The Townshend Duties
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After becoming Chancellor of the Exchequer, on May 13, 1767 Charles
Townshend revealed his painless way of getting $ out of America—his
program saddled America with a full measure of external taxes
collectively known as the Townshend duties (remember, Townshend
and others were under the impression that external taxes were o.k.
thanks to Franklin’s speech, at least they played the part since most
astute/educated officials knew better).
Townshend’s program:
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Americans would pay duties on the items they imported from England (under the
Navigation Acts they could import these items only from England) such as glass, lead,
paper, paints, and tea)
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Under Townshend, the American Customs Service was reorganized—now duties would
be collected in America under the supervision of a separate Board of Customs
Commissioners located in Boston.
To the colonists, the Townshend Duties provided more explicit
evidence of a wide-ranging plot/conspiracy because they had been
passed despite all the violence of the colonists’ reaction to the Stamp
Act.
Colonial Response to Townshend Duties
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John Dickinson of Philadelphia spoke on behalf of the colonists in his Letters
from a Pennsylvania Farmer in which he declared there was no distinction
between internal and external taxes designed to collect revenue from the
colonists while refuting Townshend’s justification for imposing the duties in the
first place. Dickinson quoted the resolves of the Stamp Act Congress (the
problem was that a majority of the members in Parliament along with other
important officials never bothered to read these petitions/resolutions).
The various colonies instituted/implemented non-importation agreements of
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British goods until the Townshend duties were repealed
**Colonists saw all the Townshend Acts as measures designed to tax
them.
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Colonists denied Parliament’s right (authority) to levy duties for the purpose of
revenue.
Townshend duties contd.
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The act creating the new Board of Customs
Commissioners was, to the colonists, proof
positive that Parliament was prepared to
destroy colonial legislatures to make the point
they had the power to tax—The act enhanced
the influence of the customs administration
(which had already come under suspicion) by
reinforcing the significance of their role/
function.
There had been, it was realized, by the late
1760’s, a sudden expansion in the number of
customs agents in the colonial government.
Benjamin Franklin (right) explained how the
agents who were sent were “generally
strangers to the provinces they are sent to
govern, have no estate, natural connection,
or relation there to give them an affection for
the country…”
Furthermore, Franklin explained: “they come
only to make money as fast as they can; are
sometimes men of vicious characters and
broken fortunes, sent by a minister merely to
get them out of the way”.
In fact, the increase in customs agents had begun as far back as the Seven
Years War:
Wartime Orders in Council issued during the conflict demanded a
stricter enforcement of the Navigation Laws (i.e. laws that regulated
colonial trade), thus necessitating more customs agents to enforce the
laws.
The number of customs agents sent to the colonies multiplied with the
passage of the Sugar Act in 1764.
The American Board of Customs Commissioners, which was created
in 1767, was authorized to create as many “under officers” as they
pleased.
In short, all of these developments could be seen to have provided for an
almost incredible number of “inferior officers” (i.e. customs agents), most of
whom the colonists believed to be “wretches…of such infamous characters that
the merchants cannot possible think their interest safe under their care.”
Colonists’ attitude toward customs agents
• Most colonists viewed the new Board of
Customs Commissioners as leeches since their
salaries would be paid from the very duties they
were sent to collect.
• The customs agents/commissioners were
perceived as “a set of idle drones,” as well as
“lazy, proud, worthless pensioners and
placemen.”
Colonists’ attitudes toward customs agents contd.
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“The Birth of the Republic: 1763-1789” (p.37):
“It was not that the colonists objected to a more efficient enforcement
of the Navigation Acts. In 1768, as we have seen, they were still ready
to admit Parliament’s right to regulate their trade for the benefit of the
mother country; and while they would scarcely welcome anyone who
interfered with smuggling, they would not deny that England had a
right to interfere. But the New Commission was not there simply to
enforce the old Navigation Acts. It was there to collect the revenue
which Townshend had promised Parliament from America. If the men
chosen for this purpose had been saints, they would still have been
unpopular in New England. Unfortunately the commissioners who
descended on Boston in November 1767 bore no resemblance to
saints. They were a rapacious band of bureaucrats who brought to
their task an irrepressible greed and a vindictive malice that could not
fail to aggravate the antagonism not only against themselves but also
against the Parliament that sent them”
The danger(s) of royal patronage:
Perhaps more serious, the new Board of Customs Commissioners revealed a deeper constitutional
danger, especially since the royal ministry possessed the exclusive authority to fill these newly created
offices and posts.
Since the crown and its ministers had appointive powers, they controlled who occupied these posts
(and, thus, who benefited from the salary and pensions that came with these posts).
The crown and its ministers used their appointive power(s) to enhance their influence over the
members of Parliament who hoped to reward their own political supporters and friends by getting them
appointed to these newly created positions.
The only way the members of Parliament could hope to get their own supporters and friends appointed
to these positions was if they gratified or indulged the interests of the person(s) who possessed the
appointive power(s).
One of the most effective ways members of Parliament could demonstrate their loyalty to the crown
and its ministers was through compliance and support of the various initiatives of the crown and its
ministers.
Thus the crown and its ministers used the offering(s) of these posts to distract the members of
Parliament (who became pre-occupied with winning the favor of the crown and its ministers) while
slowly increasing their own power and influence (at the expense of Parliament (who was too preoccupied with winning favor to either notice or care).
• It was in the best interest of the customs agents occupying the
offices/posts within the Board of Customs Commissioners (if they
wished to keep their pensions/salaries) to concur in all the crown’s
measures, especially since they held those offices only at will of the
crown.
• For this reason, colonists viewed these customs agents and
officeholders as instruments of power, manipulated by the crown to
serve its will.
• The colonists further believed these customs agents were parasitic
officeholders, thoroughly corrupted by their obligations to those who
had appointed them—officeholders who would strive to distinguish
themselves by their zeal in defending and promoting measures
which they knew beyond all question to be in violation of the rights
and interests of the colonists as well as destructive to the true
interests of their country.
• Colonists believed these officeholders (customs agents) served only
one purpose: to “serve the ambitious purposes of great men at
home [i.e. the crown and the ministry].”
• A wise and prudent customs official would realize how crucial it was
to please the powerful and how dangerous to provoke them—that
compliance/submissive behavior would obtain a favorable attention.
James Wilson noted the political/constitutional danger presented by these new customs agents:
“The crown will take advantage of every opportunity of extending its prerogative [right or privilege] in
opposition to the privileges of the people, [and] that it is the interest of those who have pensions or
offices at will from the crown to concur in all its measures”.
Remember: the more power (control) the crown has over the people, the less freedom (control)
they have over themselves. If people are not diligent/vigilant in protecting/defending their rights
and freedoms, governments may easily increase their power and control.
The customs agents were described as “baneful harpies” and were perceived as instruments (i.e. puppets)
of royal power/prerogative who would/could upset the balance of the British constitution by extending the
influence of the crown and its ministers far beyond its former limits.
In the end, this extension of executive patronage, based on a limitless support of government through
colonial taxation, was viewed as very dangerous.
Resentment and fear of the extension of patronage offices (i.e. plural/multiple office holding) in the colonies.
(1.) The crown and its ministers
Used the offering of these
Posts and offices to
Distract members of
Parliament while they
Slowly began to increase their
Power and influence.
Furthermore, Parliament was
Being corrupted through its
Obsession with extravagance
(i.e. all they seemed to care about
Was winning favor and being rewarded)
How royal
patronage enabled
the crown/ministry
to usurp the
supposed
independent
powers of the
Parliament
(2.) Since the crown and its
Ministers had appointive
Powers, they controlled
Who filled these new
Positions; this power was
Used to enhance their
influence over members
Of Parliament to increase
Their power at the expense
Of Parliament
(3.) In order to gain influence
ith the crown and to win its
favor (and thus to be
rewarded with these position
along with the salaries and pensions
that went with them, members of
Parliament and other officials in
government had to demonstrate
their loyalty to the crown—through
compliance/support of its initiatives..
It wasn’t just the constitutional danger presented by
the new Board of Customs Commissioners, but
the method(s) used to collect the taxes.
The Usual method for tax collection
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These customs agents were
susceptible to a more lucrative kind
of graft (i.e. acquiring $ through
immoral/illegal means):
For example, violations of the Sugar Act
were punishable by seizure of the
offending vessel and cargo
caught/suspected of smuggling.
Both the vessel and the cargo would be
sold and the proceeds divided into
thirds:
1/3 went to the English treasury
1/3 went to the colonial governor
within whose jurisdiction the
seizure was made.
1/3 went to the customs
officer responsible for seizure
To an enterprising officer bent on
amassing a fortune, the prospect of
making as many seizures as possible
was inviting.
This was perceived as a racket to the
colonists.
Usual method used by tax collectors contd.
(3.) seize all vessels/cargo
that were
following hitherto the policy
allowed (i.e. catch the
smugglers who were
previously getting away with it
off guard).
(1.) Follow lax procedure for
a period (i.e. don’t enforce
the Navigation laws
stringently, thus permitting
smugglers with the
opportunity to get away with
breaking the law.
(2.) Shift suddenly to a strict procedure
(i.e. begin strict enforcement of the
Navigation laws and start cracking down
on smugglers).
Usual method used by tax collectors contd.
This practice involved little risk for the collection officers/customs agents
for example, the Sugar Act (a Navigation Act) provided that customs agents were to be free from any damage suits
for mistaken seizure as long as they could show “probable cause”.
Since these cases would be tried in Admiralty courts w/o juries, civil suits brought by colonial merchants victimized by
wrongful seizures were usually thrown out; besides, such suits were often very costly and inconvenient to the one
bringing them since the Admiralty courts were far away.
Furthermore, these officials were afforded protection by British troops stationed in America and, thus, could not be
easily intimidated/threatened.
These racketeers were hated by the colonists, merchants, traders.
Right: re-enactment of an
Admiralty Court.
Another colonial grievance
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Writs of assistance: a writ (court order) issued by a superior colonial court
authorizing officers of the British crown to summon aid and enter and
search any premises (e.g. home, office, warehouse, vessel, etc.) of anyone
suspected of smuggling.
Similar to “John/Jane Doe” search warrants insofar as they did not
necessarily need to specify the places/persons to be searched and/or items
to be seized.
Such warrants could be issued upon probable cause.
Not surprisingly, colonists complained about the execution/use of writs of
assistance: “our houses, and even our bedchambers, are exposed to be
ransacked, our boxes, trunks, and chests broke open, ravaged and
plundered by wretches whom no prudent man would venture to employ
even as menial servants”.
Changes to the judiciary (1760’s)
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By the mid 1760’s, the independence
of the judiciary (crucial to the balance
of the Constitution) was being
threatened
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December 1761: Orders were sent out
from the King in Council to all colonies
permanently forbidding the issuance of
judges’ commissions anywhere on any
tenure but that of the pleasure of the
crown
Whereas life tenure was an effective
check on executive power b/c it helped
to ensure the independence of the
judiciary, judicial tenure “at the will of
the crown” would mean the bench
would be occupied by men who
depended upon the smiles of the crown
for their daily bread and the possibility
of having an independent judiciary as
an effective check upon executive
power would be lost
Furthermore, this condition was also
perceived as a threat to liberty since
the court existed in large part to define
and protect the rights of Englishmen
(including colonists)
Changes to the judiciary contd.
Originally, the Parliamentary statute of 1701 which guaranteed judges in England life tenure in their posts was
denied to the colonies because (1.) properly trained lawyers were scarce in the colonies and (2.) it was
reasoned that life appointments would prevent the replacement of ill-qualified judges by their betters if/when
they appeared.
Another reason life tenure was denied to colonial judges dealt with the fact that officials in the British
government were fearful of removing all executive control from the judiciary (remember colonial judges were
appointed by either the crown or its royally appointed colonial governors). If colonial judges, once appointed,
stayed on the bench for life and received their salaries through legislative appropriations, then it was feared
that those judges could no longer maintain their independence—rather, judges would become hopelessly
subordinate/dependent on the elected members of the legislature (and thus popular influences). In other
words, judges would no longer base their decisions on the application of the law as they interpreted it along
with the evidence presented in each case and their own sense of justice, but rather, how they decided cases
and controversies would be unduly influenced by what the majority of the citizens wanted them to rule
(remember, colonial legislators were elected representatives).
Changes to the Judiciary contd.
The whole issue involving the judiciary exploded in the early 1760’s:
1750: In NY, the judges of the Supreme Court, by a political maneuver, had managed to
secure their appointments for life
1759: The PA Assembly declared that the judges of that colony would thereafter hold their
offices by the same permanence of tenure that had been guaranteed to the judges of
England—the only problem was that the law passed by the PA Assembly was disallowed
(vetoed) by the crown.
1760: George II died; requiring the re-issuance of all crown appointments/commissions; an
unpopular and politically weak lieutenant governor in New York, determined to prevent his
enemies from controlling the courts, refused to re-commission the judges on life tenure
December, 1761: orders were sent out from the King in Council to all the colonies,
permanently forbidding the issuance of judges’ commissions anywhere on any tenure but
that of the pleasure of the crown (affected NJ, NC, Mass).
Everywhere there was bitterness at the decree and fear of its implications, for everywhere it
was known that judicial tenure “at the will of the crown” was “dangerous to the liberty and
property of the subject,” and that if the bench were occupied by “men who depended upon
the smiles of the crown for their daily bread,” the possibility of having and independent
judiciary as an effective check upon executive power would be wholly lost.
Lords North (left) and Hillsborough
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September 1767: Townshend
succeeded by Lord North as new
Chancellor of the Exchequer
January 1768: Crown created new
office: Secretariat of State (for the
colonies only); First Secretariat of
State was Lord Hillsborough (he
also served as the president of
Board of Trade by virtue of his
office as First Secretariat of State)
– Both North and Hillsborough were
committed to preserving the
supremacy of Parliament and they
were convinced that colonists were
aimed at total independence
– This conviction motivated them in
coming years and by acting on it
they eventually made it come true
The situation in Boston (Massachusetts colonial seat of government)
(3.) Massachusetts governor instructed
to dissolve assembly; assembly,
defiant, contd. as a de facto assembly
Hillsborough determined to
make an example in Boston;
he shipped 2 regiments of British
regulars to Boston (Sept. 1768);
with 2 more regiments soon to follow.
(1.) February 1768: Massachusetts
Assembly sent circular
letter to other colonies
denying Parliaments
right to tax America
(open challenge to England).
(2.) Hillsborough’s ordered
Massachusetts Assembly
to rescind letter
& other colonial assemblies
to treat it “with the contempt It
deserves” Rather, Massachusetts
Assembly voted 92-17 to refuse to
rescind it & other colonial assemblies
formally approved it.