Migration: An answer to a
European demographic
dilemma?
Hervé Le Bras
Research Director
École des Hautes Études Sociales (EHESS) and
French National Institute for Demographic Studies (INED), France
[email protected]
The ‘Lampedusa Dilemma’:
Global Flows and Closed Borders.
What should Europe do?
EUI, Florence
17-18 November 2014
INTRODUCTION
The EUI Forum on Migration,
Citizenship and Demography is a
joint initiative by the four
departments of the EUI, the
Robert Schuman Centre for
Advanced Studies and the Max
Weber Programme. It brings
together critical analysis, informed
debate and policy
recommendations from the wider
field of citizenship and democracy,
demography, migration and
asylum governance, and the
management of cultural diversity.
Professor Anna Triandafyllidou is
the Scientific Organiser of the
Forum’s Inaugural Event: The
2014 Conference on the
Lampedusa Dilemma.
Policy experts and scholars from a
variety of disciplines will share
their views on migration
governance, human rights,
asylum-seeking and international
protection, as well as irregular
migration.
The Lampedusa disaster of
October 2013 demonstrates the
dramatic events taking place in
the Mediterranean area which
require urgent, forward-looking
and well-thought out responses.
Can migration counteract population decline in Europe? The question is
often addressed to or by demographers. But what population decline: the
absolute number of people? The labor force? The ratio of old people to
people in working age? We will consider the three possibilities.
Furthermore, should we take Europe as a whole or follow each country
separately, for the differences in age structure and population dynamics are
wide all over Europe. We will consider the two situations: Europe as a whole
and each country as a closed nation. Europe as a whole suppose a perfect
fluidity of labor in Europe, countries with surplus filling countries with
deficit. Each country separately means no net migrations between European
countries. The truth lies between these two extremes we will compute.
First we will estimate the amount of net migration involved in each of the
three hypotheses. In a second time, we will ask the question itself, if one can
say: Are there other means to stabilize the labor force and the dependency
ratio. Furthermore, is the stabilization of the population a necessity?
Page 2
MIGRATION:
AN
ANSWER
DEMOGRAPHIC DILEMMA?
TO
A
EUROPEAN
STABILIZATION OF THE EU POPULATION, LABOUR FORCE,
DEPENDENCY RATIO
First, the amount of migration that can overcome population decline :
Amount of migration that can
overcome population decline
The following method was adopted for each country and for the 27 members
together. Starting in 2005, the population projection was performed using
the data set of the UN population division (medium hypothesis without
migration). UN provides the number of people in each five years age group
for each sex from now until 2050 and the mortality rates for these age
groups by sex for each five years period. The only missing distribution is net
migration by age. This is a very stable distribution all around the world and
since long time. We took data available from France.
Combining these data is demographer's work. For each five years leap from
2005 until 2050, the age pyramid was computed with a null net migration at
each age. The total population was obtained by adding all the age groups.
The result was compared with the total population five years ago. If there
was a decline in number, a net migration was added at each age group
according to the migration age profile in a way to restore the total number of
people five years ago. If there was no population decline, no net migration
was added1. Finally, the total amount of net migration between 2005 and
2050 was computed. The net migration proposed by the UN for the medium
projection with migration was subtracted to give the amount of
supplementary net migration imposed by the hypothesis of no population
decline. The table 2 contains the annual number of net migrants asserted by
the UN for each country by periods of five years (UN predicts a low level of
net migration not at pace with the data collected by the UE states as shown
later).
Let us have a comment of the results :
Amount of net migration that
can overcome a decline of the
labor force.
If there is a perfect fluidity of migration inside the UE, surprisingly, the
amount of surplus net migration necessary to overcome total population
decline is very low with only ten millions people in 45 years, or 220 000 each
year. If there is absolutely no fluidity, the total amount grows to 30 million,
or 670 000 each year, a fairly reasonable number. But, there are great
contrasts by country: 7 million for Poland and Germany, 5 million for
Romania, 3 million for Italy and nothing for 13 countries. The UN projections
do not take into account the peculiar historical situations. Likely, fertility will
increase in former eastern countries and mortality decrease for reason of
convergence with the west. Thus, the result for Poland and Romania are
somewhat exaggerated.
Second : the amount of net migration that can overcome a decline of the
labor force :
The labor force was taken in the demographic meaning, i.e., the number of
people aged 15-54 years. The same method as for the total population was
applied with a light modification. Having determined the gap in number in
the labor force at five years intervals, the profile of migration was used to
compute the total number of migrants to be injected (not equal to the deficit
EUI FORUM on MIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP and DEMOGRAPHY
Page 3
MIGRATION:
AN
ANSWER
DEMOGRAPHIC DILEMMA?
TO
A
EUROPEAN
in the labor force because the age profile of migrants cover all the ages from
0 to 100 years and more). The result can be red on the second row of table 1.
Like the preceding result, the net-migration forecasted by UN division of
population is subtracted. Because of aging, the decline of the labor force
would be more severe if not compensated by net migration. 60 millions of
people will miss even in the case of perfect fluidity of the labor force, 65
million either. It is not an impossible goal. According to the SOPEMI data (and
not the UN data), net migration in Europe can be estimated to 1,8 million
people in the recent years (We know the in and out migrations in 16
countries totalizing 280 million inhabitants. In 2012, the total regular inmigrations in these countries amount to 2,35 million and the total outmigrations to 1,36 million, a ratio of 0,58. Applying the same ratio to the
whole UE gives a net migration of 1,8 million, equivalent to 80 million in 45
years). Thus, 60 million necessary to maintain the labor force means less
than a doubling of the net migration in Europe. As it can be seen on the table
1, two thirds of the deficit are due to only 4 countries, Germany, Spain,
Poland and Italy. The gap between the net migration for UE as a whole and
for each country individually is much less for the labor force than for the
total population. The reason for that is simple. All countries will experience a
decline of their labor force in the lack of a surplus migration. Only in certain
period some will have without net migration a surplus that compensates the
deficit of the others.
Maintaining the old/15-64
dependency ratio in the whole
EU.
The last case: maintaining the old/15-64 dependency ratio at its present level
in all countries or alternatively in the whole EU.
In the same way as in the preceding section, one can compute the amount of
net migration necessary to overcome the effects of aging on the dependency
ratio. The result appears in the third row of the table 1. The numbers of
migrants involved does not show any common measure with those in the
two former hypotheses. Alone or together, the UE countries should receive
between 561 and 582 million net migrants until 2050. Most if all the
countries would need more migrants than their present population : 68
million for Spain, 81 million for Poland (in this case, the actual low
dependency ratio will rise rapidly with increasing expectation of life) and all
the former eastern countries. In Germany, in France, in Italy, in United
Kingdom, the amount of net migration would amount to the actual
population, or for the last three states, more than one million more people
from outside each year. Clearly, the third hypothesis is unrealistic.
Immigration is not a cure for aging populations. The two first hypotheses are
more manageable, but we must ask their feasibility.
GOING BEYOND DEMOGRAPHIC COMPUTATIONS
Stabilization by net migration
is a shortcoming.
Postulating the stabilization by net migration is a shortcoming. First they can
be other means of stabilization than net migration. Second, it is not proved
the stabilization is an optimal goal. Let us discuss these two points.
The demographic age bracket 15-59 years or 20-64 or any other is not an
accurate indicator of the labor force. It is more recommended to use
participation rates by age of men and women. The labor force depends from
one hand from the age pyramid and for the other from the values of the
EUI FORUM on MIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP and DEMOGRAPHY
Page 4
MIGRATION:
AN
ANSWER
DEMOGRAPHIC DILEMMA?
TO
A
EUROPEAN
participation rates. Net migration is therefore not the only mean to increase
the labor force. Changes in participation rates can do the job. The
heterogeneity is big along the EU countries. The employment rates
(proportion of workers in the population 15-64 years) stretch from 58 % in
Poland to 76 % in Sweden. Two main potential reserves of worker does exist :
women and people over 55 years. Employment rate of women is 46 % in Italy
and 74 % in Sweden. A first scenario would be a convergence of the
participation rates of the women toward those of the women in 2050.
Second cause of discrepancy, the early departure from work : participation
rates of men fall under 50 % at 58,5 years in France, at 63,5 in Sweden. A
second scenario will be a convergence of the participation rates of the 55-64
years toward the Swedish rates in 2050. They are other differences
particularly the participation rates of the young very high in Denmark. Two
last hypotheses were tested : a convergence of the participation rates of the
men and the women toward the Danish rates at each age and furthermore, a
convergence of the participation rates of the women to those of the Danish
men2.
The increase of the labor force obtained by each of these four scenarios are
displayed on table 3. The sum of the gains of the two first scenarios or of
each of the two last is enough to fill the gap between the number of workers
in 2007 and 2050. In a few countries like Germany or Bulgaria, a deficit
remains in 2050, but in many others a surplus appears, i.e. in France, in
Ireland, in the Scandinavian countries. It must be stressed the different
hypotheses are not utopian. The convergence of participation rates of men
and women in en the way since the 1960's. The profile of employment by age
in Denmark or in Sweden is not out of reach for the other European
countries. It is not question of taking characteristics from another civilization
or another system like communist regimes or far-east Asian countries.
Projections are made usually under the assumption of any other factors
maintained constant. Removing this assumption increase the degree of
freedom of the future.
The second point concerns the benefit of a stabilized population against a
decreasing one. There no evidence of such a benefit. Since a half century,
any researches were performed to compare demographic and economic
rates of increase without any clear result. Furthermore, a recent paper of
Ronald Lee from Berkeley suggests there is some advantage to earn from a
weakly decreasing population. Lee's argument rests on the age profiles of
private and public benefits, consumption and labor income he collected in 40
countries. Lee looked for the level of fertility maximizing the overall gain all
the life cycle long. He found for most countries a fertility level under the
replacement value. The same criticism can be addressed as that in the
preceding paragraph: when fertility and age pyramid change, the profiles of
public and private benefits and payments change as clearly illustrated by the
large gap between the profiles of the 40 countries. Lee is aware of that
criticism, but he argues that he is not addressing a final state but a cross
sectional tendency (but he uses stable population pyramids for its
demonstration). The interest of Lee's work is partly elsewhere. He reminds us
not to take quantitative population data too seriously, including migration
flows. The count may be more for their quality, for the differences the
impulse in a society than for their rough number.
EUI FORUM on MIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP and DEMOGRAPHY
Page 5
MIGRATION:
AN
ANSWER
DEMOGRAPHIC DILEMMA?
TO
A
EUROPEAN
A FINAL REMARK WITH A FINAL GRAPH
Difficult to attract migrants in
sufficient number.
Even in the case where net migration can play a role, it will be difficult to
attract migrants in sufficient number. This remark sounds strange in such a
meeting devoted to the migratory pressure from the south, but it is
historically documented. When the demand for work was high in Europe
after the first world war or in the sixties, the migrants did not come in
sufficient number. It was necessary to send recruiters who solicited
candidates. The past trend of net migration toward Europe is more close to a
sinusoid than an exponential with the exception of periods of high economic
growth. Moreover, the emigration of European citizens counterweight more
or less the immigration of foreigners. This is clear in Ireland and also in
France and explains the sinusoidal shape of the net migration in France for
the last fifty years as one can see on the following figure.
Figure 1: Annual net migration in France since 1975
Source
Data are taken from the data banks of Eurostat , the Population Division of the UN and INSEE.
-SOPEMI, annual report (from 2006 to 2013), OECD, Paris
-H. Le Bras : The Nature of Demography, Princeton U.P., Princeton, 2008.
-R. Lee, A. Mason : “Is really low fertility a problem : Population aging, dependency and
consumption”, Science, vol. 346, Issue 6206.
-Les chiffres de la politique de l'immigration et de l'intégration, Rapport au Parlement, La
Documentation française, Paris, 2013
EUI FORUM on MIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP and DEMOGRAPHY
Page 6
MIGRATION:
AN
ANSWER
DEMOGRAPHIC DILEMMA?
TO
A
EUROPEAN
Table 1
Total net migration necessary to stabilize until 2050 the population, the labor force
and the dependency ratio (thousands)
(1) stabilization of the total populations
(2) stabilization of the labor force
(3) stabilization of the dependency ratio (people over 64 on
people 15-64
EUI FORUM on MIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP and DEMOGRAPHY
Page 7
MIGRATION:
AN
ANSWER
DEMOGRAPHIC DILEMMA?
TO
A
EUROPEAN
Table 2
Annual net migrations (thousands) as forecast by the UN division of
population for the 27 countries and the EU (Croatia not included)
Period
2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 2040 2045
Total
-10 -15 -20 -25 -30 -35 -40 -45 -50 (annual x5)
Country
Austria
32
30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
Belgium
68
30 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
Bulgaria -17 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10 -10
Cyprus
9
7
6 5 5
4
3
2 1
Czech Rep. 60
40 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
Denmark 18
15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15
Estonia
-3
0 0 0 0
0
0
0 0
Finland
14 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10
France
104 130 120 100 100 100 100 100 100
Germany 120 110 100 90 90
90 90 90 90
Greece
11 10 10 20 20
20 20 20 20
Hungary 19 15 15 15 15
15 15 15 15
Ireland
22 10 10 10 10
10
10 10 10
Italy
182 180 150 120 120 120 120 120 120
Latvia
-17 -2 -2 -2 0
0
0 0 0
Lithuania -32 -6 -4 -3 -1
0
0
0 0
Luxemb.
8
5 5 4 3
3
2
1 1
Malta
1
1 1 1 1
1
1
1 1
Netherland 11 10 10 10 10
10
10 10 10
Poland
-14 -8 -8 -8 -8
-8
-8 -8 -8
Porugal
20 20 20 20 20
20
20 20 20
Romania -11 -9 -9 -9 -9
-9
-9 -9 -9
Slovakia
6 3 3 3 3
3
3
3 3
Slovenia
9 4 4 4 4
4
4
4 4
Spain
150 120 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Sweden
52 40 40 40 40
40 40 40 40
Un.King. 168 180 180 170 170 170 170 170 170
1360
1190
-535
210
1550
690
-15
520
4770
4350
855
695
510
6760
-115
230
160
45
405
410
900
415
150
205
4850
1860
7740
Total
39360
1371 936 846 786 789
788
787 785 784
Disclaimer: The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the EUI’s Forum, its
constituent parties or scientific directors and organisers.
EUI FORUM on MIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP and DEMOGRAPHY
Page 8
ENDNOTES
MIGRATION:
AN
ANSWER
DEMOGRAPHIC DILEMMA?
TO
A
EUROPEAN
1
We bet indulgence for these computations were made quite roughly, but
they can be done in a more refined way if more time is devoted to the model and to
the data to be collected and criticised. The result being very clear, we did not invest
times in such refinements.
2
The computation were made using the participation rates by age and sex in
2007 available on Eurostat databank. As for the net migration computations their
precision is a bit illusory. They must be taken as giving an order of magnitude and, in
this respect, the results give clear indications. As for the first part of the paper, the
computations can be made a bit less roughly and with more recent data, but it
seems unlikely the main tendencies here stated would change.
EUI FORUM on MIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP and DEMOGRAPHY
Page 9
MIGRATION:
AN
ANSWER
DEMOGRAPHIC DILEMMA?
TO
A
EUROPEAN
MORE ABOUT THE EUI FORUM ON
MIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP AND DEMOGRAPHY
Scientific Directors
Professor Joseph H. H. Weiler, President of the EUI
Professor Brigid Laffan, Director of the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced
Studies, EUI
Mission Statement
The EUI Forum on Migration Citizenship and Demography is a 2-year
programme (2014-2016) that brings together professors, senior fellows,
post-doctoral researchers and PhD students from the four EUI departments,
the Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies and the Max Weber
Programme, over a set of themes of common expertise and interest.
Building on a wealth of academic publications, policy papers, conferences
and workshops, produced by EUI scholars in the wider field of citizenship and
democracy, demography and migration management, cultural diversity and
ways to address it, the Forum offers critical analysis, informed debate and
policy recommendations.
Topics to be addressed by the Forum activities in the form of Oxford debates,
policy workshops and academic conferences include:





FORUM website
The management of cultural and religious diversity in Europe at times of
intensified globalisation trends and increased migration flows
Balancing demographic and labour market challenges. How to build an
effective and efficient migration and migrant integration policy in
Europe?
Upholding our asylum commitment in an increasingly volatile geopolitical
framework: Ethical and political considerations.
EU law and policy on migration and asylum: Fit for purpose for 2030?
Europe: a continent of emigration, immigration and mobility. Past
experiences, present challenges and future trends.
http://www.eui.eu/Projects/TheForum/Home.aspx
EUI FORUM on MIGRATION, CITIZENSHIP and DEMOGRAPHY