Journal of the War of 1812
An International Journal Dedicated to the Last Anglo-American War, 1812-1815
Articles of Interest:
The Providence ... of the Largest Cannon
A House Divided: The N.Y. Election of 1813
Searching for the Connections with Antarctica
Perry Transfers His Flag
Inside:
An Analysis of the Perry-Elliott Controversy
Features: Chronology of Hull's Surrender, Things you should know, New Book
Reviews, Perry's “Messages”, and More...
SPECIAL NEW FEATURE: The War of 1812 Microscope...
Fall 2010
Vol. 13, No. 3
Subscription Rates/
Information Inside
The Journal of the War of 1812
Volume XIII, No. 3, FALL 2010
An International Journal Dedicated
to the Last Anglo-American War,
1812-1815
the submission to its' publication may be up to
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will be notified should the estimated publication
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Editor – Harold W. Youmans
Co-Editor – Christopher T. George
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Journal of the War of 1812
An International Journal Dedicated to the last Anglo-American War, 1812-1815
Volume XIII, No. 3, Fall 2010
DEPARTMENTS
2 | Editor's Quoin
Searching for the Apostrophe Apostate
3 | Email and Letters
Lexicographers and philosophers
10 | War Leader Profile
The Perry-Elliott Controversy
18 | The Documents
Oliver Hazard Perry's “Messages”
22 | War of 1812 Chronology
Hull's Campaign through Ohio to Detroit:
April to August 1812
23 | Visit 1812
Erie Maritime Museum and
U.S. Brig Niagara
26 | State Profile
Pennsylvania on the Eve of War
27 | War of 1812 Microscope on
The Carlisle Gazette
28 | Subscription Form
Prices subject to change after December 1,
2010
FEATURES
4-9 | A HOUSE DIVIDED: THE NEW YORK
GUBERNATORIAL ELECTION OF 1813 (PART
II)
by Harvey Sturm
Republicans and Federalists battle at the ballot
box in the midst of war
11-17 | PROVIDENCE . . . OF THE LONGEST
CANNON (PART II)
by John A. Tures
An examination of the theories behind American
sea victories during the War of 1812
19-21 | SEARCHING FOR THE WAR OF 1812
CONNECTIONS WITH ANTARCTICA
by Harold W. Youmans
With Royal Navy officers, American-built ships,
privateers in action, and a marooning, you have
the start of a good yarn
NEWS OF INTEREST AND MORE
17 | What you should know about Perry's Victory
and International Peace Memorial
24-25 | Book Reviews:
Barbuto, Richard V., Long Range Guns, Close
Quarter Combat (Youngstown, NY: 2010)
Conners, W.J., Report of the Perrys Victory
Centennial Commission (Albany, NY: 1916).
NEXT ISSUE: The Frigates in 1811
COVER PHOTO: Perry Transfers His Flag (Courtesy, Naval War College, Newport, RI)
EDITOR'S QUOIN
Searching for the apostrophe apostate,
and other grammatical faux pas
While most of you missed it, Friday, September
24, 2010, was National Punctuation Day. The
date is neatly tagged on the calender used to mark
the production schedule of this Journal for
probably two very important reasons. First, your
Editor is a prevaricating apostrophe apostate, a
classical comma contrarian, and an egregious
ellipsis exhibitor. Yes, as some of you noted, I
must still give Sister Mary Raymond, that mostbeloved
elementary
school
grammarian,
nightmares. Second, your Editor may also be a
punctuation-deficient lifetime learner. The note
reminds me, annually, of my never-ending need
to improve.
This deficiency, however, has it roots in the
national security interests of the United States. It
seems that when Winston Churchill was
wandering the world preaching about the
descending “Iron Curtain,” your Editor was
under the drape. After World War II (you know,
the big one), we, as military dependents, had
followed Dad to Europe.
Assignments in Italy, Germany and France during
my grammar school years and the absence of the
good Sisters of Saint Francis, while broadening
the cultural outlook, almost assured that
punctuation would be as foreign to me as Cyrillic
notation. Second-grade Grammar: colons and
semicolons; Third-grade Grammar: colons and
semicolons; Fourth-grade Grammar: colons and
semicolons. Yes sirree bob, by the time I got back
to the United States and safely into St. Joseph's
Elementary School, I was a semicolon
aficionado, and a lost cause; too much ... even for
dear Sister Raymond.
But not to worry. That's what Co-Editors are for.
My continuing thanks to Chris George for
keeping me punctually pure. (Is that the right
word: punctually? Or is it punctuational-ly
pure?) Now, was that Perry's Victory or Perrys'
Victory?
So, be prepared and be vigilant! It is classically
true that “smoking dogs and bicycles are
perennially prohibited on the porch.” Well, the
quotation marks are used – correctly, anyway.
Journal readers may also miss another important
day in history. October 16, 2010, is National
Dictionary Day; you know, spelling, and
definitions, and all that! War of 1812
contemporary Noah Webster, the “American
lexicographer, textbook pioneer, English spelling
reformer, political writer, editor, and prolific
author” (whew!), was born on October 16, 1758,
some seventy years before the first publication of
the American Dictionary of the English
Language. While my library does not have a
copy of the first printing, the dog-eared 1968
version is close at hand. Yes, it is true, the one I
use is about 5,000 words short. So much for
modernity.
Close at hand, though, is a copy of The 1811
Dictionary of the Vulgar Tongue: Buckish Slang,
University Wit, and Pickpocket Eloquence.
(London, 1811, Reprint: 1994). This was written
by Captain Francis Grose and first published in
1785. It was “updated,” if that's a useful term, by
among others, “Hell-Fire Dick,” and republished
in 1811. Some of our War of 1812 heroes and not
a few of our other citizens may have had need of
this thoroughly fascinating and bawdy book. I
have used it myself when penning a fictional tale
of privateers in 1813 Charleston. Imagine what
the crew would had done if they arrived back at
the harbor without their “socket money.”
Well, to this quarter's issue. Enjoy the
continuation of Harvey Strum's and John Tures's
separate articles and our own Antarctic excursion.
There is also much to learn about the Battle of
Lake Erie and Hull's Trail in Ohio. Look for the
two books reviews, details on the Erie Maritime
Museum, Pennsylvania on the Eve of War, and
the first of our new exchange advertisements with
the Smoke and Fire News.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 3, Page 2.
EMAILS & LETTERS TO
THE EDITOR
September 4, 2010: Reader Daniel Slosberg
commented on the Editor's use of the word “rare”
when describing Dr. George J. Svejda's book, The
History of the Star-Spangled Banner from 1814 to
the Present (1969). He had recently purchased a
2005 edition through Amazon. He was correct in
calling me on it.
Nonetheless, it appears that his copy is “rarer”
than
mine.
Checking
the
website
http://firstsearch.oclc.org, your Editor discovered
that the edition he has is held by more than 400
libraries worldwide, while the 2005 edition is
held by 3. There was also a 1976 reprint and a
2010 Google-based computer file. My use of the
word was in the sense that the book was
“uncommon.” The primary definition of “rare”
most often today relates to “price.” This book
was seen on recent used book sites at from $20 to
$125. Look for the book to be mentioned again as
the bicentennial unfolds in these pages. The
Editor will probably not describe it as “rare.”
September 24, 2010: Reader John Pauly, from
Blasdell, near Buffalo, New York, wrote to load
us up with questions on this issue of the Journal's
signature topic: The Battle of Lake Erie: He
asked: How many U.S. Marines were present at
the battle? How many were casualties? How
many U.S. Army soldiers were on board Perry's
ships acting as Marines? What Regiments were
they from? What were their casualties? How
many were used as sailors? What British Army
units were used during the Battle as Sailors or
Marines?
The answer(s): A LOT! This response does not
seek to avoid specific answers, but the research
and literature is contradictory and less than
compelling.
Perhaps the best approach to these answers was
taken by author Gerald T. Altoff in his Deep
Water Sailors, Shallow Water Soldiers: Manning
the United States Fleet on Lake Erie – 1813 (Putin-Bay, Ohio: 1993). His Appendices list
American soldiers and marines by unit, various
types and sources for volunteers, serving marine
who were not on board at the time of battle, and
casualties.
Mr. Altoff, who was with the National Park
Service for many years, also wrote Oliver Hazard
Perry and the Battle of Lake Erie (1999),
Amongst My Best Men: African-American and
the War of 1812 (1996), and, with David Curtis
Skaggs, co-authored A Signal Victory: The Lake
Erie Campaign, 1812-1813 (Annapolis, MD,
1997). Each of these answers some of our
reader's questions.
An older and interesting source is Ruth Weiler,
Squadron in the Wilderness (Erie, Pennsylvania,
1963). The subject was also broached at the
recent 14th National War of 1812 Symposium in
Baltimore on October 2, 2010, when Dr. Charles
Brodine with The Naval History and Heritage
Command,
Washington,
DC,
took
on
“Commodore Oliver Hazard Perry and the Battle
of Lake Erie, September 10, 1813.”
British Army support for Captain Barclay was
briefly discussed in War on the Great Lakes:
Essays Commemorating the 175th Anniversary of
the Battle of Lake Erie, edited by Skaggs and
William Jeffrey Welsh (Kent, Ohio, 1991) and in
Sandy Antal, A Wampum Denied: Proctor's War
of 1812 (Ottawa, 1997).
Your editor wishes he could answer each and
every question posed. The best the Journal can
do with its resources is to point the way toward
the “answers” and encourage as many scholars
and enthusiasts as possible to continue to search
for definitive conclusions.
To All: Thanks for the letters and thanks for
keeping me on my toes.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 3, Page 3.
A House Divided: The New York Gubernatorial Election of 1813
(Part II)
by
Harvey Strum
In early 1813, Republicans fought among themselves. Expecting the
Clintonians to block the re-nomination of Governor Tompkins, Tammany called for
changing the Republican nominating process from the legislative caucus to a state
convention of elected delegates. Clintonians objected to this change, and the
Tammany plan failed to stir public support. However, the legislative caucus did renominate
Tompkins in February but surprisingly dumped De Witt Clinton from the ticket as LieutenantGovernor and nominated John Taylor by a vote of 32-16. Former Clinton friend Ambrose
Spencer played a key role in the decision to drop Clinton from the ticket. This reflected the sharp
decline in Clinton’s political power produced by his challenge to Madison’s reelection and his
flirtation with the Federalists.12
Martin Van Buren was deeply involved in
the NY Gubernatorial Election of 1813
Clinton‟s opponents within the Republican
Party cited the surprise election of Rufus King as
Senator as proof of the Clintonian-Federalist deal.
Allegedly, the Clintonians agreed to elect King in
exchange for Federalist support during the election of
Presidential electors. Martin Van Buren broke with
Clinton over King‟s election. While both Clinton and
Rufus King denied the existence of a quid pro quo,
Clintonian historian Jabez Hammond suspected some
Clintonians made a private deal with the Federalists
without either King or Clinton‟s approval.
Actually, this was probably part of an understanding negotiated earlier between Senator
Obadiah German and Federalist Congressman Thomas R. Gold. This further alienated Republicans
who formerly supported Clinton and angered James Wilkin, former Speaker of the Assembly, who
expected the Senatorial appointment. Richard Riker, another close political associate of Clinton‟s, tried
to halt the deflection of Clintonians and unsuccessfully appealed to Van Buren not to join the Madison
Administration which he said “will be more universally execrated than any which we have ever had.”13
12
Craig Hanyan, “De Witt Clinton and Partisanship: The Development of Clintonianism From 1811-1820,” New York
Historical Society Quarterly 56 (April, 1972), 126 briefly mentions the 1813 campaign. Cornog, Empire, 102-103 also
briefly mentions it.
13
New York Columbian, January-February, 1813; Albany Argus, January-February, 1813; Jabez Hammond, The History of
Political Parties in the State of New York (Albany, 1842), 354-356. Charles Holt to Martin Van Buren, January 20, 1813;
Richard Riker to Martin Van Buren, February 15, 1813, Reel 4, Martin Van Buren Papers, LC; Henry Wheaton to Levi
Wheaton, February 17, 1813, Ambrose Spencer to Henry Wheaton, February 13, 1813, Robert Williams to Henry
Wheaton, January 7, 1813, Box 5, Henry Wheaton Papers, Morgan; Marturin Livingston to Albert Gallatin, January 10,
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 3, Page 4.
The defection of Clintonians to the Madison-Tompkins camp reflected the decline in Clinton‟s
political power already evident in President Madison‟s patronage appointments in late 1812/early 1813.
Previously, Presidents Thomas Jefferson and James Madison ignored the appeals of opponents of the
Clintonians in New York‟s Republican Party. However, this time Madison listened to Marinus Willett
and other Tammany leaders. After removing most Clintonians holding federal office, Madison replaced
them with former Senator John Smith as federal marshal, William P. Van Ness, a former Burrite as
district judge, Tammany Sachem John Haff as Surveyor and Grand Sachem John Ferguson as naval
officer. By withdrawing patronage support to the Clintonians, President Madison undercut De Witt
Clinton‟s leadership and actively encouraged Clinton‟s political enemies to drive him from political
office as they did when Republicans dumped Clinton from the 1813 ticket. Madison‟s actions also
encouraged Clinton loyalists to abandon Clinton and rally behind Madison and his New York
Republican supporters like Governor Daniel Tompkins. As a result many of Clinton‟s former allies,
like Martin Van Buren, jumped ship in early 1813 abandoning Clinton to save their political careers and
preserve their chances for political office. In the end opportunism, access to patronage, and selfpreservation trumped personal loyalty to most Clintonians as they switched to Tompkins and
Madison.14
To further weaken Clintonian influence, John Taylor and Ambrose Spencer financed the
establishment of the Albany Argus, edited by Jesse Buel, to counter Clintonian Solomon Southwick‟s
Register. Meanwhile, Spencer and John Armstrong persuaded Henry Wheaton, a Rhode Island
Republican, to edit a pro-Madison paper, The National Advocate. With the financial backing of
Colonel William Few, Wheaton established his paper in December 1812 to counter the Clintonian New
York Columbian. “Nothing is said of De Witt Clinton…at the moment,” concluded Henry Wheaton,
and “he is universally considered as politically defunct.” Agreeing, Ambrose Spencer believed Clinton
had “sunk to the lowest point of political degradation” and had become “absolutely odious to his
friends.”15 In a suicidal attempt to prove his continued political power, De Witt Clinton and a group of
his die-hard followers tried to sabotage Tompkins‟ reelection. After months of hedging on the war, the
1813, Reel 7, Albert Gallatin Papers, N-YHS; New York National Advocate, January, 1813; Abraham Lansing to James
Madison, April 8, 1813, Reel 15, James Madison Papers, LC; Thomas R. Gold to David Dagget, November 25, 1812,
Box 4, Dagget Papers, Yale.
14
Marinus Willett to James Madison, February 25, 1813, Jacob Barker to James Madison, March 13, 1813, C.F. Dunn to
James Madison, October 25, 1812, Reels 15, 14, James Madison Papers, LC; Jerome Mushkat, Tammany: The Evolution
of a Political Machine, 1789-1865 (Syracuse, 1971) 51; John Armstrong to Jonathan Russell, December 10, 1812,
Jonathan Russell Papers, Brown; Ambrose Spencer to John Armstrong, December 22, 1812, Rokeby Collection, John
Armstrong Papers, N-YHS; Henry Wheaton to Levi Wheaton, November 7, December 7, 14, 28, 1812, Henry Wheaton
Papers, Morgan; John Montgomery to Albert Gallatin, June 21, July 3, 1812, Reel 7, Albert Gallatin Papers, N-YHS;
Canadaigua Ontario Messenger, November 3, 1812.
15
Ambrose Spencer to Henry Wheaton, December 22, 1812, February 13, 1813, Robert Williams to Henry Wheaton,
January 24, 1813, Box 5, Wheaton Papers, Morgan; Henry Wheaton to Levi Wheaton, February 5, March 9, 1813,
Henry Wheaton Papers, Brown University; Charles Holt to Martin Van Buren, February 3, 1813, Reel 4, Martin Van
Buren Autobiography, p. 61, Reel I, Martin Van Buren Papers, LC; Morgan Lewis to the Secretary of War, January 8,
1813, Reel 54, Letters Received by the Secretary of War, Registered Series, Record Group 107, National Archives,
Washington, D.C.; Ambrose Spencer to John Armstrong, February 1, 1813, Rokeby Collection, John Armstrong Papers,
N-YHS; New York Columbian, February 2-11, 1813; Albany Argus, February 5-15, 1813; Albany Register, January,
1813; Poughkeepsie Republican Herald, January 6, 1813.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 3, Page 5.
Clintonians finally took a public stand against the war during the 1813 campaign. “Ours is the only
free republican government remaining in the world,” the Clintonian declared, “and all history…informs
us that war is the pioneer of military despotism.” We should remain clear of European conflicts and
avoid an alliance with Bonaparte. The United States went to war unprepared and it led to disaster and
defeat. Just because Congress declared war, it did not mean citizens should cease discussing the
wisdom of the decision for war. “Now if war is to silence discussion, to extinguish all opposition,”
Clintonians noted, then all the President has to do when seeking reelection is “to bring about a war.”
Since Governor Tompkins and John Taylor supported the ruinous policies of the Madison
Administration and “evinced a cold neutrality, or an invidious hostility” to Clinton‟s Presidential bid,
the Clintonians felt no obligation to endorse the reelection of men “blindly devoted to the Virginia
Dynasty.”16
The Clintonian attack on the war was consistent with De Witt Clinton‟s emphasis on the need
for military preparations. Since 1806 Clinton repeatedly pressured the state and federal governments
for money to protect New York City. Clintonians criticized the Madison Administration in the spring of
1812 for the lack of military preparations. After the 1813 election, Clinton attacked the state and
federal governments for failing to provide an adequate defense of New York, and he drafted a report on
the city‟s inadequate defenses in 1813. He lashed out at Republicans in Albany who refused to spend
more for defense. In 1814 he served on the city‟s Committee of Defense. Clintonian attacks on military
preparedness remained consistent with previous positions. However, the assault on Tompkins
repudiated the close ties between Clinton and Tompkins in 1807 and 1810. It was an act of frustration
that was politically suicidal for Clinton and any Republicans foolish enough to join him.17
Pro-Tompkins editors including Jesse
Buel and Henry Wheaton denounced the
appeal and tried to discredit it.
The
Clintonian address had little impact upon the
voters and further discredited the Clintonians
with rank and file Republicans who loyally
followed Governor Tompkins. Party leaders
refused to follow Clinton. Only six former
Assemblymen and six former Congressmen
signed the Clintonian appeal while an
address backing Tompkins won the
endorsement of fourteen current State
Senators and fifty Assemblymen. Prominent
former Clintonians who deserted to
Tompkins and signed the address included
Martin Van Buren, Clintonian Presidential
Albany had been the Capital of New York State
since 1797
16
Hammond, Political Parties, I, 354-355; Buffalo Gazette, April 27, 1813; New York Statesman, April, 1813; Address of
a number of Republicans…on the alarming situation of our Country (Albany, 1813); Martin Van Buren, Autobiography,
p. 66, Reel I. Van Buren Papers, LC.
17
See Siry, De Witt Clinton, 192-194; Hanyan, De Witt Clinton, 337-342; For example, see De Witt Clinton to James
Madison, April 26, 1806, De Witt Clinton Papers, Columbia University. Another example is Letter from a Gentleman in
Albany, April 15, 1813, in the Clinton Papers. See reels 1 and 5 of the microfilm edition.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 3, Page 6.
electors John W. Taylor and John C. Vanderveer, and four members of the Clintonian Committee of
Correspondence, James W. Wilkin, William Ross, Francis A. Bloodgood and Ruggles Hubbard.18
The pro-Tompkins address written by Martin Van Buren appealed to the spirit of 1776, “the
same rights you then fought to obtain, you must now fight to preserve.” Van Buren called upon voters
to rally behind Tompkins and Madison in a just struggle against British tyranny. “Remember ours is
the last republic,” Van Buren noted and we had to demonstrate to the European monarchs the viability
of a republican government in time of war. Republicanism stood in peril and upon the outcome of the
Anglo-American war depended “whether man is capable of self-government.” An American victory
would prove to the world “the efficacy of… [our] mild and wholesome government.” Historian Robert
Cray observed that “the memory of the American Revolution pervaded and often defined the politics of
the early republic,” and the address by Van Buren demonstrated the importance of the Revolutionary
legacy to Republicans during the War of 1812.19
Van Buren‟s themes were consistent with the rhetoric used by other Republicans to defend the
war. As a means of drumming up support for the war, Republicans, like Van Buren, whipped up
Anglophobia and wrapped themselves in the Revolutionary War legacy. This was an opportunity for
the sons of the Revolutionary generation to prove the viability of republicanism. Through appeals to
republicanism Van Buren used the public‟s faith in republicanism to justify the war, generate public
support, and discredit criticism of the war by Federalists and Clintonians. By using the Revolutionary
War legacy, Republicans “legitimized the War of 1812 and stigmatized the Federalists as anti-American
traitors.”20
During the campaign the Republicans denounced the Federalists as “domestic traitors.”
Rensselaer Republicans warned, “from these pretended „Friends of Peace‟ we have more to fear, than
from the most formidable operations of the enemy.” Federalist opposition to loaning money to the
federal government led Henry Hager to argue that their opposition should “satisfy every man what their
principles are.” Republicans blamed the Federalists for the smuggling. Customs officers could not
stop the illegal trade, John Nicholas concluded, “because the influence at these places is entirely
against them” and recommended sending loyal troops, “no federalists,” to enforce the law.
Republicans charged the Federalists with fostering secessionist sentiment and seeking to make New
York “the fifth member of a Northern Confederacy.” New York Republican rhetoric in early 1813
depicted their opponents “not as fellow Americans” with policy differences “but as foreign lackeys out
18
Albany Argus, March 23-26, April 23-30, 1813; New York National Advocate, April 10-25, 1813; New York Columbian,
May 28, 1812; Address to a number of Republicans, 14-15.
19
Ray Irwin, Daniel D. Tompkins, (New York, 1968), Chapter IX: War Governor: I; Charles Lincoln, ed., Messages from
the Governors, II, 735-783; Albany Argus, March-April, 1813; Hammond, Political Parties, I, 353-354; Martin Van
Buren, Autobiography, p. 44, Reel I, Series I, Martin Van Buren Papers, LC; Henry Hager to William C. Bouck, March
29, 1813, folder 40, Box 6, Lyman Sanford Papers, AI; Robert Cray, “Remembering the USS Chesapeake: The Politics
of Maritime Death and Impressment,” Journal of the Early Republic, 25 (Fall 2005), 449.
20
For an analysis of republican rhetoric see John Berens, Providence and Patriotism in Early America, 1640-1815,
(Charlottesville, Va., 1978), 156; Steven Watts, The Republic Reborn: War and the Making of Liberal America, 17901820, (Baltimore, 1987), 209; Reginald Stuart, War and American Thought: From The Revolution to the Monroe
Doctrine, (Kent, Oh., 1982), 144-147.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 3, Page 7.
to destroy American independence” and unity.21
Republicans asked voters to elect a
Republican majority in the Assembly and
reelect Tompkins because a Federalist
Assembly “will unquestionably prove
injurious to the war,” and “support of
Tompkins was the support of the War.” To
discredit Stephen Van Rensselaer they
blamed the disaster at Queenston upon his
alleged military incompetence. Republicans
blamed every military defeat on Federalist
opposition to the war effort and their
discouraging the militia from volunteering.
Trying to further discredit Van Rensselaer
Republicans described his tenants as “subject
to…more than Egyptian bondage.” Raising
the issue of aristocracy, Republicans warned
NY Republicans attempted to discredit Stephen
Van Rensselaer over the loss at Queenston,
October 13, 1812
voters the Patroon‟s election was “a direct and sure means of creating a dangerous aristocracy.” Again,
this was part of a national pattern to portray Federalists as aristocrats, but the Van Rensselaer land
holdings gave the charge an effective local credibility.22
Hoping to capitalize on settlers‟ fears of the Indians, Schoharie Republicans reminded citizens
of “the flames of your fields…the horrid yells of savage triumph…the dying screeches and groans of
some of your aged fathers and mothers.” Settlers in western and northern New York feared the British
and their Indian allies would repeat the massacres of the Revolution. As Governor Tompkins noted
“the inhabitants of Stueben and Allegheny Counties were desirous of being prepared to meet
any…attack…by…Indians.” Republicans raised the Indian issue because the inhabitants of western
New York genuinely feared Indian warfare. Western New Yorkers were concerned about the repeat of
21
Henry Hager to William C. Bouck, March 29, 1813, folder 40, Box 6, Lyman Sanford Papers, AI; Albany Argus, MarchApril, 1813; Cooperstown Otsego Herald, March-April, 1813; Hudson Bee, March-April, 1813; Orange County
Republican (Newburgh), April 30, 1813; Kingston Plebian, April 20, 1813; L. Schoolcraft to Henry Schoolcraft, April
16, 1813, Reel 1, Henry Schoolcraft Papers, LC; New York , April 20, 1813; L. Schoolcraft to Henry Schoolcraft, April
16, 1813, Reel 1, Henry Schoolcraft Papers, LC; New York Western Star, April 24, 1813; New York Columbian, MarchApril, 1813; New York National Advocate, March-April, 1813; Montgomery County Independent Republican, reprinted
in Goshen Orange County Patriot, February 9, 1813; Canadaigua Ontario Messenger, April 27, 1813; Buffalo Gazette,
January 12, 1813; A. Colvin to James Madison, February 17, 1813, Reel 15, James Madison Papers, LC; Henry
Wheaton to Levi Wheaton, December 18, 1812, February 17, 1813, March 24, 1813; Henry Wheaton Papers, Morgan;
Isiah Bunce to John Taylor, January 12, 1813, Box B, Taylor Papers, N-YHS; Brooklyn Long Island Star, March-April,
1813; Berens, Providence and Patriotism, 155.
22
Plattsburgh Republican, April, 1813; Cherry Valley Otsego Republican Press, March 26, 1813; Watertown Northern
Luminary, March 2, 1813, April 20, 1813; John Nicholas to James Madison, March 11, 1813, Series II, Reel 26, James
Madison Papers, LC.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 3, Page 8.
the Tory-Indian massacres of the 1780s, and in every crisis since the 1790s settlers on the frontier
feared attacks from Canada. In a few months these fears would turn into reality on the Niagara
Frontier.23
Republicans denied they fought the war to conquer Canada. This was “not a war of conquest,”
declared Albany Republicans, “but of right—it is a conflict for the preservation of that liberty and free
exercise of commercial rights for which our fathers fought.” At a Rensselaer County meeting, during
which William L. Marcy served as secretary, Republicans defended the war as “urged upon us by…self
preservation” and not as a war for conquest not “to gratify the pride of domination.” Pro-war
Republicans portrayed the war as part of the continuing struggle since the Revolution to protect the
rights of a free people and the War of 1812 was a just war to defend the rights of men. Broadsides and
newspapers used the slogan Free Trade and Sailors‟ Rights as part of the legacy of the Revolution and
the American obligation to protect individual liberty and American national identity. For Republicans
British impressment and attacks on American shipping turned this into a just war to protect liberty and
American commercial rights from a renewed threat by the British.24
Pro-Tompkins Republicans especially appealed to followers of De Witt Clinton to abandon their
leader and support Tompkins reelection. Supporters of Tompkins, as Ambrose Spencer noted, sought to
destroy and isolate Clinton “without enabling him to draw after him any considerable part of the party.”
While Irish-Americans voted for Tompkins they continued to honor Clinton. At the St. Patrick‟s Day
celebration in Albany, the Irish drank to Clinton, “the brightest star in the councils of state, his abilities
fit him for any office in the fight of the people.” Anti-Clinton Republicans succeeded in isolating
Clinton from his political base in 1813. Irish-American loyalty to Clinton was a product of Federalist
Hibernaphobia and the nativism of anti-Clinton Tammany Republicans who resented the growing
power of Irish immigrants.25
END OF PART II
Harvey Strum is a professor of history and political science at the Sage College at Albany, and also
teaches for Empire State and Excelsior colleges. He has written extensively on the politics of the War
of 1812 in New York, New Jersey and Rhode Island. His other research area include the American
reaction to the Great Famine in Ireland and American Jewish history. He is co-president of the Jewish
Historical Society of Northeastern New York and on the executive councils of the New York State and
Northeastern political science associations. His most recent publication is “A Jersey Ship for Ireland,”
chapter 1, in David Valone, ed, Ireland's Great Hunger, Vol. 2, 2010.
23
Henry Hager to William C. Bouck, March 29, 1813, folder 40, Box 6, Lyman Sanford Papers, AI; Martin Van Buren,
Autobiography, Reel I, 67; Albany Argus, March-April, 1813.
24
“Onondaga County Republican Meeting, April 12, 1813,” Broadside, N-YHS; Amos Coit to Benjamin Fowler, March 4,
1813, Benjamin Fowler Papers, NYPL; James Burr to Nathan Williams, March 14, 1813, Box 1, Nathan Williams
Papers, UtHI; Hugh Hastings, ed., Public Papers of Daniel Tompkins (Albany, 1898-1902) III, 181-182, 300; Albany
Argus, March-April, 1813; Paul Gilje, “Free Trade and Sailor‟s Rights: The Rhetoric of the War of 1812,” Journal of the
Early Republic 30:1 (Spring 2010), 1-23.
25
Union of the States, Sailors’ Rights & Free Trade, March 12, 1813, Broadside, NYSL; Ambrose Spencer to Henry
Wheaton, February 13, 1813, Box 5, Henry Wheaton Papers, Morgan.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 3, Page 9.
WAR LEADERS IN CONFLICT
The Perry-Elliott Controversy
In early 1969, in an infantry division deployed to
Vietnam, a company of three platoons was
ordered to assault a ridge line abreast of each
other. No combat assault should be taken for
granted but each of the three platoon leaders went
into action expecting the full support and
cooperation of the other two. One faltered. The
enemy recognized and exploited the gap in the
lines. One of the platoons took an extraordinary
number of casualties due to the gap.
One of those platoon leaders went on to long and
somewhat successful Army career. One, the
laggard, was released after three years on active
duty and was killed in a 1979 auto accident. The
third was incensed from the day he came off the
hill. He demanded action against the laggard,
hounding his chain of command until he, himself,
was relieved and transferred to an obscure
posting from which his career never recovered.
While no one really notes that small action today,
a very similar scenario unfolded on September
10, 1813. For the rest of Oliver Hazard Perry's
life following the Battle of Lake Erie, which
lifted the spirits of the nation, he was embroiled
in a “controversy” with his second-in-command,
Jesse Duncan Elliott. When Perry died in 1819,
Elliott and his supporters continued the efforts to
clear his name to and beyond his own death in
1845.
Did Elliott, who had shown his mettle with the
taking of the Caledonia from under the guns of
British Fort Erie early in the war, deliberately
hold his Niagara out of the action until Perry's
Lawrence was literally shot to pieces forcing
Perry to take the unusual step of transferring his
flag to the Niagara in hopes of pulling a victory
from a looming and certain defeat?
More to the point in the eyes of Perry's
supporters, did Elliott either out of jealousy,
cowardice, or hope of glory hold back until
seemingly all was lost before moving decisively
to tilt the battle in America's favor. After the
battle Perry praised all of his men, including
Elliott, for their bravery and dedication, and for a
time refused to be dragged into the “controversy.”
But the rumors kept the story alive and Elliott
fumed.
His supporters argued that the strategy and tactics
in the Age of Sail held, and held strictly, to the
rule that once the line of battle was formed it was
Elliott's duty not to break it and by Perry's
placing Niagara third in line, he was bound as a
good sailor and subordinate to stay there. If
Perry wanted to change the line of battle he had
the means of signaling that intention, but never
did.
Elliott insisted that his name be cleared.
Relations fell to the point that Elliot challenged
Perry to a duel which Perry refused. At one point
in 1818 Perry demanded that the Secretary of the
Navy, Benjamin H. Crowninshield (1772-1851),
court-martial Elliot for his conduct. The
Secretary, after consultation with the President,
James Monroe (1758-1831), did not act on that
demand.
Perry died of yellow fever on a diplomatic
mission to Venezuela in 1819. Elliott continued
his career but not without additional controversy.
He was suspended without pay following
conviction on charges of misconduct while in the
Mediterranean (1835-1838).
Both Perry and Elliott appear not to have handled
this matter well. Both came off demonstrating the
all to human traits of pride, jealousy and too large
a concern over their own “reputation.” The
“controversy” almost obscured the memory of
that “signal victory” which the United States
desperately needed on the Lakes.
As the episode described at the beginning of this
essay shows, War Leaders, too, have both
strengths of character and the full panoply of
human frailties.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 3, Page 10.
“The Providence ... of the Longest Cannon”
(Part II)
by John A. Tures
Author's Note: In the previous half of the
article, Dr. Tures examined a series of
arguments that attempt to explain America's
success in several naval conflicts during the
War of 1812, as well as British victories in
subsequent confrontations. In this concluding
installment, a theory concerning a ship's
firepower and its chances of victory is
examined.
Rival
explanations
about
“disguised
ships-of-the-line,”
so-called
“picked men,” and use of British deserters
are here rejected by the evidence. The
conclusion is that in a majority of cases, the
stronger ship simply ... prevailed!
Dr. John A. Tures is an Associate Professor of
Political Science at LaGrange College, LaGrange,
Georgia.
He sought to express his appreciation and
indebtedness to Mr. Derek G. Baldridge for support in
data collection and to Ms. Lisa Crutchfield for
appropriate edits.
While the theory may seem quite intuitive, there are perils with simply accepting myths as
fact, according to historian Donald R. Hickey. Therefore, it is important that we subject the
hypothesis (that is, the strongest ship prevailed) to the test. Ship-to-ship confrontations from the
War of 1812 are thus examined to determine if firepower makes a difference in battles on the seas and
lakes. In addition to assessing whether the hypothesis is supported, I will also look at those cases
which do not conform to expectations, to see if we can learn from exceptions to the rule.
Research Design
To examine the connection between the cannon advantage of one ship over another, I consult a
variety of sources (each is listed in the supporting bibliography at the conclusion of this article). Then,
I calculate a ratio of guns between the ships. For squadrons, I add the number of cannons for all of the
ships. The ratio is the number of cannons the American ship or ships have, divided by the number of
cannons the British ship or ships have. For example, if a 55-gun U.S. warship tangles with a 42-gun
British frigate, the ratio would be 1.30952.1 If an American sloop-of-war with 20 guns faces a British
corvette with 22 cannons, the ratio would be 0.90909.
I then assign a numeric coding system for the cases. A “–3” indicates a ratio of 0.5 or less (a
huge advantage to the British ship or squadron). A “–2” means the ratio is between 0.501 and 0.818.
For cases between 0.818 and 0.999, a score of “–1” is assigned. If the case has a ratio between 1.001
1
In fact, this case is included in the dataset. It is also one of the examples where a stronger ship failed to come away with
a victory. The USS President attempted to capture the smaller HMS Belvidera, but the former suffered an internal
explosion from an accident which killed or wounded 16 sailors, and injuring the captain (Toll, 2006: 336). Additionally,
the latter was able to dump a series of nautical necessities (anchor, drinking water) to escape, something the American
large frigate was unwilling to do, given its long-term mission (Elting, 1995: 73). But it serves as another case of bigger
not always being better, especially in a chase.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 3, Page 11.
and 1.222 (a slight American advantage, it gets a “1.” For “2s,” the ratio is between 1.2221 and 1.9999.
When the ratio is greater than a 2, the score I give is a “3.” For the rare case where both ships have
exactly the same number of guns, a zero is assigned.2 For a visual representation, see Table 1.
Table 1: Coding the Armament Data
CODE
RATIO*
DEFINITION
3
X>2
Strong American Advantage
ARMAMENT
2
1.2221<X<1.9999
American Advantage
1
1.001<X<1.222
Slight American Advantage
0
0
Completely Even
-1
0.818<X<0.999
Slight British Advantage
-2
0.5<X<0.818
British Advantage
-3
X<0.5
Strong British Advantage
*The Ratio is determined by A/B,
with “A” representing America’s cannons and “B” representing Britain’s cannons
When it comes to judging the outcome of a battle, I adopt a trichotomous (Editor: division by
three's) measure. With a “-1,” the British ship or squadron has prevailed, capturing the American ship
or squadron or gaining a sizeable tactical advantage. A score of “1” means that the American ship or
squadron bested the British. For cases of a zero, neither side has clearly prevailed. Either the ships
battled each other to a draw, or one ship was able to slip away to fight another day. See Table 2 for an
example.
Table 2: Coding the Outcome Data
CODE
OUTCOME 1
0
-1
RESULT
American Victory
Draw
British Victory
In my research, I have found 80 cases involving at least one warship (on either side) and either a
privateer or ships with a Letter-of-Marque.3 I discovered an additional 16 cases, but data were missing
2
3
As you might imagine, it is difficult to code cases of ships and the number of guns. In some cases (especially involving
privateers and ships with Letters-of-Marque), no number is given. In many more, conflicting numbers are given. Take,
for example, the well-documented battle between the USS Constitution and the HMS Guerrière. The former is cited as
having 44 guns, while the latter is listed as having 38 guns (Cross, 1960: 44-45). But that is the “size” of the ship (how
they are rated). Both ships actually placed more guns aboard than they were rated for (Hickey, 2006: 11). The USS
Constitution is coded as carrying 54 or 55 guns, while the HMS Guerrière is listed by Hickey as having 49. As
Roosevelt (1882: 88) put it “One navy was certainly as deceptive as another, as far as underrating went.” To overcome
this, I look only at cases where one side had an advantage or not (regardless of the ratio), not the disparity of the
advantage. Later, I note the results of this test.
I only count cases that occurred after hostilities began, so the shots fired by the HMS Leopard against the USS
Chesapeake in 1807 and the exchange between the USS President and HMS Little Belt in 1811 do not count (Cross,
1960: 43). But I do count cases after the official ratification of the Ghent peace treaty when both sides at sea were
fighting under the belief that the war was still ongoing. The dataset concludes with the ill-fated exchange between the
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 3, Page 12.
on the number of guns from at least one ship. But I recognize that a number of privateers and ships
with a Letter-of-Marque had either inexperienced crews or significantly less guns than naval warships.
In case someone feels that including the cases involving privateers and Letters-of-Marque is
problematic, I run a second test with the 45 cases where only naval warships battling each other are
examined.
Hypothesis Test Results
The findings show that, in general, Hickey's assessment was correct. When looking at the two
samples of battles, the ship (or ships, in the case of a squadron) possessing more guns usually wins. In
the larger dataset, the ship or squadron with more guns wins two-thirds of the time. When restricted to
confrontations between a U.S. and an British naval ship, the stronger ship or squadron still wins 61.37
percent of the time.
An initial look at the disparity of guns supports this analysis (see Table 3 for details). When all
cases are analyzed (including several with privateers and Letters-of-Marque), the differences between
the armament of ships becomes all too clear. When one side has twice as much firepower as the other
side, the stronger ship or ships win 78.9 percent of the time. For cases of -2 and 2 (or when the
Americans have either a 0.501 to 0.818 disadvantage against the British, or advantage between 1.2222
and 1.9999 over the British), the success rate is 71.4 percent. When the difference between the
firepower of both sides is far narrower, the slightly stronger side prevails only 57.1 percent of the time.4
Table 3: The Success Of American Or British Ships, Based Upon Armament Ratios
ARMAMENT
CODE
DEFINITION
SUCCESS RATE
FOR THE
STRONGER SHIP
(All Ship Battles)
3 or -3
Strong American or
Strong British
Advantage
American or
British Advantage
Slight American or
Slight British
Advantage
78.9%
SUCCESS RATE
FOR THE
STRONGER SHIP
(USN Or HMS
Warships Only)
61.1%
71.4%
60%
57.1%
62.5%
2 or -2
1 or -1
But what might surprise the reader involves a closer analysis of the armament of warships,
when cases of privateers and those with Letters-of-Marque are excluded from the study. In instances of
the greatest disparity between a U.S or British warship (see Table 3), the success rate of the ship with
many more cannons is 61.1 percent. That differs little from battles where the disparities were narrower
(-2/2 = 60 percent for the more powerful ship or squadrons, -1/1 = 62.5 percent chance of victory for
4
USS Peacock and HMS Nautilus, nearly five months after hostilities had formally ceased in 1815 (Hickey, 2006: 289).
Naval scholar Alfred Thayer Mahan, author of The Influence of Sea Power Upon History adopted the thesis that the
United States needed capital ships in its naval arsenal in his assessment of the War of 1812 (Toll, 465).
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 3, Page 13.
the stronger side). One would expect the chances for success to be greater when one side employs far
more guns than the other side.
There is also the puzzle of those cases when a weaker ship or ships prevail, or prevent the
stronger side from winning outright. An examination of these “upsets” (where the ship with less guns
either wins or forces a tie) reveals an interesting pattern.
The first category of cases where the stronger side does not win (either losing or failing to beat
a weaker ship or set of ships, resulting in a “no decision”) involves battles upon the Great Lakes, or inland waterways. These include America's surprising successes at Lake Erie 5 and Lake Champlain,6
British success at Lake Huron,7 and draws at Lake Ontario8 and Chesapeake Bay.9 In the latter
examples, a large squadron was unable to take advantage of its firepower, allowing the enemy to slip
away.
The second category of cases primarily involves chases where the pursuer was unable to nab the
pursued vessel. Typically, these involve cases where a 74-gun British ship-of-the-line (and sometimes
some escorts) was unable to apprehend a smaller ship, like a frigate or sloop-of-war.10 But it also
included cases where large American frigates like the USS President and USS Constitution were unable
to chase down smaller (and lighter) British warships.11
Of course, there are a tiny number of cases where a stronger ship was defeated by a weaker one
(USS Argus-HMS Pelican12 and HMS Frolic-USS Wasp13). But both advantages by the “stronger” ship
were slight at best. Perhaps another factor, like the quality of weaponry, may additionally play a role.14
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
Elting, 1995: 88-92, 95-98; Cross, 1960: 51-54.
Elting, 1995: 255-263; Cross, 1960: 55-57.
Elting (1995: 279-280).
Elting (1995: 86-88, 92-94, 98-102). Elting feels that Sir James Yeo and the British generally got the better of U.S.
Commodore Isaac Chauncey.
Elting (1995: 79) documents the case of the Chesapeake Bay, and missed chances for the British (and their inability to
catch American gunboats) as well as blown opportunities for the Americans to catch the attacking ships in close quarters.
There are several examples of this in my dataset. None is as well documented as the case of the USS Constitution
escaping the HMS Africa and her escorts in an epic race over the course of several days (Cross, 1960: 44).
In fact, Elting (1995) critiques the performance of the larger American frigates, in contrast to their smaller U.S.
counterparts for disrupting the British merchant fleet. “By contrast with the destruction dealt out by the sloops, the
frigates accomplished very little…[i]t was obvious that sloops-of-war were far better fitted for commerce raiding, being
easier to build, man and equip. Moreover, their superior speed and maneuverability made it easier for them to evade
blockaders, while they had enough fire power to handle English vessels of their class (Elting, 1995: 82-83).” The dearth
of prizes not only applies to hapless ships like the USS Congress, but even the USS President and venerated USS
Constitution.
There is an additional explanation for the loss of the USS Argus to the smaller HMS Penguin. Evidently, the American
ship was celebrating its 21st capture of a merchant ship; one loaded with Portuguese wine. The HMS Pelican pounced
upon the frolicking Americans. The loss of her captain and first lieutenant early in the battle made matters worse for the
USS Argus and she was forced to strike her colors (Elting, 1995: 81).
While Toll's (2006: 367) sources have the HMS Frolic carrying fewer guns than the USS Wasp, Roosevelt (1882: 139 &
144) claims that the British ship had an extra gun advantage upon the Americans.
Roosevelt (1882) weighs the pros and cons of the longer range 12-, 18- and 24-pound cannons as opposed to the shortrange stubby 32-pound carronades. “If a ship armed with long 12's meets one armed with 32-pound carronades, which
is superior in force? At long range the first, and at short-range, the second; and of course each captain is pretty sure to
insist that 'circumstances' forced him to fight at a disadvantage. The result would depend largely on the skill or luck of
each commander in choosing position (Roosevelt, 1882: 100).”
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 3, Page 14.
This will be the subject of a future analysis of mine. Besides, with all the clashes at sea, it wouldn't be
too surprising to see the occasional upset in single-ship combat.
What We've Learned
Certainly for the War of 1812, preliminary evidence does support Hickey's hypothesis that the
stronger ship or squadron prevails, on average. But what about the links between the “upsets” or
unexpected outcomes? What can they teach us?
In the cases involving close quarters, like lakes or narrow inlets from bays, greater firepower
seemed to confer no special advantage. Additionally, on the high seas, the huge ships-of-the-line
seemed to struggle in their ability to catch the more nimble ships with fewer guns.15 Could having too
many cannons slow down these floating fortresses, weakening their ability to catch their prey? In
addition, having superior firepower seemed to matter less and less in close quarters, such as the lakes
between the United States and Canada.
It is worth noting that in the battle for the Great Lakes, both sides planned the construction of
massive ships topping 100 guns, in their attempt to control the border between the United States and
Canada. But such plans for floating castles were abandoned, most likely due to their impracticality.16
Something did replace this mania for more guns. Fifty years later, the United States witnessed
the Battle of Hampton Roads, where a ten-gun ship sank a 50-gun ship and burned another ship with 50
cannons, in the same battle, without assistance. That was because the CSS Virginia was an ironclad,
which made the superior number of guns on the USS Cumberland and USS Congress obsolete.17 The
following day, the CSS Virginia found itself in a historic duel to a draw with a two-gun ship, the USS
15
16
17
Whipple (1978) notes the demise of the ships-of-the-line in the wake of Admiral Horatio Nelson's death at the Battle of
Trafalgar. “There were other sailing fleet battles after Trafalgar, but none so remembered or revered. The day of the
majestic, synchronized fleet engagement was dying. Only seven years after Trafalgar, the War of 1812 was fought
almost entirely by frigate against frigate instead of by the big ships of the line. And 17 years after Trafalgar, the Comet,
a wooden paddle-wheel steam warship of 80 horsepower, was commissioned in the Royal Navy. The Age of Fighting
Sail had ended. Horatio Nelson had died just in time (Whipple, 1978: 169).” What Whipple fails to note is the role the
War of 1812 played in demonstrating the need to develop an alternative technology. When large ships-of-the-line, laden
with heavy siding and overarmed with so many cannon could fail to run down the more nimble American frigates, a
change in technology, such as the paddle-wheel steam warship, was needed. Similarly, Symonds (2005: 79) claims that
“the Battle of Lake Erie was a template of naval combat that was already passing…” in favor of the steamboat. Each
author assumes that change was a matter of mere technological development, rather than results from battles on the sea.
Steam engines and iron defense were not new concepts by the early 1800s, but perhaps the War of 1812 exposed the
weakness of the alternative: bulky overarmed wooden boats and the limits of superior firepower on battles held on the
Great Lakes and close quarters. Not only would speed from steam be valued, but also greater defensive armor to
produce a “game changer” in battles on lakes, rivers and bays.
Elting (1995) refers to the folly of the British construction of the 112-gun HMS Saint Lawrence for Sir James Yeo's fleet
on Lake Ontario and Commodore Isaac Chauncey's attempt to build two 130-gun ships and a 58-gun frigate for the
Americans to counter the new threat on the smallest of the Great Lakes. “Both fleets had been a tremendous drain on
their respective logistical systems, and had used up hundreds of men by hardship and disease. The whole business was
hardly glorious (Elting, 1995: 102).” Hickey (2006: 135) also documents this “naval arms race,” illustrating how
ineffective the HMS Saint Lawrence was destined to be. “Compared to oceangoing warships, the shallow-draft St.
Lawrence was flimsy and unstable. About a third of its guns were carronades, so it needed to be close to an enemy to
take full advantage of its firepower (Hickey, 2006: 135).”
Cross, 1960: 78-80.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 3, Page 15.
Monitor.18
The development of such ironclads, and their connection to the results of the War of 1812, are
not as far-fetched as would otherwise seem. As Symonds has noted, the Confederacy was well aware
of their shortcomings in the number of ships it could throw against the United States Navy. Therefore,
Confederate States Naval Secretary Stephen Mallory planned a strategy similar to the one employed by
the United States against the British blockaders in the War of 1812. He would rely upon stronger
coastal defenses as well as some “cutting-edge naval weapons.”19 According to Mallory's
correspondence with his wife, these would include ships with “defensive characteristics” that could
stand up to a whole squadron of conventional United States ships.20 These are not unlike the “44-gun”
larger frigates that the United States built which generally outclassed their 38-gun frigates of Her
Majesty's Navy.21 Meanwhile, the United States, with its excellent intelligence network on the South's
plans, merely developed its own ironclad to counter the Southern threat.22
Steam-powered wooden ships would still play a role in naval engagements during the Civil War.
These included the Battle of New Orleans, where Admiral Farragut's squadron got by Forts Jackson
and St. Philip and an ironclad.23 Another such confrontation occurred at the Battle of Mobile Bay,
where a squadron that combined the power of wooden ships and ironclads defeated a Confederate
ironclad, its escorts, and a pair of forts.24 But the big-gunned wooden ship era was clearly in its
twilight. In the Spanish-American War, the Spanish battleships with wooden decks sandwiched
between metal plating were easy targets for American ships, whose shots set them ablaze in battles like
Manila Bay25 and the one at Santiago de Cuba.26 Successful ships found that the reduction of firepower
could be overcome by changes in armor. But even before such technology was available, some War of
1812-era ships discovered that while the ships with more guns usually won, the bulkier boats could not
always cope as well with chases on the high seas or in close quarters on narrow lakes. These
shortcomings helped paved the way for the desire to focus upon speed and defensive armament, rather
than bigger ships loaded with even more cannon.
Concluding Editor's Note: So, it seems, that Dr. Tures' conclusion: “That in a majority of cases,
the stronger ship prevailed” is, after all, correct!
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
Cross, 1960: 81-83. Actually, the CSS Virginia (referred to in the North as the “Merrimack,” the name of the halfscuttled ship whose hull was used by the CSS Virginia) tangled with a third ship. She was responsible for the 44-gun
USS Minnesota running aground, but had to retire before she could destroy the third Northern ship. It was in the
morning when the CSS Virginia returned to finish off the wooden Union ship when she spied the USS Monitor,
beginning the famous ironclad clash (Cross, 1960: 80).
Symonds, 2005: 92.
Symonds, 2005: 93.
“A 44 was matched against a 38; it was not surprising that she should win, but it was surprising that she should win with
ease and impunity (Roosevelt, 1882: 94).”
Symonds, 2005: 99.
Cross, 1960: 72-76.
Cross, 1960: 93-99.
Symonds (2005: 167) describes the Spanish fleet at the Battle of Manila Bay, which included the Castilla the second
strongest ship in Admiral Montojos' fleet. This ship was evidently partially made of wood, having no armor. The
Castilla burned during the fight (Symonds, 2005: 180).
Cross, 1960: 111; Symonds, 2005.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 3, Page 16.
“The Providence ... of the Longest Cannon” (Part II)
by John A. Tures
Supporting Bibliography
Wilbur Cross, Naval Battles and Heroes (New York, NY: American Heritage/Golden Press, 1960).
Donald R. Hickey, Don't Give Up the Ship! Myths of the War of 1812 (Urbana & Chicago, IL:
University of Illinois Press, 2006).
History Channel, “Battlefield Detectives: The War of 1812, The Chesapeake and the Shannon,” DVD,
2005.
Assheton Humphreys, The USS Constitution's Finest Fight: The Journal of Acting Chaplain Assheton
Humphreys, USN, ed. Tyrone G. Martin (Mt. Pleasant, SC: The Nautical & Aviation Publishing Co. of
America, Inc., 1815/2000).
William James, Naval Occurrences of the War of 1812: A Full and Correct Account of the Naval War
Between Great Britain and the United States of America, 1812-1815 (London: Conway Maritime Press,
1817/2004).
Craig L. Symonds, Decision at Sea (Oxford: University Press, 2005).
Ian W. Toll, Six Frigates: The Epic History of the Founding of the U.S. Navy (New York, NY: Norton
Publishers, 2006).
Theodore Roosevelt, The Naval War of 1812: Or, The History of the United States Navy During the
Last War with Great Britain, to Which Is Appended an Account of the Battle of New Orleans (New
York, NY: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1882).
A.B.C. Whipple, The Seafarers: Fighting Sail (Alexandria, VA: Time-Life Books, 1978).
THINGS YOU SHOULD KNOW ABOUT:
Perry's Victory and International Peace Memorial
Put-in-Bay, Ohio







The grounds of the Park are seasonally open (Call 429.285.2184, for hours).
The 352-foot monument shaft, itself, is closed and under restoration.
The projected re-opening of the monument shaft is in May 2012.
The monument shaft was constructed between October 1912 and June 1915.
Nine states cooperated with the federal government in funding the Memorial.
When you can, try walking the 467 steps from the plaza to the Observation Parapet.
Details on the monument's construction can be found in Jeff Kissell, Put-in-Bay: The
Construction of Perry's Monument (Charleston, SC: 2001).
 Most importantly: The real story here is about the Battle of Lake Erie on September 10, 1813.
And that's something you should know about.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 3, Page 17.
The Documents
Oliver Hazard Perry's “messages” following the Battle of Lake Erie
Most of us are familiar with the famous note Oliver Hazard Perry (1785-1819) wrote to General William
Henry Harrison (1773-1841) on an old envelope following the battle with the British fleet on Lake Erie,
September 10, 1813. It was reproduced in Benson J. Lossing's Pictorial Field Book of the War of 1812
(1869: 530):
Dear General:
We have met the enemy and they are ours:
Two Ships, two Brigs, one Schooner & one Sloop.
Yours with great respect and esteem
O.H. Perry
Later that same momentous day, Perry send a more formal report to Secretary of the Navy, William Jones
(1760-1831):
U.S. Brig Niagara off the Westward Sister
Head of Lake Erie, Sepr. 10Th 1813
4 p.m.
Sir:
It has pleased the almighty to give the arms of the United States a signal victory
over their enemies on this Lake. The British Squadron consisting of two Ships, two
Brigs, one Schooner & one Sloop have this moment surrendered to the force under
my command, after a sharp conflict.
I have the honor to be
Sir
Very Respectfully
Your Obdt. Servt.
O.H. Perry
This second message is held by the National Archives and Records Administration within Record Group
45: Records of the Department of the Navy, Captains' Letters.
Did you every notice that both reports were wrong. According to the research conducted by David Curtis
Skaggs and Gerald T. Altoff in their A Signal Victory: The Lake Erie Campaign, 1812-1813 (1997: 123,
n 6 and 148, n 48), followed by Altoff's Oliver Hazard Perry and the Battle of Lake Erie (1999: 54, n
129-130), British Captain Robert Heriot Barclay's (1786-1837) squadron actually consisted two ships, one
brig, two schooners and one sloop. On September 10, 1813, young Perry was excited!
The message for those who read, write and enjoy history is that even then in 1813 the first reports were
almost enviably wrong. Now what does all this mean if the near-in-time “what I did in the war”
narratives may have errors, the laudatory biographies of the participants are slanted, and the jingoistic
histories have audiences not keen on true accuracy, and today's revisionist historians are even further
from the true account? History doesn't change; our poorly researched perception of it does.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 3, Page 18.
Searching for the War of 1812 Connections with Antarctica
by
Harold W. Youmans
Although the subject of conjecture and rumor since the 4th century B.C., and placed on maps,
both ancient and medieval, it was only toward the end of the seventeenth century that we had any
real knowledge of the vast southern continent known as Antarctica. And what does all this have
to do with the War of 1812? Well, combine commissioned officers of the Royal Navy,
American shipbuilding skill, privateers in action, and a marooning, and you have the basis of a
good yarn about life and exploration “below the Convergence.”
Antarctic Explorer James Weddell (17871834)
Our Royal Naval officer is James Weddell
(1787-1834), an Antarctic explorer sitting in
the sailing pantheon with the likes of Captain
James Cook. On numerous southern
expeditions Weddell drove his ships and
consorts further south than any sailor before
and is today remembered as the inspiration for
the naming of Weddell Sea along the
continent's shore. Weddell's sailing record
would stand for some 80 years. But in 1813
Weddell was Master of the ten-gun brig, HMS
Hope, in the English Channel.
Our privateer is the fabulously successful True Blooded Yankee. She was a French brig outfitted
by Henry Preble, a Rhode Islander living in Paris during the war. On March 1, 1813, she sailed
from Brest under the command of a Captain Hailey and made a nuisance of herself in the Irish
Channel. In about 37 days she seemed to be taking prizes daily (27 on this cruise), occupied
British territory for a week when needing a repair (a small island off the Irish coast), invaded and
sacked a Scottish harbor (burning seven docked vessels), and was back in Brest with 270
prisoners and an enormously valuable cargo. Lloyd's took note!
Refitted by September 21, 1813, she again sailed into British waters intent, so the notice posted
at Lloyd's Coffee House, London, said, “to sink, burn, and destroy” British commerce. The truth
was otherwise and additional captures were undertaken by the American. Her luck, however, ran
out. As most readers know, successful privateers had to place a small part of her crew on the
captured vessels into order to sail them to port and to the available “prize courts.” By the time
the True Blooded Yankee encountered the HMS Hope, she was down to thirty-two men out of an
original complement of over 200. Master Weddell had his prize. After several more assignments
Weddell was set ashore on half-pay in 1816.
In his early thirties, Weddell is described as vigorous, intelligent and ambitious. Napoleon is
limited to St. Helena, the American war is ended, and promotion in the Royal Navy is too slow
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 3, Page 19.
for the ambitious.
service.
Happenstance or no, Weddell takes to the southern ocean in the merchant
Here there are fresh rumors of new lands to
the south of Cape Horn. Here, too, are new
adventures and new hunting grounds for the
seal and other fur-bearing animals of those
islands and climates. Who could resist
employment in a skill in which you excelled,
adventure upon unknown seas, and profits
seemingly at the end of every cruise?
Weddell's ship was the brig Jane. Although
not the first to spot the Antarctic mainland, in
her, he drove his crews for his owners south
in search of the adventure and the profit.
Image said to be the True Blooded Yankee
Antarctic author Alan Gurney (Below the Convergence, 1997) described the Jane. In 1819 this
American-built two-masted vessel, 75-feet long and 20 feet in the beam, was 30 years old.
However, at 160-tons with a crew of a slim 22, the size was said to be perfect for sealing.
Weddell's Jane in the Antarctic
Gurney does not offer any other history than to
say she was taken as a prize during the War of
1812. Several possibilities emerge. Harrison
Scott Baker (American Prisoners of War Held
at
Barbados,
New
Providence
and
Newfoundland During the War of 1812, 2007)
reports a privateer, Jane, captured on March 6,
1813, by HM Brig Swaggerer. In his American
Prisoners of War Held at Halifax During the
War of 1812 (2008), he reports another
privateer named Jane captured by HMS
Maidstone on November 4, 1814.
A third reference to a ship named Jane was the tender used by Captain Sir Peter Parker, RN,
before Baltimore in August, 1814. There, as in other instances, blockading ships the Royal Navy
used captured shallow-draft vessels to get closer to shore and to navigate on the rivers along the
Atlantic seacoast. Finally, a Jane was encountered by the Canadian privateer Dart on June 26,
1813, off New England. The Dart's skipper decided that that vessel was not worth manning (See
C.H.J. Snider, Under the Red Jack: Privateers of the Maritime Provinces of Canada in the War
of 1812 (n.d., c. 1928). More research for the diligent awaits those seeking to trace the Jane
before 1819. Weddell's Jane endured three Antarctic expeditions and was allowed to founder
only in 1829.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 3, Page 20.
There is also one more War of 1812 connection with early Antarctic expeditions. On his second
cruise James Weddell “stumbled” across an American captain who had been marooned on New
Island in the Falklands. If there is any truth to the old adage that no good deed ever goes
unpunished, one need only to hear the story of James H. Barnard.
Some time in 1813 the Isabella, a British ship, was wrecked on the Southern Ocean. As fate
would have it Captain Barnard had a benevolent streak and sought to aide sailors in distress (a
custom than transcends national policy and war, by the way). His reward? Treachery, avarice
and deceit as the American is overtaken by the British crew and the solitary figure of Barnard is
left to a stone hut on the uninhabited New Island for more that two years until he, himself, is
rescued by others. Weddell was entranced by the story and included details in his own book, A
Voyage towards the South Pole: Performed in the Years 1822-24, Containing an Examination of
the Antarctic Sea, to the Seventy-fourth Degree of Latitude; and a Visit to Tierra del Fuego, with
a Particular Account of the Inhabitants. To which is Added, Much Useful Information on the
Coasting Navigation of Cape Horn, and the Adjacent Lands (1825). He also encouraged Barnard
to set his own tale in letters. His Narrative Of The Sufferings And Adventures of Capt. Charles H.
Barnard, In A Voyage Round The World, During The Years 1812, 1813, 1814, 1815, & 1816;
Embracing An Account Of The Seizure of His Vessel At The Falkland Islands, By An English
Crew Whom He Had Rescued From The Horrors Of A Shipwreck; And Of Their Abandoning
Him On An Uninhabited Island Where He Resided Nearly Two Years (1829) is available on-line.
So, the reader is correct again. There were no known ship duels near Antarctica and there were
certainly no land operations. But the southern waters were becoming more and more into focus.
American ships of war did pass into the Pacific. There were South Atlantic duels. The Royal
Navy had an active “Station” at Buenos Aires. And for the 25 years following the war American
and British veterans of that conflict were in the van, exploring this newly discovered continent.
Certainly not an 1812 story, but Weddell and others veterans including those on the U.S. Wilkes
Expedition in the 1830s led the way. Each had a War of 1812 connection.
Antarctica Before the War of 1812
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 3, Page 21.
CHRONOLOGY
Hull's Campaign through Ohio to
Detroit: April to August 1812
Offered this issue is a detailed chronology of General
William Hull's disastrous campaign at the opening of
the War of 1812. Hopefully there is no hint in here
regarding the lack of any courage or fidelity to duty.
Apr 29: Ohio Governor Return J. Meigs orders
militia rendezvous in Dayton.
Apr 08: General William Hull is appointed
commander of Northwest Army; heads for Ohio.
Apr 29: Three regiments of Ohio militia arrive at
Dayton rendezvous.
May 10: Hull passes through Cincinnati, Ohio.
May 20: General Hull arrives in Dayton, Ohio.
May 25: Hull takes command of NW Army.
Jun 06: Indian tribes near Urbana agree to adhere
to Treaty of Greenville (1795) terms.
Jun 01: Hull's Army begins march north; stops at
Staunton, present-day Troy, Ohio).
Jun 07: Hull's Army reaches Urbana
Jun 09: Urbana Indian council grants Army
permission to cross tribal lands.
Jun 10: 4th US Infantry (Col. Duncan McArthur)
joins Hull at Urbana.
Jun 16: Construction of Fort McArthur begun at
King's Creek (near Kenton, Ohio).
Jun 18: US declares war on Great Britain
Jun 22: Hull's Army, delayed by rain, reaches
Fort Necessity.
Jun 24: British forces in Canada receive news of
declaration of war; a full week before Hull.
Jun 24: Secretary Eustis sends order to Hull with
authorization to invade Canada (see Jul 02).
Jun 25: Hull's Army reaches Fort Findlay.
Jun 26: Hull receives Secretary of War William
Eustis's warning that war is close at hand.
Jun 26: Col. Lewis Cass tasked with building
road to the Rapids of the Maumee River.
Jun 30: Hull, at Fallen Timbers battlefield,
dispatches boat to Detroit with papers.
Jul 02: Hull's Army reaches Raisin River in
Michigan Territory; learns of declaration of war.
Jul 05: Hull arrives near Detroit, opposite
Sandwich; Cass refused entry to British outpost.
Jul 09: Hull received orders authorizing an
invasion of Canada.
Jul 12: Colonel James Miller's and Cass's
regiments cross into Canada; Hull's proclamation.
Jul 12: British forces under Colonel Thomas St.
George at Fort Malden numbers about 900.
Jul 15: McArthur's command foraging in Canada;
receipts are issued.
Jul 16: Miller and Cass reconnoiter towards
Malden; Hull directs protection of Canadian
private property.
Jul 18: McArthur has two skirmishes with British
forces at Aux Canards bridge.
Jul 19: In a report to Eustis, Hull is hopeful of a
successful outcome for US.
Jul 21: Hull returns to Detroit; command of army
in Canada falls to McArthur.
Jul 22: Hull reports to Eustis that he intends to
lay siege to Fort Malden.
Jul 22: General Isaac Brock's counterproclamation restores confidence in British arms.
Jul 25: Major James Denny confronts British
again near Aux Canards bridge.
Jul 28: News of the fall of Fort Mackinac (Jul 17)
reaches Hull at Detroit.
Aug 03: American Fort Mackinac garrison
reaches Detroit under parole.
Aug 04: Major Thomas Van Horn, ordered to
escort supplies, is ambushed near Brownstown.
Aug 05: Hull orders attack on Fort Malden.
Aug 07: The Army, readying for Malden attack,
is ordered back to US soil.
Aug 08: Malden receives reinforcements under
Colonel Henry Proctor.
Aug 09: Relief column under Miller attacked at
Maguaga, south of Detroit.
Aug 10: Miller's column retreats to Detroit.
Aug 12: Subordinates meet and discuss Hull's
fitness for command.
Aug 13: Hull refuses to allow maneuvering
British, in view, to be fired upon.
Aug 15: British General Brock demands
surrender of Detroit garrison.
Aug 15: Unknown to Hull, garrison at Fort
Dearborn (Chicago) is attacked and surrenders.
Aug 16: General William Hull surrenders to
British under General Isaac Brock.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 3, Page 22.
VISIT1812
ERIE MARITIME MUSEUM and
U.S. BRIG NIAGARA,
Erie, Pennsylvania
The Erie Maritime Museum and U.S. Brig
Niagara presages the future of the historic site in
this nation. It is a rational blend of the old and
new with a clear mission of honoring the exploits
of the past while passing skills on to the future.
The Battle of Lake Erie was a pivotal battle in
this nation's war to secure it's place in the Old
Northwest. However, to understand the battle is
to understand the context. In 1813 the world was
at war. The conflict between a maritime Britain
and a continental France was raging. It had been
fought with but small pauses for two decades.
Britain felt justified in treating its former colony,
the United States, with less respect than the latter
felt it was due. At the Museum the battle is
viewed within that context.
At the museum docents will guide the visitor
through the construction of Perry's fleet,
including his USS Niagara. Visitors will come to
know the stories behind the fleet's authorization,
the role played by the village and port, the
builders, where the manpower and supplies were
found and transported, and how the fleet
overcame natural obstacles to place it on the Lake
and in the position to challenge the British
squadron. And, yes, the details of the Battle on
the western end of the Lake is also well told.
Someone once said that winning in battle is
mostly just showing up. They're wrong. Both
Perry and his British counterpart were
experienced sailors and well versed in 19th
century tactics. Both had ships of similar design
and strength. Both had manpower and supply
challenges. And both used skill and determination
to take them to the scene. What Perry had, after
he showed up, was luck.
The British never attacked Erie during the
construction of Perry's fleet or during his very
vulnerable cameling operation. In retrospect they
could have readily ended the American threat if
they had. Perry's survival on-board the Lawrence
was also truly amazing. Every other officer,
except Perry and his younger brother, was either
killed or wounded. The ship's boat that Perry
used to transfer his flag to the Niagara was the
only remaining one afloat. It had been shot
through, but all the damage was above the
waterline. The wind freshened just when Perry,
now on the Niagara, needed it most. And, even
Perry's black spaniel survived a direct hit on the
closet to which it had been confined on the
Lawrence. Just showing up? How about skill,
professional preparation, willingness to venture,
and LUCK?
The Erie Maritime Museum lays it all out. But
there is more here. Erie became a most important
port and shipbuilding center and remained so
throughout the 19th century. Maritime interests
including commercial fishing rose in importance.
Erie was a “Mecca” for the immigrants who
flooded into western Pennsylvania from Atlantic
ports. They built on the character of the land and
fully supported the local community.
By the time the 1913 centenary of the battle
approached plans were undertaken to raise the
deliberately-sunken remains of the Niagara to
attempt a restoration. In the end, only 10% of the
hulk could be used, but it was used to good cause
and in July 1913 the U.S. Brig Niagara received
her first visitors in nearly 100 years. The original
1813 timbers are still aboard but now in nonsupporting parts of the ship. Other major
reconstructions followed and today the ship has a
new mission.
Flagship Niagara is today a premier sail training
ship. The adventurous by the thousands have
participated in educational programs at the
Museum. Also visit the Museum Store. Details
are available at the Erie Maritime Museum, 150
East Front Street, Erie, PA 16507. Call them at
814.452-2744 (Fax: 814.455.6760), or visit them
on line at www.eriemaritimemuseum.org.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 3, Page 23.
BOOK REVIEWS
Long Range Guns, Close Quarter Combat: The
Third United States Artillery Regiment in the
War of 1812 by Richard V. Barbuto, Ph.D.
Youngstown, New York: Old Fort Niagara
Association, Inc., 2010, 144 pp., includes
bibliographical
references
and
index,
softcover. - Reviewed by Harold W. Youmans.
The bag of powder and the round of ammunition
is loaded into the muzzle. A crew member rams
the package to the back of the barrel with a
wooden ramming staff. The senior, behind the
gun, places a pick into the firing vent piercing the
bag of powder. The fuse is placed in the vent.
With the target designated, the cannon is
positioned, elevated and aimed. At the officer's
command, “Fire,” the port fire, a burning match
held on a rod, lights the fuse. The gun is fired.
Its effect is observed. And the process repeated;
repeated thousands of times in the life of the
Third United States Artillery Regiment.
Richard V. Barbuto, a Professor and Deputy
Director of the Department of Military History at
the United States Army Command and Staff
College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, discovered
(or re-discovered) the “orders book” of the Third
U.S. Artillery. This monograph is the result of
his research.
George Armstrong, the hero at Fort McHenry,
was in the Third. Alexander Macomb was its
wartime Colonel.
He went on to be the
Commanding General of the Army during the
Adams Administration in 1828. George Mitchell,
a medical doctor, was a battalion commander at
the Battle of Oswego in May, 1814. Thomas
Legate, Rufus McIntire, James House all played
roles in the Regiment. Thomas Stockton was
briefly in the Third and went on to be the
Governor of Delaware.
The monograph traces the life of the Regiment
from its organization during the war-time flurry
of Congressional actions in 1812 to its
consolidation into the Corps of Artillery in 1814
and beyond.
Along the way scenes from
Queenston Heights, Sackett's Harbor, Sandy
Creek and elsewhere come into view.
Dr. Barbuto, who also penned Niagara 1814:
America Invades Canada (Lawrence, Kansas,
2000), blends rare and unique archival and
published primary sources with a full variety of
secondary books and articles to bring the Third
United States Artillery Regiment to life. “Close
Quarter Combat?” Yes, indeed. Manning the
guns, fighting as infantry, advance guard, rear
guard; it's all here. The rich and richly-illustrated
story of one of the fighting regiments of the war.
Thank you, Dr. Barbuto.
RETROSPECTIVE REVIEW
The Perrys Victory Centenary: Report of the Perrys
Victory Centennial Commission, State of New York
by William James Conners and George Douglas
Emerson. Albany, NY: J.B. Lyon Company,
Printers, for the New York State Perrys Victory
Centennial Commission, 1916. - Reviewed by
Harold W. Youmans
At the time of the centenary of the War of 1812 in this
country there was no parsimonious stinginess, no
hesitation, no unfunded mandates and, certainly, less
fear of our history as state after state created and
supported centenary commissions between 1910 and
1912. The State of New York created the Perrys
Victory Centennial Commission in 1913 and this
massive 300+ page book is their own monument.
Connors and Emerson were, respectively, Chairman
and Secretary of the Commission and took on the task
of assembling all things “Perry” available at the time.
There were events to be coordinated (the Niagara was
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 3, Page 24.
paying a port call at Buffalo), statute to be funded and
erected (the Perry statute at The Front in Buffalo), and
the activities of state and local veterans, womens and
African-American groups to be supported.
Historical societies, clubs, and re-enactor groups
seeking to recruit members are offered special
rates.
CURRENT ADVERTISING RATES
The most valuable part of the book are the
Appendices. Here were essays on the Battle by
leading historians, such as George Bancroft and Frank
H. Severance, and the text of commemorative
speeches and presentations.
The legislative
authorizations and proceedings are included. Find
here, too, archival data: Robert H. Barclay's Official
Report; Perry's 1814 correspondence to the New York
Legislature; muster rolls; and an excellent
biographical sketch of Stephen Champlin who as a
young officer in 1813 fired the first and the last shot
during the battle and went on to serve the United
States Navy well into the middle of the 19th century.
Research suggests that approximately 134 libraries
and repositories hold this book. The copy in your
Editor's library was formerly owned, indicates an
inscription in a soft feminine hand, by an S. T. Lewis,
from Buffalo, New York. Mrs. F. Park Lewis served
on the Women's Committee during the Centenary.
Her husband who died in 1940 was an
ophthalmologist.
Full Page: $450; $375 a time X 4 issues
Half Page: $200; $150 a time X 4 issues
1/4 Page: $100; $75 a time X 4 issues
1/8 Page: $50; $35 a time X 4 issues
Business Card Placement: $10 each, per issue
Classifieds: 25 cents per word per issue
DEADLINES
December 1 for the Winter Issue
March 1 for the Spring Issue
June 1 for the Summer Issue
September 1 for the Fall Issue
The Journal Has Renewed
Its Advertising Program
The Journal is now accepting advertising copy.
Each month more enthusiasts are being
aggressively recruited into our ranks. They know
the value of this publication and are bonded by
common interests.
Commercial vendors, museums, and parks now
have the ultimate way of reaching this readership
and we can help inform our readership of your
services and products.
If you own a business and want to reach this
readership, call: 813.671.8852 or Email the
Editor at [email protected]
The Journal thanks the Smoke and Fire News
for this exchange ad!
We will be glad to forward our media kit with our
sizes and prices to fit your business.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 3, Page 25.
STATE PROFILE: PENNSYLVANIA
ON THE EVE OF WAR
Pennsylvania in 1810 was one of the larger of the
eighteen United States: 153 miles from north to
south and 273 miles from east to west, divided at
that time politically, socially and geographically
by the Appalachian Mountains. In the eastern half
of the state, eastward flowing rivers drained good
soils. From the earliest European settlement,
those soils produced grains, vegetables and fruits.
Traveling to the interior, hills turn to mountains,
some quite rough that eventually give way to the
westward and northward flowing rivers again
watering rich productive farmlands. Its 27.2
million acres already were being brought to
productivity exceeding the standards of the day.
Philadelphia, of course, anchored the east, housed
the swaddling clothes of the republic, and served
as the capital for both the state and the nation for
some years. Pittsburgh, a village where the
“Allegheny meets the Monongahela to form the
mighty Ohio” was a respectable, growing area,
but way shy of the industrial powerhouse it was
to become.
When the 12th United States Congress convened
on March 4, 1811, all Representatives in the
Pennsylvania delegation but one and both
Senators were Democratic Republicans, if not all
Madison supporters. As the U.S. slid into war this
delegation overwhelmingly supported the move.
Within the state, too, both the Governor and the
Legislature were strongly in favor of the war.
East and west, Pennsylvanians seemed very ready
for the contest.
The son of poor German immigrants, Simon
Snyder rose to prominence in Pennsylvania and
was elected Governor in 1811, out-polling his
Federalist rival by a phenomenal 52,319 to but
3,609. He created a powerful coalition known as
the “Snyderites” and supported fully the national
administration before, during, and after the war.
He believed that his state's future was in
manufacturing and British policies were an
impediment to that development and maturation.
On April 10, 1812, Congress required states to
take effectual measures to organize, arm and
equip and to hold in readiness 100,000 militia
soldiers. The state's allocation was 14,000.
Generally governors took no action until the call
was made by the federal Department of War, but
Snyder acted quickly. Unlike his Federalist
counterparts in New England who challenged the
constitutionality of the call, Snyder acted in May
1812 to order a reorganization of the State militia
forces. He directed the State's Adjutant General,
William Read, to prepare for a call. By the time
war was declared by President Madison on June
18, 1812, Read reported he was ready. When the
call did come in August 1812, the first
contingents under the April law were ordered to
rendezvous at Meadville and Pittsburgh.
Historians characterized the Pennsylvania militia
as brave and honorable. Most were and fought
well, however, many called to service the first
year of the war refused to cross the international
border to fight in Canada. By the end of the year
it was clear that Snyder and the Legislature had
more work to do if Pennsylvania were to
effectively contribute to the war with its militia
forces.
Hard fighting was ahead. Perry at Presque Isle
and deployments to the northwest loomed in the
west in support of General William Henry
Harrison and the threats and deployments to the
coasts and in Delaware and Maryland arose in the
east. Each were to test the resolve of the war's
supporters in Pennsylvania.
References:
Victor Sapio. Pennsylvania & the War of 1812.
(Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press,
1970).
Sanford W. Higginbotham. The Keystone in the
Democratic Arch: Pennsylvania Politics, 18001816. (Harrisburg, PA: Pennsylvania Historical
and Museum Commission, 1952).
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 3, Page 26.
The War of 1812 Microscope on
The Carlisle Gazette,
Carlisle, Pennsylvania
Carlisle, Pennsylvania, was like many towns in Pennsylvania: very Republican during the years leading
to the War of 1812. It was settled in 1751 and incorporated before the end of the American Revolution
in 1782. She had been known during the Revolution as depot and was the last home of Molly Pitcher,
who was buried there, and the birthplace of future Secretary of War, John Armstrong, Jr. Carlisle
played a role in the Whiskey Rebellion in 1794, but by the eve of the War of 1812, no one expressed
the views of her citizens as well as George Kline (1758?-1820), the Republican editor of the Carlisle
Gazette.
Some of his views were cautious. Some supported and even led the local mood. Like in other
Pennsylvania towns, the Chesapeake-Leopard Affair ignited anger and further distrust of British
intentions. The Gazette in July, 1807, was reporting a growing local feeling of patriotism, loyalty and
energy in the town. The citizens, here and throughout the nation, would do what they had to do, and
Kline was in agreement with those sentiments. The Gazette approved of Jefferson's action barring
British ships from ports and harbors.
While virulent newspapers like the Pittsburgh Commonwealth openly called for annexation of Canada
in their pages published between 1807 and 1812, the Gazette was cautious. By 1809, supporting the
Madison Administration in Washington was one thing, but there was something about a war of
conquest that was not quite right. Not yet! Kline and others reported that war was coming, but in 1809
at least it was not to be fully embraced or endorsed. Slowly that view began to change.
By 1811 events on the ground had fully evolved. If Canada under the British were used as a base to
support Indian atrocities, then to continence continued British rule must be opposed, Kline reasoned.
In October, 1811, he, in the pages of the Gazette, was calling for war. Time for “forbearance and
conciliation” was over. Time for the maintenance of the nation's “honor and independence” was nigh.
Kline's drumbeat continued. Citizen meetings became more frequent and more fully attended. The
small town was in concert with its newspaper editor. Kline had supported the Embargo of 1807, calling
it a “judicious measure,” and he supported the one imposed in 1812. The 1812 Embargo was a tocsin
to the shipping interests. It was not a declaration of war, but rather it served to protect property already
in port, to warn Americans abroad to head for the safety of ports at home, and to inform foreign
powers, especially the British, that the time for redress of American grievances had come. In Kline's
view, the nation's “options” were becoming more and more “limited.”
By June, 1812, Kline, the Carlisle Gazette, and the citizens of this sleepy little crossroad town echoed
others in the state and fully supported the war policy of the Madison Administration in the War of 1812.
Maintaining the fighting spirit under the hazards and trials of war was to be for all in Pennsylvania
another matter.
Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 3, Page 27.
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Journal of the War of 1812, Volume 13, No. 3, Page 28.
Next Issue of the Journal of the War of 1812:
The Super-Frigates Prepare for War:
The U.S. Navy in 1811
Sail Plan of the USS President
(from Chapelle, The History of the American Sailing Navy (1949), p. 267)
Can you name each of the sails aboard the USS President in 1814?
Also next Quarter:
Pre-war Use of the Frigates
Secretary of the Navy Paul Hamilton
USS Chesapeake and the Gosport Shipyard
Send your questions on the Frigates
to the Editor at [email protected]
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