High-speedrailandregionaldevelopment:intermediatestationsinborderregions
Abstract
High-speedrailhasdevelopedbothnationallyandinternationallyinEuropeasasuccessful
alternativetobothairandroadoverdistancesof400-600km.Inter-citytraffic,especiallybetween
themajormetropolitanareasinNorth-westEuropehasbenefittedgreatlyfromtheinvestmentin
thisnetwork.Thispaperexplorestwoissues:theimpactontheintermediateareasbetweenthese
majormetropolitanareasandthecreationofpotentialcross-borderinter-regionalservices.The
evidenceshowshowbothlevelsofserviceandpotentialeconomicimpactshavebeenmuchless
pronouncedintheseintermediateareas.Suchareashavebeenaffectedbothbyafailuretosee
greatlyimproveddirectaccesstomajorcitiesotherthanwithintheirowncountriesandalackof
newcross-borderinter-regionalservices.Thepaperarguesthatthecreationofthehigh-speedrail
TEN-Thasnotmettheprimaryobjectivesofreducingregionaldisparitiesinaccessibilityorreducing
theeffectofnationalbordersonregionalintegration.Toachievethisrequiresnotjustinfrastructure
provisionbutanappropriateregulatoryframeworkforserviceprovisionandaccompanying
measuresatthelocallevel.
Keywords:High-speedrail;regionaldevelopment;stationlocation;borderregions
Introduction
High-speedraildevelopedinitiallyasamodeofinter-citytravel,largelyasanalternativetoairtravel
overdistancesof400-600km.Asthehighspeednetworkhasgrown,however,sotoohasthe
expectationofwidereconomicimpacts.Newhigh-speedrailstationsinanumberofcitieshavebeen
usedasthecatalystforurbanredevelopmentandtherearesomeobvioussuccesses.
Incontrast,whileintermediatestationshavebeenprovidedonmostroutes,therehasbeenlittle
identifiablelocaleconomicdevelopmentassociatedwithmanyofthesestations.Inseveralcases,
thechoiceoflocationawayfromthenearesturbanareaandpoorconnectivityintolocaltransport
networkhavegonehandinhandwithmodestlevelsofserviceandtraffic.Trainoperatorshavebeen
reluctanttoserveintermediatestationsmorefrequentlybecauseadditionalstopsincreaseheadline
timesandthisisseenasunacceptabletointer-citypassengers.Nevertheless,thereisnowemerging
evidencethat,oncetheinfrastructurehasbeenprovided,high-speedrailcanbeusedtoprovide
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shorterdistanceservicesofupto200kmwhichcanhaveamoresignificantimpactonpatternsof
commutingandhenceonregionaldevelopment.
Thispaperdevelopsananalysisofthreeinter-relatedissues.First,itexaminesthewayinwhichthe
growthofhigh-speedrailintheLondon-Paris-Brussels-Amsterdam(referredtohereastheNorthwestEuropeHSR)networkhashaddifferentialeffectsonthevariousintermediateplacesserved.
Theseregionsarenotamongstthebestperformingeconomicallyintheirrespectivecountriesand
couldbearguedtocontinuetosufferfromborderregioneffectsdespitetheprogresstowards
greaterintegrationandgenerallyhigh-standardsoftransportinfrastructure.Thegeneralfindingis
thatintheabsenceofclearaccompanyingpoliciesonlanduseandimprovinglocalaccessibility
therewillbelittleinthewayoflong-termimpacts.However,thedevelopmentofmorelocal
regionalservicesonthehigh-speedlinesishavinganimpactonpatternsofcommuting.
Thepaperthengoesontolookathigh-speedrailservicesinthecross-bordercontextandwhether
servicescanbedevelopedacrossborderswhichwouldservetoachievegreaterintegrationbetween
neighbouringregions.Thehypothesishereisthatthismaybeamoreeffectivewayofreducing
disparitiesthangreaterintegrationwiththeneighbouringmetropolitanregion.Thenetworkunder
studyistheonlyoneinEurope(andprobablyintheworld)whichhasbeendevelopedprincipallyto
providecross-borderservicesbetweennationalcapitalcities.Althoughthemajorityoftheseservices
operatewithintheSchengenAreaandthusdonotrequireborderchecks,theservicestoandfrom
theUKdorequiremandatorypassportchecksand,duetotherequirementsoftheChannelTunnel,
securityscreeningofbothpassengersandbaggage.
Mosthigh-speedrailserviceshavebeendevelopedwithrelativelyhomogeneoustypesofservice.
JapaneseShinkansenservicesdooperatedifferentlevelsofserviceaccordingtostoppingpatterns,
butwithanessentiallyhomogeneousfleetoftrains.InSpainsomeshorterdistance,essentially
commuting,serviceshavebeenintroducedwithdifferentrollingstock,speedandfarestructures.
However,thedevelopmentsdiscussedhereimplythemixingofdifferenttypesofservicetoexploit
thecapacityavailable.Thisraisesthefurtherquestionofhowfartheregulatoryframeworkisbest
suitedtoachievingsuchobjectivesandhowtodeveloppartnershipswithtrainoperatorstoensure
thedevelopmentofserviceswhichcanassistregionaldevelopment.
Thesethreeissuesareinter-relatedforanumberofreasons.First,andmostobviously,theyare
relatedthroughtheimpactofasinglepieceofinfrastructure.Thesupportforhigh-speedrail
developmentbringstogetherarangeofsupporterswithdifferingobjectives.Theserangefromthe
operationalandbusinessinterestsoftherailindustry,throughthedesireofindividualcitiesand
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regionstobeonthenewnetwork,tothepotentialforgreaterEuropeanintegrationthrougha
genuinelynewEuropeannetwork.Secondly,high-speedrailchangestheaccessibilityand
connectivityoflocationsalongthelineinadiscontinuousmanner.Thenatureofhigh-speedrail
servicesmeansthattheychangetherelationshipbetweenEuclideandistanceandaccessibility,
intermediatepointsloseouttoend-points,smallercitiesloseouttolargercities.Thirdly,thelocal
policyresponsetohigh-speedrailwilldiffer.Somecities(largeorsmall)canembracethenew
opportunitiesandseektoputinplacepolicieswhichcapitaliseonthese.Othersmaysimplyexpect
newadvantagestoemergewithoutanyparallelintervention.Thuswemayexpecttwocitiesin
similarrelativelocationstoexperienceverydifferentlong-termimpacts.
Ofcourse,thelackofconnectivityisonlyoneaspectofthebarrierswhichfacecross-border
integrationasdifferencesin,forexample,language,taxregimes,planningpolicies,industrialand
labourmarketpoliciesallplayarole(Vickerman,2008).Thesemayaffectthepatternofinward
investmentandcross-borderactivitybyfirmsandhouseholdasbothconsumersandinthelabour
market.Ourpurposehereissimplytodemonstratehowthefailuretoimprovetheselinkswithnew
infrastructurereinforcestheseproblems.
High-speedrailandintermediatestations
Theoriginalconceptofhigh-speedrail(HSR)wasessentiallyasrapid,citytocity(usuallymajor
metropolitancities),transportoverdistancesof400-600km.Atoperatingspeedsof250km/hor
above,thisdistancerangewouldmakehigh-speedrailsignificantlyquickerthanairforcitycentreto
citycentretravelwithjourneystakinglessthan3hours.Overshorterdistancesoflessthan400km,
high-speedrailcanbecompetitivewithcarbyavoidingcongestedroutesaroundcities(seeGivoni,
2006;deRus,2009;AlbalateandBel,2012;Nash2013forafullerdiscussionofthedevelopmentof,
andeconomicargumentsforandagainst,high-speedrail).ThepressureforHSRdevelopmentdid
notjustarisefromadesireforgreaterspeedandshorterjourneytimes;oftenmoresignificantwas
theneedtoincreasecapacityonkeyroutes.Butincreasingcapacityonexistinglineswasoften
difficultduetotopographicalandurbandevelopmentconstraints.Thusnewlinesoftentooktheline
ofleastresistance,avoidingintermediatesettlementsandthusoftenprovidingshorterroutes
betweenthemaincities.TheParis-Lyonlineforexamplereducedtheraildistancebetweenthetwo
citiesbymorethan100kmto430km,butindoingsoavoidedthemajorsettlements.
Suchanapproachledtointermediateregionsclaimingthattheywouldsufferalltheenvironmental
costsofanewline,butreceivenoneofthesupposedeconomicbenefitsthroughgreater
accessibility.Asaresultnewstationsweredevelopedalongthenewlines,although,particularlyin
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France,thesewerefrequentlyatsomedistancefromthesmallersettlementstheyweretoserve.
ThreesuchstationsweredevelopedbetweenParisandLyononLGV(LigneàGrandeVitesse)Sudest,onebetweenParisandLilleonLGV-NordandthreeonLGV-Est.TheevidencefromTGV-Sud-est
isthatthemaincentresbenefitedincludingsomeofthoseoffthenewlinebutservedbydirect
trains(Bonnafous,1987;Mannone,1997).WhilstthesettlementsservedbetweenParisandLyon
weresmallertowns,muchlargercitieswereinvolvedonotherroutes.ThusonLGV-Nordthestation
TGVHautPicardiewaslocatedtoserveAmienswhichhadcomplainedbitterlyaboutnotbeing
serveddirectlyandStQuentin;onLGV-EstthestationTGV-Lorrainewaslocatedmidwaybetween
MetzandNancy.TGV-ChampagnewassituatedtoserveReimsbutoutsidetheurbanareaand
similarlyonLGV-AtlantiquethestationforTours,themainintermediatecitywassituatedwell
outsidetheurbanarea;inbothofthesecasesshuttleservicesoflocaltrainsprovidetheconnection.
TheoriginalplanforLillewasforanextra-urbanstationatthepointwherethelinestoBrusselsand
Londondivergetoavoidtheexpensivethreadingofthenewroutethroughthecoreofthecity,but
localpressurehereinsistedonacentralcitystation(albeitseparatefromthehistoricmainstation)
aspartofamajorurbanredevelopment.Urbanredevelopmentalsodictatedthelocationofthe
mainstationforthroughtrainsinLyonwhereLyonLaPartDieuhasbecomethecentreofanew
urbancoreandmajortransporthub.ThispressuretoensurethatHSRservestheurbancorealso
affectedthestationlocationsatAshford(Kent)andAntwerp(Belgium).Inthelattercaseahistoric
terminalstationwasturnedintoathroughstationbyextensivetunnelling.
Ingeneral,althoughlargerandmediumsizedcitiesonhigh-speedraillinkshavebenefited(Ureñaet
al,2009),andevensomesmalleronesonnationalnetworks(Ureñaetal,2012),theperformanceof
smallerintermediatestationshasgenerallybeenpoor(PrestonandWall,2008).Mostofthe
examplesdetailedabovehavedeliveredneitherexpectedpassengernumbersnortheeconomic
impactthatwasclaimed.Thishasacumulativeeffectbecausetrainoperatorsarereluctanttomake
extrastopsonhigh-speedservices,especiallywheretheendtoendtimingsarecriticalwithrespect
tocompetitionwithair,sothelevelofservicefallsbelowalevelwhichwouldbeattractiveto
potentialinvestorsinalocation.Weshallexplorethisissueinmoredetailinthecontextofthe
North-westEuropeHSRnetworkinthefollowingsection.Thepossibleexceptionsarethosecases
wheregoodinterchangefacilitieswithlocalrailserviceshavebeenprovidedsuchasatValance,
southofLyononthesouthernextensionofLGVSud-est,oratReimsonLGVEst.AtValancea
deliberatepolicyofusingthenewextra-urbanstationtocreateanintegrateddevelopmentappears
tohavehadsomesuccess.
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Ashasbeenarguedinmoredetailelsewhere(Vickerman,2012),theconceptofHSRhasalso
changedfromthefocusoncitytocitylinks.Twodimensionsofthiscanbeobserved.Oneisthe
linkingofHSRtoairportsreflectingthecomplementarityofrailandairratherthantheinitialfocus
oncompetition.Thesecondistherecognitionthatovershorterdistances,upto200km,HSRcan
changetheshapeofmetropolitanlabourmarketsandcreatenewopportunitiesforcommuting
(Garmendiaetal,2012).Thismixingofdifferenttypesoftrafficcancreateproblems,butitalso
createsnewopportunities.
Theproblemsarisefromtheneedtooperatedifferenttypesofrollingstocktosuitthedifferent
typesoftraffic.IntheUKforexampletheregionalhigh-speedJavelinservicesonHS1operateata
lowermaximumspeed(230km/h)andhavemoreintermediatestopsthantheinternationalEurostar
services(300km/h)usingthesametrack.Serviceintegrityonthelineismaintainedbyvirtueofthe
lighterJavelintrainshavingmuchfasteraccelerationwhichcompensatesfortheirlowertopspeed.
Assumingthesetechnicalaspectsofmixingtrafficcanbeaccommodated,dedicatingspecific
servicestospecifictypesoftrafficcanovercometheobjectionfromoperatorsthat,forexample,
intermediatestopsimposeunacceptabletimepenaltiesontheoften80percentormoreof
passengerswhosimplywantthefastestpossibleendtoendspeedbetweenthemajorcities.
TheNorth-westEuropeHSRNetwork
Figure1depictstheNorth-westEuropeHSRnetworkwhichlinksLondon,Paris,Brussels,Amsterdam
andKöln.Thesefivelargecities,togetherwithFrankfurtamMainwhichislinkedbyadedicatedHSR
linefromKöln,formthemetropolitancoreoftheEuropeanUnion.Frankfurtisalsoservedmore
directlyfromParisviatheFrenchLGVEstline.Theyareattheidealdistanceapart,400-600km,for
HSRservice.Theyarealsoinfivedifferentmemberstatesthusrequiringcoordinationofboth
infrastructureplanningandserviceprovisionacrossnationalboundaries.Differencesintechnologies
havecausedsomeproblems,notablybetweenFrenchandGermantechnologiesonthelinebetween
BrusselsandKölnwhereincompatibilitiesbetweentheFrenchTGVandGermanICEtrainsonthe
sameinfrastructurehaveledtoconflicts.Therehavealsobeenmajorproblemswiththetrains
procuredforthededicatedBrussels-Amsterdamservicewhichledtoadelayofnearlyfouryearsin
theirintroductionandthenewservicewasabandonedinJanuary2013afterjustonemonthof
chaoticoperation.
Servicecompatibilityhasbeenlargelyachievedbyfoundinganumberofjointventurecompanies
suchasEurostarbetweenFrench,BritishandBelgianrailintereststooperatetheLondontoParisor
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BrusselsservicesandThalysoriginallyformedbyFrench,BelgianandGermanrailcompaniesand
operatedwiththecooperationofDutchrailways,tooperatetheParistoBrussels,Amsterdamor
Kölnservices.BelgianandDutchrailwaysoperatebetweenBrusselsandAmsterdam,althoughthe
attempttoprovideahigh-speedFyraservicetoreplacethetraditionalinter-cityservicefaileddueto
failureoftherollingstockandtheserviceiscurrentlyinadegreeofturmoil.Thalyshasincreasedthe
numberoftrainsoperatingthroughtoAmsterdam.Germanrailways(DeutscheBahn)have
withdrawnfromtheThalysconsortiumandcompetewithThalysbetweenBrusselsandKöln(and
onwardstoFrankfurt)andFrenchrailwaysoperateTGVservicesbetweenBrusselsandParisCharles
deGaulleAirport(andonwardstoLyonandsouthernFrance).ThalysnowprovidesaLille-BrusselsAmsterdamservicewhichcompeteswithTGVandEurostarservicesbetweenLilleandBrussels.
Figure1North-westEuropeHSRNetwork
Figure2demonstrateshowtheheadlinetimesbetweenthesemajorcitieshaschangedastheresult
ofthenewHSRserviceswithreductionsofbetweenoneandthreehours.However,itwillbenoted
thatthisdiagram,takenfromaEuropeanCommissionpublicationchampioningtheroleofhighspeedrail,ignoresalltheintermediatestationsdepictedinFigure1.
Figure2JourneyTimesbetweenStations1989-2009
Levelsofservicearecorrespondinglylowerattheseintermediatestations.Table1showshowthe
servicesconcentrateonthecapitaltocapitalflows,orwithinFranceandtheUKonflowstoand
fromthecapital.Overallflowsontheinter-capitalsservicesprovidedbyEurostarandThalyshave
grown(Figure3)buttotalflowsontheseserviceshavenotreachedthelevelspredictedintheinitial
studiesfortheParis-Brussels/Londonservices(Table2).NotetheextenttowhichitistheChannel
TunnelservicesandthosebetweenParisandNorthernFrancewhichhavefailedtomatch
expectationswhereasthecross-borderservicesbetweenParisandBrusselsandbeyondhavecome
nearertotheexpectedvolume.MuchoftheshortfallontheFrenchdomesticservicesisinservices
tothesmallertownsandcitiesintheNord-PasdeCalaisregionratherthantoLille.
Table1DailyDirectServicesonNorth-westEuropeHSR
Figure3EurostarandThalysPassengers
Table2ForecastandactualpassengerflowsonLGV-Nord
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ParticularlynotableinTable1isthelevelofwhatisessentiallyacommuterservicetoLondonfrom
thetwointermediatestationsonthehigh-speedlineHS1,EbbsfleetandAshford.Thiscontrastswith
themuchpoorerlevelsofinternationalservicefromeachofthesestationsasthestoppingpattern
waseffectivelysplitbetweenthetwowhenthehigh-speedlinewasopenedin2007leavingneither
withalevelofserviceattractivetothebusinessuser.Figure4,basedonticketsales,showsclearly
howtheintroductionofHSRnotonlydivertedtrafficfromtheexistingregionalservices,butalsoled
toasignificantincreaseintotalpassengersbuyingticketsallowinguseofHSRservicestoLondon.
TotalrailpassengernumbersfromAshfordincreasedby17percentaftertheintroductionofHSR
services,withHSRaccountingforover70percentofalljourneys.
Thelevelofinternationalservicefromtheintermediatestationsrelatestothevolumeoftraffic.
DetailedflowdatabystationisnotavailablefromEurostarforcommercialreasons,butourbest
estimateisthatover90percentofEurostarpassengerstravelendtoendbetweenLondonandParis
orBrussels.OftheremainderthelargestflowisbetweenLondonandLille,probablyaccountingfora
littlefewerthan5percentofthe10milliontrips.Relativelyfewpassengers,probablylessthan2per
cent,actuallymakejourneysbetweenpairsofintermediatestationsandsomereturnjourneys,such
asAshford-Calais,areactuallyimpossible.Therankingofflowsisplausibleonthebasisofcaptive
populationsaroundstations,buttheabsolutelevelisrathersmallercompoundedbythereduction
insupply.ThisforcespassengerstomakejourneysviaLondontoandfromdestinationsinKentorvia
LillefromthoseinNord-PasdeCalaisgiventheabsenceofsuitableservices.Unpublishedestimates
oftrippotentialsaresignificantlygreaterthantheactualnumbersclaimedbyEurostar,butnoneof
thiscanbeindependentlyverified.
Figure4EffectofIntroductionofRegionalHSRServices,Kent
SimilarlyFigure5showshowtheintroductionofTGVandTER-GVservicesovertheLGV-Nord
betweenLilleandCalaisledtoasignificantriseinthenumberofpassengers,particularlybetween
LilleandBoulognewherethereductioninjourneytimeswassignificant.Thisisanexampleofthe
waythatserviceswhichruntodestinationsoffthehigh-speedlinecantransformaccessibility.
SimilareffectshavealsobeennotedinKentwithincreasesofaround40%injourneysfromDover,
CanterburyandThanet(HSRaccountingfor65to70percentofalljourneys).Thehigh-speed
serviceintheUKdoesinvolvepremiumfares,butthededicatedline,especiallyontheapproachto
theLondonterminus,meansthatreliabilityismuchgreaterthanonconventionalservicesandthis
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togetherwiththesavingofaround35minutesontypicaljourneyshasmadethenewservice
attractive.
Figure5EffectofIntroductionofRegionalHSRServicesinNord-PasdeCalais
Figure6EffectofIntroductionofRegionalHSRServicesintheNetherlands
ThesituationintheNetherlandsisratherdifferent.Theconstructionofthehigh-speedlineHSL-Zuid
avoidedstopsformajortownssuchasDenHaagandBredafocussingonthedirectlinkfrom
Amsterdam(viaSchipholAirport)andRotterdamtoBrusselsandParis.WhilstThalysinternational
services(andtheill-fatedFyraAmsterdam-Brusselsservice)wouldbenefitfromthis,therewas
considerableprotestattheabsenceofevenanoutoftownstopforDenHaag.Withinthe
NetherlandsaprovisionalservicebetweenAmsterdamandRotterdamusingthenewline,butnot
dedicatedHSRrollingstock,wasstartedandthiswasextendedtoserveBredain2011.Problems
withthelineandwiththeservicehavenotledtothedramaticimpactobservedinKentorNord-Pas
deCalais.Afterinitialgrowthonintroductionoftheservicepassengernumberslevelledoff(Figure
6).Oneofthepossiblereasonsforthisisthatfrequentnonhigh-speedservicesareavailableand
thesemaybemoreaccessiblebyvirtueoftheirfrequency,theirmorefrequentstopsandthe
absenceoftheneedforreservationandofpremiumfares.AlthoughtherailoperatorusedtheFyra
name,whichwasassociatedwiththenewhigh-speedrollingstock,forthestart-upservice,butusing
traditionalrollingstock,itdidnotprovidetheimpactfactorwhichnewhigh-speedtrainstypically
convey.Intheeventthenewtrainsfailedtoperformandafteranumberofembarrassingtrain
failureswerealltakenoutofserviceandreturnedtothemanufacturer.Atthecurrenttimeonlythe
ThalysservicescanfullyexploitthenewlineandThalystooktheopportunitytointroduceextratrips
betweenAmsterdamandBrussels.AccesschargesforHSL-Zuidarealsoconsiderablyhigherthanon
FrenchandBelgianhigh-speedlineswhichmaydeterpotentialnewentrants.
InternationalHSRservices,borderregionsandintermediatestations
Aswehaveshown,thedevelopmentoftheNorth-westEuropeHSRhasbeenlargelydrivenbythe
objectiveofjoiningthemajormetropolitanareas.Thenetworkisaninternationaloneandassuch
hastendedtoignoreintermediateandbordertownsinfavourofrapid,citytocity,links.Insome
casesthisisbecausethedirectrouteby-passestownsontraditionalrailroutes.Inothercases
individualtownshavelobbiedtoensurethatatowncentrestationisserved.ForexampleLille
lobbiedhardtosecurethedevelopmentofacentralstationsiteatLilleEurope(Hollidayand
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Vickerman,1990;ChenandHall,2012).Ashfordalsolobbiedtoensurethattheexistingstationwas
servedratherthananoutoftownsite(NormanandVickerman,1999).ThestationatCalais-Fréthun
ishoweveranoutoftownsite.Inothercasesmedianstationswerecreatedbetweenurbanareas
suchasTGV-HautePicardiebetweenAmiensandStQuentin.Another,andpossiblyunique,example
isthatofEbbsfleetwhereanewparkwaystationwasdevelopedclosetoamajormotorway
intersection,butatalocationwhereitwasbelievedthattherewasconsiderablepotentialfornew
brownfieldurbanredevelopment;thishasnotyetbeenrealised.Thefinalexampleisthatof
StratfordInternationalwhichwasdesignedasafocusforurbanregeneration.Itslocationhas,
however,beenseenastooclosetoLondonStPancrasforinternationalservicestostop;itisonly7
minutesfromStPancrasandthecostofthesecurityandbordercontrolmeasuresneededfor
internationalservicesintheUKwouldbeprohibitive(seeGarmendiaetal,2012,forafurther
discussionoftheUKintermediatestations).
PartofthephilosophyoftheEuropeanUnion’stransportpolicyistoimproveaccessibilityforregions
acrosstheEU,withaparticularobjectiveofreducinginequalities.OneoftheprioritiesoftheTransEuropeanNetworksforTransport(TEN-T)istoassistinreducingtheremainingbarrierscausedby
borders,particularlyinrailnetworksduetotheirlargelynineteenthcentury,nation-stateorigin
(EuropeanParliamentandCounciloftheEuropeanUnion,2010;Vickerman,forthcoming).Thisisof
particularimportancetoborderregionswhichareoftenperipheralwithintheircountryandsuffer
fromincompletehinterlands.But,despitethispolicyobjective,transportinvestmentremainslargely
acompetenceofindividualmemberstates.Completingcross-borderconnectionsisfrequentlythe
lastlinkinthenetwork.DespitethecompletionoftheChannelTunnelin1994,ittookuntil2007
beforethehigh-speedlineconnectingittoLondonwasfinallycompleted.Similardelayshavebeen
experiencedwiththecompletionofthecross-bordersectionoftheBrussels-Amsterdamhigh-speed
line.
Evenwherecross-borderintegrationobjectivesareseenasaprioritybytheregionsthemselves,
problemsofjurisdictionalsegregation,competenceandcompetitionpreventthecreationofnew
serviceswhichcouldtransformregionalperformance(Vickerman,2008).Wecanalsoobservethis
similarprocesshappeningbetweenlocalareaswithinregions.NormanandVickerman(1999)
documenthowthechoiceofstationsitesontheUK’sHS1ledtoaformoftugofwarbetween
localitiesinwhichsomewantedtosecureastationsiteasameansofimprovingaccessibilitywhilst
otherswereintentonkeepingthenewlineasfarawayaspossible.Inmanycasestheseleadstoa
re-emergenceofacore-peripheryproblemwithinregions.
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Thelocalitywhichsecuresthestation,especiallyifthatisalreadythelocationwiththegreatest
agglomerationpotential,seesamovementofactivitytowardsit,notfromoutsidetheregion,but
fromwithinit.ThuscitiessuchasLyonandLilleinFrancehavebothprofitedfrombeingamajorhub
forHSRattheexpenseofsmallercitiesintheirregion.ThedevelopmentofTER-GVinNord-Pasde
Calais,whichhasimprovedaccessibilityfromthecoastalarea,hasledtoasignificantincreasein
commutingfromtownsonthecoasttoLille.Lillehasappearedtodraweconomicactivityfromthe
oldindustrialtownssurroundingit(ChenandHall,2012).Themainimpactoftheregionalservices
onHS1intheUKappearstohavebeenanincreaseincommutingtowardsLondon,reinforcing
existingpatternsofactivityratherthancreatingnewbusinessactivityintownssuchasAshford.This
issimilartosomeextenttothewaythatthecreationofcompletelynewlinksinSpainhasledtonew
commutingpatterns,althoughthereissomeevidencetherethatthishasenabledatwo-way
developmentofcommuting(Garmendiaetal,2012).
MuchofhowtheadventofHSRaffectsregions,andespecially,butnotonly,thoseawayfrommajor
metropolitanareasdependscriticallyonlocalaccesstotheHSRnetworkandhowitintegrateswith
localrail(orotherpublictransport)services(seeMartinezandGivoni,2012).Thecreationofoutof
townparkwaystationshastypicallynotledtomuchlocalimpactiftheonlymeansofaccessisby
car.Onceapotentialpassengerstartsajourneybycardrivingoutofthedirectlineofrouteto
accessanHSRstationislesslikelythanstayinginthecar,especiallyifaccesstothestationinvolvesa
longwalkacrossanopenaircarparkandawaitinwhatistypicallyalesswelcomingstation
environmentthanthoseavailableatmajorstations.TherelativelackofsuccessofTGV-Haute
PicardieandTGV-LorrainefallsintothiscategoryandEbbsfleetintheUKpotentiallyfacesthesame
fate.SuccessisusuallycoupledwiththeHSRstationbecomingamainhubofthelocalorregionalrail
orurbantransportsystem.ThiswasachievedinLyonandLillewherenewmetrolinesservetheHSR
stationsatLyonPartDieuandLilleEurope.ThemoveoftheEurostarterminalinLondonfrom
WaterlootoStPancrasbroughtittobepartofthelargestconcentrationofsurfaceand
UndergroundlinesinLondon.ThelogicofcreatinganinternationalstationatAshfordwasbasedon
itsbeingservedbyfiveconventionalraillinesandStratfordwasalsopresagedonitsbecominga
majorinnerurbanrailhub.ThisopportunityisofcourseunderminedifthelevelofHSRserviceat
thestationisinadequate.Hencelocalandregionalaccessibilitytothehigh-speednetworkisseenas
equallyimportanttothegreateraccessibilitytomajormetropolitanareasaffordedbythehighspeedline.High-speedlinesshouldbepartoftheoverallnetwork,notaseparate(andmore
exclusive)network,iftheyaretoachievetheiroftenstatedgoalsofenhancingcohesionand
inclusion.
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AsummaryofthedifferentlocalsituationsofthetwostationsintheUK,AshfordandEbbsfleet,
whichhavenotbeensosuccessfulincreatingeithertrafficorlocaldevelopment,isgiveninthe
Appendix.Thesearecontrastedwiththemuchmoresuccessfulexampleofurbanregeneration
foundinthe,albeitmuchlarger,FrenchcitiesofLilleandLyon.Thisisdespitetherebeingno
physicalconnectionbetweenthetwostationsinLilleandthenewcentreatLyonLaPartDieubeing
asignificantdistancefromthehistoriccentre.Itwouldseemtobethecasethatonlyinlargercities
canthedegreeofassociatedredevelopmentcoupledwithimprovedlocaltransportconnections
ensurethesuccessofanewstation.However,Ureñaetal(2012)suggest,onthebasisofevidence
forSpain,thateveninsmallercitiescarefulplanningandintegrationofthestationintotheurban
spacecanhavepositiveimpacts.Opportunitiestoprovidebetterintegrationofcommercialand
residentialareasatAshfordhavenotbeentakenandthestationareaactuallyconstitutesabarrier
betweentwopartsofthetown.TheplantocreateanewurbansettlementaroundEbbsfleetwas
putonholdduetotheonsetofthefinancialcrisisandsubsequentrecessionatthetimeofthe
stationopeningin2007.
Frenchexperiencedoessuggest,however,thatthegreatestopportunitytogrowtrafficariseswhen
theneedtochangetrainsisobviated.Thusrunningdirectservicesoffthehigh-speedlinetoother
centresisanimportantpartofcreatingaservicepattern.Thesearedesignedtoprovide,inthe
main,directservicestoParis(Bonnafous,1987).Thalysalsoprovidesanumberofdirect,mainly
peakhour,servicesbetweenParisandOstendandviaMonsandNamurtoLiège.Eurostarand
ThalysprovideseasonaldirectservicestothesouthofFranceandtheFrenchAlpsfromLondonand
Brusselsrespectively.EurostarhasplanstodevelopservicesbeyondBrusselstoAmsterdamandvia
LilletoGeneva.DeutscheBahnstillhopestoprovidethroughFrankfurtorAmsterdamtoLondon
services.ButEurostarhasfailedtobeabletodeveloptheoriginallyplannedthroughservicesfrom
otherUKcitiestoParisandBrussels(KnowlesandFarrington,1998),althoughitremainsapossibility
withthedevelopmentofHS2toBirminghamandeventuallyManchesterandLeeds.Giventhe
competitionfromlowcostairlinesandthecostburdenofthesecurityandbordercontrolsimposed
intheUKthisremainsadifficultservicetojustifyoneconomicgrounds.Thelikelystartdatefor
thesenewserviceshasslippedconsiderably.
Problemsoftheregulatoryframework
Whilstinfrastructureinvestmentremainslargelyanationalcompetencewithinthebroadoutlinesof
theTEN-T,theprovisionofservicesonthatnetworkhasalsobeensubjecttoavarietyofregional,
nationalandinternationalregulatorystructures.AlthoughthevariousrailwaypackagesoftheEU
11
havesoughttoopenuptheprovisionofrailservicesatalllevelstocompetition,progressinsecuring
genuinecompetitiononthenetworkshasbeenslow(Nash,2011).Detaileddifferencesintechnical
specification,despitetheconceptofinter-operability,requirelongperiodsforthetechnicalapproval
ofnewrollingstock.Separateregulatoryprovisions,definedbyinternationaltreaty,fortheprivately
ownedChannelTunnelhaveprecludedthedevelopmentofasimpleinter-regionalserviceto
complementthecapitaltocapitalserviceofEurostarandhavedelayedtheintroductionofthe
competingserviceproposedbyDeutscheBahn(HouseofLords,2011).
Perhapsthegreatestproblemmilitatingagainstthedevelopmentofinter-regionalcross-border
servicesisthedifferingmodelsoffundingrailservices.Notonlydoesthebasicphilosophyofthe
proportionofcostswhichshouldbecoveredbyfaresvarybetweencountries,butthecosts
themselvesdiffermarkedly.Forexample,estimatesoftheinfrastructureusagecostsbetweenLille
andLondonsuggestthattrainspayabout€7.5/kmontheFrenchLGVagainstjustover€43/kmon
theUKHS1andamassivealmost€210/kmforuseofEurotunnelinfrastructure.Infrastructure
chargesthusamounttoaround20percentofthetotalcostsofrunningatrainontheFrenchLGV
against60percentintheUKandnearly90%inthetunnel.Whilstotherinternationalservicesdo
notfacethisdegreeofdifferenceandtheuseoftheChannelTunnelisclearlyaseparatecase,the
hugedifferencebetweenthechargesfortheuseofhigh-speedinfrastructureintheUKandFrance
doesraiseconcerns.SimilarlythehighcostsofusingHSL-Zuidhavealreadybeenidentifiedasoneof
thedifficultiesindevelopingservicesonthatline.
Ashigh-speedlinesbecomemoreheavilyused,slotcompetitionfordifferenttypesofservicewill
increasejustasitdoeswithairports.Thuslongerandmoreheavilyusedtrainswillhavean
advantagejustaslargerwide-bodiedjetsoninter-continentalflightscandominateregionalservices
usingsmalleraircraftatmajorairports.Thiswillmilitateagainstthedevelopmentofmoreflexible
localandinter-regionalservices.Regionalauthoritieswillfinditdifficulttoargueformakingrail
serviceproviderssensitivetolocalneedswhenservicelevelsaredrivenfromoutsidearegionand
thecostsofprovidinglessprofitablelocalservicesappeargreater.Localandregionalgovernments
haveaclearroleinsecuringbetterservicelevelsfortheirregion,butthismayresultinmore
competitionbetweenregionstosecuretheirshareofwhatmaybeperceivedasazero-sumgame
ratherthanbetterservicelevelsoverall.Inthistheobjectiveofgreaterequalityinaccessibilitymay
besqueezedbycommercialpressurefromoperators.
ButthefailureofHSRtomakeadifferenceatintermediatestationswheredemandisnotassured
justbypopulationisoftentheresultoffailuretoensurecomplementarydevelopmentsaroundthe
station.ThelackofservicedevelopmentatAshfordandEbbsfleetisdueprimarilytoalackoflocally
12
generateddemandforthatservicewhichisinturnassociatedwiththelackofnewbusiness
opportunities.AsHollidayandVickerman(1990)andChenandHall(2012)havenotedinthecaseof
Lille,firmandcommittedlocalpolicyleadingtosignificantregenerationdevelopmentsupportedby
thelocalgovernmentcanservetokickstartthatgeneration.Aguaranteedbaselevelofdemand
leadstoimprovedservicewhichencouragesfurtherdevelopmentandavirtuouscircleensues.
Conclusions
ThispaperhasraisedanumberofissuesconcerningtheproblemswhichthedevelopmentofHSR
hasposedforintermediatecities,whetherornottheyachievedirectaccesstothenetwork.Inpart
thisiscausedbythedominanceoftheinter-metropolitanflows,inpartbytheeconomicsofHSR
operationandinpartbythefailureoflocalgovernmentauthoritiestorecognisethattheprovision
ofaccesstonewinfrastructuredoesnotbringautomaticbenefits.Wemaywishtoconcludefrom
thisthatHSRisactuallyonlyaboutthehigh-levelinter-metropolitantrafficwhereitactsasan
alternativetoairandthatHSRisinappropriateforshorterdistanceorinter-regionalflowsover
distancesupto200km.TheevidenceforSpainandfromtheregionalJavelinservicesintheUKtends
tocontradictthiswhentheservicesarepartofacommutingnetworkaroundamajormetropolitan
area.ButwhatisclearisthatthedevelopmentofHSRhasnotledtothereductionininequalitiesin
accessibilityandanyassociatedeconomicconsequencesclaimedforinEUpolicies.Thusitisnot
distancewhichisthemajorobstacle,butratherthecross-bordernatureoftheproblemfacing
intermediateregions.Newinfrastructureandnewtypesofservicedonotseemtohavebeenableto
effectchange.ThisoutcomeisconsistentwiththeexpectationsoutlinedbyVickermanetal(1999)
whereitwasshownthatrelativeaccessibilitieswouldchangeverylittleasaresultofthe
implementationoftheTEN-Tandthatthemaingainerswouldbethoseregionswhichalready
demonstratedthehighestlevelsofaccessibility.
Sowhatremainsforpolicy?Clearlythedirectengagementoflocalandregionalauthoritiesinthe
developmentofnewtransportinfrastructureiscriticaltoensuretherighttypeofcomplementary
development.Thiscomplementarydevelopmentisbothprovidingaccesstothehigh-levelnetwork
andmakingthestationinterchangeadestinationinitsownrightasabusinesscentre.Butlocal
governmentisoftenpowerlesstodealwiththeconsequencesofhigherleveldecisionsonthe
regulatorystructureoftheprovisionofrailinfrastructureandservices.Thedesiretopromote
competitionandaccountabilitywithintherailsectorthroughsuccessiverailpackagesattheEUlevel
andtheirdifferingimplementationatnationallevelhascontributedtoanincreasingfragmentation
13
oftherailindustry.Railoperators,especiallythoseoperatingataninternationallevel,arenot
incentivisedtorecognisethedifferentlevelsofmarket.
14
Acknowledgements
IamgratefulfortheassistanceofDafyddPugh,KentCountyCouncilBrusselsOffice,forassistancein
acquiringbackgroundinformationforthispaper;andtotheparticipantsintheJeanMonnetseminar
inBarcelonainMarch2013forcommentsonanearlierdraftofthispaper.Thecommentsoftwo
anonymousrefereeshavehelpedimprovetheargument.Responsibilityforanyremainingerrorsand
fortheinterpretationsandopinionsexpressedinthepaperremainthoseoftheauthor.
15
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17
Table1DailyDirectServicesonNorth-westEuropeHSR1
London
London
Ebbsfleet
-
73
2
Ashford
Calais
Lille
Paris
Brussels
Amsterdam
Köln
2
3
9
14
9
-
-
33 2
2
4
5
4
-
-
3
1
-
-
8
3
-
-
-
25
14
-
-
-
26
11
5
26
-
21
5
9
37 2
-
38 2
34 2
-
1
1
Calais
2
1
0
-
11
Lille
9
4
1
11
Paris
14
6
3
8
25
Brussels
9
4
1
3
14
Amsterdam
-
-
-
-
-
13
23
Köln
-
-
-
-
-
5
9
Ebbsfleet
76 Ashford
3
3
4
5
-
-
-
-
Notes:
1
Weekdayservices,wintertimetable2012-13(excludestrainsoperatinglessthan5daysaweek).Directservicesonly
2
Localservicesonly;internationalservicescannotcarrylocalpassengerswithinUK
OnlyEurostar,TGVandTER-GVtrainsbetweenLille-EuropeandCalais-Fréthunincluded
4
DuetoUKbordercontrolproblemsticketsarenotavailablefromBrusselstoLilleonallEurostartrains
5
PublishedtimetableincludingFyraservicescurrentlysuspended
3
18
Table2ForecastandactualpassengerflowsonLGV-Nord
Actual
Forecast passengers
Error as %
passengers (mn)
(mn)2002
forecast
2002
Paris-NorthernFrance
10.9
6.4
41.3
Paris-Brussels/Amsterdam/Köln
7.2
5.5
23.6
Paris/Brussels/Lille-London
20.6
7.3
64.6
Source:BilanLOTIdelaLGVNord,RFF,May2005.
19
Figure1North-westEuropeHSRNetwork
Source:ConseilRégional,NordPasdeCalais
20
Figure2JourneyTimesbetweenStations1989-2009
Amsterdam
London
1:51
3:18
4:52
5:16
1:53
2:39
2:55
2:40
Köln
Brussels
2:15
1:47
5:12
2:30
1:10
1:22
2:25
3:15
3:14
2:10
5:00
5:05
3:48
Frankfurt
6:13
1:50
Saarbrücken
3:55
Paris
2:20
HSR (2009)
4:00
Ordinary rail
Journey Time
Strasbourg
2009
1989
Source: European Union (2010), High-speed Europe
21
Figure3EurostarandThalysPassengers
Source:EurostarandThalysreports
22
Figure4EffectofIntroductionofRegionalHSRServices,Kent
Source: South-eastern Railway
Note:Dataisbasedonticketsalesdifferentiatingbetweenthosewhicharevalidorinvalidforuseonhigh-speedservices.
23
Figure5EffectofIntroductionofRegionalHSRServicesinNord-PasdeCalais
Source: Conseil Regional Nord-Pas de Calais
24
Figure5EffectofIntroductionofRegionalHSRServicesintheNetherlands
Source: Nederlandse Spoorwegen
25
Appendix
3
1
4
AshfordTownCentre
6
AshfordInternationalStation
2
5
FigureA1.Ashford
Therailwaysplitsthetraditionaltowncentrefromnewerresidentialandcommercialareastothe
south.Aswellasthehighspeedlinewhichbisectsthepicturefromnorthwest(towardsLondonat
1)tosoutheast(towardstheContinent,at2)thepictureshowsthefiveclassicraillineswhichrunto
Maidstone(3),Canterbury(4),Dover(paralleltothehigh-speedlineat2),RyeandHastings(5)and
TonbridgeandLondon(6).
26
1
Existing
urban
area
4
Existing
urban
area
3
Ebbsfleet
International
Station
Development
area
5
2
Carparks
Carparks
2
FigureA.2Ebbsfleet
EbbsfleetStationisonabrownfieldsitearoundwhichtheplanneddevelopment,shownasthe
shadeddevelopmentarea,hasnotyethappened.Notethesignificantspacegivenovertocarparks
aroundthestation.Thehigh-speedlinerunsfromLondon(1)towardsAshfordandtheContinent(2)
withaspurat(3)whichlinkswiththetraditionallocalraillinebetweenLondon(4)andGravesend
(5).ThereishowevernodirectconnectionforpassengersbetweentheclassicraillineandEbbsfleet
International.
27
1
LilleCity
Centre
LilleEuropeStation
EuralilleCommercial
Centre
3
LilleFlandresStation
2
FigureA.3Lille
LilleEuropestationisbuiltaspartofamajorurbanredevelopmentcalledEuralillewithofficeblocks
constructedabovetherailstationandamajorcommercialcentrebetweenLilleEuropeandthe
traditionalterminalstationLilleFlandres.Thehigh-speedlinerunsintunnelfromnorthwest(1)
towardsCalaisandLondontosoutheast(2)towardsParisandBrussels.Thetraditionalraillines
fromLilleFlandres(3)leavetowardsthesoutheastbutdivergetoservearangeofdestinations.The
linesfromLilleFlandreslinkwiththehigh-speedlineforLille-Paristrains.
28
1
Lyon
Traditional
Centre
LyonLaPartDieu
StationandNew
CommercialCentre
3
LyonPerrache
Station
2
FigureA.4Lyon
LyonLaPartDieustationwasbuilttoserveamajorredevelopmentawayfromthetraditionalcity
centrewhichliesbetweenthetworiversSaôneandRhône.LaPartDieuisnotactuallyonahighspeedlinebutthelinestowardsParis(1)andtheMediterranean(2)connectontohigh-speedlines
tothenorthandsouthoftheconurbation.ForthroughtrainsnotstoppinginLyonthereisaby-pass
high-speedlinewhichservesLyonStExupéryairport.TrainsbetweenParisandLyonusuallyproceed
toterminateatthetraditionalstationLyonPerrachewhichisclosertothetraditionalcitycentre.A
networkofmetroandtramwaylineslinkthevariouslocations.
29