FINAL DECLARATION OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE
July 21, 1954
Final declaration, dated the 21st July,
1954, of the Geneva Conference on the
problem of restoring peace in Indo-China, in
which the representatives of Cambodia, the
Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam, France,
Laos, the People=s Republic of China, the
State of Viet-Nam, the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom,
and the United States of America took part.
1.
The Conference takes note
of the Agreements ending hostilities in
Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam and
organizing international control and the
supervision of the execution of the
provisions of these agreements.
2.
The Conference expresses
satisfaction at the ending of hostilities in
Cambodia, Laos, and Viet-Nam; the
Conference expresses its conviction that the
execution of the provisions set out in the
present Declaration and in the Agreements
on the cessation of hostilities will permit
Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam henceforth to
play their part, in full independence and
sovereignty, in the peaceful community of
nations.
3.
The Conference takes note
of the declarations made by the
Governments of Cambodia and of Laos of
their intention to adopt measures permitting
all citizens to take their place in the national
community, in particular by participating in
the next general elections, which, in
conformity with the constitution of each of
these countries, shall take place in the course
of the year 1955, by secret ballot and in
conditions of respect for fundamental
freedoms.
4.
The Conference takes note
of the clauses in the Agreement on the
cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam
prohibiting the introduction into Vietnam of
foreign troops and military personnel as well
as all kinds of arms and munitions. The
Conference also takes note of the
declarations made by the Governments of
Cambodia and Laos of their resolution not to
request foreign aid, whether in war material,
in personnel or in instructors except for the
purpose of the effective defense of their
territory and, in the case of Laos, to the
extent defined by the Agreements on the
cessation of hostilities in Laos.
5.
The Conference takes note
of the clauses in the Agreement on the
cessation of hostilities in Viet-nam to the
effect that no military base under the control
of a foreign State may be established in the
regrouping zones of the two parties, the
latter having the obligation to see that the
zones allotted to them shall not constitute
part of any military alliance and shall not be
utilized for the resumption of hostilities or in
the service of an aggressive policy. The
Conference also takes note of the
declarations of the Governments of
Cambodia and Laos to the effect that they
will not join in any agreement with other
States if this agreement includes the
obligation to participate in a military alliance
not in conformity with the principles of the
Charter of the United Nations or, in the case
of Laos, with the principles of the
Agreement on the cessation of hostilities in
Laos or, so long as their security is not
threatened, the obligation to establish bases
on Cambodian or Laotian territory for the
military forces of foreign powers.
6.
The Conference recognizes
that the essential purpose of the Agreement
relating to Viet-Nam is to settle military
questions with a view to ending hostilities
and that the military demarcation line is
provisional and should not in any way be
interpreted as constituting a political or
territorial boundary.
The Conference
expresses its conviction that the execution of
the provisions set out in the present
Declaration and in the Agreement on the
cessation of hostilities creates the necessary
basis for the achievement in the near future
of a political settlement in Viet-Nam.
7.
The Conference declares
that, so far as Viet-Nam is concerned, the
settlement of political problems, effected on
the basis of respect for principles of
independence, unity and territorial integrity,
shall permit the Vietnamese people to enjoy
the fundamental freedoms, guaranteed by
democratic institutions established as a
result of free general elections by secret
ballot. In order to ensure that sufficient
progress in the restoration of peace has been
made and that all the necessary conditions
obtain for free expression of the national
will, general elections shall be held in July
1956, under the supervision of an
international commission composed of
representatives of the Member States of the
International Supervisory Commission,
referred to in the Agreement on the cessation
of hostilities. Consultations will be held on
this subject between the competent
representative authorities of the two zones
from 20 July, 1955 onwards.
8.
The provisions of the
Agreements on the cessation of hostilities
intended to ensure the protection of
individuals and of property must be most
strictly applied and must, in particular,
allow everyone in Viet-Nam to decide freely
in which zone he wishes to live.
9.
The
competent
representative authorites of the Northern
and Southern zones of Viet-Nam, as well as
the authorities of Laos and Cambodia, must
not permit any individual or collective
reprisals against persons who have
collaborated in any way with one of the
parties during the war, or against members
of such persons' families.
10.
The Conference takes note
of the declaration of the Government of the
French Republic to the effect that it is ready
to withdraw its troops from the territory of
Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, at the
request of the governments concerned and
within periods which shall be fixed by
agreement between the parties except in the
cases where, by agreement between the two
parties, a certain number of French troops
shall remain at specified points and for a
specified time.
11.
The Conference takes note
of the declaration of the French Government
to the effect that for the settlement of all the
problems
connected
with
the
re-establishment and consolidation of peace
in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, the
French Government will proceed from the
principle of respect for the independence
and sovereignty, unity and territorial
integrity of Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam.
12.
In their relations with
Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam, each
member of the Geneva Conference
undertakes to respect the sovereignty, the
independence, the unity and the territorial
integrity of the above-mentioned States, and
to refrain from any interference in their
internal affairs.
13.
The members of the
Conference agree to consult one another on
any question which may be referred to them
by
the
International
Supervisory
Commission, in order to study such
measures as may prove necessary to ensure
that the Agreements on the cessation of
hostilities in Cambodia, Laos and Viet-Nam
are respected.
JOHNSON RECALLS HIS DECISION TO COMMIT
TROOPS (1965)
We discussed Ball's approach for a
long time and in great detail. I think all of us
felt the same concerns and anxieties that Ball
had expressed, but most of these men in the
Cabinet Room were more worried about the
results, in our country and throughout the
world, of our pulling out and coming home.
I felt the Under Secretary had not produced
a sufficiently convincing case or a viable
alternative.
Dean Rusk expressed one worry that
was much on my mind. It lay at the heart of
our Vietnam policy. "If the Communist
world finds out that we will not pursue our
commitments to the end," he said, "I don't
know where they will stay their hand."
I felt sure they would not stay their
hand. If we tan out on Southeast Asia, I
could see trouble ahead in every part of the
globe - not just in Asia but in the Middle East
and in Europe, in Africa and in Latin
America. I was convinced that our retreat
from this challenge would open the path to
World War III.
Our consultations had only begun. I
met the next day with the Joint Chiefs of
Staff and the Secretaries of the military
services. In the afternoon I met again for
nearly an hour and a half with Rusk,
McNamara, Ball, General Wheeler, Bundy,
and several civilian advisers, including Clark
Clifford, John McCloy, and Arthur Dean.
Later that day I went up to Camp David to
reflect. I invited several advisers to join me
there for further long discussions on Sunday,
July 25.
Secretary McNamara, Ambassador
to the United Nations, Arthur Goldberg, and
Clark Clifford, then Chairman of the
President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory
Board, joined me in the Aspen Lodge at
Camp David in the afternoon. One of the
things we wanted to discuss was whether we
should take any action in the United Nations
in connection with Vietnam. The weight of
opinion was against a major effort to
persuade the United Nations to act at that
time. Most of my advisers felt that the
leaders in Hanoi would turn down any UN
proposal, because they had consistently
declared that Vietnam was not a proper
matter for UN involvement. Moreover, it
was virtually certain that the Soviet Union
would veto any proposal Hanoi might have
trouble accepting.
At this session my old friend Clark
Clifford was in a reflective and pessimistic
mood. "I don't believe we can win in South
Vietnam," he said. "If we send in 100,000
more men, the North Vietnamese will meet
us. If North Vietnam runs out of men, the
Chinese will send in volunteers. Russia and
China don't intend for us to win the war."
He urged that in the coming months
we quietly probe possibilities with other
countries for some way to get out honorably.
"I can't see anything but catastrophe for my
country,'' he said.
I told Clifford that he was
expressing worries that many Americans,
including the President, were experiencing.
No one was more concerned than I was, but
we could not simply walk out. Nor was I
prepared to accept just any settlement as a
cover-up for surrender. What we needed
was a way to start real negotiations and I
intended to keep pressing our offer to talk
peace.
We continued our review of the
military situation and the requirement for
additional forces. Our military commanders
had refined their estimates and indicated
they could meet the immediate demand with
50,000 men. I called a meeting of the
National Security Council two days later, on
July 27. I asked McNamara at that time to
summarize again the current need as he saw
it.
McNamara noted that the Viet Cong
had increased in size through local
recruitment and replacements from the
North. Regular North Vietnamese army
units had increased in number and strength.
Communist control of the countryside was
growing. A dozen provincial capitals were
virtually isolated from surrounding rural
areas. The South Vietnamese army was
growing, but not nearly fast enough to keep
pace with the expanding enemy forces.
Without additional armed strength, South
Vietnam would inevitably fall to Hanoi. I
told the NSC there were five possible choices
available to us.
"We can bring the enemy to his
knees by using our Strategic Air Command,"
I said, describing our first option. "Another
group thinks we ought to pack up and go
home.
"Third, we could stay there as we are
- and suffer the consequences, continue to
lose territory and take casualties. You
wouldn't want your own boy to be out there
crying for help and not get it.
"Then, we could go to Congress and
ask for great sums of money; we could call
up the reserves and increase the draft; go on
a war footing; declare a state of emergency.
There is a good deal of feeling that ought to
be done. We have considered this. But if we
go into that kind of land war, then North
Vietnam would go to its friends, China and
Russia, and ask them to give help. They
would be forced into increasing aid. For that
reason I don't want to be overly dramatic
and cause tensions. I think we can get our
people to support us without having to be
too provocative and warlike.
"Finally, we can give our
commanders in the field the men and
supplies they say they need."
I had concluded that the last course
was the right one. I had listened to and
weighed
all
the
arguments
and
counterarguments for each of the possible
lines of action. I believed that we should do
what was necessary to resist aggression but
that we should not be provoked into a major
war.
We would get the required
appropriation in the new budget, and we
would not boast about what we were doing.
We would not make threatening noises to
the Chinese or the Russians by calling up
reserves in large numbers. At the same time,
we would press hard on the diplomatic front
to try to find some path to a peaceful
settlement.
I asked if anyone objected to the
course of action I had spelled out. I
questioned each man in turn. Did he agree?
Each nodded his approval or said "yes." . . .
There was more to it than listening
to the arguments and dissents, the
explanations and the justifications of my
wisest advisors in and out of government.
When a President faces a decision involving
war or peace, he draws back and thinks of
the past and of the future in the widest
possible terms. On his sworn oath, a
President pledges he will protect the nation.
The security of the whole country is the
foremost responsibility of the Chief
Executive. The most important question I
had to face was: How will the decisions we
make in Vietnam or elsewhere affect the
security and the future of our nation?
A President searches his mind and
his heart for the answers, so that when he
decides on a course of action it is in the
long-range best interests of the country, its
people, and its security.
That is what I did - when I was alone
and sleepless at night in the Executive
Mansion, away from official cables and
advisers; when I sat alone in the Aspen
lodge at Camp David; when I walked along
the banks of the Pedernales River or looked
out over the Texas hill country. In those
lonely vigils I tried to think through what
would happen to our nation and the world if
we did not act with courage and stamina - if
we let South Vietnam fall to Hanoi.
This is what I could foresee: First,
from all the evidence available to me it
seemed likely that all of Southeast Asia
would pass under Communist control,
slowly or quickly, but inevitably, at least
down to Singapore but almost certainly to
Djakarta. I realize that some Americans
believe they have, through talking with one
another, repealed the domino theory. In
1965 there was no indication in Asia, or from
Asians, that this was so. On both sides of the
line
between
Communist
and
non-Communist Asia the struggle for
Vietnam and Laos was regarded as a
struggle for the fate of Southeast Asia. The
evidence before me as President confirmed
the previous assessments of President
Eisenhower and of President Kennedy.
Second, I knew our people well
enough to realize that if we walked away
from Vietnam and let Southeast Asia fall,
there would follow a divisive and
destructive debate in our country. This had
happened when the Communists took
power in China. But that was very different
from the Vietnam conflict. We had a solemn
treaty commitment to Southeast Asia. We
had an international agreement on Laos
made as late as 1962 that was being violated
flagrantly. We had the word of three
Presidents that the United States would not
permit this aggression to succeed. A divisive
debate about "who lost Vietnam” would be,
in my judgment, even more destructive to
our national life than the argument over
China had been.
It would inevitably
increase isolationist pressures from the right
and the left and cause a pulling back from
our commitments in Europe and the Middle
East as well as in Asia.
Third, our allies not just in Asia but
throughout the world would conclude that
our word was worth little or nothing. Those
who had counted so long for their security
on American commitments would be deeply
shaken and vulnerable.
Fourth, knowing what I did of the
policies and actions of Moscow and Peking, I
was as sure as a man could be that if we did
not live up to our commitment in Southeast
Asia and elsewhere, they would move to
exploit the disarray in the United States and
in the alliances of the Free World. They
might move independently or they might
move together. But move they would whether through nuclear blackmail, through
subversion, with regular armed forces, or in
some other manner. As nearly as one can be
certain of anything, I knew they could not
resist the opportunity to expand their control
into the vacuum of power we would leave
behind us.
Finally, as we faced the implications
of what we had done as a nation, I was sure
the United States would not then passively
submit to the consequences. With Moscow
and Peking and perhaps others moving
forward, we would return to a world role to
prevent their full takeover of Europe, Asia,
and the Middle East - after they had
committed themselves.
LYNDON B. JOHNSON
AMERICAN POLICY IN VIETNAM
April 7, 1965
. . . Over this war--and all Asia--is another
reality:
the deepening shadow of
Communist China. The rulers in Hanoi are
urged on by Peking. This is a regime which
has destroyed freedom in Tibet, which has
attacked India, and has been condemned by
the United Nations for aggression in Korea.
It is a nation which is helping the forces of
violence in almost every continent. The
contest in Viet-Nam is part of a wider
pattern of aggressive purposes.
Why are these realities our concern? Why
are we in South Viet-Nam?
We are there because we have a promise to
keep. Since 1954 every American President
has offered support to the people of South
Viet-Nam. We have helped to build, and we
have helped to defend. Thus, over many
years, we have made a national pledge to
help
South
Viet-Nam
defend
its
independence.
And I intend to keep that promise.
To dishonor that pledge, to abandon this
small and brave nation to its enemies, and to
the terror that must follow, would be an
unforgivable wrong.
We are also there to strengthen world
order. Around the globe, from Berlin to
Thailand, are people whose well-being rests,
in part, on the belief that they can count on
us if they are attacked. To leave Viet-Nam to
its fate would shake the confidence of all
these people in the value of an American
commitment and in the value of America's
word. The result would be increased unrest
and instability, and even wider war.
We are also there because there are great
stakes in the balance. Let no one think for a
moment that retreat from Viet-Nam would
bring an end to conflict. The battle would be
renewed in one country and then another.
The central lesson of our time is that the
appetite of aggression is never satisfied. To
withdraw from one battlefield means only to
prepare for the next. We must say in
southeast Asia - as we did in Europe - in the
words of the Bible: "Hitherto shalt thou
come, but no further."
There are those who say that all our effort
there will be futile - that China's power is
such that it is bound to dominate all
southeast Asia. But there is no end to that
argument until all of the nations of Asia are
swallowed up.
There are those who wonder why we have
a responsibility there. Well, we have it there
for the same reason that we have a
responsibility for the defense of Europe.
World War II was fought in both Europe and
Asia, and when it ended we found ourselves
with continued responsibility for the defense
of freedom.
Our objective is the independence of South
Viet-Nam, and its freedom from attack. We
want nothing for ourselves - only that the
people of South Viet-Nam be allowed to
guide their own country in their own way.
We will do everything necessary to reach
that objective and we will do only what is
absolutely necessary.
In recent months attacks on South
Viet-Nam were stepped up. Thus, it became
necessary for us to increase our response and
to make attacks by air. This is not a change
of purpose. It is a change in what we believe
that purpose requires.
We do this in order to slow down
aggression. We do this to increase the
confidence of the brave people of South
Viet-Nam who have bravely borne this
brutal battle for so many years with so many
casualties. And we do this to convince the
leaders of North Viet-Nam - and all who
seek to share their conquest - of a very
simple fact: We will not be defeated. We
will not grow tired. We will not withdraw,
either openly or under the cloak of a
meaningless agreement.
We know that air attacks alone will not
accomplish all of these purposes. But it is
our best and prayerful judgment that they
are a necessary part of the surest road to
peace.
We hope that peace will come swiftly. But
that is in the hands of others besides
ourselves. And we must be prepared for a
long continued conflict. It will require
patience as well as bravery - the will to
endure as well as the will to resist.
I wish it were possible to convince others
with words of what we now find it necessary
to say with guns and planes: Armed
hostility is futile. Our resources are equal to
any challenge - because we fight for values
and we fight for principle, rather than
territory or colonies, our patience and our
determination are unending.
Once this is clear, then it should also be
clear that the only path for reasonable men is
the path of peaceful settlement.
Such peace demands an independent
South Viet-Nam - securely guaranteed and
able to shape its own relationships to all
others - free from outside interference - tied
to no alliance - a military base for no other
country.
These are the essentials of any final
settlement.
We will never be second in the search for
such a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam.
There may be many ways to this kind of
peace: in discussion or negotiation with the
governments concerned; in large groups or
in small ones; in the reaffirmation of old
agreements or their strengthening with new
ones.
We have stated this position over and over
again, fifty times and more, to friend and foe
alike. And we remain ready, with this
purpose, for unconditional discussions.
And until that bright and necessary day of
peace we will try to keep conflict from
spreading. We have no desire to see
thousands die in battle - Asians or
Americans. We have no desire to devastate
that which the people of North Viet-Nam
have built with toil and sacrifice. We will
use our power with restraint and with all the
wisdom that we can command.
But we will use it.
This war, like most wars, is filled with
terrible irony. For what do the people of
North Viet-Nam want? They want what
their neighbors also desire: food for their
hunger; health for their bodies; a chance to
learn; progress for their country; and an end
to the bondage of material misery. And they
would find all these things far more readily
in peaceful association with others than in
the endless course of battle.
A COOPERATIVE EFFORT FOR
DEVELOPMENT
These countries of southeast Asia are
homes for millions of impoverished people.
Each day these people rise at dawn and
struggle through until the night to wrestle
existence from the soil. They are often
wracked by disease, plagued by hunger, and
death comes at the early age of 40.
Stability and peace do not come easily in
such a land. Neither independence nor
human dignity will ever be won, though, by
arms alone. It also requires the work of
peace. The American people have helped
generously in times past in these works.
Now there must be a much more massive
effort to improve the life of man in that
conflict-torn corner of our world.
The first step is for the countries of
southeast Asia to associate themselves in a
greatly expanded cooperative effort for
development. We would hope that North
Viet-Nam would take its place in the
common effort just as soon as peaceful
cooperation is possible.
The United Nations is already actively
engaged in development in this area. As far
back as 1961 I conferred with our authorities
in Viet-Nam in connection with their work
there. And I would hope tonight that the
Secretary General of the United Nations
could use the prestige of his great office, and
his deep knowledge of Asia, to initiate, as
soon as possible, with the countries of that
area, a plan for cooperation in increased
development.
For our part I will ask the Congress to join
in a billion dollar American investment in
this effort as soon as it is underway.
And I would hope that all other
industrialized countries, including the Soviet
Union, will join in this effort to replace
despair with hope, and terror with progress.
The task is nothing less than to enrich the
hopes and the existence of more than a
hundred million people. And there is much
to be done.
The vast Mekong River can provide food
and water and power on a scale to dwarf
even our own TVA.
The wonders of modern medicine can be
spread through villages where thousands die
every year from lack of care.
Schools can be established to train people
in the skills that are needed to manage the
process of development.
And these objectives, and more, are within
the reach of a cooperative and determined
effort.
I also intend to expand and speed up a
program to make available our farm
surpluses to assist in feeding and clothing
the needy in Asia. We should not allow
people to go hungry and wear rags while
our own warehouses overflow with an
abundance of wheat and corn, rice and
cotton.
So I will very shortly name a special team
of outstanding, patriotic, distinguished
Americans to inaugurate our participation in
these programs. This team will be headed by
Mr. Eugene Black, the very able former
President of the World Bank.
In areas that are still ripped by conflict, of
course development will not be easy. Peace
will be necessary for final success. But we
cannot and must not wait for peace to begin
this job.
THE DREAM OF WORLD ORDER
This will be a disorderly planet for a long
time. In Asia, as elsewhere, the forces of the
modern world are shaking old ways and
uprooting ancient civilizations. There will be
turbulence and struggle and even violence.
Great social change--as we see in our own
country now--does not always come without
conflict.
We must also expect that nations will on
occasion be in dispute with us. It may be
because we are rich, or powerful; or because
we have made some mistakes; or because
they honestly fear our intentions. However,
no nation need ever fear that we desire their
land, or to impose our will, or to dictate their
institutions.
But we will always oppose the effort of
one nation to conquer another nation.
We will do this because our own security
is at stake.
But there is more to it than that. For our
generation has a dream. It is a very old
dream. But we have the power and now we
have the opportunity to make that dream
come true.
For centuries nations have struggled
among each other. But we dream of a world
where disputes are settled by law and
reason. And we will try to make it so.
For most of history men have hated and
killed one another in battle. But we dream of
an end to war. And we will try to make it so.
For all existence most men have lived in
poverty, threatened by hunger. But we
dream of a world where all are fed and
charged with hope. And we will help to
make it so.
The ordinary men and women of North
Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam--of China
and India--of Russia and America--are brave
people. They are filled with the same
proportions of hate and fear, of love and
hope. Most of them want the same things for
themselves and their families. Most of them
do not want their sons to ever die in battle,
or to see their homes, or the homes of others,
destroyed.
Well, this can be their world yet. Man now
has the knowledge--always before denied--to
make this planet serve the real needs of the
people who live on it.
I know this will not be easy. I know how
difficult it is for reason to guide passion, and
love to master hate. The complexities of this
world do not bow easily to pure and
consistent answers.
impressive.
done enough?
In the countryside where I was born, and
where I live, I have seen the night
illuminated, and the kitchens warmed, and
the homes heated, where once the cheerless
night and the ceaseless cold held sway. And
all this happened because electricity came to
our area along the humming wires of the
REA. Electrification of the countryside--yes,
that, too, is impressive.
We may well be living in the time foretold
many years ago when it was said: "I call
heaven and earth to record this day against
you, that I have set before you life and death,
blessing and cursing: therefore choose life,
that both thou and thy seed may live."
A rich harvest in a hungry land is
impressive.
The sight of healthy children in a
classroom is impressive.
These -- not mighty arms -- are the
achievements which the American Nation
believes to be impressive.
But the simple truths are there just the
same. We must all try to follow them as best
we can.
And, if we are steadfast, the time may
come when all other nations will also find it
so.
CONCLUSION
Every night before I turn out the lights to
sleep I ask myself this question: Have I done
everything that I can do to unite this
country? Have I done everything I can to
help unite the world, to try to bring peace
and hope to all the peoples of the world?
Have I done enough?
This generation of the world must choose:
destroy or build, kill or aid, hate or
understand.
We can do all these things on a scale never
dreamed of before.
Well, we will choose life. In so doing we
will prevail over the enemies within man,
and over the natural enemies of all mankind.
To Dr. Eisenhower and Mr. Garland, and
this great institution, Johns Hopkins, I thank
you for this opportunity to convey my
thoughts to you and to the American people.
Good night.
We often say how impressive power is.
But I do not find it impressive at all. The
guns and the bombs, the rockets and the
warships, are all symbols of human failure.
They are necessary symbols. They protect
what we cherish. But they are witness to
human folly.
A dam built across a great river is
Ask yourselves that question in your
homes--and in this hall tonight. Have we,
each of us, all done all we could? Have we
PROGRAM OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF INDOCHINA
HO CHI MINH
February 18, 1930
Workers, peasants, soldiers, youth, and
pupils!
Oppressed and exploited compatriots!
Sisters and brothers! Comrades!
Imperialist contradictions were the
cause of the l9l4-1918 World War. After this
horrible slaughter, the world was divided
into two camps: one is the revolutionary
camp including the oppressed colonies and
the exploited working class throughout the
world. The vanguard force of this camp is
the Soviet Union.
The other is the
counterrevolutionary camp of international
capitalism and imperialism whose general
staff is the League of Nations.
During this World War, various
nations suffered untold losses in property
and human lives. The French imperialists
were the hardest hit. Therefore, in order to
restore the capitalist forces in France, the
French imperialists have resorted to every
underhand scheme to intensify their
capitalist exploitation in Indochina. They set
up new factories to exploit the workers with
low wages. They plundered the peasants=
land to establish plantations and drive them
to utter poverty. They levied many heavy
taxes. They imposed public loans upon our
people. In short, they reduced us to
wretchedness. They increased their military
forces, firstly to strangle the Vietnamese
revolution, secondly to prepare for a new
imperialist war in the Pacific aimed at
capturing new colonies; thirdly to suppress
the Chinese revolution; fourthly to attack the
Soviet Union because the latter helps the
revolution of the oppressed nations and the
exploited working class. World War Two
will break out. When it breaks the French
imperialists will certainly drive our people
to a more horrible slaughter. If we give
them a free hand to prepare for this war,
suppress the Chinese revolution, and attack
the Soviet Union, if we give them a free hand
to stifle the Vietnamese revolution, it is
tantamount to giving them a free hand to
wipe our race off the earth and drown our
nation in the Pacific.
However, the French imperialists=
barbarous
oppression
and
ruthless
exploitation
have
awakened
our
compatriots, who have all realized that
revolution is the only road to life; without it
they will die out piecemeal. This is the
reason why the Vietnamese revolutionary
movement has grown ever stronger with
each passing day: the workers refuse to
work, the peasants demand land, the pupils
strike, the traders boycott. Everywhere the
masses have risen to oppose the French
imperialists.
The Vietnamese revolution has
made the French imperialists tremble with
fear. On the one band, they utilize the
feudalists and comprador bourgeois in our
country to oppress and exploit our people.
On the other, they terrorize, arrest, jail,
deport, and kill a great number of
Vietnamese revolutionaries. If the French
imperialists think that they can suppress the
Vietnamese revolution by means of terrorist
acts, they are utterly mistaken. Firstly, it is
because the Vietnamese revolution is not
isolated but enjoys the assistance of the
world proletarian class in general and of the
French working class in particular.
Secondly, while the French imperialists are
frenziedly carrying out terrorist acts, the
Vietnamese Communists, formerly working
separately, have now united into a single
party, the Communist Party of Indochina, to
lead our entire people in their revolution.
Workers, peasants, soldiers, youth, pupils!
Oppressed and exploited compatriots!
The Communist Party of Indochina
is founded. It is the party of the working
class. It will help the proletarian class lead
the revolution in order to struggle for all the
oppressed and exploited people. From now
on we must join the Party, help it and follow
it in order to implement the following
slogans:
1 - To overthrow French
imperialism, feudalism, and the reactionary
Vietnamese capitalist class.
2 - To make Indochina completely
independent.
3 - To establish a worker-peasant
and soldier government.
4 - To confiscate the banks and other
enterprises belonging to the imperialists and
put them under the control of the
worker-peasant and soldier government.
5 - To confiscate all of the
plantations and property belonging to the
imperialists and the Vietnamese reactionary
capitalist class and distribute them to poor
peasants.
6 - To implement the eight hour
working day.
7 - To abolish public loans and poll
tax. To waive unjust taxes hitting the poor
people.
8 - To bring back all freedom to the
masses.
9 - To carry out universal education.
10 - To implement equality between
man and woman.
Statement by Walter Bedell Smith at the Geneva Conference
July 21, 1954
Declaration
The Government of the United States being resolved to devote
its efforts to the strengthening of peace in accordance with the
principles and purposes of the United Nations takes note of the
agreements concluded at Geneva on July 20 and 21, 1954 between (a)
the Franco-Laotian Command and the Command of the Peoples Army
of Viet-Nam; (b) the Royal Khmer Army Command and the Command
of the Peoples Army of Viet-Nam; (c) Franco-Vietnamese Command
and the Command of the Peoples Army of Viet-Nam and of paragraphs
1 to 12 inclusive of the declaration presented to the Geneva Conference
on July 21, 1954 declares with regard to the aforesaid agreements and
paragraphs that (i) it will refrain from the threat or the use of force to
disturb them, in accordance with Article 2(4) of the Charter of the
United Nations dealing with the obligation of members to refrain in
their international relations from the threat or use of force; and (ii) it
would view any renewal of the aggression in violation of the aforesaid
agreements with grave concern and as seriously threatening
international peace and security.
In connection with the statement in the declaration concerning
free elections in Viet-Nam my Government wishes to make clear its
position which it has expressed in a declaration made in Washington on
June 29, 1954, as follows:
In the case of nations now divided against their will,
we shall continue to seek to achieve unity through
free elections supervised by the United Nations to
insure that they are conducted fairly.
With respect to the statement made by the representative of the
State of Viet-Nam, the United States reiterates its traditional position
that peoples are entitled to determine their own future and that it will
not join in an arrangement which would hinder this. Nothing in its
declaration just made is intended to or does indicate any departure
from this traditional position.
We share the hope that the agreements will permit Cambodia,
Laos and Viet-Nam to play their part, in full independence and
sovereignty, in the peaceful community of nations, and will enable the
peoples of that area to determine their own future.
THE TONKIN GULF RESOLUTION
August 7, 1964
To Promote the Maintenance of International Peace and Security in
Southeast Asia.
Whereas naval units of the Communist regime in Vietnam, in
violation of the principles of the Charter of the United Nations and of
international law, have deliberately and repeatedly attacked United
States naval vessels lawfully present in international waters, and have
thereby created a serious threat to international peace; and
Whereas these attacks are part of a deliberate and systematic
campaign of aggression that the Communist regime in North Vietnam
has been waging against its neighbors and the nations joined with them
in the collective defense of their freedom; and
Whereas the United States is assisting the peoples of southeast
Asia to protect their freedom and has no territorial, military or political
ambitions in that area, but desires only that these people should be left
in peace to work out their own destinies in their own way: Now,
therefore, be it Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the
United States of America in Congress assembled.
That the Congress approves and supports the determination of
the President as Commander in Chief, to take all necessary measures to
repel any armed attack against the forces of the United States and to
prevent further aggression.
SEC.2. The United States regards as vital to its national interest
and to world peace the maintenance of international peace and security
in Southeast Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the United States
and the Charter of the United Nations and in accordance with its
obligations under the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the
United States is, therefore, prepared, as the President determines, to
take all necessary steps, including the use of armed force, to assist any
member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense
Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its freedom.
SEC. 3. This resolution shall expire when the President shall
determine that the peace and security of the area is reasonably assured
by international conditions created by action of the United Nations or
otherwise, except that it may be terminated earlier by concurrent
resolution of the Congress.
REAGAN ON VIETNAM
Ronald Reagan Press Conference
February 18, 1982
President Ronald Reagan made the following comments at a Press Conference
If I recall correctly, when France gave up Indochina as a colony, the
leading nations of the world met in Geneva with regard to helping those
colonies become independent nations.* And since North and South Vietnam
had been, previous to colonization, two separate countries,** provisions were
made that these two countries could by a vote of all their people together,
decide whether they wanted to be one country or not.***
And there wasn't anything surreptitious about it, that when Ho Chi
Minh refused to participate in such an election**** - and there was provision
that people of both countries could cross the border and live in the other
country if they wanted to. And when they began leaving by the thousands and
thousands from North Vietnam to live in South Vietnam, Ho Chi Minh closed
the border and again violated that part of the agreement.
And openly, our country sent military advisers there to help a country
which had been a colony have such things as a national security force, an army,
you might say, or a military to defend itself. And they were doing this, if I
recall correctly, also in civilian clothes, no weapons, until they began being
blown up where they lived and walking down the street by people riding by on
bicycles and throwing pipe bombs at them. And then they were permitted to
carry sidearms or wear uniforms. But it was totally a program until John F.
Kennedy - when these attacks and forays became so great that John F. Kennedy
authorized the sending in of a division of Marines. And that was the first move
toward combat troops in Vietnam.*****
* There was a Geneva conference, but the U.S. refused to sign or recognize the
Geneva Accords.
** Vietnam was never divided into two separate countries until the U.S.
installed a Saigon government in the South after the French-Indochina War.
The Accords specifically state such an action was illegal.
*** The scheduled election was, according to the Accords, to choose one
government for Vietnam, not decide whether there should be a North and
South division.
**** Ho Chi Minh’s name was not allowed on ballots issued in South Vietnam
because of U.S. fears that he would win in a fair election with well over 80%.
***** Combat troops were first sent under President Johnson's order in 1965.