1–13, 2012
Forms of Government and Climate Change
Policies in US Cities
Jungah Bae and Richard Feiock
[Paper first received, November 2011; in final form, April 2012]
Abstract
It has long been believed that council-manager governments with professionally
trained public managers are more efficiency oriented and insulated from political
pressure than mayor-council governments. Despite the general acceptance of this
conventional wisdom, empirical evidence to support the predicted differences in
policy has been extremely hard to come by. Most studies have found no direct effect
of form of government on expenditures or policy; the effect of local institutions has
been indirect, working to amplify or reduce supplier or demander preferences. In
contrast, this paper examines a unique dataset of sustainability efforts in governmental operations and the community, and reports evidence that forms of government
are an important direct influence on the approach that communities take to sustainability. Council-manager government systems have a significant positive effect on
efforts directed to governmental operations, but a negative effect on community
efforts.
Introduction
For nearly a century, urban scholars and
practitioners in the US have argued that the
council-manager form of government produces greater efficiency in local government
policy and operations than the traditional
mayor-council form of government. The
application of professional management
skills to administration of personnel, management of public funds and implementation of programmes is presumed to produce
an emphasis on efficiency over responsiveness in cities with council-manager government (Ruhil, 2003; Clingermayer and
Feiock, 2001; Sharp, 1986; Dye, 1967).
Policy differences linked to professional
city management are conventional wisdom
within the city management profession, but
are less apparent to outsiders. Over the past
30 years empirical studies have found little
evidence that municipal structure is directly
Jungah Bae and Richard Feiock (correspnding author) are in the Askew School of Public
Administration and Policy, Florida State University, Bellamy Building, Tallahassee, Florida, 323062250, USA. E-mail: [email protected] and [email protected].
0042-0980 Print/1360-063X Online
Ó 2012 Urban Studies Journal Limited
DOI: 10.1177/0042098012450481
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2
JUNGAH BAE AND RICHARD FEIOCK
related to local policy and fiscal decisions
(Morgan and Pelissero, 1980; Deno and
Mehay, 1987; Campbell and Turnbull,
2003; Carr and Karuppusamy, 2010;
Karuppusmy and Carr, 2011). Instead,
existing research reports indirect or mediating effects (Lineberry and Fowler, 1967;
Sharp, 1986; Lubell, Feiock and Handy,
2009; Lubell, Feiock and Ramı́rez, 2005,
2009) but not direct effects.
This paper investigates how forms of government and community factors together
shape local government climate change mitigation efforts. We argue that energy and climate protection efforts provide an ideal
policy arena to study the policy impacts of
mayor-council versus council-manager government because these programmes can be
targeted to promote energy efficiency in
governmental operations, which aligns with
the career incentives of professional managers, or they can be targeted to residences and
business in the community, a strategy in
alignment with the incentives of elected
mayors.
Climate Policies in US Cities
In the US, as in much of Europe, cities,
rather than the national government, have
taken the lead role in promoting sustainability and reducing greenhouse gas emissions. With failed climate bills littering the
halls of the US Congress and many state legislatures, a growing number of scholars have
directed their attention to local governments’ response to climate change (Portney,
2003; Portney and Berry, 2010; Lubell,
Feiock and Handy, 2009; Krause, 2010,
2011a; Feiock and Bae, 2011; Sharp et al.,
2011; Daley et al., 2012).
Urban areas are significant contributors
to climate change and are also particularly
vulnerable to its effects. By some estimates,
more than three-fourths of global carbon
emissions come from urban areas
(Satterthwaite, 2008; Stern, 2007). Local
governments are uniquely positioned to
address a range of activities that directly
contribute to climate change, from land use
to electricity consumption. Municipal governments have tools to address energy efficiency, conservation and carbon emissions
directly through their well-established role
in regulation and service delivery. Despite
the dramatically increased reliance on local
governments to handle energy and climate
issues, we know little about which factors
account for the local adoption of sustainability programmes.
We begin to fill this lacuna by addressing
three questions. Which factors explain variation in the adoption and policy commitment of cities to climate protection? How
are actions directed to sustainability in governmental operations different from actions
directed to climate sustainability in the
larger community? How does the form of
municipal government shape the choice to
promote sustainability in government operations or in the larger community?
In answering these questions, we use the
lens of the political market in order to differentiate sustainability efforts directed to local
government operations from those directed
to the community at large as the outcome of
an exchange between government policy
suppliers and citizen and interest-group
policy demanders. On the demand side,
demographic changes, community preferences and the mobilisation of business and
environmental group support signal policy
demands for governmental sustainability
actions. On the supply side, the structure
and organisation of government and local
government institutions determine the benefits to public decision-makers from different programmes and the strategies and the
transaction costs of pursuing them (Lubell,
Feiock and Handy, 2009; Ramı́rez de la
Cruz, 2009; Sharp et al., 2011).
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FORMS OF GOVERNMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES
Targeting Governmental vs
Community for Sustainability
Policy
Sustainability has emerged as an important
issue at all levels of government and cities
are no exception. The concept of sustainability has proven difficult to define; it has
become a buzz word producing an everexpanding list of meanings (Zeemering,
2009). A diverse array of tools has been
adopted in pursuit of sustainability objectives, but extant research treats them
monolithically, rather than differentiating
specific impacts on existing programme
and constituencies.
Previous studies have examined whether
programmes are targeted to specific policy
by sectors (such as building, transport,
energy) and whether they rely on specific
policy instruments (such as regulation,
information, rebates, tax incentives). For
instance, Krause notes that any GHG-reducing policy that a municipality can undertake
has three dimensions: an emissions sector, a
target population and a policy instrument
(Krause, 2011b, p. 52). However, the choice
to target programmes to city government
operations or business and residents in the
community has not been isolated in comparative analysis.
Climate policies may be directed to inhouse governmental operations in order to
increase energy efficiency and reduce emissions from local government facilities, transport and operations. Alternatively, they can
be directed outward to promote or restrict
the actions of non-governmental actors in
the larger community. There is substantial
variation in the approach taken by municipal governments (Feiock and Bae, 2011;
Francis and Feiock, 2011; Krause, 2011b).
These differences may reflect differences in
the economic and political benefits and thus
the interested stakeholders across these two
sectors.
3
We argue that the choice to target programmes to government or the community
is an important policy dimension. For example, green building programmes can be
applied to government by requiring compliance with energy efficiency standards or certification for public buildings. They can also
be applied in the broader community by
requiring or providing incentives for energy
efficiency in permitted new development.
Programmes targeted to government are
easier in that the programmes are under the
direct control and authority of local government managers and are more easily implemented and monitored.
The benefits of governmentally targeted
programmes are more collective. Efficiencies
that significantly reduce energy costs for city
government are shared by taxpayers. On the
other hand, community programmes produce wider co-benefits from cost savings for
those who participate in them. However,
they are likely to spill over across political
boundaries, adding more complex hurdles
to pursuing those programmes targeting the
broader community (Daley et al., 2012).
Often, it is high SES individuals and neighbourhoods that capture most of the gain
(Powers et al., 1992). Alternatively, eligibility requirements for community programmes can be designed to subsidise
low-income residents or other groups and
constituencies in the community.
The importance of the distinction between
city and community targeted programmes
was reinforced in interviews with local
administrators and elected officials in several
metropolitan areas. When asked about city
sustainability policy, city managers invariably
first describe efforts to reduce energy use in
governmental operations, but mayors
describe efforts to reduce energy consumption and GHG emissions in the community
at large (Terman and Feiock, 2012).
Previous studies that construct additive
indices of overall sustainability generally do
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4
JUNGAH BAE AND RICHARD FEIOCK
a good job of capturing a diverse set of sectors, targets and instruments, but they do
not isolate this important distinction and
thus may not adequately account for how
community preferences and the incentives
of governmental decision-makers influence
strategic choice. In addition, differentiating
sustainability efforts directed to local government operations from those directed to
the community at large allows direct investigation of how the policy demands in the
political market as well as the institutional
incentives shape sustainability strategies.
Political institutions structure these
exchange relationships and the distribution
of policy benefits across different types of
interest-groups and policies (Lubell, Feiock
and Ramı́rez, 2005, 2009). The following
section provides a theoretical framework to
examine both sustainability policies directed
to local government operations and those
directed to behaviour in the wider community to identify how the council-manager
form of government influences responsiveness to policy demand and supply.
Form of Government: Motivations,
Incentives and Constraints
Local government structure in the US
reflects a configuration of institutional
provisions in municipal charters as has
been emphasised in recent scholarship
(Frederickson and Johnson, 2001; Svara
and Nelson, 2008; Carr and Karuppusamy,
2009; Karuppusamy and Carr, 2011).
Nevertheless, form of government has traditionally been thought to be more fundamental to municipal structure than other
charter provisions (Kemp, 1999). The form
of government—typically either an elected
mayor-council structure with an elected
mayor as a chief executive or a councilmanager structure with a professional manager hired by the elected council—is the
platform upon which the other institutional components are built (see Svara and
Nelson, 2008).
Mayor/council cities are based on the
separation of powers model of the US federal
government and the form divides political
authority between executive (mayor) and
legislative (council) branches of city government. Council/manager governments, in
contrast, consolidate political power in a
single branch and the city council collectively hires a professional administrator to
manage city operations. Frederickson and
Johnson (2001) detail how, over time, communities have incrementally adapted their
charter provisions to existing conditions.
Nevertheless, the mayor-council versus
council-manager platform suggests fundamental differences in the motivations and
incentives of local executives. Karuppusamy
and Carr (2011) argue that the distinction
indicated by the two forms is the extent to
which the institutional structure of the government fragments or consolidates political
authority. Because their career goals depend
on support from political constituencies,
elected mayors will at times have incentives
to pursue short-term political gain in their
policy choices (Frant, 1993, 1996; Feiock
et al., 2003; Zhang and Feiock, 2010).
Schneider et al. (1995) found that,
depending on the electoral constituencies,
mayor-council government produces both
pro-growth and anti-growth entrepreneurship in the community. Clingermayer and
Feiock (2001) describe directly elected executives as full-time politicians attuned to
political credit claiming opportunities and
thus having incentives to cultivate political
support among local residents and businesses. Elected executives may be especially
sensitive to how governmental programmes
influence electoral support. Thus, mayors
are cast as more supportive of environmental consituencies and less concerned
with operational efficiency in government
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FORMS OF GOVERNMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES
(Clingermayer and Feiock, 2001; Lubell
et al., 2005).
Appointed managers in council-manager
systems have been demonstrated to have a
stronger interest in efficiency and innovation in government operations (Zhang and
Feiock, 2010; Kearney et al., 2000; Schneider
and Teske, 1992). There are examples of
governmental efficiency oriented mayors
such as Rudy Giuliani in New York City.
Nevertheless, managers’ career interests and
professional norms are generally more
aligned with the promotion of efficiency,
making them receptive to policies that
might reduce operational costs in the public
sector.
Despite acceptance of this conventional
wisdom, empirical evidence to support the
predicted differences in policy is lacking.
Most quantitative analysis reports no direct
effect of form of government on expenditures or policy after controlling for community characteristics. Instead, the effect of
local institutions has been to amplify or
reduce supplier or demander preferences,
moderating supply and demand influences,
rather than directly influencing policy
(Lubell, Feiock and Ramı́rez, 2009).
What accounts for this disconnection
between practitioner experience and empirical findings? One possibility is that the measures of policy used as dependent variables in
this research—typically based on budgetary/
fiscal outcomes of cities—do not clearly align
with the efficiency vs constituency responsiveness motivations that are presumed to
underlie these differences.
The governmental vs community strategies for the promotion of sustainability
described in the previous section map more
closely to these motivations (Francis and
Feiock, 2011; Feiock and Bae, 2011). Thus,
city sustainability programmes provide an
excellent laboratory to investigate the direct
policy impacts of different form of government. City efforts to promote energy
5
efficiency provide opportunities for managers to institute internal management
reforms and to guide city councils on these
issues based on their expertise in governmental operations.
We anticipate that differences in municipal government structure will translate into
support for efficiency enhancements over
constituency service in the targeting of
public programmes under council-manager
governments and support for targeting
community constituencies over internal efficiency under mayor-council government.
Applying this proposition to the two categories of sustainability policy, we hypothesise that council-manager government will
support targeting sustainability efforts to
internal government operations and will
oppose targeting sustainability efforts to the
promoting energy efficiency in the larger
community. To test these hypotheses we
apply the political market approach (Feiock,
2006).
Energy and climate policies are modelled
as the outcome of an exchange between
government policy suppliers and community and group policy demanders. On the
demand side, community preferences are
shaped by constituency demographics and
the mobilisation of business and environmental group support that signal constituency policy demands. On the supply side,
the structure and organisation of government and local institutions determine the
benefits to public decision-makers of different programmes and strategies and the
transaction costs of pursuing them (Lubell,
Feiock and Handy, 2009; Ramı́rez de la
Cruz, 2009; Sharp et al., 2011).
Based on this discussion, the professional
socialisation of city managers and their
career incentives, the council-manager form
of government is hypothesised to produces
a bias favouring the targeting of sustainability efforts to governmental operations and
resisting efforts to direct these resources to
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6
JUNGAH BAE AND RICHARD FEIOCK
the external community. In addition to the
form of government, supply-side factors
such as the internal organisation of sustainability functions, intergovernmental competition, fiscal resources and conflicting
budget priorities are anticipated to influence governmental officials’ supply function
towards programmes targeted to government operations versus the community at
large. Central cities in metropolitan areas
are expected to be active in energy climate
actions because of their advantaged position
in the metropolitan public goods market
(Bickers et al., 2010). We also expect that
having a sustainability office will promote
energy and climate action both within and
outside government. The decisions of governmental suppliers are also shaped by fiscal
resources and competing policy priorities
(Horn, 1995).
On the demand side, both the preference
of constituents and organised interestgroups can be important. Support for environmental conservation and sustainability
has been consistently linked to population
characteristics such as population and density, higher education and socioeconomic
status, and racially homogeneous populations. With regard to organised interests,
support from business and environmental
groups is particularly salient (Feiock, 2006;
Lubell et al., 2005). The exchange relationships between governmental suppliers and
policy demands are reflected in the scope of
energy and climate action targeted to governmental operations and community at
large.
Data and Methods
The empirical tests utilise multiple data
sources. The dependent variables and several independent variables are derived from
a mixed-media national survey of cities
with populations of over 20 000 residents
conducted by the Florida State University
in 2010. The sample frame of 1180 municipalities included all 680 with populations
over 50 000 and a random sample of 500
cities with populations of 20 000–50 000
residents. The survey was implemented
with an initial Web-based survey and three
waves of a follow-up mailed survey.
City managers and chief administrative
officers (CAOs) were the initial contacts for
the survey. A 57.5 per cent response rate
was obtained, with 679 returned surveys.
Demographic data at the municipal level
were obtained from U.S Census Bureau
sources, 2000 and 2007. Institutional and
structural data for local governments come
from various volumes of the International
City Management Association (ICMA)
Municipal Yearbook, the 2006 ICMA Form
of Government Survey and the US census.
The dependent variables are based on
counts of the number of specific
energy/climate issues that each respondent
jurisdiction ‘‘officially addresses through
regulation or policies as it relates to government facilities and the community at
large’’. The questionnaire asked respondents about the following 13 items: green
buildings; retro-fitting existing buildings
for energy efficiency; alternative transport
systems; green procurement; technology
innovation/demonstration projects; energyefficient devices (appliances, lighting, etc.);
energy-efficiency systems (building controls, etc.); inventory of greenhouse gas
emissions; renewable energy; smart grid/net
metering; alternative fuels; incorporating
energy use in land use decisions; providing
information about efficiency to employees/
residents. For each item, the respondents
identified both whether the issue was
addressed for government facilities and
operations, and addressed for the overall
community. Figure 1 reports the percentage
of cities addressing each of these issues for
governmental facilities and for the
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FORMS OF GOVERNMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
7
In-House
Community-Wide
Figure 1. In-house vs city-wide sustainability policy adoption.
community. Generally, cities address
these issues more often in governmental
operations.
We also operationalise the supply and
demand factors defined earlier. On the
supply side, we include indicators of local
government structure and organisation. The
form of municipal government structure is
coded 1 for council-manager and 0 for
mayor-council or other structure. Because
city managers are presumed to be efficiency
oriented, we expect council-manager government to be related to sustainability in
governmental operations more than in the
community. Administrative organisation
for energy and climate policy is measured as
a dummy variable indicator of whether the
city has an office of sustainability or not.
Separate sustainability offices are anticipated to increase adoption of climate innovation in government and the community.
Advancing energy priorities may be difficult
in cities where a central department is not
responsible for developing, articulating and
implementing plans.
Central cities’ position in local markets
for public goods is likely to support sustainability efforts generally. The central city in a
metropolitan area is positioned to respond
to competition from surrounding governments and also to have opportunities for
collaboration and policy learning that are
expected to enhance climate innovation. In
addition, survey measures of specific obstacles to sustainability such as costs/lack of
funds and competing budget priorities are
examined. These survey indicators of perceived barriers to city energy and climate
action allow us to measure the degree to
which fiscal constraints influence local climate protection efforts. Table 1 reports variable descriptions for the dependent variables
as well as the demand- and supply-side factors included in the analysis.
Next, we attempt to capture demandside measures of issue salience and preferences related to sustainability, including
measures of population and density as well
as racial heterogeneity (proportion of population non-Hispanic White) and per capita
personal income. These community characteristics have been linked to environmental
protection in previous research (Lubell
et al., 2005). In addition, we include survey
measures of support for sustainability goals
by several key stakeholders collected in the
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8
JUNGAH BAE AND RICHARD FEIOCK
Table 1.
Variable descriptions
Description
Dependent variables
Governmental sustainability
Community sustainability
Independent variables
Supply-side factors
Council-manager government
Separate sustainability office
Lack of funds
Conflict with other budget priorities
Central city
Demand-side factors
Public support
Business group support
Environmental group support
Personal income
Population
Population density
Non-Hispanic White
Sustainability issue salience
Count of sustainability policy tools targeted to
governmental operations
Count of sustainability policy tools targeted to the
community at large
Dichotomous variable: 1 if the city has a council-manager
form of government and 0 if the city has a mayor form of
government
Dichotomous variable: 1 if the city has a separate
sustainability office and 0 if not
The five-point Likert scale (from 1 = not an obstacle to
5 = substantial obstacle)
The five-point Likert scale (from 1 = not an obstacle to
5 = substantial obstacle)
Dichotomous variable: 1 if the city is central and 0 if not
The five-point Likert scale (from 1 = strongly oppose to
5 = strongly support)
The five-point Likert scale (from 1 = strongly oppose to
5 = strongly support)
The five-point Likert scale (from 1 = strongly oppose to
5 = strongly support)
Per capita personal income 1999
Total city population in 2000
Population per square mile in 2000
Total non-Hispanic White population in 2000
The four-point Likert scale (from 1 = not very important to
4 = very important)
survey. The levels of opposition or support
from these groups is measured with a fivepoint Likert scale ranging from strongly
opposed to strongly supportive for the general public, the chamber of commerce and
environmental organisations. The survey
measures ‘‘group support or opposition to
energy conservation and climate protection
efforts’’. We expect citizens to be an important factor in both community and governmental models. We also expect community
and group support to positively influence
sustainability efforts in both sectors. Table 2
reports descriptive statistics for the dependent variables as well as the demandand supply-side factors included in the
analysis.
Results and Findings
Table 3 reports the results from the estimation of Poisson event count regression
models for the number of sustainability
tools applied both to governmental
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FORMS OF GOVERNMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES
Table 2.
Descriptive statistics
Variables
Mean
S.D.
Governmental operation
Community at large operation
Council-manager government
Separate sustainability office
Lack of funds
Conflict with other budget priorities
Central city
Public support
Business group support
Environmental group support
Per capita personal income
Population
Density
Non-Hispanic White
Issue salience
6.271
3.638
0.623
0.252
3.845
3.252
0.348
3.877
3.779
4.315
842.26
342.87
266.63
616.39
2.492
3.880
3.318
0.485
0.435
1.137
1.200
0.477
0.758
0.799
0.965
357.996
675.1
814.435
663.1
0.819
Table 3.
9
22
99
3
55
8
357
2
128
Minimum
0
0
0
0
1
1
0
1
1
1
9 462
13 856
11.3047
908
1
Maximum
77
8 008
26
2 801
13
13
1
1
5
5
1
5
5
5
092
278
403.01
995
4
Poisson regression estimates of sustainability policy tool adoptions
Governmental operation
(n = 479)
Independent variables
Community at large operation
(n = 477)
Supply-side factors
Council-manager government
Separate sustainability office
Lack of funds
Conflict with other budget priorities
Central city
0.089**
0.234***
20.031
20.020
0.047
20.105**
0.124**
20.013
20.069***
0.004
Demand-side factors
Public support
Business group support
Environmental group support
Per capita personal income
Population
Density
Non-Hispanic White
Issue salience
Constant
0.039
0.075***
0.004
0.083
0.089*
0.048*
20.027
0.137***
20.776
0.102**
0.113***
20.000
0.007
0.063**
0.047
20.062
0.219***
21.180
Log likelihood
Regression R2
21375.59***
0.22
21281.71***
0.17
Notes: * p \ 0.10; ** p \ 0.05; *** p \ 0.01 (two-tailed).
operations and to business and residences
in the larger community. Poisson regression
is used to estimate the equations because
the outcome variables, the number of sustainability issues addressed, are event
counts with a skewed distribution (King,
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10
JUNGAH BAE AND RICHARD FEIOCK
1988). No evidence of overdispersion was
observed in the estimations.
The results provide support for our political market explanation and for a number of
the specific hypotheses. The first column of
Table 3 shows the results from the Poisson
estimation of the number of sustainability
tools in governmental operations. The
second column shows the estimation results
for the number of sustainability tools
directed to the community at large. These
results indicate that several factors positively
influence the number of sustainability
actions in both policy arenas, including
having a separate sustainability office, business group support, population and issue
salience. These relationships are each consistent with our political market explanation.
Even more outstanding are the points of
divergence between sustainability efforts in
government and in the community.
Consistent with our expectations, we find
strong support for our key supply-side
factor, the form of municipal government
influence on the targeting of sustainability.
It is not just the magnitude of the effect
that is different, the sign actually reverses.
Council-manager government has a significant positive effect on the expected number
of sustainability tools that are directed to
governmental operations and also has a significant negative effect on communitybased sustainability efforts. In other words,
managers are more likely than mayors to
promote policies to reduce operational
costs in the public sector and are less likely
to accommodate community and interestgroup demands. The implications of these
effects are addressed in the discussion that
follows.
Overall, the factors that explain sustainability in government operations are different from those that explain communitywide efforts. On the supply side, in
addition to form of government, conflict
with other budget priorities reduces the
number of community efforts. On the
demand side, public support for sustainability influences community but not governmental programmes and the influence
of population density is confined to governmental operations.
Discussion
This analysis extends the political market
framework and confirms its utility for investigating local government policy decisions
relating to sustainability. Both supply and
demand factors are important to the scope
and target of local sustainability efforts. On
the supply side, we report clear policy differences linked to council-manager government. In addition, having a separate energy
office is related to more policy actions
regardless of government operations or the
community. Neither central-city location
nor lack of funds influences either approach
to sustainability, but conflict over budget
priorities substantially influences the
number of sustainability tools addressing
community issues.
On the demand side, problem severity as
reflected by issue salience and population
exhibits a positive relationship consistent
with expectations and previous findings.
Public demand and support influence sustainability in the community at large and
business group support increases policy
actions in both government and the community. Where business was more supportive of sustainability, local governments
directed more efforts to reducing carbon
emissions in governmental as well as residential and commercial operations. Where
business is less supportive of sustainability
goals, fewer policy efforts were reported.
The importance of business support to both
community programmes and governmental
operations may reflect their direct stakes in
each of these arenas.
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FORMS OF GOVERNMENT AND CLIMATE CHANGE POLICIES
Our two central findings—that form of
government has different effects and
that different factors explain sustainability
in government and the community
operations—have potentially important
implications both for advancing the role of
institutions within a political market
approach to local policy, and for our understanding of local energy sustainability. The
existing literature has combined together,
rather than differentiating, sustainability
programmes directed to government and
the community. Our findings suggest that
these are two fundamentally different
approaches. Different policy actors define
sustainability in differing ways consistent
with their backgrounds and socialisation
(Ramı́rez de la Cruz, 2009; Zeemering,
2009). The study of local-level policy and
programme design needs to take into
account the different perspectives and constituencies for actions across different policy
arenas and how they may align with institutional incentives and the professional and
political motivations of decision-makers.
Finally, it has long been believed that
council-manager governments with professionally trained public managers are more
efficiency oriented and insulated from
political pressure. In spite of this conventional wisdom, confirmatory evidence has
been limited and scarce. Previous research
emphasises the mediation and moderation
effects rather than the direct influence of
structure on outcomes. Instead, we report
the direct evidence that council-manager
government has a significant direct positive
effect on sustainability directed to governmental operations and a significant negative effect on community-based efforts.
This result might have practical implications for efforts to bolster the rationale for
council-manager government and responding to efforts to abandon this form of government in favour of the mayor-council
form (Keene et al., 2007).
11
Previous work demonstrates that political
institutions structure these exchange relationships and the distribution of policy benefits across different types of interest-groups
and constituencies (Lubell, Feiock and
Ramı́rez, 2009). By differentiating sustainability efforts directed to local government
operations from those directed to the larger
community, we are able to test more directly
whether local policy commitments are
shaped by institutional differences in government structure that distribute benefits
differently to elected officials and appointed
administrators. This suggests that theories
of local governments and political markets
need to focus on the alignment of costs and
benefits not just to policy demanders, but
also directly to the actors responsible for
supplying public programmes.
Funding Statement
This project was supported by the IBM Center
for the Business of Government and the National
Science Foundation under grant SES-0943427.
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