0
Summer Frost
A Natural Hazard with Fatal
Consequences in Preindustrial Finland
Timo Myllyntaus
Finland is a country with four distinct seasons. Temperate green sum
mers offer a pleasant counterbalance to brisk white winters. The Gulf
Stream and North Atlantic Drift provide this variable and habitable
climate, although nearly a quarter of Finland’s territory lies north of
the Arctic Circle and Helsinki is the second nortFfernmost capital after
Reykjavik. The Barents Sea and the Siberian tundra separate Finland
from the Pacific Ocean, and that vast landmass exerts a continental
influence on the Finnish climate. Snow covers the country at least
three months of the year. The Finns are accustomed to cold, snow,
and ice during wintertime. For example, a temperature of —30 degrees
Celsius (—22 degrees Fahrenheit), as the Finns have had during the past
few winters, does not mean a catastrophe.
% There are, however, limits to resisting cold. While people can
survive extended periods of bitter cold, nature cannot. Because Fin
land is situated at the northernmost edge of the boreal (or subarctic)
zone, where forests can exist and crops can be cultivated, the growing
season is the shortest possible in what are considered normal years.
In such extreme circumstances, even mild weather disturbances may
seriously damage harvests. Historically such disturbances occurred
fairly often.
Coming at a critical point in the agricultural cycle, summer frost
has traditionally been the most dreaded environmental hazard for the
Finns. One frosty night can destroy the entire harvest, In southern and
77
78
TIMO MYLLYNTAUS
central Finland, May through early June and the last week of August
to about September 6 (that is, planting time and harvest) have tended
to be the periods of highest risk. During harvest time, atmospheric
pressure frequently rises and heat evaporates from the soil very rapidly
overnight.’ Despite its potentially severe consequences for human
communities, night frost is a natural phenomenon that seldom has
any decisive, long-term impact on Nordic ecosystems. It is interesting
that the Finnish term for summer frost—kesähalla—does not sound as
frightful as its English counterpart, killing frost.
On September 3, 1867, night frost struck in eastern Finland.
2 The
following night the temperature fell below zero degrees Celsius (0°C)
throughout the country, and the next two nights were also icy cold.
3
Nearly green spikes of barley became covered with white frost or ice.
That frost devastated the last hope of the Finns, who had already en
dured hard times for several months. The preceding spring had been
exceptionally cold. In May ice had still covered the northern part of
the GuM of Bothnia, making it possible to cross the Baltic Sea from
Vaasa to Umeâ in Sweden by means of horse-drawn sledges. Ice melted
from Lake Pielinen only on June 23, six weeks later than usual. In the
nineteenth century, snow and frozen earth generally melted in central
Finland by early May, and after that farmers could begin to prepare the
soil for cultivation. In contrast, plowing and sowing were impossible
in 1867 until early June. People hoped then that the summer would
be warm and last until September. Instead the night frosts came early.
Temperatures in September were below average, and a premature win
ter followed.
4
Because the country had already consumed its regular reserves,
the abnormal spring and summer in 1867 led to a catastrophe. The
sequence of several poor harvests and a simultaneous economic crisis
in the 1860s precipitated a famine in Finland that became the last
severe peacetime subsistence crisis in Western Europe. Between 1866
and 1868, roughly every twelfth Finn died of malnutrition and related
diseases or distress. The Irish famine historian Cormac 0 Gráda has
compared the Finnish case to three other major European calamities:
famine in France between 1693 and 1694, the “Big Winter” there from
1708 to 1709, and the Great Famine of Ireland from 1846 through
1852. All of these crises began with weather- or fungus-induced crop
failures that resulted in a tremendous drop in annual harvests and a
corresponding rise in food prices.
5
Even more striking is the fact that a long series of Finnish fam
ines is practically unknown among historians in other countries. This
series includes dozens of crop failures, listed in table 3.1, and at least
SUMMER FROST
79
one Finnish famine clearly surpasses the Great Irish Famine in terms
of both loss of life and enduring social effects. In this chapter I will ex
amine this neglected part of European history in order to analyze how
an intangible, silent natural phenomenon of such short duration could
cause such a severe calamity in a society long accustomed to coping
with subarctic weather patterns.
FREQUENCY OF CROP FAILURES
‘
Famine typically causes ancillary problems such as widespread mal
nutrition, the use of surrogate foodstuffs, chronic digestive distur
bances, infectious diseases, miscarriages, and above-average death
6 Social disruption also frequently characterizes famine periods.
rates.
Unemployment rises, poverty expands and deepens, and vagrancy
becomes common as people leave their homes in search of work and
food. Occasionally, famines have prompted crime waves, riots, or mass
7
migration.
In southern and central Europe, weather became an object of sys
tematic study in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries,
when various devices with which to measure meteorological events
were introduced and daily weather records started to be kept.
8 This
kind of activity, which was stimulated by the Enlighteiament, eventu
ally became common in the Northc countries. In the Baltic region, the
systematic documentation of weather observations began in Uppsala,
Sweden, in 1739 and, a few years later, in Turku/Abo, St. Petersburg,
and Stockholm as well. Of those early observations, the time series
compiled by the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences in Stockholm are
the most comprehensive. They include statistics on temperature, rain
fall, and other meteorological phenomena from the mid-eighteenth
century to the present.
9
In Swedish and Finnish history the Enlightenment included the
so-called Age of Utility (approximately 1719—1772), an era that em
phasized the search for economic applications of the sciences and
knowledge in general. Any scientific device, system, or principle that
could be profitably utilized was highly valued.’
0 The sciences were
expected to provide quick economic benefits. Practical knowledge was
appreciated, and it was not long before the techniques of observing and
measuring nature as well as keeping weather and agricultural diaries
diffused from universities to wider circles of society. Landlords and
clergymen began to record daily weather observations, such as sow
ing times and quantities, harvest dates and yields, in their personal
80
TIMO MYLLYNTAUS
diaries. Some of these diaries covered several decades. In addition to
practical domestic purposes, many of the diaries aimed at higher objec
tives. For example, a Finnish landlord named Herman Mjödh, whose
statistics cover the period from 1782 to 1801, attempted to test some
current hypotheses on climatic regularities. Mjödh aimed to prove sta
tistically the assertion made by experienced farmers that each decade
invariably contains two abundant crops, five moderate crops, two poor
crops, and one failure)
1
Tn 1785 similar estimates of the frequency of crop failuies were
made at the university of Turku/Aho by Pehr Adrian Gadd, a chemis
try professor who calculated that the eighteenth century had seen, on
average, two severe crop failures per decade, and the harvests in three
other years of the same ten-year period were barely enough to feed the
population. 12
At present it is possible to compile more comprehensive statistics
on crop failures in the past, although the reliability of some source
materials remains in doubt. These later figures, such as those given
in table 3.1, confirm that crop failures occurred with the approximate
frequency estimated by Gadd. In a 630-year period from 1300 to 1930,
at least 110 major crop failures occurred—that is, an average of 1.7
failures per decade. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
however, the number of crop failures rose to between 3.0 and 3.3 per
decade. Consequently, at least part of the population faced a famine
every third year during those two centuries. By contrast, weather
conditions were much more favorable in the fourteenth and twenti
eth centuries, which experienced only two or three peacetime crop
failures.
In the thirteenth century the European climate began to get colder
from east to west. Simultaneously, summers became wetter. In northcentral Europe and the British Isles torrential rains and floods caused
a famine between 1315 and 1322 that turned out to be the severest
of the medieval period. Historians regard this Great Famine as one of
the most catastrophic subsistence crises ever to strike northern Eu
rope. For centuries afterward it haunted the minds of Europeans, who
recalled tales of widespread starvation, violent social conflicts, tax re
volts, ruthless crimes, epidemic diseases, and terribly high mortality.
It is assumed that in northern Scotland and large parts of the Nordic
countries the famine was less severe. In Finland, as in central Europe,
famine was recorded in only one of these years, 1315.13 However, ex
tremely harsh winters were commonplace. It has been claimed that
the Baltic Sea was completely ice-bound in the years 1296, 1306, 1323,
1408, 1423, 1426, and l460. Known as the Little Ice Age, this period
SUMMER FROST
81
of cooler temperatures on the European continent north of the Alps
lasted from about 1300 to about l850.’
At the beginning of the sixteenth century, climatic conditions wors
ened from the viewpoint of agriculture. Information on crop failures
is fragmentary. For example, Finnish sources do not confirm the main
cause for crop failures in every case. The available data does, however,
indicate that frost was probably the most frequent and most undetect
able reason for crop failures. The second most common hazard was rain,
and drought ranked third. Frost was the predominant nuisance in the
seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. In contrast, torrential rains and
droughts troubled the eighteenth century far more than frost.
Poor weather in early modern times was not attributed to random
factors but to a climatic change that took place around the middle
of the sixteenth century. Especially northern Europe suffered from
chilly, rainy summers and cold winters until the mid-nineteenth
century, when the turn to a warmer climate began. The crop failures
mentioned in table 3.1 afflicted not only the countries that rimmed
the Baltic Sea but also countries to the south. While crop failures also
occurred in other countries, the weather-induced misfortunes in these
nations cannot compare with the severity of winters and the hazards
of summers in Finland, where from 1550 to 1868 the climate was most
unfavorable for growing grain.
MAJOR FAMINES
A mild period that began about 1460 ended in the mid-sixteenth
century, and during the next hundred years the climate was mainly
continental throughout almost the entire temperate zone of Europe.
Winters were chilly and windy, snow cover was thick, and glaciers
began to advance. By the mid-seventeenth century the glaciers reached
their widest spread in both Iceland and the Alps.’
6 Climate historians
have estimated that in the Nordic countries average temperatures dur
ing the years from 1560 to 1600 were 1.5 degrees lower than tempera
tures from 1880 to l930.’ The Little Ice Age had reached its climax.’
8
Throughout this coldest era (1560—1600), climatic disturbances tended
9
to be regional and the worst were usually limited to northern Europe.
However, two extraordinarily cold decades from 1590 to 1610 seem
to have taken place with synchronized cycles on the hemispheric and
even global scale.
°
2
In Finland, summer frosts began to occur more frequently from
the very beginning of the seventeenth century. In the late 165 Os, har
82
TIMO MYLLYNTAUS
vests in four separate years were damaged by night frosts. However,
the misfortune was even worse in the 1 690s, when frost-induced crop
failures took place nearly every second year. The Late Maunder Mini
mum (LMM) from 1675 to 1715 was one of the harshest periods in the
recent history of climate in northern and central Europe. Throughout
Europe north of the Alps a long, cold, dry winter in 1695 was followed
by a chilly, wet summer when it snowed in June as far south as Lem
21 In Finland, grain fields were
berg (present-day Lvov) at latitude 500 N.
sown in late June—that is, more than a month later than usual—and in
August, night frosts destroyed the half-ripe rye. The year 1696 was also
exceptional. Lakes thawed as early as February in some places, and in
Stockholm grass was already growing long when a cold spell suddenly
occurred in March. Lakes froze over again and the tender seedlings of
a new crop were devastated. A second crop, sown after the cold spell
ended, had not yet ripened by the time severe night frosts began on Au
gust 7. Famine broke out in several countries around the Baltic. Starving
people ate cats and dogs, and there were even a few incidents of can
nibalism. As a result of poor harvests in three successive years—l 694,
1695, and 1696—mortality in Finland from 1696 through 1697 exceeded
the normal rate by roughly 117,000; roughly 2.3 percent of the total pop
ulation—which, including the Käkisalmi province, was approximately
22
a half million people—died during this two-year period.
In relative terms, this subsistence crisis was the worst in Finnish
history, and it took nearly six decades for the country to regain its pre
crisis population.
Tn 1700, long before the kingdom had had time to recover from
this catastrophic crisis, the Northern War broke out between Sweden
and Russia. Misery worsened when frequent rains ruined harvests
from 1704 through 1708. The last of these years was the worst. Wet,
unfavorable weather damaged the autumn sowing and night frost de
stroyed the spring sowing. The Big Winter of 1708—1709 was bitterly
cold throughout Europe, making the lives of people who were already
starving even worse. It was the severest winter of the past five centu
ries (l500—2008).
The Finnish winter of 1740 was cold, and it was followed by the
coldest spring and summer of the eighteenth century; in fact, the
spring of that year was the coldest of the past five hundred years in all
of Europe.
25 For a period of twenty-one months from December 1739
to September 1741, bizarre climatic conditions prevailed across the
European continent, causing what became known in the British Isles
as the Great Frost, which is claimed to have turned Ireland into an
26
Arctic country.
SUMMER FROST
Table 3.1:
Malor Crop Failures in Finland, ISOO—1899
1500—1599
1600—1699
1527
1529
1542
1543
1544*
1545
1551
1570
1571
1580
1587
1589
1595
1596
1597
1598
1600*
1601*
1609
l20
1630
1631
1632
16330
1700—1799
134
1635*
1638
j4
1649
1650
1655
1656*
1657*
1669*
1670*
16720
1673o
16740
1675
1676
1678
1685
1687
1688
Centenary total (96)
>
>
Failures mainly owing to
Frost* (21)
Failures mainly owing to
Rainø ((5)
Failures mainly owing to
Drought (14)
1800—1899
17040
17050
17060
17070
17080
1722
1726
1734
1740*
1808*
8I2
18210
1831
1832*
1835*
18440
J.Z4
JiJ,
18560
1857*
1862*
1867*
1878
1892*
1893*
1752
l754o
17550
.[ZZ
!Z
1766
1769
1770
l77l
1772
1774
1776
1783
1784
1785
1790
1791
1797
1692*
1694*
16950*
16 96*
>
83
I6
33
30
17
1
II
I
8
5
7
3
7
3
4
The absence of a symbol indicates that the cause of the crop failure in that year is unknown.
Sources: K. R. Melander and Gustaf Melander, “Katovuosista Suomessa,” Omo mao 5 (Porvoo: WSOY. 1924),
350—59; Jaakko Keranen, Kosvukauden säiden Jo vuodentulon keskindisestd riippuvaisuudesto m000somme vuosina
1921—I 928 (Helsinki:Taloudelllnen neuvottelukunta, 1931); Gustaf Utterstram,”Climatic Fluctuations and Popu
lation Problems in Early Modern History,’ Scandinavian Economic History Review 3, no. I (1955): 3—47.
84
1’
TIMO MYLLYNTAUS
Nineteenth-century Finland experienced several serious crop fail
ures, although the climate was warming up. Nevertheless, unfavorable
weather events occurred at least once in every thirty-year period, and
poor harvests in consecutive years led inevitably to national subsis
tence crises. The first meager harvest of the century took place in sev
eral provinces in 1807. The reduction of nutrition level was reflected
as a clear rise in the death rate of adults just a few months later. The
situation worsened the next year, when frost damaged crops in north
ern Finland. In the same year, 1808, war broke out between Sweden
and Russia, and as enemy troops began to invade parts of the country,
the food supply came under exceptional pressure. The transportation
of grain and flour from Russia helped avoid a crisis in the winter of
1808—1809. Nevertheless, the Swedish army could not defend Finland,
which in 1809 was annexed to the Russian empire as an autonomous
27
grand duchy.
Another period of miseries occurred in Finland in the early 1 830s.
Every year from 1829 through 1832 there were poor harvests, some
of which were frost-induced. When a summer frost severely damaged
the growing grain in 1832, several provinces were hit by a total crop
failure. Soon thereafter, mortality began to rise. It peaked in March
1833, when the number of deaths exceeded the average rate by a fac
28 In the same period, cholera entered the country for the
tor of four.
first time, but the death toll from this feared disease was negligible
29 Simultaneous economic stagnation and successive
by comparison.
meager harvests contributed to an acute subsistence crisis in the first
half of the decade, particularly in northern and eastern Finland. The
brisk population increase of the entire grand duchy turned to a clear
decrease with abnormally high mortality in 1833.°
The Crimean War (1853—1856) was followed by another crop
failure in the northern provinces in summer 1856, but the famine it
precipitated was less severe because farmers had some surplus grain
in their storehouses.
’ Nevertheless, only the southernmost regions
3
of the grand duchy were able to adequately feed their populations. In
1857 a summer frost ruined the rye crop in the central regions from
Ostrobothnia to the eastern border. Because of successive poor har
vests, the grain reserves of all provinces were gone by the spring of
1858. Insufficient food production, dire poverty, and almost chronic
nutritional stress elevated mortality rates in the spring of 1855, 1856,
1857, and 1858. However, the peak in the death rate during that pe
riod occurred in early autumn 1857. Epidemics of such diseases as
consumption, malaria, and measles increased the mortality among
32
children and the elderly.
SUMMER FROST
85
The next decade again started with harsh weather, and the crop
failure of 1862 is attributed to frost. The summer of 1866 produced a
very bad harvest, which resulted in depletion of grain reserves, espe.
cially in rural areas. Snow cover during the winter of 1866—1867 was
extraordinarily thick, and that spring was unusually cold. In Helsinki
the mean temperature in May of 1867 was only +1.8°C, seven degrees
below the average temperature of ÷8.8°C for May during the mid-nine
teenth century. The freezing cold weather lasted until mid-June. In
St. Petersburg, that spring was the coldest of the previous 140 years.
Frequent blizzards continued into late May, and floods were common
place. Long winter and late spring not only postponed sowing but also,
owing to the lack of fodder, resulted in the starvation of many cattle
even though large numbers of them had already been slaughtered dur
ing the winter some months earlier. Slaughter was inevitable because
there were not even surplus potatoes to feed the cattle, since a rainy
33
August had damaged the previous year’s potato crop.
Night frosts of September 3—6, 1867, destroyed the entire harvest
in northern Finland, where the failure led to an enormous famine. The
situation ws worst in north-central Finland. Prior to the crop failure,
rye, the staple food of the poor, accounted for more than one half of the
total national grain output. The average yield ratio was only four or
five to one. Because the previous years had brought had harvests, gra
naries in villages were nearly empty. By Christmas, grain reserves had
been consumed and crowds of paupers had begun to flow from north to
south. The Finnish government began to construct a railway line from
Riihimãki to St. Petersburg, a project that attracted malnourished
workers from around the country with the promise of employment.
As people migrated in search of food and work, they spread epidemics,
and communities began to suffer not only from hunger and despair
but also from disease. In spring of 1868 mortality rose steeply, being
highest in the central provinces of Vaasa and Kuopio and in the remote
34 The total population declined from 1.84
northern province of Oulu.
million in 1865 to 1.73 million by 1868, a 6 percent drop, while the
35 The latter statistic reflects
number of births fell by almost a third.
the seriousness of this famine, since sharp declines in the birth rate are
36
generally considered a good indicator of malnutrition.
The next night frost to cause an environmental crisis in Finland
took place on August 31, 1892. Night frosts also occurred in the fol
lowing summer, and July 15, 1893, saw the worst summer frost in a
37 Later summer frosts, such as those in 1902 and 1923,
generation.
did not bring about any national famine, although serious local food
shortages did occur. Weather conditions improved considerably in
86
TIMO MYLLYNTAUS
the l9SOs, and owing to warmer and longer summers, the cultivation
of wheat was expanded to the northern province of Oulu. The 1940s
witnessed some harsh winters and a few droughts, but widespread
weather-induced crop failures did not occur. Bad harvests were not
rare in the second half of the twentieth century, but there were no
major setbacks in Finland’s total agricultural output. Agricultural
production was by then more diversified, exceeding domestic demand
for foodstuffs and fodder; as a result, temporary bad weather could no
longer trigger a crisis.
PEASANTS’ RESPONSES TO CROP FAILURES
Until the early years of the twentieth century, Finland remained one
of the most agrarian and poorest countries in Europe. It has been es
timated that at the beginning of the 1860s, Finland’s per capita gross
domestic product was about 25 percent below the European average.
Many farmers were living nearly in a subsistence economy; what little
surplus they produced was sold in local markets for cash that was
used to pay taxes and to purchase items they themselves could not
grow or manufacture. There were several reasons for their low yields.
The climate was unfavorable for growing grain. Farms were small and
productivity remained low. Rye was the principal crop and barley was
of secondary importance. Barley could tolerate harsher climatic condi
tions than any other sort of grain, however, and was therefore a more
widely cultivated crop in the northern provinces, such as Oulu. Oats
were also widely sown, whereas wheat was produced in much smaller
quantities and only in the southern parts of the country. The cultiva
tion of potatoes increased especially in the late eighteenth and early
nineteenth centuries. Replacing turnips, potatoes gradually became an
important foodstuff for people and a fodder for livestock. Nevertheless,
in various regions, grain output remained so modest that even in the
case of an abundant crop, it did not cover local demand. In the nine
teenth century grain imports, mainly from Russia, were an ongoing
38
necessity.
During famines, the Finns attempted to find alternative food
sources. Wild berries and mushrooms were important foodstuffs in the
late summer and autumn even in ordinary years, but in several sum
mertime crises cold weather destroyed them along with agricultural
39 Fishing and hunting intensified, although cold weather had a
crops.
negative impact on fish stocks and game as well. Only coastal regions
and archipelagos could rely on fishing, and in Lapland the herds of
SUMMER FROST
87
reindeer leveled out climatic variations. After the crop failures the
production of tar, potash, sawn timber, and handicrafts usually in
creased because country people tried to supplement their incomes by
producing and selling those items. However, the prices for these prod
ucts tended to fall as their supply increased, while the price of grain
continued to rise.
40
There were frequent shortages of fodder to feed livestock during
the winter, and undernourished cows often stopped producing milk
for several months. Bad harvests exacerbated these difficulties. When
rotten fodder made animals sick, they had to be slaughtered, which
meant that during famine years, meat was sometimes replaced by grain
as a food source.
’ For centuries, a traditional way to avoid malnutri
4
tion was to grind the inner bark of pine, known as pettu, and mix it in
with grain flour or baking bread. In addition, chaff, straw, lichen, moss,
bog arum, sorrel, clover, hay, roots, leaves, and pea and potato vines
were used to make food, at the time similar surrogates were also used
to make food elsewhere around the Baltic Sea.
42 After snowfall these
became harder to collect. The preparation of surrogate foodstuffs de
manded special skills, and their use involved various other problems.
Despite its bitter taste and poor digestibility, pettu remained the most
popular surrogate until the 1 920s; pines were available year-round and
were unaffected by sudden climatic disturbances. This indicates how
limited the Finns’ subsistence strategies were during serious famines.
FAMINE AND MORTALITY: STARVATION OR DISEASE?
Causes of high mortality during famines have been debated for a long
time. Oral tradition has reiterated that poverty and malnutrition in
creased the risk of death. It was often claimed that poor people used to
die of “hunger,” that is, the lack of proper food compelled them to eat
surrogate food, and that led to malnutrition and lowered resistance,
followed by fflness!’ Eating bread made from a mixture of grain and
pettu or straw was especially regarded as a health hazard. It has been
suggested that digestive diseases and bloody diarrhea were directly at
tributable to the consumption of surrogate foods.
45
In international terms, Finnish population records are rich and
versatile. The official national population statistics begin in the year
1749 and are generally consistent and reliable.
46 Historical source
materials thus provide a great deal of information on nineteenth
century calamities such as the Great Finnish Famine of the 1860s.
Some historians studying population records have noticed that, ac
88
TIMO MYLLYNTAUS
cording to these statistics, quite few died of sheer starvation. Instead,
disease was most often given as the cause of death. This observation
led Oiva Turpeinen to title his doctoral thesis “Was the Killer Hunger
or Disease? Years of Terror, 1866—1868,” and to argue that disease was
the primary cause of the population catastrophe that occurred in these
47 He attributes the exceptionally high mortality rates during
years.
the famine to the concomitant occurrences of crop failures, other eco
nomic misfortunes, and epidemics of lethal infectious diseases.
48
An examination of the mortality statistics of the 1860s shows
that deaths related to the famine resulted from various diseases, such
as typhus, dysentery, and pulmonary tuberculosis, as shown in table
According to these figures, “starvation” caused only two thou
sand to four thousand deaths during the famine, while an additional
ten thousand to twelve thousand, mainly children, died of “unknown”
causes. In other words, this data does not expose malnutrition as a
major cause of death. On the contrary, the principal culprit is the mys
terious disease called “typhus,” which had no clear definition. There
were three variants of this fever: typhus abdominalis or typhoid fever,
also known as enteric fever; typhus exanthematicus; and epidemic
louse-borne typhus. Medical officers rarely attempted to distinguish
between these variants, because their symptoms were so similar. In
1868, the peak year of mortality, typhus accounted for 43 percent and
dysentery for 6 percent of the total mortality among Lutherans. These
two diseases were responsible for more than half of all excess deaths,
which were estimated at 132,000 during the three famine years of 1866
through 1868.
Table 3.2: Total Number of Deaths and Deaths Due to Selected Causes in Finland between
1862 and 1870 According to the Population Change Tables (Lutheran Parishes)
‘fear
1862
1863
864
1865
1866
1867
1868
1869
1870
Total
48,639
51,556
39,914
45,743
61,894
69,774
137,720
42.474
31,071
“Typhus”
1,437
1,574
2,038
3,747
14,151
21,026
59,582
7,471
2,819
Dysentery
878
1,771
728
835
1,299
1,038
7,855
848
615
Pulmonary Smalltuberculosis pox
4,660
4,594
4,460
4,788
5,253
5,895
8,048
4,674
6,758
302
307
321
3,033
4,264
3,103
4,159
712
205
Measles
Whooping
cough
2,439
4,179
852
1,215
1,327
808
2,322
727
172
3,546
7,439
2,190
1,945
2,933
3,497
3,494
1,562
1,474
Source: Karl Pitknen, Deprivation and Disease: Mortality during the Great Finnish Famine of the 1860s (Helsinki: Finnish
Demographic Society, 1993), 70.
SUMMER FROST
89
As already noted, starvation and diseases were not mutually ex
clusive causes of death. Indeed, a certain synergy or mutuality existed
between these two factors. When a person had to face malnutrition
and infectious disease simultaneously, their combined effects might
lead to a fatal outcome.
Social turmoil is the third major factor behind exceptionally high
death rates, and the latest research stresses it as the predominant cause
for the steep rise in famine-related mortality. Unemployment and food
shortages compelled the country people, especially the landless, to
leave their homes in order to find work, a place in a poorhouse, or an
itinerant existence wandering from one farmhouse to another as beg
gars. During the worst famine from autumn 1867 to December 1868,
almost one hundred thousand people abandoned their home parishes
because of a subsistence crisis, and 20 to 30 percent of these vagrants
never returned to their communities of origin.
50
Because the crop failure of 1867 was nearly complete in the three
northern provinces, the wave of migrants moved southward.
’ In
5
1868 large numbers of vagrants, beggars, and work migrants began to
arrive in several municipalities. These were primarily communities
where the government had set up extensive construction projects
(railway, canals) to ease unemployment. Attracted by economic op
portunities, people from the countryside flooded many urban cen
ters. Similarly, parishes with poorhouses and hospitals witnessed
significant influxes of migrants. These communities experiehced far
higher death rates than neighboring municipalities. Even on their ar
rival, drifters were often in poor physical condition. Poorhouses and
other charitable facilities became crowded and could not provide ad
equate health care. As a result, sanitary circumstances deteriorated
substantially, while contacts between people increased. All these
factors promoted the spread of infectious diseases. Among ordinary
country people in Finland, typhoid fever was endemic, whereas
louse-borne typhus was obviously an epidemic disease.
52 Neverthe
less, the decisive role of epidemics cannot be confirmed by the data
because the country was not afflicted by any other epidemic with a
similar lethal impact.
While the crowds of migrants transmitted diseases along their
routes, they themselves suffered from extraordinarily high death rates.
An educated guess of some vicars is that 20—30 percent of migrants
never returned to their home parishes.
53 They had to pay the high toll
of the social upheaval and the shortage of foodstuffs. In the Finnish
context, the relationship between famine and high mortality rates
was a complex one. The three major factors—malnutrition, infectious
90
TIMO MYLLYNTAUS
diseases, and socioeconomic turmoil—ought to be regarded as inter
related causes that jointly produced the population crisis.
RESPONSES FROM THE AUTHORITIES
Prior to the famines of the 1890s, responses from the authorities re
mained rather limited. Nor did market forces manage to ameliorate
the situation. Why did crop failures so easily cause a crisis in agrar
ian Finnish society? First, in preindustrial Finland it was impossible
to predict night frosts reliably. Even today forecasting remains a very
inexact science, and weather conditions can vary dramatically within
a small area.
Second, because night frost caused damage throughout several
provinces around the country, it was difficult for authorities to
collect information and establish a comprehensive picture of the
situation. When newspapers started hiring local correspondents in
provinces, these reporters became the best source of information
for the authorities as well as the public. Newspapers were relatively
common across the country in the second half of the nineteenth cen
tury. Officially, the provincial governor was responsible for submit
ting reports on major events in his province to the governor general,
who was the tsar’s representative in Finland. Often these reports
were delayed. Provincial administrations were not very efficient in
gathering news and generating reports, nor were networks of local
officials capable of instant communication and quck reactions. In
addition, governors in the east-central and northern provinces still
relied in the 1860s on postal services to communicate with the
central government in Helsinki, because telegraph lines connected
only the major cities in the south. For example, Governor General
Platon Rokassovski read in a newspaper on October 29, 1865, that
two months earlier night frost had caused economic disruptions
and migrations to Norway, while a growing number of people had
become ill in northern Finland. The newspaper story prompted him
to request the governor of the Oulu province to send him a report
on the situation.
54
Third, a delay of two months might be decisive for the transporta
tion of emergency grain, because by November or December, ice was
already beginning to cover the coastal areas of the Gulf of Bothnia.
55 In
preindustrial times, shipping stopped altogether when sea ice formed,
and the transportation of grain in large quantities by roads was not
feasible. Later, railways solved this problem.
SUMMER FROST
91
Fourth, not only were peasants’ granaries nearly empty in autumn
1867, but the supplies in parish granaries and government storehouses
around the country were also depleted and could not provide the
amount of grain needed to avert a crisis. Several bad harvests in the
1 860s had nearly exhausted national reserves. The Great Famine was
thus the result of a cumulative series of unfortunate events over a
period of several years.
Fifth, the value of the crop failure in 1867 has been estimated at
forty-five million marks. This sum was three times more than the
government’s expected annual revenue of sixteen million marks. Fur
thermore, senator Johan Vilhelm Snellman, whose rank corresponds
to that of prime minister in modern Finland, claimed that by the end
of the year, the government had only 1.7 million marks in cash. These
figures illustrate the depth of the economic crisis. The government
had neither grain nor funds to meet the people’s needs and assuage
their despair.
56
Sixth, the government’s last resort was to apply for a loan from
abroad. It succeeded in obtaining a loan of 5.4 million Finnish marks
from the German bank of M. A. von Rothschild and Söhne. Although
this amount was transferred in late September 1867 entirely to the
relief fund, it was too small to contribute substantially to solving the
problem. Sneliman later realized that he should have asked for a big
ger loan.
57
Seventh, in the early 1860s he Finnish government was setting
up a national currency, the markka. To guarantee this reform, the
central bank limited its loans to the business sector and kept the
amount of money in circulation at a low level. Both these measures
tended to elevate interest rates. Finally, in 1865, when the mark was
tied to the silver standard, the currency was revalued by 20 percent.
Consequently, tight monetary policy and the fall of prices aggravated
the economic depression. Indebted businessmen were either unable or
unwilling to engage in large transactions, such as massive imports of
grain. A wave of bankruptcies began to rise even before the crop failure
of autumn 1867.58
The government sought to alleviate the agricultural crisis by
supplying edible and seed grain for the three northern provinces. Un
fortunately, this measure failed in part because the administration
had borrowed an insufficient amount of money from international
money markets, in part because high grain prices limited acquisi
tions, in part because Finnish merchants were unwilling to purchase
foreign grain on the senate’s terms, and in part because an early win
ter halted shipping.
92
TIMO MYLLYNTAUS
The government attempted to reduce unemployment in two ways.
On the one hand, it launched big construction projects, including a rail
way line to St. Petersburg and some canals. On the other hand, it cam
paigned for the development of peasants’ handicrafts and small-scale
industries and encouraged exportation of these products. The objective
of the latter was also to earn foreign currency for grain imports. These
aims were not achieved. As a result, the government saw the subsis
tence crisis and economic depression as inevitable. Sneilman’s cynicism
is apparent in his famous comment: “What is rotten may collapse!”
59
LESSONS OF RECURRENT FROST AND CROP FAILURES
Because frost and other weather disturbances were so frequent, one
might expect the Finns to adapt their economy to the climatic condi
tions. They had, of course, made efforts to fight back against frost.
Influenced by the theory that night frost arises from water, the Finns
began to drain marshes and lakes and to clear hilltop fields. The most
straightforward method was by burning bonfires around cornfields in
order to cover them with smoke during cold nights. These measures
could not solve the problem on a large scale, however.
Peasants planted frost-resistant strains, which helps to explain the
popularity of particular rye and barley varieties that were developed
through experimentation over several decades to withstand night
frosts. To utilize the entire growing season, farmers often sowed rye in
the autumn. In spring, rye starts growing as soon as diurnal tempera
ture rises above the freezing point. The introduction of the potato was
clearly an attempt to diversify crops, but other innovations were both
slow and modest until the late nineteenth century.
To prepare themselves for possible crop failures, peasants routinely
stored extra grain to see them through one or more growing seasons.
In the 1620s the Swedish government ordered each parish to build a
granary for the temporary storage of grain collected as a tax. From 1642
to the end of the century, the Swedish parliament discussed measures
to set up granaries in the northern provinces and mountainous areas
as a precaution against crop failures. No clear decisions were made,
although the crop failures of the 1 690s reanimated discussions. The
authorities tried to persuade farmers to build their own, self-governed
storehouses, while farmers demanded that the granaries be owned
and managed by the crown. In the 1 750s the opposition from farmers
relaxed somewhat, and dozens of parish storehouses were set up in
various parts of the country. Parish granaries were not a rule, how-
SUMMER FROST
93
ever, and even if a parish did have a granary, it did not always operate
properly. In the late eighteenth century, these granaries were criticized
for various reasons, such as a mice problem, poor storage techniques,
incompetent bookkeeping, inefficiency, and unpaid loans. 60
Between 1726 and 1809 a total of 124 parish granaries were set up
in the part of Finland that was under Swedish rule. On the eve of the
War of Finland (1808—1 8091,61 there were seventy-four granaries in the
Finnish part of the kingdom, while in the Swedish part across the Gulf
of Bothnia there were more than eight hundred. In both parts nearly
every third parish had a granary. Parishes in Finland were generally
quite large, while in Sweden they were smaller and more numerous. In
Sweden proper, however, parish granaries were much wealthier than
those in Finland. In per capita terms, granaries in Finland typically
stored enough grain for just a couple of days. During the Swedish pe
riod, parish g;anaries generally failed in their main tasks; nevertheless,
they were an important source of relief for the poor under ordinary
62 During the Russian period (1809—1917), the number of
conditions.
parish granaries more than doubled, and by 1850 the amount of grain
they stored had grown by a factor of five in per capita terms. Despite
this favorable development, these reserves were inadequate when a
major famine occurred.
63
In preindustrial Finland farmers often supplemented their income
from agricultural crops by producing tar, saltpeter, potash, boats,
ships, and various handicrafts for sale. They also cut firewood, carried
freight, and supplied hewed and sawn timber. For a minority, these
subsidiary occupations were crucial to their survival.
64
The famine of the l860s shook farmers’ confidence in grain as a
reliable crop, and the search intensified for new cultivation methods
and other means by which to earn a living. However, because grain
varieties with higher frost resistance and/or a shorter growing season
had not yet been developed, the same types of grain were planted even
after the famine. In contrast, the cultivation of potatoes expanded
after the Great Famine owing to new sorts of potato and better tilling
methods, which made it less vulnerable to weather disturbances. The
interest in husbandry had been on the rise since the crisis of the 1 830s,
and the development of dairy production accelerated considerably dur
ing the last third of the nineteenth century. By growing more hay and
clover, farmers improved their capacities to feed cattle and produce
more milk. Milk and butter were sold first to local customers and later
exported as well. As the scale of production increased, dairies were
set up and milk separators were purchased. In addition, agriculture
began to be mechanized, and the rising demand from wood-processing
94
TIMO MYLLYNTAUS
industries for timber provided both income and jobs. In short, modern
ization was considered essential for the prevention of future weather65
induced socioeconomic crises.
CONCLUSIONS
Summer frost was a constant threat to traditional Finnish agriculture.
It caused widespread damage to crops once or twice per decade on av
erage and bad harvests even more frequently. Farmers were resigned
to these setbacks because there was no realistic alternative to growing
grain. Rye and barley were the staple foodstuffs and agriculture the
foundation Qf the Finnish economy.
Historians have searched in vain for the principal cause of the
exceptionally high mortality in the Great Famines of the 1 690s and
1860s. Unfavorable weather might account for a single crop failure,
but it cannot adequately explain a long sequence of bad harvests, crop
failures, and famines. It is easy to argue that those setbacks could
have been avoided with extra investments in agriculture, more effi
cient cultivation methods, more innovative planning, and better risk
management. Many claim that agricultural backwardness must be
attributed to poverty and a lack of dynamism. However, a widespread
subsistence economy and mercantilist economic policy did not favor
reforms or encourage bold business enterprises. The lack of markets
has been cited as the main reason for economic stagnation in preindus
trial Finland. Small domestic markets and a low level of occupational
diversification were two sides of the same coin.
By the early modern period, it was clear that poor soil, adverse
climatic conditions, and primitive cultivation methods handicapped
Finland’s agricultural production and thus the Finnish economy as.
a whole. Manure was the only fertilizer and it was in short supply.
Without markets for dairy products, husbandry was unprofitable, and
the shortage of cash income discouraged making further investments
in agriculture. As a result, subsistence farmers rarely produced much
surplus grain either for storage or for the market. Most farmers could
not afford the costs and risks of storing large amounts of grain, and
they tended to underestimate the likelihood of famine. This may be
the major reason why the system of parish granaries failed. It also ex
plains why a series of two or three famines within a few years usually
exhausted the reserves of most parishes. The vicious circle of poverty
and limited economic incentives made the Finns less prepared for and
more vulnerable to famine.
66
SUMMER FROST
95
A series of bad harvests and crop failures such as the one in the
l860s compelled landowners to fire both their temporary laborers and
even their regular servants. The systems of poor relief in the parishes
of the most vulnerable areas could not cope with the steeply rising
numbers of the unemployed. When poorhouses became overcrowded,
migration and beggary were seen as the last resort. Migration pro
moted the spread of disease and increased mortality in the destina
tion areas. The toll among some well-off occupational groups, such as
medical doctors, was conspicuously high, but the death rate in towns
still remained lower than one would expect considering the heavy
concentration of migrants in these areas. Ujrban dwellers may have
67
had better immunity and other ways to avoi’d infections.
There were also hige social differences in the quantity and qual
ity of nutrition. Most landowners faced difficulties in feeding their
families. However, the landless agrarian proletariat suffered most.
While some studies claim that women are able to withstand famines
better than men, Kari Pitkänen has studied the data for several Finnish
famines of the nineteenth century without finding any consistent sex
68 His results do not support hypotheses
differences in mortality rates:
that attribute “great male vulnerability to inherent biological differ
ences between the sexes, such as men’s inferior regulation of the im
mune system or their poorer capability to resist the adverse effects of
69
food deprivation.”
Theft rates rose during the Finnish famines of the nineteenth
century, but neither in the 1830s nor in the l860s did a mob take any
action against members of the social elite or the local authorities.
In contrast to Polaiid, no revolt broke out in Finland during those
° The Irish blamed the English fQr Ireland’s Great Famine of
7
decades.
the 1840s.
’ In Finland ordinary people accused neither the Finnish
7
senate nor the Russian government. Such political tranquility in the
midst of national tragedy was extraordinary. Night frost, a frequent
natural hazard—not the public administration—was recognized as the
cause of the calamity. According to the religious interpretation, this
was how God punished the sinful. Therefore the central actors in the
disaster were God, nature, and the individual. The subsistence crisis
was viewed as having no social origins. Large deliveries of grain to
areas devastated by a crop failure had never occurred in the past and
were thus not expected during the famine of the 1860s.
From 1865 through 1867, climatic conditions in Finland, northern
Sweden, and northwest Russia were quite similar. All three areas suf
fered simultaneously from economic difficulties, crop failures, rising
prices of foodstuffs, and underemployment. Nevertheless, in Sweden
96
TIMO MYLLYNTAUS
and Russia death rates rose only modestly by comparison with the rate
72 Thus the calamity that took place in Finland cannot be
in Finland.
explained by environmental factors alone. In this particular case envi
ronmental factors interacted dramatically with nutritional, epidemio
logical, socioeconomic, and political circumstances and influences.
The Great Irish Famine writ beyond the Finnish calamity of the
in its intensity, duration, and l
ng-term consequences. In Finland,
6
860s
1
approximately 130QO0 thousand out of 1.8 million (7.2 percent) died
prematurely, while Ireland lost one million out of 8.5 million (11.8 per
cent). In Finland, the acute mortality aises of three consecutive years
peaked in one catastrophic year, whereas in Ireland above-average death
rates continued more than four years. It took Ireland more than half
a century to recover, whereas Finland regained its precrisis vigor and
population within seven years. These facts may partly explain why the
Irish famine is well known around the world while the Finnish famine
of 1866—1868 is almost unknown outside Finland.
73
The famine years of the 1860s have often been described as a turning
point in Finnish history. The severe crisis actually accelerated the col
lapse of traditional agrarian society. In contrast to Ireland, the calamity
did not prompt a huge migration from Finland, and those who survived
understood th necessity of restructuring the national economy. In other
words, the calamity precipitated deep structural changes in Finnish so
ciety and culture. An exceptionally brisk, export-led economic boom
between 1870 and 1875 supported the recovery and discouraged a mass
migration. A simultaneous rise in the birth rate quickly compensated
for the famine-related population loss. In addition, the liberalization of
economic policy intensified, and the rising nationalist movement fos
tered positive sentiments and expectatiors of a better future.
NOTES
1. Eino Jutikkala, “Maanviljelijan talous,” in Suomen taloushistoria 1,
Agraarinen Suomi, Eino Jutikkala, Yrjö Kaukiai.rien, and Sven-Erik Aström,
eds. (Helsinki: Tammi, 1980), 171—239, esp. 198.
2. Wiborgs Tidning, 71 (September 4, 1867).
3. Abo Underrätelser, 105 (September 5, 1867); Tampereen sanomat (Sep
tember 10, 1867).
4. Ismo Björn, Enon historia 1860—1967 (Jyväskylä: Municipality and par
ish of Eno, 1994).
5. Cormac 0 Gráda, “Adam Smith and Amartya Sen: Markets and Fam
ines in Pre-industrial Europe,” (2003), www.princeton.edu/rpds/seminars
/pdfs/grada_smithsen.pdf (accessed December 28, 2008), 6—8 and passim.
SUMMER FROST
97
6. Famine “is a critical shortage of essential foodstuffs leading through
hunger to starvation and a substantially increased mortality rate in a com
munity or region” (Peter Garnsey, Famine and Food in the Graeco-Roman
World. Responses to Ri9k and Crisis [Cambridge and New York: Cambridge
University Press, 1988], 10); See also Dionysios Ch. Stathakopoulos, Famine
and Pestilence in the Late Roman and Early Byzantine Empire: A Systematic
Survey of Subsstencc Crises aiid Epidemics (Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2004),
1—14.
7. Cornelius Walford, “The Famines of the World: Past and Present, I—il,”
Journal of the Statistical Society 41(1978): 433—535, and 42 (1979): 76—275.
8. D.’ S. L. Cardwell, Thrning i’oints in Western Technology (Canton,
Mass.: Science History Publications/USA, 1991), 51—57, Christian Pfister,
Wetternachhersage, 500 Jahre Kilmavaria tionen und Naturka tastrophen
(1496—1995) (Bern, Switzerland: Verlag Paul Haupt, 1999), 20—29, 38; Rudolf
Brazdil, Christian Pfister, Heinz Waimer, Hans von Storch, and Jurg Luter
bacher, “Historical Climatology in Europe—The State of the Art,” Climatic
Change 70, no. 3 (2005): 363—430.
9. Matleena Thornberg, “ilmaston-ja sadonvathtelut Lounais-Suomessa
l550-luvulta 1860-luvulle,” Turun historiallinen arkisto 44 (1989): 59—75, esp.
7 1—72, Heikki Vesajoki and Jari Holopainen, “The Early Temperature Records
of Turku (Abo), South-West Finland, 1749—1800,” in Documentary Climatic
Evidence for 1750—1850 and the Fourteenth Century, Burkhard Frenzel, Erik
Wishman, ard Mirjam M. Weiss, eds. (Stuttgart: G. Fischer, 1998), 151—62,
Anders Moberg, “Meteorological observations in Sweden made before 1860,”
in Frenzel, Wishman, and Weiss, eds. (1998), 99—120, and Pfister, Wetternach
hersage, 32—34.
10. Jan Niemelä, Vain hyodynkb tähden? Valistuksen ajan hyotyajattelun,
luonnontieteen ja talouspolitiikan suhde Pehr Adrian Gaddin elärnäntyön
kautta tarkasteltuna (Helsinid: SHS 1998), 59—72.
11. Thornherg, “Ilmaston-ja sadonvaihtelut Lounais-Suomessa,” 71—74.
12. K. R. Melander and Gustaf Melander, “Katovuosista Suomessa,” Oma
maa 5 (Porvoo: WSOY, 1924), 350—59, esp. 351.
13. William Chester Jordan, The Great Famine, Northern Europe in the
Early Fourteenth Century (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press 1988),
8, 178, Christian Pfister, “Variations in the Spring-Summer Climate of Central
Europe from the High IVUddle Ages to 1850,” in Long and Short Term Vari
ability of Climate: Lecture Notes in Earth Sciences 16, Heinz Wanner and Uirich Siegenthaler, eds. (Berlin, 1988), 57—82, together with Gudrun Kleinlogel,
Gabriela Schwarz-Zanetti, and Milène Wegmann, “Winters in Europe: The
Fourteenth Century,” Climatic Change 34, no. 1 (1996): 9 1—108.
14. Gustaf Utterström, “Climatic Fluctuations and Population Problems
in Early Modern History,” Scandinavian Economic History Review 3, no. 1
(1955): 3—17.
15. P. D. Jones and R. S. Bradley, “Climatic variations over the last 500
years,” in Climate Since AD. 1500, R. S. Bradley and P. D. Jones, eds. (Lon
don and New York: Routledge 1992), 649—65, Astrid E. J. Ogilvie and Trausti
98
TIMO MYLLYNTAUS
Jónsson, eds., The Iceberg in the Mist: Northern Research in Pursuit of a
“Little Ice Age” (DZrdrecht and Boston: Kiuwer Academic Publishers, 2001);
Jurg Luterbacher, Daniel Diçtrich, Elena Xoplaki, Martin Grosjean, and Heinz
Wanner, “uropean Seasonal and Annual Temperature Variability, Trends,
and Extremes Since 1500,” Science 303 (March 5, 2004): 1499—1503; Brazdil
et al., “Historical Climatolngy in Europe—The State of the Art”; Brian Fagan,
The Little Ice Age: How Clim_ate Made History, 1300—1850 (New York: Basic
Books, 2002), 47—59.
16. Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie, Times of Feast, Times of Famine. A History
of Climate since the Year 1000 (New York: Noonday Press, 1971), 9-45, 61,
90, 95.
17. Eino Jutikkala, “Ilmaston muutokset ja historia,” in “Pane leipaan puo
let p&tä jaistä “—Nälkä—-/a pulavuodet Suomen historiassa, Petri Karonen, ed.
(Jyvaskyla: University of Jyvaskyla, 1994), 18—19.
18. ljtterström, “Climatic Fluctuations and Population Problems in Early
Modern History,” 24—25; Eino Jutikkala, “Ilmaston muutosten vaikutuksia
Pohjoismaiden väesto—ja asutushistoriaan,” Societas Scientiarum Fennica,
Vuosikfrja, ser. B, 51.7 (1974): 3—12.
19. Pfister, Wetternachhersage, 78—197, 206—7, 210—12.
20. Fagan, The Little Ice Age, 50.
21. Christian Pfister, “Spatial Patterns of Climatic Change in Europe
1675—1715,” in Climatic Trends and Anomalies in Europe 1675—i 715: High
Resolution S1?atiotemporal Reconstructions from Direct Meteorol.ogical Ob
servations and Proxy Data. Methods and Results, Burkhard Frenzel, Christian
Pfister, and Birgit Gläser, eds. (Stuttgart: C. Fischer, 1994), 287—317 J. Luter
bacher, R., Rickli, E. Xoplaki, C. Tinguely, C. Beck, C. Pfister, and H. Wan
ner, “The Late Maunder Minimum (1675—1715)—A Key Period for Studying
Decadal Scale Climatic Change in Europe,” Climatic Change 49, no. 4 (2001):
441—62.
22. The Käkisalmi province was annexed to the Swedish kingdom in the
peace treaty of Stolbova in 1615, and at the end of that century it was still
regarded as a triumphal region by Finns and Swedes.
23. Eino Jutikkala, “The Great Finnish Famine in 1696—97,” Scandina
vian Economic History Review 3, no. 1 (1955): 48—63; Ilkka Mantyla, Kru
unu ja alamaisten nälkä: 1690—luvun katovuosien verotulojen vahennys
Pohjanmaalla ja esivallan ‘vastatoimenpiteet, Scripta historica XIII, Acta
societatis histnricae Ouluensis (Kuusamo: Historical Society of Oulu, 1988),
117—18; Seppo Muroma, Suurten kuolovuosien (1696-169 7) väestonmenetys
Suomessa (Helsinki: Societas Historica Finlandi, 1991), 175—80; The Eco
nomic History of Finland, Historical Statistics, Kaarina Vattula, ed. (Helsinki:
Tammi, 1983), 17.
24. Melander and Melander, “Katovuosista Suomessa,” 356—57; Ladurie,
Times of Feast, Times of Famine, 92—93; Luterbacher et al., “European Sea
sonal and Annual Temperature Variability,” 1499—1503.
25. Luterbacher et al., ‘European Seasonal and Annual Temperature Vari
ability,” 1499—1503.
SUMMER FROST
99
26. David Dickson, Arctic Ireland: The Extraordinary Story of the Great
Frost and Famine of 1740—41 (Belfast, Ireland: White Row Press, 1997),
11—16.
27. Gunnar LindstrOm, “Hätavustus vuosina 1808 ja 1809,” Historiallinen
Aikakauskirja 2 (1904): 77—83; James H. Mielke and Kari J. Pitkänen, “War
Demography: The Impact of the 1808—09 War on the Civilian Population of
Aland, Finland,” European Journal of Population 5 (1989): 373—98.
28. V. F. Johanson, Finlands agrarpolitiska historia: En skildring av det
finlansla lanthrukets ekonomiska hetingelser, vol 1, fran 1600-talet till or
1870, Lantbruksvetenskapliga samfundets i Finland meddelanden, häfte 13
(Helsingfors: [Suomen maataloustieteellinen seura], 1924), 88—91; Kaisa Kau
ranen, Rahvas, kauppahuone, esivalta: Katovnodet pohjoisessa Suomessa
1830—luvulla (Helsinki: SHS 1999), 29—37; Kari Pitkänen, “Famine Mortality
in Nineteenth-Century Finland: Is there a Sex Bias?” in Famine Demography:
Perspective from the Past to Present, Tim Dyson and Cormac 0 Gráda, eds.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 65-73.
29. Bertel von Bonsdorff, The History of Medicine in Finland 1828—1918
(Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica 1975), 81—82.
30. Oiva Turpeinen, Naläntorjunta ja hyvinvointivaltion pen.lsteet: Hal
unto ja kansalainen Suomessa 1808—1905 (Helsinki: Hallintohistoriakomitea
and VAPK-kjstannus, 1991), 44.
31. Johanson, Finlands agrarpolitiska historia, 103—8; Santeri Seppalä,
“Nälànhiitãã kilrsivän väestön huoltoa tarkoittavasta toiminnasta Laihi
alla 1850- ja 1860-luvuilla sattuneina katovuosina,” Valvoja-Aika 6 (1928):
300—311.
32. Ernst Brydoif, “Sverige and Finland under Nödvintern 1856—57,” Nord
isk tidskrift for vetenskap, konst och industri (n.s.) 20 (1944): 416—27; Johan
son, Finlands agrarpolitiska historia, 102—9; Pitkänen, “Famine Mortality in
Nineteenth-Century Finland,” 72—73.
33. Melander and Melander, “Katovuosista Suomessa,” 358.
34. Antti Hkkinen, “On Attitudes and Living Strategies in the Finnish
Countryside in the Years of Famine 1867—68,” in Just a Sack of Potatoes?
Crisis Experience in European Societies, Past and Present, Antti Häkkinen,
ed. (Helsinki: Societas Historica Finlandiae, 1992), 149—52; Kari J. Pitkänen,
Deprivation and Disease: Mortality during the Great Finnish Famine of the
1860s (Helsinki: Finnish Demographic Society, 1993), 81—89.
35. The Economic History of Finland, Historical Statistics, Kaarina Vattula,
ed. (Helsinki: Tammi, 1983), 17—19, 38—39.
36. John D. Post, Food Shortage, Climatic Variability, and Epidemic Dis
ease in Preindustrial Europe (Ithaca, N.Y., and London:. Cornell University
Press, 1985); John Walter and Roger Schofield, Famine, Disease and Crisis
Mortality in Early Modern Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1989); Lucile F. Newman, ed., Hunger in History: Food Shortage, Poverty, and
Deprivation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990); Tim Dyson and Cormac
O’Grada, eds., Famine Demography, Perspective from the Past and Present
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
—‘
100
TIMO MYLLYNTAUS
37. Melander and Melander, “Katovuosista Suomessa,” 359.
38. A.rvo Soininen, Vanha maataloutemme: Maatalous Ia maalousvaesto
Suornesa perinnäisen maita1ouden loppukaudella 1 720-luvulta 18 70-luvu lie
(Helsinki: Societas Historica Fin1andi 1974), 166—73, l85 Jutikkala, “Maan
viljelijàn talous,” 188—92.
39. Even in quite normal years, a cold period in June could seriously damage
the coming berry harvest.
40. Antti Häkkinen, Vappu Ikonen, Kari Pitkãnen, and Hannu Soikkanen,
Kun ha7la nalan tuskan toi: Miten suomalaiset kokivat 1860-luvun nälkävuo
dat (Porvoo: WSOY, 1991), 64—68, 116—19.
41. Jutikkala, “Maanviljelijän talous,” 200—202.
42. Ingvar Svanberg and, Marie C. Nelson, “Bone Meal Porridge, Lichen
Soup, or Mushroom Bread: Acceptance or Rejection of Food Propaganda in
Northern Sweden in the 1860s,” in Just a Sack of Potatoes?, Häkkinen, ed.,
119—47.
43. Antti Häkkinen, “Kuolema tulee jäkäläleiwästà!’ Htaravinto,
jäkalaleipavalistus ja sen vastaanotto,” in Häkkinen et al., Kim halla nalän
tuskan toi, 91—113.
44. Kari Pitkänen, “Miten kansa kärsi? ‘Ruumiita kuin puita pinossa’—
Kuoleman satoisat vuodet,” in Häkkinen et al., Kim halla nãliin tuskan toi,
212—14. See also Post, Food Shortage, Climatic Variability, and Epidemic
Disease; and Walter and Schofield, pamine, Disease and Crisis Mortality;
Newman, Hunger in History.
45. Häkkinen, “Kuolema tulee jäkaläleiwästä!,” 91—113.
46. E. Arosenius, “The history and organization of Swedish official statis
tics,” in The History of Statistics, Their Development and Programs in Many
Countries, John Koren, ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1918); Erland Hofsten,
“Wargentin and the Origin of Swedish Population Statistics,” Journal of Of
ficial Statistrcs 4, no. 3 (1988): 261—64. See also Stein Kuhnle, “Statistikkens
historie I Norden,” in Norden forr och flu: Ett sekel i statistisk belysning, 18:
e, Nordiska statiskermotet, Nordiskt statistiskt samarbete 1889—1 989 (Stock
holm: Norstedts tryckeri, 1989), 21—48; and Pitkanen, “Famine Mortality in
Nineteenth-Century Finland,” 67—69.
47. Diva Turpeinen, Nälkä vai tauti tappoi? Kauhunvuodet 1866—1868
(Helsinki: Societas Historica Fin1andi, 1986).
48. This issue is also discussed in Climate Change, Food Production, and
Interstate Conflict: A Conference Held at the Bellagio Study and Conference
Center, Italy, lime 4—8, 1975, Rockefeller Foundation, ed. (New York: Rock
efeller Foundation, 1976); and Robert 1. Rotberg and Theodore K. Rabh, eds.,
Hunger and History: The Impact of Changing Food Production and Consump
tion Patterns on Society (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1983).
49. On average 45,780 died annually in 1860-1 864, which period included
two years of fairly high mortality. In the late 1860s, the deceased over that figure
can be regarded as “excess deaths,” The Economic History of Finland, Histori
cal Statistics, Kaari.na Vattula, ed. (Helsinki: Tammi, 1983), 17—19, 38—39.
SUMMER FROST
101
50. Kari Pitkiinen, “The Road to Survival or Death? Temporary Migration
During the Great Finnish Famine in the l860s,” in Just a Sack of Potatoes?,
Häkkinen, d., 87—118, esp. 103-5; Antti Häkkinen and Jarmo Peltola, “On
the Social History of Unemployment and Poverty in Finland 1860—2000,” in
Down From the Heaven&, Up Prom the Ashes; The Finnish Economic Crisis
of the 1990s in the Light of Economic and Social Research, Jorma Kalela,
Jaakko Kiander, Ullamaija Kivikurti, Heikki A. Loikkanen, and lussi Simpura,
eds. (Helsinki: Government Institute for Economic Research, 2001), 309—45,
esp. 310—l.
51. See Post, Food Shortage, Climatic Variability, and Epidemic Disease;
and sections in Newman, Hunger in History.
52. Kari Pitkänen pohders whether louse-home typhus was, after all, also an
endemic disease in Finland, observing that “[t]he disease may persist in jails
and prisons (‘jail fever’) even when it is not present in the population at large”
(Pitkänen, Deprivation and Disease, 72—74, 79, 93).
53. Pitkänen, Deprivation and Disease, 109.
54. Turpeinen, Nälkä vai tauti tappoi? Kauhunvuodet 1866—1868, 13.
55. Nowadays the Gulf of Bothnia as a rule starts to freeze in December,
and ice-breakers frequently manage to keep shipping routes open throughout
the winter.
56. Turpemnen, Nälkä vai tauti tappoi? Kauhunvuodet 1866—1868, 148—50.
57. Turpeineb, Nälkä vai tauti tappoi? Kauhunvuodet 1866—1868, 148-49.
58. Antti Kuusterä, “l860-luvun epäonnistunut talouspolitiikka,” in Nälkä,
talous, kontrolli: Nñl<ökuhnia kriisien ja konfliktien syntyyn, rnerkitykseen
ja kontrolliin, Kari Pitkänen, ed. (Helsinki: Department of Economic and So
cial History, University of Helsinki, 1987), 43—57.
59. V. F. Johansson, Suomen maanviljelijäin velkaantumi.nen ja toinlen
piteet sen lieventämiseksi vv. 1931—1934, Suomen maataloustieteellisen
seuran julkaistija 44 (Helsinki: Finnish Society for Agricultural History, 1941),
24.
60. Ilkka Teerijoki, Nälkävuosien tnrva? Pitäjänmakasiinit Suomessa
I 700-luvulla (Helsinki: Societas Historica Finlandi, 1993), 25—66.
61. In th War of Finland, the Swedish army failed to defend the Finnish
provinces against the attack of the Russian army. As a result, the troops of
Tsar Alexander I managed to occupy all of Finland, and the entire country was
ceded to Russia. The consequences of this event were not entirely unfavor
able; for instance, Finland gained a political status it had never enjoyed under
Swedish rule.
62. Teerijoki, Nälkävuosien turva?, 79, 107, 115—21, 204—9.
63. Teerijoki, Ndlkävuosien turva?, 206.
64. Pentti Virrankoski, Käsitöistä leivän lisää, Suomen ansiokotiteol
lisuus 1865—1 944 (Helsinki: Societas Historica Finlandi 1994); Jan Kunnas,
“En bortglomd skogsprodukt: Vedforbrukning vid tillverkning av pottaska i
Finland 1800—1908,” in Va.rna, vdrda, värdera: Miljöhistoriska aspekter och
aspekter pd zniljöhistoria, Erland Màrald and Christer Nordlund, eds. (Umeâ:
Landskapet som arena 2003), 69—75.
102
TIMO MYLLYNTAUS
65. Teppo Vihola, Leipaviljasta lypsykarjaan: Maatalouden tuotantosuun
nan muutos
1 Suomessa 1870-lu vulta ensimrnäisen maailmansodan vuoslin
(Helsinki: Societas Historica FinIandi 1991).
66. J. V. Tallqvist, “Om den inverkan av missváxterna pa 1860-talet utof
vade pa den ekonomiska foretagsamheten i landët,” in Ekonomiska Sam fun
det i Finland: Foredrag och Forhandlingar Band I, hafte 3 (Helsingfors, 1898),
50—68.
67. Karl Pitkänen, “The patterns of mortality during the Great Finnish
Famine in tcie 1 860s,” in Acta Demographica 1992, G. Buttler, C. Heilig, and
C. Schmitt-Rink, eds. (Heidelberg: Physica-Verlag, 1992), 8 1—i 02; Pitkänen,
Deprivation and Disease, 114.
68. Phelim P. Boyle and Cormac 0 Gráda, “Fertility Trends, Excess Mortal
ity, and the’ Great Irish Famine,” Demography (1986): 543—62; Alex de Waal,
“Famine Mortality: A Case Study of Darfur, Sudan 1984—5,” Population Stud
ies 43, no. 1 (1989): 5—24; Ann Bowman Jannetta, “Famine Mortality in Nine
teenth-Century Japan: The Evidence from a Temple Death Register,” Popula
tion Studies 46, no. 3 (l992: 427—43; Cormac O Gráda, Black ‘47 and Beyond:
The Great Irish Famine in History, Economy, and Memory (Princeton, N.J.:
Princeton University Press, 1999), 10.
69. Pitkänen, “Famine Mortality in Nineteenth-Century Finland,” 65—92.
70. Agathdn Meurman, Nälkävuodet 1860-luvulla (Helsinki: Kansanvalis
tuseura 1892); Antti Häkkinen, “Nälkavuosien sosiaalinen protesti” in Pit
känen, ed., Nälkä, talous, kontrolli, 69—77.
71. Cormac 0 Gráda, Ireland Before and After the Famine: Explorations
in Economic History, 1800—1925 (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
1988), ,1l0—1B; O Cráda, Black ‘47 and Beyond, 77—83.
72. Marie Clark Nelson, “The Prevention of Moral Decline. The Distribu
tion of Voluntary Contributions to the Destitute in Norrbotten following the
Crop Failures oT 1867,” in Nälkä, talous, kontrolli, Pitkänen, ed., 11-42; Marie
C. Nelson, Bitter Bread: The Famine in Norrbotten 186 7—1868 (Stockholm:
Almqvist and Wiksell International, 1988).
73. Cormac O Gráda, “For Irishmen to Forget?’ Recent Research on the
Great Irish Famine,” in Just a Sack of Potatoes?, Häkkinen, ed., 17—52.
-
Natural Disasters,
Cultural Responses
Case Studies toward a
Global Environmental History
Edited by
Christof Mauch and Christian Pfister
LEXINGTON BOOKS
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ROWMAN & LITrLEFIELD PUBLISHERS, INC.
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Copyright © 2009 by Lexinton Books
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Natural disasters, cultural responses : case studies toward a global
environmental history! edited by Christof Mauch and Christian Pfister.
p. cm.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN-13: 978-0-7391-2415-4 (cloth : alk. paper)
ISBN-10: 0-7391-2415-3 (cloth : alk. paper)
ISBN- 13: 978-0-7391-2416-1 (pbk. : alk. paper)
ISBN-iD: 0-7391-2416-1 (pbk. : aik. paper)
ISBN-13: 978-0-7391-3461-0 (electronic)
ISBN-iD: 0-7391-3461-2 (electronic)
1. Natural disasters. 2. Disaster relief. I. Mauch, Christof. II. Pfister,
Christian.
GB5014.N384 2009
2008045289
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Printed in the United States of America
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@TM
Contents
List of Figures
vii
List of Tables
ix
Acknowledgments
xi
Introduction
Christof Mauch
1
Learning from Nature-Induced Disasters: Theoretical
Considerations and Case Studies from Western Europe
Christian Pfister
2 Disaster and Political Culture in Germany since 1500
Franz Mauelshagen
3
4
Summer Frost: A Natural Hazard with Fatal
Consequences in Preindustrial Finland
Timo Myllyntaus
Society and Natural Risks in France, 1500—2000:
Changing Historical Perspectives
René Favier and Anne-Marie Granet-Abisset
1
17
41
77
103
V
CONTENTS
vi
5
6
onses
Humanitarianism and Colonialism: Religious Resp
1870
1866—
of
ine
to the Algerian Drought and Fam
Bertrand Taithe
137
gical
The Floods of Baghdad: Cultural and Technolo
Responses
Otfried Weintritt
165
ic Texts
7 Interpreting Earthquakes in Medieval Islam
Anna A. Akasoy
8
9
10
11
ine in
Famine in Bengal: A Comparison of the 1770 Fam
Bengal and the 1897 Famine in Chotanagpur
Vinita Damodaran
197
a:
“Heaven-Sent Disasters” in Late Imperial Chin
The Scope of the State and Beyond
Andrea Janku
233
Cultures of Disaster, Cultures of Coping:
ppines
Hazard as a Frequent Life Experience in the Phili
Greg Bankoff
265
nial
The Paraná River Floods during the Spanish Colo
Period: Impact and Responses
Maria del Rosario Prieto
285
of
12 Documenting Disaster: Archival Investigations
ico
Mex
nial
Colo
in
he
strop
Climate, Crisis, and Cata
es,
Davi
h
Georgina H. Endfield, Sara J.
isabel Fernández Tejedo, Sarah E. Metcalfe,
and Sarah L. O’Hara
13
183
American Disasters during the Twentieth Century:
The Case of New Jersey
James K. Mitchell
Afterword
Christian Pfister
Index
About the Contributors
305
327
355
361
379
IN II INA I kN\1. I N\ IRNM[ NI \I I
PL.IIIIL\IkN ‘I liii ( 1 R.MAN I III’.’RIL \I. INIIIL
NATURAL DISASTERS,
CULTURAL RESPONSES
—I
CASE STUDIES tOWARD A
GLOBAL ENVIRDNMEN TAL I 1ISiORX
w
q
History
•
Environmental Studies
bloods, iiiitiiies, earthquakes. and other disasters have wrought havoc throughout history. I his hook presents stud
ies ranging front litilatid to the Eli lip p nes. and front medieval tunes to the present day, to show the diversity of
huitian responses to c.itastroplie Everyone interested in the uneasy relationship between nature said culture will
want to read this book”
—J. R. MeNeili. Georgetown University
Edited by two acknowledged masters of envirotsitiental history, Christof Maoch atid Christian Pfister, this absorb—
nsg collection enriches our u oderstatiding of how huttians at different tones sod ni different places have dealt with
disasters. Unpredictable natural disasters have brought sufferitig, death, fatniiie, and disease to rich and poor, rural
atid u rha it alike. I lowever, as the expert contributors to this hook denio nstra te so persuasively its historical case
studies of catastrophes aroutid the svorld, these crises have also generated innovative sociopolitical, technological,
and economic coping strategies I los is an inforittative sod thoiight—provokiig hook tsot only for the wealth of in—
foritiation it contaitis, which coissiitiites a itiajor contribution to the growitig field of disaster studies, but also for its
tiniely pu hlica non in an era ss’li en ho tttan beings, perhaps ittore than at any other period in history, feel vulnerable
—Jane Carruthers, University of South Africa
in the face ofgrowiisg aiiiltropogetiic catastrophe.”
According to UN statistics, approxiiitately two hundred ititllioti people are directly affected every year by natural
disasters—seven times the nunther of people svho are affected by war. Discossiotis about global wartttitig and fatal
disasters such as II urr cane K ,i i r ia sod the Stimatra—Andaitian earthquake atid tssi namt of 2004 have heightened
our awareness of natural catastrophes and of their itttpact on both local and global conitnunities. I Iollvwood has
reflected this new consciousness by pradu ci no nuitierous disastet movies in recent years, several of which have
becottie blockbusters.
Tb is collection of essays testifies to the profound impact ih,it earthquakes, hurricanes, floods, and other such
events have hid on huttians throughout history ni every part of the world. Several contributors argue that the
experience of catastrophe has ch.itmged humitaits’ behavior and perceptions over tittie without iiecessarilv reducing
their degree of exposure or risk. The hook iticludes case studies froiti Western Europe. Sc,uiditi,ivi,i, Algeria. the
i\1iddl Fast, China, mdi,,. the Philipputes. ArgetitHia. Mexico. and the East Coast of the United States, rang—
mug ire ni the iii edieva I through the nioder it period. WIt i.e natural disasters occur around the globe. dtfferettt
cultures, societies. ,mtid regions hive .idoped specific itiethods and techitologies for ittanagmisg local h.iaards atid
for surviving catastrophic natural evetits I tidred. how huntans deal with catastrophes depends largely on social
and cultural patter us. valu es, belief svsi cuts, political institutiotis. and ecu nont ic structures. The roles that nit U ru
dis,isters play in society atid the itie.initlgs they are given vary froitu one politic.il atid geographic space to the
next. The essays collected here help us to uitderstand not only how people across the cetituries have leartued to
cope with disaster but also how cotuuitiutuities in different p.irts of the ssorld have developed cultural, social, atid
techtaological strategies for doing so.
CONTRIBUTORS
Anita A. Akasoy, Greg Bankoff. Vitiuta [)auiiodar,mn. S.irah J Davies. Georgutta II. Etsdtield. Retté Favier, Isabel
Eertsändez Tejedo, Atiiue—Marie ( ratiet—Ahisset. Andrea Janku. Christof M,nich. I’r,itsz M.iuelsh.igcis Sarah F. Met—
calfe. Jimmies K Mitchell, Ttnio My Ily ntaus. y,irah I. 01 lara. Christian Ptister. M,iria del Rosario Prieto. Bertrand
hmthe. Oufried Weiittritr
,
C HR ISTOF tviA U C H is the clm,i i r of N i’ rt is Amtier can history a id transatlantic relations
t.udwig—Maxmitnlians—Universitat iii Munich. Geriuu.iumy
at
the Ant erika— I uusti tot
of’
C HRISTIA N PFISTER is professor of economic, social, and ens’irotsnmental histor at the Institute of I I story. Urn—
versiry sit’ Bern. in Bert, Sss’itzerlatid,
I sir usi’ders and iiif’iiriii.itiuuii ple.isi.’ c’usitt,it tlis.’ pulslislss.’r
I EXING ION BOOKS
A sltvisisni it’ l&siw tint d I ittleliu.’Id Publishers, Inc.
45 ) I I sirbes Biiulcs’,iu’sl Suits.’ 2))))
I ,uiili,iuit, M,it’ Iiid 2)7) tO
I-hut --l(i2-(,4.2 I
svs w.ls.’\tnotiunlsuusuks.,,’,sIti
(is ci design Iss Ncil ). ( ‘snci ill
ISBN
978-0-7391-2416-)
90000
91 1,1 j JI,IJIjIIJLIJ11 1 1 1 1 uN III