THE ECONOMIC
IN
DECLINE
MEDIEVAL
Nancy
W.
OF
THE CHURCH
ENGLAND
Clegg
B.A. (Hons.) (Economics), Simon Fraser University 1990
THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
in the
,Department of Economics
@ Nancy W. Clegg 1991
SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY
July 1991
All rights reserved. This work may not be
reproduced in whole or in part, by photocopy
or other means, without permission of the author.
APPROVAL
Name :
Nancy W. Clegg
Degree :
M.A. (Economics)
Title of Thesis:
The Economic Decline of the Church
in Medieval England
~xaminingCommittee:
Chairman :
DrATerry Heaps
- .
Senior Supervisor
r
-
.-
Dr. ~qlhnF. Chant
,
D;. S. Easton
Prof =sor
.,
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w i t h o u t my w r i t t e n permlsslon.
T 1 t i e o f Thes 1 s/Project/Extended Essay
The Economic Decline of the Church in Medieval Enal and
Author :
(signature)
Nancv W. Cleqg
( name 1
July 18, 1991
(date 1
.
1
ABSTRACT
The r i s e o f t h e n a t i o n s t a t e i n E n g l a n d a c c o m p a n i e d not!
o n l y t h e decay of t h e manorial system, b u t a l s o t h e economic
d e c l i n e o f t h e m e d i e v a l E n g l i s h Church.
T h i s t h e s i s examines
t h e d e c l i n e o f t h e Roman C a t h o l i c C h u r c h i n E n g l a n d f r o m 1350
t o
1536.
Borrowing
literature,
building
this
from
thesis
and product
the
develops
industrial
a
model
quality consistent
organization
of
with
reputation
the
English
e x p e r i e n c e i n t h e l a t e r Middle Ages.
T h i s t h e s i s c o n t e n d s t h a t t h e d e c l i n e o f t h e C h u r c h was
p r e c i p i t a t e d by t h e Crown's a t t a c k s on t h e m o n a s t e r i e s which
c u l m i n a t e d i n t h e D i s s o l u t i o n o f 1536-1540.
The m o n a s t e r i e s
r e s p o n d e d t o t h e s e a t t a c k s by r e d u c i n g t h e a m o u n t o f
alms
t h e y d i s t r i b u t e d from t h e o f f e r i n g s c o l l e c t e d from t h e l a i t y .
While t h i s
retrenchment h a s been
widely viewed by
social
h i s t o r i a n s a s a moral d e c a y i n t h e f a b r i c o f t h e Church, t h i s
t h e s i s c l a i m s t h a t i t was s i m p l y t h e r a t i o n a l r e s p o n s e o f a
wealth-maximizing f i r m t o a t h r e a t t o i t s f u t u r e e x i s t e n c e .
C o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h i s a p p r o a c h i s t h e o b s e r v a t i o n t h a t as
Church
sLpport
for
the
poor
declined,
the
state
assumed
r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r p o o r r e l i e f a n d t h e care of t h e s i c k a n d
aged.
By 1 6 0 1 , t h e C h u r c h n o l o n g e r p l a y e d a n y p a r t i n t h e
p r o v i s i o n of
social services,
s t a t e i n E n g l a n d was c o m p l e t e .
iii
and t h e
rise o f
the nation
TABLE
OF
CONTENTS
Page
Chapter
Approval Page
Abstract
iii
L i s t of F i g u r e s
Introduction
The Church a s a F i r m
A Model o f t h e Church
The Economic D e c l i n e o f t h e E n g l i s h
C h u r c h , 1350-1536
42
The D e c l i n e of t h e Church i n W e s t e r n
Europe
61
Conclusion
71
Appendices
74
References
86
LIST
OF
FIGURES
Page
Figure
1
S t a t e S p a c e Diagram
2
Percentage D i s t r i b u t i o n of Bequests,
1480-1600
39
51
R e l i g i o u s and S e c u l a r Donations,
1480-1600
W e a l t h a n d S p i r i t u a l Income R a n k i n g s ,
b y County
54
55
INTRODUCTION
The r i s e of t h e n a t i o n s t a t e i n England has long e x c i t e d
t h e i n t e r e s t of economic h i s t o r i a n s .
most p a r t ,
Discussion h a s ,
for the
c e n t e r e d on t h e d e c l i n e of t h e manorial system and
t h e t r a n s f e r of t h e r o l e of domestic p r o t e c t o r from t h e l o r d
t o the state.l
But t h i s t e l l s o n l y h a l f t h e s t o r y .
h i g h Middle Ages,
In t h e
t h e r e was a t r i p a r t i t e d i v i s i o n of power:
t h e monarch p r o v i d e d p r o t e c t i o n from e x t e r n a l t h r e a t s ;
l o r d provided j u s t i c e ,
the
and p r o t e c t i o n from i n t e r n a l t h r e a t s ;
and t h e Roman C a t h o l i c Church i n England m a i n t a i n e d s o c i a l
order
through
charity.
the
provision
The o t h e r h a l f
nation s t a t e , therefore,
of
of
the
religious
s t o r y of
the
services
and
r i s e of
the
i s about t h e d e c l i n e of t h e Church
a s a power i n e a r l y English s o c i e t y .
The e a r l y medieval Church was a u b i q u i t o u s presence which
wielded c o n s i d e r a b l e economic power.
as
" t h e g r e a t e s t of p o l i t i c a l
R.H.
Tawney d e s c r i b e s it
institutions".
(24)
Douglass
North l i k e n s t h e Church t o a s t a t e
w i t h t h e pope a s r u l e r and a v a s t b u r e a u c r a c y
through which t h e pope amassed wealth and power and
agents
( a r c h b i s h o p s and b i s h o p s )
themselves
siphoned o f f r i c h e s and became r i c h and p o w e r f u l .
(125)
See, for example, North and Thomas (1973).
But t h e m e d i e v a l C h u r c h was more l i k e a f i r m w h i c h s o l d two
products:
r e l i g i o u s s e r v i c e s a n d income i n s u r a n c e .
Parish
p r i e s t s s o l d r e l i g i o u s s e r v i c e s such a s worship and baptisms.
Monks,
with
their
vows
of
celibacy
and
poverty,
were
e n t r u s t e d w i t h t h e c o l l e c t i o n o f o f f e r i n g s from p a r i s h i o n e r s .
I n r e t u r n t h e y s u p p l i e d income i n s u r a n c e i n t h e f o r m o f p o o r
relief,
1350,
care o f t h e s i c k a n d a g e d , a n d h o s p i t a l i t y .
t h e Church w a s h i g h l y s u c c e s s f u l ,
areas of
England and broadening
however,
losing
foundations.
the
e x p a n d i n g i n t o new
its market.
After
1350,
t h e m o n a s t i c a r m o f t h e C h u r c h went i n t o d e c l i n e ,
gradually
of
Prior t o
market
its
share
to
private
charitable
By 1 5 3 6 when Henry V I I I b e g a n t h e D i s s o l u t i o n
monasteries,
the
insurance
side
of
the
Church's
business was v i r t u a l l y defunct.
S o c i a l h i s t o r i a n s have s t u d i e d t h e D i s s o l u t i o n of t h e
monasteries i n great d e t a i l .
There i s widespread agreement
t h a t t h e m o n a s t e r i e s h a d f a l l e n i n t o m o r a l d e c a y a n d were
c o l l e c t i n g h u g e sums o f money b u t n o t f u l f i l l i n g t h e i r d u t y
t o succour t h e poor and t h e aged.
W.K.
Jordan w r i t e s :
This
long
and
inexorable
process
of
the
..
d e t e r i o r a t i o n o f monasticism w a s f a r advanced
p e r h a p s most d r a m a t i c a l l y s o i n England where,
almost a generation p r i o r t o t h e Dissolution, t h e
f a b r i c w a s i n d e c a y [ a n d ] c o n t r i b u t i o n s were d r y i n g
up.. . (58)
.
Dom David Knowles n o t e s :
Not o n l y a t t h e e p o c h o f t h e D i s s o l u t i o n , b u t f o r
an undefined and very long period previously, t h e
monks a n d c a n o n s o f E n g l a n d , w i t h a f e w n o t a b l e
e x c e p t i o n s , h a d b e e n l i v i n g on a s c a l e o f p e r s o n a l
comfort and corporate magnificence, and with a
v a r i e t y o f r e c e i p t s and expenses of a l l kinds,
w h i c h were n e i t h e r n e c e s s a r y f o r , n o r c o n s i s t e n t
with, t h e f a s h i o n of l i f e i n d i c a t e d by t h e i r r u l e
and e a r l y i n s t i t u t i o n s .
(256)
Even
A.
Hamilton
Thompson,
an
obvious
apologist
for
the
Church, o b s e r v e s :
I n such matters it i s dangerous t o g e n e r a l i z e and
very easy t o be censorious, and t h e r e is nothing
more m i s l e a d i n g t h a n t o a p p l y t h e m o r a l s t a n d a r d s
of a later age t o t h e shortcomings o f medieval
r e l i g i o n . . . . I t i s i m p o s s i b l e , however, t o e s c a p e
t h e conclusion t h a t English monasteries i n t h e
f i f t e e n t h c e n t u r y needed s p i r i t u a l quickening t o
j u s t i f y t h e i r e x i s t e n c e a s a whole.
(176-77)
B u t s o c i a l h i s t o r i a n s h a v e n o t a s k e d why t h e m o n a s t e r i e s f e l l
f o c u s s i n g i n s t e a d on how m o r a l d e g e n e r a c y l e d t o
i n t o decay,
the Dissolution.
And t o d a t e ,
economic h i s t o r i a n s have n o t
a s k e d why e i t h e r .
This paper addresses t h e question of
decline of
what
led to the
t h e monasteries p r i o r t o t h e Dissolution.
It
a r g u e s t h a t t h e m o n a s t e r i e s were i n f a c t w e a l t h - m a x i m i z i n g
firms
which
threats.
reacted
rationally
Sensing t h e
approach
to
a
series
of
the
of
external
Dissolution,
they
withdrew from t h e i n s u r a n c e b u s i n e s s , b u t n o t b e f o r e r e a p i n g
a windfall profit
from t h e i r customers,
the parishioners.
This retrenchment
represented an abdication
of
t h e Church
f r o m i t s p o s i t i o n o f power, h e l d by v i r t u e o f i t s m a i n t e n a n c e
of
s o c i a l o r d e r i n England.
monasteries,
but
he
did
Thus Henry V I I I d i s s o l v e d t h e
not
usurp
monasteries had a l r e a d y surrendered it.
their
power.
The
S e c t i o n I o f t h i s paper examines t h e s t r u c t u r e of t h e
C h u r c h a n d a r g u e s t h a t i n i t s o p e r a t i o n s a n d b e h a v i o u r it w a s
i n f a c t i n d i s t i n g u i s h a b l e f r o m what e c o n o m i s t s would s u g g e s t
is c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of
Section
building
I1 r e v i e w s
a
the
and product
modern-day
economic
quality,
profit-maximizing
l i t e r a t u r e on
reputation
a model
and develops
firm.
of
a
monastery c o n s i s t e n t w i t h t h e behaviour observed i n t h e later
Middle Ages.
Section
I11 p r o v i d e s
a
test
of
t h e model,
a p p l y i n g it t o t h e E n g l i s h e x p e r i e n c e from t h e
century t o t h e
are
set
out
conclusions.
late
13th
iss solution.
Suggestions f o r f u r t h e r research
in
IV,
Section
and
Section
V
provides
THE
CHURCH AS
FIRM
A
The m e d i e v a l E n g l i s h C h u r c h w a s
maximizing
firm
with
religious
branches
l i k e a wealth-
specializing
in
two
Its secular branch s o l d s e v e r a l types
d i v e r s i f i e d products.
of
two
much
services
to
both
the
laity
and
I n i t i a l l y u n d e r t h e d i r e c t a u t h o r i t y o f Rome,
the
Crown.
in the early
1 4 t h c e n t u r y c o n t r o l was g r a d u a l l y wrested f r o m t h e p o p e b y
t h e E n g l i s h c l e r g y a n d t h e monarch.
the
s e c u l a r arm o f
By t h e l a t e Middle Ages,
t h e C h u r c h r e s e m b l e d more
a
franchise
operation than a branch p l a n t .
The m o n a s t i c a r m o f t h e Church s o l d income i n s u r a n c e i n
t h e form o f poor r e l i e f , h o s p i t a l i t y and c a r e of t h e s i c k and
W h i l e r e l i g i o u s o r d e r s were l e g i t i m i z e d d i r e c t l y b y
aged.
t h e pope,
t h e a c t u a l b u s i n e s s o f e a c h m o n a s t e r y was d i r e c t e d
by i t s own s e n i o r monks.
fine division of
supervise
sizable
W i t h i n e a c h m o n a s t e r y , t h e r e was a
l a b o u r b e t w e e n b r o t h e r s who o f t e n h a d t o
staffs
of
servants.
With
m o n a s t e r i e s i n E n g l a n d i n t h e h i g h M i d d l e Ages,
over
1,000
t h i s arm o f
t h e Church e x e r t e d a p o w e r f u l i n f l u e n c e i n s o c i e t y .
T h i s s e c t i o n examines t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e s t r u c t u r e and
o u t p u t o f t h e Church,
therein.
i t s market and t h e revenue g e n e r a t e d
I t i s a r g u e d t h a t t h e m e d i e v a l C a t h o l i c Church,
a l l i m p o r t a n t r e s p e c t s , w a s t h e same a s a modern-day f i r m .
in
The Secular Church
A.
The medieval English Church was divided into two parts:
one half - the secular arm - sold religious services while
the other - the monastic arm - sold income i n s u r a n ~ e . ~The
secular arm offered a wide range of services, the most common
being religious worship on Sundays, feast days and saints'
days.
The bulk of these ceremonies was performed in local
churches by the most lowly of the secular clergy, the parish
priest.
Estimates suggest that there were about 9,500 active
parish churches in England in 1291, but only 8,800 in 1535.
(Swanson, 4)
The decline in numbers is generally attributed
to depopulation caused by the Black Death in the mid-14th
century.
Parish priests also offered a variety of other
services
including
marriage
ceremonies,
baptisms
and
funerals, and services for the purification of women after
childbearing.
Above the parish priest in the hierarchy of the Church
were archdeacons, bishops and, at the top, the Archbishops of
Canterbury
and
of
Y ~ r k . In
~
addition
to
playing
-
I t i s common i n t h e l i t e r a t u r e on t h e Church f o r t h e c l e r g y who
performed t h e s p i r i t u a l f u n c t i o n s t o be c a l l e d " t h e s e c u l a r c l e r g y " and
t h e monks who a t t e n d e d t o m a t e r i a l m a t t e r s s u c h a s p o o r r e l i e f and
h o s p i t a l i t y t o be c a l l e d " t h e r e l i g i o u s " .
The i r o n y of t h i s usage s e e m s
t o have e s c a p e d w r i t e r s of e c c l e s i a s t i c a l h i s t o r y .
T h i s d e s c r i p t i o n i s a n o v e r s i m p l i f i c a t i o n of t h e Church h i e r a r c h y .
T h e r e w e r e many o t h e r o f f i c e r s of t h e Church - c u r a t e s , cannons, d e a n s
a n d d e a c o n s t o name b u t a few.
See Swanson, C h a p t e r 1 a n d Rodes,
C h a p t e r 4 f o r a more d e t a i l e d t r e a t m e n t o f t h e Church a d m i n i s t r a t i v e
structure.
administrative roles, archdeacons and bishops presided over
domestic ecclesiastical courts.
Ecclesiastical courts had
jurisdiction over crimes of morality like slander and sexual
misbehaviour, as well as the more serious infanticide and
heresy.
Claims of non-payment of tithes or of petty debts as
well as all probate matters were also heard in these c o ~ r t s . ~
(Swanson, 142)
Appeals of decisions made in the lower courts
could be made to the Archbishop's court or to the papal court
in Rome, although this rarely occurred.
(Swanson 160)
Bishops and archbishops also possessed limited powers of
dispensation from ecclesiastical law.
Dispensations were
typically granted to the laity for consanguinity or the
placement of altars in private homes15 and to the clergy for
ordination despite illegitimacy or for non-residence from
their
living^.^
One of the most famous dispensations was that
granted to Henry VIII so he could marry his brother's widow.
(Swanson, 16)
The Church also provided the monarch with consulting
services and clerical help.
In the early Middle Ages, only
I n g e n e r a l , r o y a l and m a n o r i a l c o u r t s w e r e r e s t r i c t e d t o h e a r i n g
It i s curious t h a t
crimes of v i o l e n c e a g a i n s t p r o p e r t y and person.
i n f a n t i c i d e was o m i t t e d from l a y j u r i s d i c t i o n .
I t h a s been s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e Church was opposed t o t h e e x i s t e n c e of
a l t a r s i n p r i v a t e homes n o t f o r any s p i r i t u a l r e a s o n , b u t b e c a u s e t h e y
r e p r e s e n t e d a p o s s i b l e l o s s of some of t h e C h u r c h ' s p o t e n t i a l revenue.
A l i v i n g , o r b e n e f i c e , was a p r i v a t e l y endowed p o s i t i o n w i t h i n t h e
Church.
B e n e f i c e s were t h e prime s o u r c e o f p a t r o n a g e a v a i l a b l e t o t h e
pope o r s e n i o r E n g l i s h c l e r g y f o r r e w a r d i n g f a v o u r i t e s .
A particularly
d e s e r v i n g c a n d i d a t e might even w a r r a n t two o r more b e n e f i c e s , p r o v i d i n g
him w i t h a r e l a t i v e l y a f f l u e n t l i v i n g .
c l e r i c s were l i t e r a t e .
Hence t h e s t a t e employed p r i e s t s i n
many
transcribing
positions,
from
statutes
to
accounts t o p r o v i d i n g advice on p o l i t i c a l m a t t e r s .
Wolsey,
keeping
Cardinal
who o r d e r e d and s u p e r v i s e d t h e e a r l y 1 6 t h c e n t u r y
monastic s u p p r e s s i o n s , provides perhaps t h e b e s t example of a
churchman who r o s e t o a p o s i t i o n of g r e a t power i n t h e r o y a l
administration.
The c l e r g y were a l s o p a r t i c u l a r l y u s e f u l t o
A s t h e Middle
t h e s t a t e a s l i a i s o n s with t h e Church i n Rome.
Ages
progressed,
common.
educated
lay
people
were
becoming .more
By 1540, t h e Church's r o l e i n t h e s t a t e was much
l e s s s i g n i f i c a n t t h a n i t had been two hundred y e a r s e a r l i e r .
(Swanson, 103-7)
The pope occupied t h e h i g h e s t
hierarchy,
p o s s e s s i n g u n t i l t h e mid-14th
power over a l l Church m a t t e r s .
VIII
position
In f a c t ,
i n t h e Church
century absolute
i n 1302 Boniface
proclaimed i n t h e Unam Sanctum t h e s u b j e c t i o n of
s p i r i t u a l and temporal a u t h o r i t y t o papal supremacy.
I,
among
restriction
other
of
monarchs,
his
strongly
sovereignty
and
objected
thereby
all
Edward
to
this
initiated
a
c o n f l i c t between Church and Crown which would never be f u l l y
resolved.
(Ferguson, 7 )
I n 1351, t h e Crown f i r s t a l i e n a t e d
some of t h e pope's p r e r o g a t i v e w i t h t h e S t a t u t e of P r o v i s o r s
which gave t h e English Church t h e r i g h t , h i t h e r t o h e l d by t h e
papacy
alone,
to
allocate
benefices
amongst
the
clergy.
Erosion of papal supremacy continued a s t h e E n g l i s h Church,
a i d e d by t h e monarchy, d e c l a r e d i n c r e a s i n g j u r i s d i c t i o n over
papal a u t h o r i t y .
By 1450, t h e power of t h e papacy i n England
had been
reduced e s s e n t i a l l y t o g r a n t i n g b i s h o p r i c s
nomination by t h e monarch and t h e E n g l i s h Church.
upon
(Swanson,
14)
A t t h e same time,
declined.
papal r e c e i p t s from t h e English Church
P r i o r t o t h e mid-14th c e n t u r y , t h e E n g l i s h Church
p a i d a v a r i e t y of
t a x e s t o Rome on such t h i n g s
a s newly
granted
and
who
benefices
intestate.
the
(Rodes, 200)
estates
of
clerics
died
A f t e r t h e Black Death, although t h e
pope s t i l l possessed t h e power of t a x a t i o n , no new t a x e s were
levied.
(Swanson, 223)
I n a d d i t i o n , a s t h e E n g l i s h Church
usurped t h e p o p e ' s p r e r o g a t i v e ,
a s dispensations,
ordinations
fewer f e e s f o r s e r v i c e s such
and c o u r t a p p e a l s f e l l d u e .
Toward t h e end of t h e Middle Ages,
l i t t l e more t h a n P e t e r ' s Pence,
t h e E n g l i s h Church p a i d
f i x e d a t 2 9 9 marks
(about
•’200) p e r annum, t o t h e mother Church.'
The o u t p u t of t h e s e c u l a r arm of t h e medieval E n g l i s h
Church c o n s i s t e d of s e v e r a l t y p e s of s e r v i c e s :
o t h e r ceremonies,
justice,
d i s p e n s a t i o n s from e c c l e s i a s t i c a l
r e g u l a t i o n s , and c l e r i c a l and c o n s u l t i n g s e r v i c e s .
s e r v i c e , t h e Church charged a f e e .
f o r example,
worship and
For every
A t Hornsea i n Yorkshire,
t h e f e e f o r a marriage s e r v i c e i n 1420 was 4
pence, while f u n e r a l s c o s t 6 pence and p u r i f i c a t i o n s c o s t 1.5
'
--
R.E. Rodes n o t e s t h a t P e t e r ' s Pence was o r i g i n a l l y a t a x of one penny
on e a c h h e a r t h i n England and had been p a i d t o Rome s i n c e Anglo-Saxon
times.
By t h e end of t h e 1 2 t h c e n t u r y t h e p o p u l a t i o n had i n c r e a s e d s o
t h a t t h e l o c a l e c c l e s i a s t i c a l a u t h o r i t i e s were c o l l e c t i n g s u b s t a n t i a l l y
more t h a n 299 marks. Thus t h e y forwarded t h e f i x e d sum t o Rome and k e p t
(197)
t h e e x c e s s f o r themselves.
pence each.
(Swanson, 215)
fees a n d p r o b a t e
The C h u r c h a l s o c o l l e c t e d c o u r t
fees.
Swanson
R.N.
suggests
that
the
h o s t i l i t y frequently evidenced against e c c l e s i a s t i c a l c o u r t s
was
more l i k e l y d i r e c t e d a t t h e a d m i n i s t r a t i v e c o s t s t h a n a t
t h e punishment meted o u t .
for
consulting
services
(220)
and
The s t a t e g e n e r a l l y p a i d
clerical
help
by
providing
b e n e f i c e s f o r t h e employed p r i e s t s t h u s f r e e i n g t h e C h u r c h o f
the
expense
of
supporting
these
clergymen.
Hence,
the
s e c u l a r Church w a s i n t h e b u s i n e s s of s u p p l y i n g a w i d e r a n g e
o f s e r v i c e s f o r which i t e x a c t e d s p e c i f i c f e e s f o r s e r v i c e .
B.
The
Monastic
Church
The m o n a s t i c a r m o f
t h e E n g l i s h Church s o l d s e v e r a l
f o r m s o f income i n s u r a n c e .
i n d e t a i l below,
relief,
F o r a premium,
which i s d i s c u s s e d
t h e monasteries undertook t o provide poor
medical c a r e a n d h o s p i t a l i t y i n t i m e o f n e e d .
They
also s o l d a n n u i t i e s and c o r r o d i e s .
The
first
records
of
m o n a s t e r i e s d a t e from 1066.
the
existence
of
English
The number o f r e l i g i o u s h o u s e s
a n d monks grew r a p i d l y t o 1350 when t h e B l a c k D e a t h t o o k i t s
toll.
By
1422,
the
religious
population
had
fallen
dramatically.
A l t h o u g h some r e c o v e r y o c c u r r e d i n t h e l a t e
15th century,
t h e r e l i g i o u s population never again reached
more t h a n t w o - t h i r d s
the
size
of
the
of i t s s i z e p r i o r t o 1350.
religious
population
and
E s t i m a t e s of
the
number
of
monasteries
i n England and Wales f o r v a r i o u s p e r i o d s
from
1066 t o t h e D i s s o l u t i o n i n 1536-1540 a r e a t t a c h e d a s Appendix
.*
I t o t h i s paper
The monastic arm of t h e Church o p e r a t e d independently of
t h e s e c u l a r arm.
Legitimized d i r e c t l y by t h e pope, England's
monastic o r d e r s had t h e i r own a d m i n i s t r a t i o n s and h i e r a r c h y ,
and were not s u b j e c t t o e p i s c o p a l a u t h o r i t y .
Within each monastery,
an abbot
( o r p r i o r i f t h e r e was
no a b b o t ) occupied t h e most s e n i o r p o s i t i o n .
juniors,
general
the prior
and s u b - p r i o r s ,
a d m i n i s t r a t i o n of
His
immediate
assisted h i m w i t h the
t h e monastery's
business.
The
abbot and h i s p r i o r s were e l e c t e d t o t h e i r p o s i t i o n s by t h e
r e s i d e n t monks.
was
also
A c o u n c i l of
elected
to
s e n i o r monks
make
major
monastery's business operations.
- t h e "Chapter"
decisions
In p r a c t i c e ,
about
however,
-
the
the
abbot wielded e x t e n s i v e power and t h e o v e r a l l w e l f a r e and
p r o s p e r i t y of t h e monastery depended almost e n t i r e l y on h i s
management s k i l l s .
(Snape, 6 2 )
R e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r day-to-day
categories
- spiritual,
delegated t o
the
operations f e l l i n t o three
temporal
resident
monks.g
and
social
Within
the
-
and
was
spiritual
*
Nuns a n d t h e i r h o u s e s a c c o u n t e d f o r a b o u t 1 8 % o f t h e r e l i g i o u s
They a r e i n c l u d e d
community d i s p e n s i n g income i n s u r a n c e a f t e r 1 1 5 4 .
w i t h i n t h e meaning of monks and m o n a s t e r i e s .
Again, t h i s
classifications
house, more t h a n
C h a p t e r s 1 and
presentation.
d i s c u s s i o n p r o v i d e s a n o v e r s i m p l i f i c a t i o n o f t h e job
and d u t i e s i n a l a r g e r e l i g i o u s h o u s e .
I n a smaller
one job would need t o be done by e a c h monk. See Snape,
2 a n d B a s k e r v i l l e , C h a p t e r 1 f o r a more t h o r o u g h
category,
f o r instance,
order
the
in
Church;
a c i r c a was i n charge of p r e s e r v i n g
a
sacristan
was
responsible
for
m a i n t a i n i n g t h e m a t e r i a l equipment i n t h e Church,
a custos
operum
monastic
for
buildings,
the
repair
of
the
Church
and
the
and an a n n i v e r s a r i a n f o r t h e observance of o b i t -
days and c o l l e c t i o n of t h e dues a s s o c i a t e d with them.1•‹
A d m i n i s t r a t i o n of t h e monastic e s t a t e s f e l l w i t h i n t h e
temporal c a t e g o r y .
Upon founding, a monastery was generously
endowed w i t h p r o p e r t y from which t o e a r n i t s s u b s i s t e n c e .
(Clarke, 1 4 6 )
increased.
Over time t h e landholdings of most monasteries
M.M.
Postan e s t i m a t e s t h a t i n t h e 1 1 t h c e n t u r y
t h e Church owned perhaps a s much a s o n e - t h i r d of t h e occupied
land a r e a of England, while J . P . Cooper s u g g e s t s t h a t by 1436
it h e l d approximately 20-22% of t h e t o t a l a r e a .
Cooper,
421)
Accordingly,
the
(Postan, 7 8 ;
administration
of
these
e s t a t e s r e q u i r e d t h e a t t e n t i o n of an h o r d a r i a n who r e c e i v e d
produce from t h e l a n d s farmed by t h e monastery, a r e f e c t o r i a n
who s t o r e d t h e produce and provided t h e k i t c h e n with s t o r e s
as
required,
and a
receiver
who a t t e n d e d t o
leasing the
e s t a t e s and c o l l e c t i n g t h e cash r e n t s t h e r e f r o m .
acting
within
the
temporal
sphere
were
a
cellarer
Also
who
s u p e r v i s e d t h e k i t c h e n and a l l food p r e p a r a t i o n and s e r v i c e ,
a chamberlain who provided t h e monks' c l o t h i n g and shoes, and
an h o r t u l a n who looked a f t e r t h e monastery's gardens.
lo
On o b i t - d a y s , memorial s e r v i c e s were h e l d , o f t e n i n memory of t h e
d e a t h of a p a r i s h i o n e r who had l e f t a p a r t i c u l a r l y g e n e r o u s b e q u e s t t o
t h e monastery.
The b u s i n e s s of supplying income i n s u r a n c e f e l l w i t h i n
t h e s o c i a l c a t e g o r y of t h e monastery's o p e r a t i o n s .
To t h i s
end, an i n f i r m a r i a n was r e s p o n s i b l e f o r t h e i n f i r m a r y . l1
All
monasteries, no m a t t e r how humble, had g u e s t q u a r t e r s where a
person
could
(Woodward, 2 0 )
get
a
meal
and
find
a
place
to
sleep.
Hence a guestmaster had charge of t h e lodging
and comfort of v i s i t o r s ;
a c u r t a r i a n looked a f t e r food f o r
t h e v i s i t o r s a s w e l l a s t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of k i t c h e n l e f t o v e r s
t o t h e poor who g a t h e r e d d a i l y a t t h e monastery g a t e s .
An
almoner a c t e d a s both c o l l e c t o r and d i s t r i b u t o r of c h a r i t a b l e
alms.
Many m o n a s t e r i e s a l s o appointed a school master from
among t h e i r
number
who was
responsible
for
teaching the
c h i l d r e n of noble f a m i l i e s who were a t t a c h e d t o t h e a b b o t ' s
household f o r e d u c a t i o n a l purposes.12
Most
positions
of
responsibility
were
endowed,
the
incumbent b e i n g e x p e c t e d t o keep h i s o p e r a t i o n a l expenses
w i t h i n h i s budgetary l i m i t s .
was
a
trend
toward
I n t h e l a t e r Middle Ages, t h e r e
c e n t r a l i z a t i o n with
all
expenses p a s s i n g through a b u r s a r ' s o f f i c e .
receipts
and
For t h e most
p a r t , however, each incumbent had f i s c a l c o n t r o l over h i s own
portfolio.
(Snape,
34-37)
He
also
had
supervisory
l1
Some religious orders also ran hospitals independently of their
monasteries. Initially for the care of the sick, in the later Middle
Ages many had become virtual almshouses. Hospitals specifically founded
for the care of lepers, for instance, were converted into almshouses or
hospices as leprosy became more uncommon. (Knowles & Hadcock, 310)
G.W.O. Woodward suggests, however, that the boys were kept at the
monasteries primarily as choristers as the instruction they received
appeared to be mainly in reading and singing. (19)
r e s p o n s i b i l i t i e s , a s manual l a b o u r was g e n e r a l l y p e r f o r m e d by
servants.
- m i l l e r s , bakers, shoemakers, t a i l o r s ,
Servants
launderers,
hands,
field
outnumbered
the
medics,
religious
et
population.
m o n a s t e r y a t Meaux i n Y o r k s h i r e ,
were
102
Lincolnshire,
there
were
residents
of
-
St.
often
Cistercian
h a d 2 6 monks
I n 1537,
(Snape, 1 4 )
Mary's
o n l y 2 6 o f whom were n u n s .
often
The
l3
f o r example,
a n d 57 s e r v a n t s i n r e s i d e n c e i n 1 3 9 3 .
there
cetera
nunnery
(Snape,
19)
in
Thus
substantial supervisory responsibilities
a t t a c h e d t o a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p o s i t i o n s i n t h e monastery.
M o n a s t i c income was o f two t y p e s .
T e m p o r a l income w a s
d e r i v e d from t h e e x p l o i t a t i o n o f t h e monastic e s t a t e s ,
spiritual
offerings.
income
consisted
they
feudal
the
tithe
and
voluntary
T h e r e were s e v e r a l s o u r c e s o f t e m p o r a l income.14
A s major landholders,
and
of
while
exacted
dues.
t h e m o n a s t e r i e s were a l s o f e u d a l l o r d s
from t h e i r
Like
the
villeins
manorial
all
lords,
the
applicable
they
c o n s t a n t s t r e a m o f revenue from t h e i r g r a i n m i l l s .
derived
a
Early i n
t h e M i d d l e Ages income f r o m t h e demesne was p r i m a r i l y i n t h e
form o f
produce.
By t h e
late
14th century,
however,
it
t e n d e d t o b e i n t h e form of c a s h r e n t s a s t h e m o n a s t e r i e s ,
reflecting
a
trend
in
the
lay
sector
of
the
economy,
l3
Early C i s t e r c i a n monasteries a l s o employed l a y brethren who took
monastic vows b u t were n o t , o f t e n because of t h e i r low l e v e l of
education o r b i r t h , allowed t o receive orders.
The presence o f l a y
brethren had a l l but disappeared by 1 4 0 0 . (Snape, 9 )
l4
Unless otherwise s t a t e d , t h e information i n t h i s paragraph comes
from Snape, 91-94.
increasingly
leased
their
lands
to
tenants.
By
the
D i s s o l u t i o n i n 1536, t e m p o r a l income i n k i n d amounted t o o n l y
about one-thirteenth
from t e n a n t s .
of
t h e income r e c e i v e d
O t h e r s o u r c e s o f t e m p o r a l r e v e n u e came f r o m
t h e exploitation of
t h e woods a n d p a s t u r e s ,
q u a r r i e s fou n d on t h e m o n a s t i c e s t a t e s .
kept
sheep and t h u s developed an
E n g l i s h wool
years'
wool
surviving
i n cash rents
trade.
Most
i n advance
for a
C i s t e r c i a n houses
interest
often they
and mines and
i n t h e growing
would
sell
lump sum p a y m e n t .
several
Although
( o r published) monastic accounts a r e fragmentary,
t h e temporal
income
i s thought
t o have been
substantial.
A l e x a n d e r S a v i n e h a s c a l c u l a t e d from t h e Valor Ecclesiasticus
t h a t t h e a n n u a l t e m p o r a l m o n a s t i c income on t h e e v e o f t h e
D i s s o l u t i o n exceeded •’93,000.
(270-78)
The t i t h e w a s o n e s o u r c e o f s p i r i t u a l i n c o m e .
payment o f o n e - t e n t h
t h e Church
o f o n e ' s income,
Tithing
-
i n kind o r i n cash, t o
- had been r e q u i r e d by law i n England s i n c e a t
least t h e year 944.
At that
recalcitrant tithe-payers
time,
King Edmund d e c r e e d t h a t
be e x c o m m u n i c a t e d f r o m t h e C h u r c h .
I n r e t u r n f o r t h i s g u a r a n t e e d income,
t h e C h u r c h was t o u s e
one-third
of
t h e income f o r t h e s u p p o r t o f
one-third
f o r t h e r e p a i r o f t h e Church.
t h i r d was f o r t h e r e l i e f o f t h e p o o r .
parish priests collected the tithe,
t h e c l e r g y and
The r e m a i n i n g one-
(Tate, 135)
Initially
but by t h e 13th century
it became e v i d e n t t h a t t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f t h e t i t h e w a s n o t
as s t i p u l a t e d .
and
More s p e c i f i c a l l y , t h e p o o r r e c e i v e d few a l m s
parishioners
were
required
t o
repair
the
Church.
( C l a r k e , 123-24)
C o n s e q u e n t l y , t h e t i t h e was i m p r o p r i a t e d t o
t h e m o n a s t e r i e s i n t h e b e l i e f t h a t monks,
of
poverty,
distribution.
would
not
(Snape, 7 6)
be
tempted
h a v i n g t a k e n vows
t o
cheat
on
the
Whether t h a t b e l i e f w a s j u s t i f i e d
i s o p e n t o q u e s t i o n a n d i s d i s c u s s e d i n d e t a i l i n S e c t i o n I11
below.
Even t h o u g h t h e t i t h e was a s o u r c e o f m o n a s t i c income,
it w a s n o t
a payment
f o r income i n s u r a n c e b u t
represented
i n s t e a d a payment f o r membership i n t h e C h u r c h .
w a s a compulsory payment.
excommunication, and,
The p e n a l t y f o r non-payment
a s Swanson n o t e s ,
t h e C h u r c h meant s o c i a l d e a t h .
p a i d h i s t i t h e , however,
(179)
-
each,
of course,
excommunication from
Once a p a r i s h i o n e r had
- f u n e r a l s and j u s t i c e and s o
w i t h i t s own p r i c e .
Hence t h e t i t h e
w a s n o t b y i t s e l f a payment f o r r e l i g i o u s s e r v i c e s .
it
a
payment
for
was
he had a c c e s s t o t h e o t h e r r e l i g i o u s
s e r v i c e s o f f e r e d by t h e Church
on
The t i t h e
income
insurance.
Long
Nor was
after
the
D i s s o l u t i o n t h e l a i t y c o n t i n u e d t o g i v e t i t h e s t o t h e Church.
D.
Lupton
provides
convincing
proof
of
their
continued
payment w i t h h i s v i t r i o l i c a t t a c k p u b l i s h e d o v e r 100 y e a r s
a f t e r t h e Dissolution:
Manifold have been t h e p e t i t i o n s (and n o t without
j u s t c a u s e ) f o r t h e p u t t i n g down a n d t a k i n g away
of t i t h e s
. . The g r o s s a b u s e s , i n c o n v e n i e n c e s ,
troubles, lawsuits, quarrellings, contentions,
strifes,
debates,
hatred,
heartburnings,
suspicions,
wrongs,
vexations,
murmurings,
g r u d g i n g s , a n d m i s c h i e f s , which h a v e a n d d o d a i l y
a r i s e betwixt t h e t i t h e - t a k e r s and t h e t i t h e p a y e r s , a s t h e y a r e n o t b e n u m b e r e d . . . What
p a r i s h , h a m l e t , town, o r c i t y i n a l l England,
.
which e i t h e r i s n o t o r h a t h n o t been q u a r r e l l e d
w i t h a l by t h e i r wrangling t i t h i n g m i n i s t e r s ?
H o w c a n s u c h m i n i s t e r s t e a c h t h e word o f God i n
m e e k n e s s , who a r e f i l l e d w i t h r a n c o u r a n d ill w i l l
f o r want o f t h e i r d u e i n t i t h e s ?
...
( f r o m T h e T y t h e -T a k e r s C a r t O v e r t h r o w n o r t h e
Downfall of T v t h e s ( l 6 5 2 ) , quoted i n Thirsk &
Cooper, 133-34)
F u r t h e r , t h e t i t h e was f i x e d a t 1 0 % o f income a l t h o u g h s u r e l y
the risk
of
loss
of
income must
d u r i n g t h e Middle Ages.
premium,
payment
would
have v a r i e d c o n s i d e r a b l y
Had t h e t i t h e b e e n a n
have
varied
with
risk
insurance
and
ceased
a l t o g e t h e r upon t h e d i s s o l u t i o n o f t h e m o n a s t e r i e s .
Voluntary
spiritual
offerings
income.
These
formed
the
offerings
second
source
of
included donations
to
r e l i g i o u s o b j e c t s a n d a t s h r i n e s , b e q u e s t s o f money a n d l a n d ,
and purchases of a n n u i t i e s and c o r r o d i e s .
The
income
derived
from
donations
t o
shrines
was
a p p r e c i a b l e a l t h o u g h t h e few s u r v i v i n g f e r e t r a r s ' a c c o u n t s d o
not
allow even
known,
however,
rough
estimates o f
i t s magnitude.
is
It
t h a t d o n a t i o n s t o t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l l y famous
s h r i n e o f S t . Thomas a t C a n t e r b u r y f o r m e d t h e g r e a t e s t p a r t
of
t h e income o f
l a t e M i d d l e Ages.
t h e C a t h e d r a l p r i o r y from 1220 u n t i l t h e
(Snape, 75)
R e c o r d s o f a s h r i n e i n Durham
show t h a t more t h a n 5 6 8 9 was r e c e i v e d i n d o n a t i o n s o v e r f o u r
years
i n t h e e a r l y 14th century,
including t h e g i f t
g o l d e n s t a t u e o f t h e V i r g i n v a l u e d a t •’500.
The i n c o m e f r o m s h r i n e s ,
however,
of
a
(Swanson, 2 2 6 )
was h i g h l y v a r i a b l e .
The
f e r e t r a r ' s a c c o u n t s f r o m 1456 t o 1 4 6 1 f o r a s e c o n d s h r i n e i n
Durham show a n n u a l r e c e i p t s v a r y i n g b e t w e e n C5 1 4 s . a n d 1 6 s .
(Snape,
74)
Swanson c i t e s t h e p r o c t o r o f
S e l b y Abbey i n
Y o r k s h i r e who i n 1 4 2 1 r e m a r k e d on t h e n o t i c e a b l e i n c r e a s e i n
receipts a f t e r the pestilence there that year.
(215)
B e q u e s t s of money a n d l a n d w e r e a l s o a n i m p o r t a n t p a r t
of t h e voluntary o f f e r i n g s .
Bequests o f t e n t o o k t h e form of
c h a r i t a b l e t r u s t s whereby o n e p e r s o n c o n v e y s h i s w e a l t h t o a
second t o hold f o r t h e b e n e f i t
of
a third party.
In the
Middle Ages,
t h e C h u r c h was most o f t e n named t h e b e n e f i c i a r y
with
endowments
large
being
vested
for
the
support
of
almshouses and h o s p i t a l s and s c h o o l s run by t h e r e l i g i o u s
orders.
Many b e q u e s t s w e r e o u t r i g h t g i f t s .
( J o r d a n , 40-52)
Alexander
Savine
monastic
estates
inheritance
found
in
rather
that
1535
than
by
the
had
greater
been
purchase
proportion
acquired
or
of
through
exchange.
While
p o o r e r p e o p l e o f t e n g a v e s m a l l p a r c e l s o f l a n d t o t h e Church,
occasionally t h e wealthy
donated e n t i r e manorial
estates.
(152)
The p a y m e n t
implicit
contract
t i m e of need.
of
these
voluntary
f o r t h e d e l i v e r y of
offerings
created a n
income i n s u r a n c e i n
B o t h t h e l a y a n d t h e r e l i g i o u s p o p u l a t i o n knew
t h a t t h e worldly function of t h e monasteries w a s t o provide
t h i s i n s u r a n c e i n t h e form o f poor r e l i e f ,
t h e care of
the
s i c k and aged.
h o s p i t a l i t y and
They a l s o knew t h a t
the
income f r o m t h e m o n a s t i c e s t a t e s was f o r t h e s u p p o r t o f t h e
monasteries and t h e i r households,
and t h a t t h e g r e a t e r p a r t
o f t h e t i t h e was f o r membership i n t h e s e c u l a r C h u r c h .
It is
thus not
unreasonable
to
suspect
that
both p a r t i e s
would
u n d e r s t a n d t h a t t h e f u n d s u s e d by t h e m o n a s t e r i e s t o p a y f o r
t h e p r o v i s i o n o f income i n s u r a n c e came f r o m t h e i r o n l y o t h e r
s o u r c e o f income
- t h e voluntary offerings.
i s supported by t h e v a r i a b i l i t y of
This suspicion
t h i s source of
income;
t h e f l u c t u a t i o n s may w e l l h a v e b e e n a r e s p o n s e t o c h a n g i n g
p e r c e p t i o n s o f t h e r i s k o f income l o s s .
Included within t h e d e f i n i t i o n of voluntary offerings is
t h e purchase of a n n u i t i e s and c o r r o d i e s .
payment,
a
parishioner
could purchase
For a f i x e d cash
an annuity and t h e
m o n a s t e r y would p r o v i d e t h e r e a f t e r a y e a r l y
annuitant,
generally
d e p e n d e d upon t h e
for
size
of
life.
the
expectancy of t h e annuitant.
annuity
except
that
firewood and candles,
monastery i t s e l f .
b e made i n k i n d .
the
The
size
income t o t h e
of
c a s h payment
A corrody
corrodian
was
the
income
and t h e
life
s i m i l a r t o an
received
and i n food and s h e l t e r ,
payment
in
often i n the
I n a d d i t i o n , payment f o r t h e c o r r o d y c o u l d
G.W.O.
Woodward c i t e s t h e c a s e o f J o h n a n d
Agnes Hudson who p u r c h a s e d a c o r r o d y i n 1518 f r o m E s h o l t ,
C i s t e r c i a n nunnery i n Yorkshire.
They p a i d f o r t h e c o r r o d y
w i t h t h i r t e e n cattle, t h r e e c a l v e s , f o r t y sheep,
thirty-four
lambs and 20s.
a
i n cash.
s i x wethers,
By 1536, J o h n h a d d i e d
b u t t h e n u n n e r y w a s s t i l l s u p p o r t i n g Agnes who w a s t h e n 8 0
years of age.
were
". . .
(24)
Woodward f o u n d t h a t a n n u i t a n t s g e n e r a l l y
men o f means who s o u g h t a s e c u r e i n v e s t m e n t f o r
some s u r p l u s c a p i t a l " ,
w h i l e c o r r o d i a n s t e n d e d t o be
more humble f o l k who w a n t e d s e c u r i t y f o r t h e i r o l d a g e . "
". ..
He
a l s o found t h a t
t h e wealthy
a n n u i t i e s or
o f t e n purchased
corrodies for faithful servants.
(24-25)
The p r i m a r y b u s i n e s s o f t h e m o n a s t i c a r m o f t h e C h u r c h
was the
s u p p l y of
income
- a l m s , m e d i c a l care,
insurance
h o s p i t a l i t y and a n n u i t i e s .
While t h e p u r c h a s e p r i c e o f a n
a n n u i t y o r a c o r r o d y w a s made e x p l i c i t ,
provision
of
implicit.
the
remaining
forms
the contract for the
of
The C h u r c h e x p e c t e d t h a t
insurance
those of
remained
means w o u l d
g i v e , a n d t h e l a i t y t r u s t e d t h a t t h o s e i n n e e d would r e c e i v e .
C.
The
The
C h u r c h as a Firm
medieval
behaviour,
English
Church,
in
its
business
b o r e t h e e a r m a r k s o f a modern d a y f i r m .
N a t u r e o f t h e Firm",
Coase
R.H.
and
I n "The
(1952) suggests t h a t
firms
a r i s e b e c a u s e t h e y r e p r e s e n t a more e f f i c i e n t v e h i c l e t h a n
the
marketplace
production.
for
Firms
the
avoid
allocation
the
costs
of
resources
associated
a l l o c a t i o n of resources through t h e marketplace
t o
with
the
- t h e costs
of d i s c o v e r i n g t h e r e l a t i v e p r i c e s of c o o p e r a t i n g f a c t o r s and
o f n e g o t i a t i n g c o n t r a c t s o f exchange f o r t h e i r s u p p l y
superseding
the
price
mechanism.
"entrepreneur-co-ordinator"
uses i n production,
Coase
also
notes
In
a
- by
firm,
an
directs resources t o t h e i r best
t h u s e l i m i n a t i n g t h e need f o r c o n t r a c t s .
that
firms
arise
under
conditions
of
uncertainty,
e s p e c i a l l y when t h e c o n t r a c t
of
purchase
and
s a l e i s f o r a s e r v i c e t o be s u p p l i e d i n t h e d i s t a n t f u t u r e .
The f i r s t c o n d i t i o n ,
t h a t t h e f i r m supersede t h e p r i c e
i s s a t i s f i e d by b o t h arms of
mechanism,
t h e Church.
The
f a c t o r s of p r o d u c t i o n used by t h e s e c u l a r arm of t h e Church
were p r i m a r i l y clergymen and churches.
Direction f o r t h e i r
use, t h e d e f i n i t i o n of d u t i e s and t h e a l l o c a t i o n of b e n e f i c e s
f o r example,
came i n i t i a l l y from t h e pope.
While t h e s e n i o r
E n g l i s h c l e r g y played an i n c r e a s i n g r o l e i n t h i s r e g a r d from
t h e mid-14th
c e n t u r y on,
t h e r e was never any q u e s t i o n t h a t
t h e work of t h e more j u n i o r
above.
The s u p e r s e s s i o n
extensive
in
the
religious
population
c l e r g y was being d i r e c t e d from
of
monastic
t h e p r i c e mechanism was more
arm
provided
of
the
their
own
a d d i t i o n t o supplying income i n s u r a n c e .
factors,
Church
where
subsistence
the
in
Cooperation between
and hence t h e s a v i n g s on t r a n s a c t i o n s c o s t s by t h e
monastery, was a l s o more pronounced t h a n i n t h e s e c u l a r arm.
For example,
t h e g u e s t master and t h e c u r t a r i a n j o i n t l y co-
o r d i n a t e d t h e h o s p i t a l i t y which was provided t o v i s i t o r s ,
and
t h e r e f e c t o r i a n and t h e c e l l a r e r s h a r e d r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r
f e e d i n g t h e monastic household every day.
The
Church
operated
perpetual uncertainty.
themselves b u t ,
. ..
It
in
a
society
characterized
by
sold r e l i g i o u s s e r v i c e s not f o r
a s Douglass North has noted,
f o r "salvation
i n a world where h e l l and damnation were b e l i e v e d t o be
t h e f o r e d e s t i n e d l o t of most of t h e populace."
t h i s f e a r of t h e a f t e r l i f e ,
(125)
I t was
undoubtedly promulgated by t h e
clergy,
which a l l o w e d t h e s e c u l a r Church t o e x a c t from t h e
l a i t y both a
tithe
and f e e s
for religious
services.
The
t i t h e represented t h e value t o t h e parishioner of t h e r i g h t
t o buy,
for
for a fee,
income
s a l v a t i o n i n t h e n e x t l i f e .I5
insurance,
uncertainty.
by
its
nature,
The demand
arises
out
of
Both t y p e s o f c o n t r a c t s o f f e r e d b y t h e Church
w e r e long-term
agreements f o r s a l e .
The i m p l i c i t c o n t r a c t s
l e f t o p e n t h e s t a r t i n g d a t e f o r t h e payment o f b e n e f i t s w h i l e
the explicit
contracts
did
not
s p e c i f y t h e date o f
final
payment.
Thus
the
Church
satisfied
in
both
conditions f o r t h e existence of a firm.
resources t o production,
Under
conditions
of
respects
Coase's
In t h e a l l o c a t i o n of
it s u p e r s e d e d t h e p r i c e mechanism.
uncertainty,
it
provided
services
on
long-term c o n t r a c t s .
G.W.O.
Woodward h a s s u g g e s t e d t h a t t h e m o n a s t e r i e s w e r e
w i d e l y r e g a r d e d as " l o r d s h i p s i n e c c l e s i a s t i c a l h a n d s " .
I n 1515,
(4-5)
a r o y a l j u d g e d e c l a r e d t h a t t h e t h i r t y a b b o t s who
s a t i n Parliament alongside f o r t y l a y peers
l5
The t w o - p a r t p r i c i n g s t r u c t u r e which c h a r a c t e r i z e d t h e s e c u l a r arm
o f t h e Church r a i s e s some q u e s t i o n s which must r e m a i n t h e t o p i c of
another paper.
Why d i d t h e Church c h a r g e f e e s f o r s e r v i c e ?
Did t h e y
r e f l e c t t h e marginal c o s t of p r o v i d i n g t h o s e s e r v i c e s ?
Why d i d t h e
Church n o t , l i k e D i s n e y l a n d , c h a r g e o n l y a membership f e e a n d p r o v i d e
t h e s e r v i c e s a t a z e r o p r i c e , t h u s c a p t u r i n g t h e e n t i r e consumer
surplus?
Was t h e demand f o r r e l i g i o u s s e r v i c e s downward s l o p i n g , i n
which c a s e t h e Church was n o t c a p t u r i n g a l l p o s s i b l e s u r p l u s ? O r was i t
p e r f e c t l y i n e l a s t i c , i n which c a s e t h e l e v y o f a f e e f o r s e r v i c e i n
a d d i t i o n t o t h e t i t h e would n o t s a c r i f i c e any o f t h e consumer s u r p l u s ?
+<,
-I
f <,
r
have no p l a c e i n t h e Parliament-chamber by reason
of t h e i r s p i r i t u a l i t y , but o n l y by reason of t h e i r
(6)
temporal p o s s e s s i o n s .
Woodward has found t h a t a b b o t s were remarkably a g g r e s s i v e i n
t h e i r defence and management of t h e monastic e s t a t e s .
He has
found numerous c o u r t r e c o r d s i n which a b b o t s i n i t i a t e d law
s u i t s w i t h r e s p e c t t o t r e s p a s s i n g and d i s p u t e s over l e a s e s
and l a n d t i t l e s .
He a l s o c i t e s t h e c a s e of
t h e abbot of
Byland, a C i s t e r c i a n house i n Yorkshire who i n t h e e a r l y 1 6 t h
c e n t u r y when i n f l a t i o n was beginning t o be f e l t demanded a
l e a s e renewal f e e e q u i v a l e n t t o two y e a r s 1 r e n t r a t h e r t h a n
t h e customary t h r e e months.
was
"...
almost
no
Woodward concludes t h a t t h e r e
distinction
monastic l a n d l o r d s and t h a t of
(10)
between
t h e behaviour
of
t h e i r secular equivalents."
I f medieval l o r d s of t h e manor were wealth-maximizing
i n d i v i d u a l s , a s most economic h i s t o r i a n s would s u g g e s t , t h e n
it must be t h e c a s e t h a t t h e monastic arm of t h e Church, a s
r e p r e s e n t e d by i t s abbots, was a wealth-maximizing body t o o .
I1
MODEL
A
OF
THE
CHURCH
The b u s i n e s s o f t h e m o n a s t i c arm of t h e m e d i e v a l C h u r c h
w a s t h e s a l e o f income i n s u r a n c e .
By t h e l a t e 1 4 t h c e n t u r y ,
t h e monasteries had acquired a r e p u t a t i o n
high quality product:
f o r supplying a
contemporary opinion g e n e r a l l y h e l d
t h a t t h e y were p r o v i d i n g e x t r e m e l y v a l u a b l e s o c i a l s e r v i c e s .
( J o r d a n , 58)
P r i o r t o t h e Dissolution,
however, t h e y h a d a l l
b u t g o n e o u t of b u s i n e s s l e a v i n g t h e i r p a r i s h i o n e r s t o s e a r c h
f o r a l t e r n a t i v e f o r m s o f income i n s u r a n c e .
T h e r e i s a s u b s t a n t i a l l i t e r a t u r e on r e p u t a t i o n b u i l d i n g
a n d p r o d u c t q u a l i t y which i s germane t o t h e e c o n o m i c d e c l i n e
o f t h e m e d i e v a l Church.
A common theme i n t h i s l i t e r a t u r e i s
t h a t a f i r m w i l l behave i n a n "honest"
fashion only i f
p a y s more t h a n b e h a v i n g i n a " d i s h o n e s t " f a s h i o n .
of
information,
is pivotal.
I f t h e r e i s n o tomorrow,
may n o t p a y t o h o n o u r c o n t r a c t s t o d a y .
profitable
t o
honour
its
it
I f tomorrow t h e f i r m
h a s t o p a y t h e p r i c e o f t o d a y ' s d u p l i c i t y , however,
more
The r o l e
s p e c i f i c a l l y t h e f i r m ' s b e l i e f s about
future existence,
it
contracts
and
i t may b e
invest
in
a
reputation f o r honesty.
T h i s s e c t i o n p r o v i d e s a brief
on s e l f - e n f o r c i n g
ensuring
contract
survey of t h e l i t e r a t u r e
agreements and t h e r o l e of
performance.
A
mode1
reputation i n
of
a
medieval
monastery
which borrows
f e a t u r e s from e a c h o f
surveyed is then constructed.
model:
on t h e one hand,
-
an
fashion.
"honest"
papers
Uncertainty characterizes t h i s
t h e monastery i s n o t
f u t u r e e x i s t e n c e w h i l e on t h e o t h e r ,
parishioners
the
sure of
its
- the
i t s customers
a r e n o t s u r e i f t h e monastery w i l l behave i n
Given
this
uncertainty,
the
model
d e f i n e s t h e c o n d i t i o n s u n d e r which t h e m o n a s t e r y w i l l h o n o u r
i t s i m p l i c i t c o n t r a c t f o r t h e p r o v i s i o n o f income i n s u r a n c e .
Self-enforcing
A.
In
Theory
"A
Agreements
of
Self-enforcing
Agreements",
Lester
T e l s e r examines a g r e e m e n t s which a r i s e between two p a r t i e s
when it i s t o o c o s t l y t o r e l y o n a t h i r d p a r t y s u c h as t h e
H e f i n d s t h a t t h e s e agreements
Courts t o e n f o r c e compliance.
emerge o n l y where a
will
some p o s i t i v e p r o b a b i l i t y
occur
in
the
is
agreements
future.
that
A
self-enforcing
that
agreement
more
by
is not
t h e r e must o n l y
transactions w i l l
condition
violation
of
one
self-enforcing
party
leads
t o
Hence T e l s e r c o n c l u d e s t h a t f o r a
t e r m i n a t i o n by t h e o t h e r .
gains
transactions
The s e q u e n c e n e e d n o t be i n f i n i t e ;
finite.
be
sequence of
to
from c o m p l i a n c e must
survive,
exceed t h e
the
expected
one-time
future
gain that
would a c c r u e f r o m v i o l a t i o n .
Telser
agreement
uses
between
a
a
multi-period
buyer
and
model
a
seller
to
examine
who
the
repeatedly
t r a n s a c t f o r t h e exchange of some p r o d u c t .
t o derive a benefit,
b,,
p r i c e , pt, i n p e r i o d t .
The buyer e x p e c t s
from a product f o r which he pays a
The b e n e f i t depends upon t h e c o s t t h e
The lower i s t h e
s e l l e r incurs i n supplying t h e product.
c o s t , t h e lower i s t h e b e n e f i t t o t h e buyer.
The n e t b e n e f i t
t h e buyer e x p e c t s t o d e r i v e i n p e r i o d t i s bt-p,.
The buyer
i s s a i d t o have v i o l a t e d t h e agreement i f he r e c e i v e s b e n e f i t
bt
but
pays
only pt*<pt.
gains
from
violating
the
i n any p e r i o d exceed t h o s e from a d h e r i n g t o i t s
agreement
terms, t h a t i s bt-pt* > bt-pt.
s u p p l y i n g t h e product,
p e r i o d of p,-ct.
gains
from
The s e l l e r i n c u r s a c o s t ct i n
and e x p e c t s t o d e r i v e a n e t g a i n each
The s e l l e r i s deemed t o have v i o l a t e d t h e
agreement i f he r e c e i v e s p,
the
The
violation
but i n c u r s only c t * < c t .
in
any
period
Again,
exceed
those
a s s o c i a t e d with compliance.
The buyer and t h e s e l l e r b e l i e v e with some p r o b a b i l i t y ,
7,
If
YE
[O,l],
they
t h a t t h e i r next t r a n s a c t i o n w i l l be t h e i r l a s t .
are
transaction
both
certain
that
it
w i l l
be
their
final
( i f y = l ) , t h e n t h e y know t h e r e w i l l be no f u t u r e
g a i n s t o be s a c r i f i c e d by v i o l a t i n g t h e agreement.
Since t h e
one-period g a i n from v i o l a t i o n exceeds t h a t from compliance,
both w i l l v i o l a t e t h e agreement i n t h e l a s t p e r i o d .
The same
argument a p p l i e s t o t h e p e n u l t i m a t e p e r i o d when b o t h know
t h a t t h e y w i l l v i o l a t e t h e agreement
i n t h e f i n a l period:
s i n c e t h e r e a r e no f u t u r e g a i n s t o be made, t h e y w i l l c h e a t
on
the
agreement
in
the
next
to
last
period
as
well.
Backward i n d u c t i o n c o n t i n u e s t o t h e f i r s t p e r i o d , and n e i t h e r
'
p a r t y e v e r complies with t h e t e r m s of t h e agreement.
result
is
known
as
the
chain-store
paradox.16
This
Telser
concludes t h a t no agreement f o r a sequence o f t r a n s a c t i o n s
c a n be s e l f - e n f o r c i n g
transaction
if
both parties
is t h e f i n a l one.
He
know f o r s u r e w h i c h
finds,
however,
that
if
some positive probability exists that the transactions w i l l
continue,
t h e sequence h a s no l a s t p e r i o d and under c e r t a i n
c o n d i t i o n s a n a g r e e m e n t w i l l be s e l f - e n f o r c i n g .
Telser a r g u e s t h a t t h e b u y e r w i l l n o t v i o l a t e t h e t e r m s
o f t h e agreement i f h i s expected f u t u r e n e t b e n e f i t s exceed
h i s c u r r e n t expected c o s t of continuing with t h e agreement:
which i m p l i e s
where
(1-yt)
is
the
probability
that
the
sequence
t r a n s a c t i o n s w i l l c o n t i n u e beyond t h e t t h p e r i o d .
t h e seller w i l l n o t v i o l a t e t h e agreement i f
of
Similarly,
t h e one-time
g a i n from v i o l a t i o n i s less t h a n t h e expected f u t u r e g a i n s
from c o n t i n u i n g t h e sequence of t r a n s a c t i o n s :
l6
See Rasmussen, 88, for a full discussion of the chain-store paradox.
which i m p l i e s
T e l s e r concludes t h a t an agreement w i l l be s e l f - e n f o r c i n g
t h e r e i s a sequence
{
p which s a t i s f i e s e q u a t i o n s
if
( 2 ) and
(4)
T e l s e r n o t e s s e v e r a l c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s of
agreements.
no one e n t e r s a s e l f - e n f o r c i n g agreement
First,
expecting t h e other party t o v i o l a t e i t .
profitable
self-enforcing
t h a n adherence,
Were v i o l a t i o n more
he a r g u e s ,
the violating party
would n o t e n t e r t h e agreement i n t h e f i r s t p l a c e .
Second,
t h e l o n g e r i s t h e expected time horizon, t h e g r e a t e r a r e t h e
p o s s i b l e g a i n s from a d h e r i n g t o t h e agreement.
Third,
l o n g e r i s t h e time t o d i s c o v e r y of a v i o l a t i o n ,
are
the
possible
gains
from c h e a t i n g .
p e r i o d s f o r a v i o l a t i o n t o be d i s c o v e r e d ,
the
the greater
takes
two
f o r example,
the
If
it
v i o l a t i n g p a r t y w i l l be a b l e t o c o l l e c t twice t h e g a i n s from
cheating.
Last,
self-enforcing
under c o n d i t i o n s of
know when t h e
perfect
information.
f i n a l transaction
adhere t o t h e agreement.
agreements
w i l l
cannot
If
occur,
survive
both p a r t i e s
neither
w i l l
B.
Reputation in a Finite Horizon Model
I n "Reputation and Imperfect Information",
and Robert Wilson u s e a m u l t i - p e r i o d
David Kreps
e n t r y d e t e r r e n c e model
t o e x p l o r e t h e importance of imperfect information i n f i n i t e
stage games.
Like Telser,
they find t h a t the existence of
e v e n a s m a l l amount o f u n c e r t a i n t y r e s u l t s i n t h e breakdown
o f t h e b a c k w a r d i n d u c t i o n mechanism w h i c h i s c h a r a c t e r i s t i c
of t h e c h a i n - s t o r e p a r a d o x .
The
players
monopolist
in
and an
the
Kreps
entrant.
In
and
Wilson
each period,
chooses t o e n t e r t h e market o r t o s t a y o u t .
are
game
the
If
a
entrant
the entrant
chooses t o e n t e r ,
t h e m o n o p o l i s t must c h o o s e t o f i g h t e n t r y
o r t o acquiesce.
The m o n o p o l i s t ' s p a y o f f i s g r e a t e s t i f t h e
entrant stays out;
better
off
i f t h e e n t r a n t e n t e r s , t h e monopolist i s
acquiescing because
fighting
is
costly.
The
e n t r a n t ' s payoff i s g r e a t e s t i f he e n t e r s and t h e monopolist
because
is l e a s t
it
acquiesces;
fighting
is
if
t h e monopolist
costly.
If
the
fights,
entrant
again
and
the
m o n o p o l i s t know t h a t t h e game w i l l e n d i n some f u t u r e p e r i o d
t , t h e y know t h a t t h e m o n o p o l i s t i s b e t t e r o f f a c q u i e s c i n g i f
the
entrant
market
to
enters
protect.
in
that
But
given
acquiesce i n t h e f i n a l period,
w i l l
be better
off
p e r i o d t-1 a s w e l l .
p e r i o d as t h e r e
that
the
i s no
future
monopolist
w i l l
t h e y know t h a t t h e m o n o p o l i s t
acquiescing
if
the
entrant
enters
in
The game t h u s u n r a v e l s b a c k t o p e r i o d 1
where t h e e n t r a n t always e n t e r s a n d t h e m o n o p o l i s t
always
acquiesces.
there
If
is
any
uncertainty
b a c k w a r d i n d u c t i o n b r e a k s down.
example,
in
the
game,
however,
If t h e e n t r a n t b e l i e v e s ,
for
t h a t t h e m o n o p o l i s t h a s some m o t i v a t i o n o t h e r t h a n
p r o f i t maximization f o r f i g h t i n g , perhaps because h e r e l i s h e s
a good f i g h t , t h e n t h e e n t r a n t w i l l e x p e c t t h e monopolist t o
and w i l l not
fight
enter.
f i g h t i n g i f e n t r y occurs,
Kreps
and Wilson
f i n d t h a t by
e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e e a r l y s t a g e s of
t h e game, t h e m o n o p o l i s t c a n b u i l d a r e p u t a t i o n f o r t o u g h n e s s
which w i l l d o m i n a t e e v e n i n t h e f i n a l p e r i o d o f t h e game.
In
"Predation,
Milgrom a n d
John
Reputation and Entry Deterrence",
Roberts
extend t h e
above
m o n o p o l i s t who o p e r a t e s i n s e v e r a l m a r k e t s .
Paul
to a
analysis
They f i n d t h a t
i n f o r m a t i o n a l a s y m m e t r i e s make it r a t i o n a l f o r a m o n o p o l i s t
to
fight
when
there
are
many
markets
i r r a t i o n a l t o f i g h t i n any s i n g l e m a r k e t .
f i r s t few m a r k e t s ,
toughness.
even
when
it
is
By f i g h t i n g i n t h e
t h e monopolist can b u i l d a r e p u t a t i o n f o r
The s u b s e q u e n t e n t r a n t s w i l l b e u n c e r t a i n a b o u t
whether predation
is typical of
t h e monopolist's
general
b e h a v i o u r , and w i l l b e less l i k e l y t o e n t e r .
K r e p s a n d W i l s o n a n d Milgrom a n d R o b e r t s n o t e t h a t s m a l l
amounts o f i m p e r f e c t i n f o r m a t i o n can have s i g n i f i c a n t e f f e c t s
on
the
outcome
existence of
of
games.
Where
Telser
found
that
uncertainty about t h e f i n a l period of
the
a game
h a l t e d t h e b a c k w a r d i n d u c t i o n mechanism o f t h e c h a i n - s t o r e
paradox,
K r e p s a n d W i l s o n a n d Milgrom a n d R o b e r t s f i n d t h a t
u n c e r t a i n t y about t h e m o t i v a t i o n of a p l a y e r w i l l have t h e
same e f f e c t , e v e n when b o t h p l a y e r s know t h e y a r e i n t h e l a s t
period.
earlier
In
a
entrant's
addition,
Milgrom a n d R o b e r t s
monopolist
fights
entry,
subjective probability that
f i g h t again a s t h e horizon approaches.
the
find that
greater
the
is
t h e monopolist
an
w i l l
Hence t h e r e p u t a t i o n
e f f e c t i s s t r e n g t h e n e d a s t h e game a p p r o a c h e s t h e e n d .
C.
Product
Quality
in
an
I n f i n i t e Horizon Model
I n "The R o l e o f M a r k e t F o r c e s i n A s s u r i n g C o n t r a c t u a l
Benjamin K l e i n a n d K e i t h L e f f l e r a l s o l o o k a t
Performance",
agreements
which
enforcement.
rely
on
the
market
mechanism
for
They f i n d t h a t i n a c o m p e t i t i v e m a r k e t f i r m s
which s u p p l y h i g h q u a l i t y p r o d u c t s r e q u i r e a p r i c e premium a s
a n i n c e n t i v e t o c o n t i n u e t o do s o .
But t h e e x i s t e n c e o f
p o s i t i v e economic p r o f i t s i n a c o m p e t i t i v e market p o s e s a
problem;
market
equilibrium
requires
that
profits
be
d i s s i p a t e d s o t h a t f i r m s e a r n o n l y a normal r e t u r n .
Klein
timeframe.17
to
produce
and
Leffler
construct
a
model
A f i r m i n a c o m p e t i t i v e market
a
high
quality
or
a
low
in
an
infinite
chooses whether
quality
product.
Consumers c a n n o t d e t e r m i n e t h e a c t u a l q u a l i t y p r e p u r c h a s e ,
b u t o n l y w h e t h e r it meets some minimum s t a n d a r d .
The c o s t o f
l 7 See Tirole, 122-23, f o r a more complete presentation of K l e i n l s and
L e f f l e r l s model.
producing a product of high quality,
quality,
cl.
ch, e x c e e d s t h a t o f low
The f i r m c h a r g e s p r i c e ph f o r a h i g h q u a l i t y
product.
K l e i n an d L e f f l e r assume t h a t a l l consumers c o s t l e s s l y
communicate q u a l i t y i n f o r m a t i o n among t h e m s e l v e s .
I f a f i r m which
t h e y know what q u a l i t y e v e r y f i r m p r o d u c e s .
contracts
to
consumers
of
firm.
Once
becomes
produce
that
the
high
product
continues
to
continue t o purchase
supplies
firm
universally
quality
known
as
a
low
Initially
quality,
"notorious
do
so,
from t h a t
however,
cheater",
it
and
c o n s u m e r s w i l l n o t buy f r o m it a g a i n .
A f i r m which s u p p l i e s low q u a l i t y when i t h a s c o n t r a c t e d
t o supply high,
o f income :
therefore,
. .)
( 1+8+8~+.
6=1/ ( l + r ) .
But
it
stands t o lose its future stream
( p h - c h ) , where t h e d i s c o u n t f a c t o r i s
stands
to
gain
the
one-time
a s s o c i a t e d w i t h s u p p l y i n g a low q u a l i t y p r o d u c t
quality price:
ph-cl.
profit
a t a high
Klein and L e f f l e r argue t h a t t h e f i r m
w i l l n o t c h e a t on i t s c o n t r a c t i f t h e f u t u r e s t r e a m o f r e n t s
e x c e e d t h e one-time g a i n :
which i m p l i e s
Thus K l e i n a n d L e f f l e r
conclude t h a t
the
firm requires a
premium f o r h i g h q u a l i t y w h i c h e x c e e d s t h e c o s t o f p r o d u c t i o n
by a t least r(ch-cl).
price,
They n o t e t h a t t h e q u a l i t y a s s u r i n g
ph, i n c r e a s e s a s t h e l e v e l o f q u a l i t y i n c r e a s e s
to preserve
t h e n e c e s s a r y premium.
price
increases
also
when
the
The q u a l i t y a s s u r i n g
minimum
quality
( c l & ) , as t h e f i r m r e q u i r e s a
decreases
(chT)
standard
l a r g e r premium t o
o f f s e t t h e l a r g e r o n e - t i m e g a i n from c h e a t i n g , ph-cl.
The
existence
of
positive
economic
profits
c o m p e t i t i v e m a r k e t , however, p o s e s a p r o b l e m .
an
incentive
to
enter
output w i l l result
the
market.
But
in
a
N e w f i r m s have
their
additional
i n t h e q u a n t i t y supplied exceeding t h e
q u a n t i t y demanded a t t h e q u a l i t y a s s u r i n g p r i c e .
supply cannot l e a d t o a p r i c e decrease,
The e x c e s s
f o r i f firms receive
a p r i c e l e s s t h a n p h t h e y w i l l n o l o n g e r e a r n t h e premium
necessary t o induce production of high q u a l i t y .
Therefore
e q u i l i b r i u m i n t h i s market r e q u i r e s t h a t t h e economic p r o f i t s
be
dissipated;
f i r m s must
appear t o earn
only a
normal
return.
The n e e d f o r p r o f i t s t o be d i s s i p a t e d p o s e s a f u r t h e r
problem.
Consumers know t h a t a f i r m must e a r n a premium f o r
supplying
high
quality
products.
Hence
the
dissipation
i t s e l f must a c t a s a s i g n a l t o c o n s u m e r s t h a t t h e f i r m i n d e e d
e a r n e d t h e r e q u i s i t e premium.
Klein and L e f f l e r suggest t h a t
i n v e s t m e n t i n c o n s p i c u o u s a s s e t s s u c h a s l u x u r i o u s showrooms
and o r n a t e
signs
acts
as
a
signal,
as
do advertisements
f e a t u r i n g p r o m i n e n t p e o p l e who must be p a i d h i g h l y f o r t h e i r
services.
In
"Premiums
Reputations",
Klein
and
f o r High Q u a l i t y P r o d u c t s
a s Returns t o
C a r l S h a p i r o c o n s t r u c t s a model much l i k e t h e
Leffler
model.
He
argues,
however,
that
the
p o s i t i v e economic p r o f i t s e a r n e d by c o m p e t i t i v e f i r m s need
not
be
dissipated
as
they
represent
a
normal
return
on
investment i n reputation.
S h a p i r o a s s u m e s t h a t new f i r m s e n t e r t h e m a r k e t f o r h i g h
q u a l i t y p r o d u c t s w i t h a r e p u t a t i o n f o r s u p p l y i n g low q u a l i t y .
Consumers t h e r e f o r e w i l l n o t p u r c h a s e f r o m a new f i r m a t a n y
p r i c e h i g h e r t h a n t h e low q u a l i t y p r i c e ,
establish
a
reputation
high
quality,
P1<Ch<Ph.
a
TO
firm
must
i n i t i a l l y s u p p l y h i g h q u a l i t y a t t h e low q u a l i t y p r i c e ,
thus
i n c u r r i n g a l o s s o f pl-ch.
for
pl,
I n a l l subsequent periods,
f i r m supplies a high q u a l i t y product,
i f the
it e a r n s t h e q u a l i t y
premium p h - c h .
The c o n d i t i o n f o r f r e e e n t r y i n t o t h e h i g h
q u a l i t y market
is t h a t t h e p r o f i t s of a p o t e n t i a l entrant
must be n o n - p o s i t i v e :
which i m p l i e s
S h a p i r o a r g u e s t h a t i n a c o m p e t i t i v e m a r k e t f o r low q u a l i t y
p r o d u c t s p r i c e e q u a l s m a r g i n a l c o s t s i n c e f i r m s do n o t e a r n
q u a l i t y premiums.
The n o - c h e a t i n g
R e p l a c i n g cl f o r p l i n ( 8 ) y i e l d s
c o n d i t i o n d e r i v e d by K l e i n and L e f f l e r and
adopted by Shapiro i s
S h a p i r o combines
(9) and
( 6 ) t o form a n e q u a l i t y which,
he
i m p l i e s t h a t t h e q u a l i t y premium i s s i m p l y t h e n o r m a l
argues,
r e t u r n on t h e f i r m ' s i n v e s t m e n t i n r e p u t a t i o n .
Shapiro notes
that
any
discussion
of
s e n s e l e s s when t h e r e i s p e r f e c t i n f o r m a t i o n .
reputation
is
The v a l u e o f a
r e p u t a t i o n i s t h a t it s u b s t i t u t e s f o r i n f o r m a t i o n
-
in this
case f o r p r i o r knowledge o f p r o d u c t q u a l i t y .
D.
A
Model
The
captured
of t h e Church
economic d e c l i n e
by
a
model
of
of
the
medieval
reputation
Church
building
can
be
and
product
q u a l i t y which i s a h y b r i d o f t h o s e d i s c u s s e d a b o v e .
In t h i s
model, a m o n a s t e r y ( c a l l e d " t h e Church",
which produces a p r o d u c t ,
f o r short) i s a firm
income i n s u r a n c e .
The c o n s u m e r s
are p a r i s h i o n e r s
who p a y
premiums
in
each period
to
the
C h u r c h a l t h o u g h t h e y d o n o t c o l l e c t b e n e f i t s u n t i l some l a t e r
period,
if a t a l l .
The s i z e o f t h e premium d e p e n d s on t h e
The h i g h e r i s t h e r i s k
parishioners1 "tastew f o r insurance.
of
income l o s s ,
and
the
larger
Parishioners
t h e s t r o n g e r i s t h e i r desire f o r coverage,
the
is
cannot
premium
immediately
b e n e f i t s t h e Church p a y s o u t ,
w i l l behave
they
i n an honest
are
observe
willing
the
quantity
f a s h i o n and w i l l provide a
i n any period,
of
b u t t h e y b e l i e v e t h e Church
p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e premium it c o l l e c t s i n b e n e f i t s .
premium p a i d
t o pay.
if
large
Given t h e
t h e Church d i s p e n s e s h i g h
q u a l i t y , o r r e l a t i v e l y ample, b e n e f i t s , p a r i s h i o n e r s w i l l buy
again t h e following period.
quality,
or
relatively
Once t h e C h u r c h d i s p e n s e s low
meagre,
benefits,
they
w i l l
shop
e l s e w h e r e f o r income i n s u r a n c e .
I n a T-period
model,
whether t o dispense high q u a l i t y ,
b e n e f i t s each period.
..,T,
t=1,2,.
q=l,
o r low q u a l i t y ,
The c o s t o f p r o v i d i n g b e n e f i t s i s
cl f o r h i g h o r low q u a l i t y r e s p e c t i v e l y ,
period.
t h e Church chooses
Parishioners
have
a
collective
taste,
pay
up t o pt=6
for
and z e r o o t h e r w i s e .
coverage
as
or
6,
for
i f they purchase
m a r g i n a l v a l u a t i o n o f t h e C h u r c h ' s p r o d u c t i s 8qt;
w i l l
ch
w i t h ch>cl>O i n a n y
i n s u r a n c e a n d p e r p e r i o d u t i l i t y o f 6qt-pt
t h e i n s u r a n c e f o r a premium p t ,
q=O,
long
as
Their
hence t h e y
the
Church
continues t o provide a high q u a l i t y product.18
l8
A s o t h e r s o u r c e s of income i n s u r a n c e ,
Ages,
were
not
common,
the
demand
e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e e a r l y Middle
f o r t h e C h u r c h ' s p r o d u c t was
If t h e C h u r c h i n c u r s t h e c o s t o f p r o v i d i n g h i g h q u a l i t y
r e l i e f i n t h e i n i t i a l period,
it e s t a b l i s h e s a r e p u t a t i o n f o r
The most it c a n g a i n f r o m t h i s r e p u t a t i o n i n t h e
honesty.
f o l l o w i n g p e r i o d i s a one-time
g a i n o f &cl,
a s parishioners
w i l l n o t buy f r o m t h e C h u r c h a f t e r t h e y o b s e r v e l o w q u a l i t y
The C h u r c h w i l l m i l k i t s r e p u t a t i o n i f t h e c o s t
benefits.
savings
f r o m s u p p l y i n g low q u a l i t y
exceed t h e discounted present
i n any period,
value of
ch-cl,
its reputation
for
h o n e s t y : l9
The d i s c o u n t f a c t o r i s 6=l/ ( l + r ) where r i s t h e r e a l i n t e r e s t
rate.
Conversely,
t h e Church w i l l c o n t i n u e t o s u p p l y h i g h
q u a l i t y b e n e f i t s i f t h e c o s t s a v i n g s are less t h a n t h e v a l u e
of its reputation.
P a r i s h i o n e r s i n i t i a l l y b e l i e v e w i t h some p r o b a b i l i t y a,
aE[0,1],
t h a t t h e Church, b e c a u s e o f i t s c o n n e c t i o n w i t h God,
values its reputation highly.
Thus t h e y b e l i e v e i n i t i a l l y
t h a t it w i l l n o t p a y t h e C h u r c h t o c h e a t .
They u p d a t e t h i s
p r o b a b i l i t y each period a f t e r observing t h e q u a l i t y supplied.
Their marginal valuations,
-
-
-
therefore,
are E (eq,) = e a t .
The
--
e f f e c t i v e l y a n a l l - o r - n o t h i n g demand.
Thus p a r i s h i o n e r s who wanted
c o v e r a g e would b e w i l l i n g t o pay up t o t h e i r m a r g i n a l v a l u a t i o n s t o
secure it.
l 9 S i n c e t h e Church does n o t have d i r e c t c o n t r o l o v e r t h e premium which
t h e p a r i s h i o n e r s pay, i t c o n s i d e r s i t s c o s t s a v i n g s , c h - c l , i n any
p e r i o d a s t h e one-time g a i n from c h e a t i n g .
Church b e l i e v e s w i t h some p r o b a b i l i t y Y,
YE [Or 1 1 ,
market w i l l "disappear" i n t h e next p e r i o d .
and t h e p a r i s h i o n e r s
t h a t its
t h e Church
If
know t h a t Y=l i n some p e r i o d t ,
the
c h a i n - s t o r e p a r a d o x i m p l i e s t h a t t h e Church w i l l n e v e r s u p p l y
a
high
q u a l i t y product,
and t h e
parishioners
p u r c h a s e i n s u r a n c e from t h e Church.
any
substance,
therefore,
there
w i l l
never
F o r t h i s model t o h a v e
must
be
some
positive
p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e market w i l l c o n t i n u e t o e x i s t ,
t h a t is
(1-y)>O.
becomes
In
this
event,
the
discount
factor
8= (1-y) / ( l + r ) .
The Church w i l l r e p e a t e d l y s u p p l y h i g h q u a l i t y b e n e f i t s
if
which i m p l i e s
F o r r e l a t i v e p a r a m e t e r v a l u e s 8>ch>c1>0, a n d r e a s o n a b l e r a t e s
o f i n t e r e s t , t h e s t a t e s p a c e d i a g r a m i s a s shown i n F i g u r e 1.
The
likelihood
that
the
Church
w i l l
supply
high
or
low
q u a l i t y b e n e f i t s is contained within t h e u n i t
square,
with
p a r i s h i o n e r b e l i e f s on t h e v e r t i c a l a x i s a n d C h u r c h b e l i e f s
on t h e h o r i z o n t a l a x i s .
Figure
1.
Space
State
Diagram
l o w quality
From F i g u r e 1 it c a n b e s e e n t h a t a s t h e p r o b a b i l i t y o f
market d i s i n t e g r a t i o n i n c r e a s e s
Church w i l l milk
benefits
reputation
i t s r e p u t a t i o n by p r o v i d i n g
increases
parishioners'
too.
beliefs
weaken
(y?) , t h e l i k e l i h o o d t h a t t h e
that
( d )a n d
It
can
the
also
Church
be
w i l l
low q u a l i t y
seen
that
protect
t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s t o pay
as
its
(0a)
d e c l i n e s , t h e Church i s less l i k e l y t o p r o v i d e h i g h q u a l i t y
relief.
As
a f a l l s , t h e value of t h e Church's reputation
d e c l i n e s making t h e c o s t
more a t t r a c t i v e .
s a v i n g s from c h e a t i n g r e l a t i v e l y
Thus s t a r t i n g f r o m p o i n t A ,
a combination
of a n i n c r e a s i n g t h r e a t o f m a r k e t d i s a p p e a r a n c e a n d d e c l i n i n g
p a r i s h i o n e r t r u s t would p u s h t h e Church o v e r t i m e i n a s o u t h -
east d i r e c t i o n ,
u n t i l i n some f u t u r e p e r i o d it p a s s e s o v e r
t h e b o u n d a r y a n d p r o v i d e s low q u a l i t y b e n e f i t s t h e r e a f t e r .
In the l i m i t ,
when y=l a n d a=O,
high
and
quality
the
t h e Church n e v e r p r o d u c e s
parishioners,
having
observed
low
q u a l i t y , never purchase i t s product.
The
location of
monastery
depends
t h e boundary
upon
three
i n any p e r i o d
factors.
Starting
f o r each
from i t s
l o c a t i o n i n F i g u r e 1, a n i n c r e a s e i n t h e t a s t e p a r a m e t e r ,
w i l l s h i f t t h e boundary i n t h e south-east
r i s k o f income l o s s i n c r e a s e s ,
direction.
0,
As the
s o d o e s t h e amount o f premium
parishioners a r e w i l l i n g t o pay.
T h i s enhances t h e v a l u e of
t h e Church's r e p u t a t i o n and hence i t s i n c e n t i v e t o supply a
high q u a l i t y product.
A widening o f t h e c o s t d i f f e r e n t i a l ,
ch-clr s h i f t s t h e b o u n d a r y i n t h e n o r t h - w e s t
t h e cost
s i z e of
direction.
As
s a v i n g s f r o m s u p p l y i n g low q u a l i t y i n c r e a s e ,
the
the
expected windfall p r o f i t
from c h e a t i n g
along w i t h t h e Church's i n c e n t i v e t o c h e a t .
w i l l b e more
l i k e l y t o provide
grows
Thus t h e Church
low q u a l i t y i n s u r a n c e .
An
i n c r e a s e i n t h e i n t e r e s t r a t e a l s o s h i f t s t h e boundary i n t h e
north-west
d i r e c t i o n . It d e c r e a s e s t h e v a l u e of t h e Church's
r e p u t a t i o n making it more l i k e l y t h a t t h e Church w i l l p r o v i d e
l o w quality insurance.
The Church a l w a y s h a s some i n c e n t i v e
Even i f t h e r e i s no p r o b a b i l i t y t h a t t h e market
t o cheat.
(y=O), t h e Church w i l l provide a high q u a l i t y
w i l l disappear
product only i f
c h < r( c l - c h ) which c o n t r a d i c t s t h e r e l a t i v e
parameter v a l u e s f o r non-negative r a t e s of i n t e r e s t .
This model p r e d i c t s t h a t a medieval monastery would have
v i o l a t e d i t s i m p l i c i t c o n t r a c t f o r t h e p r o v i s i o n of
income
i n s u r a n c e i f t h e value of i t s f u t u r e r e p u t a t i o n was l e s s t h a n
t h e one-time
c o s t s a v i n g s from p r o v i d i n g low q u a l i t y r e l i e f .
The v a l u e
of
a monastery's
beliefs:
i t s own b e l i e f
parishioners'
beliefs
reputat ion.
Thus
in
r e p u t a t i o n was
dependent
upon
i t s f u t u r e e x i s t e n c e and i t s
in
its
evidence
desire
regarding
to
protect
the
that
subjective
p r o b a b i l i t i e s h e l d by both a monastery and i t s p a r i s h i o n e r s
i s n e c e s s a r y t o t e s t t h i s model.
cannot be determined
argues t h a t
While t h e s e p r o b a b i l i t i e s
w i t h any a c c u r a c y ,
r e p e a t e d s e i z u r e s of
t h e next
section
monastic p r o p e r t y by t h e
Crown between t h e l a t e 1 3 t h century and t h e D i s s o l u t i o n would
have
cast
doubt
monasteries.
on t h e
f u t u r e e x i s t e n c e of
the
remaining
F u r t h e r , t h e widely observed d e c l i n e i n r e l i e f
s u p p l i e d o v e r t h a t p e r i o d was n o t n e c e s s a r i l y an i n d i c a t i o n
of moral decay a s s o c i a l h i s t o r i a n s s u g g e s t , but was i n l a r g e
\
p a r t t h e r a t i o n a l response of wealth-maximizing f i r m s t o t h i s
t h r e a t t o t h e i r continued e x i s t e n c e .
THE
ECONOMIC DECLINE
1350
OF
TO
THE
ENGLISH CHURCH,
1536
I n t h e h i g h Middle Ages, t h e C a t h o l i c C h u r c h i n E n g l a n d
r e p r e s e n t e d a p o l i t i c a l a n d economic f o r c e i n s o c i e t y .
Its
s e c u l a r a r m e x e r c i s e d p o l i t i c a l power t h r o u g h i t s r o l e a s
a d v i s o r t o t h e Crown a n d l i a i s o n w i t h t h e p o p e .
Its monastic
a r m h e l d e c o n o m i c power by v i r t u e o f i t s p o s i t i o n a s p r o v i d e r
o f income i n s u r a n c e .
T h i s s e c t i o n e x a m i n e s t h e economic d e c l i n e o f t h e Church
i n medieval England from t h e 1 4 t h c e n t u r y t o t h e d i s s o l u t i o n
of
t h e monasteries.
It
argues t h a t
repeated
seizures of
m o n a s t i c p r o p e r t y b y t h e Crown c a s t d o u b t on t h e c o n t i n u e d
existence of t h e remaining houses.
Consequently,
surviving
m o n a s t e r i e s c u t b a c k on t h e r e l i e f t h e y d i s p e n s e d ,
retaining
virtually a l l of
t h e i r income f o r t h e m s e l v e s .
It
further
argues t h a t as t h e l a i t y observed t h i s retrenchment,
they
redirected t h e i r c h a r i t a b l e d o n a t i o n s t o p r i v a t e f o u n d a t i o n s
which p r o v i d e d t h e t r a d i t i o n a l eleemosynary f u n c t i o n s o f t h e
Church.
By 1 5 3 6 ,
t h e monasteries '
r a p i d l y becoming d e f u n c t .
a thriving enterprise,
p o w e r f u l economic f o r c e .
i n s u r a n c e b u s i n e s s was
What Henry V I I I s u p p r e s s e d w a s n o t
but
the physical
s h e l l of
a once-
This section a l s o t r a c e s t h e secularization of English
society.
provided
With t h e c o n t r a c t i o n i n s o c i a l s e r v i c e s h i t h e r t o
by
the
monasteries,
begging
crime became
and
t h r e a t t o t h e maintenance of s o c i a l o r d e r .
Accordingly,
a
the
Crown g r a d u a l l y a n d r e l u c t a n t l y assumed r e s p o n s i b i l i t y o v e r
t h e 16th century f o r t h e administration of poor r e l i e f
t h e care o f t h e s i c k a n d t h e a g e d .
e n a c t e d h e r g r e a t P o o r Law,
e c o n o m i c power.
A.
not
t h e Church no l o n g e r p o s s e s s e d
of the Monasteries
dissolution
c e n t u r y was
By 1601, when E l i z a b e t h I
E n g l i s h s o c i e t y h a d become s e c u l a r .
The Decline
The
and
of
without
the
monasteries
precedent.
in
the
mid-16th
Early English
almost c o n t i n u a l l y a t w a r w i t h France,
kings,
w e r e concerned about
t h e t r a n s m i s s i o n o f revenue from a l i e n m o n a s t e r i e s t o t h e i r
mother houses i n Europe.
Accordingly,
i n 1 2 9 5 Edward I s e i z e d
p r o p e r t y b e l o n g i n g t o a number o f C l u n i a c h o u s e s , a n d o u t l a w e d
the
transmission
of
any
revenue
t o France.
(Clarke,
170)
Edward I1 t o o k more d r a s t i c a c t i o n b e t w e e n 1308 a n d 1312 when
he dissolved a further forty-eight
a n d Hadcock,
46)
alien priories.
(Knowles
I n 1337, Edward I11 s e i z e d t h e p r o p e r t y o f
a n u n c e r t a i n number o f C l u n i a c h o u s e s , h o l d i n g i t u n t i l t h e r e
w a s temporary peace w i t h France i n 1361.
of
t h e houses w e r e naturalized,
control,
that
is,
At that time,
some
f r e e d from French
w h i l e o t h e r s were l a t e r g i v e n by R i c h a r d I1 t o t h e
E n g l i s h Church.
(Clarke,
177)
Between
1350 a n d
1414,
l e a s t s e v e n t y more a l i e n p r i o r i e s were s u p p r e s s e d .
a n d Hadcock,
t o
appropriated
the
on,
property
the
15th century,
t.o
property
transferring
Later
(Knowles
46)
Prior
attaching
at
foreign
the
the
priory
the
Church,
to
it
increasingly
i t s own p u r p o s e s .
century
used
priories
to
an
generally
either
English
by
gave
way
of
or
by
house,
l i q u i d a t e d w e a l t h d i r e c t l y t o t h e Church.
however,
to
Crown
property
build
and
Henry V i n
which
endow
directed
formerly
several
commandeered
the early
belonged
t o
colleges.
15th
alien
Henry
VI
s i m i l a r l y b u i l t a n d endowed E t o n C o l l e g e a n d K i n g ' s C o l l e g e ,
Cambridge i n t h e mid-15th
suppression of
assault
on
indication
century.
(Clarke,
178)
While t h e
a l i e n monasteries d i d not represent a d i r e c t
the
that
English
the
it
Church,
Crown
was
not
served
as
opposed
an
t o
early
forceful
a c q u i s i t i o n o f Church w e a l t h .
The d i r e c t a s s a u l t o n t h e E n g l i s h C h u r c h b e g a n i n 1404
when t h e House o f Commons p e t i t i o n e d H e n r y I V t o s e i z e t h e
Church's
temporal
income
t o
pay
for
the
defence
Kingdom.
A s i m i l a r p r o p o s a l was made i n 1 4 1 0 , b u t Henry I V ,
under t h e i n f l u e n c e of t h e Archbishop o f Canterbury,
(Clarke,
177)
several
the
refused.
I n 1 5 1 8 , C a r d i n a l Wolsey s u p p r e s s e d t h e f i r s t
E n g l i s h monastery.
of
of
With i t s r e s o u r c e s ,
colleges.
Wolsey
h e began t h e b u i l d i n g
suppressed
m o n a s t e r i e s b e t w e e n 1524 a n d 1 5 2 9 .
a
further
Among o t h e r t h i n g s ,
30
the
wealth
of
these
houses
financed t h e b u i l d i n g of
Cardinal
C o l l e g e , now C h r i s t Church, O x f o r d . 20
This accelerating attack
monastic
arm
suppressions
of
and
the
was
directed
Church.
following
the
solely
Throughout
Dissolution,
the
the
Church c o n t i n u e d t o o f f e r i t s s e r v i c e s as b e f o r e .
it w a s n o t
until
after the
reign
of
Henry V I I I
E n g l i s h Church b ro k e e n t i r e l y w i t h c a t h o l i c i s m ,
t h e b r e a k was t e m p o r a r y .
at
the
early
secular
In f a c t ,
that
the
and even t h e n
E.F. R i c e notes t h a t
many t h o u s a n d s [ o f E n g l i s h s u b j e c t s ] l i v e d l o n g
e n o u g h t o be Roman C a t h o l i c s i n 1 5 2 9 , H e n r i c i a n
C a t h o l i c s from 1534 t o 1547, m o d e r a t e ,
then
e x t r e m e , P r o t e s t a n t s u n d e r Edward V I ( 1 5 4 7 - 1 5 5 3 ) ,
Roman C a t h o l i c s o n c e more u n d e r Mary ( 1 5 5 3 - 1 5 5 8 ) ,
and a g a i n moderate P r o t e s t a n t s under E l i z a b e t h I .
(17 1)
By t h e t i m e o f t h e D i s s o l u t i o n i n 1 5 3 6 , t h e r e f o r e ,
English
Church
had
received
many
indications
that
c o n t i n u e d e x i s t e n c e o f i t s m o n a s t i c a r m was u n c e r t a i n .
any l e v e l o f p a r i s h i o n e r b e l i e f s i n t h e i r honesty,
monasteries
would
have
been
moving
eastward
in
the
the
For
surviving
their
own
f o r m u l a t i o n s o f F i g u r e 1, w i t h t h e i n c e n t i v e t o s u p p l y a h i g h
q u a l i t y product diminishing over t i m e .
I n f a c t , i t a p p e a r s t h a t as t h e 1 5 t h c e n t u r y s u p p r e s s i o n s
proceeded,
R.H.
t h e q u a l i t y of t h e Church's
c h a r i t y did d e c l i n e .
S n a p e h a s f o u n d , f o r example, t h a t h o s p i t a l i t y ,
which was
Wolsey suppressed 4 English monasteries in 1524, 17 in 1525, 3 in
See Knowles, 470 for a full list of
1527, 5 in 1528 and one in 1529.
early suppressions.
one o f t h e Church's c h a r i t a b l e f u n c t i o n s , f e l l o f f .
Inns w e r e
erected
t o t a k e t h e place of t h e monastery's h o s t e l r y - i n
some cases b y t h e a c t u a l c o n v e r s i o n o f t h e h o s t e l r y
i n t o an i n n .
Hospitality t o the great doubtless
c o n t i n u e d , b u t t h e r e i s e n o u g h e v i d e n c e t o show
t h a t f o r t h e p o o r e r t r a v e l l e r l i t t l e was b e i n g d o n e
i n t h e e n d , a n d t h a t t h e monks i n t h i s d i r e c t i o n
a l s o w e r e c e n t r i n g ( s i c ) t h e i r i n t e r e s t s more a n d
more
on t h e i r own e a s e a n d w e l f a r e , a n d l e s s a n d
l e s s on a n y s e r v i c e s w h i c h t h e y m i g h t d o t o t h e i r
(Snape, 1 1 2 )
neighbours
.
T h i s view of t h e r e l i g i o u s i s s u p p o r t e d by contemporary
observers.
The g r e a t s a t i r i s t , G e o f f r e y C h a u c e r , p r o v i d e d t h e
f o l l o w i n g d e s c r i p t i o n o f a monk a t t h e e n d o f t h e 1 4 t h c e n t u r y
A Monk t h e r was, a f a i r f o r t h e m a i s t r i e ,
An o u t r i d e r e , t h a t l o v e d e v e n e r i e ,
......................................
Of p r i k y n g a n d o f h u n t y n g f o r t h e h a r e
Was a1 h i s l u s t , f o r n o c o s t wolde h e s p a r e .
I s e i g h h i s s l e v e s p u r f i l e d a t t h e hond
With g r y s , a n d t h a t t h e f y n e s t e o f a l o n d ;
And, f o r t o f e s t n e h i s hood u n d e r h i s chyn,
H e h a d d e o f g o l d ywroght a f u l c u r i o u s pyn;
......................................
H e was n a t p a l e as a f o r p y n e d g o o s t .
A f a t swan l o v e d h e b e s t o f a n y r o o s t . * l
21
Theodore Morrison p r o v i d e s a modern t r a n s l a t i o n (65-66):
There was a Monk, and nowhere was h i s p e e r ,
and a r o v i n g o v e r s e e r .
A hunter,
...........................................
H i s t a s t e was a l l f o r t r a c k i n g down t h e h a r e ,
And what h i s s p o r t might c o s t he d i d n o t c a r e .
H i s s l e e v e s I n o t i c e d , where t h e y m e t h i s hand,
Trimmed w i t h g r a y f u r , t h e f i n e s t i n t h e l a n d .
H i s hood was f a s t e n e d w i t h a c u r i o u s p i n
Made of wrought g o l d and c l a s p e d b e n e a t h h i s c h i n
...........................................
H e was n o t p a l e n o r peaked l i k e a g h o s t .
H e r e l i s h e d a plump swan a s h i s f a v o r i t e r o a s t .
Snape also found e v i d e n c e o f t h e v a l u e o f a l m s g i v e n
R.H.
H e c i t e s t w o s p e c i f i c cases.
o u t b y selected m o n a s t e r i e s .
1409-1410,
of
In
F i n c h d a l e , a B e n e d i c t i n e a b b e y i n Durham, g a v e a l m s
E2 1 0 s . 3 d .
o u t o f a g r o s s income o f
r o u g h l y 1 . 3 % o f i t s income.
f e l l t o under
1%. I n
•’187 1 5 s .
ld.,
or
The following y e a r t h e p r o p o r t i o n
1442-1443,
o n l y 11s. 5 d .
out
of
an
o r roughly 0.3%, w a s given as a l m s .
i n c o m e o f •’177 1 4 s . 6 d . ,
These f i g u r e s d o n o t i n c l u d e c h a r i t y i n kind, b u t Snape n o t e s
t h a t i n c l u s i o n o f t y p i c a l amounts o f
food and c l o t h i n g given
b y other m o n a s t e r i e s would n o t b r i n g t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f g r o s s
income g i v e n as a l m s t o 5 % .
Whalley,
(Snape,
114)
The r e c o r d s f o r
a C i s t e r c i a n abbey i n Lancashire, i n d i c a t e t h a t a l m s
a s a p r o p o r t i o n of t o t a l i n c o m e a m o u n t e d t o 4% i n 1 4 7 7 , b u t
o n l y 2-1/4% i n 1 5 2 7 . ( S n a p e , 1 1 5 n n . )
Alexander
Savine
notes
in
his
study
of
the
Valor
Ecclesiasticus t h a t o n a v e r a g e , j u s t p r i o r t o t h e D i s s o l u t i o n ,
m o n a s t e r i e s were d i s p e n s i n g n o t more t h a n 3 % o f t h e i r g r o s s
i n c o m e s a s alms.
of
over
•’90,000,
Out o f 210 m o n a s t e r i e s w i t h c o m b i n e d i n c o m e s
for
instance,
c h a r i t a b l e purposes i n 1535.
that
the
monasteries'
If
a monastery
•’2,700 w a s
(Savine, 238)
spiritual
approximately one-quarter
100)
just
given
Savine c a l c u l a t e s
income
accounted
o f t h e i r g r o s s incomes.
gave
the
required
for
one-third
for
(Savine,
of
its
s p i r i t u a l income t o t h e p o o r , t h e r e f o r e , t h e p r o p o r t i o n o f i t s
t o t a l income g i v e n o u t would b e o v e r 8 % .
Clearly,
i f Snape
a n d S a v i n e a r e c o r r e c t i n t h e i r estimates o f t h e q u a n t i t y o f
alms b e i n g d i s p e n s e d ,
t h e monasteries w e r e not
supplying a
"high q u a l i t y w product.
It
suspect,
the
therefore,
monasteries'
that
would n o t
unreasonable
be
parishioners'
trust
in
to
the
l l h o n e s t y l l would h a v e b e e n d e c l i n i n g
continued
over t h e 15th and e a r l y 16th c e n t u r i e s .
In t h i s event,
the
f u t u r e v a l u e o f i t s r e p u t a t i o n t o a m o n a s t e r y would a l s o h a v e
I n t e r m s o f F i g u r e 1, t h e m o n a s t e r y w o u l d h a v e
decreased.
moved
a
in
southward
direction.
Combined
with
the
i n t e n s i f y i n g t h r e a t o f s u p p r e s s i o n , many m o n a s t e r i e s may w e l l
have found it did n o t pay t o continue t o provide h i g h q u a l i t y
social services.
By
contrast,
contracts
many
monasteries
entered
into
explicit
f o r annuities with increasing frequency.
G.W.O.
Woodward h a s f o u n d t h a t s h o r t l y b e f o r e t h e D i s s o l u t i o n a l a r g e
number
of
houses
s o l d more
management w o u l d d i c t a t e .
Yorkshire,
against
annual
had
fifty-one
i t s revenue
value
Benedictine
of
the
friary
in
annuities than
Kirkstall,
annuities
1536
abbey's
also
in
a n n u i t i e s t o t a l l i n g •’101 1 9 s . ,
valuation.
(26)
-
about
prudent
fiscal
a C i s t e r c i a n abbey i n
totalling
one-fifth
property.
(26)
Yorkshire,
had
•’58 c h a r g e d
of
the net
Whitby,
a
forty-seven
o r nearly one-quarter
of
its
Woodward n o t e s t h a t many o t h e r m o n a s t e r i e s
s o l d a g r e a t number o f a n n u i t i e s i n t h e y e a r s l e a d i n g t o t h e
Dissolution.
H e concludes t h a t t h e monasteries
m u s t h a v e b e e n f a i r l y c e r t a i n t h e d i s s o l u t i o n was
c o m i n g when t h e y c h o s e e i t h e r t o f a v o u r t h e i r
f r i e n d s w i t h f r e e l y g r a n t e d p e n s i o n s which t h e y
knew t h e y would n o t t h e m s e l v e s h a v e t o p a y , o r e l s e
t o o b t a i n t h e maximum c a s h i n h a n d b y t h e
widespread s a l e of a n n u i t i e s .
The c r o w n , t h e i r
successor,
w a s l e f t burdened with a l l t h e s e
payments without e n j o y i n g t h e b e n e f i t o f t h e
p u r c h a s e money.
(26)
Thus
progressed,
for
would
it
the
appear t h a t
as
the
early
suppressions
t h e m o n a s t e r i e s honoured t h e i r i m p l i c i t c o n t r a c t s
provision
of
income
insurance
with
decreasing
I t would f u r t h e r a p p e a r t h a t t h e y m i l k e d t h e i r
generosity.
reputations:
they sold annuities i n f i s c a l l y irresponsible
q u a n t i t i e s so as t o r e a p as l a r g e a w i n d f a l l g a i n a s p o s s i b l e
p r i o r t o t h e Dissolution.
B.
The Alienation of the Laity
The
model
developed
in
Section
I1
predicts
that
as
p a r i s h i o n e r s observed t h e d e c l i n i n g q u a l i t y of t h e Church's
product,
t h e y would s e e k o t h e r methods
of
s e c u r i n g income
insurance.
Some e v i d e n c e h a s b e e n f o u n d which s u p p o r t s t h i s
prediction.
The c h a r i t a b l e t r u s t , f o r e x a m p l e , w a s w e l l known
i n England i n medieval t i m e s .
centuries,
most
beneficiary,
in
charitable
the
16th
While i n t h e 1 4 t h and 1 5 t h
trusts
century
named
the
increasing
Church
as
numbers
of
c h a r i t a b l e t r u s t s named p r i v a t e f o u n d a t i o n s a s b e n e f i c i a r i e s .
( J o r d a n , 111)
W.K.
Jordan
studied
the
probate
records
E n g l i s h c o u n t i e s f o r t h e p e r i o d 1480-1660.22
of
several
He divided the
--
22
The c o u n t i e s s t u d i e d a r e B r i s t o l , Buckinghamshire, Hampshire,
L a n c a s h i r e , N o r f o l k , Somerset, W o r c e s t e r s h i r e and Y o r k s h i r e .
Kent,
i n t e n d e d u s e s of
relief,
t h e bequests
social
into five categories:
rehabilitation,
b e t t e r m e n t s and r e l i g i o n . 2 3
education,
poor
municipal
He noted t h a t only t h e b e q u e s t s
f o r r e l i g i o n went t o t h e Church;
t h e o t h e r b e q u e s t s were l e f t
t o p r i v a t e c h a r i t a b l e foundations t o a d m i n i s t e r a s d i r e c t e d by
Figure 2 p l o t s t h e p e r c e n t a g e d i s t r i b u t i o n of
the testator.
b e q u e s t s from 1480-1600.
(Poor r e l i e f ,
social rehabilitation
and education have been combined t o form " s o c i a l s e r v i c e s " . )
From F i g u r e 2 i t can be seen t h a t d u r i n g t h e f i n a l two
decades
of
the
15th century,
the
proportion
of
bequests
d i r e c t e d t o t h e Church r o s e from about 60% t o 70%, while t h e
proportion
designated
approximately 2 7 % t o 2 2 % .
for
social
services
fell
from
This would suggest t h a t t h e l a i t y
g e n e r a l l y s t i l l b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e Church was f u l f i l l i n g i t s
eleemosynary
functions,
and
that
private
charitable
foundations were not thought t o be e s s e n t i a l f o r t h e r e l i e f of
the
poor.
After
1500,
however,
declined steadily,
until
only
bequests
4 4 % of
to
Jordan's
the
Church
sample
was
d e s i g n a t e d f o r r e l i g i o u s use by t h e time of t h e D i s s o l u t i o n .
A t t h e same time,
t h e p r o p o r t i o n of b e q u e s t s l e f t t o p r i v a t e
23
Poor relief is further classified as outright relief, almshouses,
general charity and the aged.
Social rehabilitation consists of
bequests to be used for prisons, loans, workhouses, apprenticeship
schemes, the sick and hospitals, and marriage subsidies. Classes of
education are schools, colleges and universities, non-university
libraries and scholarships and fellowships. Municipal betterments are
divided into general uses, companies for the public benefit, parks and
public works, roads, etc. Religion is divided into church general,
prayers, church repairs, maintenance of clergy, puritan lectureships and
church building.
foundations t o be used f o r poor relief, s o c i a l r e h a b i l i t a t i o n
-
and education
t h e t r a d i t i o n a l c h a r i t a b l e f u n c t i o n s of t h e
- increased t o
monasteries
Following t h e Dissolution,
46%.
t h e d e c l i n e i n d o n a t i o n s t o t h e Church,
bequests
for privately
dramatic.
bequests
Throughout
intended
provided
and t h e i n c r e a s e i n
w a s more
social services,
the e n t i r e period t h e proportion
for
municipal
projects
remained
of
fairly
s t e a d y a t a b o u t 5% t o 1 0 % .
Figure
.
%
100
90
80
70
Percentage
1480-1600
2.
--
--
-;
E
50
--
40
--
-20 -30
*----
0
Social
Services
Religious
Donations
-- 1
'\
-
----- *--_--
-\
_---
-0-4----
c
-
a-
0
--.
-- -,----.-
- - * * - m a
I
''
\
Municipal
0
-,---
0
\
a*
Bequests,
of
/
60
Distribution
\
\
I
I
I
I
I
I
1
1
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I
Source:
Jordan, T a b l e s I1 t h r o u g h V I .
a t t a c h e d t o t h i s p a p e r a s Appendix 11.
I
1
I
I
Jordan's figures a r e
J o r d a n ' s f i n d i n g s a r e n o t e w o r t h y f o r two r e a s o n s .
First,
t h e d e c l i n e i n donations f o r r e l i g i o u s purposes began a t t h e
t u r n of t h e 16th century.
I n t e r m s o f t h e model d e v e l o p e d i n
S e c t i o n 11, t h i s t i m i n g s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e l a i t y expected t h e
Church t o v i o l a t e ,
violating,
and indeed must have observed t h e Church
i t s i m p l i c i t c o n t r a c t f o r t h e p r o v i s i o n of
high
q u a l i t y r e l i e f b e f o r e C a r d i n a l Wolsey's e a r l y s u p p r e s s i o n s .
Hence J o r d a n ' s
that
the
power,
findings provide
Church
had
support
effectively
h e l d by v i r t u e of
f o r t h e hypothesis
i t s maintenance of
p r i o r t o t h e D i s s o l u t i o n of t h e monasteries.
findings
are
noteworthy
because
its
surrendered
they
economic
s o c i a l order,
Second, J o r d a n ' s
indicate
that
the
economic d e c l i n e of t h e English Church began w e l l b e f o r e t h e
r i s e of P r o t e s t a n t i s m which,
IV,
a s w i l l be d i s c u s s e d i n S e c t i o n
played a p a r t i n t h e d e c l i n e of t h e European Church.
Thus
t h e d e c l i n e of t h e English Church, p r i o r t o t h e D i s s o l u t i o n ,
appears t o have been a p u r e l y economic phenomenon.
J o r d a n ' s f i n d i n g s have been t h e s u b j e c t of a c o n s i d e r a b l e
c o n t r o v e r s y which f o c u s e s p r i m a r i l y on h i s f a i l u r e t o d e f l a t e
t h e v a l u e of
t h e bequests.24
William B i t t l e and Todd Lane
( 1 9 7 6 ) d e f l a t e J o r d a n ' s decadal e s t i m a t e s with a Brown-Hopkins
index,
and d i v i d e t h e b e q u e s t s
donations.
into religious
and s e c u l a r
They f i n d , l i k e Jordan, t h a t from 1 5 0 0 t h e r e was a
marked r e d i r e c t i o n of c h a r i t a b l e funds away from t h e Church.
They maintain,
however, t h a t p r i v a t e foundations d i d not g a i n
from t h e Church's l o s s .
B i t t l e and Lane suggest i n s t e a d t h a t
This problem has been circumvented through the use of percentage
distributions rather than English pounds to show relative changes in the
nature of giving in Figure 2. In addition to the two papers discussed
here, see Coleman (l978), Gould (1978) and ~ i t t l eand Lane (1978).
24
". . .
there was
of t h e l a i t y .
a decline i n t h e over-all philanthropic urge"
(204)
J . F . Hadwin d i s a g r e e s .
a n d Lane,
made
bequests.
deflated y i e l d o f
Hadwin
calculates
the
total
s e c u l a r b e n e f a c t i o n s t o b e • ’ 3 , 8 9 5 i n 1480-
• ’ 6 6 , 3 4 8 i n 1531-1540,
a n d • ’ 7 6 , 2 4 3 i n 1591-1600.
This represents an increase of
1600% between
(111)
1490 a n d t h e
and a f u r t h e r 15%between t h e D i s s o l u t i o n and t h e
Dissolution,
end of t h e century.
Hadwin's
and B i t t l e
failed t o c a l c u l a t e t h e y i e l d i n f u t u r e decades of
previously
1490,
H e claims t h a t J o r d a n ,
deflated
Figure 3 p l o t s B i t t l e and Lane's
estimates o f
secular donations,
w i t h B i t t l e a n d L a n e ' s estimates o f
and
together
religious donations f o r
t h e p e r i o d 1480-1600.
I t i s c l e a r f r o m F i g u r e 3 t h a t a d e c r e a s i n g p r o p o r t i o n of
c h a r i t a b l e d o n a t i o n s went t o t h e C h u r c h a f t e r 1 5 0 0 .
The l a i t y
apparently
from
stopped
monasteries.
foundations,
insuring,
purchasing
Whether
they
income
were
insurance
buying
from
a s J o r d a n a n d Hadwin w o u l d s u g g e s t ,
a s B i t t l e a n d Lane would s u g g e s t ,
the
private
o r self-
i s a matter f o r
debate.
Some s u p p o r t f o r t h e s e l f - i n s u r a n c e
from t h e f i n d i n g s o f
R.S.
Schofield ranks thirty-eight
t h e o r y can be gleaned
Schofield and Alexander Savine.
English counties by l a y wealth
d e f i n e d t o be t h o u s a n d s o f E n g l i s h p o u n d s p e r a c r e a t 1 5 1 5 .
S a v i n e p r o v i d e s a l m o s t c o m p l e t e f i g u r e s f o r s p i r i t u a l income
in
for
1536
counties
nineteen
have been
s p i r i t u a l income.
of
ranked
Schofieldls
1 through
counties
1 9 by
.25
These
wealth
a n d by
The h i g h e s t w e a l t h o r income l e v e l i s g i v e n
a r a n k o f 1, w h i l e t h e l o w e s t i s g i v e n a r a n k of 1 9 .
The two
sets o f r a n k i n g s a r e superimposed on e a c h o t h e r i n F i g u r e 4 .
Figure
3.
T
Religious
and
Secular Donations,
1480-1600
Reli
Dona
Source: Bittle and Lane (l976), Table 3; h ad win, Table 1.
Bittlels and Lane's and Hadwin1s estimates are attached to
this paper as Appendix 111.
Savine actually provides figures for gross income, which he defines
as temporal plus spiritual income, and gross temporal income for each
monastery by county.
Hence spiritual income is taken to be the
difference between the two. The figures for nine of the counties are
complete, while those for the remaining ten each lack temporal, and
hence spiritual, income figures for one monastery.
25
Figure
4.
Wealth and S p i r i t u a l
By County
Income
Rankings
Rank
20
,
Source:
S c h o f i e l d , Table 2; and Savine,
Appendix I V f o r t h e a c t u a l f i g u r e s .
270-87.
See
The s t r a i g h t l i n e r e p r e s e n t s t h e r a n k i n g b y l a y w e a l t h .
The h i s t o g r a m r e p r e s e n t s t h e r a n k i n g b y s p i r i t u a l i n c o m e .
If
a l l c o u n t i e s g a v e t h e same p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e i r w e a l t h t o t h e
church
-
f o r example,
identical.
rankings
Hence
below
the
the tithe
counties
wealth
- t h e two r a n k i n g s w o u l d
which
line
have
gave
a
be
spiritual
income
relatively
larger
p r o p o r t i o n o f t h e i r w e a l t h t o t h e Church t h a n t h e c o u n t i e s
with s p i r i t u a l
income r a n k i n g s above t h e w e a l t h
line.
It
would a p p e a r
Herefordshire,
from F i g u r e
that,
4
the eight wealthiest
except
f o r Cornwall and
c o u n t i e s i n t h e sample
gave l e s s t o t h e monasteries than t h e i r r e l a t i v e wealth would
d i c t a t e , and t h e eleven p o o r e s t gave more.
Schofield suggests
that
wool
and
cloth,
rather
than
a g r i c u l t u r a l goods, provided t h e main source of income f o r t h e
wealthiest counties.
(100)
The p a r i s h i o n e r s of t h e s e c o u n t i e s
may w e l l have b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e i r r i s k of
income l o s s was
f a l l i n g (0.1) a s t h e English wool and c l o t h t r a d e boomed i n t h e
f i r s t h a l f of t h e 1 6 t h c e n t u r y .
86)
Self-insurance
(Clarkson, 124;
Holderness,
may have appeared t o be an a t t r a c t i v e
a l t e r n a t i v e t o an i n c r e a s i n g l y m i s e r l y Church.
D.N. McCloskey has found t h a t r e s i d e n t s of s o u t h e a s t e r n
England were involved
i n t h e d i v e r s i f i e d economy of London and t h e
northwest c o a s t of t h e Continent, faced broader and
t h e r e f o r e more s t a b l e markets f o r t h e i r crops t h a n
d i d p e a s a n t s f a r t h e r i n l a n d , and c o u l d d i v e r s i f y
t h e i r p e r s o n a l p o r t f o l i o s more e a s i l y o u t s i d e
(118)
agriculture .
. .
Of t h e e i g h t w e a l t h i e s t c o u n t i e s i n F i g u r e 4 ,
s o u t h e a s t e r n England. 26
AS
seven a r e i n
t r a d e and commerce expanded over
t h e l a t e r Middle Ages, t h e p a r i s h i o n e r s of t h e s e c o u n t i e s may
have b e l i e v e d t h a t t h e i r r i s k of income l o s s was f a l l i n g , and
t h u s t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s t o pay f o r t h e Church's product would
have d e c l i n e d t o o .
26
Somerset is in the southwest.
W h i l e e v i d e n c e o f a d e c l i n e i n d o n a t i o n s t o t h e Church i s
w e l l documented,
remain t h e
t h e m o t i v a t i o n u n d e r l y i n g t h i s d e c l i n e must
subject
of
The m o n a s t e r i e s were
speculation.
p r o v i d i n g s o c i a l s e r v i c e s which w e r e d i m i n i s h i n g i n q u a l i t y
a n d q u a n t i t y o v e r t h e l a t e r M i d d l e Ages.
The l a i t y m i g h t w e l l
h a v e c o n c l u d e d t h a t t h e Church was f a c i n g a g r o w i n g i n c e n t i v e
t o cheat;
i n t h i s e v e n t t h e i r marginal v a l u a t i o n s and hence
t h e i r w i l l i n g n e s s t o g i v e t o t h e C h u r c h would h a v e d e c l i n e d .
( 8 d ) Hence, it i s n o t u n r e a s o n a b l e t o s u s p e c t t h a t t h e r i s e
of p r i v a t e c h a r i t a b l e foundations and t h e concomitant d e c l i n e
o f t h e C h u r c h were more t h a n c o i n c i d e n t a l .
C.
The
Secularization
of English
Society
The s t a t e g r a d u a l l y , a n d most o f t e n r e l u c t a n t l y , assumed
t h e Church's function of maintaining s o c i a l order through a
long
series
century.
of
enactments
dating
back
to
the
late
14th
B y 1 6 0 1 , when E l i z b e t h I e n a c t e d h e r g r e a t P o o r Law,
t h e s e c u l a r i z a t i o n o f E n g l i s h s o c i e t y was c o m p l e t e ,
and t h e
s t a t e w a s t h e s o l e h o l d e r o f power.
The s t a t e ' s e a r l i e s t c o n c e r n a b o u t t h e C h u r c h ' s a b i l i t y
t o m a i n t a i n s o c i a l o r d e r was e x p r e s s e d i n s e t t l e m e n t l a w s . * '
With t h e d e c a y o f t h e m a n o r i a l s y s t e m , l a b o u r t e n d e d t o become
27
Cannan, C h a p t e r 3 p r o v i d e s a thorough d i s c u s s i o n o f t h e c o n t e n t o f
e a c h of t h e laws c i t e d i n t h i s s e c t i o n .
,
more m i g r a t o r y .
But vagrancy was viewed a s a t h r e a t , a s bands
of roving beggars would o f t e n l o o t and p i l l a g e t o s t a y a l i v e .
Hence i n 1388, Richard I1 decreed t h a t impotent beggars must
remain i n t h e town t h e y were i n when t h e Act was proclaimed.28
Apparently, t h i s Act was not enforced.
century,
By t h e e a r l y 1 6 t h
vagrancy had become a " c h r o n i c plague" i n England.
(Leonard,
13)
Thus i n 1495 and 1503, Henry V I I re-enacted
s e t t l e m e n t laws which forbade t h e impotent poor from begging
o u t s i d e t h e i r own p a r i s h e s ;
law were
t o be p u n i s h e d
birth.29
Even
though
s t r a y i n g v a g r a n t s who broke t h e
and
the
returned
t o their
distribution
of
places
alms
by
of
the
m o n a s t e r i e s was not i n any sense a c o o r d i n a t e d system of poor
relief,
i t was b e l i e v e d t h a t i f
p a r i s h could look a f t e r i t s own.
t h e poor s t a y e d p u t ,
(Jordan, 82)
t h e Crown t r i e d t o combat vagrancy.
each
Again i n 1530,
Beggars were l i c e n s e d ,
and a s s i g n e d a p a r t i c u l a r geographic region i n which t o beg.
Every able-bodied vagrant was t o be s e n t back " . . . t o t h e p l a c e
where he was born o r where he l a s t dwelt
t h r e e years,
. ..
by t h e space of
and t h e r e put himself t o l a b o u r l i k e a s a t r u e
man ought t o do. w 3 0
The f i r s t t r a n s f e r t o t h e s t a t e of some r e s p o n s i b i l i t y
f o r t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of poor r e l i e f o c c u r r e d i n 1536.
Henry
V I I I decreed t h a t each c i t y , town o r p a r i s h be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r
28
1 2 R i c h a r d 11, c. 7
29
11 Henry V I I ,
30
22 Henry V I I I , c . 1 2
c.2
(1495),
1 9 Henry V I I , c . 1 2
(1503)
i t s own poor by p r o v i d i n g c h a r i t y f o r t h e d i s a b l e d , and work
p r o j e c t s f o r t h e s t u r d y unemployed.
the
parish
to
collect
poor
1547,
Edward
In
S u n d a y s . 31
To t h i s end, he empowered
relief
VI
in
the
repealed
churches
this
act,
on
but
confirmed t h e duty of t h e p a r i s h t o c a r e f o r i t s own impotent
poor.
The new a c t
instructed the
clergy t o exhort t h e i r
c o n g r e g a t i o n s each Sunday t o g i v e alms f o r t h e support of t h e
Edward V I a l s o d e c l a r e d vagrancy p u n i s h a b l e by two
poor.
y e a r s ' e n s l a ~ e m e n t . ~The
~ s l a v e r y p r o v i s i o n s of t h i s a c t were
r e p e a l e d two y e a r s l a t e r , but t h e duty of t h e l o c a l government
was r e a f f i r m e d .
In
33
1551,
payment
of
poor
rates
was made
compulsory.
Every town and p a r i s h was i n s t r u c t e d t o e l e c t , each y e a r , two
officers
townsfolk.
to
be
collectors
of
charitable
alms
from
the
The o f f i c e r s ,
.
on t h e Sunday next a f t e r t h e i r e l e c t i o n . . when
t h e people i s a t church and h a t h heard God's holy
word, s h a l l g e n t l y ask and demand of every man and
woman what t h e y of t h e i r c h a r i t y w i l l be c o n t e n t e d
t o g i v e weekly towards t h e r e l i e f of t h e poor;
and
t h e same t o be w r i t t e n i n t h e [ o f f i c i a l ] r e g i s t e r
o r book. 34
Recalcitrant rate-payers
" . . .according
would,
31
27 Henry V I I I ,
32
1 Edward VI,
33
3
&
4 Edward VI,
c. 1 6
34
5
&
6 Edward VI,
c. 2
C. 25
C. 3
were t o be s e n t t o t h e b i s h o p who
t o his discretion,
take order for the
reformation"
of
the
offender.
In
1562,
Elizabeth
I
a u t h o r i z e d c i v i l m a g i s t r a t e s t o compel payment of poor r a t e s 3 5
- r e c a l c i t r a n t s were t o be s e n t t o p r i s o n - t h u s f i n a l l y
r e l i e v i n g t h e Church of
i t s duty t o p r o v i d e alms
for the
poor.
In 1572 and a g a i n i n 1597, E l i z a b e t h I c o n s o l i d a t e d p a s t
settlement
laws
legislation
correction
and
also
for
poor
relief
authorized
idle
rogues
l e g i ~ l a t i o n . ~The
~ 1597
the
and
building
of
houses
further declared t h a t
of
the
impotent poor were t o be c a r e d f o r i n h o s p i t a l s w h i l e t h e
c h i l d r e n of t h e poor were t o be a p p r e n t i c e d .
Elizabeth's
famous
Poor
Law
of
16013'
(Clarkson, 171)
was
primarily
a
r e p e t i t i o n of t h e a c t s of 1572 and 1597, but it s u r v i v e d and
governed t h e c a r e of
t h e poor
f o r n e a r l y 250 y e a r s .
The
Church had no o f f i c i a l r o l e t o p l a y i n providing c h a r i t y under
t h i s law;
English s o c i e t y had become t r u l y s e c u l a r .
35
5 Elizabeth I , c. 3
36
1 4 Elizabeth I, c.5
37
4 3 Elizabeth I , c.2
(l572), and 39 Elizabeth I, c. 3 (1597)
OF
THE DECLINE
THE CHURCH IN WESTERN EUROPE
The e a r l y e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e m e d i e v a l C a t h o l i c C h u r c h i n
W e s t e r n E u r o p e w a s much l i k e i t s e x p e r i e n c e i n E n g l a n d .
The
1 4 t h c e n t u r y had w i t n e s s e d t h e g r a d u a l e c l i p s e o f t h e papacy,
and t h e concomitant rise of t h e l o c a l sovereign t o a p o s i t i o n
o f power w i t h i n t h e C h u r c h .
W.K.
Ferguson n o t e s t h a t i n the
f i f t e e n t h century
p o p e s made t h e i r p e a c e w i t h k i n g s a n d p r i n c e s
t h r o u g h a series of t a c i t agreements o r formal
c o n c o r d a t s , b y which t h e y s h a r e d t h e n o m i n a t i o n o f
Church o f f i c e r s a n d t h e t a x a t i o n o f t h e c l e r g y w i t h
the secular rulers.
(12)
But t h e 1 6 t h c e n t u r y e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e European Church w a s
unlike that
of
England,
Protestantism a f t e r
overview
of
the
primarily because
1515.
rise
of
of
t h e rise of
This section provides
Protestantism
as
it
a brief
affected
monasticism, a n d o f t h e d e c l i n e o f t h e C a t h o l i c Church i n t h e
n o t i n g similarities w i t h and
Netherlands and Austria-Hungary,
differences
remains
points
product
from t h e
t o be
done
English
in this
experience.
regard;
t o t h e p o s s i b l e a p p l i c a t i o n of
q u a l i t y model d e v e l o p e d
European c o n t e x t .
this
the
Much
research
s e c t i o n merely
reputation
and
i n S e c t i o n I1 t o a w i d e r
A.
rote st ant ism^^
The R i s e of
The r o l e o f t h e Roman C a t h o l i c Church i n m e d i e v a l E u r o p e
w a s e s s e n t i a l l y t h e same a s i n E n g l a n d :
religious
services
while
monasteries
i n s u r a n c e i n t h e form o f c h a r i t y .
on t h e c o n t i n e n t as i n England,
c o n t r i b u t i n g t o t h e problem o f
p o v e r t y was becoming a n i s s u e .
just
parish priests sold
supplied
income
I n t h e l a t e r Middle A g e s ,
t h e decay of
vagrancy.
feudalism w a s
The q u e s t i o n o f
Were p a u p e r s h o n e s t l y p o o r o r
Were t h e m o n a s t e r i e s i n d e e d p r o d u c i n g a r m i e s o f
lazy?
beggars with t h e i r indiscriminate almsgiving?
I n 1517 M a r t i n L u t h e r ,
ideological
controversy
(Tawney, 1 0 1 )
a C a t h o l i c monk,
with
his
inaugurated an
attack
not
only
m o n a s t i c i s m , b u t on t h e n a t u r e o f t h e C a t h o l i c f a i t h .
on
Luther
d e n o u n c e d m e d i e v a l c h a r i t y a n d r e l i g i o u s f e s t i v a l s as s o u r c e s
of
idleness,
obtained,
believed,
he
an
unforgivable
wrote,
not
sin.
through
Salvation
good
works
b u t t h r o u g h f a i t h i n God a l o n e .
was
to
be
as C a t h o l i c s
The h o n e s t p o o r
w e r e t o b e p r o v i d e d f o r by t h e towns i n which t h e y l i v e d ;
they w e r e a secular, not a religious,
83)
Consequently,
obligation.
(Tawney,
u n d e r L u t h e r a n i s m , t h e r e was n o p l a c e f o r
m o n a s t i c i s m a s it e x i s t e d i n t h e M i d d l e Ages.
38
This section is not in any way a thorough treatment of the rise of
Protestantism in western Europe.
Its focus is on the (non)-role of
monasticism and how it affected in decline of the Catholic Church in the
16th century.
C a l v i n i s m , named a f t e r t h e Frenchman J o h n C a l v i n , s p r a n g
from
Lutheranism
Luther,
in
the
mid-16th
century.
Calvin,
s a w no r o l e f o r medieval monasticism,
like
preaching t h a t
t h e t r u e C h r i s t i a n v i r t u e s were i n d u s t r y a n d t h r i f t .
Unlike
Luther
Calvin
who
denounced
commerce
and
capitalism,
a p p l a u d e d t h e a c c u m u l a t i o n o f w e a l t h t h r o u g h h a r d work i n a
s e r v i c e a c c e p t a b l e t o God.
By t h e mid-16th
the Protestant
(Tawney, 82, 9 4 )
century,
Reformation.
some form o f t h e new r e l i g i o n ;
a l l Europe had been touched by
Many s o v e r e i g n s h a d e m b r a c e d
a s E.F. R i c e n o t e s ,
c o n v e r s i o n t o P r o t e s t a n t i s m was e c o n o m i c a l l y
tempting.
L u t h e r condemned m o n a s t i c i s m ;
a
s e c u l a r i z a t i o n o f Church p r o p e r t y ,
especially
m o n a s t i c p r o p e r t y , was a l l r e f o r m l l t h a t c o u l d l e a d
(162)
t o a s i g n i f i c a n t i n c r e a s e i n revenue.
H e a l s o n o t e s t h a t b e c a u s e a l l r e l i g i o u s camps
w e l l as Lutherans and C a l v i n i s t s
-
- C a t h o l i c s as
persecuted heretics,
the
r e l i g i o n o f a s o v e r e i g n a l m o s t w i t h o u t e x c e p t i o n became t h e
r e l i g i o n of
his territory.
(160)
R.S.
Dunn c o n c u r s .
He
n o t e s t h a t t h e o n l y t h i n g e v e r y o n e c o u l d a g r e e upon was t h a t
It
.. .
r e l i g i o u s t o l e r a t i o n was i n t o l e r a b l e . "
European
Church
was
not
subject
to
the
(8)
long
While t h e
series
s e i z u r e s which b e l e a g u e r e d t h e E n g l i s h m o n a s t e r i e s ,
of
i t must
have s e e n i n t h e r i s e o f P r o t e s t a n t i s m a t h r e a t a t l e a s t as
ominous a s t h a t e x p e r i e n c e d by t h e E n g l i s h C h u r c h .
B.
The Netherlands
Social historians generally maintain t h a t t h e Catholic
Church i n t h e N e t h e r l a n d s m e t i t s v i o l e n t end i n t h e Dutch
Revolt
of
1568-1574,
which
pitted
a
growing
Calvinist
movement a g a i n s t t h e h e r e d i t a r y C a t h o l i c m o n a r c h y .
re-examination,
it
is
not
clear
whether
the
But on
rise
of
P r o t e s t a n t i s m w a s t h e cause o f t h e Church's d e c l i n e o r merely
i t s f i n a l blow.
A t t h e close of
t h e M i d d l e Ages,
p a r t o f t h e S p a n i s h Habsburg Empire.
t h e 16th century,
t h e Netherlands w a s a
F o r t h e f i r s t h a l f of
i t s r u l e r w a s C h a r l e s V,
Duke o f Burgundy.
From 1 5 2 3 u n t i l t h e e a r l y 1 5 5 0 1 s , C h a r l e s V s u p p o r t e d t h e
E p i s c o p a l I n q u i s i t i o n which p r e s c r i b e d d e a t h by b u r n i n g f o r
heretics.
This
policy
Netherlands Catholic.
was
successful
in
keeping
the
P i e t e r Geyl n o t e s t h a t
a f t e r t h e f i r s t d e a t h s by f i r e - t h e v i c t i m s w e r e
t w o Antwerp A u g u s t i n i a n monks, b u r n t a t B r u s s e l s i n
1523 - t h e t e r r o r of t h e p e r s e c u t i o n s began t o
cause emigration.
(56)
But a f t e r C h a r l e s V ' s d e a t h i n 1556 h i s s o n , P h i l l i p 11, was
unable t o prevent t h e spread of Calvinism,
a more s u i t a b l e
r e l i g i o n f o r t h e commercial N e t h e r l a n d e r s t h a n t h e Lutheran
religion.
I n 1574, P r i n c e W i l l i a m o f Orange,
emerged t r i u m p h a n t from t h e Dutch w a r o f
Spain,
seized
the
monasteries,
exiled
i n h a b i t a n t s and p r o h i b i t e d Catholicism.
a Calvinist,
independence with
their
religious
(Geyl,
162)
The
.
i n c o m e f r o m t h e m o n a s t i c l a n d s was d e d i c a t e d t o t h e s u p p o r t
of
t h e Reformed c l e r g y a n d t o t h e p r o v i s i o n o f c h a r i t y a n d
education.
210-11)
(de V r i e s ,
is a
There
suggestion,
economic h i s t o r i a n ,
J.A.
however,
in the
van Houtte,
a l r e a d y m e t i t s economic d e a t h .
that
work
of
the
t h e Church had
van H o u t t e f o u n d t h a t p r i o r
t o t h e D u t c h R e v o l t many m o n a s t e r i e s h a d b e e n
mortgage t h e i r lands o r s e l l o f f
forced t o
t h e i r valuables t o cover
v o r a c i o u s e c c l e s i a s t i c a l t a x e s l e v i e d by t h e S p a n i s h monarchy
in
l a t e Middle
the
Ages.
(74)
further
He
found
that
medieval monastic c h a r i t y i n t h e Netherlands had long been
r e g a r d e d as i n a d e q u a t e ,
towns
where
private
Houtte's
f o u n d a t i o n s were b e t t e r
endowed t h a n
(128)
r u r a l m o n a s t e r i e s . 39
van
and t h a t paupers tended t o remain i n
formulation
s i t u a t i o n i n England.
sounds
remarkably
P e r h a p s t h e Dutch Church,
like
the
ravaged by
t a x e s r a t h e r t h a n by s e i z u r e s , had ceased p r o v i d i n g adequate
charity.
Perhaps
monastic duty,
f o r t h e poor.
Henry
VIII,
the
observing t h i s violation of
f u n d e d p r i v a t e c h a r i t a b l e f o u n d a t i o n s t o care
P e r h a p s P r i n c e W i l l i a m o f Orange,
seized
only
Church.
39
laity,
See also Cuvillier, 547.
the
shell
of
a
l i k e King
once-prosperous
C.
Austria-Hungary
The 18th century Austro-Hungarian experience may provide
a more
straight-forward test of the model
Section 11.
Habsburgs,
developed
in
Austria-Hungary, also ruled by the Catholic
survived the Protestant Reformation
with
Catholic Church in tact, but not without a struggle.
Protestantism
had
made
Bohemia and Hungary.
substantial
(Mamatey, 38)
inroads
its
By 1570
in Austria,
But the accession of a
string of staunchly Catholic monarchs, beginning with Rudolf
I1 in 1576, marked the start of a militant Catholic Counter-
Ref ormat ion.
For the next two centuries, the Habsburg
monarchs relentlessly pursued Protestants and prohibited them
from practising their religion.40
(Mamatey, 44)
By the late
17th century, only Catholics could be citizens of AustriaHungary,
only
Catholics
could operate businesses
members of guilds, only Catholics could own land.
584)
or be
(Blitz,
Thus the Catholic Church in Austria-Hungary in the mid-
18th century enjoyed much the same status that the Church all
over Europe had enjoyed in the high Middle Ages.
In the latter half of the 18th century, the Empress
Maria Theresa (1740-1780) and her son, Joseph I1 (1780-1790),
became concerned about the declining standard of living of
their subjects.
(Komlos, 457)
Maria Theresa implemented a
40
For an extreme account of the Habsburg persecution of Protestants in
Austria-Hungary, see Michiels, w e t History of t h e a n GovernmenL
tic pe-ons
of Protes-,
(1859)
-
series of r e l i g i o u s reforms a i m e d a t r e d u c i n g t h e o p p r e s s i v e
e f f e c t o f t h e C h u r c h on t h e economy.
I n 1754 a n d 1 7 7 1 , s h e
o r d e r e d a r e d u c t i o n i n t h e number o f r e l i g i o u s h o l i d a y s w i t h
t h e i r a d v e r s e e f f e c t s on p r o d u c t i v i t y ;
t h a t t h e C h u r c h n o t i f y t h e Crown o f
in
1779
she
decreed
that
all
s a n c t i o n e d by t h e government.
i n 1755, s h e demanded
e v e r y excommunication;
religious
(Blitz,
fines
588-59)
must
be
J o s e p h I1
c o n t i n u e d h i s m o t h e r ' s r e f o r m s by f u r t h e r r e d u c i n g t h e number
o f r e l i g i o u s h o l i d a y s f r o m 42 t o 2 7 .
same t i m e ,
( B l i t z , 593)
he relaxed t h e r e s t r i c t i o n s
At
the
on P r o t e s t a n t s a n d
J e w s w i t h t h e Toleranzpatent o f O c t o b e r 1781, w h i c h a l l o w e d
some n o n - C a t h o l i c s
t o become c i t i z e n s o f A u s t r i a a n d t h u s
engage i n a g r i c u l t u r e and i n d u s t r y .
( B l i t z , 594)
But J o s e p h 11's r e a l argument w a s w i t h t h e m o n a s t r i e s .
H e wrote
The p r i n c i p l e s o f m o n a s t i c i s m a n d human r e a s o n a r e
Monks a r e
i n f l a t contradiction t o each o t h e r
t h e most d a n g e r o u s a n d most u s e l e s s s u b j e c t s a
country can possess.
(Leger, 384)
...
On 1 2 J a n u a r y 1 7 8 2 , J o s e p h I1 s i g n e d a s e c u l a r i z a t i o n e d i c t
w h i c h l e d t o t h e s u p p r e s s i o n , b e t w e e n 1782 a n d 1786, o f o v e r
700
monasteries.
R.C.
Blitz
notes
that
the
initial
s e c u l a r i z a t i o n proceeded with g r e a t speed:
One may s u r m i s e t h a t t h e p r o c e d u r a l d e t a i l s may
h a v e b e e n worked o u t s e c r e t l y w e l l i n a d v a n c e a n d
c o m m i s s a r s may h a v e b e e n p u t i n p l a c e s e c r e t l y i n
advance t o execute s e q u e s t r a t i o n s i n o r d e r t o
prevent h i d i n g and t r a n s f e r of t r e a s u r e .
(590)
He also n o t e s t h a t t h e e a r l y suppressions
were
better
organized
and
more
carefully
inventoried than l a t e r ones.
I n subsequent years
t h e c l e r g y succeeded i n sequestering s u b s t a n t i a l
amounts o f wealth long b e f o r e t h e commissars
appeared a t t h e monastery.
(591)
Throughout
the
suppressions,
Joseph
l i k e Henry V I I I ,
11,
remained a f a i t h f u l s o n o f t h e C a t h o l i c Church.
from t h e s a l e o f
The p r o c e e d s
the confiscated property w e r e put
into a
Religionfond managed b y t h e s t a t e , f o r t h e f u r t h e r a n c e o f t h e
Catholic religion.
I n t h e e n d J o s e p h I1 a c t u a l l y e x p a n d e d
t h e t r a d i t i o n a l religious services of t h e parishes.
(Blitz,
593)
The A u s t r o - H u n g a r i a n
e x p e r i e n c e a l s o sounds remarkably
l i k e t h e English experience.
11's d i s r e g a r d
clear,
Although t h e r e a s o n f o r Joseph
f o r t h e m o n a s t i c arm o f
i t would n o t be u n r e a s o n a b l e
t h e Church i s n o t
t o speculate t h a t the
m o n a s t e r i e s w e r e n o t f u l f i l l i n g t h e terms o f t h e i r i m p l i c i t
B o t h M a r i a T h e r e s a a n d J o s e p h I1 r e c o g n i z e d t h a t
contracts.
t h e Church w a s i n h i b i t i n g economic growth;
t h e y may w e l l
have observed t h e monasteries c o l l e c t i n q , b u t n c t r e t u r n i n g ,
l a r g e sums o f money f r o m t h e l a i t y .
D.
Sweden,
The
Hungarian
Germany and Other' I n q u i r i e s
above
discussions
experiences
are
of
the
by
no
Dutch
means
and
the
Austro-
comprehensive
or
conclusive;
further
t h e y a r e meant only t o s e r v e a s s u g g e s t i o n s f o r
avenues
of
study.
German e x p e r i e n c e s might
In
prove
addition,
the
Swedish and
interesting t e s t s
for the
model developed i n S e c t i o n 11.
I n 1527, King Gustav Vasa of Sweden - "more i n t e r e s t e d
i n L u t h e r ' s t e a c h i n g s on r e l a t i o n s between Church and s t a t e
...
than i n h i s p u r e l y t h e o l o g i c a l d o c t r i n e s "
(Oakley, 7 1 ) -
c o n f i s c a t e d monastic l a n d s t o pay f o r i t s war w i t h Denmark
for
the
possession
of
Norway.
While
effectively
this
r e p r e s e n t e d a break with Rome, Gustav d i d not commit himself
t o Lutheranism f o r a n o t h e r decade.
(Oakley, 7 1 - 7 2 )
Gustav,
l i k e Henry V I I I and Joseph 11, must have h e l d t h e monasteries
in
low
esteem
when
he
suppressed
them
but
retained
his
Catholic f a i t h .
In Germany, peasant u p r i s i n g s i n t h e l a t e 1 5 t h and e a r l y
1 6 t h c e n t u r i e s a g a i n s t b o t h manorial l o r d s and Church were
ineffective.
revolt
of
plundering
Following t h e
1525
of
achieved
r i s e of
more
Luther,
success
c a s t l e s and m o n a s t e r i e s .
however,
with
the
widespread
(Schapiro,
66-73)
J.S. S c h a p i r o s u g g e s t s t h a t e c c l e s i a s t i c a l t a x e s l e v i e d on
t h e p e a s a n t r y were s e v e r e
(16);
perhaps t h e Church was not
s u p p l y i n g enough c h a r i t y t o r e t a i n p a r i s h i o n e r f a i t h i n i t s
d e s i r e t o p r o t e c t i t s r e p u t a t i o n f o r honesty.
Another l i n e ' of
i n q u i r y which might be pursued i s t h e
r e l a t i o n s h i p between feudalism and monasticism.
Section
I,
the
monasteries
were
feudal
As noted i n
landlords.
V.S.
Mamatey s u g g e s t s t h a t p a r t of t h e reason monasticism survived
i n Austria-Hungary
r e l i g i o u s wars of
was
that
after the
t h e 17th century,
more i n t o f e u d a l i s m .
devastation
of
the
t h e a r e a receded o n c e
A l b e r t Guerard s u g g e s t s t h a t t h e French
m o n a r c h y was n e v e r t e m p t e d b y P r o t e s t a n t i s m b e c a u s e it h a d
o b t a i n e d from t h e pope a c o n c o r d a t a p p o i n t i n g t h e King a s
head
of
Luther.
t h e French C a t h o l i c Church p r i o r t o t h e
of
H e a l s o n o t e s t h a t on t h e whole t h e F r e n c h e c o n o m i c
system w a s
(88-98)
rise
"purely medieval"
throughout
the
16th century.
P e r h a p s t h e d e c l i n e o f t h e C a t h o l i c Church n o t o n l y
accompanied t h e rise of t h e n a t i o n s t a t e ;
prerequisite.
p e r h a p s it w a s a
CONCLUSION
The r i s e o f t h e n a t i o n s t a t e i n E n g l a n d a c c o m p a n i e d n o t
o n l y t h e d e c l i n e of t h e manorial system, b u t a l s o t h e d e c l i n e
o f t h e m e d i e v a l E n g l i s h Church.
t h e Church w a s p r e c i p i t a t e d by t h e Crown's
t h e decline of
a t t a c k s on t h e m o n a s t e r i e s ,
1536-1540.
reducing
culminating i n t h e Dissolution of
The m o n a s t e r i e s
the
This paper has argued t h a t
amount
of
responded t o t h e s e a t t a c k s by
alms
they
o f f e r i n g s c o l l e c t e d from t h e l a i t y .
distributed
from
the
While t h i s r e t r e n c h m e n t
h a s b e e n w i d e l y v i e w e d by s o c i a l h i s t o r i a n s a s a m o r a l d e c a y
in the
f a b r i c of
t h e Church,
it may s i m p l y h a v e b e e n t h e
r a t i o n a l response of a wealth-maximizing
firm t o a threat t o
its future existence.
This paper
ceased
to
has
provide
further
income
suggested t h a t
assistance,
a s t h e Church
vagrancy
t h r e a t e n e d t h e maintenance of s o c i a l o r d e r .
and
crime
Hence t h e S t a t e ,
o v e r t h e 1 6 t h c e n t u r y , r e l u c t a n t l y assumed r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r
poor r e l i e f and t h e c a r e of t h e s i c k and aged.
By 1601, t h e
Church no l o n g e r p l a y e d any p a r t i n t h e p r o v i s i o n o f s o c i a l
s e r v i c e s , a n d t h e t r a n s f e r o f power f r o m Church t o Crown was
complete.
The e v i d e n c e p r e s e n t e d i n s u p p o r t o f t h e r e p u t a t i o n a n d
product q u a l i t y theory is admittedly scanty.
R.H.
Snape,
in
t i c F m c e s i n t h e J ~ a t e r Middle A a u ,
first
p u b l i s h e d i n 1 9 2 6 , bemoans t h e p a u c i t y of a v a i l a b l e monastic
records,
apologizing
for
having
to
s u r v i v i n g accounts f o r h i s a n a l y s i s .
in
1989 which,
on
fragments
of
H e would perhaps
(2-5)
Swanson's Church and S o c i e t y
have found comfort i n R . N .
U t e Medieval Ena-,
rely
in
a remarkably thorough work p u b l i s h e d
however,
suffers
from
the
same
lack
of
c o n c l u s i v e evidence.41 Alexander S a v i n e ' s English Monasterjes
t h e Eve of n l s s o h t i o n ,
apparently the
only
f i r s t p u b l i s h e d i n 1909, remains
comprehensive
evaluation
of
monastic
p o s s e s s i o n s , and i t u n f o r t u n a t e l y i s r e s t r i c t e d t o t h e p e r i o d
of
the
these
Dissolution.
and
other
Nevertheless,
sources
is
Thus,
fragmentary,
can
confidence.
evidence
consistent
developed i n S e c t i o n 11.
inferences
the
with
found
the
in
model
even though t h e evidence i s
be
drawn
with
considerable
There i s some s u g g e s t i o n i n t h e s o c i a l h i s t o r y
l i t e r a t u r e t h a t many monastic r e c o r d s e x i s t which have not
been made p u b l i c .
Were more r e c o r d s made a c c e s s i b l e ,
the
model developed i n t h i s paper might be f u r t h e r t e s t e d .
A more r i g o r o u s t e s t
of t h e model would c o n s i s t of i t s
a p p l i c a t i o n t o t h e wider European e x p e r i e n c e .
it
was
suggested
that
the
decline
Netherlands and i n Austria-Hungary
with
t h e profferred theory,
but
of
the
I n Section I V
Church
in
the
a p p e a r s t o be c o n s i s t e n t
that
further
41
Swanson cites no less than 203 original
secondary sources, including R.H. Snape.
research
manuscripts
and
is
944
required
in
this
regard.
With
allowances
made
l i m i t a t i o n s imposed b y t h e fragmentary e v i d e n c e ,
stands
as
medieval
a
first
attempt
C a t h o l i c Church
nation s t a t e .
to
explain t h e
and t h e
for
t h i s paper
d e c l i n e of
concomitant
the
rise
of
the
the
APPENDICES
APPENDIX
Number
of
I
in
R e l i g i o u s H o u s e s and M o n k s
Wales,
1066-1540
E n g l a n d and
The following figures are two independent estimates contained in Knowles
and Hadcock, Appendix 11, of the size of the religious community in
medieval England and Wales.
Number
Period
Monks
c. 1066
48
-
Canons
of
Houses
Friars
Nuns
Total
13
61
132
15
296
26
1154-1216
328 - 343
117
1216-1350
349
350
145
1350-1422
347
329
144
1422-1500
277
269
144
1500-1534
265
254
142
1534-1540
253
-
249
137
1066-1100
71
1100-1154
195
Number
Period
Monks
c. 1066
844
1066-1100
835-2135
1100-1154 3242-5575
1154-1216 6050-6195
1216-1350 6037-5474
1350-1422 2743-3768
1422-1500 3904-3953
1500-1534 3917-3699
1534-1540 3650-2895
Canons
of
-
-
-
16
86
74
261
133
640
146
981 - 1028
148
487
748
144 1007 -
992
-
911
143
925
142
895
136
848
865
840
Religious
Friars
Nuns
Total
APPENDIX
Undeflated
Bequests
(Source:
Decade
Poor
Relief
Jordan,
by
I1
Decade,
1480-1660
Tables I1 t h r o u g h VI)
S o c i a l Municipal
Services Projects Education Religion
f
6248
5266
4179
4130
5109
7566
7758
7454
8849
8601
4665
11603
4879
24178
13827
14667
12456
9229
s
18
8
1
8
8
17
4
2
17
9
9
10
17
14
6
10
19
4
E
29907
53459
74719
40839
46615
35618
20024
13501
11294
7027
6195
7441
17459
41732
71941
125388
24981
28101
s
4
13
11
6
1
7
18
6
10
13
18
3
15
11
11
11
3
APPENDIX
Deflated
(source:
Religious
and
Secular
Bequests,
Bittle and L a n e (19761, T a b l e 3;
I
Decade
I11
1480-1660
Hadwin, T a b l e 1.)
B i t t l e & Lane
Religious
B i t t l e & Lane
Secular
d
d
29,907
61,478
81,836
40,840
35,501
26,598
11,344
5,354
4,589
2,534
1,968
1,790
4,192
9,107
15,699
23,600
4,440
5,204
19,476
25,315
61,881
41,028
46,298
33,325
29,097
56,367
33,172
35,672
36,328
28,576
46,240
83,445
77,947
46,823
33,965
39,750
Hadwin
Secular
APPENDIX
Ranking
by
Wealth
of
(Source:
County
Bedfordshire
Berkshire
Buckinghamshire
Canbridgeshire
Cornwall
Derbyshire
Devonshire
Dorset
Essex
Gloucestershire
Hampshire
Herefordshire
Hertfordshire
Huntingdonshire
Kent
Lancashire
Leicestershire
Lincolnshire
Holland
Kesteven
Lindsey
Middlesex
Norfolk
Northamptonshire
Nottinghamshire
Oxfordshire
Rutland
Shropshire (Salop)
Somerset
Staffordshire
Suffolk
Surrey
Sussex
warwickshire
Niltshire
Worcestershire
Yorkshire
East Riding
North Riding
West Riding
IV
Thirty-eight
1515
English
Schofield, Table 2.
Wealth flOOO's/acre
80.4
88.0
70.8
65.7
50.8
18.7
67.4
72.0
102.0
93.3
67.1
38.4
90.0
89.8
100.5
3.8
61.2
)
Counties,
Annual
Monastic
Nineteen
Income Prior t o the Dissolution
Monasteries
Counties
with
Nearly
Complete
of the
Information
The following information comes from Savine, 270-87. Gross income
is from column 2 while temporal income is from column 4 of Savinels
Appendix. The spiritual income has been calculated as the difference
between the gross and temporal incomes.
Other counties listed in
Savine's Appendix have not been included as they lack income figures for
more than one monastery. Savine notes that the incomes are for the year
prior to the Dissolution commissioners' visitation. Thus the year could
be 1535, 1536, 1537 or 1538, depending upon when each monastery was
visited.
Monastery
Gross
Income
E
s d
Temporal
Income
f
s d
Spiritual
Income
E
s d
Bedfordshire
Bushmead
Caldwell
Chicksand
Dunstable
Elstow
Harwood
Merkyate
Newnham
Wardon
Woburn
TOTAL
81 13 6
73 12 6
182 16 9
unknown
139 17 9
26 13 2
53 10 5
156 3 2
410 13 5
390 13 12
Buckinghamshire
Ankerwyke
Bittlesden
Burnham
Ivinghoe
Lavenden
Little Marlow 37 6 11
Medmenham
24 17 2
Missenden
285 15 9
Nutley
495 18 6
Snetteshall
24 0 0
TOTAL
26 8 10
18 6 5
198 15 8
177 9 2
23 10 2
0
75 3 4
47 6 8
unknown
185 4 4
20 0 0
90 8 0
187 12 3
31 18 6
40 0 0
675 13 1
Rank
Monastery
Gross
Income
f
s d
Temporal
Income
E
s d
Spiritual
Income
E
Rank
s d
Cornwall
Bodmin
St. Cyrus
St. Germans
Helston
Launcest on
Tywardreath
289 11 11
11 1 0
243 8 0
14 7 3
392 11 3
151 16 1
217 9 11
unknown
119 11 4
14 7 3
233 2 7
51 18 3
TOTAL
130
Barnstaple
~uckfastleigh
Buckland
Canonleigh
Carswell
Cornworthy
Dunkeswell
Exeter St .N.
Frithelstoke
Hartland
Newenham
Pilton
Plympton
Pols10
Tavistock (a)
Tavistock (b)
Torre
Totnes
6
9
114 0 1
435 16 6
213 10 3
166 18 7
unknown
26 12 7
290 4 7
109 18 9
76 14 4
150 1 3
209 12 8
29 2 8
459 17 10
98 18 5
712 10 6
37 16 5
268 12 3
81 6 9
TOTAL
72 2 0
unknown
123 16 8
0
159 8 8
99 17 10
455
5
2
16 6 8
68 14 3
65 10 0
49 4 6
unknown
40 3 10
19 9 4
51 9 4
65 7 0
158 19 8
30 8 6
34 12 11
471 2 7
80 12 0
198 14 6
27 5 4
156 12 5
72 9 11
1607 2 9
Dorset
Abbotsbury
Bindon
Cerne
Cranborne
Ford
Holme
Middleton
Shaftesbury
Sherborne
Tarrent
TOTAL
483 1 1 0
236 8 10
622 7 11
49 5 1
394 4 5
16 9 4
715 9 11
1324 14 7
743 14 2
239 10 10
392 3 2
185 8 10
559 19 3
21 0 0
371 11 1
unknown
588 3 11
1210 18 5
652 15 8
217 13 6
90 18 8
51 0 0
62 8 8
28 5 1
22 13 4
unknown
127 6 0
113 16 2
90 18 6
21 17 4
609 3 9
#17
Monastery
Gross
Income
E
s d
Temporal
Income
E
s d
Spiritual
Income
E
s d
~ e r e ofr d s h i r e
Aconbury
Clifford
Dore
Flanesford
St.Guthlacls
Lymbrook
Wigmore
Wormesley
TOTAL
78
49
87
15
189
23
316
89
18 2
11 11
0 0
8 9
2 2
17 8
13 6
3 9
51
26
65
15
134
19
183
37
1
5
13
8
11
11
19
17
2
3
4
9
6
0
8
5
Huntingdonshire
Hinchinbrook
19 9
Huntingdon
232 7
St. Ives
69 0
St.Neots
256 1
Ramsey
1849 8
Sawtre
199 11
Stonely
61 5
TOTAL
2
1
8
4
5
8
8
17
126
41
192
1786
159
36
17 10
11 5
3 4
14 0
9 9
11 8
18 11
Lancashire
Burscough
Cartmell
Cockersand
Conishead
Furness
Holland
Hornby
Lytham
Penwortham
Whalley
TOTAL
Bradley
Bredon
Croxton
Dalby Roth.
Garendon
Grace Dieu
Kirby Beller
Langley
20
25
430
274
186
101
178
34
15 7
8 1
11 8
11 2
15 3
8 3
7 11
6 2
20 2 3
8 8 1
319 0 8
unknown
172 15 3
93 8 3
122 7 11
17 12 10
13 4
17 0 0
111 11 0
unknown
14 0 0
8 0 0
56 0 0
16 13 4
Rank
Monastery
Gross
Income
E
Temporal
Income
s d
•’
Leicestershire,
Launde
510 16 6
Leic.St.Mary 1056 18 3
Olverston
174 13 10
Ulverscroft
101 3 10
Spiritual
Income
s d
f
s d
continued
279 4 10
732 12 1
149 0 6
70 18 10
TOTAL
231 11
324 6
25 13
30 5
835 13
8
2
4
0
10
Lincolnshire
Ailesham
Alvingham
Axholme
Bardney
Barlings
Belvoir
Bollington
Bourn
Cattley
Crowland
Egle
Fosse
Frest on
Goykwell
Greenfield
Grimsby
Hagneby
Haverholme
Hevening
Humberston
Hyrst
Irford
Kirkstead
Kyme
Legbourne
Linc.St.Cath
Linc.St.Mary
Louth Park
Markby
Neubo
Newsome
Newstead
Nocton Park
Nuncot ton
Nunormesby
Revesby
Sempringham
Sixhill
Spalding
61 5 2
100 8 4
173 17 0
248 13 6
269 3 2
60 4 10
85 9 9
110 6 10
29 13 8
909 5 2
unknown
6 5 4
84 6 8
15 1 10
79 13 1
9 10 3
93 15 1
69 1 2
28 0 0
25 11 3
7 11 8
11 6 8
323 3 4
85 16 2
28 0 4
122 11 9
18 6 10
146 4 7
127 11 11
83 10 8
73 14 9
37 11 8
45 19 3
41 11 3
74 0 0
312 6 6
211 2 9
139 16 8
740 2 9
22 12 8
41 6 8
117 2 8
180 13 6
38 13 4
69 12 8
120 6 0
87 10 8
9 0 0
141 12 8
unknown
2 0 0
82 1 6
4 16 8
2 0
2 13 4
4 13 3
6 10 5
30 13 4
17 0 0
0
3 6 8
15 13 8
52 8 7
29 13 2
137 6 8
7 18 4
23 0 0
36 6 8
32 0 0
40 6 8
8 0 0
12 0 0
12 3 4
24 0 0
37 1 8
148 9 5
30 2 0
138 14 6
Rank
Monastery
Gross
Income
t
s d
Temporal
Income
L
Spiritual
Income
s d
Lincolnshire, continued
Stam.St.Leon.
Stam.St.Mich.
Staynesfield
Stixwold
Swineshed
Thornholm
Thornton
Torkesey
Tupholm
Vaudey
Wellow
Willoughton
TOTAL
Middlesex
Elsing Spital 239
Haliwell
347
Hounslow
80
Kilburn
86
Lon.St.Barth. 773
London
736
Lon.St.Helen 376
Lon.St.John 2286
Lon.st.Maryl 282
Lon.st.Mary2 602
Lon.St.Mary3 558
Lon.Minories 342
Lon.St.Thoma.5 336
Stratford
121
Syon a Bridg 1943
Westminster 3912
TOTAL
14
1
15
7
0
2
6
13
16
3
14
6
11
0
11
4
Beauvale
Blyth
Brodholm
Felley
Lenton
Mattersey
Newstead
Rufford
Shelford
Thurgarton
8 0
8 3
11 10
4 8
7 9
16 7
18 9
6 8
14 1
16 2
227
125
18
61
418
61
219
254
151
359
0
8
2
11
2
7
0
11
5
9
10
11
2
6
9
1
t
s d
Rank
Monastery
Gross
Income
b
s d
Temporal
Income
b
Nottinghamshire,
~allingwells 87
Welbeck
297
worksop
311
TOTAL
8
4
7
8
8
0
21
165
165
Spiritual
Income
b
s d
s d
continued
8 0
1 0
7 10
66 0
132 3
145 19
1137 7
8
8
2
8
Shropshire
~ r o m ield
f
Brewood
~uildwas
Chirbury
Haghmond
Halesowen
~illeshall
Shrewsbury
Wenlock
wombridge
TOTAL
Somerset
Athelney
290
~arlinch
167
Bath
707
~ridgwater
196
Bris.St.James
61
rut on
528
Byrkley
6
Cannington
69
Cleeve
277
Glastonbury 3642
Dunster
58
Hinton
271
Keynsham
466
Minchin Bock. 237
Montacute
463
Muchelney
511
Mynchen Barwe 29
Taunton
452
Templecombe
124
Wells St.John 69
Witham
249
ors spring
112
TOTAL
19 6
18 7
3 1
13 8
7 10
7 9
8 8
17 0
3 11
3 1
15 0
1 4
0 6
11 3
2 7
2 0
6 10
19 2
0 4
6 9
0 3
15 2
271
117
545
81
43
337
6
53
245
3289
23
271
416
122
379
393
20
264
122
50
239
97
0
10
15
14
7
15
2
1
6
13
16
1
13
19
0
18
11
11
13
4
10
11
4
9
7
11
1
9
0
9
11
9
4
4
9
0
1
0
10
6
8
3
5
10
19 19 2
50 7 10
161 7 6
114 18 9
18 0 9
190 12 0
6 8
16 15 3
31 17 0
352 9 4
34 18 8
0
49 6 9
114 12 3
84 2 6
117 4 0
8 15 0
188 7 8
1 6 8
19 2 6
9 9 10
15 3 4
1599 3 5
Rank
Monastery
Gross
Income
E
s d
Temporal
Income
E
s d
Spiritual
Income
E
s d
Staffordshire
Burton.Trent
Croxden
Dieulacres
Dudley
Hulton
Ronton
Roucester
St. Thomas's
Stone
Trentham
Tutbury
356
103
243
36
87
102
111
181
130
121
244
16 4
6 7
3 6
8 0
10 2
11 1
11 7
1 10
2 11
3 2
16 8
TOTAL
Suffolk
Bliburgh
Brusyard
Bungay
Bury St.Ed.
Butley
Campsey
Eye
Flixton
Heringfleet
Holy ~rinity
Ixworth
Leiston
Letheringham
Redlingfield
Sibton
Wangford
Woodbridge
TOTAL
Surrey
Bermondsey
Chertsey
Merton
Newark
Reigate
Shene
St .Mary's
Tandridge
Waverley
TOTAL
412 6 0
591 9 9
758 10 4
219 2 1
61 5 0
unknown
456 8 9
61 9 3
196 0 4
135 16 6
146 10 6
277 11 0
75 15 4
17 0 0
unknown
200 1 4
24 18 4
13 8
878 6 8
Rank
Monastery
Gross
Income
E
Temporal
Income
s d
f
909 7 11
Battle
Boxgrove
186 3 0
Duref ord
108 13 9
Easeburn
47 3 0
Hastings
57 18 2
Lewes
1091 9 7
Michelham
182 0 3
~obertsbridge272 9 6
Rusper
40 0 0
Shulbrede
79 15 4
Tortington
101 4 1
s d
773 16 7
110 19 8
102 7 1
22 14 1
44 11 6
577 7 9
154 13 7
253 9 2
unknown
61 7 10
81 6 9
TOTAL
Warwickshire
Alcester
Avecote
Combe
Coventry C
Coventry Ch
Erdbury
Henwood
Kenilworth
Maxstoke
Merevale
~ u n e a on
t
Pinley
Pollesworth
Stoneleigh
Studley
Thelesford
Warwick
Wroxall
TOTAL
Spiritual
Income
E
s d
135 11 4
75 3 4
6 6 8
24 8 11
13 6 8
514 1 10
27 6 8
19 0 4
unknown
18 7 6
19 17 4
853 10 7
Rank
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