Airspeed Velocity of an Unladen Swallow When Rabbi Jeremiah met his holy grail Rabbi Neil Janes bBava Batra 23b Translation Notes A YOUNG PIGEON WHICH IS FOUND ON THE GROUND WITHIN FIFTY CUBITS FROM A COTE BELONGS TO THE OWNER OF THE COTE; IF FOUND BEYOND FIFTY CUBITS FROM THE COTE, IT BELONGS TO THE FINDER. IF IT IS FOUND BETWEEN TWO COTES IT BELONGS TO THE ONE TO WHOSE COTE IT IS NEARER. IF IT IS EXACTLY MIDWAY, THEY MUST SHARE IT. This is the mishnah that the gemara is going to interpret. Baba Batra, Chapter 2, deals with property and the need to ensure that one’s use of it does not damage another’s property. The mishnah here is connected to the preceding one, which included the need for a dovecote to be situated in a space where there are fifty cubits of free space on all sides. הבבלי ניפול הנמצא בתוך חמשים.'תני חוץ,אמה ־ הרי הוא של בעל השובך מחמשים אמה ־ הרי הוא של מוצאֹו קרוב לזה ־,נמצא בין שני שובכות מחצה על, קרוב לזה ־ שלו,שלו .מחצה ־ שניהם יחלוקו Cubits: A cubit is the length from one’s elbow to hand, which is about 50cm. Diagrams of the cases in the Mishnah: 1) Case 1: The bird is found within a 50 cubit radius of the dovecote. 50 cubits The bird is returned to the owner of the dovecote. Case 2: The bird is found outside a 50 cubit radius of the dovecote. 2) 50 cubits The bird is can be kept by the finder. Airspeed Velocity of an Unladen Swallow Rabbi Neil Janes The Lyons Learning Project 3) Case 3: The bird is found closer to one dovecote than another. 50 cubits 50 cubits The bird is returned to the nearest dovecote. 4) Case 4: The bird is found halfway between two dovecotes. 50 cubits 50 cubits The bird is split between the two owners of the dovecotes. The Talmud continues: GEMARA. R. Hanina says: If a case can be decided one way on the ground of majority and another way on the ground of nearness, we decide on the ground of majority. And although the plea of nearness equally with the plea of majority derives its warrant from the Scripture (Exodus 23:2), yet the plea of majority carries greater weight. R. Zera questioned this. Scripture tells us, “And it shall come to pass that the city nearest unto the slain man . . . [shall bring a heifer].” (Deuteronomy 21) that is to say, even though there are other towns [in the vicinity] with a larger population? We assume that there are none. But [if majority is the decisive factor] why not take the biggest town anywhere? Scripture speaks of a town surrounded by mountains. lyonslearning.org.uk Rabbi Hanina sets up the two halakhic principles which will be of interest to the gemara. The principle of ‘nearness’ and of ‘majority’. These are really measures of probability. Each can be used to determine, for example, ownership of lost property. Does it belong to the nearest owner or the owner with the most number of the lost items. Rabbi Hanina argues that where the two principles can be applied the preference is for the plea of the majority, even though they are both in the Torah. רוב: אמר רבי חנינא.'גמ Rabbi Zera disagrees with Rabbi Hanina. He argues this by demonstrating that there is a case in the Torah which supports his view (from Deuteronomy 21:3). This is the case of a person who is found murdered in the open and the identity of the murderer is unknown - the town which is nearest must make atonement for the murder. According to Rabbi Zera this implies that the principle of ‘nearness’ is preferred to that of ‘majority’. The response by the anonymous voice of the gemara is, “there are none’. There are no towns with a larger population, hence the case is not one in which a conflict between nearness and majority is present. The situation is challenged again, by asking why not go after the majority found in the world. The reply given is that the town is isolated. Rashi interprets this to mean that there is no route for a murderer to come to the town. Therefore, whereas the case may have been thought to be one where nearness is favoured over majority, it is not. Rather it is just a case of nearness. ) (דברים כ"א:מתיב רבי זירא 2 ,וקרוב ־ הולכין אחר הרוב דאורייתא דרובא ואע"ג אפילו הכי,וקורבא דאורייתא .רובא עדיף והיה העיר הקרובה אל החלל ־ ואע"ג דאיכא אחריתי דנפישא וליזיל בתר רובא.מינה בדליכא ִ .דעלמא ביושבת בין ההרים ִ @lyonslearning Airspeed Velocity of an Unladen Swallow Rabbi Neil Janes The Lyons Learning Project In the Torah: Commandments found in the Torah, described in that way by the sages, are known as de-Oraita. De-Oraita is an aramaic word which means ‘of the Torah’! Not all commandments are de-Oraita, some are de-Rabbanan - these are commandments that are ‘of the Rabbis’. The Principle of Majority: The use of the majority/nearness principles are heuristics for calculating probability. The principle of majority is preferred in halakha and can be seen at work in the following case: If a town contained a majority of kosher butchers, let us say 9 out of 10 butchers are kosher, and a piece of meat is found in the street outside the one unkosher butcher, is the meat considered kosher? The answer is yes; because the majority of butchers are kosher the meat which is found is assumed to be kosher too. We learnt: A YOUNG PIGEON WHICH IS FOUND ON THE GROUND WITHIN FIFTY CUBITS OF A COTE BELONGS TO THE OWNER OF THE COTE; and this even though there may be a bigger cote in the neighbourhood? We assume that there is not. If that is so, then what of the next clause: IF FOUND BEYOND FIFTY CUBITS FROM THE COTE, IT BELONGS TO THE FINDER? Now if there are no other cotes in the neighbourhood, there can be no question that the bird comes from this one? Our Mishnah speaks [in the first clause] of a bird which can only hop. Since Mar Ukba has laid down that a bird which can only hop does not go further than fifty cubits. R. Jeremiah raised the question: If one foot is within fifty cubits and the other beyond. How do we decide? It was for this that they threw R. Jeremiah out of the Beit Midrash. The gemara now returns to the mishnah, as indicated by the words ‘We learnt’ ()תנן. Having established that majority is preferred to a plea of nearness (see above), the mishnah seems to decide on the basis of nearness. Therefore the question, “though there may be a bigger cote in the neighbourhood,” is an ‘attack’ on the previous conclusion that majority is favoured over nearness. Once again the response to the challenge is that there is no bigger dovecote in the area, hence the ruling on the basis of nearness is fine. In response to this answer a new challenge is levelled. If there are no other dovecotes in the area then there can be only one owner, whether within 50 cubits or beyond 50 cubits. The response to this challenge is to perform a chiluk, to differentiate between the case at the beginning of the mishnah, ‘Within 50 cubits’ and the later case, ‘Beyond 50 cubits’. The ‘Within 50 cubits’ case refers to a bird which can only hop (not fly), and the maximum distance it can hop (according to Mar Ukba) is 50 cubits. The case of ‘Beyond 50 cubits’ concerns a bird which can fly, hence it follows after the majority of the world, not the nearest dovecote. Finally, Rabbi Jeremiah asks the pivotal question. If one foot is inside 50 cubits and one outside 50 cubits how do we decide? (Either how do we decide who is the owner or how do we decide what kind of bird it is?) ניפול הנמצא בתוך חמשים:תנן אמה ־ הרי הוא של בעל השוב ֹך ואף מיניה ִ על גב דאיכא אחרינא דנפיש חוץ: אימא סיפא, אי הכי.בדליכא מחמשים אמה ־ הרי הוא של מוצאֹו ודאי מההוא נפ ִל הכא,ואי דליכא דאמר רב,במאי עסקינן ־ במדדה כל המדדה ־ אין:עוקבא בר חמא .'מדדה יותר מנ ' רגלו אחת בתוך נ:בעי ר' ירמיה אמה ורגלו אחת חוץ מחמשים מהו? ועל דא אפקוהו לרבי,אמה .ירמיה מבי מדרשא Chiluk: There are a number of techniques used by the sages to resolve challenges to their arguments. A challenge is called a kushya and a resolution is called a terutz. One way of resolving a kushya is to argue that there are two different scenarios being talked about - one argument is about oranges and the other about apples. This is a chiluk because it splits the argument and allows for a resolution to be found. Beit Midrash: The history and reality of the Beit Midrash in the rabbinic period is not entirely clear. A Beit Midrash means a House of Study, or perhaps House of Inquiry. lyonslearning.org.uk 3 @lyonslearning Airspeed Velocity of an Unladen Swallow Rabbi Neil Janes The Lyons Learning Project The isolated dovecote and the Talmudic chiluk: The Talmud describes a completely isolated dovecote, so that there is only one dovecote from which a bird within 50 cubits could come. Therefore, the bird must be returned to the owner of the dovecote: 50 cubits However, if the dovecote is isolated, why should we not return a bird found beyond 50 cubits to the owner of the dovecote, rather than let the finder keep it? 50 cubits The answer is, according to the Talmud, that they are two different birds: In the first case, the bird is a young chick, only able to walk, and could not hop further than the 50 cubits. On the other hand a bird beyond 50 cubits is a bird that can fly and could have come from far away. 50 cubits 50 cubits Rabbi Jeremiah wants to know: What if one foot was beyond the 50 cubit distance from the dovecote and one foot within? Who gets to keep the bird and what kind of bird is it anyway? For this, he is thrown out of the study hall. lyonslearning.org.uk 4 @lyonslearning Airspeed Velocity of an Unladen Swallow Rabbi Neil Janes The Lyons Learning Project Sages in the text: There are two general periods in rabbinic literature, they have an internal consistency to the text. The first is the Tannaitic period: the tannaim are the sages of the mishnaic period (approx. 0-200CE). The second period is the Amoraic period: the amoraim are the sages of the Talmud (approx. 200-500CE). Rabbi Hanina: Is an early Amora (first generation of Amoraim) who was a student of Rabbi Judah Ha-Nasi and taught in Sepphoris. He studied in Babylonia and then came to Palestine. Rabbi Zera: There are two Rabbi Zeras, but this is most likely the older of the two, who was the teacher of Rabbi Jeremiah. He is about two generations after Rabbi Hanina. Also came from Babylonia to Palestine. Mar Ukba: Again there were two Mar Ukbas! Both were exilarchs (head of the exiled community in Babylonia). Rabbi Jeremiah: Originally came from Babylonia and was a student of Rabbi Zera. He became the authority of the community in Tiberias. What was the problem with Rabbi Jeremiah? (according to medieval commentaries) Rashi (11th Century) . שהיה מטריח עליהם- ועל דא אפקוהו “For this they threw him out” - because he was wearisome for them. Tosafot (commentaries after Rashi including Rashi’s grandson) אין לפרש משום דבעי מילתא דלא שכיחא כלל דהיכי איתרמי דרגלו אחת תוך חמשים ורגלו.על דא אפקוהו לרבי ירמיה מבי מדרשא אחת חוץ לחמשים בצמצום דהא אשכחנא דמתניתין נמי בכהאי גוונא איירי דקתני מחצה על מחצה יחלוקו ונראה לרבינו תם דמשום :הכי אפקוהו משום דמדדה אינו מדדה כלל יותר מחמשים אמה אפילו רגלו אחת דכל מדות חכמים כן הוא “For this they threw R. Jeremiah out of the Beit Midrash” - This cannot be explained because his question is about a case that does not generally happen. For how could it happen that one foot was within fifty cubits and one foot outside fifty cubits? With a narrowing of the case, for we have also found this in our mishnah according to the example dealing with, “if half and half, they split it.” For Rabbenu Tam it seems that they threw him out because a ‘hopping bird’ is not able to hop more than fifty cubits not even one foot. For all the measurements of the sages are so. Hyam Maccoby - from ‘The Day God Laughed’ Maccoby quotes the following: ‘Rabbi Aha ben Jacob said: Rabbi Zera never laughed in his life, and even Rabbi Jeremiah failed to make him laugh.’ (B. Niddah 23a) “The great scholar Isaac Halevi in his Dorot Harishonim tried to argue that all Rabbi Jeremiah’s questions were meant seriously, being intended to attack the Sages’ methods of fixing limits and measures. Significantly, however, Halevi makes no reference to the last-given instance above, or to the comment of Rabbi Aha ben Jacob... The trouble with Rabbi Jeremiah was that he was an ultra-rationalist, who could not bring himself to accept the element of arbitrariness in human affairs. His teacher, Rabbi Zera, tried to reconcile him to the fact that rules have to be precise, even though no reason can be given why the line is drawn precisely at this point. Rabbi Jeremiah was eventually accepted back in the House of Study, and, in time became a great authority. lyonslearning.org.uk 5 @lyonslearning Airspeed Velocity of an Unladen Swallow Rabbi Neil Janes The Lyons Learning Project Alan Dershowitz - from ‘The Genesis of Justice’ Pages 4-5 If a skeptical student asked a question outside of the canon, the teacher had a ready response: “If your question were a good one, the rabbis before you, who were so much smarter than you, would have asked it already. If they did not think of it, then it cannot be a good question.” The teachers even had an authoritative source for their pedagogical one-upmanship. The Talmud recounts the story of the great teacher Rabbi Eliezer, who was teaching the following principle: If a fledging bird is found within fifty cubits [about seventy-five feet] … [of a man's property], it belongs to the owner of the property. If it is found outside the limits of fifty cubits, it belongs to the person who finds it. Rabbi Jeremiah asked the question: “If one foot of the fledging bird is within the limit of fifty cubits, and one foot is outside it, what is the law?” It was for this question that Rabbi Jeremiah was thrown out of the house of study. I would occasionally ask impertinent questions that got me tossed out of class. I remember upsetting a teacher by asking where Cain's wife came from, since Adam and Eve had no daughters. A classmate was slapped for wondering how night and day existed before God created the sun and the moon. My teachers dubbed these questions klutz kashas-the questions of a “klutz,” or ignoramus. But I persisted in asking them, as did many of my classmates. I continue to ask them in this book. Re-reading the text: An interesting question to ask ourselves is why, on this discussion in particular, does the text tell us that Rabbi Jeremiah was thrown out of the Beit Midrash? Couldn’t it be that there were other occasions when Rabbi Jeremiah was more irksome? After all, as Tosafot point out, the case that Rabbi Jeremiah describes is almost identical to one already found in the mishnah - so why throw him out now? The argument of Rabbi Jeremiah is one of reductio ad absurdum - he takes the arguments of the text, which already seem a little absurd, to the end point - thus demonstrating the inherent problem. What’s so bad about that? Perhaps if we read the text as a literary work it might make additional sense... 1 Rabbi Jeremiah’s question is about a bird which is straddling a boundary; a boundary which, within the world of the sages, is not arbitrary but determinative of two different birds. 2 Rabbi Jeremiah is, on the one hand, arguing his case from within the world view of the sages- using their own methods against them. On the other hand he is challenging the world view of the sages by trying to demonstrate the fallacy of their measurements. In effect, Rabbi Jeremiah straddles the boundary between the sages’ world view and that of the ‘outside’ world. 3 From the sages’ perspective, the bird must be either a ‘hopping bird’ or a bird that flies. As the Ritba points out - if it has one leg over the fifty cubits then it cannot be a hopping bird. Similarly, from the sages’ perspective, a person can either accept their world view or not. You cannot straddle one foot in and one foot out. 4 Consequently, just as the bird must be one or the other, so too Rabbi Jeremiah must either be in or out. Since he has a foot over the line he must be fully out - and that is why they throw him out. Monty Python’s ‘Holy Grail’ (further proof they were influenced by the Talmud!) Bridgekeeper: What... is the air-speed velocity of an unladen swallow? King Arthur: What do you mean? An African or European swallow? Bridgekeeper: Huh? I... I don't know that. [he is thrown over] lyonslearning.org.uk 6 @lyonslearning
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