香
港 樹
仁 大
學
THE ARCHITECTS OF TWO ASIAN ECONOMIC
MIRACLES:
LI KUO-TING OF TAIWAN AND JOHN
COWPERTHWAITE OF HONG KONG
Fu-Lai Tony Yu
May 2011
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Department of Economics and Finance
Hong Kong Shue Yan University
1
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THE ARCHITECTS OF TWO ASIAN ECONOMIC MIRACLES:
LI KUO-TING OF TAIWAN AND JOHN COWPERTHWAITE OF HONG KONG
Fu-Lai Tony Yu
Professor
Department of Economics and Finance
Hong Kong Shue Yan University
North Point, Hong Kong
Email: [email protected]
Abstract
This paper compares economic management of two architects of Asian economic
miracles, namely, Li Kuo-Ting of Taiwan and John Cowperthwaite of Hong Kong. It
reveals that two financial ministers showed drastically different management styles.
Li Kuo-Ting of Taiwan took on a ‘directive’ approach while John Cowperthwaite of
Hong Kong relied on the free market in resource allocation. However, both economies
achieved impressive economic growth during the post-war period. This comparison
reveals that there are many paths to economic development. Furthermore, common
ground in economic management of two governments is worth mentioning. Both
Taiwan and Hong Kong demonstrated themselves as a competent government. Both
governments were good learners and took on a pragmatic approach in economic
management. Finally, their economic policies, be ‘directive’ or ‘facilitative’, showed
respect to private businesses. In both economies, governments relied on private
enterprises to promote economic dynamics. Hence, this paper concludes that it would
be fruitful to investigate different ways in which governments and markets are
interrelated and how governments and private businesses can cooperate to achieve
economic growth.
Keywords: Li Kuo-Ting, Taiwan, John (James) Cowperthwaite, Hong Kong, public
sector management
1. Introduction
Taiwan and Hong Kong showed dazzling economic growth during the postwar period (1950s-80s). They are the Asian Newly Industrialized Economies that the
World Bank (1993) refers to as ‘East Asian Miracles’. However, two economies took
drastically different paths in their economic development. In Taiwan, the government
1
took directive role in economic affairs while the Hong Kong government embarked
on a laissez-faire policy. The drastic differences in government policies in economic
development in two economies beg the question of the role of the government in
economic development. Neoclassical free market economists generally argue in
favour of the ‘invisible hands’ in the four Asian Newly Industrialized Economies.
They contend that government intervention policies in these economies are in general
market conforming or market sustaining (World Bank 1993). In particular, Milton
Friedman (1980:57) insists that “Malaysia, Singapore, Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong,
and Japan-relying extensively on free markets-are thriving... By contrast, India,
Indonesia, and communist China, all relying heavily on central planning, have
experienced economic stagnation”. Furthermore, free market economists insist that
Taiwan was able to grow rapidly in the 1980s only after the government liberalised its
economy. For example, Cheung (1989:82) argues that Taiwan has become prosperous
in recent decades because its government has taken steps in deregulating the economy
and in reducing taxes. Economists at the World Bank and International Monetary
Fund (IMF) conclude that if other developing economies want to grow faster, the key
is “getting prices right” and avoiding distortions in the market.
However, scholars from political sciences, such as Wade (1988; 1990),
Johnson (1982; 1992), White (1988), Amsden (1989), Weiss and Hobson (1995)
disagree with the views of neoclassical free market economists. For them, the
government in Taiwan intervenes extensively in the economy and actively promotes
many new industries. It is said that in Taiwan, the government defines the growth,
productivity and competitiveness of their economies (Johnson 1982). It explores
opportunities and sets the direction for the businesses to follow. The government in
the island economy is “not only as the source of economic policy, but also as the
proprietor, entrepreneur and operator of industrial and commercial enterprises”
(Lichauco 1988:111). In short, the economy of Taiwan has been engineered by the
government and is a prototype of government-led growth (Deyo 1987:17).
There are also debates on the economic miracle of Hong Kong. Hong Kong
has been referred by Milton Friedman and other free market economists as a classical
model of free capitalism of Adam Smith. It has often been described as a capitalist
paradise (Woronoff 1980) or the last bastion of laissez-faire by free market
economists (Rabushka 1979). In particular, Schneider (1997:12-13) notes:
2
Hong Kong is the closest existing model of an ideal, laissez-faire state as Adam
Smith envisioned two centuries ago. There are virtually no tariffs or non-tariff
barriers to trade. There are few limits on immigration. Low tax rates have created
a large incentive to produce and prevented a "brain drain". This precipitated to
the emigration of highly-skilled professionals, such as doctors and scientists,
from other countries with higher tax rates, like Britain in the 1960s. The almost
total lack of regulation and corresponding freedom of exchange has left Hong
Kong's citizens unfettered in their productive capacity, and led to a massive
increase in standard of living. These factors have resulted in Hong Kong's
astounding growth.
However, in a compelling study, Schriffer (1991:180-196) argues the interventional
role of government in economic development of Hong Kong. His examination of
economic policy (both micro and macro) of the Hong Kong government (Schriffer
(1991:194-195) suggests that
non-market forces intervene significantly in all factor markets – land, labour, raw
materials and capital – having the combined effect of lowering costs of
production for small-scale industry, the backbone of Hong Kong’s export led
growth. It would appear that those who have represented Hong Kong as sterling
example of unfettered laissez-faire capitalism have been mistaken.
Despite numerous studies on economic development of Taiwan and Hong Kong
across different disciplines, none of them investigates in detail the thinking and
practices of those policymakers who work behind the economic successes of both
economies. Specifically, the most important architects of the economic success of
Taiwan, such as Yin Chung-Jung and Li Kuo-Ting, have never been studied or simply
been ignored.1 In Hong Kong, systematic research on the architects of Hong Kong’s
1
In a seminal study on Taiwan’s economic development, Wade (1990) cites Li’s
works six times. None of the citations discusses Li’s biography and thinking. For
biographical information regarding Yin, see note 7.
3
economic miracle, namely John Cowperthwaite and Phillips Haddon-Cave 2 is also
lacking. It is not difficult to understand the reason for neglecting these important
policymakers in mainstream neoclassical economics. Human agency has no place in
neoclassical mathematical growth models. It must be iterated that the making of
national economic policy is principally in the hands of policymakers. It would be odd
to study a policy change without making reference to the thoughts and actions of
policymakers. To understand economic success in an evolutionary perspective, it
requires us to know major political and economic players who are in charge of the
economy. Li Kuo-Ting and John Cowperthwaite have been widely recognised as
distinguished policymakers of the economic growths in Taiwan and Hong Kong
respectively. In what follows, this study will present the thoughts and economic
management of these two financial housekeepers. We shall draw some common
insights from their economic management and hence shed new light on the economic
miracles of these two economies.
2. A Brief Biography of Li Kuo-Ting3
Li Kuo-Ting,4 who was Taiwan’s Minister of Economic Affairs (1965-69), has
been regarded as a very capable government official. Although Li is well known to
Taiwanese people,5 he is relatively unknown to the western academic world. Li Kuo2
Philip Haddon-Cave was the Financial Secretary of Hong Kong from 1971 to 1981.
He adopted “positive non-interventionism” as its chief principle during the period
when he was in charge of the economic policy of the Hong Kong government. He was
subsequently appointed the Chief Secretary, in which post he served from 1981 to
1985. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Philip_Haddon-Cave; accessed on 24
August 2008).
3
Also known as Li Kwoh-Ting or K.T. Li
4
In this paper, following the Chinese convention, the last name of Li Kuo-Ting is put
at the front, before the first name. All other names follow the western convention.
5
Li Kuo-ting is well known in Taiwan. Several research or information centres have
been set up and devoted to the study of Li. The National Central University Library
and the Institute of Modern History (Academia Sinica) have set up special archives to
collect his information and photographs. The K.T. Institute for Information Industry
(Taiwan) constructs a memorable website for Li. The Li Foundation for Development
4
Ting was born in Nanjing (formerly Nanking), China on January 28, 1910 and died in
Taipei, Taiwan on May 31, 2001. After his university education in Nanjing, Li went
to the University of Cambridge in 1934 to study physics. Returning to mainland China,
Li spent many years in industry. He fled to Taiwan in July 1948 with the Nationalist
Party which lost a civil war to the Chinese Communist Party. He became the president
of the Taiwan Shipbuilding Corporation in 1951. In 1953, he was appointed as a
member of the Industrial Development Commission which was responsible for
planning economic development of Taiwan. Invited by Mr. Yin Chung-Jung
(Taiwan’s Minister of Economic Affairs at that time) 6 , Li headed the Industrial
Development and Investment Centre under the auspices of the Council for United
States Aid in 1959. In 1965, Li joined the Cabinet, first as the Minister of Economic
Affairs (1965-69) and later as the Minister of Finance (1969-76).7 Since 1976, he was
appointed as the Minister without portfolio, promoting science and technology in
Taiwan. Li and other economists helped formulate a policy that attracted
entrepreneurs in high-tech industry and provided government funding to electronics
companies in Taiwan. He created a large industrial park in the port of Hsinchu which
came to be known as Taiwan’s “Silicon Valley”. This policy helped Taiwan quickly
become a leading producer of computer parts (Li 1995).
3.
Taiwan’s Economic Progress in Li’s Time
When Li Kuo-Ting and Chiang Kai-Shek’s Nationalist Party came to Taiwan
at the end of 1940s, the island was still a traditional, pre-modern agricultural society,
of Science and Technology set up a Li-Kuo-Ting fund to promote the development of
science and technology in Taiwan.
6
Yin Chung-Jung came to Taiwan when mainland China was taken over by the
Communists. In 1954, he became the Minister of Economic Affairs and the director of
Central Trust of China. Yin’s economic policy was heavily influenced by Professor
S.C. Tsiang. Yin’s work is said to lay the foundation for Taiwan’s economic recovery
in the 1950s (Wou 1992:164).
7
When Li was responsible for major macroeconomic policies between 1963-1973,
Taiwan’s gross national product and industrial production grew at an average rate of
10.1 per cent and 18.5 per cent respectively (Economic Planning Council 1976:2; Li
1995:346).
5
although there were some rudimentary industries such as cement, chemical and metal
manufacturing. The Chiang’s government exercised a tight economic control on the
island and embarked land reform programmes during 1949-1953. A gradual increase
in farmers’ income set the stage for the development of labour-intensive light
industries. In 1953, the government launched a series of four-year economic
development plans. Between 1953-1960, Taiwan witnessed a considerable economic
progress. The average annual economic growth was 7.6 per cent during the period (Li
1995:12). Rapid industrialization was experienced during 1961-1972, with annual
economic growth increased from 7.6 per cent in the 1950s to a peak of 10.2 per cent
in 1972 (Li 1995:13). Both income and living standards had improved substantially
over time. By 1979, three years after Li retired, Taiwan’s per capita gross national
products had reached US$1869. An increase in income brought improvements in
living standards. Per capita daily calorie intake in Taiwan increased from US$2390 in
1960 to US$2830 in 1979, the highest in Asia (Li 1995:16). We would like to
investigate how Li Kuo-Ting managed the economy of Taiwan.
4.
Li’s Evolutionary Economic Policy
From Li’s biography, we know that Li never had any formal training in
economics. His knowledge on economic management was largely gained from daily
practical experience, through trial and error, working with economists in an effort to
help the government shape its economic policy (Li 1988:25). As a result, his policy
formulation was largely immunized from economic ideology. In deciding a policy, he
simply took a pragmatic approach. Evidences in Li’s books and monographs suggest
that his national management and policies are largely evolutionary and gradualist.
More importantly, though rather ironically, his trial and error policies which is
evolutionary in nature has steered Taiwan into an economic success. This can be seen
from Taiwan’s liberalization policies. According to Li (1995:210), liberalization of an
economy represents a process of depoliticizing the economic system, as the creative
energies of the population are channelled increasingly through the market mechanism,
and there is less and less political interference. A free market is not given in social
calculus. It must be constructed, slowly, through a process of changes in policy focus.
Furthermore, “the simultaneous depoliticizing of the economic system on all fronts
should not be viewed as a sudden burst of the dam. Rather, it has been a slow but sure
cumulative process that began with and accommodated the externally oriented growth
6
phase that started in the early 1960s” (Li 1995:210-211). Liberalization, as an
economic reform, was “a long gradual process rather than following the international
wave of free market ideology appearing in the 1960s and the 1970s. It is important to
note that the liberalization movement in Taiwan gained momentum through time in
small cumulative steps rather than by large leaps and bounds” (Li 1988:19).
Li also illustrated his gradual and incremental approach in economic
management by the example of the import substitution strategy which Taiwan
adopted during its early stage of industrialization. Under the policy, the sheltering of
domestic manufacturers by political means brought about an intense fear of
competition. It is one of those vicious circles of underdevelopment that the fear
generated under political protection in turn generated demand for the very political
patronage that created the fear in the first place. Thus, to open an economy to
international competition can only be a slow gradual process, because it must work
against the intertwining of vested ideas (including deep-rooted fear) and interests.
Initially, the fear of competition was manifested in both domestic and international
markets. With experience in world markets during external orientation phase, fear of
international markets was alleviated. The success of domestic producers following the
opening of domestic market ultimately allayed the former fear as well. This is not to
say that manufacturers liked the competition, only that they ceased to be afraid of it
(Li 1995:241).
5.
A Pragmatic Approach to Problem solving
Li (1995:252) argues that policy evolution involves an analysis of two types of
issues. One is the issue of the impact of policy in the narrow sense. Popular
understanding of what policy is all about invariably focuses on this issue. The other is
the issue of causation - the reason a particular policy appears at a particular time in an
evolutionary perspective. The issue, therefore, is why a particular policy is adopted.
This is a difficult political issue, often an ideological one. However, Taiwan solves
these issues in a particularly pragmatic way. To put it differently, it is a problemoriented approach to policy formulation that characterizes the Taiwan government.
For example, in the late 1970s, other countries with lower labour costs began to
compete with Taiwan’s traditional export products. There was a need for Taiwan to
upgrade technological sophistication in its industrial structure. Problem-solving
polices involved the promotion of technology-oriented science parks as a replacement
7
for the more labour-intensive export processing zones, promotion of spending for
research and development, and more rigorous enforcement of patent and trademark
rights (ibid:215). Taiwan’s experience demonstrates that the island economy is able to
identify needs, devise and initiate development programs, and carry them to
completion (ibid:305).
In Li’s view, pragmatism should override ideology during decision-making
process. “Policy innovation should be based on the anticipation of impending
problems and conflicts, rather than be purely ideologically motivated… The very
notion of an evolution of policy suggests that the timing (or timely appearance) of a
particular policy is important, and a good policy innovation is one that does not arrive
prematurely. Ideological considerations often get in the way of appropriate timing as,
for example, with so-called welfare state legislation that the economy simply cannot
support. What can almost be called a rejection of ideology lies at the heart of a
healthy pragmatism that has guided policymakers in Taiwan and has supported a
social consensus for growth and economic liberalization.” (ibid:251; italics added).
6. A Learning Government: Elimination of Errors, Revision of Plans and Policy
Change
During the period of Li’s economic management, many new policies were
adopted and later modified or abandoned by the government of Taiwan as problems
arose. This is recognised by Li (1995:37):
From the short history of Taiwan’s planning machinery it has been learnt that
while economic planning needs to take into consideration a great many complex
factors, frequent revisions of the plan are also necessary to cope with unexpected
developments during the course of implementation, which in turn call for
coordination, follow up and evaluation.
The flexibility of Taiwan’s government policy, as Li claimed, made it possible to
abandon ineffective programs and devise new ones to meet changing conditions
(ibid:305). For example, in agricultural reforms, Taiwan attempted to design a series
of programs to boost rice production. The government supported rice prices in 1974,
partly because of rice shortage in 1973 and partly because of inflation during the first
oil crisis. This policy was later found to distort prices and disrupt the balance between
8
demand and supply. This price quarantine program, which tried to reduce the income
gap between rural and urban workers, was very costly. It led to a huge stockpile of
rice. Surplus rice was also sold on world markets at lower prices and foreign countries
accused Taiwan of practising dumping. Agricultural protection programs, though
conducted in many advanced industrial nations, appeared to be an inadequate
development policy, leading to the emergence of many economic and social problems.
To correct the policy, in 1984, the government introduced a six-year program to
encourage the conversion of paddy land to the growing of fruits and vegetables, corn,
soybeans and even fodder for dairy cows in order to alleviate the burgeoning rice
surplus. Li (ibid:225) felt that Taiwan should further liberalize its agricultural sector
after being admitted to full membership in GATT in the early 1990s.
7. Learning to be a Responsible Government: Rejection of Inflationary Finance
Evolutionary economics focuses on the effect of learning and the correction of
errors. Li Kuo-Ting was a government official when the Kuomintang controlled
mainland China. Therefore, he was well aware of the harmful effect of hyperinflation.
As a direct result of the Kuomintang’s inflationary finance policies, Chang Kai-Shek
lost mainland China to the Chinese Communist Party. Li, therefore, condemned every
means of inflationary finance during the time he managed the economy of Taiwan. He
claimed that “Taiwan’s experience shows that fiscal reforms (tax legislation) and
monetary reforms (moving toward central bank autonomy) are major evolutionary
steps taken by a responsible government…. What underlies both reforms is a rejection
of the insanity of relying on the printing press to create purchasing power for the
government to use in an effort to solve socioeconomic problems” (Li 1995:233).
Li was content with his capability to control inflation. In his view, what made
Taiwan differ from other Latin American countries was its rejection of using
inflationary finance as a method of obtaining resources. He claimed that, unlike many
Latin American countries, Taiwan gave up the exercise of political power to create
purchasing power through money creation. This renouncement was a part of
liberalization movement - a trend toward a more restrained exercise of power. The
depoliticizing of economic system in Taiwan implies that “the government gradually
learned to be more responsible and open about what it was doing” (Li 1995:239). Li
(ibid:240) concludes that “a responsible government means a rejection of the printing
press as a source of revenue and an adoption of a more visible taxation system.”
9
8.
Li Kuo-Ting as a Private Enterprise Advocate
Li’s believed (1995:xi) that the Taiwan government had been guided by an
important principle, namely the maintenance of private property and the market
environment favouring private enterprises. Private enterprises and foreign trade in
Taiwan were encouraged, guided and protected by the state. As Li (ibid:87) claims,
Over the past 30 years, the government has been constantly taking measures to
promote the sound development of private enterprises, and it has always
encouraged entrepreneurs to be the first to take advantage of the investment
opportunities in newly developing industries. Other promotional measures taken
by the government included improving the investment climate, simplifying
administrative procedures… providing necessary financing through banking
institutions, and promoting investment and exports through tax relief and other
incentives.
Li (ibid:86) contends that while Taiwan had practised economic development
planning for more than two decades, the government had always refrained from direct
intervention in private investment. Although in economic planning, the government
called for investment projects from the private sector, business people were not forced
to participate. They had complete freedom in making their investment decisions. The
state economic plans served merely as a guide. Admittedly, the government exercised
its fiscal and monetary powers to create a favourable condition to investment,
inducing private capital to move in directions that were called for in economic plans
and facilitating investments in favoured sectors and industries.
Li’s support of private enterprises is not without qualification. Within the
framework of the Principle of People’s Livelihood,8 private property is protected and
8
The Constitution of the Republic of China is based on Dr. Sun Yat-Sen’s Three
Principles of the People: Nationalism, Democracy, and People’s Livelihood. The
Principle of Nationalism includes not only equal treatment and sovereign international
status for the country, but also equality amongst all ethnic groups in the nation. The
Principle of Democracy assures every individual the right to political and civil
liberties. The Principle of People’s Livelihood states that the powers granted to the
10
price mechanism is regarded as a major instrument for the adjustment of socioeconomic activities. However, in some cases, private capital was regulated in the
interests of the expansion of state capital. In this way, the Principle of People’s
Livelihood calls for a planned free economy (ibid:85). Hence, Li’s view broadly falls
into what Wade (1990) referred to as a “guided market economy”.
John (James) Cowperthwaite: “The father of Hong Kong's economic boom”9
9.
John Cowperthwaite’s economic management style is entirely different from
Li Kuo-Ting. Cowperthwaite was born in Edinburgh, Scotland on April 25, 1915. He
studied Classics at St. Andrews University and Christ's College (Cambridge). He also
studied economics after his return to St. Andrew University. He joined the British
Colonial Administrative Service in Hong Kong in 1941, but left the island for a post
in Sierra Leone during the World War II. After the war, the British established a
military government in Hong Kong in September 1945 and export and import
resumed in the colony. Cowperthwaite returned to Hong Kong in 1945 and worked in
Trade and Economic Affairs Department. Hong Kong was in ruin after the war. In
1951, the colony was described by a visiting American journalist as a dying city (Ho
1992:1). However, it soon recovered after the war and embarked on export-led
industrialization in the early 1950s. Cowperthwaite was promoted as the assistant
Financial Secretary in 1952. He succeeded Arthur Clarke as the Financial Secretary in
1961, and in charge of Hong Kong’s economic management until his retirement in
1971.
10
Under his economic management, Hong Kong experienced rapid
industrialization in the 1960s. Between 1961 and 197l, the average income growth
rate in real terms was approximately 11 per cent (Ho, 1992: 22) and by 197l, the per
government must ultimately serve the welfare of the people by building a strong and
prosperous economy and a fair and just society (http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwanwebsite/5-gp/brief/info04_3.html; access 10 September 2005).
9
Patrick Crozier regards Cowperthwaite as “the father of Hong Kong’s economic
boom” (http://www.croziervision.com/index.php/pct/archives/2006/01/; accessed on
24 August 2008).
10
Materials based on http://en-cowperthwaite.blogspot.com/2007/01/financial-secret
ary-period.html; accessed on Dec 17, 2007.
11
capita income reached HK$6,096, placing it only behind Japan in the Asia Pacific
region (Riedel, 1974: 11).11
10.
John Cowperthwaite’s Legacy
When Cowperthwaite retired from his position in 1971, Hong Kong had
accumulated a reserve of HK$2.1 billion and the economy grew at 13.8 per cent (with
a real growth rate of 8.9 per cent) (Lion Rock Institute 2007). While there were many
factors12 leading to an impressive economic growth of Hong Kong during that period,
the contribution of Cowperthwaite to Hong Kong’s economic prosperity cannot be
denied. In particular, Milton Friedman said, “it would be hard to overestimate the debt
Hong Kong owes to Cowperthwaite.” More importantly, Cowperthwaite's free market
management in Hong Kong contrasts sharply with Mao Zedong’s socialism in
mainland China in the same period. Distinctive different economic policies and
development in these two Chinese economies provide good materials for studying
comparative economic systems. Some scholars even claim that Hong Kong would
never enjoy more than 30 years of prosperity without the foundation laid by
Cowperthwaite (Lion Rock Institute 2007).
11.
Cowperthwaite and the Birth of a Pro-business Government
The thinking of a policymaker, though in large extent evolves out of his or her
early experience and education, cannot be separated from objective environment he or
she lives in. To understand how Cowperthwaite’s principles of economic management
11
Sir Phillip Haddon-Cave succeeded him as the Financial Secretary. Following
largely the legacy of Cowperthwaite, Hong Kong has further emerged as a major
financial centre in the Asia Pacific region. Between 1986 and 1991, the city economy
was still growing in real terms at an average annual rate of 6.5 per cent (Chau, 1993:
31). In 1997, the year when Hong Kong’s sovereignty was handed over to China, the
gross domestic product (GDP) of Hong Kong reached HK$742,582 million. In 2002,
per capita GDP at current market prices amounted to HK$187,282. After more than
three decades of rapid growth, Hong Kong has emerged as one of the richest
economies in Asia (Chau, 1993: 1).
12
For a review of explanations of the early economic success of Hong Kong, see Yu
(1997:3-6).
12
works in Hong Kong, it is required to know historical and political settings of Hong
Kong in his time. Britain was the world’s economic power after embarking the
industrial revolution in mid-18th century. Equipped with advanced military weapons
and industrial technologies, Britain explored overseas markets. To penetrate the
market in China, the British needed a springboard for Far Eastern trade. They chose
Hong Kong which had excellent environmental advantages for trade. It was located at
the mouth of the Canton River, leading directly into Canton, the trading centre. It was
uniquely endowed with a good natural harbour (Chan 1991:23). As early as 1836,
James Matheson, the most significant oriental trader in Great Britain, conceived the
acquisition of the Hong Kong Island as a factory for British traders.13 In The Canton
Register (a weekly newspaper), he claimed that “If the lion’s paw is to be put down
on any part of the south side of China, let it be Hong Kong; let the lion declare it to be
under his guarantee a free port, and in ten years it will be the most considerable mart
east of the Cape” (Chan 1991:21). The British successfully seized Hong Kong via the
Treaty of Nanjing in 1842. The British merchants and officials intended to make
Hong Kong as a free entrepot in order to compete with Portuguese Macao. They
established Hong Kong as a base for Far Eastern trade. In 1842, Sir Henry Pottinger
declared Hong Kong as a free trade port. (Yu 2006:167). So, when Hong Kong was
founded 150 years ago by the traders, it remained a city of merchants (Chau 1993: 23).
Hong Kong is destined as a city of free trade. The role of Hong Kong government is
to cultivate the city for businessmen, if not solely for the British, to seek profits. In
other words, Hong Kong government must not work against the interests of private
entrepreneurs. It is these political and economic settings that Cowperthwaite entered
Hong Kong’s civil servant. Furthermore, government officials were appointed, not
elected. They had no temptation to court short-term popularity with bread and votes.
They could take a longer view in policy decision. It was also possible for some quite
unlikely types of people to rise to the positions of great authority. Cowperthwaite’s
non-interventive economic philosophy would not be possible in any democratic
economy and the market will not carry out his principle into full extent unless it is in
the unique political situation such as Hong Kong. As Rabushka (1985) remarks,
Cowperthwaite “wouldn’t have lasted five minutes in a similar post in Britain, since
13
Jardines Matheson & Co., founded by James Matheson and William Jardine in
1832, remains one of the most influential ‘hongs’ (firms) in Hong Kong.
13
he was not predisposed to compromise any of his principles- only the constitutional
structure of Hong Kong allowed him that power.” (Wignall 2005). It was in this
historical setting that someone with libertarian beliefs such as Cowperthwaite became
one of the most powerful people in the Hong Kong government in the 1960s.
Given the role of the Hong Kong government is to facilitate trade and
entrepreneurship in the island, what Cowperthwaite needed to do is to make sure that
Hong Kong developed a good free port for business people to trade. His economic
policies must be pro-business. The aim of the Hong Kong government is to create an
environment for business and entrepreneurs to seek profits. To achieve this goal,
firstly, the government ensured that the public sector did not compete with private
businesses. This means the size of the public sector was to be kept at minimum.
Secondly, the government made every means to establish a stable and excellent
environment for enterprises to exchange. Therefore, it maintained laws and orders,
social safety nets, provision of public housing, education, water supplies and other
public goods. Thirdly, its industrial policies served as a coordinating mechanism and
must not choke off entrepreneurial spirits (Yu 2006: 173).
Given the pro-business policy stance, Cowperthwaite, as the financial
secretary, could help business people in Hong Kong in two ways: (1) The government
could actively embark on economic policies that could benefit merchants. This
method can be regarded as ‘directive’. 14 (2) The government could cultivate an
environment for business people to do transactions. It could act like a night-watcher
whose responsibilities were limited to protecting individuals from coercion, fraud and
theft, to requiring reparation to victims, and to defense the country. This method is
facilitative. Cowperthwaite took the second route. The practice of the facilitative role
of the Hong Kong government in economic development has led many scholars to
regard Cowperthwaite as a disciple of laissez-faire economics.15
12.
14
Cowperwaite’s Principles of Economic Management
Yu (1997:161) differentiates government policy in economic development as into
directive and facilitative.
15
For example, Friedman (2006) says, “Cowperthwaite, who died on Jan. 21 this year,
was so famously laissez-faire that he refused to collect economic statistics for fear this
would only give government officials an excuse for more meddling.”
14
Cowperthwaite has been regarded as a classical free thinker in a tradition that
extends from Adam Smith to Milton Friedman. In particular, Welsh (1993:460)
remarks, “a political economist in the tradition of Gladstone or John Stuart Mill, Sir
John personified what might be called the Hong Kong school of economists.”
Cowperthwaite’s economic policies were later coined by his successor Sir Philips
Haddon-Cave as “Positive Non-interventionism”.16
12.1
Positive Non-interventionism17
Cowperwaite believes in little government intervention and money should be
let flow freely in the hands of taxpayers. He stated, “money comes here and stays here
because it can go if it wants to. Try to hedge it around with prohibitions and it would
go and we could not stop it and no more would come.” The government should not
compete with the private sector. He said, “when government gets into a business it
tends to make it uneconomic for anyone else.” He further maintained, “let money
fructify in the pockets of taxpayers. Government should not presume to tell any
businessman and industrialist what he should or should not do; attempts to frustrate
the operation of market forces will tend to damage the growth rate of the economy”
(Hong Kong Hansard 1963:51).
He is more confident on the decisions of the general public than the
bureaucrats. In his first budget speech (Hong Kong Hansard 1961), he stated that “in
the long run, the aggregate of the decisions of individual businessmen, exercising
individual judgment in a free economy, even if often mistaken, is likely to do less
16
According to Haddon-Cave, positive non-interventionism “involves taking the view
that it is normally futile and damaging to the growth rate of an economy, particularly
an open economy, for the Government to attempt to plan the allocation of resources
available to the private sector and to frustrate the operation of market forces”.
Furthermore, in Haddon-Cave’s view, the word ‘positive’ means that the government
carefully considers each possible intervention to examine ‘where the advantage’ lies,
although usually it will come to the conclusion that the intervention is harmful rather
than beneficial. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Positive_non-interventionism; retrieved
on 2 October 2008).
17
Unless otherwise stated, all citations on Cowperthwaite’s thinking or speeches are
obtained from Lion Lock Institute (2007).
15
harm than the centralized decisions of a Government; and certainly the harm is likely
to be counteracted faster… Over a wide field of our economy it is still the better
course to rely on the 19th century's ‘hidden hand’ than to thrust clumsy bureaucratic
fingers into its sensitive mechanism.” (see also Rabushka 1985:142). Furthermore,
“for us a multiplicity of individual decisions by businessmen and industrialists will
still, I am convinced, produce a better and wiser result than a single decision by a
Government or by a board with its inevitably limited knowledge of the myriad factors
involved, and its inflexibility.” This is exactly what Hayek (1945) refers to dispersed
knowledge and that central planning is impossible.
Case 1: Hand-off approach to tackle the financial crisis
The 1960s was an economic turbulent decade for Hong Kong. Specifically, the
economy encountered bank crisis, currency instability caused by the British Pound
devaluation and the riot in 1967. The general public asked the government for help.
At that time, Hong Kong accumulated huge reserve and there was an incentive for
senior government officials to use public money generously so that the society could
remember them. However, Cowperthwaite refused such temptation. He held on to his
principle and rejected requests from lawmakers and representatives from industries.
Case 2: Refusal of winner picking
Picking an industry which may possess substantial potential in comparative
advantage is a rather prevalent concept in development planning. Cowperthwaite
rejected the idea of picking winner. For an instance, a legislative member in Hong
Kong once requested the government to use policies to encourage new industries and
discourage obsolete industries. Cowperthwaite rejected his suggestion outright. In his
view, the government should let the market select the winner. He said, “I must
confess my distaste for any proposal to use public funds for the support of selected,
and thereby, privileged, industrialists, the more particularly if this is to be based on
bureaucratic views of what is good and what is bad by way of industrial
development.” In his view, “an infant industry, if coddled, tends to remain an infant
industry and never grows up or expands.” Similarly, in the 1960s, when some
business people tried to lobby the government for special treatment in their industries,
which they claimed to be crucial to the economy, Cowperthwaite replied that “I
should have thought that a desirable industry was, almost by definition, one which
16
could establish itself and thrive without special assistance in ordinary market
conditions.”
Case 3: Rejection of using public funding for special interest groups
As the financial secretary, Cowperthwaite encountered pressure from lobbyists
from time to time. In Hong Kong, land is scarce and parking in central business
district is a big problem to rich people. Hence, it is not unreasonable for members in
the legislative council (which are mostly wealthy groups) to request the government
to build car parks at the heart of the small city. Cowperthwaite reacted this request
with the same principle that it was a misuse of public funds. To him, if no private firm
was willing to build a car park, how could it become the responsibility of the
government? He further pointed out that if the affluent groups could afford to own
cars, it would be an abuse of public funds to use them to subsidize parking for a rich
few. Cowperthwaite estimated that a parking space would cost about HK$65,000 to
construct. This sum of money would be used for providing housing for 115 people
(Wignall 2005). In another instance, an executive from a large British firm requested
Cowperthwaite to develop merchant banking industry in Hong Kong. He told the
executive that merchant bankers in Hong Kong should be the best persons to be asked
for.
12.2
On managing the Government budget
On managing government finance, Cowperthwaite acts like a conservative
household keeper, rather than a venturing entrepreneur. During Cowperthwaite’s term
of employment as the financial secretary, the government budget showed no deficit.18
His principle for government budgeting is simple and straightforward. The
government should only spend within the limits of revenues and fiscal balance. On
using deficit budget to tackle economic downturn, Cowperthwaite once claimed,
“deficit budget won't work for us under our current economic conditions.” Resources
should be kept in the hands of the general public. “I have a keen realization of the
importance of not withdrawing capital from the private sector of the economy. ...I am
confident, however old-fashioned this may sound, that funds left in the hands of the
18
Fiscal deficits occur in years 1959-60; 1974-75; 1982-82; 1983-84; 1995-96 and
1998-99.
17
public will come into the Exchequer with interest at the time in the future when we
need them.”
12.3
Resisting the temptation of government intervention
The essence of Cowperthwaite's philosophy is that the individuals are wise
enough to make decisions. Policymakers should give individuals sufficient freedom to
choose. On doing this, Cowperthwaite spent much of his efforts to overcome pressure
from the public and resisted the temptation of planning Hong Kong as a big society.
When Cowperthwaite was asked whether he agreed with those who said that the
secret of his success was “doing nothing”. He disagreed because he spent much of his
time thwarting politicians from London to leave Hong Kong alone (Tupy 2006).
To minimize the temptation of government intervention, Cowperthwaite
suggested that the government “should abolish the Office of National Statistics”. He
believed statistics would increase the possibility of economic intervention by
government officials. This would in turn hinder self-adjustment mechanism in the
market. When Cowperthwaite was the Financial Secretary of Hong Kong, British
officials came to Hong Kong to find out why data on employment were not being
collected. He “literally sent them home on the next plane back” (Singleton 2006).
12.4
Helping the poor through economic growth
On improving income inequality, Cowperthwaite’s position is clear. He
strongly believed that poverty could only be eliminated through free capitalism. He
said, “the only cases where the masses have escaped from grinding poverty. . .the only
cases in recorded history, are where they have had capitalism and largely free
trade. . .There is no alternative way of improving the lot of the ordinary person that
can hold a candle to the productive activities of the free-enterprise system – and
productive, creative and energetic people ruled by just law.”
19
In a Legislative
Council meeting (Proceedings of the Hong Kong Legislative Council, February 1969:
104), his position was clear and strong:
I myself have no doubt in the past tended to appear to many to be more
concerned with the creation of wealth than with its distribution. I must confess
19
http://www.britsattheirbest.com/002260.php.; accessed on 25 August 2008.
18
that there is a degree of truth in this, but to the extent that it is true, it has been
because of my conviction that the rapid growth of the economy, and the
pressure that comes with it on demand for labour, both produces a rapid and
substantial redistribution of income directly of itself and also makes it possible
to assist more generously those who are not, from misfortune temporary or
permanent sharing in the general advance. The history of the last fifteen years
or so demonstrates this conclusively.
13.
The Legacies of Two Financial Housekeepers and Common Ground for Two
Economic Miracles
As mentioned above, Taiwan and Hong Kong are two economies that gain
impressive growth in the post-war period. However, the development policies of two
economies are drastically different. In Taiwan, Li Kuo-Ting took directive or state-led
growth policies in economic affairs while, in Hong Kong, Cowperthwaite embarked a
relatively free market, non-interventive policy in economic management. This
phenomenon indicates that economic growth of a nation can take many routes.
Depending on historical setting, both government-led or market-led growth policies
can be a possible path to economic success. Having said that, we can search for some
common grounds for two economic miracles by examining their governments and
economic management.
(1)
A competent government
A competent government is important for economic growth. It can be said that
both governments in Taiwan and Hong Kong during the post-war period were
competent and efficient, though they were not entirely free from corruption.
However, two competent governments did not emerge out of luck or
coincidence. There were some historical reasons for this phenomenon. Yu, Jeng and
Li (2005) argue several environmental and historical factors that compelled Chiang
Kai-Shek’s administrative officials in Taiwan to be a good government. First of all,
Kuomintang leaders experienced profound humiliation in being beaten by what they
considered to be only a peasant army. They learned the lesson that a corrupted
government would lose public support. To survive, they were willing to correct these
19
defects. 20 Secondly, although the Kuomingtang was the sole party government in
Taiwan, it had its competition too. After retreating to Taiwan, the Kuomintang needed
to compete with its 'twin brother', namely, the Communist (in mainland China). The
separation of the Chinese economy, each led by an independent party, formed an
effectively, though reluctantly, competitive environment (Mo 1995). In order to
survive, the Kuomintang could not afford to lose its last bastion of Taiwan. Thirdly,
after retreating to Taiwan, the Kuomintang needed to search for justification for its
continued ruling in the island. This is important when the Taiwanese considered the
mainlanders as immigrants or even outsiders like the Japanese. One way of gaining
continued legitimacy of ruling in Taiwan was to promote economic growth and raise
its living standard in the island. This aim is the origin of its 'development state'
(Johnson 1982) in Taiwan. Thus, Wade (1990: 337-339) comments that Taiwan
evolves out of a serious military threat from outside or from other communal groups
in the countries, which raises the prospect of the leaders’ demise if they do not assert
the state’s order throughout the society. In other words, a ‘hard state’ is required.
Unlike democratic societies where public policy decision is heavily influenced by the
interest groups, the hard states can ignore private demands without affecting their
legitimacy. Hence, Wade (1990: 339) concludes that “in this kind of political regime,
the bureaucracy can more easily demonstrate competence and remain ‘clean’ because
it is neither caught between and penetrated by struggling interest groups nor subverted
from above by the politics of rulers’ survival”.
In Hong Kong, as mentioned above, when the British took over Hong Kong as
a colony, they intended to make Hong Kong a free port to compete with the
Portuguese Macao. So Hong Kong was designated to be built into an efficient port to
facilitate international trade. Therefore, the job of the Hong Kong government was to
provide a stable and just society for business people to trade. The government should
not give any financial burden to the London administration. Hence, this forced the
Hong Kong government to keep budget surplus and to live on its own. The principal
role of government in the economy, as clearly spelt out in the document, was “to
ensure a stable framework in which commerce and industry can function efficiently
20
In particular, Chan and Clark (1992:79) write, “Chiang Kai-Shek and many KMT
leaders realized the need for reform in the wake of their humiliation on the mainland
(China)”.
20
and effectively with minimum interference. The idea of “prudent fiscal management”
originated from the Financial Procedures contained in the Colonial Regulations
stipulating the ultimate fiscal principle of self-support and balanced budget. The
objective was to ensure that there was no need for the British government to
financially support the colony (Lam 2001:50). In short, the Hong Kong government at
that time needed to be a competent housekeeper.
Public choice theories remind us that in democratic system, rent-seeking
behaviour is a prevalent phenomenon. Political parties and special interest groups
often call for government intervention at the expense of public money. Both Taiwan
and Hong Kong were “no-party” states (Harris 1977:11) during the miracle age of the
1950s to 1970s. However, both governments were able to resist rent-seeking. Such
restraint can only be found in dictatorial no-party government because they don’t need
to buy votes from special interest groups. Of course, a dictatorial government may
lead to a vampire state. 21 However, this was not the case in both economies. This
might be attributed to the Communist Revolution in China and the Cold War in the
1950s and 1960s. 22 During the early stage of industrialization. Taiwan received huge
assistance from the United States in forms of aids, grants and loans because Taiwan
was the United States’ allies against communist China. Receiving foreign aids from
the Unites States, Chiang’s government ought to behave well if it wanted to continue
to receive protection and financial aids from the United States. In Hong Kong, the
Communist Revolution in China and Cold War led to the influx of Shanghainese
industrialists bringing capitals, entrepreneurial skills and social network to the colony.
With a hostile communist government just across the border, entrepreneurs in Hong
Kong focused on seeking profit without concerning about politics. As long as
entrepreneurs enjoyed a relatively free business environment facilitated by the Hong
Kong government and were left alone on their own to seek profit, they would not
openly complain against the government. Furthermore, legal or illegal immigrants
from mainland China, notably in the periods of the Great Leap Forward and the
Cultural Revolution, settled and struggled to survive in Hong Kong. At that time, they
were willing to work for long hours without complaint on poor working conditions in
21
Therefore, we are willing to accept a democratic system at the cost of voting and
rent-seeking.
22
I thank the anonymous referee of this journal to bring out this point to me.
21
the colony, even though public policy is pro-business. As a result, three parties,
namely, government, businesses and labouring class in Hong Kong were willing to
live in harmony without making troubles.
(ii)
A pragmatic approach in economic management
Both Li and Cowperthwaite were not prophets in economic development.
Instead, they managed their economies by trial and error. In this sense, they knew that
they had to be very careful. They avoided unrealistic policy or policy based on
ideology. They took on pragmatic approach in economic management.
In Taiwan, Li Kuo-Ting believed that an ideology-oriented reform often made
timing mistakes because it ignored economic signals or was motivated by goals
considered larger than actual well-beings of people. Such timing errors had proven
costly economically and disruptive socially and politically (Li 1995: 223). In his view
(Li 1995:253), “policy changes caused by change in ideology is... harmful”. Li took
an example from agricultural sector. Farm mechanization program launched too early
could be as costly as one launched too late. The market mechanism, not ideology,
provided the clearest guidance of when mechanization would increase efficiency.
In Hong Kong, Cowperthwaite was described as “a thrifty Scot”23. He knew
that public money came from hardworking people. Therefore, he was very careful in
spending public money. Translating this behaviour into fiscal management, budget
surplus was always maintained. Commenting on Hong Kong’s public administration
and bureaucracy, Harris (1977:73) writes, “Hong Kong’s ‘ideology’ is a strict ‘nonideology’; its basic credo is that of survival. Its rulers are permanent, practised,
anonymous for the most part, and best, impartial. There is a desire to preserve the
status quo and not to disturb Hong Kong’s delicate balance of forces. Hong Kong may
well be one of the rarest cases of ‘pure administrative state....”. In short, both public
managers in Taiwan and Hong Kong took pragmatic approach in managing their
economies.
(iii)
A good learner
Unlike China in the late Ch’ing dynasty, which was a poor improver and bad
learner (Landes, 1999), governments in Taiwan and Hong Kong exhibited themselves
23
http://forums.scout.com/mb.aspx?S=7&F=1405&T=6067307&P=1; accessed on 8
July, 2010.
22
as excellent learners. If policies were demonstrably incorrect or inappropriate in the
face of changed circumstances, it would be quickly discontinued or reversed (The
World Bank 1993:86-87). It is well known that Taiwan had been able to succeed
because its policymakers were willing to learn and unlearn. Taiwan’s economic
success may give us an impression that appropriate polices were deployed. This is
true. However, it is more correctly to say that the spirits of pragmatism and
experimentation among Taiwan’s policymakers were strong and enabled them to
replace policies that were not working (Fei 1995:43). Though the right policy was not
always adopted, policymakers were willing to try new methods and make changes.
Policies that did not work were abandoned. Policies that did work were adopted. A
natural selection force is at work (Fei 1995:36). Taiwan’s economic ‘miracle’ has
been the result of a long process of government entrepreneurial vision, careful policy
planning, experimentation and market selection.
Although Hong Kong embarked on a more liberal economic policy, this
should not be construed to mean that the government did not need to do anything. On
the contrary, the government learnt to manage a Chinese city since its first day of
establishment in Hong Kong in 1843. It aimed to transform the colony into “the Mart
of East Asia”. In managing Hong Kong, the government encountered and learnt to
solve several serious challenges. One of them was corruption. Bribery became
rampant in the colony in the 1970s. These activities posted a deleterious effect on
administrative efficiency and political economic development. Regarding the
seriousness of the problem, the government determined to tackle corruption by
establishing Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in February 1974.
At its early days of the implementation of anti-corruption policies, tension was built
up between the police force and the ICAC. Punch-ups between ICAC officers and
angry policemen were reported. After overcoming the crises 24 , ICAC effectively
eliminated corruption in both public and private sectors. This was particularly
beneficial for less well-connected small business owners and foreign businessmen not
familiar with the local art of bribery (Chau 1993: 28).
24
The conflict ended with the announcement of a partial amnesty for minor
corruptions committed before 1977 (http://sc.icac.org.hk/gb/www.icac.hk/en/services
_and_ resources/sa/bucpf/index.html; accessed on 12 July 2010).
23
(iv)
A respect for and cooperation with private businesses
Both governments in Taiwan and Hong Kong encouraged private
entrepreneurs to exploit their talents. Although the government in Taiwan took on a
directive role in economic development, it did not neglect private enterprises. The
government formulated a series of policies that encouraged entrepreneurial talents.
Under the threat of the Cold War, the government in Taiwan worked closely with the
private sectors in order to promote national growth for survival. It paid consistent and
coordinated attention to the problems and opportunities of certain industries, based on
a long-term perspective (Weiss and Hobson 1995:155-156). In some cases, the
government provided industrial assistance to specific industries with export potential
and even to specific firms. In other cases, it proposed a project to private firms and,
through credit and financial guarantees, encouraged them to proceed. It sometimes
even created a small number of interest groups and gave them monopoly rights in
return for which they claimed the right to monitor in order to discourage the
expression of narrow demand. (Wade 1990:27). Entrepreneurs were virtually
guaranteed against nationalisation of their enterprises. The government bureaucrats
might be unfamiliar with an industry. For this reason, the government officials in
Taiwan were engaged in a policy network with information sources closer to
operational level of particular industries. Moreover, interactions between business and
government leaders allowed all parties to know expectations each other (Fallows
1994:446). The Ministry of Economic Affairs and Council for Economic Planning
and Development (CEPD) was set up to link private enterprises, publicly funded
research and service organisations and state banks together (Wade 1990:336).
For Hong Kong case, as mentioned, the original intention for the British to
seize Hong Kong was to obtain a trading port in the Far East. Hence, the Hong Kong
government has always been pro-business since the first day of its establishment (Yu
2006:163-183). However, such pro-business policies were conducted in very subtle
ways. First, the government imposed a very low profit rate to corporations, but the
fiscal deficit was made up by the sales of its crown land via auctioning. Secondly, it
granted monopoly rights to public utilities companies such as gas, electricity,
telecommunications, buses and trams, which were largely owned and operated by
British merchants. This policy was in fact a kind of non-monetary benefit transfer
which allowed the British to obtain tremendous monetary profits in Hong Kong.
Thirdly, the government provided merchants a ‘competitive environment’ so that they
24
could exploit profit freely in Hong Kong. Accordingly, it did not intervene the
manufacturing industries. There was no minimum wage law, no welfare benefit for
labouring class. Business people are free to exploit profit on their own. The
government only furnished them with limited amounts of consultancy facilities such
as the Hong Kong Productivity Centre and Trade Development Council. These nonintervention economic policies were interpreted as letting entrepreneurs to pick the
‘right’ industries. It was under such subtle government-business relationship that the
economy of Hong Kong cruised into a prosperous journey with unexpected results by
all people.
Conclusion
This paper has compared economic management styles of the chief architects
of two Asian economic miracles, namely, Li Kuo-Ting of Taiwan and John
Cowperthwaite of Hong Kong. It has revealed that the management styles of two
financial ministers are drastically different. Li Kuo-Ting took on a state-led approach
while Cowperthwaite relied on the free market in resource allocation. However, both
economies achieved impressive economic growth during the post-war period. This
comparison reveals that there are many paths to economic development. Furthermore,
this paper has identified common grounds in economic managements of two
architects. Both Taiwan and Hong Kong demonstrated themselves as a competent
government. Both governments were good learners and took on a pragmatic approach
in economic management. Their economic policies, be ‘directive’ as the one in
Taiwan or ‘facilitative’ as the one in Hong Kong, showed respect for private
businesses. In both economies, the governments had worked with private enterprises
to promote economic dynamics. Thus, instead of maintaining an ideological insistence
that states should limit their influence on markets, it would be fruitful to investigate
the different ways in which governments and markets are interrelated and how
government and private businesses can work together to achieve economic growth.
Acknowledgement
Some parts of this paper (on Li Kuo-Ting) were presented at seminars
respectively held by Department of International Business, Asia University (Taiwan)
on October 28, 2005 and Department of Economics, Feng Chia University (Taiwan)
on November 3, 2005. I thank Paul Chao, Teresa Chen, Grace Tsai, Wey Wang for
25
their comments on my writing on Li Kuo Ting. I am grateful to Diana Kwan for proof
reading this paper.
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The working paper series is a series of occasional papers funded by the Research and
Staff Development Committee. The objective of the series is to arouse intellectual
curiosity and encourage research activities. The expected readership will include
colleagues within Hong Kong Shue Yan University, as well as academics and
professionals in Hong Kong and beyond.
Important Note
All opinions, information and/or statements made in the papers are exclusively those
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Department of Economics and Finance
Hong Kong Shue Yan University