, a physician at the D.C.,
jail, mentioned that Guiteau remained optimistic and completely dismissed the possibility
of his execution. During this process, the prosecution selected John Gray, the head of an
92 Rosenberg, The Trial, xiii.
93 James W. Clarke, “American Assassins: An Alternative Typology,” British Journal of Political Science,
Vol. 11, No. 1 (January 1981): 90, 94; in his article, Clarke defines four types of assassins: psychotics,
nihilists, neurotics, and zealots.
94 Rosenberg, The Trial, 76-81.
44
asylum in New York, to determine Guiteau's fitness to stand trial. Gray conducted
extensive interviews with the prisoner and concluded Guiteau sane and fit to stand trial,
even going so far as to state how he “was unable...to discover the slightest evidence of
insanity” throughout the talks.95 As the trial loomed closer, the courthouse underwent
renovations and expansions to help handle the large numbers expected for Guiteau's trial.
The Trial and Execution of Guiteau
On 17 November 1881, almost two months after Garfield expired, Charles J.
Guiteau's trial began. The Honorable Judge Walter S. Cox presided over the case, while
District Attorney George B. Corkhill, with the assistance of Walter D. Davidge of
Washington D.C., and John K. Porter of New York, formed the prosecution. George M.
Scoville represented Guiteau throughout the case; however, Scoville's expertise
concerned land titles, not criminal defense. As previously mentioned, Leigh Robinson,
the well-respected D.C., attorney, served as co-counsel for the defense. The all male jury
consisted of “one restaurant keeper, one retired businessman, one machinist, two
plasterers, one iron worker, two grocers, a cigar dealer, and three merchants.”96
The defense devised three unique strategies to clear Guiteau. The first option
concerned arguing that the president died not from the gunshot wounds inflicted by
Guiteau, but rather from the incompetence of his physicians. This defense, considered
the strongest by Robinson, received virtually no consideration. Guiteau's counsel also
prepared an avenue that would rescind the charges of murder based on the issue of
jurisdiction. This approach involved emphasizing that Garfield died in Elberon, New
Jersey, not Washington, D.C., where the shooting took place. This reasoning continued
on the grounds that “to constitute murder death must take place in the same jurisdiction in
which the wound was inflicted.” The third, and final angle, which the majority of the
trial revolved around, involved presenting Guiteau's insanity as grounds to abolish the
murder charges. Shortly within the proceedings, Robinson resigned from his position
95 Rosenberg, The Trial, 89, 90-92, 96.
96 E. Hilton Jackson, “The Trial of Guiteau,” The Virgina Law Register, Vol. 9, No. 12 (April 1904):
1025-1026; Rosenberg, The Trial, 116.
45
citing Scoville's recalcitrant manner as the main cause. Scoville, who did not agree with
Robinson's medical malpractice defense, publicly criticized his colleague.97
Guiteau's attorneys' emphasis on the insanity defense led to expert testimony from
both sides. During the Gilded Age, psychiatrists endured great difficulty in determining
one's level of sanity. The courts used the M'Naghten Rule to determine the mental health
of a defendant. This standard involved ascertaining whether a person could distinguish
between right and wrong; if so, the court accepted the person as sane. To achieve this,
the “prosecution sought to show that Guiteau was not insane, but simply immoral” in his
actions.98 Whether or not Guiteau suffered from a mental illness, he did cause frequent
disruptions through outbursts and criticisms, especially directed toward his brother-inlaw. Nevertheless, in an effort to prevent people from suspecting that the court viewed
him as unbalanced or insane, Judge Cox did not remove Guiteau from the courtroom.
Dr. John P. Gray, the same psychiatrist who examined Guiteau before the trial,
also served as a consultant and key witness for the prosecution. Gray explained that
because Guiteau distinguished his “delusion as an insane delusion,” he could not suffer
from insanity. Of all the medical experts in the case, Gray gave the longest testimony,
which he based on notes from his discussions with the defendant.99 Dr. Gray's testimony
that Guiteau possessed a healthy mind, greatly influenced the jury, but the spotlight also
shone on one of the defense's medical experts.
Edward Charles Spitzka, a young psychological counselor and well-known
psychiatrist, testified for the defense after turning down a request to serve the
prosecution. Spitzka, who believed Guiteau suffered from insanity, faced intense ridicule
from both the prosecution and their witnesses. The prosecution's experts referred to him
as a “horse doctor,” since he previously worked as a Professor of Comparative Anatomy
at Columbia Veterinary College. Spitzka did not take this mockery lightly, but rather
97 Jackson, “The Trial,” 1026-1027 ; Clark, Murder of Garfield, 117, 126.
98 Clark, Murder of Garfield, 118-119, 129.
99 Allen D. Spiegel and Florence Kavaler, “The Differing Views on Insanity of Two Nineteenth Century
Forensic Psychiatrists,” Journal of Community Health, Vol. 31, No. 5 (October 2006): 447-448.
46
responded by claiming he treated two-legged asses, not horses. Even though Spitzka
attempted to present his point about Guiteau's mental state, District Attorney Corkhill
succeeded in discrediting him in the eyes of the jury.100
During the trial, Scoville attempted to summon President Chester A. Arthur to the
witness stand, but the new commander-in-chief ignored the requests. Scoville wrote to
Arthur asking that he stop the prosecution from only submitting “official” interpretations
and analyses of Guiteau's writings and statements to the press; Scoville realized that his
brother-in-law's sanity would decide the case and wanted to stop the district attorney
from influencing the public to show that the insanity plea “[was] a sham.” At no point
during the trial or its aftermath did Arthur intervene on Guiteau's behalf.101
On 25 January 1882, the jury began deliberations at 4:35 P.M. and returned at
5:40 P.M. with a guilty verdict. For about six months, Guiteau remained in jail waiting
his execution. While incarcerated, discussions of his sanity resumed, since the assassin
now faced execution. William A. Hammond, a respected neurologists, argued that
Guiteau deserved execution, but that the American people must recognize that he suffered
from insanity and did not fall within the spectrum of normal.102 The British Medical
Journal put forth its opinion that based on his life experiences, which included the
formerly discussed frequent moves from community to community and rapid career
changes, as well as attempts to assault his sister with an ax, divorce from his wife, and
excessive egotism, Guiteau suffered from mental illness.103
During the weeks leading up to Guiteau's execution, the chaplain of the jail that
housed Guiteau, Reverend W.W. Hicks, met with the convicted man daily to pray
together and discuss religion. Hicks established such a strong rapport with him that
100Stewart Mitchell, “The Man Who Murdered Garfield,” Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical
Society, Third Series, Vol. 67 (October 1941-May 1944): 472-474.
101George Scoville to Chester A. Arthur, 8 October 1881, Reel 1, CAA MS; George Scoville to Chester A.
Arthur, 6 December 1881, Reel 1, CAA MS.
102William A. Hammond, “Reasoning Mania: Its Medical and Medico-Legal Relations; With Special
Reference to the Case of Charles J. Guiteau,” 1 March 1882, History of the Case Pamphlets, Vol. 1, Box
142, LRG MS.
103“Guiteaumania,” The British Medical Journal, Vol. 1, No. 1121 (June 24, 1882): 947.
47
Guiteau, in his will, granted the full copyright to his book, The Truth, and the rights to his
body to Hicks.104
On 30 June 1881, the day of his execution, Guiteau ate a hearty breakfast and
lunch, before walking calmly to his death. A crowd gathered in the courtyard of the
gallows to watch President Garfield's assassin meet his fate. In the minutes before
Guiteau's plank vanished, he read to the crowd a hymn that he composed earlier that day,
which included repetition of the phrases “I am going to the Lordy, I am so glad” and
“Glory hallelujah!” Following the hymn, Guiteau uttered his final words, “Glory, ready,
go,” signaling his readiness to go to the Lordy.105
104Mitchell, “Man Who Murdered,” 478.
105Rosenberg, The Trial, 236-238; Guiteau's autopsy report, although inconclusive, seemed to provide the
possibility that Guiteau did suffer from insanity.
48
CHAPTER 3
“The Cry of the People”:
Civil Service Reform and the Midterm Election of 1882
Filled with somber thoughts, Chester Alan Arthur, the new President of the United
States, began his sojourn to Elberon, New Jersey. After eighty tortuous days, his
commander-in-chief, James Abram Garfield, had lost his battle with the assassin's bullet,
thereby elevating Arthur to the presidency in mid-September 1881. Upon arriving in the
town where Garfield took his final breath, President Arthur offered his condolences to
Lucretia Garfield and her grieving family. The new chief executive, together with the
bereaved and Garfield's emaciated body, boarded a train to Washington, D.C., to allow
the disheartened citizens to pay their final respects to their fallen leader.
Once they reached D.C., the government afforded the former president a State
funeral and over one hundred thousand people passed by Garfield's body as it lay in the
rotunda of the Capitol building, eventually resting in Ohio. As the lamenting continued,
President Arthur designated 26 September 1881 as a national day of mourning for the late
president. Senator John Sherman and Representative William McKinley, who less than
two decades later became president and suffered the same fate as Garfield, co-chaired a
memorial service held by Congress on 27 February 1882. James G. Blaine, Garfield's
secretary of state, delivered an awe-inspiring eulogy, later described by one of his
biographers as “not excelled by any similar production, and will always be a classic.”1
Establishing His Presidency
Although the press lambasted Arthur during the eighty days, once he ascended to
the presidency, they began softening their attacks as they recognized the difficulties he
would face. Arthur's demeanor and actions during the previous months helped him
1 Edward Stanwood, James Gillespie Blaine (New York: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1905), 257.
49
garner initial widespread support. Julia I. Sand, a frequent correspondent of the
president, told Arthur how his “dignified silence” and admirable manner during the crisis
with Garfield made him a nobler man, while also earning him the respect of the people.2
By the time Garfield expired, national tension dissipated and the public became detached,
easing Arthur's transition into the presidency.3 Compared to many other contemporary
leading politicians, as well as businessman, “Arthur's star appeared dimmer,” as he
became president after only serving as vice-president, his first elected public office, for a
handful of months.4 To elicit the support of the public, President Arthur needed to
effectively, efficiently, and honestly administer national affairs; however, according to
historian H. Wayne Morgan, Arthur “took refuge in stoicism” and alienated himself from
the people, as well as Republican leaders.5
Arthur's first trial, dealing with Roscoe Conkling and the Stalwarts, began in
October 1881 and lasted throughout his presidency. Arthur quickly recognized his new
responsibilities as president and radically shifted his demeanor to match the high office.
In the past, Arthur showed complacent behavior to his Stalwart superiors, but as
commander-in-chief, he led by his own actions and did not follow the policies and
expectations of his longtime associates.6 In October 1881, ex-Senator Roscoe Conkling of
New York met with President Arthur in Washington. They discussed William H.
Robertson, whose appointment as the Collector of Customs at the Port of New York led
Conkling to resign in protest during the previous spring. Conkling desired, possibly more
than anything else, that his old friend, President Arthur, invoke his new patronage powers
2 Julia I. Sand to Chester A. Arthur, 25 September 1881, Reel 1, Chester Alan Arthur Papers, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited CAA MS).
3 Justus D. Doenecke, The Presidencies of James A. Garfield & Chester A. Arthur (Lawrence: The
Regents Press of Kansas, 75; Zachary Karabell, Chester Alan Arthur, (New York: Henry Holt and
Company, 2004), 65; Thomas C. Reeves, Gentleman Boss: The Life of Chester Alan Arthur (New York:
Alfred A. Knopf, 1975), 249.
4 Karabell, Chester Alan Arthur, 68.
5 H. Wayne Morgan, From Hayes to McKinley: National Party Politics, 1877-1896 (Syracuse: Syracuse
University Press, 1969), 145-146; regardless of the validity of Morgan's assertion, it fails to recognize
that Arthur's experience came not from politics, but rather from public administration.
6 Doenecke, Garfield & Arthur, 77.
50
and remove Robertson from office. Arthur, recognizing that “his constituency was...the
American people,” refused to agree to Conkling's demands.7 By standing his ground and
not budging against the power of the Stalwarts, Arthur hoped to establish his own
credibility, while appearing both “autonomous and independent.”8 Ms. Sand warned him
that by associating with Conkling, the public might view it as the Stalwarts receiving
preferential treatment during Arthur's tenure.9 In a few short weeks, President Arthur
“rose to the responsibilities of his high position [as president] with a dignity and fidelity
which dismayed his old cronies and disarmed his apprehensive critics.”10
After the Senate met in October 1881, with the primary goal of electing a pro
tempore, who would become next in line for the presidency, Arthur carefully began
planning his new cabinet. Following the customs of the times, Garfield's cabinet
members began drafting their resignations for Arthur, but the new chief executive
requested that they remain in their positions until Congress met in December 1881. Even
with this appeal, some of the cabinet members tendered their resignations. William
Windom, the incumbent secretary of the treasury, resigned shortly after Arthur's
inauguration and by late October 1881, the commander-in-chief selected Chief Justice of
the New York Supreme Court Charles J. Folger to fill the opening. Incumbent Attorney
General Wayne MacVeagh submitted his notice in early November, amidst Arthur's pleas
for him to remain in office. Arthur nominated Benjamin Harris Brewster of
Pennsylvania, a longtime friend of the president and a qualified candidate who sought
civil service reform, for the opening, which he received by mid-December 1881.11
7 David M. Jordan, Roscoe Conkling of New York: Voice in the Senate (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1971), 414-415; Morgan, From Hayes to McKinley, 149.
8 Karabell, Chester Alan Arthur, 69-71.
9 Julia I. Sand to Chester A. Arthur, 5 October 1881, Reel 1, CAA MS
10 David Saville Muzzey, James G. Blaine: A Political Idol of Other Days (New York: Dodd, Mead, &
Company, 1935), 256; as a biographer of Blaine, the leading Half-Breed politician, Muzzey's statement
of approval for Arthur proves interesting, since most people recognized Arthur as a leading Stalwart.
Furthermore, many biographers and historians of the 1930s still followed the model established by the
Progressive Era historians, which condemned corruption and viewed most Gilded Age politicians
poorly.
11 Reeves, Gentleman Boss, 252-255.
51
Many in Washington, as well as around the nation, expected Arthur to nominate
Roscoe Conkling to replace Secretary James G. Blaine; however, the new president
recognized that elevating his friend to this coveted position would whip up national
outrage and potentially serve as a mockery to President Garfield's assassination. In
November 1881, Arthur nominated Frederick T. Frelinghuysen to succeed Secretary
Blaine. Frelinghuysen brought a distinguished record of service to his new position,
including time as a state attorney general and United States senator. To balance the
factional make-up of his cabinet, President Arthur nominated Half-Breed and Blainesupporter William E. Chandler for the position of secretary of the navy. Arthur
nominated Stalwart Senator Henry Teller of Colorado to replace incumbent Secretary of
the Interior Samuel J. Kirkwood. Stalwart leaders wholeheartedly approved Teller's
appointment and reformers recognized his natural ability to lead in the position.12 During
this distribution of cabinet positions, Arthur received frequent suggestions for candidates
to fill the different positions, including former New York Governor Edwin D. Morgan
and former President Ulysses S. Grant.13
Throughout Arthur's first few months as president, many people noticed that he
failed to offer any substantial spoils to his old Stalwart cronies. In early 1882, the
president attempted to rectify this situation by offering Conkling, who expected he would
replace Blaine as secretary of state, a position on the Supreme Court. The Senate quickly
confirmed the appointment, but Conkling declined the “high and unexpected honor” to
remain in private practice in New York City.14 By the end of the first months of 1882,
Arthur's administration made 874 appointments, with only 49 of the 874 due to the
administration removing a worker from office.15
12 Reeves, Gentleman Boss, 255-259.
13 E.D. Morgan to Chester A. Arthur, 2 December 1881, Reel 1, CAA MS; Karabell, Chester Alan Arthur,
80.
14 Chester A. Arthur to Roscoe Conkling, 21 February 1882, Reel 3, CAA MS; Roscoe Conkling to
Chester A. Arthur, 3 March 1882, Reel 3, CAA MS; Reeves, Gentleman Boss, 260-261.
15 Reeves, Gentleman Boss, 293.
52
President Arthur and Civil Service Reform
Following the death of President Garfield, public opinion radically changed in
regards to patronage and civil service reform. The public realized, according to the New
York Times, that new measures must eliminate the spoils system and appoint candidates
on merit, not political ties, which many people believed played a role in Garfield's death.
The majority of Americans carefully watched the developments of Arthur's
administration, wary of the selection of new cabinet members opposed to reform.16 Antipatronage rhetoric appeared in many magazines and newspapers from the fall of 1881
through the spring of 1882, with statements that generally described the spoils system as
“the foe which has converted the machinery of government all over [the United States]
into a formidable engine for personal or party ends.”17
At the start of his presidency, reformers expected little from Arthur as president,
but remembered his vice-presidential acceptance letter that included his thoughts on
appointing civil servants based on their perceived abilities, rather than their political
connections. Carl Schurz, a civil service reformer and former secretary of the interior,
became the Editor-in-Chief of the New York Evening Post in 1881 and used his
newspaper to push his civil service reform ideology forward, but also remained skeptical
of Arthur's presidency from the start.18 The New York Times argued that this public
attention, as well as consideration from politicians and the press, turned civil service
reform into “the most important part” of President Arthur's administration.19
Arthur helped elevate the importance of civil service reform when he delivered an
address to Congress in December 1881. He stated his belief that “original appointments
should be based on ascertained fitness” and that “the tenure of office should be stable,”
while discussing the problem of determining one's capability and how any proposed
16 “Public Opinion and Reform,” New York Times, 29 September 1881.
17 “The Evils of Patronage,” New York Times, 30 October 1881; Ari Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils:
A History of the Civil Service Reform Movement, 1865-1883 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press,
1961), 223.
18 Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils, 215; Hans L. Trefousse, Carl Schurz: A Biography (Knoxville:
The University of Tennessee Press, 1982), 254-255.
19 “Politics Vs. Public Affairs,” New York Times, 23 April 1882.
53
legislation needed to address this issue. President Arthur endorsed aspects of the British
civil service system, which included laws and schemes that brought in educated and
qualified candidates to serve the public for many years. The chief executive furthered his
commitment to reform, while also confirming his intentions to follow through with his
vice-presidential acceptance letter, when he stated that even if Congress passed a plan
that deviated from his wishes, he would still give the act his “earnest support.”20
During the fall of 1881, the New York Times discussed how Congress must adopt
actions to reform the civil service, since the events of the preceding summer, namely the
assassination of President Garfield, clearly demonstrated a need for change. An article
mentioned Ohioan Senator George H. Pendleton's civil service reform bill, which
included a gradual change from appointments based on patronage to competitive exams,
receiving support in both chambers of Congress.21 Following Arthur's December address,
Pendleton, a Democrat, continued advocating his bill by reintroducing it and attempting
to argue that the patronage system led to the assassination of President Garfield. He
reasoned that Charles J. Guiteau expected a “new distribution” of appointments with the
inauguration of a new president, thereby motivating Guiteau to remove President
Garfield. This situation led Pendleton to argue that removals should only occur to
improve overall efficiency. The Democratic senator even told Republican senators that
by controlling the upper house, they would benefit by solidifying their civil service
appointments, if they passed the Pendleton civil service bill.22
Pendleton continued his efforts during the spring of 1882, leading The Atlantic
Monthly to describe him as “the most conspicuous figure in either house among the
advocates of reform.”23 Even though Pendleton received the most attention, other
congressional leaders submitted proposals and ideas for reforming the civil service.
Writing for The North American Review, W.M. Dickson described this as a problem,
20 “The President's Message,” New York Times, 7 December 1881; Karabell, Chester Alan Arthur, 72-73;
Reeves, Gentleman Boss, 266; Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils, 216.
21 “Congress and Reform,” New York Times, 26 November 1881.
22 “Both Houses in Session,” New York Times, 14 December 1881.
23 “The Political Situation,” The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 0049, No. 293 (March 1882), 397.
54
since the many different schemes essentially confused politicians on what constituted
civil service reform. The many civil service reform plans advocated by various reformers
called for different changes, such as competitive examinations, exclusion of congressmen
from the process, and exemption from political assessments.24
Patronage and the Summer of 1882
As the spring of 1882 began winding down, the civil service reformers met for
their annual meeting in early May, during which John Jay, the grandson of the former
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court who bore the same name, articulated
his opinion that Garfield's assassination turned civil service reform into one of primary
issues of the day. By this point, thirty one local and state civil service reform associations
existed throughout the country.25 Senator Pendleton continued to support implementing
changes to the patronage system and noted how the spoils system forced presidents to
spend valuable time on filling offices. The Senate Committee on Civil Service, on which
Pendleton served, articulated their belief that reform proved necessary.26
Political assessments, the act of politicians collecting monetary payments from
civil servants that received their position through the spoils system, became the leading
issue of the summer of 1882. While patronage primarily concerned the allocation of
positions, it did include this fundraising, predominately during election years.
Republican leaders would seek this support by requesting that these public officials
provide “voluntary contributions,” which would support Republican campaigns, thereby
preventing the Democrats from usurping the Republicans' political control.27
During the summer, as both parties began mobilizing their constituents,
Representative Jay A. Hubbell of Michigan, the Chairman of the Republican
Congressional Committee, began preparations to raise funds by levying an assessment on
24 W.M. Dickson, “The New Political Machine,” The North American Review, Vol. 0134, No. 302
(January 1882), 40-42.
25 “The Political Reformers,” New York Times, 5 May 1882.
26 “Civil Service Improvement,” New York Times, 15 May 1882.
27 Contemporaries of the Gilded Age usually referred to this practice as political assessments, voluntary
contributions, or levying taxes. Although the context of these phrases sometimes affect their
connotation, this chapter uses these terms interchangeably.
55
Republican public servants. In mid-June 1882, the Republican Congressional Committee
began mailing out a circular to civil servants all across the Union, asking for
contributions based on a specific percentage of the official's annual salary. Around the
same time, the National Civil Service Reform League, which continually gained
momentum following Garfield's assassination, informed many of these federal officials
that they could face a fine or removal if they paid the assessment, since the League and
its attorneys believed the contributions violated the law.28
The New York Times published a letter penned by Hubbell that challenged George
William Curtis's, the leader of the National Civil Service Reform League, conclusions.
Hubbell asserted that civil servants voluntarily contributing to the Republican
Congressional Committee would not violate any laws.29 The League's legal council
responded by arguing that since the assessments went directly to the “legislative
officer[s] of the Government,” they violated the federal code, which prevented federal
officials from contributing funds to each other. The lawyers believed that officials only
paid these contributions to retain the favor of the politicians that appointed them in the
first place.30
The dialogue between Hubbell and the League continued into late June. Curtis
accused Hubbell of acting without honor by forcing civil servants to pay the assessment
or face removal, an ultimatum that clearly made them anything but voluntary. Curtis also
raised another point that weakened Hubbell's position, that public officials could choose
to forgo contributing, by showing that the circulars went out to public employees only,
not all Republicans.31 Later in June, the attorneys of the League wrote a letter to Attorney
General Benjamin Harris Brewster informing him of Hubbell's circular. They argued that
if public officials responded with money, they would violate the law, which prevented
government employees from supplying “money or property or other things of value for
28
29
30
31
“Political Assessment,” New York Times, 20 June 1882.
“The Civil Service ‘Warning,’” New York Times, 24 June 1882.
“Assessing Federal Employees,” New York Times, 25 June 1882.
“Taxing the Office-Holders,” New York Times, 26 June 1882.
56
political purposes.” The League's lawyers urged the attorney general to instruct the
district attorneys around the country to issue indictments for all employees of the United
States government who breached the law by providing funds to politicians.32
Also in late June, Pendleton addressed the Senate on the issue of political
assessments. Pendleton completely denounced the practice of seeking voluntary
contributions from civil servants. He began talking about the issue as a partisan problem,
by focusing his condemnations on the Republicans; however, Republican congressmen
quickly pointed out to the chamber that the Democrats employed similar practices in
earlier elections when they controlled the patronage.33
The New York Times criticized Hubbell and his circular. In a 25 June article, they
asserted that Hubbell would face no legal repercussions if he received assessments, since
the law only applied to those that contributed. The Times mentioned this because
Hubbell argued that if assessments violated the law, he would also face consequences.
Although the article does not directly accuse Hubbell of lying, it indirectly shows that he
continually misconstrued facts. Hubbell proposed to the League that the opinion of the
attorney general should settle this matter; however, the Times reasoned that Hubbell's
letter suggested that he already knew the attorney general’s stance.34 In a 2 July story, the
Times alleged that Representative Hubbell's only defense for the assessments circular
concerned the fact that both parties employed this practice in the past. The article briefly
acknowledged that in past elections, the Democrats did employ an assessment scheme to
raise revenue from their patronage appointments, but emphasized that contributions
during presidential campaigns differed from those collected during congressional
elections.35
By mid-July 1882, Hubbell continued levying assessments on those individuals,
including men, women, and children, who received government funds. He also began
32
33
34
35
“Mr. Hubbell’s Circular,” New York Times, 29 June 1882.
“Filling Party Coffers,” New York Times, 27 June 1882.
“Mr. Hubbell’s ‘Challenge,’” New York Times, 25 June 1882.
“An Astonished Committee,” New York Times, 2 July 1882.
57
ignoring letters from the National Civil Service Reform League, which accepted an
earlier challenge by Hubbell to let the courts decide the legality of voluntary
contributions from public official to politicians.36 The Times covered a circular, sent by
Hubbell and the Republican Congressional Committee, delivered to poor laborers, which
stated:
The committee is organized for the protection of the interests of the
Republican Party in each of the Congressional districts of the Union. In
order that it may prepare, print, and circulate suitable documents
illustrating the issues which distinguish the Republican Party from any
other, and may meet all proper expenses incident to the campaign, the
committee feel authorized to apply to all citizens whose principles or
interests are involved in the struggle. Under the circumstances in which
the committee finds itself placed[,] the committee believes that you will
esteem it both a privilege and a pleasure to make to its fund a contribution,
which it is hoped will not be less than $17.50.
The committee is
authorized to state that such voluntary contribution from persons
employed in the service of the United States will not be objected to in any
official quarter.
The Times noted that these laborers received between $1.80 to $3.00 per day, which many
needed to support their wives and children.37 Amidst all this negative publicity, in late
July 1882, Attorney General Brewster issued his opinion on the issue of political
assessments. Brewster concluded that “officer[s] of the Government” did not include
congressmen, which for all intents and purposes, legally permitted civil servants to
contribute money to Hubbell and the Republican Congressional Committee.38
In addition to the issue of assessments, during the spring and summer of 1882,
36 “Hope in Hubell,” New York Times, 11 July 1882; “Hubbell Evading the Issue,” New York Times, 13
July 1882.
37 “Hubbell’s Latest Demand,” New York Times, 17 July 1882.
38 “The Party Assessors,” New York Times, 26 July 1882.
58
brief discussions of civil service reform in general occurred. Leading figures, such as
literary critic Richard Grant White, viewed the spoils system as corrupting the American
people, who could preserve their “self-respect” and purify their politics by stomping it
out.39 The Times speculated that reformers, who would usually not consider voting for the
Democrats, might either abstain from voting for the Republicans or actually vote for a
Democrat, since they viewed the 47th Congress as doing nothing toward advancing civil
service reform.40 As the start of election season neared, the Times described the issue of
civil service reform as “the most important in American politics,” because the spoils
system required a considerable amount of time from public leaders as they went through
possible appointees. Even so, the Times contemplated the possibility that “the cry of the
people may some day become so loud as to penetrate even the walls of the White House
and the Capitol and make itself heard above the clamor of the spoilsmen.”41
Patronage and The Midterm Election of 1882
When election season opened around the nation in August and September, the
issue of assessments remained in the limelight. Throughout the entire election, a “storm
of public indignation” followed Hubbell as more and more people became aware of the
circular and his efforts to raise revenue through contributions from civil servants.42 In
early August, news began surfacing that the Treasury Department official, who wrote the
letter that eventually led Attorney General Brewster to issue the aforementioned opinion
on assessments, did not actually write the letter. The Times broke the story, which
included an admission from the Treasury Department civil servant who suspected that
either Hubbell or one of his cronies authored the letter to allow the Republicans to
continue collecting contributions.43
Clearly aware of the negative consequences associated with assessment, President
39 Richard Grant White, “The Business of Office-Seeking,” The North American Review, Vol. 0135, No. 1
(July 1882), 41.
40 “A Practical Question,” New York Times, 12 June 1882.
41 “A Neglected Issue,” New York Times, 9 July 1882.
42 “Compulsory Reform,” Washington Post, 10 August 1882.
43 “Hubbell’s Latest Dodge,” New York Times, 13 August 1882.
59
Arthur publicly declared that those who chose not to pay the assessment levied by the
Republican Congressional Committee would not face any reprisal; however, corrupt
congressmen still possessed the means to remove civil servants that dissatisfied them.44
Reports on assessment continued throughout August, with one article including an
interview with a Pennsylvania Republican. This civil servant faced assessments from two
fronts: Representative Hubbell and Pennsylvania's Republicans. This public official
described how he contributed in order to “secure the good-will of those who have the
control of appointments,” even though he needed to provide for his wife and five
children. By late August, this phenomenon became common around the country, with
many government employees paying off multiple committees in their party.45 The Nation,
as well as the Boston Daily Globe, reported how similar schemes began spreading to
other procurers of offices, who sought contributions from the civil servants that they put
into office.46
In late August 1882, The Nation discussed how Hubbell's cronies personally
visited civil servants around Washington and analyzed the practice of voluntary
contributions within the Republican Party. Referring to Hubbell and others who sought
voluntary contributions as unintelligent, The Nation argued that Hubbell's infamous
circular revealed a belief held by Republican leaders that the voting paradigm from the
previous decades, in which their constituents supported the Republican Party based on its
principles, no longer held. Rather, the Republican politicians assumed only political
assessments could keep them in their elected positions.47 In early September, Harper's
Weekly put forth a similar stance, interpreting Hubbell’s circular as suggesting that the
Republicans relied on the financial contributions of the party members rather than their
44 “The Assessment Business,” New York Times, 22 August 1882.
45 “One of Hubbell and Cooper’s Victims,” New York Times, 27 August 1882; “More Assessments,” New
York Times, 27 August 1882.
46 “The Week,” The Nation, 31 August 1882.
47 “Summary of the Week’s News,” The Nation, 31 August 1882; “’Voluntary Contributions’ and the
Republican Party,” The Nation, 31 August 1882; “Principles and Purses,” Harper’s Weekly: A Journal
of Civilization, Vol. XXVI, No.1342 (9 September 1882); “The Political Assessment Machine,” Boston
Daily Globe (Morning Edition), 24 October 1882.
60
party’s principles for success in elections.
Also in September, a wave of disapproval from different politicians appeared in
the press, all against Representative Hubbell and assessments. Representative William A.
Russsell of Massachusetts, a member of the Republican Congressional Committee that
Hubbell chaired, condemned follow-up letters sent out by the committee, since the letters
insinuated a threat of removal if the civil servants did not pay the requested amount.
Russell openly and directly opposed the removal of government employees who chose
not to contribute to the committee.48 Congressman William Wallace Crapo, a prominent
Republican from Massachusetts, announced his hostility to Hubbell's practice, arguing
that no political purpose could justify raising funds by levying a tax on civil officials.49 In
an early September speech, Republican Governor Charles Foster of Ohio charged the
Democrats with raising funds by levying assessments on civil servants when they
controlled the patronage in earlier decades. The Washington Post, which covered this
story, pointed out that the status quo changed in two ways: many Americans favored
reform of the civil service, including assessments, and that the old Democrats of the
antebellum period, which Foster referred to, no longer existed.50
In mid-September, Representative Jay A. Hubbell received a surprise from his
constituents in Michigan: they did not renominate him for the upcoming midterm
election. The New York Times suggested that Hubbell alienated his own electorate
through the assessment his committee levied on government employees. The Nation, on
the other hand, recognized that many different factors possibly played a role in Hubbell’s
failure to secure renomination, but noted that the Michigan convention members surely
realized that citizens around the nation could interpret Hubbell's lack of renomination as a
sign that his fellow Michiganders viewed his assessment system with “contempt.”51
48 “The Week,” The Nation, 7 September 1882; “Political Assessments,” Chicago Tribune, 2 September
1882.
49 “Mr. Crapo on Assessments,” New York Times, 5 September 1882.
50 “Gov. Foster on Assessments,” Washington Post, 7 September 1882.
51 “Hubbell As An Example,” New York Times, 12 September 1882; “The Week,” The Nation, 21
September 1882.
61
Hubbell defended himself by citing that people approved of his actions two years earlier,
during the Garfield campaign, when he raised funds by levying a tax on civil servants.
Nonetheless, to many Americans, Hubbell remained “the great assessor and bulldozer of
Government clerks.”52
In October, the publication of The Republican Campaign Text Book For 1882
brought Representative Hubbell back to the center of the political stage. This book,
designed specifically for the 1882 election, spent a considerable amount of space
discussing the issue of assessments, in which the Republicans justified the practice and
even cited instances where the martyred President Garfield used it to raise funds. The
textbook also referred to Curtis and the civil service reformers as “hypocrites and frauds,
and as working to overthrow or suppress, either by violence or fraud, all lawful
majorities,” according to the Times. Hubbell's influence appeared in the textbook, which
approved collecting contributions from civil servants. Two weeks later the Campaigner,
another Republican publication, appeared; issued by Representative Hubbell, this
pamphlet argued for the necessity of political assessments to prevent the Democrats from
taking control of the government.53
Throughout the election, the civil service reformers remained as active as
Hubbell's assessment collection. In early August 1882, the National Civil Service
Reform League held their annual meeting in Newport, Rhode Island, which included the
election of George William Curtis as Chairman and President of the League. These
reformers adopted resolutions that called for “means more direct than mere agitation,” as
well as increased activity among the smaller civil service reform associations in state and
local elections. During this meeting, Curtis recognized how the 47th Congress, composed
of many old politicians, served as a roadblock for furthering civil service reform; in an
52 “Political Assessments,” Chicago Tribune, 1 October 1882; “New York,” Chicago Tribune, 4 October
1882.
53 The Republican Campaign Text Book For 1882 (Washington, D.C.: Republican Congressional
Committee, 1882), 94-97, 99-103; “A Great Political Document,” New York Times, 1 October 1882;
“Hubbell as the Party,” New York Times, 3 October 1882; “The Campaigner,” New York Times, 18
October 1882.
62
attempt to influence the midterm elections, the League tasked the local and state
associations with questioning candidates directly on their civil service reform stance and
playing a more active role during the election season. Once they ascertained the
candidates' position, they would inform the public, who, the League hoped, would
support reform candidates. By late September 1882, the local and state civil service
reform organizations adopted the League's suggestions and actively questioned
candidates.54
Leading newspapers and journals, including the New York Times, Washington
Post, Harper's Weekly, and The Nation, backed the civil service reform movement, since
many viewed the spoils system as inherently evil, including the “indecent” assessment
practices.55 In late October, Harper's Weekly argued that the desire for reforming the civil
service appears “perfectly clear…[among] the most intelligent citizens” who no longer
would accept assessments and appointments for political gain, evident in the creation of
twenty-one state-level civil service reform associations.56 As election day neared, the
reformers continued pushing forth their cause by informing the public about both the
positions of politicians and civil service reform facts. The New York Times commented
how the reformers could use the declarations of politicians, if elected, as reference
material when the 48th Congress met to discuss civil service reform. Even though the
associations questioned the candidates, The Nation asserted that by defending their cause,
the spoilsmen actually pushed people to the reformers. The Nation noted how the
patronage supporters' actions, including the Conkling and Platt resignation, “the
assassination of President Garfield by a half-crazed and disappointed officeseeker [sic],”
President Arthur appointing his cronies, and Hubbell levying assessments, all contributed
54 “Civil Service Reform,” New York Times, 3 August 1882; “The Week,” The Nation, 10 August 1882;
“Questioning Candidates,” New York Times, 18 August 1882; “Reform in California,” New York Times,
17 September 1882; “Questioning Candidates,” Harper’s Weekly: A Journal of Civilization, Vol. XXVI,
No. 1345 (30 September 1882).
55 Paul P. Van Riper, History of the United States Civil Service (White Plains: Row, Peterson, and
Company, 1958), 92; “A Reform Query Considered,” Washington Post, 29 August 1882.
56 “Prospects in Congress,” Harper’s Weekly: A Journal of Civilization, Vol. XXVI, No. 1348 (21 October
1882)
63
to the widespread support for civil service reform.57
This mass support appeared in many midwestern and northern states, generally
Republican strongholds.58 Most state tickets adopted some form of civil service reform,
addressing issues such as the boss and machine systems, political assessments, and
patronage appointments and removals. The Connecticut Republican state convention, for
example, issued a platform that among many things, called for “a judicious system of
civil service reform, by which competent officers would be secured for the public
service.” The Republican platform in Illinois resolved to “favor honest reform in the civil
service, and denounce the extortion of large sums of money from officeholders.”59
During the months preceding election day, speculation for the outcome veered
toward a Democratic takeover of the House of Representatives. In mid-August, the Post
considered that a Democratic victory looked probable, because the Democrats remained
united while the Republicans “burst into belligerent factions.” By early October, the Post
continued espousing their belief that the Democrats would control the next House. In the
North and Midwest, much of the press focused on the elections in Ohio, Massachusetts,
Pennsylvania, and New York, which together demonstrated the “increasing disgust and
indignation with the political use of patronage” and factionalism of the Republican
Party.60
57 “The Reform Associations,” New York Times, 1 November 1882; “An Instructive Parallel,” The Nation,
2 November 1882.
58 Three major issues sectionalized the United States during the midterm election of 1882. The leading
problem in the West concerned Chinese immigration, the main topic of the South revolved around
Republican carpetbaggers and African-American voters, and civil service reform took center stage in
the North and Midwest. By this point in American history, the Solid South mentality pushed the former
Confederate states to vote Democratic, removing the need to analyze this region. Although civil service
reform received some discussions in Western elections, this region played a minor role in the elections
in the Midwest and North.
59 “What is Republican Doctrine?” New York Times, 11 August 1882; “The Connecticut Ticket,” New York
Times, 21 September 1882; “Recent Republican Platforms,” New York Times, 25 September 1882; “The
Convention,” Chicago Tribune, 8 September 1882; Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils, 231.
60 “As to the Next House, Washington Post, 11 August 1882; “The Fight of the Factions,” Washington
Post, 24 August 1882; “As to The Next House,” Washington Post, 2 October 1882; “The Political
Situation,” Harper’s Weekly: A Journal of Civilization, Vol. XXVI, No. 1348 (21 October 1882);
“Democratic Prospecting for the Next Speakership,” Boston Daily Globe (Morning Edition), 24 October
1882.
64
Ohio
Ohio's midterm election occurred in October 1882, approximately one month
before the general midterm election. Although not completely Republican, Ohio sent one
of their congressmen, James Abram Garfield, to the White House two years earlier.
During the election, Governor Charles Foster, a Republican, served the Ohioans as they
prepared for state, local, and congressional elections. The results of the elections in Ohio
provided politicians, from both parties, evidence for speculation regarding the general
elections.
In mid-July, the Democrats in Ohio met for their state convention, but faced some
factionalism. The party essentially split between those in favor of Ohioan Senator
George H. Pendleton's civil service reform efforts and those against him. The major
difficulty occurred with incorporating civil service reform into the Democrats' platform,
which led Senator Pendleton to return to his home state to battle the “rank and file of the
party [that] want[ed] nothing” to do with reform, since they themselves sought to control
the spoils. The convention adopted a platform that included a plank for “honest reform in
the civil service and denounce[d] the extortion of money from office-holders,” while also
selecting the triumphant Senator Pendleton as its chair.61
Throughout the entire election, the Republicans tended to focus on temperance, a
state issue at the time. Governor Foster injected the liquor issue into the campaigns, even
though the Democrats at their convention did not place much emphasis on prohibition.
Republicans recognized that they could alienate the German-Americans in Ohio, a block
of voters who usually went Republican, if they pursued an anti-saloon stance. Foster's
keynote pushed for prohibition and the governor believed that even if the GermanAmerican Republicans supported the Democrats over the temperance issue, that the
Republicans could still win in October. Foster further alienated these Republicans and
the saloonkeepers in Ohio by intimating that these groups battled against the “intelligent
61 “The Ohio Democrats’ Platform,” New York Times, 18 July 1882; “Ohio Democrats Bitter,” New York
Times, 20 July 1882; “Young Democrats Beaten,” New York Times, 21 July 1882; “Summary of the
Week’s News,” The Nation, 24 August 1882.
65
class,” who supported prohibition.62
As 10 October, election day, neared, national attention began focusing on Ohio.
The Chicago Tribune referred to the members of the Prohibition Party as fanatics,
concluding that their union with the Republicans “forever alienated the Germans” from
the Republicans. The New York Times recognized that the temperance issue garnered
some attention in the Ohio elections, “the most important of the October elections,” but
speculated that the Republicans would carry a large chunk of the prohibition votes. Even
though many suspected that state and local elections would revolve around temperance,
while congressional elections would focus on national policy, uncertainty ran rampant
over which party would receive the majority of the vote.63
“The Ohio Tidal Wave,” as the Washington Post called it, became clear as the
preliminary tallies became official.64 Initial reports gave parts of the state ticket to the
Democrats, as well as fourteen to fifteen of the twenty-one congressional seats.65 The
days following the election included news of further gains from the Democrats, who took
the entire state ticket and possibly sixteen congressional districts; however, the official
returns showed the Democrats winning in fourteen districts and the Republicans, who
controlled fifteen seats before the election, ending up with only seven.66
Various public leaders, newspapers, and journals provided their opinion as to the
Republicans' terrible defeat in Ohio. The New York Times argued that prohibition gave
the Democrats the state and local elections, while Ohioan Representative George L.
62 “Ohio,” Chicago Tribune, 1 September 1882; “Ohio,” Chicago Tribune, 5 September 1882; “Ohio,”
Chicago Tribune, 9 September 1882; “Ohio,” Chicago Tribune, 13 September 1882; “Ohio,” Chicago
Tribune, 22 September 1882.
63 “Ohio,” Chicago Tribune, 5 October 1882; “Outlook in Ohio,” New York Times, 8 October 1882; “The
Ohio Election,” New York Times, 9 October 1882; “Party Hopes and Fears,” New York Times, 10
October 1882; “The Elections of this Year,” Washington Post, 10 October 1882; “Ohio,” Chicago
Tribune, 10 October 1882.
64 “The Ohio Tidal Wave,” Washington Post, 12 October 1882.
65 “Ohio Goes Democratic,” New York Times, 11 October 1882; “A Big Victory in Ohio,” Washington
Post, 11 October 1882; “The Ohio Ticket,” Chicago Tribune, 11 October 1882; Prior to this election,
only twenty congressmen represented Ohio, but after a new apportionment, Ohio gained an additional
representative.
66 “The Great Defeat in Ohio,” New York Times, 12 October 1882; “Ohio,” Chicago Tribune, 13 October
1882.
66
Converse reasoned that the Republicans suffered terrible losses due to their stance on
patronage and their recent assessment schemes. Speaker of the House J. Warren Keifer,
another Ohioan, believed the liquor question contributed to the defeat. The Washington
Post claimed that the the anti-Stalwart mentality pushed many Republicans to the
Democrats, evident in the districts where liquor played no role, but the Democrats still
saw gains. Lawrence T. Neal, a Democratic congressional candidate in Ohio who lost,
argued that the temperance issue played a minor role in the election. He stated that the
Democratic candidates focused on national issues, including the “corruption and
extravagance of the Republican Party.” The aforementioned Chairman of the Republican
Congressional Committee, Jay A. Hubbell, put forth his opinion that temperance cost the
Republicans the election.67
While some papers and citizens argued that a single factor contributed to the
returns, others suggested a combination of elements. Former Congressman William
Lawrence of Ohio articulated five causes that led to the Republican defeat: the
temperance issue, dissension toward Republican candidates, “unfounded complaints
against the recent Republican Congress,” dissatisfaction with the Republican Legislature
in Ohio, and general apathy from Republican voters in the state. The Nation
acknowledged that many aspects affected the outcome in the Ohio election, noting that in
the large city elections, temperance played a major role. They also explored other
possible reasons for the congressional results, including the negative publicity generated
by Hubbell’s assessment actions and disgust with the Stalwarts' use of the patronage
system in Ohio.68
Disagreements over the effects of the Ohio election became as polarized as those
over the causes. The Chicago Tribune believed that the midterm election in Ohio
67 “The Result in Ohio,” New York Times, 12 October 1882; “The Great Defeat in Ohio,” New York Times,
12 October 1882; “The Contest in Politics,” New York Times, 13 October 1882; “Effects of Stalwart
Methods,” Washington Post, 14 October 1882; “Ohio Men Explaining the Defeat in Ohio,” New York
Times, 15 October 1882; “Ohio,” Chicago Tribune, 17 October 1882; “Hubbell,” Chicago Tribune, 18
October 1882; “The Next Congress,” New York Tribune, 19 October 1882.
68 “Ohio Men Explaining the Defeat in Ohio,” New York Times, 15 October 1882; “The Political
Situation,” The Nation, 19 October 1882.
67
represented the start of the Democrats taking control of Republican states and soon the
national government. The New York Times noted that the struggle between the
Republicans and Democrats in Indiana intensified following the Ohio returns, but
Representative Hubbell expected that the Indiana Republicans would become more
energized and therefore carry their state. Some Washington residents considered the
possibility for a Democratic House in the next Congress, based on the Ohio election. The
Washington Post asserted that many people did not want to see the Stalwarts in power,
especially because of Garfield’s death, a fate that the Stalwart Republicans faced.69
Massachusetts
In May 1882, the civil service reform movement in Massachusetts received a jolt
when Roland Worthington became the Collector of Customs at the Port of Boston. The
Boston Civil Service Reform Association condemned the action and called on the citizens
of Massachusetts to elect politicians who would reform the civil service, rather than reap
benefits from the spoils system.70 During the summer of 1882, the Bostonian civil service
reformers denounced levying assessments on public officials, because they believed it
sustained the patronage machine.71 As election seasoned began in August and September,
the reform movement continued to gain strength and solidify its ground in Massachusetts.
In mid-September, Republicans in Boston banded together and signed a pledge that they
would not vote for politicians who would not provide an “explicit declaration” of support
for civil service reform. By this point, reforming the spoils system became the leading
issue in the state and frequently appeared in the rhetoric of the Democratic gubernatorial
candidate.72
In late September, the Democrats held their state convention and General
69 “The Effect,” Chicago Tribune, 12 October 1882; “What is Said in Washington,” New York Times, 12
October 1882; “The Effect in Indiana,” New York Times, 15 October 1882; “The Next Congress,” New
York Tribune, 15 October 1882; “The Doom of Stalwartism,” Washington Post, 20 October 1882.
70 “The Boston Collectorship,” New York Times, 16 May 1882.
71 “The Boston Assessment,” New York Times, 12 June 1882; “Denouncing Party Assessments,”New York
Times, 20 June 1882.
72 “Massachusetts,” Chicago Tribune, 11 September 1882; “Civil Service Reform,” Washington Post, 11
September 1882; “The Week,” The Nation, 21 September 1882.
68
Benjamin F. Butler received the gubernatorial nomination, which “perfectly satisfied” the
delegates. The Democratic platform called for “thorough reform of the civil service” and
“fitness over favor” for receiving civil appointments. These Bay Staters supported the
spirit of Pendleton's civil service bill and condemned the spoils system, conveniently
neglecting to mention its past with the Democratic Party. Representative Crapo, the
expected Republican gubernatorial nominee, lost the support of his constituents, who
nominated Robert R. Bishop, the President of the Massachusetts State Senate. The
Republican convention, chaired by Senator George F. Hoar, produced a “diffusive and
complacent” platform, unlike their Democratic counterpart.73
About two weeks after the conventions, General Butler formally accepted the
nomination. In his public addresses, Butler discussed Pendleton's bill in relation to civil
service reform and vehemently called for reforming the civil service system through the
use of competitive exams and merit appointments, rather than continuing the standard
patronage approach.74 The Boston Daily Globe, which openly endorsed Butler and the
Democratic state ticket, believed that the general's campaigning efforts around
Massachusetts helped inform the population for the necessity of reform and change. In
the days leading up to the election, the Daily Globe wrote about the widespread anger
from Republicans over the “scenes of corruption and hypocrisy” from their party's
leadership, as well as the difficulties that made the Republican machine “out of repair.”75
The other candidates across Massachusetts could expect that their constituents would
boot them from consideration, assuming they opposed civil service reform. The
reformers wanted to guarantee that candidates would follow through with their statements
73 “Massachusetts,” Chicago Tribune, 20 September 1882; “Butler for Governor,” Washington Post, 20
September 1882; “Butler and Reform,” New York Times, 20 September 1882; “The Massachusetts
Republicans,” New York Times, 21 September 1882; “Massachusetts Republicans Nominations,”
Harper’s Weekly: A Journal of Civilization, Vol. XXVI, No. 1345 (30 September 1882).
74 “Massachusetts,” Chicago Tribune, 8 October 1882; “General Butler’s Acceptance,” The Nation, 12
October 1882.
75 “Another Whine from the Machine,” Boston Daily Globe (Morning Edition), 31 October 1882.; “We’ve
Got ‘Em On The Run, Boys,” Boston Daily Globe (Morning Edition), 1 November 1882.; “Why A
Change Is Needed,” Boston Daily Globe (Morning Edition), 2 November 1882; “Democratic State
Ticket,” Boston Daily Globe (Morning Edition), 7 November 1882.
69
on reforming the patronage system, since many in Massachusetts demanded a “complete
abrogation of the systems of spoils and assessments.”76
Pennsylvania
The largest Republican schism in the midterm election occurred in Pennsylvania
during late the spring of 1882. The Stalwart faction, led by Senator J. Donald Cameron,
normally controlled the affairs of Pennsylvania through their use of the spoils system;
however, with the growing civil service reform movement, a new camp grouped together
and formed the Independent Republicans of Pennsylvania. Their initial grievances
concerned Cameron's selection for governor, General James A. Beaver, for the upcoming
election, since they wanted a fair convention to select the candidate, not politicians who
benefited from patronage. These Independent Republicans sought to challenge Senator
Cameron’s hegemony over state politics. By late May 1882, the New York Times
suspected that the two factions would split the Republican vote leading to the Grand Old
Party’s defeat in the midterm elections in Pennsylvania.77
Like many popular third party movements, the Independents recognized that even
if they could not defeat Cameron’s forces, they could still steal enough votes to allow a
Democratic victory, thereby destroying his machine. These citizens clearly stated that
they viewed themselves as members of the Republican Party, but wanted to push through
civil service reform, since they viewed Garfield’s victory two years prior as “the triumph
of a true reform in the civil service.” Their convention, which virtually revolved around
the issue of civil service reform, outwardly condemned the spoils system, including its
practice of removing qualified civil servants. These Republicans nominated John
Stewart, a former state senator, to represent their faction in the gubernatorial race.78
In late June 1882, the Pennsylvania Democrats met for their state convention.
76 “Massachusetts Reformers,” New York Times, 27 September 1882; “Reform Sentiment in
Massachusetts,” New York Times, 16 October 1882.
77 “Too Much Patronage,” New York Times, 1 May 1882; “The Pennsylvania Independents,” New York
Times, 25 May 1882.
78 “Cameron’s Eager Foes,” New York Times, 25 May 1882; “A Significant Warning,” New York Times, 8
June 1882.
70
Robert E. Pattison, the controller of Philadelphia and a Democrat known as a reformer,
received the nomination for Pennsylvania’s governor’s mansion. Unlike the
discombobulated Republicans, according to the Times, the Democrats remained unified in
their support of Pattison for the governorship. Since the Republicans in Pennsylvania
essentially split into two tickets, the “election of Mr. Pattison and his Democratic
associates” became “nearly certain as anything in politics can be…” Pattison’s
exemplary record provided the possibility of attracting many young Republicans in the
state that desired a change in the system. The strength of the Independents, however,
seemed to ensure Pattison's victory by stealing the necessary votes needed by General
Beaver, the Stalwart nominee.79
In mid-July 1882, an unusual event occurred. The Independent Republicans sent
an ultimatum to the Pennsylvania Stalwarts stating that if each camp withdrew their
gubernatorial candidate and those politicians agreed not to accept any renomination by a
future convention, then they could reunite the party. Senator Cameron did not accept this
offer, since he wanted his candidate to continue in the race; this further alienated the
Independents, who detested how General Beaver received the nomination through the
machine system. By late July, the point of compromise passed and the Independents,
who recognized their candidate would not win, worked toward the defeat of Cameron's
ticket, which in their opinion did not represent “fair and fit men.”80
The “open revolt” in Pennsylvania continued as campaigns around the nation
picked-up in fall 1882. In August and September, the Republicans from both sides
continued meeting to unite the party. Rumors circulated that General Beaver, Cameron’s
candidate for the governorship, considered accepting the Independent Republicans’ offer
to resign, thus allowing the Republicans to stand a better chance in the election.81 Even
79 “The Pennsylvania Democrats,” New York Times, 29 June 1882; “Parties in Pennsylvania,” New York
Times, 8 July 1882.
80 “The Independents’ Offer,” New York Times, 14 July 1882; “The Pennsylvania Contest,” New York
Times, 19 July 1882; “Politics in Pennsylvania,” New York Times, 28 July 1882; “Politics and
Politicians,” New York Times, 12 August 1882.
81 “The Outlook in Pennsylvania,” New York Times, 24 August 1882; “Another Machine Smashed,”
Chicago Tribune, 2 September 1882; “Pennsylvania,” Chicago Tribune, 13 September 1882.
71
with these possibilities, the anti-Cameron sentiment in Pennsylvania flourished as
election day neared. After word reached Pennsylvania of the Republican disaster in
Ohio, more reports surfaced that internal discussion between the two groups
recommenced to ensure a Republican victory. Even though factionalism divided the vote,
following the Ohio elections, Representative Jay A. Hubbell articulated his belief that the
Republicans would see strong congressional returns.82
In the two weeks leading up to election day, two developments occurred. ExSenator Simon Cameron, the father of Don Cameron, explained his opposition to civil
service reform. Simon Cameron argued that instituting appointments based on fitness
would remove the chance for “poor young men” to receive employment in the civil
service, because only the wealthy would possess the education necessary to appear
qualified for the positions. While this surely antagonized those seeking civil service
reform, the Independent Republicans received a boost when Pennsylvania Governor
Henry M. Hoyt issued a letter that condemned Senator Don Cameron and his machine,
while openly supporting the anti-boss and reform efforts of the Independent Republicans.
With the support of Governor Hoyt, the Independent Republicans became invigorated
and increased their efforts to win the election.83
New York
Alonzo B. Cornell, the son of Cornell University's founder Ezra Cornell, served as
the Republican Governor of New York going into the midterm elections. Cornell, a
Stalwart crony of Conkling, failed to heed to the wishes of the ex-senator, leading to
another Republican schism. During the summer of 1882, Jay Gould, one of the most
powerful businessmen of the Gilded Age, hired Roscoe Conkling for “legal services,”
which many people recognized as Conkling's control of the New York machine. In an
82 “Pennsylvania,” Chicago Tribune, 22 September 1882; “Pennsylvania,” Chicago Tribune, 27 September
1882; “Pennsylvania,” Chicago Tribune, 14 October 1882; “Hubbell,” Chicago Tribune, 18 October
1882.
83 “The Week,” The Nation, 19 October 1882; “Pennsylvania,” Chicago Tribune, 4 November 1882;
“Pennsylvania,” Chicago Tribune, 6 November 1882; “The Pennsylvania Canvass,” New York Tribune,
6 November 1882.
72
effort to affect railroad taxes, Conkling represented Gould and lobbied at New York’s
governor's mansion. Governor Cornell, who the New York Times commended for acting
in the interest of the state, did not budge on his position, thereby destroying his political
relations with Conkling.84
By the end of August, the new Conkling-Gould duo began asserting their
influence to steer New York's elections. If they succeeded in preventing Cornell's
renomination in the New York Republican convention, Gould could prove to future
governors that he controlled the governor's mansion. Conkling, on the other hand, simply
wanted to see the political destruction of Cornell, since he felt betrayed by his former
ally. The ex-Senator, along with his former colleague ex-Senator Thomas “Me Too”
Platt, continuously worked on removing Governor Cornell at all costs.85 Supporters of
Conkling and those of Cornell issued statements that attempted to damage the reputation
of their opposition. News surfaced that Conkling bribed Governor Cornell to pass
legislation that Gould favored, but the ex-senator denied these accusations, which his
machine called lies and deceits. Even with this denial, reports continued to document the
alleged bribe, which focused on Cornell receiving Conkling's favor again, assuming the
governor signed the specific railroad bill into law. This growing feud helped turn Jay
Gould into an issue in the Republican New York gubernatorial race, specifically with the
renomination of Governor Cornell.86
During the weeks leading up to the September Republican state convention, the
battle between the Conkling-Gould pair and Governor Cornell grabbed the attention of
the Empire State. Harper’s Weekly proposed that Republicans in New York nominate the
84 Henry F. Graff, Grover Cleveland (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2002), 24-25; “Political
Miscalculations,” New York Times, 14 May 1882; “Jay Gould’s New Man,” New York Times, 17 August
1882.
85 “Jay Gould’s New Man,” New York Times, 17 August 1882; “Gould and Conkling,” New York Times, 18
August 1882.
86 “Mr. Conkling Excited,” Washington Post, 19 August 1882; “Jay Gould As An Issue,” New York Times,
20 August 1882; “The Attack on Conkling,” Washington Post, 22 August 1882; “Summary of the
Week's News,” The Nation, 31 August 1882; “Anti-Cornell Tactics,” New York Times, 7 September
1882; “Governor Cornell and Mr. Conkling,” Harper’s Weekly: A Journal of Civilization, Vol. XXVI,
No.1342 (9 September 1882).
73
candidate they believe would represent Republican principles and methods, not
necessarily a Stalwart-backed politician. The Times noted that party ties in New York
appeared weaker, which they argued could prevent the Republicans from electing a
governor. The Stalwarts' dislike towards Governor Cornell appeared so strong that
Harper’s Weekly suggested that they would rather lose the governorship to the Democrats
than see Cornell reelected. As the convention neared, bitterness and animosity divided
the New York Republicans almost as badly as their Pennsylvania counterparts.87
When the Republicans met in Saratoga, for the state convention in late September,
selecting the gubernatorial nominee remained the leading issue. Governor Cornell's
opposition, Conkling and the Stalwarts, put their support behind Secretary of the Treasury
Charles J. Folger. When the balloting commenced, no candidate received the necessary
number of delegates after the first tally; however, on the second ballot, Secretary Folger
received the nomination with 257 votes to Cornell's 222. During their convention, the
Republicans also produced a platform that did include civil service reform. The Times
argued that the Republicans' stance for reforming the civil service would “command more
respect if the influences which dominated the convention...were not exercised in
opposition to that measure of reform,” namely the spoils supporting the Stalwarts.88
Upon receiving the nomination, Secretary Folger faced two immediate problems:
determining whether he should tender his resignation and anti-Stalwart anger. The media
commented on the propriety of Folger remaining the secretary of the treasury, a position
he could use to influence the New York elections, while he campaigned for governor.
The Nation argued that no conflict of interest existed, but underhandedly mentioned that
if Folger “want[ed] to remain in official life at all, [he] had better wait and see how the
87 “The Gould-Conkling Scandal,”Harper’s Weekly: A Journal of Civilization, Vol. XXVI, No. 1341 (2
September 1882); “Can The Republicans Elect A Governor?” New York Times, 5 September 1882; “The
Stalwarts and Mr. Wadsworth,” “Governor Cornell and Mr. Conkling,” Harper’s Weekly: A Journal of
Civilization, Vol. XXVI, No.1342 (9 September 1882); “New York,” Chicago Tribune, 14 September
1882.
88 “At Saratoga To-Day,” Washington Post, 20 September 1882; “A Day of Conventions,” Washington
Post, 21 September 1882; “New York Republicans,” Chicago Tribune, 22 September 1882; “The
Republican Platform,” New York Times, 22 September 1882.
74
election [would] turn out,” thus suggesting a Democratic victory in New York. The
Nation also described Folger’s nomination as the Republican gubernatorial candidate as
expected, since the Stalwart machine, controlled by Conkling and Gould, leveraged their
power to control the convention and push Folger onto the ticket. During their coverage
of Folger's nomination, Harper's Weekly noted how “a combination of government
patronage and personal revenge” led to Folger's victory.89
Unlike the chaotic Republicans, the Democrats in New York appeared harmonious
before, during, and after their convention. On the fourth ballot, the required number of
Democratic delegates selected Grover Cleveland to lead their party’s ticket for the
governorship of the Empire State. The Democratic platform called for “reform and
purification of the public service and laws to prohibit levying blackmail upon dependent
officeholders to promote party interests.” During their coverage of the convention, The
Nation described Grover Cleveland as a respectable and honorable man who served
successfully as the Democratic Mayor of Buffalo, normally a Republican stronghold.90
Following the conventions, Jay Gould remained in the spotlight, specifically
because of an attempted business dealing. Rumors appeared across the North that Gould
planned to control the Associated Press by purchasing the seven newspapers that
contributed to and formed the organization. By obtaining these papers, Gould would
hold a monopoly over the news, since he already controlled the Western Union Telegraph
company, which transmitted the stories.91
In early October, both candidates released their acceptance letters and further
elaborated on their position. The Nation interpreted Folger's lengthy note as an apology
for his nomination, since the secretary realized that many voters recognized that the
89 “Mr. Folger At Home,” Washington Post, 22 September 1882; “The Week,” The Nation, 28 September
1882; “Mr. Folger’s Nomination,” The Nation, 28 September 1882; “New York,” Chicago Tribune, 30
September 1882; “Mr. Folger’s Nomination,” Harper’s Weekly: A Journal of Civilization, Vol. XXVI,
No. 1345 (30 September 1882)
90 “Harmony in New York,” Washington Post, 23 September 1882; “New York Democrats,” Chicago
Tribune, 23 September 1882; “The Week,” The Nation, 28 September 1882.
91 “Gould’s Latest Scheme,” Washington Post, 24 September 1882; “A Bold Plan,” Harper’s Weekly: A
Journal of Civilization, Vol. XXVI, No. 1346n (7 October 1882).
75
questionable actions of the New York machine earned him his spot on the ticket.
Cleveland’s letter did not elaborate on any specific policies or plans for reforming the
civil service, but rather endorsed the general idea for a change from patronage. On the
whole, few differences appeared between the positions of the two leading gubernatorial
candidates. In the week before the election, this became more evident when both
candidates responded to a letter sent by the Civil Service Reform Association of New
York. Folger answered by saying that, if elected, he would “further legislation desirable
for the improvement of the public civil service” and would remind civil servants that they
need not contribute to assessment calls. Cleveland's response restated that he fully
endorsed the Pendleton bill, noted how the public seemed to demand a change in the
patronage system, and presented his stance that civil servants should not feel pressured to
contribute to a party to retain their position.92
Election Day and Results
On 4 November, three days before election day, Harper's Weekly wrote about the
patronage system, which they referred to as the most “demoralizing” and “dangerous”
institution to exist in the country, as the leading cause for the difficulties the Republicans
faced, namely in Pennsylvania and New York. One day before the citizens went to the
polls, the New York Times suspected that the Republicans, who controlled the majority of
offices, would suffer the full force of the public's growing anger over the spoils system.
Nevertheless, Republicans and Democrats casted their votes on 7 November 1882 and
waited to hear the results for the composition of the 48th Congress.93
In Massachusetts, predictions, including those by General Butler's managers,
expected a near total Republican victory. As the votes came in, Butler's lead over Bishop,
the Republican candidate, continued to grow. The official returns earned Butler the
92 “Mr. Folger’s Acceptance,” New York Times, 3 October 1882; “Mr. Folger’s Acceptance,” The Nation, 5
October 1882; “Curtis Against Folger,” Washington Post, 4 October 1882; “Mr. Cleveland’s Position,”
New York Times, 10 October 1882; “New York,” Chicago Tribune, 10 October 1882; “Both Candidates
Favor Civil Service Reform,” New York Times, 3 November 1882; “Questioning the Candidates,” New
York Tribune, 3 November 1882.
93 “The Reason Why,”Harper’s Weekly: A Journal of Civilization, Vol. XXVI, No. 1350 (4 November
1882); “The Canvass of 1882,” New York Times, 6 November 1882.
76
governor's mansion, with 133,946 votes to Bishop's 119,997. Although the Democrats
carried the governorship in the “Massachusetts Rebellion,” the remaining Massachusetts
state elections tended to go to the Republican candidates.94 In Pennsylvania, the
Independent Republicans destroyed Senator Cameron's machine in the election by
allowing Pattison, a Democrat, to carry the gubernatorial race. The New York Times
suggested that the people of Pennsylvania viewed a vote for General Beaver as a vote for
Don Cameron’s machine and patronage system.95 In New York, Grover Cleveland
amassed 535,318 votes to Folger's 341,464, “the largest majority ever given to a
candidate in any State in the Union,” according to the Times. Cleveland’s impressive
returns led leading Democratic figures in Washington to discuss the possibility of running
Cleveland as the Democratic candidate in the 1884 presidential election.96 The returns of
election day, “a day of dire disasters to the Republican[s],” wrecked the party's position in
the House of Representatives. The Democrats' gains came from outside of the South and
earned them 198 seats to the Republicans' 127 for the next Congress, a seventy-one seat
majority due in part to the cry of the people.97
94 “Massachusetts Prospects,” New York Times, 7 November 1882; “Butler Elected!” Boston Daily Globe
(Morning Edition), 8 November 1882; “Triumph of the People” Boston Daily Globe (Morning Edition),
8 November 1882; “A Democratic Victory,” New York Times, 8 November 1882; “Massachusetts,” New
York Times, 8 November 1882; “The Massachusetts Rebellion,” Washington Post, 9 November 1882;
“The Week,” The Nation, 9 November 1882; John L. Moore, ed., Congressional Quarterly's Guide to
U.S. Elections, 2nd Edition (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1985), 507.
95 “Cameron’s Overthrow,” New York Times, 8 November 1882; “A Democratic Victory,” New York Times,
8 November 1882; “November Elections,” New York Tribune, 8 November 1882.
96 “A Democratic Victory,” New York Times, 8 November 1882; “The News in Washington,” New York
Times, 8 November 1882; Moore, Guide to U.S. Elections, 518.
97 “A Democratic House,” New York Times, 8 November 1882; “November Elections,” New York Tribune,
8 November 1882; “Bouncing the Bosses,” Washington Post, 8 November 1882; “The Election
Yesterday,” Washington Post, 8 November 1882; “The Republican Wreck,” New York Times, 9
November 1882.
77
CHAPTER 4
“Motives of Self-Defense or Self-Aggrandizement”:
The Passage of the Pendleton Civil Service Act
On Wednesday, 8 November 1882, shocking news permeated New York City.
Continuing her established tradition, Ms. Julia I. Sand began penning a letter to President
Chester Alan Arthur about her thoughts on the recent election. Sand, a New Yorker who
frequently wrote to Arthur and whose discourse always remained both candid and direct,
told the president that “he had a terrible defeat,” an opinion that she believed resonated
throughout the United States. Sand cautioned Arthur not to interpret the midterm results
as the Republicans personally opposing him, but rather them disagreeing with his
principles. She told Arthur that he incorrectly assumed “all good men were cowards,”
since if the people “[were] aroused to danger,” even though they trusted “too much to the
goodness and intelligence of human nature,” they would act. Sand speculated that the
failure could provide Arthur with either a “stepping stone to better things” or a millstone
to sink him to the deep.1
The Election Aftermath
In the initial days following the 1882 election, major news organizations tended to
describe the “Democratic deluge” as a referendum against corrupt Republican practices,
namely political assessments and patronage appointments. The Nation reasoned that the
“trouble that prevail[ed] in a greater or less degree everywhere,” namely the spoils,
angered the huge number of Republicans who voted against their own party. Harper's
Weekly followed suit with The Nation, asserting that “the abuse of patronage” represented
the “chief cause” that disgusted those voters who contributed to the Grand Old Party's
defeat. This repulsion, as stated by Harper's, saw a return to “full vigor” after the
1 Julia I. Sand to Chester A. Arthur, 8 November 1882, Reel 2, Chester Alan Arthur Papers, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (hereafter cited CAA MS).
78
assassination of President James Abram Garfield. In regards to the “Department of
Corruption,” the Washington Post wrote how “Hubbellism ha[d] received a blow from
which it [would] never fully recover.” Popular opinion clearly, according to the same
article, expressed antagonism toward levying taxes on civil servants.2
Throughout the remaining weeks of November and into early-December, the
media and reform organizations continued to expound their interpretations of the
election's results. Harper's frequently suggested that this “tremendous Republican
rebuke to ‘bosses’ and ‘rings’” showed how the masses desired and demanded both
honest politicians and civil service reform. The New York Times claimed that the corrupt
spoils system drove many Republicans to the Democrats, because these dissenters refused
to support their own party’s candidates, who openly embraced and practiced patronage
and political assessments. Although the Times, as well as most publications, dismissed
other factors presented by Republican leaders regarding the outcome, they directly
described that the Democrats' victory resided not in popular support for their party, but
instead overwhelming anger toward the Republicans. The political aftermath also fueled
the National Civil Service Reform League, whose members persistently informed their
fellow citizens about the pressing need for destroying the spoils system and establishing a
competitive examination based civil service. The state chapters espoused similar stances,
such as the reformers in Massachusetts who believed that the Republican losses
demonstrated nearly ubiquitous support for civil service reform.3
In addition to commenting on the stimuli that shifted control of the House to the
Democrats, party leaders and the media speculated on the result's impact on the 47th
Congress's second session, which convened on Monday, 4 December 1882. Historian
2 “The Week,” The Nation, 9 November 1882; “Summary of the Week’s News,” The Nation, 9 November
1882; “What Will Not Be,” Washington Post, 10 November 1882; “The Lesson of the Campaign,”
Harper’s Weekly: A Journal of Civilization, Vol. XXVI, No. 1351 (11 November 1882).
3 “Summary of the Week’s News,” The Nation, 9 November 1882; “The Result of the Elections,”
Harper’s Weekly: A Journal of Civilization, Vol. XXVI, No. 1352 (18 November 1882); “A Distinctive
Victory For Reform,” Harper’s Weekly: A Journal of Civilization, Vol. XXVI, No. 1352 (18 November
1882); “The Democratic Opportunity,” New York Times, 26 November 1882; “Profits of the Spoils
System,” New York Times, 28 November 1882; “Civil Service Reform,” New York Times, 6 December
1882.
79
Carl Russell Fish, writing in the early twentieth century, described the Republican leaders
as “frightened” due to the devastating results from the fall elections. Astute citizens
realized that the Grand Old Party not only failed to maintain control of the House, but
that their majority in the Senate was reduced to the point where they would need to rely
on the votes of independent senators in order to maintain their hegemony. This shift in
power pushed some Republicans to support similar reasoning presented by Governor
Charles Foster of Ohio, who believed that the 47th Congress should adopt reform to
protect their currently appointed cronies.4
Harper's suspected that if reform legislation did not pass during the second
session, that the 48th Congress would implement laws to ban the practice of assessments,
since public anger over voluntary contributions remained rampant. In late November,
Harper's urged the Republican-controlled 47th Congress to implement civil service
reforms, because the publication believed their constituents voted them out of office
because they found patronage and its tentacles repulsive. This line of rhetoric continued
into early December when the Journal of Civilization reasoned that if the people desired
the spoils systems and levying taxes on government employees, they would not have
allowed a Republican defeat at the polls in November.5 The Nation embraced a similar
view, arguing that the Republicans, while still possessing a congressional majority,
should pass the much needed civil service reforms. The magazine also contemplated
possible effects from the Democratic gains, primarily that many of the party's main
supporters would begin to view the issue under a new light, since they soon expected to
exert some control over the spoils.6
In mid-November, the New York Times approached the issue of reform in an
4 Carl Russell Fish, The Civil Service and the Patronage (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920),
218; “Parties in the Senate,” New York Times, 16 November 1882; “Republican Party Policy,” New York
Times, 28 November 1882.
5 “’Voluntary Contributions,’” Harper’s Weekly: A Journal of Civilization, Vol. XXVI, No. 1351 (11
November 1882); “The Duty of the Republican Congress,” Harper’s Weekly: A Journal of Civilization,
Vol. XXVI, No. 1353 (25 November 1882); “Congress,” Harper’s Weekly: A Journal of Civilization,
Vol. XXVI, No. 1355 (9 December 1882).
6 “The November Elections,” The Nation, 16 November 1882.
80
article filled with cynicism. The Times reasoned that the Republicans would only reform
the spoils when they believed they would face defeat in elections by practicing patronage
and that the Democrats only supported civil service reform “because they recognize[d] a
popular demand” for it. The article concluded:
If, then, from motives of self-defense or self-aggrandizement, on either
side, there could be a general consent to the reform which the intelligence
and conscience of the country are demanding, both parties would be
relieved of the chief bugbear in the way of success, and our politics would
be cleared of a cause of most wholesome contention and excitement.7
The Times believed both parties understood that their efforts to reform the spoils would
impact part of their support in future elections. Noting that passing reform measures
could rejuvenate and restore the Grand Old Party, the Times implored the Republicans to
heed the demands of the people.8
On Monday, 4 December 1882, the day Congress convened, both chambers
received President Arthur's annual message. Similar to his December 1881 address,
Arthur emphasized the need for civil service reform, observing that an increasing number
of people, from both parties, across the nation desired civil service reform. The chief
executive reasoned that in the early days of the Republic, the small number of civil
service appointments did not burden the presidents; however, with the growing number of
government employees, the task of appointments consumed too much time for any
president to feasibly handle. As long as civil servants demonstrated competence and
would not face removal for political reasons, Arthur believed that the people of the
United States did not care who filled the offices. The address also included a call for new
statues to ban involuntary contributions from public servants to politicians and put forth
his support of Pendleton's civil service bill, which included competitive examinations.9
7 “Party Inducements to Civil Service Reform,” New York Times, 18 November 1882.
8 “Republican ‘Suicide,’” New York Times, 20 November 1882; “Parties and the Coming Session,” New
York Times, 3 December 1882; “Congress and Civil Service Reform,” New York Times, 4 December
1882; “The Democratic Alternative,” New York Times, 9 December 1882.
9 “The President’s Message,” New York Times, 5 December 1882; “The President’s Message,” The
81
The Pendleton Civil Service Bill in the Senate
On 11 December 1882, Senator George Hunt Pendleton of Ohio issued a motion
to commence debate on Senate Bill 133, a bill “to regulate and improve the civil service
of the United States,” informally known as the Pendleton Civil Service Bill.10 After the
Senate completed some preliminary legislative matters, the discussions on S.133 opened
on 12 December with a speech from Pendleton. “This subject [civil service reform], in
all its ramifications, was submitted to the people of the United States at the fall elections,
and they have spoken in no low or uncertain tone,” stated the Democratic senator from
Ohio. Describing the current civil service system as “inefficient, expensive, extravagant,
and...in many instances corrupt,” Pendleton called for action to reform the system that
affected all parts of the United States. Using his own state as a gauge for the public's
mood, Pendleton suggested that general anger toward patronage pushed the Republicans
out of the House and the Democrats in for the 48th Congress. The “awakened people”
around the nation protested the corruption practiced by the Republicans, according to the
senator, by opposing the Grand Old Party. Urging his fellow Democrats to support civil
service reform, a requirement in his opinion if the Democrats sought to win the White
House in 1884, Pendleton espoused his disgust with the spoils system for corrupting the
nation and proposed that the entire Senate consider civil service reform in order to “avoid
the danger” brought forth by patronage politics.11
Throughout the debate in the Senate, the bill's supporters vehemently favored civil
service reform and an end to corruption. “Even die-hard patronage defenders like [John
A.] Logan, sensing a rising tide of popular support on the eve of an election year, gave
their voices and votes in approbation,” according to historian James P. Jones. In midNation, 7 December 1882; “The President’s Message,” Harper’s Weekly: A Journal of Civilization, Vol.
XXVI, No. 1356 (16 December 1882); Justus D. Doenecke, The Presidencies of James A. Garfield &
Chester A. Arthur (Lawrence: The Regents Press of Kansas, 1981), 100; Thomas S. Mach, “Gentleman
George” Hunt Pendleton: Party Politics and Ideological Identity in Nineteenth-Century America
(Kent: The Kent State University Press, 2007), 187; Thomas C. Reeves, Gentleman Boss: The Life of
Chester Alan Arthur (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1975), 323.
10 Congressional Record, 47th Congress, 2 sess., 172
11 Ibid., 202-206, 208.
82
December, the New York Times briefly mentioned a surprise in the debate when Senator J.
Donald Cameron, Logan's Pennsylvania boss counterpart, came out favoring the bill.
Logan remained very involved through the Senate's debates and supported the bill
because it provided concrete provisions and measures, rather than vague goals.
Democratic Senator Charles W. Jones of Florida supported the bill as well, recognizing
that it did not “radical[ly]” reform the civil service, but pushed it toward “a step in the
right direction.” Jones also embraced Logan's efforts when the Illinoisan issued a major
amendment to the bill.12
Pendleton's Ohioan colleague, Senator John Sherman, endorsed both the bill and
Pendleton's opening remarks. Sherman announced that he would favor any bill that
allowed for competitive examinations over favoritism, prevented congressmen from
pressuring for removals, and forbade legislators from pressuring civil servants for
financial contributions. The senator pardoned his colleagues when he stated:
I do not blame members of Congress for making these applications; they
are compelled to do it, because the public mind has been so poisoned by
this system of appointments that all the people of the country believe that
all they have got to do is write to their Senator or Member to get
somebody appointed to office.13
Senator Joseph R. Hawley of Connecticut, the chairman of the Senate's civil
service committee and one of the movement's major supporters, described how the spoils
system forced government employees into a mass scramble, to both demonstrate and
ensure their loyalty, whenever a leadership change occurred. Hawley advocated a
commission that did not rely solely on academic merits, but also experience gained
through other areas (e.g., previous employment). The senator noted that the reform
would help ease the burden of government administrators who dealt with appointments,
12 Congressional Record, 47th Congress, 2 sess., 360; “Rival Reform Measures,” New York Times, 14
December 1882; Ari Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils: A History of the Civil Service Reform
Movement, 1865-1883 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961), 239; James Pickett Jones, John A.
Logan: Stalwart Republican from Illinois (Tallahassee: University Presses of Florida, 1982), 159.
13 Congressional Record, 47th Congress, 2 sess., 209; 363-365.
83
which they received applications for in overwhelming numbers. Hawley described the
bill as an effort to establish gatekeepers to prevent bad men from filling offices, not to
handle removals; the bill would help limit unjustified removals, though, not forbid the
ability to remove.14
Senator Warner Miller, Senator Thomas “Me Too” Platt's replacement, from New
York argued that the “evil” of patronage seeped from the national administration to the
governments of all the states and most large cities. Miller, in retaliation to the bill's
opponents, stated that “patronage may sooner or later destroy any and every party which
may have control of patronage.” The senator adopted a similar argument put forth by
Senator Hawley, noting that a merit system, instead of patronage, would relieve stresses
placed on Congress and the chief executive in regards to dealing with possible
appointees.15
Leading Half-Breed Senator George B. Hoar from Massachusetts believed that
both the country and Congress recognized the need for civil service reform. Hoar
endorsed the bill for three reasons: the bill's authors spent considerable time studying the
issue; it only affected a small number of civil servants, thereby allowing the changes to
slowly replace the spoils system; and the bill did not comment on issues affecting the
Constitutional powers of the president. Hoar also lauded the bipartisan support of the
bill, namely that of Senators Pendleton and Hawley, a Democrat and Republican,
respectively.16
Senator Francis M. Cockrell of Missouri supported the bill, however, he
continually attacked the Grand Old Party as he articulated his stance. He argued that the
Republicans, in power for over twenty years, corrupted the civil service and commanded
the entire government. Cockrell substantiated his claims by citing Republican campaign
textbooks, inaugural addresses, and congressional addresses, which showed how they
promised reform for years, but failed to implement any changes even though they
14 Congressional Record, 47th Congress, 2 sess., 241, 243, 245, 355.
15 Ibid., 283, 316-317.
16 Ibid., 273-275; “The Civil Service Debate,” New York Times, 15 December 1882.
84
controlled Congress and the presidency. Cockrell injected the issue of assessments into
the debate when he quoted the The Republican Campaign Textbook for 1882, as well as
letters between leading Republican figures. Based on these claims, Cockrell stated he did
not believe that Pendleton's bill, which he supported, would effectively reform the civil
service “as long the Republican party [was] continued in power.”17
While many senators spoke in favor of the bill, two led the opposition and hoped
to prevent the bill's passage. These challengers, primarily composed of Democratic
senators, displayed hostility toward Pendleton, whose bill they believed would hurt their
party since they expected to control the spoils in 1884 by winning the presidency.
Senator Joseph E. Brown of Georgia remained the most vocal throughout the debates in
attacking Pendleton's bill. Before the discussions even began, Brown spoke against
taking up the bill and insinuated that the Republicans only considered it now because of
their recent losses. Brown sought to postpone all civil service reform talks until after the
election of 1884; the senator reasoned that a Democratic president and Congress could
“pass a better civil-service bill” than the current Republican leaders.18
When the debates began, Brown continued his battle against the legislation,
commenting, on 14 December, that those who relied on the success of the British system
to support civil service reform failed to understand fundamental differences between the
governments of the United States and Great Britain. The senator persisted by presenting
his opinion that the bill cut the Democrats out of receiving any spoils, which the
Republicans controlled for more than the twenty preceding years. He described the bill
as providing the means for the continuation of the “aristocracy of Republican officeholding.” Brown made clear that he desired civil service reform, but only if it rectified
the “abuses of the party [the Republicans] that ha[d] so long wielded the power of the
17 Congressional Record, 47th Congress, 2 sess., 510, 512-513, 515, 522-526.
18 Congressional Record, 47th Congress, 2 sess., 173; Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils, 240-241; Mach,
Pendleton, 187-190; Williamjames Hull Hoffer, To Enlarge the Machinery of Government:
Congressional Debates and the Growth of the American State, 1858-1891 (Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2007), 133.
85
Government.”19
About a week later, Brown delivered another tirade against the bill, stressing that
the measure further entrenched the Republican position in the civil service. Brown did
not want the Democratic Party to practice the same degree of patronage as the
Republicans, assuming they won the presidency in 1884, but did want to ensure that his
party would receive a fair chance in appointments to the public service. Based on the
bill's stipulations, the Georgia senator concluded that the current public employees,
predominately Republicans, would receive protection from removal and prevent
Democrats from securing those appointments.20
During the deliberations, the New York Times followed Brown's “very frank but
very extreme and bitter speech[es] against [Pendleton’s] bill.” The paper described
Brown as “not understanding the scope of the bill” and motivated by an avaricious
“desire to see a successful Democratic Party ‘clean out’ all office-holders” to provide
more openings after the 1884 election. The Times believed that Brown’s objections to the
bill represented those of the “average Democrat,” who failed to understand how a
competitive examination system would benefit their party if politics played no role in
appointments.21
Daniel W. Voorhees of Indiana, the second senator who frequently voiced his
opposition to the bill, presented reasons similar to Senator Brown. On 16 December,
Voorhees discussed his opposition to the bill, which partially stemmed from his belief
that the Senate spent too much time on the bill, since it only applied to less than one-tenth
of public officials (on the basis that the civil service consisted of 100,000 government
employees and the bill's provisions affected no more than 10,000). Furthermore, the
senator asserted that the people did not demand civil service reform, but wanted new
statues that outlawed political assessments. Based on his interpretation that the bill
19 Congressional Record, 47th Congress, 2 sess., 276-279.
20 Ibid., 599-601.
21 “Democrats and Reform,” New York Times, 15 December 1882; “The Prospects of Reform,” New York
Times, 15 December 1882; “The Progress of Reform,” New York Times, 17 December 1882; “The
Pendleton Reform Bill in Danger,” New York Times, 23 December 1882.
86
would keep Republicans in office, Voorhees reasoned that the Grand Old Party sought to
“extend its power beyond the grave.”22
During this same speech, the Indianan included questions that potential civil
servants would face in the examination, which he believed provided no relevance to their
duties. Voorhees asked the senators in the chamber for the approximate latitude of both
Washington, D.C., and London, England. Other questions left the realm of geography
and entered that of mathematics. For example, Voorhees asked: “two-thirds of sevenninths of what number is one-half of eight and two-fifths divided by fourteen and seventenths less than fourteen and two-sevenths?” Voorhees proposed other extreme measures,
such as arguing that school teachers should exam the civil service commissioners that the
bill called for. These actions, as well the preposterous questions he posed on the Senate
floor, led the New York Times to refer to him as the “buffoon” of the Democrats opposing
Pendleton's civil service bill. This newspaper also called him a “greedy and clownish
political” hack, because they believed he sought to benefit from the spoils.23
Democratic Senator John S. Williams of Kentucky also opposed the Pendleton
Bill, representing the only member of the Senate's Committee on Civil Service, in his
opinion, that did so. Williams stated that he disapproved of the “little fiction” of civil
service reform, Pendleton's bill, which the Republicans recently began supporting,
because it did not go far enough to fix the problems. Instead, the Kentuckian wanted a
Constitutional amendment to destroy the spoils system. Similar to Senator Brown,
Williams viewed the bill as allowing for the creation of an aristocratic bureaucracy
among government employees, controlled by the same Republicans who corrupted the
government. The senator recognized that the recent election did not mean “that the
country ha[d] suddenly become in love with the Democracy, but it [was] thoroughly
disgusted with the Republicans.”24
22 Congressional Record, 47th Congress, 2 sess., 355-359.
23 Ibid.; “Democrats and Reform,” New York Times, 22 December 1882; “The Reform Bills Goes Over,”
New York Times, 24 December 1882.
24 Congressional Record, 47th Congress, 2 sess., 503-505.
87
According to the Times, many Democrats supported the reasoning of Senators
Brown and Voorhees in regards to wanting reform that did not restrict the ability of
Democrats to fill offices if they won the presidency in 1884. This antagonism appeared
in the statements of Senator George G. Vest of Missouri, who charged the Republicans
with advancing the evils of patronage, since “every Republican administration while
pretending to be for civil-service reform ha[d] stabbed it to death and [did] it deliberately
and [did] it effectually.” The appointments that the Republicans believed they owned,
according to Vest, could see improvements if the Democrats became the leading political
party and filled offices with their own men.25
During the legislative debate, both sides proposed amendments that, in their
opinion, improved the bill. The majority of the motions made by Democratic senators
failed to pass the Republican-controlled Senate. While many of the modifications
concerned specific wordings of the bill, some of the suggested changes produced
miniature battles of their own, encompassing much of the complete debate. Overall, four
amendments, as well as amendments to the aforementioned amendments, shaped the
course of the deliberations.26
On 13 December, one of the early days of the debate, Senator Logan of Illinois
introduced an amendment that restricted the competitive examinations to testing only
skills applicable to the position for which the candidate applied. Logan's alteration
placated some senators who opposed the bill because they believed that the exams
required unnecessary minimum qualifications.27 Logan, through his motion, sought a
“practical” examination that tested experience in addition to any necessary scholarship,
which, in his opinion, served the “purpose of trying to assist the bill in becoming as good
25 “The Abuse of Patronage,” New York Times, 12 December 1882; Congressional Record, 47th Congress,
2 sess., 461-464.
26 Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils, 241-242.
27 During the debates, Senator Logan provided many examples illustrating the practicability of his
amendment. For instance, Logan proposed that an elevator operator in the Treasury Department would
not need the same skill set and educational background as an auditor in the same department. For
additional examples, see Congressional Record, 47th Congress, 2 sess., 246.
88
a law as [was] possible.” The Senate, including Pendleton, agreed to the amendment.28
The next day, 14 December, the primary challenger of the bill, Senator Brown,
submitted a measure to expand the competitive examinations to all levels of the civil
service, not just the lowest levels of the relevant offices. Senator Miller of New York
challenged Brown's amendment by arguing that young men would not want to join the
public service if they entered at the lowest levels, gained experience, and then competed
with those from the private sector, who generally received a better starting salary, at the
higher levels, an opinion echoed by the New York Times. Senator James Z. George of
Mississippi hoped that the final version of the bill would remove the requirement that
forced all civil servants to enter at the lowest level, stating: the “reform of the civil
service and purification of political methods are demanded by the people. When they
speak it is our duty to listen and obey.” By the end of the talks, Brown and his supporters
succeeded in opening the civil service to all levels.29
About a week later, Senator James L. Pugh of Alabama proposed changing the bill
to force all civil servants currently in an office to undergo competitive examinations in
order to retain their position. Shortly after Pugh's motion, Senator Logan announced his
opposition to the amendment, because he believed it would destroy the spirit of the bill.
Logan also reasoned that those currently in office should not possibly face removal due to
a surplus of qualified candidates, assuming Pugh's amendment passed. Pugh's fellow
Alabamian, Senator John T. Morgan, supported the measure since “purging” the civil
servants through examinations, according to Morgan, would reduce inefficiencies.
Senator Augustus H. Garland of Arkansas, another Democrat, endorsed Pugh's
amendment on the grounds that it furthered the bill's intention, to improve the civil
service. Defending his amendment, Pugh argued that “the people, by an overwhelming
public opinion expressed at the last election, demand[ed] a purification of [the] public
service as a great national necessity, and [the senators] ought not...to subordinate it to the
28 Congressional Record, 47th Congress, 2 sess., 246-248.
29 Ibid., 280, 318-321; “Weakening the Civil Service Bill,” New York Times, 27 December 1882; Reeves,
Gentleman Boss, 324.
89
accommodation of the personal wants or claims of any individual.” The Senate rejected
Pugh's amendment.30
On Wednesday, 27 December, Senator Hawley's amendment prohibiting
assessments opened the debate on civil service reform. Hawley originally issued a bill,
independent of Pendleton's, which sought to ban politicians from collecting contributions
from government employees. As the debates on Pendleton's bill ensued, Hawley
redefined his bill into an amendment to Pendleton's. Senator Benjamin Harrison of
Indiana, who became President of the United States six years later, believed that the
government should not restrict its employees from donating to political funds, but rather
prevent forced contributions levied by politicians. Jones of Florida, on the other hand,
wanted to ban all politicians' solicitations of any individual receiving government funds.31
A detailed debate surfaced over whether Congress could legally restrict political
contributions from government employees who wanted to provide their party with funds
to use in elections. The Republicans, for the most part, agreed that Congress would
violate the Constitution if they attempted to restrict it; the majority of Democrats, though,
believed that Congress should prohibit all government employees from contributing
money for political purposes. The Democrats, in attempt to achieve their goal, put forth
amendments, with the same intent but minute differences in wording, that pushed for
banning all political contributions, but the Republicans continually voted them down.
Three back-to-back modifications to Hawley's measure issued by Democratic senators
saw no success. At the end of the deliberations on Hawley's suggestion, fifty senators
voted in the affirmative to prohibit coerced contributions, while no senator voted against
it.32
In addition to these four major amendments, other minor measures occupied parts
of the discussions. Senator Henry W. Blair of New Hampshire called for banning all
alcoholics from receiving appointments governed under the Pendleton Civil Service Bill,
30 Congressional Record, 47th Congress, 2 sess., 567-568, 587-590, 602.
31 Ibid., 635, 639-640; “Summary of the Week’s News,” The Nation, 14 December 1882.
32 Congressional Record, 47th Congress, 2 sess., 635-645.
90
which the Senate eventually agreed to. Senator Preston B. Plumb of Kansas sought to
limit the number of appointments from individuals of the same family to two, because
Plumb argued that individuals in higher position in the government tended to practice
nepotism. The Senate accepted Plumb's amendment, but rejected a measure, which
would determine appointments on party affiliations until an equalization between the
Democrats and Republicans existed in the civil service, introduced by Senator Brown.33
After the Senate tended to all the pending amendments and those introduced on 27
December, the vote occurred. Immediately before the question on the passage of the bill,
Senator Brown espoused further objections to the legislation arguing it failed to
effectively reform the civil service. After Brown's remarks, Senator Richard Coke of
Texas announced his opposition to the bill, because it did not fully embrace reform;
however, since the bill moved the nation in the right direction, according to Coke, he
declared that he would vote for it. The bill passed with the results showing thirty-eight
yeas, five nays, and thirty-three absences. Five Democratic senators, Brown, Call,
Morgan, Benjamin F. Jonas of Louisiana, and John R. McPherson of New Jersey, voted
against the bill. Following the bill's success, Senator Brown offered an amendment to
modify the title to “a bill to perpetuate in office the Republicans who now control the
patronage of the Government,” which many of his colleagues laughed at.34
The Pendleton Civil Service Bill in the House and Arthur's Signature
Two days after the Senate voted on Pendleton's bill the House received the
legislation for consideration, which did not occur until 4 January 1883. Representative
Samuel S. Cox of New York called for forgoing all debate on the bill and instead an
immediate vote, which led to an outburst of applause that echoed off the House's walls.
Cox argued that since the Senate thoroughly vetted the bill, the House should simply vote
on the matter and move on to more important proceedings, including appropriations.
When the clerk finished reading the bill to the House, members began shouting “Vote!”
33 Congressional Record, 47th Congress, 2 sess., 645-652.
34 Ibid., 660-661.
91
When Representative John A. Kasson of Iowa, who earlier proposed his own variant of
civil service reform in the House, attempted to point out some mistakes, other members
hollered for a vote, with no regard to legislative courtesy.35
Due to Cox's motion and the rules of the House, Speaker J. Warren Keifer of Ohio
enforced a strict thirty minute limit for discussions on the bill. During this alloted time, a
handful of representatives spoke either for or against the bill. Representative John H.
Reagan of Texas opposed the bill, because he felt that it did not effectively reform the
civil service and instead represented the efforts of each party trying to cheat the other.
Representative Hilary A. Herbert of Alabama also spoke against the bill and believed that
the Republicans in the House limited the debate in an effort to hamper the bill's
effectiveness. Even so, Herbert announced that he would vote for Pendleton's bill since
“it [was] a step in the right direction” and essentially condemned the Republican Party
and its methods. Representative Albert S. Willis of Kentucky favored the bill and
believed “that if the abuses of patronage continue[d], if the interests of the public [were]
to be sacrificed to partisan and personal purposes, the experiment at self-government
[would] prove a failure...” Kasson wrapped up the debate and announced his support of
the bill, even though it differed from his own legislation and did not include certain
aspects that he desired.36
“Reform Again Triumphs,” read the headline of a New York Times article on 5
January 1883. Following the thirty minutes of debate, the bill passed the House with 155
yeas, forty-seven nays, and eighty-seven absences. The supporters of the bill, clearly,
outnumbered the dissenters by more than a three-to-one margin, which became evident
when a “shout of triumph went up regardless of the hammered protests of the Speaker”
after the announcement of the results. The Times noted that President Arthur soon would
approve the law that would destroy “the greatest evil and danger of the day.”37
35 Congressional Record, 47th Congress, 2 sess., 701, 860-861.
36 Ibid,. 862-866; “Summary of the Week’s News,” The Nation, 11 January 1883; Hoffer, Machinery of
Government, 137.
37 Congressional Record, 47th Congress, 2 sess., 867; “Reform Again Triumphs,” New York Times, 5
January 1883; “The XLVIIth Congress,” Washington Post, 5 January 1883; “The Triumph of Reform,”
92
The Nation described the passage of Pendleton's bill in Congress as “one of the
most remarkable phenomena of recent times,” which became a law on 16 January 1883,
after President Arthur signed the measure. Harper's Weekly recognized that the
Pendleton Civil Service Act represented the “first step toward a complete and exhaustive
measure of reform.” Even with all the revisions, Dorman B. Eaton, the legislation's
author, did not see any major issues with the amendments tacked onto the act and
commended the additional statues prohibiting political assessments.38 Pendleton, whose
name appeared on the act's unofficial title, faced condemnation and “bitter enmity” not
only from his fellow Democrats in Ohio, but also from across the nation. Rooted in the
belief that they would win the White House in 1884, these Democrats felt cheated out of
their fair share of the spoils now reformed through Pendleton's act.39
New York Times, 5 January 1883; “The Pendleton Bill Passed By Congress,” Harper’s Weekly: A
Journal of Civilization, Vol. XXVII, No. 1360 (13 January 1883).
38 Congressional Record, 47th Congress, 2 sess.,1498; “Summary of the Week’s News,” The Nation, 4
January 1883; “’This Particular Measure Passed At Last,’” The Nation, 11January 1883; “The First
Step,” Harper’s Weekly: A Journal of Civilization, Vol. XXVII, No. 1361 (20 January 1883); Van Riper,
Civil Service, 94.
39 Joseph R. Hawley to Chester A. Arthur, 18 January 1883, Reel 2, CAA MS; “Mr. Pendleton
Condemned,” New York Times, 28 December 1882; “Disgusted Democrats,” New York Times, 29
December 1882.
93
CONCLUSION
On 20 January 1883, four days after President Chester Alan Arthur signed the
Pendleton Civil Service Act into law, Harper's Weekly wrote: “We repeat that the new
bill is but a first step toward a complete and exhaustive measure of reform. It is, as we
have said, a beginning.”1 This new legislation, the first major civil service reform law to
clear both Congress and the president, established the United States Civil Service
Commission, an entity composed of three commissioners appointed by the president. No
more than two commissioners from the same political party could serve on the
commission, a rule that legislators hoped would prevent partisanship. The law articulated
the major responsibility of the three commissioners as aiding the president in reforming
the civil service by incorporating changes to increase efficiency and decrease corruption.
The act required these commissioners to also devise a practical examination system to
“fairly test the relative capacity and fitness of the persons examined to discharge the
duties of the service into which they [sought] to be appointed.”2
The Pendleton Civil Service Act also called for distributing appointments in
proportion to the population of states and territories, a requirement that some
congressmen believed could help equalize the representation of the two major parties in
the public service. The act granted the commissioners the power to investigate matters
related to their recommended rules, while also obligating them to annually report to the
president any additional applicable suggestions. In regards to competitive examinations,
the measure created a chief examiner, a position that required this officeholder to manage
the examining boards located across the nation. As mentioned during the debate, two
amendments successfully blocked nepotism in the public service and alcoholics from
1 “The First Step,” Harper's Weekly: A Journal of Civilization, Vol. XXVIL, No. 1361 (20 January
1883).
2 The Statues At Large of the United States of America, Vol. 22 (1883), 403-404.
94
receiving appointments. The legislation also stipulated a penalty of “a fine of not less
than one hundred dollars, nor more than one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not
less than ten days, nor more than one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment” for
those individuals that violated the Pendleton Act or attempted to introduce corruption into
the examination process.3
In addition to regulating the civil service, the new law articulated that membership
in the civil service did not obligate employees “to contribute to any political fund, or
render any political service,” thereby banning forced political assessments. The act
ended the practice of levying taxes/voluntary contributions by making it illegal to solicit
or receive “any assessment, subscription, or contribution for any political purpose” from
any government employee, including members of Congress. These final sections of the
Pendleton Civil Service Act mandated a fine, imprisonment, or both for those individuals
that violated the assessment aspects.4
After signing the law, President Arthur nominated Dorman B. Eaton, John M.
Gregory, and Leroy D. Thoman, as the three commissioners for the new Civil Service
Commission. Eaton, specifically, would head the new Civil Service Commission, an
appointment that pleased many civil service reformers, including George William Curtis.
When Arthur received the recommendations compiled by the three commissioners in
May 1883, he adopted and enacted the changes, an action that elicited further support
from the reformers. In February 1885, more than two years after signing the Pendleton
Civil Service Act into law, Arthur described the act as a success. By the end of his first
and only term, twelve percent of government employees fell under the reach of the 1883
legislation.5
3 The Statues At Large of the United States of America, Vol. 22 (1883), 404-406.
4 Ibid., 404, 406-407.
5 Carl Russell Fish, The Civil Service and the Patronage (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1920),
222; Ari Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils: A History of the Civil Service Reform Movement, 18651883 (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1961), 254-255; Peter W. Schroth, “Corruption and
Accountability of the Civil Service”, The American Journal of Comparative Law, Vol. 54 (Fall 2006):
561; Paul P. Van Riper, History of the United States Civil Service (White Plains: Row, Peterson, and
Company, 1958), 117.
95
The weakening of both the Stalwarts and Arthur's health contributed to the
president's failure to secure his party's nomination in 1884. The Republicans selected
James G. Blaine and John A. Logan as their presidential and vice-presidential candidates,
respectively. Some reformers, who became known as the Mugwumps during the
campaign, defected from the Republican ticket due to the selection of these two
politicians who they viewed as corrupt and against reform. As Democratic leaders in
Washington predicted in November 1882, Grover Cleveland won the party's nomination
and ultimately defeated Blaine in the election, partially due to the support of the
Mugwumps. During the election, the two major parties endorsed the policies and
stipulations of the Pendleton Civil Service Act.6
After Cleveland's victory in November 1884, Arthur expanded the purview of the
Civil Service Commission by adding additional offices to the classified system. Over the
course of his first administration, President Cleveland removed a number of civil
servants, specifically those outside the act's scope; however, the Democratic president did
expand the legislation to affect additional governmental employees by the end of his term
in 1889. Throughout the remainder of the Gilded Age, the 1880s and 1890s, presidents
still employed the spoils for some positions outside of the act's boundaries, but also
enforced and upheld the legislation, including expansions of it. These increases, though,
tended to occur during presidents' final months as lame-ducks, rather than at the opening
of their terms.7
The three leading scholars on civil service reform, Carl Russell Fish, Paul P. Van
Riper, and Ari Hoogenboom, all put forth similar conclusions regarding the importance of
Garfield's assassination, while almost completely ignoring the 1882 elections, in the
passage of the Pendleton Civil Service Act. In his 1904 book The Civil Service and the
Patronage, Fish states: “The tragic incident of the death of Garfield at the hands of a
6 Fish, The Civil Service, 222; Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils, 258; for the most recent study on the
election of 1884, see Mark Wahlgren Summers, Rum Romanism & Rebellion: The Making of a
President, 1884 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
7 Fish, The Civil Service, 223-226; Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils, 261; Van Riper, Civil Service,
117-118.
96
disappointed office-seeker deeply affected public sentiment; and the fall elections of 1882
frightened the Republican leaders, particularly as in several cases the determining factor
seemed to be the question of civil service reform.” This single sentence represents the
entirety of Fish's argument regarding the bill's passage. While Fish correctly recognizes
the importance of these major events, he fails to support his assertions with any
meaningful evidence or discussion. Similar to Fish, Van Riper, in his 1958 book, argues
that “by far the most dramatic [event leading up to the passage of Pendleton] was the
assassination of President Garfield in 1881.” Noting how the press and major civil
service reformers pushed the notion of Guiteau's association with spoils, Van Riper
concludes that the public's awareness with civil service reform “leaped forward” during
the summer of 1881. Van Riper, like Fish, provides no evidence to corroborate these
claims, as well as his statements in reference to the importance of the results of the
midterm election of 1882 in reversing congressional Republican policy toward reforming
the spoils. Both Van Riper's and Fish's books, surveys of civil service history rather than
detailed analyses, simply state these conclusions, which elevate the significance of
Garfield's death at the expense of understanding the role of the 1882 midterm election in
achieving civil service reform.8
Ari Hoogenboom's 1961 book, Outlawing the Spoils, initially puts forth a valid
conclusion when Hoogenboom states: “Guiteau's bullet advanced the civil service reform
movement.” The scope of Hoogenboom's work, dealing with the reformers instead of the
reform, limits his discussions on Garfield's death to the reformers, a paradigm that
follows in his limited discourse on the midterm elections when he thoroughly explores
the role of the reformers without considering the public in 1882 or the major aspects of
the race. This focus prevents Hoogenboom from explaining how the combination of
Garfield's assassination and the Republicans' demise in the 1882 elections abruptly
shifted the stances of Republican congressmen. While Hoogenboom does show how the
reformers used Garfield's assassination as fuel, he neglects to establish the public's
8 Fish, The Civil Service, 218; Van Riper, Civil Service, 89, 92, 94.
97
attraction to following the president's condition, which brought forth and maintained civil
service reform in the headlines through election day in 1882.9
Allan Peskin, the leading biographer of James A. Garfield, does not even consider
the role Garfield's death played in the passage of civil service reform in Garfield, his
1978 book on the president.10 Six years later, Peskin attempted to correct this
shortcoming by publishing an article on Garfield and civil service reform. Unfortunately,
Peskin's piece minimizes the importance of the assassination of Garfield by concluding
that the martyrization by civil service reformers inaccurately portrays the late president.
Peskin does not adequately explain his reasoning for dismissing the importance of
Garfield's assassination in rousing public opinion, which clearly remained by the midterm
election of 1882.11
Unlike the three aforementioned scholars of civil service reform, who at least
acknowledge the midterm election, albeit without substantial evidence, the three most
recent studies on Garfield's assassination either completely overlook its impact on civil
service reform or inaccurately conclude the importance of other factors, a similarity to
Peskin's works. James C. Clark's 1993 book on the murder of Garfield does not even link
the assassination's role in propelling the civil service reform efforts to the masses.
Instead, Clark only briefly mentions that Arthur signed the Pendleton Civil Service Act
into law during his presidency.12 A decade later, in 2003, Kenneth D. Ackerman published
Dark Horse, a book on both the 1880 election and Garfield's death. Ackerman, similar to
Clark, does not demonstrate the assassination's significance in the battle for civil service
reform. His single mention of Pendleton's legislation, occurring in his conclusion, only
states that Arthur signed the act into law in 1883, just like Clark's closing remarks.13
9 Hoogenboom, Outlawing the Spoils, 209-214, 231-235.
10 Allan Peskin, Garfield (Kent: The Kent State University Press, 1978).
11 Allan Peskin, “The Unwilling Martyr: President Garfield and Civil Service Reform,” Hayes Historical
Journal: A Journal of the Gilded Age, Vol. 4, No. 3 (1984): 36.
12 James C. Clark, The Murder of James A. Garfield: The President's Last Days and the Trial and
Execution of His Assassin (Jefferson: McFarland & Company, Inc., 1993), 147.
13 Kenneth D. Ackerman, Dark Horse: The Surprise Election and Political Murder of President James A.
Garfield (New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2003), 437.
98
In September 2011, journalist Candice Millard published Destiny of the Republic:
A Tale of Madness, Medicine, and the Murder of a President, the most recent work on
Garfield's assassination. Devoting only two paragraphs in the entire book to civil service
reform, Millard erroneously claims that Arthur represented the “most powerful advocate”
for civil service reform after Garfield's death. She blindly implies that Arthur's December
1881 congressional address, during which he issues his support for new legislation
reforming the civil service, served as a major event in civil service reform. Millard
completely overlooks the role of the assassination, as well as the midterm election, when
she succinctly states: “It took Garfield's assassination, the resounding defeat in 1882 of
several congressmen who had publicly opposed reform, and President Arthur's support to
finally make it [Pendleton] law.” In her book, Millard ignores how the public's reaction
during the eighty days period influenced the passage of the Pendleton Civil Service Act, a
congressional measure that passed both chambers without any critical assistance from
Arthur.14
Kevin Baker's 30 September 2011 review in the New York Times, the first major
reaction to Millard's book, speaks positively concerning her narrative, but also fails to
shed light on Millard's oversight in discussing civil service reform history. In his review,
Baker argues that Garfield's death “made little difference,” unlike Lincoln's assassination
in 1865. Continuing his comparison, Baker states that “generations of historians” spent
considerable time exploring the significance of Lincoln's death, unlike Garfield's
untimely demise. Baker blunders by attempting to compare the assassination of Garfield
with Lincoln's. Lincoln death six days after General Robert E. Lee's surrender at
Appomattox Court House, Virginia, has allowed historians to speculate on his post-Civil
War policies, since his assassination prevented him from resolving the remaining
conflicts as the war came to a close. The passage of the Pendleton Civil Service Act, less
than two years after the Garfield's death, concludes the saga of the president's
14 Candice Millard, Destiny of the Republic: A Tale of Madness, Medicine, and the Murder of a President
(New York: Doubleday, 2011), 250.
99
assassination and all its implications. In his review, Baker makes no mention of the key
importance Garfield's passing played in bringing about civil service reform in 1883,
while improperly concluding that “Garfield's death had little historical significance.”15
As Isaac M. Seligman stated, the spoils system represented a cancer to American
politics in the nineteenth century, reaching its acme during the Gilded Age. The
institution of patronage facilitated the growth of massive machines run by congressmen,
at the expense, financially and politically, of government employees they placed in office.
Even though the reform movement gained some initial momentum in the late 1860s and
1870s, not until Charles Julius Guiteau fired at President James Abram Garfield at a
Washington train depot did the movement develop into a viable force for political change.
The eighty days that Garfield struggled to survive captivated the public, who
continuously provided suggestions to improve the chief executive's condition. Garfield's
death brought about the elevation of Roscoe Conkling's crony, Chester Alan Arthur, to the
presidency, but recognizing the major change in the public's opinion, Arthur deviated
from the wishes of the Stalwarts. While Arthur realized the growing support for
reforming the civil service, many of his Republican colleagues failed to understand its
significance, leading the people to cry out, boot them from office, and allow the
Democrats to gain a majority in the House of Representatives. The election returns, a
referendum on civil service reform, pushed the 47th Congress to quickly adopt the
Pendleton Civil Service Act, the first lasting step to curing the national disease.
15 Kevin Baker, “The Doctor Who Killed a President,” review of Destiny of the Republic: A Tale of
Madness, Medicine, and the Murder of a President, by Candice Millard, New York Times, 30 September
2011.
100
APPENDIX A
Diagrams of Air Conditioning Schemes
A.1. Diagram 1: An air conditioning scheme that involves pushing air from outside
through a cooling apparatus. This improved air would then travel through a special pipe
directly into the room to cool.1
1 History of the Case Pamphlets, Vol. 1, Box 142, Lucretia Rudolph Garfield Papers, Manuscript
Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
101
A.2. Diagram 2: An air conditioning idea that involves cooling the air with ice, followed
by warming the air to a suitable temperature with a steam heater, and then venting the
treated air into the president's room.2
2 R. Creuzbaur to D.W. Bliss, 5 July 1881, Reel 100, James A. Garfield Papers, Manuscript Division,
Library of Congress, Washington D.C.
102
A.3. Diagram 3: Transcription of diagram text: “A is the cap to prevent the rain from
coming in. B is a fine screen to keep out all dust. CC is the roof. DD is the water tight
tank. E is the water line. F is the ice box. The arrows show the direction of the air
current.”3
3 Wellie Gray Lee to unspecified (possibly D.W. Bliss), 11 July 1881, Reel 102, James A. Garfield
Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C.
103
A.4. Diagram 4: A system that involves pushing air through an ice chamber, then a pipe
mechanism, and finally into the specified room.4
4 A.W.V.D. to unspecified (possibly D.W. Bliss), 11 July 1881, Reel 102, James A. Garfield Papers,
Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington D.C.
104
APPENDIX B
Midterm Election of 1882 Selected Returns1
B.1. Ohio Returns for the House of Representatives
Congressional District
Candidates
Percent
1
John F. Follett (D)
Benjamin Butterworth (R)
51.4
48.5
2
Isaac M. Jordan (D)
Amor Smith (R)
53.0
47.0
3
Robert M. Murray (D)
Emanuel Shultz (R)
49.6
48.6
4
Benjamin Le Fevre (D)
Jacob S. Conklin (R)
62.7
36.6
5
George E. Sensey (D)
Lovell B. Harris (R)
59.0
39.1
6
William D. Hill (D)
Joseph H. Brigham (R)
49.7
47.5
7
Henry L. Morey (R)
James E. Campbell (D)
49.7
49.6
8
J. Warren Keifer (R)
J.H. Young (D)
50.2
45.9
9
James S. Robinson (R)
Thomas E. Powell (D)
48.8
47.5
10
Frank H. Hurd (D)
Charles A. King (R)
51.2
47.3
11
John W. McCormick (R)
John P. Leedom (D)
53.3
45.6
12
Alphonso Hart (R)
Lawrence T. Neal (D)
48.9
48.9
1 All figures come from John L. Moore, ed., Congressional Quarterly's Guide to
U.S. Elections, 2nd Edition (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1985).
105
B.1. Ohio Returns for the House of Representatives (continued from previous page)
Congressional District
Candidates
Percent
13
George L. Converse (D)
H.C. Drinkle (R)
54.2
43.0
14
George W. Geddes (D)
Rollin A. Horr (R)
51.2
45.2
15
Adoniram J. Warner (D)
Rufus B. Dawes (R)
50.4
47.9
16
Beriah Wilkins (D)
A.B. Clark (R)
57.3
41.9
17
Jonathan T. Updergraff (R)
Ross J. Alexander (D)
50.4
47.2
18
William McKinley Jr. (R)
Jonathan H. Wallace (D)
48.2
48.2
19
Ezra B. Taylor (R)
David L. Rockwell (D)
62.7
30.7
20
David R. Paige (D)
Addison S. McClure (R)
47.9
47.6
21
Martin A. Foran (D)
Sylvester T. Everett (R)
William H. Doan (Prohibition)
54.3
38.9
6.8
106
B.2. Massachusetts Returns for Gubernatorial Race
Candidate
Popular Vote
Benjamin F. Butler (D)
Robert R. Bishop (R)
133,946
119,997
Percent
52.3
46.8
B.3. Pennsylvania Returns for Gubernatorial Race
Candidate
Popular Vote
Robert E. Pattison (D)
James A. Beaver (R)
John Stewart (I)
355,791
315,589
43,743
Percent
47.8
42.4
5.9
B.4. New York Returns for Gubernatorial Race
Candidate
Popular Vote
Grover Cleveland (D)
Charles J. Folger
535,318
341,464
Percent
58.5
37.3
107
APPENDIX C
Transcript of the Pendleton Civil Service Act of 18831
An act to regulate and improve the civil service of the United States.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of
America in Congress assembled, That the President is authorized to appoint, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate, three persons, not more than two of whom shall be
adherents of the same party, as Civil Service Commissioners, and said three
commissioners shall constitute the United States Civil Service Commission. Said
commissioners shall hold no other official place under the United States.
The President may remove any commissioner; and any vacancy in the position of
commissioner shall be so filled by the President, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate, as to conform to said conditions for the first selection of commissioners.
The commissioners shall each receive a salary of three thousand five hundred
dollars a year. And each of said commissioners shall be paid his necessary traveling
expenses incurred in the discharge of his duty as a commissioner.
SEC. 2. That it shall be the duty of said commissioners:
FIRST. To aid the President, as he may request, in preparing suitable rules for
carrying this act into effect, and when said rules shall have been promulgated it shall be
the duty of all officers of the United States in the departments and offices to which any
such rules may relate to aid, in all proper ways, in carrying said rules, and any
modifications thereof, into effect.
SECOND. And, among other things, said rules shall provide and declare, as
nearly as the conditions of good administration will warrant, as follows:
First, for open, competitive examinations for testing the fitness of applicants for
the public service now classified or to be classified here- under. Such examinations shall
be practical in their character, and so far as may be shall relate to those matters which will
fairly test the relative capacity and fitness of the persons examined to discharge the duties
of the service into which they seek to be appointed.
Second, that all the offices, places, and employments so arranged or to be
arranged in classes shall be filled by selections according to grade from among those
graded highest as the results of such competitive examinations.
Third, appointments to the public service aforesaid in the departments at
Washington shall be apportioned among the several States and Territories and the District
of Columbia upon the basis of population as ascertained at the last preceding census.
1 This complete text of the Pendleton Civil Service Act comes from the The Statues At Large of the
United States of America, Vol. 22 (1883), 403-407.
108
Every application for an examination shall contain, among other things, a statement,
under oath, setting forth his or her actual bona fide residence at the time of making the
application, as well as how long he or she has been a resident of such place.
Fourth, that there shall be a period of probation before any absolute appointment
or employment aforesaid.
Fifth, that no person in the public service is for that reason under any obligations
to contribute to any political fund, or to render any political service, and that he will not
be removed or otherwise prejudiced for refusing to do so.
Sixth, that no person in said service has any right to use his official authority or
influence to coerce the political action of any person or body.
Seventh, there shall be non-competitive examinations in all proper cases before
the commission, when competent persons do not compete, after notice has been given of
the existence of the vacancy, under such rules as may be prescribed by the commissioners
as to the manner of giving notice.
Eighth, that notice shall be given in writing by the appointing power to said
commission of the persons selected for appointment or employment from among those
who have been examined, of the place of residence of such persons, of the rejection of
any such persons after probation, of transfers, resignations, and removals and of the date
thereof, and a record of the same shall be kept by said commission. And any necessary
exceptions from said eight fundamental provisions of the rules shall be set forth in
connection with such rules, and the reasons therefor shall be stated in the annual reports
of the commission.
THIRD. Said commission shall, subject to the rules that may be made by the
President, make regulations for, and have control of, such examinations, and, through its
members or the examiners, it shall supervise and preserve the records of the same; and
said commission shall keep minutes of its own proceedings.
FOURTH. Said commission may make investigations concerning the facts, and
may report upon all matters touching the enforcement and effects of said rules and
regulations, and concerning the action of any examiner or board of examiners hereinafter
provided for, and its own subordinates, and those in the public service, in respect to the
execution of this act.
FIFTH. Said commission shall make an annual report to the President for
transmission to Congress, showing its own action, the rules and regulations and the
exceptions thereto in force, the practical effects thereof, and any suggestions it may
approve for the more effectual accomplishment of the purposes of this act.
SEC. 3. That said commission is authorized to employ a chief examiner, a part of
whose duty it shall be, under its direction, to act with the examining boards, so far as
practicable, whether at Washington or elsewhere, and to secure accuracy, uniformity, and
justice in all their proceedings, which shall be at all times open to him. The chief
examiner shall be entitled to receive a salary at the rate of three thousand dollars a year,
and he shall be paid his necessary traveling expenses incurred in the discharge of his
duty. The commission shall have a secretary, to be appointed by the President, who shall
109
receive a salary of one thousand six hundred dollars per annum. It may, when necessary,
employ a stenographer, and a messenger, who shall be paid, when employed, the former
at the rate of one thousand six hundred dollars a year, and the latter at the rate of six
hundred dollars a year. The commission shall, at Washington, and in one or more places
in each State and Territory where examinations are to take place, designate and select a
suitable number of persons, not less than three, in the official service of the United States,
residing in said State or Territory, after consulting the head of the department or office in
which such persons serve, to be members of boards of examiners, and may at any time
substitute any other person in said service living in such State or Territory in the place of
anyone so selected. Such boards of examiners shall be so located as to make it
reasonably convenient and inexpensive for applicants to attend before them; and where
there are persons to be examined in any State or Territory, examinations shall be held
therein at least twice in each year. It shall be the duty of the collector, postmaster, and
other officers of the United States at any place outside of the District of Columbia where
examinations are directed by the President or by said board to be held, to allow the
reasonable use of the public buildings for holding such examinations, and in all proper
ways to facilitate the same.
SEC. 4. That it shall be the duty of the Secretary of the Interior to cause suitable
and convenient rooms and accommodations to be assigned or provided, and to be
furnished, heated, and lighted, at the city of Washington, for carrying on the work of said
commission and said examinations, and to cause the necessary stationery and other
articles to be supplied, and the necessary printing to be done for said commission.
SEC. 5. That any said commissioner, examiner, copyist, or messenger, or any
person in the public service who shall willfully and corruptly, by himself or in cooperation with one or more other persons, defeat, deceive, or obstruct any person in
respect of his or her right of examination according to any such rules or regulations, or
who shall willfully, corruptly, and falsely mark, grade, estimate, or report upon the
examination or proper standing of any person examined hereunder, or aid in so doing, or
who shall willfully and corruptly make any false representations concerning the same or
concerning the person examined, or who shall willfully and corruptly furnish to any
person any special or secret information for the purpose of either improving or injuring
the prospects or chances of any person so examined, or to be examined, being appointed,
employed, or promoted, shall for each such offense be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,
and upon conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred
dollars, nor more than one thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not less than ten days,
nor more than one year, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
SEC. 6. That within sixty days after the passage of this act it shall be the duty of
the Secretary of the Treasury, in as near conformity as may be to the classification of
certain clerks now existing under the one hundred and sixty-third section of the Revised
Statutes to arrange in classes the several clerks and persons employed by the collector,
naval officer, surveyor, and appraisers, or either of them, or being in the public service, at
their respective offices in each customs district where the whole number of said clerks
110
and persons shall be all together as many as fifty. And thereafter, from time to time, on
the direction of the President, said Secretary shall make the like classification or
arrangement of clerks and persons so employed, in connection with any said office or
offices, in any other customs district. And, upon like request, and for the purposes of this
act, said Secretary shall arrange in one or more of said classes, or of existing classes, any
other clerks, agents, or persons employed under his department in any said district not
now classified; and every such arrangement and classification upon being made shall be
reported to the President.
Second. Within said sixty days it shall be the duty of the Postmaster-General, in
general conformity to said one hundred and sixty-third section, to separately arrange in
classes the several clerks and persons employed, or in the public service at each postoffice, or under any post- master of the United States, where the whole number of said
clerks and persons shall together amount to as many as fifty. And thereafter, from time to
time, on the direction of the President, it shall be the duty of the Postmaster-General to
arrange in like classes the clerks and persons so employed in the postal service in
connection with any other post-office; and every such arrangement and classification
upon being made shall be reported to the President.
Third. That from time to time said Secretary, the Postmaster-General, and each of
the heads of departments mentioned in the one hundred and fifty-eighth section of the
Revised Statutes, and each head of an office, shall, on the direction of the President, and
for facilitating the execution of this act, respectively revise any then existing
classification or arrangement of those in their respective departments and offices, and
shall, for the purposes of the examination herein provided for, include in one or more of
such classes, so far as practicable, subordinate places, clerks, and officers in the public
service pertaining to their respective departments not before classified for examination.
SEC. 7. That after the expiration of six months from the passage of this act no
officer or clerk shall be appointed, and no person shall be employed to enter or be
promoted in either of the said classes now existing, or that may be arranged hereunder
pursuant to said rules, until he has passed an examination, or is shown to be specially
exempted from such examination in conformity herewith. But nothing herein contained
shall be construed to take from those honorably discharged from the military or naval
service any preference conferred by the seventeen hundred and fifty-fourth section of the
Revised Statutes, nor to take from the President any authority not inconsistent with this
act conferred by the seventeen hundred and fifty-third section of said statutes; nor shall
any officer not in the executive branch of the government, or any person merely
employed as a laborer or workman, be required to be classified hereunder; nor, unless by
direction of the Senate, shall any person who has been nominated for confirmation by the
Senate be required to be classified or to pass an examination.
SEC. 8. That no person habitually using intoxicating beverages to excess shall be
appointed to, or retained in, any office, appointment, or employment to which the
provisions of this act are applicable.
SEC. 9. That whenever there are already two or more members of a family in the
111
public service in the grades covered by this act, no other member of such family shall be
eligible to appointment to any of said grades.
SEC. 10. That no recommendation of any person who shall apply for office or
place under the provisions of this act which may be given by any Senator or member of
the House of Representatives, except as to the character or residence of the applicant,
shall be received or considered by any person concerned in making any examination or
appointment under this act.
SEC. 11. That no Senator, or Representative, or Territorial Delegate of the
Congress, or Senator, Representative, or Delegate elect, or any officer or employee of
either of said houses, and no executive, judicial, military, or naval officer of the United
States, and no clerk or employee of any department, branch or bureau of the executive,
judicial, or military or naval service of the United States, shall, directly or indirectly,
solicit or receive, or be in any manner concerned ill soliciting or receiving, any
assessment, subscription, or contribution for any political purpose whatever, from any
officer, clerk, or employee of the United States, or any department, branch, or bureau
thereof, or from any person receiving any salary or compensation from moneys derived
from the Treasury of the United States.
SEC. 12. That no person shall, in any room or building occupied in the discharge
of official duties by any officer or employee of the United States mentioned in this act, or
in any navy-yard, fort, or arsenal, solicit in any manner whatever, or receive any
contribution of money or any other thing of value for any political purpose whatever.
SEC. 13. No officer or employee of the United States mentioned in this act shall
discharge, or promote, or degrade, or in manner change the official rank or compensation
of any other officer or employee, or promise or threaten so to do, for giving or
withholding or neglecting to make any contribution of money or other valuable thing for
any political purpose.
SEC. 14. That no officer, clerk, or other person in the service of the United States
shall, directly or indirectly, give or hand over to any other officer, clerk, or person in the
service of the United States, or to any Senator or Member of the House of
Representatives, or Territorial Delegate, any money or other valuable thing on account of
or to be applied to the promotion of any political object whatever.
SEC. 15. That any person who shall be guilty of violating any provision of the
four foregoing sections shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall, on conviction
thereof, be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment
for a term not exceeding three years, or by such fine and imprisonment both, in the
discretion of the court.
Approved, January sixteenth, 1883.
112
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Primary
Manuscript Collections
Carl Schurz Papers. Manuscript Division. Library of Congress. Washington, D.C.
Charles J. Guiteau Collection. Georgetown University Libraries Special Collection.
Georgetown University. Washington, D.C.
Chester Alan Arthur Papers. Manuscript Division. Library of Congress. Washington,
D.C.
James Abram Garfield Papers. Manuscript Division. Library of Congress. Washington
D.C.
James Gillespie Blaine Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington,
D.C.
John Alexander Logan Family Papers. Manuscript Division. Library of Congress.
Washington, D.C.
Lucretia Rudolph Garfield Papers. Manuscript Division. Library of Congress.
Washington, D.C.
Newspapers/Periodicals
The Atlantic Monthly
Boston Daily Globe (Morning Edition)
The British Medical Journal
Chicago Tribune
Harper’s Weekly: A Journal of Civilization
The Nation
New York Times
113
New York Tribune
The North American Review
Political Science Quarterly
Records of the Columbia Historical Society
Washington Post
Books
Cox, Samuel Sullivan. Union-Disunion-Reunion: Three Decades of Federal
Legislation, 1855 to 1885. Providence: R.I., J.A., and R.A. Reid, 1886.
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Congressional Record
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The Statues At Large of the United States of America
The United States V. Charles J. Guiteau
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Theses/Dissertations/Other
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BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
Kevin A. Uhler earned his Bachelor of Arts in History with Honors, Summa Cum
Laude, in May 2010 from The Florida State University in Tallahassee, Florida. Uhler
began working toward the Master of Arts (M.A.) in History at The Florida State
University during the summer of 2010 and completed the degree in the fall of 2011. For
his M.A., Uhler majored in post-1865 U.S. History and minored in post-1789 European
History. Uhler's research interests include Gilded Age political history, Gilded Age
history of science and technology, and American diplomatic history.
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