Personality and Social Psychology Review
1999, Vol. 3, No. 4, 358-364
Copyright ( 1999 by
Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Inc.
Solomon Asch's Legacy for Group Research
John M. Levine
Department of Psychology
University of Pittsburgh
Asch's work has had a profound impact on how psychologists think about and study
social influence in groups. To appreciate this impact, we must go beyond his classic
conformity experiments and consider his broader theoreticalframework. This article
examines 4 ofAsch 's ideas that have proven to be particularly influential in later efforts to understand social influence in groups: (a) Social interaction depends on individuals' ability to represent others' positions, define themselves as members of the
same group, and regulate their behavior in terms of the norms and values ofthe group;
(b) independence is critical to effective group functioning; (c) independence and conformity are not simply mirror images that can be explained in terms of a unitary psychological process; and (d) change of meaning is an important mechanism of social
influence. Finally, Asch 's role as a theorist and researcher in the wider area of group
dynamics is considered.
In the early 1950s, Solomon Asch (1951, 1952,
1955, 1956) reported an ingenious series of experiments on social influence in groups that have since attained the status of classics and, according to Markus,
Kitayama, and Heiman (1996), are the most widely
replicated studies of all time. Today, almost half a century later, Asch's research continues to fascinate new
generations of students and stimulate new generations
of researchers.
How is Asch's research remembered by social
psychologists? When asked about the goals of this
work, most of us would probably say that Asch assumed people are quite susceptible to social influence
and that he set out to demonstrate conformity in the
laboratory. In recalling his findings, we would mention that, as Asch predicted, a high percentage of experimental participants conformed to social pressure
from a group of peers. Finally, when asked to explain
why participants conformed in Asch's studies, most
of us would probably invoke Deutsch and Gerard's
(1955) concept of normative influence, which is
based on the desire for social approval.
If Asch were alive today, how might he react to
these characterizations of his work? Probably not too
well. For one thing, Asch did not believe in the inevitability of conformity and did not set out to demon-
strate that people succumb to social influence. In fact,
his experimental paradigm (which Brown, 1965,
termed an "epistemological nightmare") was expressly designed to create a conflict between personal
and social reality and thereby increase the likelihood
that participants would respond independently.
Rather than using ambiguous stimuli, as Sherif
(1935) did in his autokinetic studies, Asch used simple perceptual stimuli on which participants had to
match the length of a standard line against the lengths
of three comparison lines. Because the discrimination
was very easy (i.e., hardly anybody made a mistake
when working alone), conformity to group pressure
meant that participants had to agree with others even
when these others were apparently wrong. Moreover,
participants in Asch's studies were not in any sense
forced to conform, as they did not receive persuasive
communications or threats from other group members. His interest in independence is also clear from
the way he described his research goals. For example,
Asch (1952) stated
Current thinking ... has taken slavish submission to
group forces as the general fact and has neglected or
implicitly denied the capacities of men for independence. ... Our present task is to observe directly the interaction between individuals and groups when the
paramount issue is that of remaining independent or
submitting to social pressure. (p. 45 1)
This article is based on a presentation in a symposium honoring
Solomon Asch at the annual meeting of the Society of Experimental
Social Psychology, Sturbridge, MA, October 1996.
Requests for reprints should be sent to John M. Levine, Department of Psychology, University of Pittsburgh, Pittsburgh,
PA 15260. E-mail: jml(vms.cis.pitt.edu.
Asch also would bridle at how his findings are
characterized. In contrast to many contemporary accounts of his data that emphasize minority members'
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ASCH'S LEGACY FOR GROUP RESEARCH
propensity to conform to a majority, his studies actually showed that minority members are quite independent.1 Asch used several measures of social
influence, including the proportion of yielding and
independent responses across all participants and the
percentage of participants who yielded or remained
independent. On the first measure, Asch (1956) found
that approximately two thirds (63.2%) of the total responses were independent, or correct.2 On the second
measure, he found that 24% of the participants were
always independent, whereas only 5% always
yielded. Now, these data do not deny that some conformity occurred. Approximately one third (36.8%)
of the total responses involved yielding to the erroneous majority, which was much larger than the percentage of incorrect responses given by control
participants who responded alone (<1%). And 27%
of the participants yielded to group pressure on 8
tol2 of the critical trials. Clearly, however, Asch
found that minority participants confronting a unanimous majority were often capable of resisting social
influence. In summarizing his results, Asch (1956)
underlined this independence, noting that
While the majority effect was considerable, it was by
no means complete, or even the strongest force at
work. The preponderance of estimates was, in each of
the experimental conditions, correct or independent of
the majority, evidence that the given stimulus conditions-the facts that were being judged-were, under
the circumstances, the most decisive. (p. 10)
Asch also found that he could increase independence rather dramatically with a simple change in procedure-namely by having a single confederate
dissent from the erroneous majority by giving correct
responses. The presence of this social supporter, or
partner, reduced the total number of yielding responses from 32% to 5.5% (Asch, 1951). The power
of social support was further demonstrated in a study
showing that participants were far more independent
when they were opposed by a seven-person majority
and had a partner than when they were opposed by a
three-person majority and did not have a partner
(Asch, 1951). In another variation, Asch (1955)
found that a dissenter from group consensus did not
need to give correct responses to increase independence-even a dissenter who was more incorrect than
' Widespread misinterpretation of Asch's conformity research has
been documented by Friend, Rafferty, and Bramel (1990). In an analysis of 99 social psychology textbooks published between 1953 and
1984, Friend et al. found a marked tendency for authors to overestimate the prevalence of conformity and underestimate the prevalence
of independence in Asch's studies.
2Because Asch's reports of his findings vary slightly from article
to article, the data reported here are based on his 1956 monograph unless otherwise indicated.
the majority substantially reduced yielding. From
these results, Asch concluded that merely breaking
group unanimity was the major cause of conformity
reduction in the social support condition (but see Allen & Levine, 1968, 1969).
Finally, Asch would resist the notion that the conformity he observed was due to normative, as opposed
to informational, influence. It is generally assumed
that informational influence is implicated in cases
where participants' actual perceptions of the experimental stimuli mirror their public responses. Because
few of Asch' s participants reported changing their perceptions of the stimuli during the group pressure situation and because subsequent studies showed that
participants' private responses after leaving the group
often differed from their public responses while in the
group, many would argue that conformity in Asch's
paradigm is based on normative influence. In contrast
to this interpretation, however, Asch (1952) reported
that most of the participants who yielded to group pressure in his studies did so because they assumed the majority was right and they were wrong (a kind of
informational influence), rather than because they
wanted to be accepted by the majority (a kind of normative influence).
That his participants showed a good deal of independence even when opposed by a unanimous majority did not surprise Asch, because, as noted earlier, he
had set out to study independence as well as yielding.
If anything, he was surprised by how much conformity
he found. In seeking to understand Asch's views on
conformity and independence, it is helpful to recall the
theoretical ideas that stimulated his research. In his
1952 book, Social Psychology, he argued that social
existence rests on two universal axioms- first, that the
physical surroundings are open to inspection by all
people, and second, that psychological functions, such
as perception and memory, operate the same way in all
people. These axioms imply that everyone has access
to a common reality, and hence we are in a position to
help one another apprehend this reality. To the extent
we do so, Asch argued, we will develop shared
thoughts, feelings, and actions, which are the basis of
group life. According to Asch (1952)
The capacity to perceive a situation that includes others and ourselves and to perceive others as referring
themselves to the same situation 'is the first requirement for the formation of a social field, of a group relation at the psychological level. (p. 162)
Although perceptual similarity across people is necessary for creating a mutually shared field, perceptual
differences can also be productive because they help us
see the limitations in our own points of view. This only
works, however, if we believe there are reasonable
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LEVINE
grounds for these differences, such as diverse perspectives on the stimulus. The bottom line is that, because
people are involved in cooperative efforts to understand the world, they have a responsibility both to
assert their own viewpoint, which involves independence, and to pay attention to others' viewpoints, which
can lead to conformity. Thus, rather than viewing conformity as deriving from irrational tendencies, Asch
saw it as a fundamentally rational response. Because
others have often provided valuable information in the
past and because everyone in the current group is responding to the same stimulus, this tendency to reach
consensus is altogether natural-what Asch (1952)
called "a dynamic requirement of the situation" (p.
484). It is important to note that he did not argue that
conformity always produces a valid, or correct, response. Rather, Asch (1952) suggested that a consensual response is valid only if "each individual asserts
his own relation to facts and retains his individuality;
there can be no genuine agreement about facts or principles unless each adheres to the testimony of his experience and steadfastly maintains his hold on reality" (p.
494). Stated differently, conformity is socially useful
only if it is based on independence.
Asch's theoretical and empirical work has profoundly affected how social psychologists think
about and study social influence in groups. Since the
1950s, hundreds of studies have sought to clarify the
conditions under which people do and do not succumb to group pressure (for reviews, see Allen, 1965;
Levine & Russo, 1987; Levine & Thompson, 1996).
It is noteworthy that, among the variables that have
received the most attention, several were originally
studied by Asch. These include the relative sizes of
the majority and minority, the extremity of the majority's responses, the minority's response mode (public
vs. private), and the characteristics of the stimulus.
So, in addition to stimulating general interest in social influence, Asch channeled subsequent work in
particular directions. Research on the relative sizes of
the majority and minority has been especially productive. For example, investigators such as Latane and
Wolf (1981), Tanford and Penrod (1984), and Wilder
(1978) have shed considerable light on how
one-person minorities respond to disagreement from
majorities of varying sizes. Allen (1975) and his colleagues also have clarified the psychological mechanisms that underlie the ability of two-person
minorities to resist majority pressure (the social support effect).
Of course, subsequent work on social influence in
groups has not been restricted to variables that Asch
initially studied, and many investigators have abandoned his face-to-face methodology for others that
are easier to implement. To appreciate Asch's impact,
we must go beyond studies that used his paradigm
and consider the influence of his broader theoretical
framework, which was spelled out most clearly in his
1952 book. Four of his ideas have proven to be particularly important. One is that social interaction depends on individuals' ability to represent others'
positions as well as their own, see themselves as
members of the same group, and regulate their behavior in terms of the norms and values of the group.
The second is that independence is critical to effective group functioning. The third is that independence
and conformity are not simply mirror images that can
be explained in terms of a unitary psychological process. Finally, the fourth is that an important mechanism of social influence involves changing the
meaning of the stimulus.
The first idea, that social interaction is based on
individuals' ability to represent others' positions, define themselves as members of the same group, and
to use the norms and values of the group as guides for
behavior, is reflected in several lines of contemporary
research. It has found expression, for example, in two
related and influential theories of group behavior: social identity theory and self-categorization theory. As
Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, and Wetherell (1987)
noted, the social identity concept can be viewed as a
specification of Asch' s idea that people can
cognitively represent the group as a whole, and
self-categorization theory can be seen as offering a
detailed explanation of how the representation of the
group is brought into existence and then regulates
members' behavior. This behavioral regulation has
been specified most clearly in the case of social influence (e.g., Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Turner, 1991).
An important aspect of Asch's position regarding
the relation between social and cognitive processes is
his view that people, through cooperative efforts, arrive at a shared understanding of the world and thereby
construct social reality. Contemporary research on social reality that owes an obvious debt to Asch includes
Ickes, Stinson, Bissonnette, and Garcia's (1990) work
on intersubjectivity; Hardin and Higgins's (1996)
work on shared reality; and Weick and Roberts's
(1993) work on collective mind in organizations (for
reviews, see Levine & Higgins, in press; Levine,
Resnick, & Higgins, 1993). Weick and Roberts's
(1993) research is particularly noteworthy because it
(and related work on team mental models) takes seriously an often overlooked aspect of Asch's position-namelfy, that shared understanding facilitates
group performance. As Asch (1952) noted
There are group actions that are possible only when
each participant has a representation that includes the
actions of others and their relations. The respective actions converge relevantly, assist and supplement each
other only when the joint situation is represented in
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ASCH'S LEGACY FOR GROUP RESEARCH
each and when the representations are structurally similar. Only when these conditions are given can individuals subordinate themselves to the requirements of
joint action. (p. 251)
Asch' s second important idea, that independence is
critical to group functioning, reflects his belief in the
utility of disagreement as a stimulus to thinking. Asch
(1952) argued, for example, that
The other is capable of arousing in me a doubt that
would otherwise not occur to me. ... In this way, the
limitations of my individual thinking are transcended
by including the thoughts of others. I am now open to
more alternatives than my own unaided comprehension would make possible (pp. 131-132)
This beneficent view of conflict is reflected in contemporary work on how sociocognitive conflict (e.g.,
Doise & Mugny, 1984; Perret-Clermont, 1980) and
controversy (e.g., Johnson & Johnson, 1989) can enhance individual learning and how dialectical inquiry
and devil' s advocacy can improve group decision making (e.g., Janis, 1982; Schwenk, 1990). It is perhaps
most evident in recent efforts to understand the impact
of minority influence on both individual members and
the group as a whole. For example, Moscovici (1976,
1985) argued that resolute minorities are necessary for
innovation and social change to occur, and Nemeth
(1986, 1995) argued that such minorities produce divergent thinking and creativity on the part of majority
members.
Asch's views about the utility of independence are
quite compatible with those of minority influence
theorists. Both assume that independence on the part
of some group members stimulates thinking on the
part of others, which in turn increases the probability
of reaching a valid conclusion. But the two positions
are not identical, particularly in regard to the motives
that underlie independence. According to Asch, people maintain independent positions because they want
the group to achieve a correct consensus, and they are
willing to abandon their positions if evidence suggests they are wrong. This kind of independence,
then, is group oriented, cooperative, and openminded. In contrast, according to some minority influence theorists (particularly Moscovici,), people
maintain independent positions because they are sure
they are right and because they want to prevail. To do
so, they must doggedly maintain a consistent viewpoint, which precludes the possibility of altering, let
alone abandoning, their position. This kind of independence, then, is self-oriented, competitive, and
closed-minded.
Clearly, both kinds of independence can be useful
for groups, but they are likely to produce different in-
teraction patterns as well as outcomes. Compared to
Asch's brand of independence, Moscovici's brand is
likely to elicit more interpersonal conflict and a
stronger "us versus them" mentality as group members seek to solve problems and reach decisions. This
hostile group climate, in turn, may reduce the likelihood that members listen to one another's arguments,
move toward one another's positions, and adhere to
collective decisions after they are made. Perhaps
most groups would benefit from forms of independence that combine elements of cooperation (Asch)
and competition (Moscovici), such as the "flexible"
minorities studied by Mugny (1982).
Asch's third influential idea is that conformity and
independence are not simply two sides of the same
coin, both explicable in terms of a single psychological process. Instead, he argued that conformity can be
produced by three processes and resistance by two. In
the case of conformity, people can yield due to distortion of perception (with no awareness of influence), distortion of judgment (based on low
confidence and the assumption the group is correct),
and distortion of action (based on desire to be accepted by the group). In the case of resistance, people
can show independence of confidence (based on the
capacity to withstand doubts and loneliness) and independence without confidence (based on the felt obligation to report one's perceptions accurately despite
low confidence). Although Asch found little evidence
of yielding at the perceptual level, his discussion of
this possibility (in conjunction with his work on
change of meaning effects) alerted later researchers
to the possibility that social influence can occur at
different levels and can therefore have different consequences for public and private responses. Attention
has been given to public versus private forms of majority influence (e.g., Allen, 1965; Nail, 1986) and to
the differential impact of majority and minority influence on public and private responses. For example,
both Moscovici and Nemeth argued that majority and
minority influence are mediated by different underlying processes and have different consequences. According to Moscovici (1976, 1985), majorities
produce compliance (public influence), whereas minorities produce conversion (private influence). According to Nemeth (1986, 1995), majorities produce
convergent thinking, whereas minorities produce divergent thinking. A recent meta-analysis by Wood,
Lundgren, Ouellette, Busceme, and Blackstone
(1994) found that there are indeed differences in the
kinds of influence that majorities and minorities produce, but whether these differences derive from qualitatively different underlying processes is still open to
question. It is worth underlining the fact that Asch
not only argued that conformity and yielding have
different causes but that each of them has more than
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one cause. He thus believed that social influence may
be more complex than simple dual-process models
suggest, a point that has been developed recently by
several authors, including Kruglanski and Mackie
(1990), Eagly and Chaiken (1993), Perez and Mugny
(1996), and Wood (1999).
Finally, Asch' s fourth idea, that social pressure can
produce a change of meaning in the stimulus under
consideration, is not typically discussed in reviews of
his work on conformity'and independence. However,
in a little-cited article, Asch (1940) found evidence that
social pressure can indeed affect the meaning of a stimulus-in this study, participants described politicians
differently after learning that peers agreed or disagreed
with their evaluation of this profession. Asch (1940)
concluded that participants who received agreement or
disagreement differed "not in the way they judged the
same group of people, but in the groups they chose to
judge" (p. 438). It is understandable that Asch did not
highlight this explanation when discussing his studies
on lengths of lines, because these simple perceptual
stimuli were unlikely to undergo change of meaning as
a result of majority pressure. The closest he came was
when he mentioned yielding at the "perceptual" level,
for which he found little evidence.
Subsequent investigators, however, have explicitly
studied change of meaning in the context of conformity, and they have obtained some intriguing findings. For example, Allen and Wilder (1980) found
that when people learn that a unanimous group of
peers disagrees with their position on an opinion
statement, they cognitively restructure the meaning of
the statement, which in turn increases their likelihood
of conforming to the group. Moreover, the presence
of a social supporter can prevent this restructuring.
More recent work has also indicated that majority
pressure can lead to cognitive restructuring of a stimulus, with the goal of integrating divergent judgments
about it (e.g., Butera, Huguet, Mugny, & Perez,
1994). Finally, Griffin and Buehler (1993; Buehler &
Griffin, 1994) have demonstrated that changes in
stimulus meaning can follow, rather than precede,
conformity, perhaps as a means of justifying this
behavior.
Having examined four of Asch's ideas that have
been particularly influential in later efforts to understand social influence in groups, I will conclude by
making a few comments about his role as a theorist
and researcher in the area of group dynamics. At the
theoretical level, Asch tackled some of the most important and difficult problems of group behavior and
offered incisive analyses of the role that groups play
in human affairs. In addition to his keen interest in
how groups modify and distort individuals' judgments, Asch (1952) sought to answer such questions
as
* How do people construct mutually shared
fields, which form the basis of all social interaction?
* How does cooperation develop in groups and
what functions does in play?
* How does social interaction create socialfacts,
that is, objects, roles, and relations that make
sense only in terms of their social setting and
function?
* What role do cultural groups play in emotional
expression?
* How do people form impressions of groups?
* How can we understand both the distinctiveness and inseparability of the group and the individual?
Three of Asch's assertions about groups deserve
special mention because of their relevance to contemporary work on group processes. One assertion, mentioned earlier, is that shared understanding is a
necessary precondition for group action in general
and effective group performance in particular. The
notion that "collective thinking is for collective doing" is the fundamental assumption underlying the
burgeoning interest in how shared mental models affect team performance (Klimoski & Mohammed,
1994; Weick & Roberts, 1993). A second important
assertion is that group phenomena have emergent
properties, that is, "group action is real, having laws
that are often not reducible to those of its components
taken singly" (Asch, 1952, p. 263). This notion is embraced by many group researchers who believe that
group phenomena arise through social interaction and
therefore laws of group behavior are not reducible to
laws of individual behavior. Asch's third important
assertion is that emotions, as well as cognitions, play
an important role in groups. He argued that the
shared understandings that underlie joint action have
affective, as well as cognitive, components. To succeed, group members must reach an emotional consensus about their goals and needs, as well as a
cognitive consensus about the properties of the environment and one another (Asch, 1959). Contemporary group researchers are showing an increasing
interest in how emotions influence group processes
(e.g., Hogg, 1993; Mackie & Hamilton, 1993;
Ridgeway & Johnson, 1990).
In spite of Asch's theoretical contributions concerning groups, his empirical work focused rather
narrowly on the issue of social influence, and his experimental paradigm was not designed to investigate
social interaction among group members. Thus, notwithstanding his evident interest in groups, Asch's
experimental work was devoid of any explicit attention to group processes. Instead, he was content to investigate how a naive participant's responses to
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simple perceptual stimuli were influenced by the
presence of several strangers, who remained passive
save to offer unanimously incorrect responses to the
same stimuli. This is a kind of group situation to be
sure, but not as rich a group situation as many contemporary researchers like to study. One can lament
Asch's apparent lack of interest in group interaction,
but one is hard pressed to identify many other
"group" researchers who have left as enduring an intellectual legacy.
In conclusion, it is hard to exaggerate the impact
of Solomon Asch's work on the field of group dynamics. Although his empirical studies may strike
some group researchers as too constrained, his theoretical writings reveal an acute sensitivity to the
range of effects that groups can have on their members. Much has been learned in the years since Asch
published his groundbreaking studies, but there is
still substantial work to do in answering what he
termed the "essential problem of social psychology-how individuals create the reality of groups and
how the latter control their further actions" (1952, p.
256). Those who wish to address this critical question
can find both inspiration and guidance in Asch' s
writings.
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